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Wilson v Cobble Patch Loganlea Pty Ltd[2015] QDC 235

Wilson v Cobble Patch Loganlea Pty Ltd[2015] QDC 235

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Wilson v Cobble Patch Loganlea Pty Ltd [2015] QDC 235

PARTIES:

ROBERT JAMES WILSON
(applicant)

v

COBBLE PATCH LOGANLEA PTY LTD
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BD2842/14

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Appellate

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Beenleigh

DELIVERED ON:

24 September 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

26 August 2015

JUDGE:

Judge Farr SC, DCJ

ORDERS:

  1. Leave to appeal is granted.
  2. The appeal is allowed.
  3. The order for summary judgment made in the Magistrates Court at Beenleigh on 27 June 2014 in the amount of $14,493.69 plus costs of and incidental to the application in the sum of $2,185.00 and interest to be calculated is set aside.
  4. The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
  5. The matter is to be determined at trial in the Magistrates Court at Beenleigh with a different magistrate.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – where the learned magistrate failed to give reasons in a contested application for summary judgment – whether leave to appeal should be granted – whether an important principle of law on justice is involved – whether there were disputes requiring resolution at trial.

COUNSEL:

LA Stephens for the applicant

P Previtera (Solicitor) for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

NIL for the applicant

Alex Mackay & Co for the respondent

  1. [1]
    The applicant seeks leave, pursuant to s 45(2) of the Magistrates Court Act 1921, to appeal an order made in the Magistrates Court at Beenleigh on 27 June 2014 whereby the magistrate ordered that summary judgment be entered in favour of the respondent in the sum of $14,493.69 plus costs of and incidental to the application in the sum of $2,185.00 and interest to be calculated.

Brief summary of alleged facts

  1. [2]
    On 8 August 2012, South East Civil and Drainage Contractors Pty Ltd (“the company”) entered into a written agreement with the respondent for the company to purchase goods on credit (“the credit agreement”). The applicant alleges that the credit agreement limited the value of the credit to be extended to the company to $10,000.00. That allegation is in dispute. The respondent alleges that the applicant guaranteed the performance of the company’s obligations (“the guarantee”). The applicant denies signing any such guarantee. Between 16 October 2012 and 28 November 2012, the respondent allegedly sold and delivered goods to the company totalling $19,127.00. On 20 August 2013, the respondent commenced proceedings against the applicant in debt, pursuant to the purported guarantee. The applicant filed a defence in the proceedings alleging:
  1. (a)
    the applicant did not sign any guarantee as alleged and the guarantee did not comply with s 56 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld);[1]or alternatively
  1. (b)
    it was a term of the credit agreement that the amount of credit to be extended to the company was limited to $10,000.00 and the respondent, without the consent of the applicant, varied the credit agreement to increase the credit limit to $19,127.00, or allowed the company to purchase goods on credit in excess of $10,000.00, and by reason of those matters the applicant is discharged from all liability under the guarantee;[2]and
  1. (c)
    the company paid the sum of $20,000.00 in full discharge of the debt.[3]

Grounds of appeal

  1. [3]
    The grounds of appeal are:
  1. (a)
    The learned magistrate ought to have found that there was a factual controversy about whether the respondent unilaterally varied the terms of the agreement between the respondent and the company which needs to be tested at a trial before a final determination can be made;
  1. (b)
    The learned magistrate erred in failing to provide any reasons for the decision when delivering judgment;
  1. (c)
    The learned magistrate erred in failing to provide reasons for the decision pursuant to r 660 and r 663 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld);
  1. (d)
    The learned magistrate erred in admitting into evidence inadmissible evidence;
  1. (e)
    The learned magistrate ought to have found that there was a factual controversy about whether the applicant signed the guarantee which needs to be tested at a trial before a final determination can be made as to the enforceability of the guarantee;
  1. (f)
    The learned magistrate ought to have found that there was a factual controversy about the amount the company owed for the reasons that:
  1. (i)
    the statement of claim does not plead or particularise the outstanding invoices that constitute the claimed amount;
  1. (ii)
    the application was for more than the claimed amount;
  1. (iii)
    the accounting evidence did not establish that the claimed amount remained outstanding; and
  1. (g)
    The learned magistrate ought to have found that it was a condition of the guarantee that the respondent would not extend credit to the company for an amount of more than $10,000.00, and that there was a breach of that promissory obligation made by the creditor which discharged the guarantor absolutely.

