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Mar v Queensland Building & Construction Commission[2017] QDC 304

Mar v Queensland Building & Construction Commission[2017] QDC 304

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Mar v Queensland Building & Construction Commission [2017] QDC 304

PARTIES:

ZLATKO MAR

(Appellant)

QUEENSLAND BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION COMMISSION

(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

876/17

DIVISION:

 

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court, Caboolture

DELIVERED ON:

15 December 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

26 October 2017 and 8 December 2017

JUDGE:

Dearden DCJ

ORDER:

1.Appeal granted.

2.Order that a default period of two months’ imprisonment be imposed in respect of each of the following restitution orders (for which no default period was imposed in the Magistrates Court):

Roberts$45,618.75

Heckenberg$70,899.89

Watkins$37,125.00

Taplin$28,500

Grainger$43,500

3.Otherwise confirm the orders made by the learned magistrate at Caboolture on 13 February, 2017.

CATCHWORDS:

LEGISLATION:

CASES:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – where the appellant pleaded guilty before the learned magistrate to 33 offences under the Queensland Building and Construction Act 1991 – where the learned magistrate imposed a global fine of $100,000 in respect of all 33 offences, legal costs of $4,446.25 (in default two years imprisonment for fine and costs) and six restitution orders totalling $225,643.64 – the fine, legal costs and restitution orders were all referred to the State Penalties Enforcement Registry for recovery action – whether the sentence is manifestly excessive – whether the restitution that was ordered is unfair

Justices Act 1886 ss. 222E, 223, 224

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, ss. 5, 5A, 35, 36, 37, 48, 181B

Penalties and Sentences Regulation 2005, s. 3

State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999, ss. 9, 34, 36, 37, 41, 52, 52A, 63, 119, 120, 155, schedule 2

State Penalties Enforcement Regulation 2014 ss. 24, 25

Queensland Building and Construction Act 1991, ss. 42, 51, Schedule 1B

Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132

McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255

R v Matauaina [2011] QCA 344

COUNSEL:

L Menolotto for the appellant

C Minnery for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Towns-Wilson Lawyers for the appellant

Queensland & Building Construction Commission for the respondent

  1. [1]
    The appellant pleaded guilty before the learned magistrate at the Caboolture Magistrates Court on 13 February 2017 to 33 offences pursuant to the Queensland Building and Construction Act 1991 (Qld) ‘QBCCA’, as follows:

Counts

Charges

Legislation

10

Unlawfully carrying out building work

QBCCA 1991 s. 42(1)

6

Improper use of a license card, certificate, number or PIN

QBCCA 1991 s. 51(2)

3

Failing to provide a commencement notice

QBCCA 1991 Schedule 1B s. 16

3

Failing to provide a copy of the Consumer Building Code

QBCCA Schedule 1B s. 18

6

Commencing services before completing the requirements of a regulated contract

QBCCA Schedule 1B s. 30

5

Demanding or receiving a deposit in excess of the allowed amount for a regulated 1 or regulated 2 contract

QBCCA Schedule 1B s. 33.

  1. [2]
    The sentence imposed was as follows:
  1. (1)
    Global fine for all offences - $100,000; and
  1. (2)
    Legal costs $4,446.25 (in default two years imprisonment for fine and costs);
  1. (3)
    Restitution:
  1. (a)
    Roberts  $45,618.75

(referred to State Penalties Enforcement Registry)

  1. (b)
    Heckenberg $70,899.89

(referred to State Penalties Enforcement Registry)

  1. (c)
    Watkins $37,125

(referred to State Penalties Enforcement Registry)

  1. (d)
    Taplin  $28,500

(referred to State Penalties Enforcement Registry)

  1. (e)
    Grainger  $43,500

(referred to State Penalties Enforcement Registry)

Total Restitution -   $225,643.64

  1. [3]
    The fine and legal costs, as well as the five restitution orders were all referred to the State Penalties Enforcement Registry (SPER) for recovery action.

Notification to the Complainants

  1. [4]
    Pursuant to Justices Act s. 222E(2):

“At least 10 days before a District Court judge hears the appeal, the relevant registrar must give notice of the hearing of the appeal to each interested person.”

  1. [5]
    S. 222E(3) defines “interested person” to mean:

“The person in whose favour the order was made or who benefitted from the operation.”

  1. [6]
    In this appeal, the five sets of complainants in whose favour restitution orders were made, were each an “interested person”, and it was common ground that the registrar had not given the appropriate notice of the hearing of the appeal to each of those persons.
  1. [7]
    However, Mr Minnery, who appears on behalf of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission (QBCC) had taken the precaution of sending letters to each of the complainants dated 22 June 2017, setting out, in detail, information in respect of the appeal, the consequences of the appeal and the effect of the appellant appealing in respect of the restitution order.[1]
  1. [8]
    Justices Act s. 224(1)(b) relevantly provides that:

“For an appeal, a District Court judge may, on the application of a party or the judge’s own initiative—

…

  1. (b)
    make orders and give directions about service of any notice and about any procedure;

…”

  1. [9]
    Accordingly, at the appeal hearing on 26 October, 2017, I ordered that the delivery of the letters dated 22 June 2017 to each of the five complainants by the Queensland Building and Construction Commission be considered sufficient service for the purposes of Justices Act s. 222E(2).

