SPJ v Queensland Police Service
[2015] QDC 217
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- Unreported Judgment
- SPJ v Queensland Police Service[2015] QDC 217
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SPJ v Queensland Police Service[2015] QDC 217
SPJ v Queensland Police Service[2015] QDC 217
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | SPJ v Queensland Police Service [2015] QDC 217 |
PARTIES: | SPJ (appellant) v QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE (respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | 16/15 |
DIVISION: | Criminal |
PROCEEDING: | Appeal |
ORIGINATING COURT: | Magistrates Court at Beenleigh |
DELIVERED ON: | Orders delivered ex tempore on 26 August 2015 Reasons delivered 11 September 2015 |
DELIVERED AT: | Beenleigh |
HEARING DATE: | 26 August 2015 |
JUDGE: | Dearden DCJ |
ORDER: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the appellant submitted that sentencing discretion miscarried – where the sentence imposed by the learned magistrate was manifestly excessive – where the magistrate erred in sentencing the defendant under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 instead of the Youth Justice Act 1992 – where the magistrate erred in imposing cumulative probation orders on the juvenile offences – where the magistrate erred in in imposing identical sentences for each adult criminal offence – where the magistrate erred in imposing cumulative disqualification periods for the adult traffic offences |
LEGISLATION: | Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) Justices Act 1886 (Qld) Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) |
CASES: | George v Queensland Police Service [2015] QDC 163 Griffiths v R (1989) 167 CLR 372 Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 R v Bowditch [2014] QCA 157 |
R v MBQ; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2012] QCA 202 R v Nagy [2003] QCA 175 Tierney v Commissioner of Police [2011] QCA 327 | |
COUNSEL: | Mr J P Todman for the appellant. Mr D Nardone for the respondent. |
SOLICITORS: | Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant. Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent. |
- [1]This is an appeal pursuant to s. 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (“Justices Act”) in respect of sentences imposed by the learned magistrate at Beenleigh Magistrates Court on 27 May 2015 in respect of a range of juvenile offences, adult criminal offences and adult traffic offences.
Juvenile offending
Offences | Date of offence | Sentence |
Enter premises and commit indictable offence | Between 7 November 2014 and 10 November 2014 | 12 months probation & conviction recorded |
Unlawful use of a motor vehicle | Between 7 November 2014 and 10 November 2014 | 12 months probation, conviction recorded on each charge (concurrently) but cumulative on the 12 months probation order for the enter premises charge (single order) |
Unlawful use of a motor vehicle | Between 7 November 2014 and 10 November 2014 |
Adult criminal offences
Offences | Date of offence | Sentence |
Enter dwelling and commit indictable offence (burglary) | 29 November 2014 | 18 months imprisonment – parole release date 26 November 2015 (after serving six months) |
Attempted unlawful use of a motor vehicle | 29 November 2014 | 18 months imprisonment – parole release date 26 November 2015 (after serving six months) |
Enter dwelling and commit indictable offence (burglary) | 30 November 2014 | 18 months imprisonment – parole release date 26 November 2015 (after serving six months) |
Unlawful use of a motor vehicle | 30 November 2014 | 18 months imprisonment – parole release date 26 November 2015 (after serving six months) |
Enter dwelling and commit indictable offence (burglary) | 1 December 2014 | 18 months imprisonment – parole release date 26 November 2015 (after serving six months) |
Unlawful use of a motor vehicle | 1 December 2014 | 18 months imprisonment – parole release date 26 November 2015 (after serving six months) |
Enter dwelling and commit indictable offence (burglary) | 1 December 2014 | 18 months imprisonment – parole release date 26 November 2015 (after serving six months) |
Stealing | 1 December 2014 | 18 months imprisonment – parole release date 26 November 2015 (after serving six months) |
Unlawful use of a motor vehicle | 29 March 2015 | 18 months imprisonment – parole release date 26 November 2015 (after serving six months) |
Receiving tainted property | 31 March 2015 | 18 months imprisonment – parole release date 26 November 2015 (after serving six months) |
Breach of bail condition | 8 April 2015 | 18 months imprisonment – parole release date 26 November 2015 (after serving six months) |
Adult traffic offences
Offences | Date of offence | Sentence |
Driving without a licence | 4 February 2015 | Convicted and not further punished. Disqualified for 12 months. Conviction recorded. |
Vehicle used on roads must be registered | 4 February 2015 | Convicted and not further punished. Conviction recorded. |
Drive uninsured vehicle | 4 February 2015 | Convicted and not further punished. Conviction recorded. |
