Christie v Commissioner of Police
[2014] QDC 70
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- Unreported Judgment
- Christie v Commissioner of Police[2014] QDC 70
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Christie v Commissioner of Police[2014] QDC 70
Christie v Commissioner of Police[2014] QDC 70
[2014] QDC 70
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
JUDGE R S JONES
No 4527 of 2013
MICHAEL ROBERT JOHN CHRISTIE Appellant
and
COMMISSIONER OF POLICEComplainant
BRISBANE
12.32 PM, FRIDAY, 28 MARCH 2014
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR: This proceeding is concerned with an application for an extension of time for the filing of a notice of appeal to a judge of this court. If leave were granted, the appeal would be dealt with pursuant to sections 222 and 223 of the Justices Act 1886. I heard argument on this matter earlier this morning and indicated that I would give my reasons orally, after I had had some further time to consider the matter. These are my reasons.
Sections 222 and 223 of the Justices Act relevantly provide:
222 Appeal to a single judge.
(1) If a person feels aggrieved as complainant, defendant or otherwise by an order made by justices or a justice in a summary way on a complaint for an offence or breach of duty, the person may appeal within one month after the date of the order to a District Court judge.
Section 223 relevantly provides:
(1) An appeal under section 222 is by way of rehearing on the evidence (original evidence) given in the proceeding before the justices.
(2) However, the District Court may give leave to adduce fresh, additional or substituted evidence (new evidence) if the court is satisfied that there are special grounds for giving leave.
(3) If the court gives leave under subsection (2), the appeal is:
(a) by way of a rehearing on the original evidence; and
(b) on the new evidence adduced.
In The Commissioner of Police v Al Shakarji [2013] QCA 319, the Court of Appeal, after referring to the decision of the High Court in Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, said, in paragraph 7:
On such an appeal the District Court judge was required to make his own determination of relevant facts in issue from the evidence, giving due deference and attaching a good deal of weight to the Magistrate’s view.
In this application, for reasons which hopefully will become clear, there was no real challenge to the factual basis or exercise of discretion on the part of the sentencing magistrate. Instead, the challenge essentially centres around the applicant’s view that he was not subject to any statutory laws of the state of Queensland and nor was he subjected to or required to attend at any court of the state of Queensland.
The background to this application is that on the 26th of June 2013, in the Magistrates Court at Hervey Bay, the appellant was convicted of a traffic offence, namely, disobeying the speed limit. That offence occurred on 20 October 2012. The matter was dealt with in the Magistrates Court on an ex parte basis pursuant to section 142A of the Justices Act due to the applicant’s nonappearance. The fact that the applicant did not appear was not a consequence of any fault on the part of the system. In fact, the applicant was not only aware of the proceeding on that date, but was present in the court building at the relevant time. The reason for his failing to appear was that he did not consider that he was required to appear as the proceedings or the matter had been, as far as he was concerned, “settled and finalised”.
Authorised as he was, the magistrate dealt with the matter on an ex parte basis and fined the defendant $300, ordered him pay costs in the amount of $81. The offence also carried the accumulation of three demerit points. Notwithstanding the applicant’s view about the state of the law in Queensland or its applicability to him in any event, nor his views about the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court, he made it known that he did not consider himself guilty of the offence and, in accordance with provisions of the Justices Act, the Magistrate Court afforded the applicant the opportunity to be reheard and the matter was listed for rehearing on 12 September 2013.
Again, the applicant failed to avail himself of the opportunity given to him to have a rehearing of the matter heard in the Magistrates Court. Again, this was not because the applicant was not aware of this opportunity, but because he believed that he was not bound to accept the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court. To this end, he advised that court “we believe our rights would be further denied and we wish to have our matter heard before a competent jurisdiction”.
In the proceeding in this court, the applicant has filed two documents. The first is a notice of application for extension of time for filing notice of appeal. The grounds stated for the extension of time are as follows:
Ex parte – on the 26th June 2013, the matter was heard ex parte with the alleged defendant’s knowledge even though the alleged defendant was at the Hervey Bay Magistrates Court on the day but no listing (please refer to application).
In the notice of appeal number 3325 of 2013, the ground – the relevant grounds of appeal are set out as follows:
(1) Cairns Police Service served the complainant’s sworn and summons unlawfully;
(2) Defendant was not listed for hearing on the 26th of June 2013 as per the summons;
(3) Defendant’s matter was heard ex parte and without the defendant’s knowledge;
(4) Defendant settled the matter with the complaint [sic] on the 22nd March 2013;
(5) Defendant denied natural justice.