The law – appeals

  1. [10]
    Justices Act s. 223(1) provides:
  1. (1)
    “An appeal under s. 222 is by way of re-hearing on the evidence (original evidence) given in the proceeding before the justices.
  1. (2)
    However the District Court may give leave to adduce fresh, additional or substituted evidence (new evidence) if the court is satisfied there are special grounds for giving leave.”
  1. [11]
    The Court of Appeal in Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132 (per SofronoffP, with whom Gotterson and Morrison JJA agreed), summarised the approach of an appellate court pursuant to Justices Act s. 223 as follows:

“…An appellate court hearing an appeal by way of re-hearing must conduct a real review of the evidence and make up its own mind about the case. That has been established by numerous cases: see for example Fox v Percy [2003] 214 CLR 118; Warren v Coombes [1979] 142 CLR 531; Dwyer v Calco Timbers [2008] 234 CLR 124. Consequently the learned District Court judge had to consider each of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant and, having regard to the evidence led in the Magistrate Court and paying due regard to the advantage that the learned magistrate in seeing the witnesses give evidence, determined for himself the facts of the case and the legal consequences that followed from such findings of fact.”

  1. [12]
    In McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255, Bowskill J addressed the process for a District Court Judge dealing with an appeal under Justices Act s. 222 in the following similar terms:

“It is well established that, on an appeal under [Justices Act] s. 222 by way of re-hearing, the District Court is required to conduct a real review of the trial, and the magistrate’s reasons and make its own determination of relevant facts and issue from the evidence, giving due deference and attaching a good deal of weight to the magistrate’s view. (Fox v Percy [2003] 214 CLR 118 at [25]; Row v Kemper {2009] 1 Qd R 247 at [3]; White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121 at [6]). Nevertheless, in order to succeed on such an appeal, the appellate must establish some legal, factual or discretionary error (Fox v Percy [2003] 214 CLR 118 at [27]; Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] 2 Qd R 489 at [4]; Commissioner of Police v Al Shakarji [2013] QCA 319 at [7], [65]; White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121 at [8]).[2]

  1. [13]
    In the appeal before me, there was no application to adduce new evidence, and consequently the appeal proceeds solely on the exhibits and submissions before the learned magistrate at the sentence hearing.

Grounds of appeal

  1. [14]
    The applicant’s grounds of appeal are as follows:-
  1. (1)
    The sentence is manifestly excessive and crushing given the extent of the unlicensed building works and other associated offences; and
  1. (2)
    The restitution that was ordered was unfair given that the complainants have received building works as well as materials and that no quotes or estimates for the losses that the victims have actually suffered was presented to the court and no prior details of estimates or calculations was provided to the defendant. The total of amounts paid to the defendant was ordered to be paid as restitution.[3]

Basis of sentence

  1. [15]
    The sentence proceeded by way of an agreed “Schedule of Fact”[4]as well as oral submissions from the prosecution and defence counsel. The Schedule of Fact may conveniently be quoted in its entirety:-

“Offences

The defendant is charged with 33 offences under the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991.

10xUnlawfully carrying out building work, pursuant to s. 42(1) QBCC Act, maximum penalty 250 penalty units

6xImproper use of a license card, certificate, number or PIN, pursuant to s 51(2) QBCC Act, maximum penalty 250 penalty units

3xFailing to provide a commencement notice, pursuant to s 16 of Schedule 1B QBCC Act, 40 penalty units.

3xFailing to provide a copy of the consumer building code, pursuant to s 18 of Schedule 1B QBCC Act, maximum penalty 20 penalty units

6xCommencing services before completing the requirements of a regulated contract, pursuant to s 30 of Schedule 1B QCC Act, maximum penalty 100 penalty units

5xDemanding or receiving a deposit in excess of the allowed amount for a regulated 1 or regulated 2 contract, pursuant to s 33 of Schedule 1B QBCC Act, maximum penalty, 100 penalty units.”

These charges have proceded by way of complaint and summons, and the global maximum penalty is $643,632 for all 33 offences.

Facts

The defendant met Michael Russell in late 2014, and learned that he was a tiler and bathroom renovator, who nevertheless held an open QBCC building license.

Over time, the defendant convinced Mr Russell, who was struggling financially, that the defendant had significant expertise in finance and company structuring, and MrRussell’s open license was a valuable source of income.

Mr Russell agreed to be a nominee for the defendant and signed a form to this effect. Whilst the defendant promised to post the form to the QBCC, the defendant in fact never did so.

The defendant then used Mr Russell’s license without Mr Russell’s express consent, in relation to five properties. The defendant used the license number to create contracts with MR Lifestyle Constructions as the builder, although this company was not connected with Mr Russell and did not hold a license, but the advertising material used to draw in the clients, and the paperwork otherwise was given a thin veneer of legitimacy by the defendant using Mr Russell’s QBCC license number. Mr Russell in fact never new of at least three of the building sites, and learned of the fourth much after significant works had been done, and had limited involvement with the fifth.