Driving without a licence | 1 March 2015 | Convicted and not further punished. Disqualified for 12 months (cumulative on the 12 month disqualification for the driving without a licence charge dated 4 February 2015). Conviction recorded. |
Vehicles on roads must be registered | 1 March 2015 | Convicted and not further punished. Conviction recorded. |
Drive uninsured vehicle | 1 March 2015 | Convicted and not further punished. Conviction recorded. |
Failing to wear approved motorbike helmet | 1 March 2015 | Convicted and not further punished. Conviction recorded. |
Grounds of the appeal
- [2]The grounds of the appeal are as follows:-
- (a)sentence was excessive in all of the circumstances;
- (b)sentences imposed as a child were not in line with the law.[1]
- [3]The appellant further submits that “the learned magistrate’s sentencing discretion miscarried in regards to the:-
- (a)imposition of the same penalty for all adult criminal offences;
- (b)imposition of cumulative probation orders on the juvenile offences;
- (c)length and term of the sentence imposed for the adult [criminal] offences;
- (d)cumulative disqualification periods [for adult traffic offences].”
Ex tempore orders delivered at sentence appeal hearing
- [4]The respondent, Commissioner of Police (represented on appeal by Mr Nardone), appropriately conceded that the learned magistrate had made errors of law in respect of the sentences imposed for offending committed as a juvenile, and in respect of all of the sentences imposed for the criminal offences committed as an adult, as well as in respect of the disqualification periods imposed in respect of the two charges of unlicenced driving (adult traffic offences).[2]
- [5]In summary, the respondent submitted that “as a whole, given the identified errors of law, it is conceded that the sentencing discretion miscarried and that this court [the District Court on appeal] should exercise the sentence discretion afresh.”[3]
- [6]In the light of that concession, when the matter came before me for hearing on 26 August 2015, the appeal was granted, the appellant was resentenced and I undertook to publish written reasons at a later date.
Antecedents
- [7]The respondent’s submissions usefully summarise the appellant’s antecedents as at the time of the sentence before the learned magistrate at Beenleigh (27 May 2015).
“2.1The appellant was born on 25 November 1997. He was 16 years and 11 months old at the time of the offences committed as a youth (those offences were committed about two weeks before he turned 17). He was aged 17 years and four days old to about 17 years and 4 months old at the time of the offences committed as an adult. He was still 17 years old at the time of the sentence.
2.2He had criminal history at the time he was sentenced. That history reflected appearances before the Children’s Court and Children’s Court of Queensland on seven prior occasions for a total of 44 offences. The vast majority of those offences are property or dishonesty type offending. Nine of those offences are burglary type offences and a further 19 of those offences are enter premises type offences. The applicant has on three occasions also been dealt with for violent offending (common assault in each case) and once for a sexual offence (rape committed on 18 November 2012). Those entries suggest that he commenced offending at the age of 13 years and 3 months.
2.3The applicant has in the past received the benefit of good behaviour orders, reprimands, a probation order and suffered the burden of the imposition of a term of six months detention coupled with a 12 month probation order [imposed on 23 April 2014 in the Children’s Court of Queensland at Beenleigh]. The rape offence itself was committed during the currency of the earlier imposed probation order and all of the offending the subject of this [appeal] was committed during the currency of the [detention]/probation order imposed on 23 April 2014. The first of those offences was committed (as a youth) between 7 to 10 November 2014 so about seven months into that probation order.
2.4In relation to that probation order the court was advised that as a condition of the order the applicant was to engage in psychological intervention. As a result the applicant engaged in a program on a weekly basis and ultimately on a fortnightly basis. During the period of the order, on 30 September 2014, he was found to be in breach. The breach was proven but no further action was taken. From that date to the end of the order the applicant reported on seventeen occasions and failed to attend once.”[4]
Facts of offending
- [8]
“3.1The applicant was before the [learned] magistrate in relation to 21 offences committed over a period of about five months from November 2014 to April 2015. The offending commenced with the applicant, in company, cutting the chain wire fence around a car yard. Once inside, two cars were taken and driven. One was unregistered. When interviewed, he admitted that he had the idea to engage in the unlawful conduct once he had learned that his co-offenders had keys to the cars.
