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Queensland Police Service v Messer[2016] QDC 214

Queensland Police Service v Messer[2016] QDC 214

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Queensland Police Service v Messer [2016] QDC 214

PARTIES:

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

(appellant)

v

HAROLD EDWARD MESSER  

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

APPEAL NO: 54/16

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court, Cairns

DELIVERED ON:

26 August 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Cairns

HEARING DATE:

24 August 2016

JUDGE:

Morzone QC DCJ

ORDER:

  1. The appellant’s application to adduce fresh evidence is refused.
  2. Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – appeal pursuant to s 222 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – conviction – disobeying speed limit – mode of hearing of appeal – error of law

Legislation

Justices Act 1886 (Qld), ss 222, s 223 & 227

Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld), ss 60, 113, 113A, 114, 120 & 124

Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Road Rules) Regulation 2009 (Qld), s 20

State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999 (Qld), ss 14 & 157

Cases

White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121

McKay v Dedman [2015] QDC 55

Suttor v Gundowda Pty Limited (1950) 81 CLR 418

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447

Attorney-General (Old) v Morris & Anor [2015] QCA 112

SOLICITORS:

A. Hilton, legal officer of the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions for the appellant

The respondent was unrepresented

  1. [1]
    On 21 March 2016 the respondent was acquitted of the charge of disobeying the speed limit, by driving a car over a speed limit of 60 km/hr, after a summary trial in the Magistrates Court held in Cairns.
  1. [2]
    The appellant now appeals.
  1. [3]
    Both parties provided outlines of argument and made further submissions on the hearing of the appeal which I have considered.

Background

  1. [4]
    At 10:20 am on 12 May 2015, a car towing a trailer with the registration number 570QJS was detected by a stationary speed camera on Mulgrave Road in Mooroobool travelling at 70km/hr in a 60km/hr speed limit area.
  1. [5]
    Exceeding the speed limit is an offence against section 20 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Road Rules) Regulation 2009 (Qld).  It is also considered a camera-detected offence under section 113 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) (“the Act”).
  1. [6]
    An Infringement Notice No. 2026936461 was issued and served by post on the respondent as registered owner of the trailer on 27 May 2015.[1]
  1. [7]
    The matter was disputed and proceeded by complaint and summons for determination.
  1. [8]
    When the trial commenced on 21 March 2016, the respondent declined to enter a plea on the grounds that there was no proof that he was driving the car. The magistrate, as she was entitled to do, entered a plea of not guilty on his behalf.
  1. [9]
    The prosecution case was confined to documentary evidence and the respondent did not call or adduce any evidence. The prosecution’s evidence comprised various certificates produced pursuant to sections 60, 120 and 124 of the Act to prove the photographic images and notation of date, speed of the vehicle, time, location and speed limit, photographic detection device calibration testing, the device site and the registration of the trailer to the respondent. The requisite instruments of delegation were also in evidence.
  1. [10]
    Statutory certificates were tendered under section 157(2) of the State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999 (Qld) to link the infringement notice with a speeding offence and the trailer; postal service of the infringement notice; and the absence of a declaration nominating another driver under section 114 of the Act.
  1. [11]
    At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate dismissed the charge supported by ex tempore reasons to the effect that she was not satisfied that the respondent was the driver of the car.

Mode of Appeal

  1. [12]
    Pursuant to section 223 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld), an appeal under section 222 is by way of rehearing on the original evidence given in the proceedings before the trial magistrate, and new evidence is adduced on appeal in special circumstances with leave.  The appeal is not a new trial to consider, as if presented for the first time.  It is a review of the record of the proceedings below, rather than a completely fresh hearing.[2]
  1. [13]
    This court is required to make its own determination of relevant facts in issue from the evidence, giving due deference and attaching a good deal of weight to the magistrate’s view.[3]
  1. [14]
    Fundamentally, the appellant must demonstrate some legal, factual or discretionary error.[4] 