The applicant does not dispute, as far as I understand, his argument that for ordinary citizens of Queensland – by way of example, such as myself – I would be bound by the statutory laws of the state of Queensland including the relevant traffic laws in this proceeding and would be bound by the jurisdiction and powers of the Magistrates Court insofar as they have the jurisdiction to deal with speeding offences such as the type under consideration here. Further, the applicant does not contend that, in such circumstances, that is, involving an ordinary citizen of the state of Queensland, such proceedings could not be dealt with on an ex parte basis. That is, of course, clearly the case, pursuant to section 142A(4)(c) of the Justices Act 1886.
However, in the advancement of his case, the applicant contended that he was not bound by such statutory laws as he is not a citizen of the state, but merely “a human being” occupying or inhabiting an area of land named or known as Queensland and/or further, that as a “human being,” he had not contracted with or otherwise agreed to be bound by the laws of the state of Queensland. I should pause here to note that this is as best as I understand the applicant’s assertions in this regard. In this context, I also refer to paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the affidavit of the applicant. Those paragraphs relevantly state:
Affiant did not and do not, as a flesh and blood human being, consent to being bound by any statute, specifically but not limited to the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995. Affiant maintains that these so called “Acts” have not been lawfully enacted.
Continuing the quote,
Queensland Police Service is not recognised within the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) nor the Queensland Constitution, therefore, the Queensland police force is a “private corporation”.
Then continuing the quote,
Affiant has no contract or agreement with representatives or agents or principal or anyone acting on behalf of the Queensland Police Service. Affiant is not a party of the body politic or corporate.
I pause here to observe that the term “affiant” is one more commonly used in the United States of America to describe the maker of an affidavit.
Turning then to each of the grounds of appeal. Submissions were made on behalf of the applicant by his brother, Alan John Christie. In respect of ground 1, as I understand the argument, it was not contested that the complaint and summons was served in accordance with our state laws, albeit in this case by way of substituted service. Instead, the applicant relied on the fact that, as stated in paragraph 3 of the affidavit, he was not bound by any such laws of the State of Queensland and had not, again, as I understand his argument, consented to being served by way of substituted service.
Dealing with ground 2, as stated earlier, the applicant was not only aware of the hearing date on the 26th of June 2013 but was present in the court precinct, albeit not in the courtroom where his matter was being disposed of. Two reasons were advanced as to why it was unnecessary for him to appear. The first was that the Magistrate Court was not a court with the jurisdiction or power to deal with a speeding fine. Again, as I understand the applicant’s argument, this is because at the relevant time the applicant had not entered into any agreement or contract with either the state or the Queensland Police Service by which he agreed to be bound by or subject to such a legal process and/or bound by the relevant Queensland statutory laws.
The second point, which was referred to by Mr Alan Christie as being “the guts of the argument”, was that the issuing police officer had failed to “validate” the police complaint against the applicant. This requires a consideration of some of the documents contained in the applicant’s affidavit. By reference to a number of annexures, what occurred was that the applicant made a number of assertions, including those concerning his innocence, and then also a number of demands requiring, in effect, the police to produce evidence dealing with matters such as the certification of the speed measuring device used and also evidence that the device was used in accordance with all relevant training manuals.
In response to these demands, on 21 January 2013 the Queensland Police Service wrote to the applicant, relevantly stating,
I acknowledge receipt of your correspondence concerning the issue of the infringement notice and I advise that investigations will be conducted into this matter. No action need be taken to pay the penalty associated with this notice until you receive further notice.
The Queensland Police Service again wrote to the applicant on 26 February 2013. This letter relevantly said,
From the information available to me I am of the opinion that this notice was justified in the circumstances. Therefore, the infringement notice will not be withdrawn in this instance. You are again afforded the opportunity of (a) paying the prescribed penalty, (b) voluntary installment plan (if applicable) or (c) election for court.
The relevant documents annexed to the applicant’s affidavit then go on, in effect, to plead or claim that by virtue of the police failing to provide the information demanded that, in some way, the proceedings against the applicant had been compromised. For example, in annexure F it is said,
As Senior Constable Ed Gompelman and Queensland Police, being fully aware of the terms of my objection, failed to provide any documentary evidence in support of their claim within the time period specified, they have defaulted in respect of their claim and have admitted and agreed to the terms of the objection tendered. Wherefore I now in the presence of a Justice of the Peace acknowledge and accept the default by Senior Constable Ed Gompelman and Queensland Police as agreement, settlement and closure between the parties.