3.2The next offending sees him into a house while a party was taking place and the house was not secure. A laptop computer, jewellery, electrical items and car keys were taken. The keys were [used] by the applicant in an unsuccessful attempt to take a car. He was linked to this offending though fingerprints found on the car. The next night he unlawfully entered another occupied home while the complainants slept. A handbag and its contents was stolen, including keys to the complainant’s car which were also taken from dwelling. When that car was located, fingerprints on it linked the applicant to the offending. The applicant made admissions. The day after that offence two more houses were unlawfully entered and a handbag was stolen from the first house (it was occupied at the time). Bicycles were also taken from the yard. Those bikes were then ridden to the next house from which jewellery was stolen. Car keys and a car were also taken from the dwelling. The car (a Toyota RAV4) was driven and the engine damaged so significantly that the car was written off resulting in an insurance payout of $17,392.58.
3.3The next series of offences are traffic related matters. The charges are self-explanatory, but that matters came to the attention of police after the applicant was involved in an accident when riding a motorbike. Within a month, the applicant was located again by police riding a motorbike on a road without a helmet. He attempted to ride away from police but mechanical problems foiled his efforts.
3.4On 29 March 2015, the applicant was a passenger in a stolen car that was identified by police and involved in a pursuit which involved the use of POL AIR. That car was only able to be stopped by police through the use of tire deflation devices after which the applicant was arrested in the company of others. His co-offender was just 13 years old. The next day a house was broken into and property including an iPad, jewellery and tattoo kits were stolen. The applicant came into possession of the iPad and some of the jewellery and took photos of himself with them. These photos were sent to the complainant via Facebook by a friend.
3.5The breach of bail offence relates to a failure to reside where required.
3.6It is clear from the recitation of facts put to the learned magistrate that over the period of the offending, the applicant was arrested on 6 December 2014, 4 February 2015, 1 March 2015, 30 March 2015 and 8 April 2015. 11 of the 21 offences were therefore committed while the applicant was the subject of one or more bail orders. The receiving offence was committed on 31 March 2015 which would have been the day after one of his dates of arrest.”
The law – appeals
- [9]In Tierney v Commission of Police[7]Margaret Wilson AJA stated “an appeal from a Magistrates Court to the District Court pursuant to s. 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) is a rehearing on the evidence given at trial and any new evidence adduced by leave. In other words, it involves a review of the record proceedings below, subject to the District Court’s power to admit new evidence. To succeed, an appellant needs to show some legal, factual or discretionary error.” [Citations deleted]
Discussion
Sentences – juvenile offences
- [10]The learned sentencing magistrate clearly misconstrued the provisions of the Youth Justice Act 1992 with respect to the exercise of sentencing the appellant for the three offences committed while aged 16. During the course of the sentencing submissions, the learned magistrate said to the applicant’s legal representative: “What’s your submission in relation to the juvenile offences given that I have to sentence as if he was a juvenile for those three.”[8]During the sentencing process the learned magistrate (in respect to the juvenile offences) stated: “I am required to sentence you, even though you’re an adult, in the same way that I would have done if you had been sentenced as a juvenile [indistinct] been a juvenile while you were being sentenced, I should say. For those two offences in the entering premises with intent and the two charges of unlawful use of a motor vehicle, I order you be subject to a probation order for two years. Convictions are recorded.”[9]The learned magistrate was then interrupted by the representative from Youth Justice who pointed out that: “in the Children’s Court, it can only be a maximum of one year probation order”, to which the learned magistrate responded: “then I will make two orders that are cumulative, in that case. For the entering with intent, you’re subject to probation for one year. For each of the unlawful uses, you will be subject to probation for one year to commence after the expiry of the earlier probation order… Convictions are recorded.”[10]
- [11]It is entirely unclear whether the learned magistrate was purporting to impose probation pursuant to the provisions of the Youth Justice Act 1992 or the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992.