New Evidence

  1. [15]
    At the outset of this appeal, the appellant applied to adduce fresh evidence in the appeal being a copy of the Infringement Notice No. 2026936461 on the following grounds:
  1. there was no failure to exercise reasonable diligence;
  1. the evidence is apparently credible; and
  1. the evidence, if believed, might reasonably have lead the tribunal of fact to return a different verdict.
  1. [16]
    The respondent opposed the application.
  1. [17]
    “Special grounds” are required before fresh, additional or substituted evidence (new evidence) may be admitted on appeal.[5]  The discretion will generally be invoked where the new evidence:
  1. could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the hearing;
  1. would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, even if not decisive; and
  1. must be apparently credible though not incontrovertible.
  1. [18]
    There was no real issue taken in respect of the last two considerations.
  1. [19]
    As to the first element, the appellant’s representative argued that there was no failure to exercise reasonable diligence. The appellant’s application was not supported by any affidavit evidence explaining the absence of the document at the hearing or whether it could have been obtained with reasonable diligence. Instead, I was referred to the exchange between the prosecutor and the magistrate towards the end of the hearing and reliance upon the indication of the magistrate that it was not required.
  1. [20]
    By that time, the prosecutor had closed its case, the respondent had elected not to call or give evidence but had made some oral submissions. Then, the magistrate did a stocktake of the evidence and told the prosecutor that she did not “seem to have the infringement notice”.  The following exchange occurred:

PROSECUTOR:   I can tender the document.

BENCH:   Well, you’ve closed your case.

PROSECUTOR:   I’ve …

BENCH:   Just hang on a moment.

PROSECUTOR:   I’ve never tendered the infringement notice before, your Honour.

BENCH:   Haven’t you?

PROSECUTOR: No.

BENCH: That’s all right.  I’ve never not had it tendered before me, but there you go.  Just wait a moment.  Let’s just see if everything

PROSECUTOR: It’s not even with the packed documents I have, your Honour.

BENCH: There you go.

PROSECUTOR: So I can’t tender it.

BENCH: That’s all right,  It doesn’t matter.  So I’ve got a photograph that shos a vehicle with a certain registration number [indistinct] then I’ve got a certification as to the certificate, that it was tested within 12 months and being accurate.  Then I’ve got the site code manual, then I’ve got a – exhibit 4 says infringement notice 2026936461 for the offence of exceeding the speed limit, involved vehicle registration number 570-QJS, but what – and then I’ve got registered owner of the vehicle, that the infringement notice was served and no statutory declaration was received.  What tells me that infringement notice number 2026936461 was for the offence shown in the photos in exhibit 1?

PROSECUTOR: I would say the complaint and summons, your honour.

BENCH: The complaint and summons isn’t evident (sic).

PROSECUTOR: That’s the only document I have to rely on, the complaint and summons and the attached documentation that went with it.

BENCH: Well, the attached documentation that went with the complaint and summons?

PROSECUTOR: That’s – yes, correct, you Honour, that’s all I have.

BENCH: Well, let me have a look.  Well, that refers to an infringement notice.  Now, there’s something about averments contained in complaints and summons, where’s that?

PROSECUTOR: I ….

BENCH: But that’s not an averment, is it, it’s a particular?

PROSECUTOR: As in the accompanying document, your Honour”

BENCH: Well, you see – no.  You know hoe eh complaint and summons and [indistinct] that it’s a car and it’s [indistinct] now, there’s some evidentiary thing about averments contained in a complaint and summons but the infringement notice number isn’t.

PROSECUTOR: No.  It’s not in the complaint and summons, no, your Honour. 

BENCH: All right.  I’m going to go and have a look at the material and decide whether it proves the offence,  So it will probably take me a while.  Twelve o’clock?

PROSECUTOR: Certainty your Honour.

 

  1. [21]
    In McKay v Dedman [2015] QDC 55, Burnett DCJ said at [34]:

“It can’t be said that there was a failure to exercise reasonable diligence if: (a) the appellant didn’t know the material, although readily capable of provision, was relevant and thus didn’t provide it, or (b) in failing to exercise a duty to request such information it was not called for, or (c) the appellant, as in this case, was in essence told that a decision had been made such that the additional material was now otiose. The Court’s implicit or direct refusal to take such additional evidence gainsays any failure of reasonable diligence on the part of the appellant. Furthermore, this case is not one of the kind to which the rule is addressed, that is, to prevent an appellant using an initial hearing as some sort of dress rehearsal. In my view leave ought to be given to read the affidavit and I do so.”