The properties and the contracts entered into were:

  • 29 Lowry Street, Woorim – extension of dwelling work, internal renovation (bathroom), shed construction – in the sum of $149,000 and separate plans and approvals in the sum of $5,000.
  • 174 Bestmann Road East, [Sandstone Point] – renovating a pergola – in the sum of $9,5000 – and a home renovation contract in the sum of $28,000.
  • 27 Doomba Drive, Bongaree – construction of a front deck and pergola – in the sum of $31,500 ($24,500 in cash, $7,000 by trading a boat) and renovating a bathroom to the value of $15,000.
  • 12 Tripcony [Street], Bellara – 38 square metre addition to residence and deck extension – in the sum of $89,000
  • 1 Cassia Avenue, Banksia Beach – extension to dwelling contract in the sum of $48,550 and a separate colourbond fence and concrete retaining wall in the sum of $8,750.

This is serious offending, in that the QBCC requires building work of a value of $3,300 or more to be undertaken by a licensee. The defendant does not hold, nor has he ever applied for, a QBCC license, and regardless he entered into contracts with a front company over five properties, where the works contracted for are worth between $8,750 and $149,000.

The defendant entered into the building contracts in relation to each of the five properties by attending the properties, selling his services as a builder of quality and giving assurances that the work would be properly done and done quickly, for reduced cost. He again used Mr Russell’s QBCC license number to provide his selling of building services an air of legitimacy. Mr Russell’s QBCC number was used on quotes, contracts and invoices by the defendant in this way. The effect of that license number was to reassure the clients, as when some of them conducted searches on the license number, they found Mr Russell’s name and a lack of adverse entries or warnings about the license number. The defendant would explain away the use of MrRussell’s name, and persist with the contract and the building work.

The work performed at each property was substandard. On inspection after the offending had been revealed it was generally unable to be certified, and required either extensive repairs or reworking to be of sufficient quality, or otherwise required to be torn down and destroyed and started again. Each of the five homeowners are left with substandard, partially complete work, for which they have paid thousands of dollars, and will need to find thousands of dollars more in order to finish the works, or re-do the works to a standard which would allow certification.

The defendant gave Mr Russell assurances as to the proper use of license, and proper supervision of his work, but was lying to Mr Russell – Mr Russell did not know many of the building sites existed, and was not allowed to speak to the clients at another. He was barely at either of the two sites he did know about (learning about one of those very late in the piece) and his attendance was controlled by the defendant.

Similarly the defendant lied to the clients, drawing the works out over time and attending the sites primarily to obtain money from each set of clients as progress payments, material payments or the like. He would lie about issues with suppliers or issues with supplies being delivered to the wrong address, and make other excuses as the work progressed past deadlines, and as there was less and less work being done on each site. Deadlines set by the clients, as to when they needed a functioning bathroom or a completed roof repair or similar issues were passed and the defendant offered more excuses.

As the defendant’s offending came to light, he lied to Mr Russell that it was “with legal”, would be alright and his license was not being improperly used. He continued to use Mr Russell’s license for about two months after Mr Russell specifically told him to stop using it.

On the attendance of investigators from the QBCC, the defendant lied in saying that he was waiting on his replacement QBCC license – the defendant in fact did not hold, and never has held a QBCC license. Later, the defendant lied to investigators about the existence of quotes for each job, saying the quotes were verbal when in fact written quotes were provided on MR Lifestyle Constructions paperwork in some instances.

The defendant was the primary offender. It was he who sought out Mr Russell and particularly Mr Russell’s QBCC license, and it was he who entered into the contracts, on false pretences, with each of the five homeowners. The defendant maintained the excuses and kept up, personally, demands for payment at each property, and drew in each home owner with his offending.

The effect on each of the home owners is relevant to sentence. All of them have suffered stress and anxiety, and embarrassment at the state of their homes, and continue to suffer this as the litigation continues and as they engage with insurers to try and fix their homes. Victim impact statements are relied on, including the medical issues suffered by Mr Grainger being compounded by the offending of the defendant, and Ms Watkins’ cancer treatment being affected. The defendant has picked or targeted particularly vulnerable people – all are retirees, some are quite elderly, and all of them drew down on savings or on their superannuation or other retirement funds to fund the building works.

It is also relevant that on 9 February 2016, the defendant was issued a QBCC Direction that he must cease all building works in the state of Queensland. The defendant continued to perform work at 29 Lowry Street, Woorim (the Taplin property) in flagrant disregard of this direction.

Parity

Two companies have been charged out of similar offending, and been dealt with before the courts.

MR Lifestyle Constructions faced 30 charges in total. The charges against that company were finalised on 31 August 2016 by being dealt with ex parte before His Honour Magistrate Duroux. A global fine of $150,000 was imposed, and MR Lifestyle Constructions was ordered to pay $934.00 in court costs.

TS Home Services faced nine charges in total. Those charges were also finalisedex parte before His Honour Magistrate Duroux on 31 August 2016. A global fine of $50,000 was imposed and TS Home Services was ordered to pay $934.00 in court costs.”