Leave to appeal

  1. [4]
    The applicant requires leave to appeal.[4]The court shall not grant leave to appeal unless it is satisfied that some important principle of law or justice is involved.[5]An important principle of justice requires that there be a question going beyond the consequence of the decision for the immediate parties to the proceeding.[6]
  1. [5]
    The applicant submits that leave to proceed should be granted for the following reasons:
  1. (a)
    the amount involved is not more than the minor civil dispute limit;[7]
  1. (b)
    the appellant did not sign any guarantee as alleged and the guarantee is not enforceable pursuant to s 56 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld);[8]
  1. (c)
    it was a term of the credit agreement that the amount of credit to be extended to the company was limited to $10,000.00 and the respondent, without the consent of the appellant, varied the credit agreement to increase the credit limit to $19,127.00 or allowed the company to purchase goods on credit in excess of $10,000.00 and by reason of those matters the appellant is discharged from all liability under the guarantee;[9]
  1. (d)
    the company paid the sum of $20,000.00 in full discharge of the debt;[10]
  1. (e)
    when entering judgment, the learned magistrate failed to give reasons which disclosed what she took into account and in what manner such things were taken into account. This is an appealable error;
  1. (f)
    when entering judgment, the learned magistrate took into account evidence that she should not have admitted; and
  1. (g)
    by reason of the facts, matters and circumstances set out above, this proceeding raises an important principle of law or justice; namely:
  1. (i)
    pursuant to r 292 UCPR, judgment should not be entered summarily if a party has reasonable prospects of defending the proceeding and there is a need for a trial to settle disputed factual issues or mixed questions of fact and law; and
  1. (ii)
    the failure to give reasons when entering judgment in a contested proceeding such as this amounts to an appealable error.
  1. [6]
    The respondent submits that the test this court should apply in determining the question of whether or not to grant leave to appeal is that of a “three-tier approach” as described in the matter of Lachlan v Hartley[11]:
  1. (a)
    did the making of the order (by the magistrate) involve a question of law or justice? ;
  1. (b)
    if it did, was it an important question? and
  1. (c)
    was the question wrongly decided?
  1. [7]
    The fact that the legislature has seen fit to require an appellant to seek leave in circumstances such as presently apply indicate that the legislature is concerned to reduce appeals of this nature and as was stated by Carter J in Glenwood Properties Pty Ltd v Delmoss Pty Ltd & Anor (1986) 2 Qd R 388:

“… an applicant for leave (to appeal) must show more than he has an arguable case … it seems to me that at least the applicant must be able to demonstrate prima facie error in the judgment of the judge in chambers and that the question in issue be one of general importance and accordingly one which the public interest requires should be the subject of further argument and decision in the full court.”

  1. [8]
    In Emanuel Management Pty Ltd (in liq) v Fosters Brewing Group Ltd[12]Chesterman J said:

“A trial judge who was asked for leave to appeal should not be defensive about the orders made or overly reluctant to give leave. Nevertheless the cases make it clear that leave should not be given unless there is an arguable case that, applying the principles of House v The King the discretion will be overturned on appeal. That means there must be an arguable case that the judge committed an error of law, or misapprehended the facts or that the result is inexplicably inconsistent with the facts.”

  1. [9]
    Ultimately, a decision as to whether leave to appeal should be granted will depend on whether any of the grounds of appeal have any realistic prospects of success, and if so, whether some important principle of law or justice is involved. I will therefore return to this issue after considering the grounds of appeal.