  1. [22]
    That case is distinguishable. Here the magistrate identified a gap or deficiency in the evidence which may have been filled by the proper tender of the infringement notice. That was one way to overcome the apparent deficiency in the absence of more detailed certificate evidence under the Act. I do not interpret Her Honour’s remarks as having either pre-determined the matter or as implicitly refusing or not requiring the evidence. The point was reached where the prosecutor found himself without the evidence, and he abandoned the point. He could have applied for an adjournment but that course may have been found wanting due to the stage of the proceeding. Instead, he sought to maintain reliance on the complaint and summons. That document was not capable of overcoming the perceived deficiency because, whilst there was some detail provided as “particulars”, it was of no evidentiary value and was too vague in any event. The circumstances simply bespeak of poor preparation.
  1. [23]
    I am not satisfied that the infringement notice, or equivalent evidence, could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the hearing. Further, an appeal is not a forum for parties to get “a second bite of the cherry” by remedying an evidentiary deficiency and present it for the first time at the appeal hearing.
  1. [24]
    In any event, like any document, the infringement notice could only have been proved through its maker or under a certificate pursuant to the Act. No attempt was made in this appeal to properly prove the document. That alone would defeat the appellant’s application to adduce fresh evidence.
  1. [25]
    Therefore, I refuse the appellant’s application to adduce fresh evidence.

New point not taken below

  1. [26]
    The appellant’s representative objected to receipt of a non-compliant affidavit of the respondent about matters not argued at the trial. I received the document as an outline of submissions.
  1. [27]
    Where a point was not taken in the trial court and evidence which could have been adduced prevented the point from succeeding, or the point requires a further trial, it cannot be taken afterwards.[6]  Otherwise, appellant courts generally tolerate new points. 
  1. [28]
    Here the respondent’s submissions in the form of a non-complying affidavit included a now familiar mantra proffered in courts by some self-represented litigants. It is best illustrated by the following extracts:

Be it known to all Courts, Governments, and other parties, that I, :Harold Edward :Messer, am a natural, freeborn Sovereign, without subjects.  I am neither subject to any entity anywhere, nor is any entity subject to me.  I neither dominate anyone, nor am I dominated.

My authority for this statement is the same as it is for all free Sovereigns everywhere: the age-old, timeless, and universal respect for the intrinsic rights, property, freedoms, and responsibilities of the Sovereign Being.

I am not a “person” when such term is defined in Statutes or Acts of Australia, or Statutes or Acts of the several states when such definition includes artificial entities or Cestui Que Vie Trusts.  I refuse to be treated as a federally or state created entity which is only capable of exercising certain rights, privileges, or immunities as specifically granted by federal or state governments, unless with my express consent on a case by case basis.

I voluntarily choose to comply with the man-made laws under God, which serve to bring harmony to society, but no such laws, nor their enforcers, have any authority over me. I am not in my jurisdiction, for I am not of subject status.

Consistent with the eternal tradition of natural law, unless I have harmed or violated someone or their property, I have committed no crime; and am therefore not subject to any penalty.

…

As such, the hidden or unrevealed contracts that supposedly create obligations to perform, for persons of subject status, are inapplicable to me, and are null and void.  If I have participated in any of the supposed “benefits” associated with these hidden contracts, I have done so through the Law of necessity and under duress, Vi Coactus, for lack of any other practical alternative.  I may have received such “benefits” but I have not accepted them in a manner that binds me to anything.  As I am executor to my Estate, this remains my express right.

…

Typical examples of such compelled and pretended “benefits” are:

…

5. State plates on my car.  Similarly, even though technically, my car does not fit the legal definition of a “motor vehicle,” which is used for commercial purposes, nevertheless, I may registered it from time to time with the state and carry the state plates on it, because to have any other plates or no plates at all, causes me to run the risk of police officer harassment and extreme inconvenience.  This does not limit me to my God given right to travel unhindered from property to property in a car that may not carry state plates or registration from time to time.  I will do so safely, and with all care and consideration to myself, and my fellow man.

…

12. Use of semantic.  There are some immature people with mental imbalances, such the craving to dominate other people, who masquerade from time to time as “government.”  Just because they alter definitions of words in the law books to their supposed advantage, doesn’t mean I accept those definitions.  The fact that they define the words “person,” “address,” “mail,” “resident,” “Borrower”, “motor vehicle,” “driving,” “passenger,” “employee,” “income,” and many others, in ways different from the common usage, so as to be associated with a subject of slave status, means nothing in real life. Because the Courts have from time to time become entangled in the game of semantics, be it known to all Courts and parties, that if I have ever signed any document or spoken any words on record, using words defined by twists in the law books different from the common usage, there can be no effect whatsoever on my Sovereign status in society thereby, nor can there be created any obligation to perform in any manner, by the mere use of such words.  Where the meaning in the common dictionary differs from the meaning in the law dictionary, it is the meaning in common dictionary that prevails, because it is more trustworthy. Let my intentions, deeds and actions be my Justice and Freedom.