  1. [16]
    The plea proceeded ex parte, with the learned magistrate accepting the pleas of guilty in the absence of a personal appearance from the defendant. Mr Marais, solicitor, appeared on behalf of the defendant and confirmed the defendant’s signed instructions to accept the schedule of fact tendered by QBCC at the sentence hearing.[5]
  1. [17]
    Mr Minnery, who appeared on behalf of QBCC before the learned magistrate, tendered impact victim statements from Rodney and Susanne Roberts, Christine Watkins and Reynold Grainger. The effect of those victim impact statements is briefly addressed in the schedule of fact.
  1. [18]
    Mr Minnery in his oral submissions before the learned magistrate emphasised a number of matters:-
  1. That the appellant had a minor criminal history, albeit that it included a larceny from 1983 and an offence of failing to report a currency transfer from 2012, as well as a drug offence, which indicated “a history of dishonesty or like offending.”[6]
  1. The appellant, on meeting Mr Russell and realizing that he had an open builders’ license, with no adverse recordings against it, then approached five different families and used that license number to personally have them enter into a variety of building contracts up to a value of $149,000.[7]
  1. The appellant targeted retirees or people more advanced in age and his modus operandi [included] “fairly drastically.”[8]
  1. The complainants were assured by the defendant that the work was “being done cheaply, but also done quickly and being done well”; and that the license number was used on receipts, invoices and quotes.[9]
  1. The company MR Lifestyle Constructions was used generally but not always by the defendant to enter into the contracts with the complainants.[10]
  1. After the QBCC became aware of some of the activity, the defendant was banned from engaging in work and on at least one instance continued to work after receiving what amounted to a cease and desist order from the QBCC.[11]
  1. The appellant lied to QBCC investigators when asked for his license (claiming a replacement license was on its way), and further when he claimed that quotes could not be produced because they were verbal.[12]
  1. The sentence proceeded “on the basis that the defendant is the primary offender” and that;

“MR Lifestyle Constructions was a company used by him and used fairly extensively, and TS [Home Services] was another company which was used somewhat, but he [the appellant] is the primary offender. It is he who would enter into the contracts. It is he that gave the excuses. It is he that presented the false pretences that enabled the contracts to be entered into. It is he that offered the excuses and it’s he that kept them up, and it’s he that turned up and importantly asked for money from each of the five complainants. His assurances are what drew each set of homeowners into his offending.”[13]

  1. In terms of restitution, in relation to each of the complainants;

“no builder will touch them because generally the work has to be pulled down…or substantially pulled apart and redone…so the cost…to do the demolition or the deconstruction is significant.”[14]

  1. There had been no insurance payout to any of the people involved although claims were on foot, the consequence was that the complainants were;

“left with homes which are partially complete, with substandard work, with work that involves windows falling out or parts not being waterproofed or parts being unusable or at least completed to only the most minor standard without painting, without fittings, without doors in some cases – without function in some cases.”[15]

  1. In terms of the appropriate sentence, that the director of MR Lifestyle Constructions was Ms Tina Sellers, “the defendant’s partner from the information [Mr Minnery had]” although Mr Minnery understood that might be disputed. Ms Sellers [(Mr Minnery submitted)] had two properties worth in the vicinity of $750,000 or $700,000 purchased fairly recently in her sole name.[16]
  1. Conceded that he was unable to tell the court what the defendant’s income was but stressed that more than $200,000 of cash went to him and “seems to have vanished”.[17]
  1. Conceded the utility in the appellant’s plea of guilty, exparte, but stressed the need for a sentence involving strong deterrence both general and specific.
  1. Stressed that the defendant was the primary offender, had come up with the scheme and was working in an industry which relied on a licensing regime from QBCC, which depended on the honesty of builders to protect the integrity of the scheme.[18]
  1. Identified that in terms of parity a fine of $150,000 had been imposed on MR Lifestyle Constructions, of whom the sole director was Ms TinaSellers, and the residential address of the defendant was also the registered address of the company and of Ms Tina Sellers.
  1. The appellant presented;

“wih some criminal history and it’s he that came up with the scheme and persisted with it, with MR Lifestyle Constructions used in the scheme but not dealt with on the basis of being the primary offender.”[19]

  1. The defendant was the primary offender, not MR Lifestyle Constructions, and that restitution should be preferred over anything else.[20]
  1. [19]
    Mr Marais, on behalf of the appellant, submitted the following:
  1. The appellant was 51 years of age, single with two grown-up children, was unemployed, focussing regaining his health and suffered from a severe lung condition.
  1. The appellant had completed Year 12, had been involved in marketing and was entering a plea.[21]
  1. That fines for an individual were generally much lower than for a company which has “no soul to damn and no body to kick”.[22]
  1. That if the company was fined $150,000, then based on Penalties and Sentences Act s. 181B(3) which provided that;

“The court may impose a maximum fine of an amount to equal to five times the maximum fine for an individual”,

the fine for the appellant should be in the order of $30,000, given the company had been fined $150,000.[23]