Conduct of appeal

  1. [10]
    An appeal is to be conducted by way of rehearing.[13]The powers of the court on appeal are set out in s 47 of the Magistrates Court Act 1921 (Qld), which states:

“On the hearing of an appeal or special case, the District Court may do any of the following:

  1. (a)
    Draw inferences of fact from facts found by the Magistrates Court, or from admitted facts or facts not disputed;
  1. (b)
    Order a new trial on such terms as it thinks just;
  1. (c)
    Order judgment to be entered for any party;
  1. (d)
    Make any other order, on such terms as it thinks proper to ensure the determination on the merits of the real questions and controversy between the parties;
  1. (e)
    As regards any special case, remit the matter to the Magistrates Court with the opinion of the District Court thereon;
  1. (f)
    Make such order with respect to the costs of the appeal or special case it thinks proper.”

Summary judgment

  1. [11]
    Rule 292 of the UCPR provides:

“292 Summary Judgment for Plaintiff

  1. (1)
    A plaintiff may at any time after a defendant files a notice of intention to defend, apply to the court under this part of the judgment against the defendant.
  2. (2)
    If the court was satisfied that –
  1. (a)
    The defendant has not real prospect of successfully defending all or part of the plaintiff’s claim, and
  1. (b)
    There is no need for a trial of the claim or the part of the claim;

The court may give judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim and it may make any other order  the court considers appropriate.”

  1. [12]
    As to the meaning of “no real prospect”, the word “real” distinguishes fanciful prospects of success. It directs the court to assess whether there is a “realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of success.[14]
  1. [13]
    The rule also requires the judge to be satisfied that there is no need for a trial. The need to be satisfied in respect of this second element and, in any event, the proper judicial exercise of the discretion to grant or deny summary judgment, are each matters which invoke the necessity for a judge to exercise great care, and proceed with appropriate caution, having regard to the patent seriousness of a decision to summarily terminate a proceeding by effectively denying a party the opportunity to present its case at a trial in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes.[15]
  1. [14]
    Whilst the authorities are clear that r 292 needs to be applied according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of the rule, an appropriately cautious approach is required, bearing in mind the well established principle that issues raised in proceedings will be determined summarily only in the clearest of cases.[16]
  1. [15]
    The legal burden of proof is on the applicant in these proceedings to satisfy the court of the matters set out in r 292. Only when evidence discharging that burden has been led does the evidentiary onus shift to the respondent, the overall burden of proof remaining on the applicant.[17]

Potential defences and contested factual issues

  1. [16]
    There was, and still exists, a dispute between the applicant and the respondent as to the terms of the credit agreement and the consequences of that agreement for the liability of the applicant. The applicant has pleaded that it was a term of the credit agreement that the credit extended to the company by the respondent would be limited to $10,000.00 and that the respondent unilaterally varied that agreement to extend more than $10,000.00 worth of credit to the company without the applicant’s knowledge or consent.[18]Mr Weekes for and on behalf of the respondent swears that the credit agreement was for $10,000.00 per month[19]and that there was an agreement to vary the credit agreement.[20]
  1. [17]
    Furthermore, the applicant has sworn that he did not sign the guarantee[21]and that the words appearing in the signature block of the guarantee were not written by him and he did not authorise any other person to write those words in the signature block.[22]Mr Weekes however, swears that he knows that the applicant signed the guarantee although he does not state the sources of the information and the ground for his belief.[23]I note that despite objection, the learned magistrate admitted that statement into evidence.[24]The objection was based on the provisions of rules 295 and 430 of the UCPR. That objection would appear to have had some merit.
  1. [18]
    Curiously, at the start of the second day of the hearing in the court below and after the learned magistrate had read all the material, the following exchange between bench and bar table occurred:

“Bench: … now, I read your case, Mr Upton, and I must admit I come to the conclusion that I thought it was distinguishable from this case, but having regard to the more recent affidavit material that’s been filed I don’t think I can probably make – give summary judgment.