Any such compelled and supposed “benefits” above may include, but are not limited to, the aforementioned typical examples.  My use of such alleged “benefits” is through necessity and under duress Vi Coactus only, and is with full reservation of all my common law rights.  I have waived not on my intrinsic rights and freedoms by my use thereof.  Furthermore, my use of such compelled “benefits” may be temporary, until better alternatives becomes available, practical, and widely recognized.

…

Notice of Peaceful Standing

Let it be known to all that my standing is of a free man, and that I come in peace to all situations. I mean no-one any harm, and ask to be respectfully left in peace accordingly.

I affirm that all of the foregoing is true and correct.  I affirm that I am of lawful age and am competent to make this Affidavit.  I hereby affix my own Pollex to all of the affirmations in this entire document with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights and my specific common law right not to be bound by a contract or obligation which I have not entered into knowingly, willingly, voluntarily, and without misrepresentation, duress, or coercion.

I understand my rights under the Australian Federal Constitution.

The use of a Justice of the Peace is for identification only, and such use does NOT grant any jurisdiction to anyone.

  1. [29]
    As interesting and attractive as these arguments might seem to someone who propounds them, they have no basis in law or fact to exculpate a person’s culpability for a traffic offence and being subject to the court’s jurisdiction.[7] 
  1. [30]
    The respondent’s submissions have no bearing on any issue in this appeal.

Grounds of Appeal

  1. [31]
    The appellant appeals against the decision in reliance on the grounds of appeal in the Notice of Appeal, to the effect that the decision was unsupported by the evidence and unreasonable:
  1. the magistrate erred in finding that the infringement notice was required to be tendered in order for the prosecution to prove the charge of disobeying the speed limit;
  1. the magistrate erred in law in finding that the prosecution had failed to satisfy the Court that the respondent was in charge of the vehicle depicted in the offence made out by exhibit 1;  and
  1. the finding of not guilty was against the weight of the evidence.
  1. [32]
    The determinative issue in the appeal can be synthesised to: whether the magistrate erred by concluding that the prosecution had failed to prove that the respondent was in charge of the vehicle on the whole of the evidence.

Appeal

  1. [33]
    Section 114 of the Act relevantly provides for the offence as follows:

Offences detected by photographic detection device

(1)   If a prescribed offence happens and the offence is detected by a photographic detection device, a person is taken to have committed the offence if the person was the person in charge of the vehicle that was involved in the offence at the time the offence happened even though the actual offender may have been someone else.

(2)   If the actual offender is someone else, subsection (1) does not affect the liability of the actual offender but the person in charge and the actual offender can not both be punished for the offence.

(3)   It is a defence to a camera-detected offence, other than an unregistered or uninsured offence, for a person to prove that—

(a)   the person was not the driver of the vehicle at the time the offence happened; and

(b)   the person—

(i)   has notified the commissioner or chief executive of the name and address of the person in charge of the vehicle at the time the offence happened; or

(ii) has notified the commissioner or chief executive that the person did not know and could not, with reasonable diligence, have ascertained the name and address of the person in charge of the vehicle at the time the offence happened.

(4)   A defence under subsection (3) … is available only if the person notifies the commissioner or chief executive about the matters in subsections (3) and (6) …, in a statutory declaration given within the required time.

(5)   The required time is 28 days after whichever of the following is first given to the person—

(a)   a written notice from the commissioner or chief executive alleging a camera-detected offence;

(b)   an infringement notice under the State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999.

(6) For subsection (3)(b)(ii) a person must prove that—

(a) at the time the offence happened, the person—

(i) exercised reasonable control over the vehicle’s use; and

(ii) had in place a reasonable way of finding out the name and address of the person in charge of the vehicle at any given time having regard to—

(A)   the number of drivers; and

(B)   the amount and frequency of use; and

(C)   whether the vehicle was driven for business or private use; and

(b) after the offence happened, the person made proper search and enquiry to ascertain the name and address of the person in charge of the vehicle at the time the offence happened.