Thereafter there is a document headed “Notice of Private Settlement Agreement”, which relevantly asserts;
Let this serve as constructive notice that the matter between Senior Constable Ed Gompelman, Queensland Police and Michael Robert Daniel Christie, 13/35 Bruce Highway, Edmonton, has been settled and closed by the private agreement of the parties. Copies of private settlement agreement and related documents are attached in support. Interference in this private contract by any third party would constitute an unwelcome and unlawful trespass and a violation of any oath of office that such third party may be bound to uphold.
Accordingly, for the purposes of ground 2 the applicant simply did not attend the court because as far as he was concerned the matter had been compromised. Turning then to grounds 3 and 4 of the notice of appeal, the assertion that the matter was dealt with without the defendant’s knowledge is without merit. The applicant was well aware of the proceedings on that date. The point raised here is essentially the same as that dealt with above, namely, that the Magistrate Court had no power to deal with the matter in circumstances where the applicant was neither within the jurisdiction of the court and/or the court lacked jurisdiction because the matter had already been compromised by the aforesaid private agreement.
Ground 5 simply states that the defendant was denied natural justice. In circumstances where the applicant knew of both proceedings in the Magistrates Court but failed to appear for what were essentially philosophical reasons did not provide any basis, in my view, to allege that he had been denied natural justice. During argument it was conceded by Mr Alan Christie that a more accurate description of what was meant by this ground of appeal was that, again, because the matter had been settled by the private agreement to which I’ve already referred, the defendant was denied natural justice because the court did not have the jurisdiction to go behind that alleged agreement.
Turning then to the grounds set out seeking to justify the application for extension of time. Again, it was conceded that the State laws, including the relevant traffic laws and those powers under the Justices Act empowering the Magistrates Court to deal with such matters, was not in question insofar as it affected an ordinary “citizen” of the State of Queensland. But as the applicants argument went, as I understood it, because the applicant was not a citizen of the State of Queensland, in that he does reside in this State but merely inhabits an area known by that name and because he had not consented to be bound by any laws or jurisdiction of the courts of this State, the Court had erred in proceeding with the matter. Again, as I understand it, the ground for the application was to the effect that at no time did the Magistrates Court have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and therefore the matter should be dealt with in this court. In this regard, Mr Christie had some difficulty in clearly articulating how it was that this court had the power to deal with the matter when the Magistrates Court did not.
Arguments of the type raised in this matter have been raised before. I’ll refer only to two cases, Carnes v Essenberg & Ors (1999) QCA 339 and Hubner v Erbacher & Or (2004) QDC 345.
In the Queen v Tait (1999) QDR 667, cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Kobylski v Queensland Police Service (2007) QCA 50, it was said to the effect that it is relevant in applications such as this to look at both the reasons for the delay and whether it is in the interests of justice to grant the extension. The latter matter, of course, calls up the need to consider the prospects of the appeal being successful in the event that it were permitted to proceed. The appeal was filed on 2 September 2013, about one and a half months out of time.
In my view, no satisfactory explanation for the delay was advanced and in any event, any appeal on the merits would be doomed to fail. At its basic level, the whole basis for this application and the appeal is based on the notion that the applicant and others of like mind are unilaterally able to opt out of the State’s legal system including relevantly here, the relevant transport legislation and the jurisdiction and supervision of the relevant State courts. That is to unilaterally opt out of the “social contract” between the State and its citizens that allows a civilised and sophisticated society to function in an orderly and cohesive way. This can be achieved according to the applicant by purporting to renounce citizenship of any State or territory and not enter into any binding contract or other agreement to be bound by the statutory laws of the State. The notion is without merit and in my view the matters raised in the application and in the notice of appeal filed by the applicant, together with the affidavit material, raises no matter which would have any prospects of being successfully prosecuted on appeal. Clearly the learned Magistrate had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Further, on the material before the court a conviction was warranted and the sentence imposed was one clearly within range. In this context there was no serious challenge to the sentence imposed.
Accordingly, for the reasons given, the application is dismissed. There being no application for costs, there will be no order as to costs.