- [12]Given that the offences of enter premises and commit indictable offence, and two charges of unlawful use of a motor vehicle were committed between 7 and 10 November 2014, those offences were committed before the appellant’s 17thbirthday (25 November 1997), and he was therefore a “child”, being “a person who has not turned 17 years” as defined in the Youth Justice Act 1992.[11]Relevantly, the offences committed by the appellant were each a “child offence”.[12]Youth Justice Act s. 134 then provides that “subject to this division, the offender must be treated as a child for the purposes of this Act in relation to a child offence committed by the offender”. Youth Justice Act s. 140 then provides for a series of exceptions governing “when offender must be treated as an adult”,[13]none of which are applicable in the current situation, where the applicant was being sentenced by the learned magistrate while still 17 (i.e. less than one year after becoming an adult).
- [13]It follows that any sentence imposed by the learned magistrate on the applicant was required to be imposed pursuant to the Youth Justice Act 1992.
- [14]Relevantly, the maximum probation order available to the learned magistrate in respect of the offences of enter a dwelling with intent[14]and unlawful use of a motor vehicle[15]was probation for one year (given that the court was not constituted by a judge)[16]and none of the offences was a “relevant offence” (i.e. an offence which would make an adult liable to imprisonment for 14 years or more).[17]
- [15]The Youth Justice Act recognises that among its principle objectives is a provision in s. 2(b) “to establish a code for dealing with children who have, or alleged to have, committed offences.”
- [16]Youth Justice Act s. 149 headed “Jurisdiction to sentence child exclusive” provides:
“(1)A court that sentences a child for an offence must sentence the child under this part.
(2)Subsection (1) applies despite any other Act or law.”
- [17]It follows that Youth Justice Act Part 7 – Sentencing (ss. 149-260) is a self-contained code with respect to the sentencing of juvenile offenders, subject to the caveat that “in sentencing a child for an offence, the court must have regard to… the general principles applying to the sentencing of all persons”.[18]The application of the general principles applying to the sentencing of all persons is, however, subject to the provisions of the Youth Justice Act.[19]
- [18]
“The [Youth Justice Act] is a code for sentencing child offenders. Its objects include ensuring that courts, in sentencing child offenders, deal with them according to principles established under the Act. A court sentencing a child for an offence must sentence the child under Pt 7 of the Act which contains the relevant sentencing principles.”[21]
- [19]Accordingly, the learned magistrate could only impose a maximum penalty on each of the three juvenile offences of one year’s probation,[22]and there is no provision in Part 7 permitting youth justice probation orders to be made cumulative. There is a provision which specifically provides for detention orders under the Youth Justice Actto be made cumulative.[23]However, there is no provision in the Penalties and Sentences Actwhich permits the making of cumulative probation orders. Terms of imprisonment pursuant to the Penalties and Sentences Act must be served concurrently unless otherwise ordered,[24]although there is a provision which specifically authorises the making of cumulative orders of imprisonment.[25]
- [20]The learned magistrate fell further into error by failing to comply with the mandated provisions of Youth Justice Acts. 194, which provides:
“A court may make a probation order against a child only if the child indicates willingness to comply with the order.”
A similar provision (differently expressed) applies to probation orders imposed pursuant to the Penalties and Sentences Act.[26]Of course, carefully taking the applicant through the requirements of a probation order pursuant to s. 193 of the Youth Justice Act might well have alerted the learned magistrate to the clear error that he fell into when purporting to impose cumulative probation orders, given that Youth Justice Acts. 193(1)(a) requires that “the child must report in person to the chief executive within 1 business day after the order is made or any longer period that may be specified in the order”. Such a provision, in the absence of any specific order by the learned magistrate, does not provide for the “report” necessary in respect of the “second” cumulative probation order.
- [21]It follows from the manifest errors of law in respect of the three juvenile offences (enter premises and commit indictable offence, unlawful use of a motor vehicle (two charges)) that the sentences imposed should be set aside and the appellant resentenced.
Sentences – criminal offences committed as an adult
- [22]The learned magistrate imposed the same penalty (18 months’ imprisonment with a parole release date set at 26 November 2015 i.e. after serving six months) in respect of all of the adult offences, which ranged in seriousness from a breach of bail condition pursuant to s. 29 of the Bail Act, constituted by failing to notify a change of address, through to five charges of burglary. The learned magistrate clearly failed to exercise any discretion as to the appropriate sentence in respect of each individual offence. As Judge Farr recognised in similar circumstances in George v Queensland Police Service[27]:
“There is no doubt that [the learned magistrate’s] approach is contrary to authority… [and] is also contrary to the provisions of s. 9(1) & (2) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992.”
