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- BAS (QLD) Pty Ltd v Complete Taxi Management Pty Ltd[2016] QDC 54
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BAS (QLD) Pty Ltd v Complete Taxi Management Pty Ltd[2016] QDC 54
BAS (QLD) Pty Ltd v Complete Taxi Management Pty Ltd[2016] QDC 54
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | BAS (QLD) Pty Ltd v Complete Taxi Management Pty Ltd [2016] QDC 54 |
PARTIES: | BAS (QLD) Pty Ltd Trading as Northstar Motor Group (appellant) v Complete Taxi Management Pty Ltd. (respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | 4604/15 |
DIVISION: | Appellate |
PROCEEDING: | Appeal |
ORIGINATING COURT: | Magistrates Court in Brisbane |
DELIVERED ON: | 17 March 2016 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 24 February 2016 |
JUDGE: | Kingham DCJ |
ORDER: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES – NATURE OF RIGHT – APPEALS IN THE STRICT SENSE AND APPEALS – where appeal pursuant to s 45(1)(a) of the MCA 1921 – where appeal from decision to refuse an application for summary judgment – where appeal in the strict sense pursuant to UCPR s 765(2)– where respondent relied on inadmissible affidavits at the original hearing – where respondent subsequently amended its defence - whether it is in the interests of justice to exercise discretion pursuant to UCPR to conduct an appeal by way of rehearing. APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW – WRONG PRINCIPLE – where the appellant claims payment for goods supplied – where the appellant applied for summary judgement – where the appellant’s application was refused – where the appellant argued the learned Magistrate failed to apply the correct test - whether the learned magistrate failed to apply the correct test for a summary judgment application. PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF – where plaintiff applied for summary judgment for payment for goods supplied – where defendant argued the plaintiff had not proved delivery of the goods – where the defence pleaded inaccuracy in the invoices and supply and return of goods not ordered - where it had a real prospect of defending the claim – whether judgment should be entered for the plaintiff. Evidence Act 1977 s 83, s 84 Magistrates Court Act 1921 s 45 Sale of Goods Act 1896 s 37 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r765 Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552, applied.. Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1352, followed. Cassatone Nominees Pty Ltd v Queenslandwide House and Building Reports Pty Ltd & Ors [2008] QCA 102, applied. Chen v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2001] QSC 43, followed. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005]2 Qd R 232, applied. Elliott v R [2007] HCA 51, applied. Hanson Construction Materials P/L v Davey & Anor [2010] QCA 246, applied. Kambarbakis v G & L Scaffold Contracting P/L [2008] QCA 262, applied. Logan v Woongarra Shire Council [1983] 2 Qd R 689, applied. |
COUNSEL: | S Hartwell for the Appellant. |
SOLICITORS: | Hartwell Lawyers for the Appellant. C M Tam, RB Lawyers for the Respondent. |
- [1]BAS (Qld) Pty Ltd, trading as Northstar Motor Group, supplied motor parts to Complete Taxi Management Pty Ltd for use in maintaining its taxis; a fleet of Volkswagen Passat station wagons. On 6 November 2015, a Magistrate dismissed Northstar’s application for summary judgment against CTM for payment for parts it says it supplied to CTM.
- [2]Northstar argues the learned Magistrate applied the wrong test; had regard to irrelevant and inadmissible evidence; and erred in finding there was a need for a trial because of disputed issues.
- [3]For reasons which follow, I have allowed the appeal, and reheard and granted the application for summary judgment. I will allow the parties to make brief written submissions on costs within 7 days of publication of this judgment.
What is the nature of the appeal and what evidence can be considered?
- [4]Northstar raised a preliminary question about the nature of the appeal and, consequently what pleadings and evidence must be considered on appeal.
- [5]The appeal is brought pursuant to s 45(1)(a) of the Magistrates Court Act 1921. Rule 765(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules provides that an appeal from a decision, other than a final decision in a proceeding, is brought by way of an appeal.[1] That is an appeal in the strict sense, where the only question is whether the judgment complained of was correct when it was given.[2]
- [6]An application for summary judgment is an interlocutory application, but the effect of the decision will determine whether or not it is a final decision within the meaning of r765(2). [3] The decision to refuse the application for summary judgment did not determine the rights of the parties on Northstar’s claim. As such, it was not a final decision in the proceeding before the Magistrates Court, which is ongoing.