Mr Upton: Do you say that it gives rise to issues about whether or not there was an agreement.

Bench: Well, I think it gives rise – yes. I mean, well, its fairly basic isn’t it?  He says – the affidavit in response – your client says he didn’t sign the agreement and he didn’t enter into any agreement with the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s representative.”[25]

  1. [19]
    I agree with the Magistrates summation on that issue. The brief recitation of the facts in these reasons amply demonstrates that there are disputed factual issues that need to be settled, and if settled in favour of the applicant, would mean that he would have reasonable prospects of success. Those disputed facts relate to the issue as to whether the applicant entered into an agreement with the respondent and if so, what were the relevant terms of that agreement.
  1. [20]
    The learned magistrate moved away from the position expressed in paragraph [18] above however in apparent reliance on the provisions of s 59(2) of the Evidence Act 1977 which states:

“A court may compare a disputed writing with any writing that is genuine and act upon its own conclusions in relation thereto.”

  1. [21]
    Her Honour compared the “signature” on the credit agreement with the applicant’s signature that appeared on his “Notice of Intention to Defend”, and concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that it was the applicant’s signature on the credit agreement. She also based that conclusion on a comparison conducted with another document which I will come to shortly.
  1. [22]
    It has not been argued that s 59(2) of the Evidence Act 1977 does not allow a comparison of writing to be conducted by a court.[26]The issue raised by the applicant relevant to this matter is that the disputed writing, bore no comparison to the genuine writing and hence it was not open for the magistrate to conclude that the applicant’s signature appeared on the credit agreement. It is further argued that the learned magistrate wrongly admitted into evidence Mr Weekes statement that he knows that the applicant signed the guarantee. I agree with the applicant’s submission in that regard. Mr Weekes did not state the source of the information and the ground for his belief and accordingly that statement of alleged fact was inadmissible.
  1. [23]
    Insofar as the comparison of handwriting is concerned, the magistrate has no advantage over this court – all relevant documents are before this court. The difficulty I have with the magistrate’s conclusion, when considering the comparison that was made between the writing on the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity and the writing on the Notice of Intention to Defend, is that the writing on the deed is in non-cursive script, whereas the signature on the defence is in cursive script. A comparison of the two, for a non-expert, is nigh on impossible. The provisions of s 59(2) of the Evidence Act 1977 provide no assistance to the court in such circumstances.
  1. [24]
    Additionally, the magistrate also compared the disputed writing with the applicant’s printed name which allegedly appears on Exhibit RJW1, and again draws a favourable comparison.[27]Confusingly however Exhibit RJW1 is a letter from the defendant’s solicitors addressed to the applicant and does not contain any signature of the applicant, printed or otherwise. No doubt, the reference to RJW1 was an error and I suspect that the correct reference should have been to PPC1 which is the Application for Credit Account, which does show the applicant’s name written in non-cursive script. And whilst it may be reasonable to infer that the applicant was the person who wrote his name on that document, there is no actual evidence to that effect and it is not the only inference which may be reasonably open in the circumstances.
  1. [25]
    It follows that I am not satisfied that comparison of a disputed writing, even if I am correct in assuming that document PPC1 was the document in question, was compared with writing that was proved to be genuine. Section 59 of the Evidence Act 1977 provides for the court to make comparison only when the court is satisfied of the genuineness of the non-disputed writing. That has not occurred in this case and accordingly s 59 has no application.