  1. That, in terms of restitution, the complainants had “received building works” and that “it’s not that they haven’t received nothing”.[24]
  1. That there was “no sound basis in just giving them their money back when they have received, in fact, materials and building works” and, in response to a query from the learned magistrate, that the complainants should sue civilly.[25]
  1. Tendered medical documents which appeared to indicate that the appellant had Type 2 diabetes, was on Diabex and Solone medication, and was unfit for work between 6 and 13 February 2017.[26]  The documents also indicated that the defendant had been suffering sarcoidosis for 10 years and was on steroids.
  1. [20]
    In reply, Mr Minnery for QBCC submitted to the learned magistrate:-
  1. That none of the complainants were in a position to submit quotes from legitimate builders to fix each of their homes; that some of them had pursued civil actions and insurance claims and had been unsuccessful. Each of them was in a position where the value of their building works was “nominal or nothing” because “it’s so badly done that it requires to be removed or replaced, or where this is a value to it, it may be destroyed in other work that will be necessary to fit it” and it had been done by “somebody who is unlicensed in every possible way”.[27]
  1. That the medical material did not contain an actual diagnosis but rather a query about sarcoidosis, and a note of a previous diagnosis of Type 2 diabetes. The material otherwise contained a request for samples, prescriptions for medication, but otherwise contained no active diagnosis with no assistance as to whether the defendant was unable, or unwilling to work or what his work situation was.[28]
  1. [21]
    The learned magistrate in his sentencing remarks noted the following:
  • The belated plea of guilty which had some significant utility (given the matters had been set for trial).[29]
  • The applicant’s dated criminal history with a drug charge, a larceny charge and a more recent Commonwealth offence.
  • The contents of the agreed schedule of fact, the victim impact statements and medical documentation.
  • The “extremely concerning charges” which indicated that the complainants “had been targeted” and seemed “to belong to a more mature age group”.[30]
  • The appellant’s use of Mr Russell’s building license without his express consent.
  • The significant amount of money paid by each of the five victims and the use of Mr Russell’s QBCC license to bring about an air of legitimacy to what was occurring, including using the QBCC license number on a number of documents.[31]
  • The work performed at each property was sub-standard leaving each complainant “with an absolute mess”[32]
  • That the appellant had lied to the complainants, had not met deadlines, and the appellant had also lied to Mr Russell and had continued to use Mr Russell’s QBCC license even after Mr Russell told him to stop.[33]
  • The appellant was the primary offender.[34]
  • The appellant drew in each of the offenders with his offending, who kept up his appearances and drew in each of the offenders with his offending.[35]
  • The effect on each of the home owners recognised in the victim impact statements was “relevant to the sentencing”.[36]
  • That it was concerning that the appellant was issued a QBCC direction to cease and desist but continued working.[37]
  • In relation to the medical documentation, that not a lot turned on it; the appellant was unfit for duty 6 – 13 February [2017]; seemed to have “unremarkable health issues” including Type 2 diabetes, sarcoidosis, some gout issues and some high cholesterol numbers.[38]
  • That while accepting the appellant had some health issues, did not accept that there were “any significant health issues”.[39]
  • Accepted that although there was a multiplication effect pursuant to Penalties and Sentences Act s. 161B, MR Lifestyle Constructions was not the primary offender.[40]
  • That the appellant was single, had two grown-up children, was unemployed, focused on regaining his health and was afflicted with a severe long condition, had a background in marketing and had his own businesses.[41]
  • In respect of restitution, considered that the victims were “out of pocket”, that the three victim impact statements tendered indicated that those victims were “a mess” and that the complainants needed “to be put back into the position that they need to be, that they should have been before [the appellant] became involved with them.”[42]
  • Was satisfied that the complainants were “entitled to full reimbursement of the amounts”.[43]
  • Considered that the recording of a conviction was warranted in the circumstances of this case.[44]
  • Imposed one penalty in relation to all complaints, and in doing so considered that the offending was “not at the lower end of the scale” or “in the middle of the scale” but was “at the higher end of the scale”, and further was satisfied that “clear messages must be sent to [the appellant] and other like-minded persons, that this type of behaviour simply cannot and will not and must not be tolerated in the community.”[45]
  1. [22]
    The appellant was convicted, the conviction was recorded and he was fined $100,000, and ordered to pay $4,446.25 costs in default of payment to be imprisoned for six days.
  1. [23]
    The learned magistrate initially made orders in respect of the restitution amounts payable to the complainants and indicated he was going to refer all amounts to the State Penalties Enforcement Registry.
  1. [24]
    After an exchange between Mr Minnery for the QBCC and the learned magistrate, Mr Minnery submitted that the maximum default imprisonment for the restitution was six months, and for the fines was two years.
  1. [25]
    The learned magistrate then adjusted the order for the fine and ordered that the appellant pay $100,000 and costs of $4,446.25 in default two years’ imprisonment and referred those matters to the State Penalties Enforcement Registry.
  1. [26]
    The verdict and judgment records from the Caboolture Magistrates Court indicate a “nil default” in default of payment of restitution in each case, with all the restitution orders referred to the State Penalties Enforcement Registry.