- [7]On a strict appeal, Northstar argued I would have to consider the matter only by reference to the pleadings as they stood at the time the application was heard and excluding any evidence that was inadmissible, because of the state of the pleadings at that time.
- [8]When the application was heard, CTM’s defence pleaded non-admissions that parts were ordered, supplied or invoiced as alleged. Rule 165(2) provides that a party who pleads a non-admission may not give or call evidence in relation to a fact not admitted, unless the evidence relates to another part of the party’s pleading. At the original hearing, CTM relied on affidavits which disputed the accuracy of the invoices and referred to a stocktake and the return of certain parts.
- [9]As the Defence pleaded only non-admissions, Northstar argued evidence about these matters was not admissible on the summary judgment application. After the hearing, CTM filed an amended Defence which did plead those matters. However, Northstar submitted, I could not consider either the amended Defence or Northstar’s affidavits because the amendment to the pleading post-dated the hearing. That seems to follow from applying r765(2).
- [10]However, the Court may conduct a rehearing of a decision which is not a final decision in a proceeding, if satisfied it is in the interests of justice to proceed in that way.[4] The purpose of the UCPR is to facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues in civil proceedings at minimum expense.[5] The courts apply the rules with the objective of avoiding undue delay, expense or technicality and facilitating their purpose.[6] I accept the merit of Northstar’s argument on a technical application of the rules relating to pleading non-admissions. However, the purpose of the rules is not to prevent the trial of issues that are genuinely in dispute.[7]
- [11]Should Northstar succeed on appeal in securing judgment against CTM, it would have the benefit of a final decision in the proceeding. Where a party can improve its position by proper amendment to the pleading, the jurisdiction to enter judgment on a summary basis should be exercised with caution.[8] CTM filed an amended Defence after the decision under appeal. Northstar concedes it does provide a basis for admitting the contested evidence. It has since filed its Reply. Given those considerations, I consider it is in the interests of justice for the appeal to proceed by way of rehearing on all of the material before her Honour and with reference to the pleadings as they now stand.
Should the appeal be allowed?
- [12]Implicit in my reasoning on the preliminary point is my acceptance that the disputed evidence should not have been considered by the learned Magistrate on the pleadings as they then stood. CTM could have, but did not, foreshadow an amended Defence to properly raise those matters addressed in its affidavits. However, that could easily enough be remedied. It is not unusual for courts to allow a respondent to a summary judgment application reasonable time to file an amended pleading in proper form. If this were the only issue with the original hearing, I would not allow the appeal.
- [13]However, I am persuaded that her Honour did not apply the correct test in considering the application.
- [14]The Court has a discretion pursuant to r292(2) to give judgment for the plaintiff on all or part of its claim if it is satisfied that:
- (a)the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending all or part of the claim; and
- (b)there is no need for a trial of the claim or part of the claim.
- [15]The nub of Northstar’s complaint is that the learned Magistrate considered she could not give judgment on a summary basis if there was any dispute between the parties. She did not consider whether CTM had a real, as opposed to fanciful prospect of successfully defending all or part of the claim. [9]
- [16]Given her Honour’s very concise reasons for her decision, I have also had regard to her exchanges with the parties’ representatives during the hearing. More than once, she made reference to a lay down misere case.[10] Although she observed the material raised substantial issues,[11] after hearing argument about what dispute was actually raised by the material, she noted the court’s reluctance to enter judgment if there is any dispute.[12] Counsel for CTM encouraged this incorrect formulation of the test by arguing the case was not a lay down misere.[13]
- [17]Respectfully, I consider this submission by counsel for CTM, as well as the following matters, led her Honour into error. Counsel for CTM did not meet Northstar’s objection to the defence affidavits. Nor did he address her Honour on Northstar’s argument about nature of the defence as then pleaded. He did not seek leave to amend CTM’s defence. He misapprehended Northstar’s submissions as being relevant only on a strike out application. His written submissions did not address the terms of the defence at all.