Dispute of mixed law and fact

  1. [26]
    The applicant submits that another dispute that required resolution at trial related to case law authority to the effect that if the principle and creditor, without the guarantor’s consent, alter the nature of the principle obligation, then the guarantor is discharged absolutely because the obligation in its altered form is not what was guaranteed. Heavy reliance was placed by the applicant on the case of Ankar Pty Ltd v National Westminster Finance (Australia) Limited (“Ankar”)[28]in support of that submission. It is submitted that where a surety agrees to be liable for the default of another upon the terms of the contract of suretyship, a significant departure by the creditor from the terms of that contract will, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, operate to preclude the existence or continued existence of the circumstances in which the surety has agreed to be bound.
  1. [27]
    The respondent has submitted that Ankar has no application as it was concerned with circumstances regarding the discharge of a surety rather than a guarantor. The respondent further submits that even if Ankar had application to this matter there has been no breach of an essential term or condition and that, in fact, at the time of entering into the credit agreement there had been no credit limit agreed to.
  1. [28]
    The learned magistrate rejected the relevance of Ankar to this matter, although for reasons which are not known. All she said on the topic was:

“… and I have read that and I think that’s distinguishable. I don’t except that is argument for the argument that Mr Upton raised.”[29]

  1. [29]
    It is impossible for this court to determine that issue on this application as the court would require far more comprehensive submissions, after hearing all relevant evidence, than have presently been provided. Suffice it to say, the proposition in Ankar may well have application to this matter, depending in part, on the facts that are found to be proved. It follows, that this was an issue of mixed fact and law about which the applicant has some realistic prospects of success. It was not the occasion for determination on a summary judgment application.
  1. [30]
    Furthermore, another dispute between the parties is on the factual issue of what if any credit limit was agreed to at the time the credit agreement was entered into. The applicant has submitted that it was $10,000.00, such submission being based on writings on the document itself. The respondent has submitted that there was, as best I understand the submission, no limit or alternatively a limit of $10,000.00 per month. In the further alternative, the respondent submits that the credit limit applied for did not form part of the agreement or the guarantee and relies upon paragraphs 3 and 7 of the guarantee in support of that submission.
  1. [31]
    The nature of the submissions, in and of themselves, demonstrate that a dispute of fact exists and that its resolution should have only occurred after all relevant evidence was led at trial.
  1. [32]
    By way of further demonstration, the respondent has also submitted that even if the court concluded that the credit limit did form part of the agreement and was initially limited to $10,000.00 then the applicant would still be liable for the full amount as he was allegedly the sole director and the controlling mind of the company, and that he would therefore be assumed to know of any agreement between the creditor and the company to increase the credit amount. Again, this is an issue that should and could be resolved only after evidence relevant to it is led at trial.
  1. [33]
    It follows, that the following issues were in dispute between the parties and should only have been resolved after the relevant facts had been settled following a trial:
  1. Did the application for credit constitute an essential term or condition of the deed of guarantee and indemnity?
  1. If so, what was the limit of the credit agreed upon?;
  1. Assuming that a credit limit had been agreed upon, was there any agreed variation to that limit to the creditor and the company?;
  1. If so, when did that happen and in what circumstances?;
  1. What information was provided to the applicant regarding the variation?;
  1. If it is alleged that the applicant knew nothing of the variation, what overt acts might be relied upon by the respondent to demonstrate that the applicant must have been aware of the variation?;
  1. What is the evidence as to the applicant’s involvement in the company?
  1. [34]
    I do not suggest that this list is exhaustive. Nevertheless, these questions had to be answered, after evidence was led at trial, to determine the true nature of the guarantee and to determine whether Ankar’s case had application.

Magistrate’s failure to give reasons

  1. [35]
    Notwithstanding the contested nature of the application for summary judgment, the magistrate failed to give reasons for her decision. It is well established that there is a duty on the part of judicial tribunals to give reasons for their decisions and the failure to give reasons which ought be given can amount to an appealable error.[30]Whilst I acknowledge the pressure on this state’s very busy magistrate’s to resolve cases quickly, that cannot relieve them of the duty to give adequate reasons.
  1. [36]
    The respondent, very fairly, acknowledges that a failure to give reasons can, on its face, imply or infer some lack of justice on the grounds of not knowing why the judgment was made and why the relevant decision was arrived at. The respondent submits however that this is not the position in this matter, as the transcript reveals exactly why the magistrate ruled the way she did. It is submitted that by both express statement and obvious inference the magistrate was satisfied that:
  1. The signature on the guarantee was that of the applicant;
  1. The applicant had not paid the account;[31]and
  1. That the terms of the guarantee did not include the credit limit applied for.[32]
  1. [37]
    It follows, so it is submitted, that the parties were in no doubt as to why the magistrate ruled the way she did.
  1. [38]
    Whilst the respondent’s submission is correct in some respects, I do not agree with it in relation to the issue as to why the magistrate distinguished Ankar and concluded it had no application. There was nothing said on that topic that assists in that regard.