  1. [34]
    The magistrate apparently accepted an offence of speeding occurred and was detected by a photographic camera device; the respondent had been sent an infringement notice for an offence of speeding; the respondent failed to provide a statutory declaration within 28 days of receiving that infringement notice; and the respondent is deemed to be the person to have committed that offence of speeding the subject of the infringement notice he was sent.[8]
  1. [35]
    These findings were evidenced by the documentary evidence:
  1. (a)
    Exhibit 1 – Three photographic images depicting the vehicle the subject of the offence and the Instrument of Delegation number D25.13;
  1. (b)
    Exhibit 2 – Certificate (Photographic Detection Device - Test) under the hand of Stephen J. Embelton, Senior Sergeant, Traffic Camera Office dated 4 November 2015;
  1. (c)
    Exhibit 3 – A certified copy of the Instrument of Delegation numbers D25.36 and D25.13 and a Certificate (Camera Site Number of the Traffic Camera Coding Manual) under the hand of Stephen J. Embelton, Senior Sergeant, Traffic Camera Office dated 4 November 2015;
  1. (d)
    Exhibit 4 – Certificate (Vehicle Identification – Exceeding the Speed Limit) under the hand of Stephen J. Embelton, Senior Sergeant, Traffic Camera Office dated 4 November 2015 and Instrument of Delegation – Set 2 of 2;
  1. (e)
    Exhibit 5 – Certificate under the hand of Claire Patricia Kearney, Prosecution Officer, Department of Transport and Main Roads, dated 2 November 2015;
  1. (f)
    Exhibit 6 – Certificate (Service of Infringement Notice – Exceeding the Speed Limit), under the hand of Stephen J. Embelton, Senior Sergeant, Traffic Camera Office dated 4 November 2015;
  1. (g)
    Exhibit 7 – Certificate (No Declaration Given – Exceeding the Speed Limit) under the hand of Stephen J. Embelton, Senior Sergeant, Traffic Camera Office dated 4 November 2015.
  1. [36]
    However, the magistrate found no evidence linking the Infringement Notice (identified by number only in exhibits 4, 6 and 7) with the offence detected in the photographic image in exhibit 1 and concluded “there is nothing from which I could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the offence of speeding, the subject of the infringement notice, is the speeding offence shown in Exhibit 1.”
  1. [37]
    Her Honour concluded that the prosecution had failed to satisfy the Court that the respondent was the person in charge of the vehicle depicted in the offence (depicted in exhibit 1) and dismissed the charge.