- [23]It is clear that “the practice whereby a sentencing judge fixes a term of imprisonment which reflects the overall criminality of a series of offences, and imposes that penalty on the most serious offence in the series, with all other sentences to be served concurrently” is a legitimate practice[28]although Dalton J noted (obiter) that if the Griffiths approach is adopted “a sentencing judge should make the basis for the sentencing express and the sentencing remarks should show the reasoning of the court as to which sentence, or sentences, have been inflated, and to what extent, to account for overall criminality.”[29]
- [24]
“Even where the effective sentence imposed for the totality of the offences is appropriate, judges should take care to fix a proportionate sentence for each offence: Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610, 623-4, 629.”
- [25]It follows that the sentencing discretion miscarried in respect of each of the sentences imposed for the adult criminal offences, the appeal should be granted in respect of those sentences, and the appellant resentenced for each of the adult criminal offences.
Adult traffic offences
- [26]The appellant’s appeal in respect of the adult traffic offences raises no issue with the penalties imposed in respect of those offences (convicted but not further punished), save for the cumulative disqualification periods of 12 months on each of the unlicensed driving offences (total of two years disqualification).
- [27]At the time of the offences, the appellant was not the holder of a driver’s licence and each of the unlicenced driving offences was charged pursuant to s. 78(1) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (“TORUMA”).
- [28]Because each of the charges of driving a motor vehicle without a driver licence had been laid pursuant to TORUMA s. 78(1) (i.e. unlicenced driving simpliciter), consequently the mandatory provisions of TORUMA s. 78(3) did not apply. Even if those provisions did apply, the relevant mandatory disqualification period pursuant to TORUMA s. 78(3)(k) was a period of three months.
- [29]There is a discretionary power available to a judicial officer to disqualify a person from holding a Queensland driver licence pursuant to s. 187 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 which relevantly provides:
“(1)If—
- (a)an offender is convicted of an offence in connection with or arising out of the operation, or the interference in any way with the operation, of a motor vehicle by the offender; and
- (b)the court by or before which the offender is convicted is satisfied having regard to the nature of the offence, or to the circumstances in which it was committed, that the offender should, in the interests of justice, be disqualified from holding or obtaining a Queensland driver licence;
the court may, in addition to any sentence that it may impose, order that the offender is, from the time of the conviction, disqualified absolutely, or for such period as is ordered by the court, from holding or obtaining a Queensland driver licence.”
- [30]The learned magistrate’s failure to identify the basis on which he purported to disqualify the appellant for the unlicenced driving charges makes it impossible for this court, in retrospect on appeal, to identify with precision which particular error he has fallen into, although the error is manifest. If the learned magistrate was purporting to exercise the disqualification power pursuant to Penalties and Sentences Acts. 187, then he should have identified that legislative provision and called for submissions from the prosecution and the legal representative for the appellant on the issue of disqualification. A call for submissions in those circumstances might well have assisted the learned magistrate in avoiding appellable error. In any event, there is no power for a sentencing court to impose cumulative driver licence disqualifications, unless the defendant falls within the very specific provisions of TORUMA ss. 90A-90D, which are not applicable in this matter.
- [31]It follows that the learned magistrate’s sentencing discretion miscarried, given the error of law in making the disqualification periods cumulative, and accordingly the appeal should be granted to the extent of setting aside the order that the appellant be disqualified for a period of 12 months in respect of each of the two unlicensed driving offences, cumulatively, and the appellant ought to be resentenced.
Resentencing
- [32]On 26 August 2015, after granting the appeal, the appellant was resentenced as follows:
Juvenile offences
- 1 x enter premises and commit indictable offence
- 2 x unlawful use of a motor vehicle
For all three offences, a single probation order of 12 months (pursuant to s.193 of the Youth Justice Act). Defendant to report within one business day to the chief executive. No conviction recorded with respect to each offence.