Amount owed

  1. [39]
    The applicant has submitted that controversy exists as to the amount owed by the company. In my view however, sufficient material was placed before the court to allow the magistrate to determine the amount outstanding. I can discern no error on the part of the magistrate in that regard.

Leave to appeal

  1. [40]
    Adopting the three-tier approach as identified in Lachlan v Hartley[33] in determining the issue of whether to grant leave to appeal, I conclude that the order made by the magistrate did involve a question of law or justice, and that it was an important question.
  1. [41]
    The magistrate’s decision denied the applicant the opportunity to place his case before the court in the ordinary way. Such an approach “should be exercised with extreme care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried”.[34]
  1. [42]
    In this matter, the magistrate’s decision denied the applicant an opportunity to present his case in the traditional way on such issues as identified in paragraph 33 above. To do so, in circumstances where the applicant, on the material before this court, has some reasonable prospects of success, constitutes an error. Furthermore, to conclude that Ankar had no application, without having heard necessary and appropriate evidence, is a further error. To do so, without giving any reasons significantly adds to that error. Finally, as I have already indicated, I can find no basis to allow comparison of disputed writing pursuant to s 59 of the Evidence Act 1977.
  1. [43]
    In my view, the potential application of the principles as enunciated in Ankar to the factual circumstances of matters such as this, involves an important question of law.
  1. [44]
    I am unable, on the material before this court, to determine if that issue (or any of the other issues) were determined correctly, but on the material before me, there is at the very least, evidence of appealable error on the approach of the magistrate.
  1. [45]
    Mindful as I am of the tests to be applied in determining whether to grant leave to appeal, I am nevertheless satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated prima facie error on the part of the magistrate on issues of general importance.
  1. [46]
    Orders
  1. Leave to appeal is granted.
  1. The appeal is allowed.
  1. The order for summary judgment made in the Magistrates Court at Beenleigh on 27 June 2014 in the amount of $14,493.69 plus costs of and incidental to the application in the sum of $2,185.00 and interest to be calculated is set aside.
  1. The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
  1. The matter is to be determined at trial in the Magistrates Court at Beenleigh before a different magistrate.
  1. [47]
    I will hear the parties as to costs.

Footnotes

[1]  Paragraph 4(a) and 4(b) of defence.

[2]  Paragraph 4(c) of defence.

[3]  Paragraph 5(iv) of defence.

[4]  Section 45(2) Magistrates Court Act 1921 (Qld).

[5]Wanstall v Burke [1925] St R Qd 295. Most recently cited with favour in Ramzy v Body Corporate for GC3 CTS 38396 & Anor [2012] QDC 397 at [41]-[42].

[6]American Express International Inc v Hewitt [1993] 2 Qd R 352.

[7]  Section 45(5), Magistrates Court Act 1921 (Qld) and the schedule to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009.

[8]  Paragraph 4(a) and 4(b) of defence.

[9]  Paragraph 4(c) of defence.

[10]  Paragraph 5(iv) of defence.

[11]  (1978) QR 1 at p 5.

[12]  [2003] QSC 484.

[13]  Rule 765 and r 785 UCPR.

[14]Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232; Bolton Properties Pty Ltd v JK Investments (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 202.

[15]Bolton Properties Proprietary Limited v J K Investments (Australia) Proprietary Limited (ibid) per Daubney J at [78].

