Taylor v Queensland Police Service
[2015] QDC 75
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- Taylor v Queensland Police Service[2015] QDC 75
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Taylor v Queensland Police Service[2015] QDC 75
Taylor v Queensland Police Service[2015] QDC 75
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Taylor v Queensland Police Service [2015] QDC 75 |
PARTIES: | CRAIG ANTHONY TAYLOR Appellant and QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE Respondent |
FILE NO: | No. 327 of 2014 |
PROCEEDING: | Appeal against sentence |
DELIVERED ON: | 26 March 2015 |
DELIVERED AT: | Southport |
HEARING DATES: | 26 March 2015 |
JUDGE: | Judge C.F. Wall Q.C. |
ORDER: | Appeal dismissed |
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – where the appellant pleaded guilty to contravening a domestic violence order made 6 weeks earlier and was placed on probation for two years – whether sentence manifestly excessive – where the appellant had no criminal history – similarity between circumstances of offending and those which led to the making of the earlier temporary protection order – where offending involved property damage and verbal abuse in presence of children – prevalence of domestic violence – personal and general deterrence |
Fairbrother v The Queen [2005] QCA 105, applied PMB v Kelly [2014] QDC 301, applied | |
COUNSEL: | Ms C. Boothman for the Appellant Ms M. Franklin for the Respondent |
SOLICITORS: | Legal Aid Queensland for the Appellant Queensland Director of Public Prosecutions for the Respondent |
HIS HONOUR: In the Magistrates Court at Southport on the 5th of November 2014, the appellant pleaded guilty to contravening a domestic violence order on the 4th of November 2014. A temporary protection order had been made on the 17th of September 2014. He was placed on probation for two years. He has appealed against this sentence, alleging it to be manifestly excessive.
It is necessary firstly to recount some of the facts which led to the making of the temporary protection order on the 17th of September 2014. On the 14th of July 2014, the appellant grabbed a glass of Coke and threw it at the complainant, at the same time yelling at her. The glass broke. He then threw a cigarette lighter at the complainant, which struck her in the back. He then approached her and yelled at her in a threatening manner. She pushed him away and ran upstairs and sought shelter in her 11 year old daughter’s bedroom. She and her daughter positioned themselves near the door to try and stop the appellant from entering. He forced the door open, pushing the child against the wall, causing pain to her back and a foot. He entered the bedroom and tried to take the complainant’s mobile phone from her. She pushed him away. He grabbed her and pushed her onto the bed. She was attempting to call for help on the phone when he wrenched the phone from her grasp whilst pinning her on the bed. During this struggle, she sustained a small cut to her left hand. He then walked out of the bedroom, taking her phone, and left the house. A short time later, he telephoned the complainant on the home phone, threatening to smash her phone and sim card. These threats were made several times during the next half an hour.
The facts relating to the offence on the 4th of November were these. The temporary protection order prohibited the appellant from approaching within 100 metres of the complainant’s residence, except with her consent in writing. She had provided written consent to him to attend and reside at the address. At approximately 7.30 am on Tuesday on the 4th of November, the appellant asked the complainant if he could use her mobile phone. She didn’t hear him and asked him to repeat what he said. A verbal argument ensued. The complainant went into the bathroom to have a shower and closed the bathroom door. The appellant commenced to punch the bathroom door, resulting in numerous holes to it. He then wrenched both the bedroom and bathroom doors off their hinges and he continued yelling at the complainant. The complainant’s children were at home and within hearing distance of what was happening. Later, the appellant was located by police and he accompanied them to the Nerang Police Station. He there made full admissions. He said he knew his actions had contravened the order and said that he was very sorry and was having anger issues, for which he was seeking assistance.
He had no criminal history. He is 38 years old. He was receiving Centrelink payments of $420 a fortnight. His tree lopping business had recently shut down due to lack of work, which put extreme pressure on him. He was having difficulties with his ex-partner in relation to custody, which made him highly emotional. He had been attending Centacare for counselling for six to eight weeks. He was going once a week to a men’s group for domestic violence and anger management. He was also seeing a psychologist once a week. He intended to fix the doors or pay for the damage. It was a very early plea of guilty, the offence happening only the day before. He had been in custody at the watch-house since 10 am on the 4th of November. His solicitor submitted that he understood the significance of domestic violence breach charges.