- [18]Ultimately the learned Magistrate said she was not satisfied that Northstar had established a prima facie case for judgment, but not why. The learned Magistrate referred to a clear dispute and to substantial issues, without either identifying them or discussing how they affected Northstar’s pleaded case. Although the court is not expected to engage in a trial of a claim on a summary judgment application, it does require a detailed analysis in order to determine whether a defence has a real prospect of success.[14] The learned Magistrate did not identify why she concluded CTM had a real as opposed to fanciful prospect of successfully defending Northstar’s claim or part of it. Respectfully, I consider the learned Magistrate was distracted from applying the proper legal test in assessing Northstar’s application for summary judgment.
- [19]Accordingly, I will allow the appeal and rehear the application.
Has Northstar led prima facie evidence of its claim?
- [20]Northstar’s Statement of Claim pleads that between 1 October 2014 and 16 April 2015 it supplied certain motor parts to CTM on terms that it pay within 60 days of the date of the tax invoice issued by Northstar upon supply of the parts.[15] The amount owing for parts supplied and invoiced, but not paid for despite demand, is $85,629.39.[16]
- [21]Northstar led evidence about the practice adopted by both it and CTM in the course of their dealings.
- [22]Robert Aldons was the dealer principal for Northstar from 1 August 2000 and its Managing Director from 1 July 2012. He described Northstar’s business process at paragraph [6] of his affidavit. Ordinarily, either Owen Turner, Northstar’s workshop supervisor, or Maria Collins, a Director and Manager of CTM, would place their order by telephone call to Michael Walker, Northstar’s parts interpreter. Mr Walker, or another Northstar employee if they took the call, would prepare a quote and use their quote number as the order number in the Volkswagen Parts Ordering System. When the parts arrived from Volkswagen, a Northstar employee, usually the sales representative Michael West, would print out the quote and check the parts against the quote. He would then receipt those parts into the Northstar system and prepare and print an invoice to CTM. The invoice would be given to the delivery driver, during the relevant period this was usually Justin Sasche, who would gather the parts and deliver them, with the invoice, to CTM.
- [23]Mr Aldons’ reviewed Northstar’s books of account and records. He exhibited the relevant invoices, the ledger report for CTM and the monthly statements of account for CTM. CTM’s written submissions observed that Northstar had not met the requirements of s 95 of the Evidence Act in relation to the invoices. That section facilitates the admission of documents generated by a computer. However, counsel did not argue the point at the appeal hearing and did not object to the evidence being considered.
- [24]In any case, s 95 is not the only basis for admitting such evidence. They meet the definition of books of account[17] and are evidence of the matters, transactions and accounts recorded therein.[18] The invoices record the name of the client, the part number, a description of the part, the quantity ordered and shipped and its price. The ledger records amounts invoiced to CTM and payments received from that company. The monthly statements identified the invoice numbers which were issued in the month and payments made by CTM.
- [25]The invoices do not record the delivery of the invoiced items. However, Mr Aldons’ affidavit describes Northstar’s usual practice for ordering parts for customers, generating invoices and delivering the goods. Although the usual delivery driver did not give evidence, it is unlikely he would be able to recall specifically what parts he delivered on what date.
- [26]Owen Turner gave evidence about CTM’s ordering process. He spoke of a computer program called Taxi Manager which was used by CTM to track the ordering of stock for repairs and maintenance. The usual process was to generate a purchase order for the required parts and then to telephone Northstar (or any other supplier) and order the parts. Northstar’s practice was to record the purchase order on its invoice. Sometimes, when Mr Turner was busy, he would not generate a purchase order, but just order the parts. In that case, when the part arrived he would generate a purchase order and match Northstar’s invoice to it. This evidence explains what CTM relied on as a deficiency in some of the invoices, which did not include a purchase order number.
- [27]When the parts were delivered by Northstar, Mr Turner said the invoice was placed in his in-tray and either he or another CTM employee would check the parts delivered against the purchase order and the stock would be receipted into the system.
- [28]Although CTM argued the invoices were insufficient proof the goods had been ordered and delivered, the evidence is not confined to the invoices alone. As well as the invoices there is other documentary evidence of the subject transactions, as well as affidavit evidence about the usual course of dealings between Northstar and CTM, from persons who had knowledge of those dealings.