[16]Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo ibid, per McMurdo P at [3]; J M Kelly (Project Builders) Pty Ltd v Toga Development 31 Pty Ltd & Anor (No 2) [2008] QSC 312, per Daubney J at [10]-[12].

[17]Qld Pork Pty Ltd v Lott [2003] QCA 271 at [41].

[18]  Paragraph 4(c)(i)-4(c)(iv) of defence; affidavit of Robert James Wilson sworn 17 May 2014, paras 4 and 5; Affidavit of Robert James Wilson sworn 24 June 2014, para 4.

[19]  Affidavit of Dan Weekes sworn 23 June 2014 at para 3.

[20]  Affidavit of Dan Weekes sworn 23 June 2014 at paras 5-8.

[21]  Affidavit of Robert James Wilson sworn 17 May 2014 at para 2.

[22]  Affidavit of Robert James Wilson sworn 24 June 2014 at para 3.

[23]  Affidavit of Dan Weekes sworn 26 April 2014 at para 3.

[24]  Transcript of proceedings of 18 June 2014 at T1-2 through to T1-8; transcript of proceedings of 27 June 2014 at T1-27, ll 15-20.

[25]  Transcript of proceedings of 27 June 2014 T1-2, ll 12-24.

[26]  See Neilsens Concrete Pty Ltd v Heath & Ors [2013] QDC 164 at [49]-[54].

[27]  Transcript of proceedings of 27 June 2014, T1-14, l 10 to T1-15, l 12.

[28]  (1987) 162 CLR 549 at 558-559, citing Holme v Brunskill (1877) 3 QBD 495; O'Donovan J “The Modern Contract of Guarantee” (2003), Thompson, London at p 345-376.

[29]  Transcript of proceedings of 27 June 2014 T1-6, l 14.

[30]Bawden v ACI Operations Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 293.

[31]  Transcript of proceedings dated 27 June 2014, T1-26, l 10.

[32]  Transcript of proceedings of 27 June 2014, T1-6.

[33]  (1978) Qd R 1 at page 5.

[34]Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 at 99.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Wilson v Cobble Patch Loganlea Pty Ltd

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Wilson v Cobble Patch Loganlea Pty Ltd

  • MNC:

    [2015] QDC 235

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Farr DCJ

  • Date:

    24 Sep 2015

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
American Express International Inc v Hewitt [1993] 2 Qd R 352
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1993] 2 Qd R 352
Ankar Pty Ltd v National Westminster Finance (Australia) Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 549
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1987) 162 CLR 549
Bawden v ACI Operations Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 293
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QCA 293
Bolton Properties Pty Ltd v J K Investments (Australia) Pty Ltd[2009] 2 Qd R 202; [2009] QCA 135
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] 2 Qd R 202
Cite 2 - [2009] 2 Qd R 202
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo[2005] 2 Qd R 232; [2005] QCA 227
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] 2 Qd R 232
Cite 2 - [2005] 2 Qd R 232
Emanuel Management Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Foster's Brewing Group Ltd [2003] QSC 484
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QSC 484
Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1983) 154 CLR 87
Glenwood Properties Pty Ltd v Delmoss Pty Ltd[1986] 2 Qd R 388; [1986] QSC 221
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1986] 2 Qd R 388
Holme v Brunskill (1877) 3 QBD 495
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1877) 3 QBD 495
JM Kelly (Project Builders) Pty Ltd v Toga Development No 31 Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2008] QSC 312
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] QSC 312
Lauchlan v Hartley [1978] Qd R 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1978] Qd R 1
Cite 2 - [1978] Qd R 1
Neilsens Concrete Pty Ltd v Heath & Ors [2013] QDC 164
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QDC 164
Queensland Pork Pty Ltd v Lott [2003] QCA 271
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QCA 271
Ramzy v Body Corporate for GC3 CTS38396 [2012] QDC 397
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QDC 397
Wanstall v Burke [1925] St R Qd 295
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1925] St R Qd 295

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Wilson v Cobble Patch Loganlea Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2015] QDC 2712 citations
1

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