Discussion

  1. [38]
    The person in charge of the vehicle in relation to an alleged offence means “the responsible operator” being “a person nominated as responsible operator under section 170 or a person corresponding to a responsible operator under a corresponding transport law.”[9]
  1. [39]
    Section 114, subsections (3) and (3A) of the Act provide the defences available to discharge liability for the offence including proof that the respondent was not the driver of the vehicle at the time the offence happened. These defences were only available to the respondent if he had notified the commissioner or chief executive about the matters in subsections (3) and (6) or subsection (3A) in a statutory declaration within 28 days after receiving the infringement notice.[10] 
  1. [40]
    An Infringement Notice issued pursuant to section 113A(2)(b) of the Act is taken for the State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999 to be an infringement notice served by an authorised person under that Act.[11]  An infringement notice for an ‘infringement notice offence’ involving a vehicle may be served on the owner of the vehicle by post.[12]
  1. [41]
    A failure to provide the requisite statutory declaration would have the effect of deeming the registered owner as the person in charge of the vehicle involved in the offence at the time the offence happened, even though the actual offender may have been someone else. Clearly, this could only be triggered by due notice of the relevant infringement notice.
  1. [42]
    Section 157(2) of the State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999 provides that a certificate purporting to be signed by or for an administering authority and stating an infringement notice was served in a stated way on a stated person for a stated infringement notice offence is evidence of that matter.
  1. [43]
    There is no dispute that Infringement Notice No. 2026936461 was served on the respondent by post for the offence of exceeding the speed limit or that he failed to provide the requisite declaration.
  1. [44]
    However, for the respondent as the registered owner of the trailer to be culpable for the offence pursuant to section 114 it was critical to prove that the infringement notice served on the respondent was for the alleged offence.
  1. [45]
    It is clear that the photographic evidence (exhibit 1) depicted a car towing a trailer. The registration number of the car was obscured by the trailer. The trailer’s registration number is depicted as “570QJS” and it is registered to the respondent. The notation on the photographic image recorded the offence as occurring at 10:20:44 am on 12 May 2015 in lane 4 on Mulgrave Road, Mooroobool, being site code 883304. The document records a travel speed of 70 km/hr in a speed limited area of 60 km/hr. There was no evidence of the identity of the person who was in charge of the vehicle. The case could only be sustained by pursuing the respondent as registered owner of the trailer in reliance upon the deeming provisions after proper notice of the alleged offence.
  1. [46]
    The difficulty facing the magistrate was that there was dearth of evidence linking the alleged offence with the infringement notice served upon the respondent. The best evidence about the infringement notice is found in exhibits 4, 6 and 7 as follows:
  1. Exhibit 4 provided:  “I certify that Infringement Notice Number 2026936461 for the offence of Exceeding The Speed Limit involved vehicle bearing registration number 570 QJS.”
  1. Exhibit 6 provided: “I certify that Infringement Notice Number 2026936461 was sent by mail to HAROLD EDWARD MESSER for the offence of Exceeding The Speed Limit.”
  1. Exhibit 7 provided: “I certify that HAROLD EDWARD MESSER, having been served with an Infringement Notice Number 2026936461 for the offence of Exceeding The Speed Limit, has not given the Commissioner notification by a way of valid Statutory Declaration, within 28 days from the Infringement Notice issue date in compliance with Section 114 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management Act 1995.”
  1. [47]
    At best the evidence about the infringement notice (in exhibits 4, 6 and 7) only provided a broad and general description of the offence as “Exceeding The Speed Limit” involving the trailer but there is no further particulars of the offence to link it to the other evidence.
  1. [48]
    The deficiency in the evidence could have been easily overcome by including a true copy of the relevant infringement notice in the certificate. In that event, the court could have gleaned the particulars of the offending as endorsed in the infringement notice itself. Alternatively, the offence could have been better described within the relevant certificates with proper particularity.
  1. [49]
    As the evidence stood, there was no direct evidence linking the infringement notice and the alleged offence. Further, I am unable to find any other basal facts upon which the magistrate could have properly drawn an inference without engaging in speculation or guesswork.
  1. [50]
    Put simply, the prosecution failed to prove its case to the requisite standard beyond reasonable doubt.

Conclusion

  1. [51]
    For these reasons, it seems to me that the verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence, and according to law. I therefore dismiss the appeal.

Judge Dean P. Morzone QC

Footnotes

[1] Pursuant to section 113A of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 and in accordance with the provisions in section 14 of the State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999.

[2] White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121 at [8] per Morrison JA (Muir JA & Atkinson J agreed)

[3] White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121 at [4] per Morrison JA (Muir JA & Atkinson J agreed)

[4] White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121 at [8] per Morrison JA (Muir JA & Atkinson J agreed)

[5] Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 223(2)

[6] Suttor v Gundowda Pty Limited (1950) 81 CLR 418 at 438; Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 8-9 and Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447 at [51].

[7] R v Stoneman [2013] QCA 209 (affirming Stoneman v The Commissioner of Police (unreported, 2012 District Court of Qld, 30 November 2012, Kingham DCJ)

[8] Decision, page 3.

[9] Section 113 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995.

[10] Section 114(4) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995, see also discussion in Attorney-General (Old) v Morris & Anor [2015] QCA 112

[11] Section 113A(3) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995.

[12] Section 14 and Schedule 2 of the State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Queensland Police Service v Messer

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Queensland Police Service v Messer

  • MNC:

    [2016] QDC 214

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Morzone DCJ

  • Date:

    26 Aug 2016

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Attorney-General v Morris [2015] QCA 112
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QCA 112
Cite 2 - [2015] QCA 112
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) 162 CLR 1
Cite 2 - (1986) 162 CLR 1
McKay v Dedman [2015] QDC 55
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QDC 55
Cite 2 - [2015] QDC 55
R v Stoneman [2013] QCA 209
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCA 209
Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 C.L.R., 418
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1950) 81 C.L.R., 418
Cite 2 - (1950) 81 C.L.R., 418
Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 200 ALR 447
Cite 2 - (2003) 200 ALR 447
White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QCA 121
Cite 2 - [2014] QCA 121
Cite 3 - [2014] QCA 121
Cite 4 - [2014] QCA 121

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Thang Long Pty Ltd v CTS Sunstate Group Pty Ltd [2022] QCATA 182 citations
1

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