The magistrate remarked that his conduct on the 4th of November was very similar to the conduct leading to the making of the temporary protection order. That is so, except that on the 4th of November there was no actual physical violence caused to the complainant. It was submitted by the appellant’s solicitor to the magistrate that a fine should be imposed or, alternatively, probation. The primary submission was for a fine. At the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, the magistrate considered, as he was required to whether he should make a protection order. The appellant’s solicitor conceded there was no reason why he should not make one and the magistrate made a protection order for two years, which is consistent with the two years probation order made by him.
Ms Boothman, counsel for the appellant, submitted that the mitigating features which have been referred to supported her submission that a sentence of two years probation was manifestly excessive. She submitted that the appellant was already addressing his offending by attending Centacare counselling and private counselling, and a men’s group for domestic violence and anger management. It was his first time before the court and, therefore, he had never before had the benefit of a fine. That option should have been tried before moving to a community based order. It is difficult to see the extent to which he was – by the 4th of November – benefiting from the counselling he had been undertaking except that on the 4th of November, there was no actual physical violence caused to the complainant as opposed to property damage.
The Magistrate in his decision referred to the facts and the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and took all of those matters into account. His Honour referred to the fact that domestic violence is not only about anger management, but is also about control and domination and manipulation. He referred to similarities between the incident on the 14th of July 2014 and that on the 4th of November 2014 and it’s important also to note that the offending on the 4th of November was only some six weeks after the temporary protection order was made on the 17th of September.
The Magistrate also referred to the following figures from the recent Bryce Report in relation to domestic violence. In 2013, there were 64 246 reported incidents of domestic violence in Queensland which is up from the previous year when there were 58 000. In 2013, there were 12 828 breaches of domestic violence orders.
His Honour also referred to remarks by the Court of Appeal in the case of Fairbrother versus The Queen [2005] QCA 105 to the effect that “Domestic violence is an insidious, prevalent and serious problem in our society. Domestic violence has a deleterious ongoing impact not only on the immediate victim, but on the victim’s wider family and ultimately on the whole of society. It is not solely a domestic issue. It is a crime against the state warranting salutary punishment. The costs to the community in terms of lost income and productivity, medical and psychological treatment and ongoing social problems is immense”.
Ms Boothman conceded that no error occurred by reason of the Magistrate referring to the figures from the Bryce Report, the comments by the Court of Appeal in Fairbrother or the similarity between the conduct on the 14th of July 2014 and the 4th of November 2014. She also agreed with remarks that I made in the case of PMB v Kelly [2014] QDC 301, agreeing with the Magistrate in that case that in these situations there is a need for personal and general deterrence. Domestic violence upon women is a problem and the interests of the community lie in preventing violence towards women and the need to protect complainants and other members of the community. These are relevant to considerations to take into account in sentencing for these types of cases.
I am unable to see any real discernible effect from the counselling undertaken by the appellant between the 14th of July and the 4th of November. It may be that he was on the latter occasion limiting his outbursts to violence against property as opposed to violence against property and individuals. Nevertheless, I think the Magistrate was correct to reflect upon what seems to have been a disturbing continuation of domestic violence on the part of the appellant. Effectively, the Magistrate determined that a fine would have little, if any, personally deterrent effect on the appellant. This was certainly the submission made by Ms Franklin for the respondent and I agree. I’m not satisfied in the circumstances that it has been established that the Magistrate erred in placing the appellant on probation rather than fining him. In these circumstances, the issue seems to be whether a probation order for two years rather than one as alternatively contended by Ms Boothman was manifestly excessive. I’m not satisfied that a decision to place the appellant on probation for two years was manifestly excessive. I’m not satisfied in the circumstances that any error has been identified in the exercise of the sentencing discretion by the Magistrate, nor am I satisfied that any error arises by implication from the length of the sentence.
The period of two years for the probation order is consistent with the duration of the protection order made by the Magistrate after he sentenced the appellant. In these circumstances and for these reasons, the appeal will be dismissed. Any other orders sought?
MS FRANKLIN: No, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: All right.