- [29]“To prove an act has been done, it is admissible to prove any general course of business or office, whether public or private, according to which it would ordinarily have been done, there being a probability that the general course will be followed in the particular case." [19]
- [30]With reference to Northstar’s invoices, monthly statements and ledger, Mr Aldons gave evidence that $107,584.03 was invoiced to CTM; that CTM paid $20,370.28 and that an amount of $85,629.39 remains unpaid.
- [31]Northstar has led prima facie evidence of its claim.
Is there no real prospect that CTM could successfully defend the claim or part of it?
- [32]Northstar does not have to demonstrate CTM’s defence is bound to fail, or cannot possibly succeed, or has no prospects of success or is hopeless.[20] Likewise, Northstar does not have to provide complete proof of its defence. It is enough to point to the existence of evidence which, if accepted, makes the prospect of a successful defence a real one.[21] The test applied on rehearing Northstar’s application is whether the defence has a real as opposed to fanciful prospect of success.
- [33]In summary, CTM alleges it is only liable to pay upon receipt of accurate invoices. It denies it is liable to pay on the invoices particularised, because it alleges they do not accurately record what was ordered by or delivered to CTM; and does not record parts that CTM returned.
(i) Does CTM’s liability to pay depend on Northstar delivering an accurate invoice?
- [34]In its amended Defence, CTM pleads it had no liability to pay for any ordered parts until the ordered parts were delivered and CTM received an invoice for delivered parts and no other parts.[22] The terms of the pleading are somewhat ambiguous as delivered parts could be read as either ordered parts, which had been delivered, or as both ordered parts and other parts that were not ordered, which had been delivered. The more sensible reading is to equate delivered parts with ordered parts which had been delivered.
- [35]Read in that way, as I apprehend the defence, CTM alleges Northstar agreed CTM did not have to pay for any parts which it ordered and which it had received, until Northstar provided an invoice which related only to parts it had ordered. If the invoice included parts which were not ordered, CTM was not liable to pay on the invoice, even for those parts which it had ordered and had received.
- [36]The primary affidavit filed by CTM is sworn by Maria Collins, a Director and Manager of CTM. She addresses the question of payment in paragraphs [25] to [30]. Her evidence is about the general practice adopted by CTM at various times, rather than the terms of CTM’s agreement with Northstar. She said CTM generally paid within 60 days of receiving a monthly account summary until about February 2015, when CTM moved to a cash on delivery basis.
- [37]Mr Aldons, the Managing Director and dealer principal for Northstar during the relevant period, swore the terms were as pleaded in the Statement of Claim. In its Further and Better Particulars, Northstar said the agreement about the terms of payment was an oral agreement reached between Mr Aldons and Gregory Collins, on behalf of CTM.
- [38]Mr Aldons said CTM adhered to the 60 day terms of payment until September 2014. In support of his evidence, he exhibited the ledger report for CTM from July 2012 until June 2015. Counsel for CTM did not argue Mr Aldons incorrectly represented the dealings recorded in the ledger report or that the ledger entries supported CTM’s defence.
- [39]On appeal, counsel for CTM noted the conflict between Ms Collins and Mr Aldons about whether payments were due on the invoices or the monthly statements was a reason there was a need for a trial of the claim. I do not accept that submission.
- [40]Ms Collins’ evidence that the monthly statements triggered the 60 days for payment is at odds with CTM’s Amended Defence, which was filed after her affidavit. It pleads that it was the invoices which triggered the liability to pay. CTM’s pleading, therefore, is consistent with Northstar’s on this point.
- [41]CTM produced no evidence of an agreement with Northstar that it only had to pay for ordered and delivered parts if it received an invoice which contained no reference to parts which had not been ordered. On the evidence before the court, CTM has no real prospect of defending the claim or part of it on that basis.
(ii) Should judgment be entered on the invoices?