Effect of the State Penalties Enforcement Act and Regulation

  1. [27]
    Pursuant to Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ‘PSA’ s. 36(1)(a), a court may order an offender to make restitution of property in relation to which the offence was committed and, pursuant to PSA s. 35(1)(b), pay compensation to a person for any loss or destruction of, damage caused to or unlawful interference with property in relation to which the offence was committed.
  1. [28]
    PSA s. 36 provides:
  1. (1)
    An order made under section 35(1) may state—
  1. (a)
    The amount to be paid by way of restitution or compensation; and
  1. (b)
    The person to whom the restitution is to be made or the compensation is to be paid; and
  1. (c)
    The time within which the restitution is to be made or the compensation is to be paid or, alternatively, that the proper officer of the court is, under the SPE Act, section 34, to give particulars of the amount of the restitution or compensation to SPER for registration under that section; and
  1. (d)
    If the order states the time within which the restitution is to be made or the compensation is to be paid—the way in which the restitution is to be made or the compensation is to be paid.
  1. (2)
    When making an order under section 35(1), the court may also order that the offender is to be imprisoned if the offender fails to comply with the order.
  1. [29]
    Once such an order is made, then pursuant to State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999 (Qld) (SPEA) s. 34, the “registration’ of the unpaid amount with SPER has the effect that SPER then becomes responsible for the enforcement of the unpaid amount.
  1. [30]
    Enforcement of a debt once registered with SPER is subject to the provision of the SPER charter which is set out in SPEA s. 9;

9The SPER charter

The SPER charter include the following—

  1. (a)
    maximising the collection, for victims of offences, of amounts ordered to be paid under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 by way of restitution or compensation;
  1. (b)
    maximising the amount of fines and other money penalties paid before enforcement action is taken;
  1. (c)
    promoting a philosophy that non-monetary satisfaction of SPER debts is for the needy in the community and not an alternative to payment of a fine for those who can afford to pay the fine;
  1. (d)
    reducing the use of imprisonment for fine default by encouraging the use of other enforcement mechanisms;
  1. (e)
    promoting public education about the obligations of offenders and the consequences of not satisfying the obligations.

In particular it should be noted that the SPER charter seeks to maximise the collection of amounts ordered for restitution and compensation, as well as fines and other monetary penalties whilst producing the use of imprisonment for fine default.

  1. [31]
    The enforcement process (relevantly) applies to the matters the subject of this appeal pursuant to PSA s. 34(1)(a) (with respect to a fine) and PSA s. 34(1)(c) (in respect of an order for restitution or compensation). Once the court registrar has given the details of the unpaid fine or other amount to SPER pursuant to s. 34(2A), the registrar is required to register the particulars as soon as practicable after receiving them SPEA s. 34(3) and pursuant to SPEA s. 34(4);

“…the registrar may issue an enforcement order, an enforcement warrant or a fine collection notice against the person concerned for the unpaid amount.”

  1. [32]
    SPEA s. 41 then provides:-

“41Ways enforcement debtor may deal with enforcement order

  1. (1)
    If an enforcement order is served on an enforcement debtor for an amount, the enforcement debtor must, within 28 days after the date of the enforcement order—
  1. (a)
    pay the amount stated in the order in full to SPER; or
  1. (b)
    apply to SPER, in the approved form or in another way acceptable to SPER, to pay the amount by instalments of not less than the minimum instalment; or
  1. (c)
    if the order relates to an infringement notice offence—make to SPER an election to have the matter of the offence decided in a Magistrates Court.
  1. (2)
    Also, an approved sponsor may, with the agreement of the debtor, apply on behalf of the debtor under part 3B for—
  1. (a)
    a work and development order to satisfy the amount stated in the order; or
  1. (b)
    if the debtor is subject to a work and development order—a variation of the order.

The effect of this is to enable the SPER debtor within 28 days of an enforcement order being issued  to either pay the full amount or apply to pay by instalments, subject to minimum payment amounts.[46]

  1. [33]
    Pursuant to SPEA s. 36, if a person served with an instalment payment notice fails to pay an instalment within the time allowed, the payment notice may be cancelled by the registrar without further notice, and pursuant to SPEA s. 37, the registrar must increase the unpaid amount for which the notice relates by the amount of the registration fee and issue an enforcement order for the total of the unpaid amount.
  1. [34]
    Pursuant to SPEA s. 34, the SPER registrar may “issue an enforcement order, an enforcement warrant or a fine collection notice against the person concerned” subject to an unpaid amount to SPER. An “enforcement order” issues if the registrar registers a default certificate for a person or the SPEA expressly authorises the registrar to issue an enforcement order against a person.
  1. [35]
    Pursuant to SPEA s. 63, an “enforcement warrant” may be issued by a registrar for an unpaid amount. That warrant allows SPER to seize and sell real and personal property, impose a charge on property, restrain or otherwise control the sale or impose a charge on specified property.
  1. [36]
    SPEA s. 52 relevantly provides: 

“52 Default after time to pay

  1. (1)
    This section applies if an enforcement debtor—
  1. (a)
    fails to pay an amount stated in an enforcement order within 28 days after the date of the order; or
  1. (b)
    fails to pay an amount stated in an instalment payment notice issued under section 42 in accordance with the notice.
  1. (2)
    The registrar may issue an enforcement warrant, a fine collection notice or an arrest and imprisonment warrant for the enforcement debtor for the balance of the unpaid amount stated in the enforcement order or instalment payment notice.
  1. (3)
    Also, if the failure relates to an instalment payment notice, the registrar may cancel the instalment payment notice without notice to the enforcement debtor.
  1. (4)
    If the registrar decides to issue an arrest and imprisonment warrant, the warrant must be for the arrest and imprisonment of the enforcement debtor for the period stated in the warrant worked out for the unpaid amount under section 52A .
  1. [37]
    Section 52A then provides the process for working out the period for imprisonment for arrest and imprisonment warrant:

“52AWorking out period of imprisonment for arrest and imprisonment arrest

  1. (5)
    The period of imprisonment that may be stated in an arrest and imprisonment warrant for an amount ordered to be paid by a court must be the period worked out by dividing the amount stated in the warrant, less any enforcement or administrative fees added by SPER, by the relevant cut-out rate for a court order rounded down to the nearest whole number and expressed as a number of days.
  1. (6)
    The period of imprisonment that may be stated in an arrest and imprisonment warrant for an infringement notice offence must be the period worked out by dividing the amount state in the arrant, less any enforcement or administrative fees added by SPER, by the cut-out rate for an infringement notice offence, rounded down to the nearest whole number and expressed as a number of days.”
  1. [38]
    Pursuant to SPEA s. 120, if an arrest and imprisonment warrant is issued, then payments made on the outstanding amount before the person named in the warrant is imprisoned reduces the length of imprisonment by a proportionate amount according to the “cut-out” rate.

Cut-Out Rate

  1. [39]
    SPEA Schedule 2 relevantly defines “cut-out rate” as follows:

“(a) for a court order under which an offender is required to serve a term of imprisonment for failing to pay a penalty or a forfeited recognisance under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992—the rate worked out by dividing the penalty or the amount of the recognisance by the number of days of imprisonment ordered, expressed in dollars for each day; or

  1. (b)
    for a court under which an offender is not required to serve a term of imprisonment for failing to pay a penalty under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992—the amount prescribed under a regulation for this paragraph or, if no amount is prescribed, $75”
  1. [40]
    State Penalties Enforcement Regulation (2014) (SPE Reg) relevantly provides:-

“24Cut-out Rate

  1. (1)
    For the Act, schedule 2, definition cut-out rate, paragraphs (b), (d), and (f), the cut-out rate is the amount equal to the prescribed penalty unit value.

…

  1. (3)
    In this section—

 Prescribed penalty unit value means the value of 1 penalty unit under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, section 5(1)(a)(i).”

  1. [41]
    PSA s. 5(1)(a)(i) relevantly provides:

“(1)The value of a penalty unit is—

  1. (a)
    for the SPE Act or an enfringement notice, other than an enfringement notice for an offence a law mentioned in paragraph (b), (c) or (d)

(i)the amount prescribed under s 5A.

  1. (2)
    If no amount is prescribed—$110.00.”
  1. [42]
    PSA s. 5A(1) provides that:-

“A regulation may prescribe the same monetary value of a penalty unit for Section 5(1)(a)(i), (c)(i) and (e)(i).”

  1. [43]
    Relevantly the Penalties and Sentences Regulation s. 3 prescribes the value of penalty units for s. 5A(1) of the PSA as $126.15.

Effect of default in payment of restitution

  1. [44]
    The amount ordered in restitution by the learned magistrate ($225,643.64), divided by the relevant current value of a penalty unit ($126.15) results in a default imprisonment period of 1,789 days (approximately four years and 11 months).
  1. [45]
    Mr Minnery, for the respondent, submits that the following steps apply to the enforcement of restitution in the current case:-

“(a)the amount of $225,643.64 becomes registered as a debt under the SPEA; and

  1. (b)
    the enforcement of that debt becomes the responsibility of the registrar, SPER; and
  1. (c)
    the enforcement of the debt is governed by the [SPEA] charter, which provides for the maximising of opportunities to recover money, including owed as restitution, and the use of imprisonment as, effectively, the least preferable option; and
  1. (d)
    the registrar may allow or approve, on application, an instalment plan for the amount; and
  1. (e)
    if that instalment plan fails the registrar must issue an enforcement order, and if that instalment plan is not sought or not approved, the registrar may issue an enforcement order; and
  1. (f)
    an enforcement order allows the issue of an enforcement warrant (amongst other things), and this allows the registrar to use broad powers to seize and sell property, place a charge over real property, suspend a driver’s license and otherwise take steps to recover the debt according to the charter. The registrar is afforded broad powers to investigate, search, seize and restrain property, in accordance with the charter and thus the primary obligation of recovering the debt, in this case for the complainant; and
  1. (g)
    the issuing of an arrest and imprisonment warrant is discretionary (section 52 SPEA provides it maybe issued), and presumably the registrar exercises that discretion in accordance with the charter provided at section 9 SPEA; and
  1. (h)
    on any arrest and imprisonment warrant issued in this matter, the amount of time to be served as imprisonment under that warrant would be up to 1,789 days, less (proportionally at $126.15 per day) any sum paid off the debt by the debtor (the appellant); and
  1. (i)
    on the issuing of the arrest and imprisonment warrant but before the appellant is imprisoned, he can still make payments to reduce or remove the amount of time on the warrant, again proportionally again to the above value.”[47]

SPER enforcement processing calculation – further issues

  1. [46]
    Although the issuing an arrest and imprisonment warrant is at the discretion of the registrar,[48]this decision is non-reviewable.[49]
  1. [47]
    It should also be noted that SPEA s. 119(7) provides:

“The period of imprisonment and enforcement a debtor must serve under the warranty is cumulative on any other period of imprisonment the debtor must serve under any other warrant or an order of a court.”