Adult criminal offences
- 1 x stealing
- 1 x receiving tainted property
For both offences, a single prison/probation order of 91 days’ imprisonment and three years’ probation (pursuant to s. 93(1) of the Penalties and Sentences Act). The defendant is to report within two business days to an authorised Corrective Services officer at Logan Central. The defendant is to be subject to two special conditions:
- (1)That the defendant submit to such medical, psychological or psychiatric treatment and/or counselling and/or programs in respect of drug abuse or any other matter considered relevant by an authorised Corrective Services officer, as directed by an authorised Corrective Services officer.
- (2)The defendant shall abstain from consumption, inhalation or administration of a dangerous drug as defined in the Drugs Misuse Act1986 or other illicit substances whilst subject to this order (without lawful excuse) and undergo drug testing (including urine analysis testing) as required by an authorised Corrective Services officer and any positive test results shall be deemed contravention of the order.
- 5 x burglary
Convicted and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, suspended after serving 91 days, with an operational period of three years.
- 3 x unlawful use of a motor vehicle
Convicted and sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment to be suspended after serving 91 days with an operational period of three years.
- Attempted unlawful use of a motor vehicle
Convicted and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment to be suspended after serving 91 days with an operational period of three years.
- Breach of bail condition
Convicted and not further punished.
All sentences to be served concurrently. With respect to all prison sentences (including the prison/probation sentence), the period between 27 May 2015 and 26 August 2015 (a total of 91 days) declared time served.
Adult traffic offences
- 2 x driving without a licence
Order that the defendant be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for three months from 26 August 2015, pursuant to s. 187 of the Penalties and Sentences Act.
Costs
- [33]The applicant at paragraph 33(e) of his outline of submissions on appeal[31]sought costs of the proceedings. However, no order as to costs can be made in respect of an appeal in relation to an indictable offence that was dealt with summarily by justices.[32]Although seven of the offences subject of the appeal were summary offences, the only contest in respect to the penalty in respect of two of those offences was the relevant disqualification periods.
- [34]In those circumstances, given that no costs are able to be ordered in respect of the majority of the matters dealt with on appeal, and noting that no objection was raised by the appellant’s legal representative in the sentencing process before the learned magistrate, no order is made as to costs on the appeal.
Footnotes
[1]Exhibit 1 – outline of submissions – appellant p. 3 para 4.
[2]Exhibit 2 – outline of submissions on behalf of the respondent pp. 6-8 paras 6.1-6.12.
[3]Exhibit 2 – outline of submission on behalf of the respondent p. 8 para 6.12.
[4]Exhibit 1 – outline of submissions on behalf of the respondent p. 3 paras 2.1-2.4.
[5]T1-9 -1-15
[6]Exhibit 2 – outline of submission on behalf of the respondent pp. 4-5 paras 3.1-3.6.
[7] [2011] QCA 327, para 26
[8]T1-17.
[9]Decision p. 3.
[10]Decision p. 3.
[11]Schedule 4 – definition of “child”.
[12]Youth Justice Act s. 132 – “Child offence means an offence committed by a child”.
[13]Youth Justice Act s. 140.
[14]Criminal Code s. 421(1) – maximum penalty – 10 years imprisonment (for an adult).
[15]Criminal Code s. 408A – maximum penalty – 7 years imprisonment (for an adult).
[16]Youth Justice Act s. 175(1)(d)(i).
[17]Youth Justice Act s. 176(10).
[18]Youth Justice Act s. 150(1)(a) and see R v W, ex parte Attorney General [2000] 1 Qd R 460, 462.
[19]Youth Justice Act s. 150(1)(a).
[20][2012] QCA 202.
[21]R v MBQ; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2012] QCA 202, para 33.
[22]Youth Justice Act s. 175(1)(d)(i).
[23]Youth Justice Act s. 213.
[24]Penalties and Sentences Act s. 155.
[25]Penalties and Sentences Act s. 156.
[26]Penalties and Sentences Act s. 95.
[27][2015] QDC 163, para 35
[28]R v Bowditch [2014] QCA 157, applying R v Nagy [2003] QCA 175 and Griffiths v R (1989) 167 CLR 372.
[29]R v Bowditch [2014] QCA 157, para 23.
[30]R v Bowditch [2014] QCA 157, para 2.
[31]Exhibit 2 p. 9.
[32]Justices Act s. 232(4).