- [42]CTM denies the invoices particularised in the Statement of Claim accurately record its liability to pay Northstar because the invoices do not accurately record the parts CTM ordered; the parts that were delivered to CTM; or the parts that CTM returned to Northstar.[23]
- [43]Dealing generally with the ordering system, Mr Aldon, Mr Turner and Ms Collins were consistent that parts were ordered by telephone. It is common ground that the only paper work generated by Northstar to document CTM’s orders were the invoices and the monthly statements. As the monthly statements only identify the invoice numbers and amounts, the invoices are the critical documents.
(a) Unordered parts
- [44]One aspect of CTM’s defence is that it received parts that it did not order. It pleaded it had the right to reject parts that it did not order and was not liable to pay for them.[24] CTM had received from and returned to Northstar some parts that it did not order.[25] CTM also pleaded that it intimated to the plaintiff that it did not accept other goods that it did not necessarily return and had no duty to return.[26] There is no evidence to support the proposition that CTM intimated it did not accept other unspecified goods. However, CTM has led specific evidence about some parts, which Northstar agrees have been provided to it by CTM.
- [45]In about April 2015, Joshua Gleeson, a CTM mechanic, did a stocktake. Attached to his affidavit is a list of parts that he said he returned over time to Northstar. That list appears to be the same as the list of returned parts identified in Annexure A to the Amended Defence.
- [46]Mr Gleeson did not identify the process he used to conduct the stocktake. Ms Collins said that she identified some parts that she did not order and specifically referred to tailgates and panels. Because these items are bulky and difficult to store safely, she only ordered them as required. It is not clear to me that any of the items in Annexure A are tailgates or panels. Certainly none are described as such. Ms Collins did not explain any other basis for identifying parts that CTM received but did not order.
- [47]In its Reply, Northstar denied CTM had a right to return those goods without liability to pay, because of the lapse of time between delivery and return and because of CTM’s failure to intimate it rejected the parts.[27] Northstar pleaded deemed acceptance of goods invoiced and delivered, pursuant to s 37 of the Sale of Goods Act 1896.
- [48]CTM has not related the parts returned to any of the invoices that Northstar has claimed for. Only one appears to be contained in those invoices: a Console, LH G/Box (V*1K0199117AM). A part matching that description appears on invoice no 619508. It was invoiced at least 8 months before its return. Most items were invoiced at least a year or more beforehand. The longest period alleged is about 4.5 years between delivery of a Mechanism (13/12/10) and its return (between 6/15 and 8/15). Further, Northstar has pleaded that it did not supply 5 of the items on the returned goods list and there is no evidence from CTM that Northstar was the source of those items.
- [49]The evidence given by Ms Collins and Mr Gleeson does not raise a real prospect of defeating Northstar’s claim on the basis that the claim relates to parts not ordered, which it had a right to return.
(b) Parts not delivered
- [50]CTM alleges it did not receive all the invoices Northstar relies on.[28] Ms Collins said that often deliveries occurred and no invoice was enclosed.[29] However, she was not specific about when this occurred and it is not clear that this complaint relates to any of the invoices which are the subject of the claim.
- [51]Further, CTM denies delivery of all of the parts Northstar invoiced.[30] The basis for the denial appears to be the allegation that the invoices do not accurately record the transactions.
- [52]Ms Collins has given some general evidence about inaccuracies in invoices or discrepancies in the delivery of parts and invoices, but has not related any examples to the invoices which are the subject of the claim.
- [53]Ms Collins said that occasionally Northstar did not have the full complement of parts ordered and then it would deliver what was in stock and place the balance on back order. However, the full order was invoiced and no other invoice provided. She does not say, though, that items placed on back order were not subsequently delivered. Nor has she alleged that a part invoiced was not delivered. Further, accepting that no other invoice was provided, she is not alleging she was charged twice for a part. At best, it might suggest that the 60 day payment period was triggered for back ordered parts before they were delivered.
- [54]Ms Collins also said that often deliveries occurred and no invoice was enclosed. It was only when the balance of the order arrived that the invoice was provided, but even then those invoices were not always accurate. If the invoice was not delivered until the balance of the order arrived, CTM was not liable to pay before the part had been delivered; rather the effect of Ms Collins’ evidence is that some parts were delivered before the invoice was issued. Her evidence that even then those invoices were not always accurate is so vague as to be almost meaningless. Ms Collins has not identified how they were inaccurate or even what period this experience relates to.
- [55]Ms Collins said monthly statements were not provided after October 2014 and that without them it was impossible to reconcile the accounts and keep track of the deliveries. Accepting that the monthly statements were not delivered, the invoices are the critical documents. In their pleadings, both parties allege the 60 day period in which to pay is triggered by the invoice, not the monthly statement.
- [56]The invoices are very particular and specific to the particular order. In contrast, the monthly statements are reconciliations of the trading relationship showing any amounts carried forward from previous months, the invoices issued in that month (by date, invoice number and amount) and any payments made during the month. Without the invoices themselves, the monthly statements could not assist CTM to keep track of deliveries of the ordered parts.
- [57]Northstar supplied CTM with copies of all the invoices relied upon in late August 2015. Despite this, Ms Collins has made only generalised assertions about inaccuracies. Further, she gave no evidence about CTM’s process for reconciling deliveries against invoices; when discrepancies were noted and, in those cases where there were discrepancies, what was done about that.
- [58]Ms Collins said CTM has no means of identifying which parts supplied by Northstar have been used on its taxis in the past. That is not the point, however. What is absent from CTM’s material is any basis for challenging Northstar’s material that the parts invoiced were ordered by CTM and delivered to it.
Is there any need for a trial of the claim or part of it?
- [59]The only arguments raised about the need for a trial have been disposed of in considering whether CTM has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim or part of it. There is nothing about the nature of the case itself that favours a trial, such as the need to make complex factual findings or to determine an issue of law that calls for full argument. Counsel for CTM did not raise any investigation or pre-trial process that would put CTM in a better position to resist Northstar’s case if there is a trial of the claim.
- [60]
- [61]Orders:
- The appeal is allowed.
- The decision made in the Magistrates Court in Brisbane on 6 November 2015 is set aside.
- Judgment is entered for the Plaintiff in the sum of $85,629.39.
- The parties have leave to file brief written submissions on costs within 7 days.
Footnotes
[1] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) r765 applies by operation of r785
[2] Logan v Woongarra Shire Council [1983] 2 Qd R 689
[3] Kambarbakis v G & L Scaffold Contracting P/L [2008] QCA 262 at [31]
[4] UCPR r765(4)
[5] UCPR r5(1)
[6] UCPR r5(2)
[7] Hanson Construction Materials P/L v Davey & Anor [2010] QCA 246 at [15]
[8] Chen v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2001] QSC 43 at [1]
[9] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005]2 Qd R 232 at [10] to [17]
[10] Transcript of hearing 1 – 4 l25 – l28 & l45
[11] Transcript of hearing 1 – 4 l33
[12] Transcript of hearing 1 – 5 l4 - 5
[13] Transcript of hearing 1 – 6 l17
[14] Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1352 at [48]
[15] Statement of Claim (3)
[16] Statement of Claim (4)(5)(6)
[17] Evidence Act 1977 s 83
[18] Evidence Act 1977 s 84
[19] Heydon, Cross On Evidence, 7th Aust ed (2004) at [1130] cited with approval as a basic proposition in Elliott v R [2007] HCA 51 at [8]
[20] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005]2 Qd R 232 at [10]
[21] Cassatone Nominees Pty Ltd v Queenslandwide House and Building Reports Pty Ltd & Ors [2008] QCA 102 at [46]
[22] Amended Defence (2)(b)(ii)
[23] Amended Defence (3)(a)(i)(ii)(iii)(iv)
[24] Amended Defence (2)(b)(v)
[25] Amended Defence (3)(d)(e)(f); Annexure A
[26] Amended Defence (3)(g).
[27] Reply [2(c)]
[28] Amended Defence (3)(a)(v)
[29] Ms Collins’ Affidavit at paragraph [24]
[30] Amended Defence (3)(a)
[31] At the conclusion of the appeal hearing I reserved judgment. Neither party asked for the opportunity to put further material before me. I am aware that CTM has since filed a further affidavit in the appeal proceedings. The parties were advised through my associate that I would not consider any material filed after the hearing unless an application was made and granted for leave to lead further evidence. No such application was made.
[32] Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 at [57]