  1. [48]
    Relevantly, in respect of the current appeal, the learned magistrate imposed a fine of $100,000 in default two years’ imprisonment, which would be cumulative upon the default custody periods for each of the five restitution orders which in turn would be cumulative on each other. The effect of this (if none of the restitution orders was paid) would be a default period of approximately six years and 11 months. Mr Menolotto (for the appellant) submits, and I accept, that such imprisonment would not be ameliorated by any early release on parole.

Appellant’s submissions

  1. [49]
    Mr Menolotto submits that:
  1. the learned magistrate fell into error by imposing a fine of $100,000 when the fine imposed on MR Lifestyle Constructions was $150,000.

Mr Menolotto refers to the provisions s 181B of the Penalties and Sentences Act which provides:-

“(1)This section applies to a provision prescribing a maximum fine for an offence only if the provision does not expressly prescribe a maximum fine for a body corporate different from the maximum fine for an individual.

  1. (2)
    The maximum fine is taken only to be the maximum fine for an individual.
  1. (3)
    If a body corporate is found guilty of the offence, the court may impose a maximum fine of an amount equal to five times the maximum fine for an individual.”
  1. [50]
    In essence, Mr Menolotto’s argument is that the fine imposed on the appellant, if the MR Lifestyle Constructions fine is treated as relevant for parity, should be one fifth of the fine imposed on the corporate defendant.
  1. [51]
    Mr Menolotto further submits that the learned magistrate has failed to pay sufficient regard to the provisions of PSA s 48(1) which provides:-

“(1)If a court decides to find an offender, then, in determining the amount of the fine and the way in which it is to be paid, the court must, as far as practicable take into account—

  1. (a)
    the financial circumstances of the offender; and
  1. (b)
    the nature of the burden that payment of the fine    will be on the offender.”
  1. [52]
    Mr Menolotto relies further on PSA s. 48(3) which provides:

“In considering the financial circumstances of the offender, the court must take into account any other order that it or another court has made, or that it proposes to make:

(a)…or

  1. (b)
    requiring the offender to make restitution or pay compensation.”

In addition, Mr Menolotto also refers to PSA s. 48(4) which provides:

“If the court considers that—

  1. (a)
    it would be appropriate both to impose a fine and to make a restitution or compensation order; and
  1. (b)
    the offender has not enough means to pay both;

the court must, in making its order, give more importance to restitution or compensation though it may also impose a fine.”

  1. [53]
    It was submitted by Mr Menolotto on behalf of the appellant that he was 51 years of age, single with two grown-up children, was unemployed, with diabetes and a lung condition (sarcoidosis), had a limited work life left, and would be unlikely to have job opportunities in the building industry given the convictions arising out of these proceedings.

Discussion

  1. [54]
    With respect, the learned magistrate was provided with no information in respect of the appellant’s financial circumstances other than that he was (at the time of his appearance) “unemployed” and “focusing on regaining his health”[50]and was suffering from diabetes.
  1. [55]
    The learned magistrate clarified in an exchange with Mr Marais (who appeared for the appellant at the sentence in the Magistrates Court) that the documentation indicated that the appellant was unfit for work as at the date of sentence, and was taking Diabex for his Type 2 diabetes.
  1. [56]
    Critically, no information was placed before the learned magistrate as to the appellant’s assets, his earnings, actual or potential (pre or post sentence), and accordingly there was simply a dearth of information provided by the appellant’s counsel as to “the financial circumstances of the offender”[51]and “the nature of the burden that payment of the fine will be on the offender.”[52]PSA s .48 requires, such matters to be taken into account “as far as practicable”,[53]and the absence of information in this case had the practical effect that the magistrate’s sentencing discretion was not constrained by those provisions of PSA s .48.
  1. [57]
    The appellant was clearly the primary offender, responsible for deliberate, ongoing and repeated breaches of the QBCC Act, deliberately and cynically manipulating Mr Michael Russell, the holder of an open QBCC building license, to provide a veneer of legitimacy for a concerted strategy of targeting vulnerable complainants, resulting in multiple breaches of the QBCC Act, extracting a total of $225,643.64 in payments from the complainants and leaving each of them with sub-standard, partly completed, uncertifiable building works which required either extensive repairs, reworking or complete demolition of those building works.
  1. [58]
    The appellant lied to Mr Michael Russell (the provider of the QBCC open license), continued to use that license for two months after Mr Russell told him to stop using it, lied to QBCC investigators about holding a license and the provision of quotes, and by false pretences lured each of the vulnerable complainants into contracts which left them significantly impacted, both financially and personally, in some cases with exacerbated health problems. Also of significant concern is that the building works continued after 9 February 2016, when a QBCC direction was issued requiring the appellant to cease all building works in Queensland.

Fine

  1. [59]
    In the light of such deliberate conduct, and given that the appellant was the primary offender, I am not persuaded that the fine imposed was manifestly excessive or crushing. If anything, the fine imposed, which was obliged to send messages of both general and specific deterrence, was modest in the circumstances. Given the paucity of information provided to the learned magistrate about the offender’s financial circumstances and the burden the payment of the fine would impose on the defendant, I do not consider that the learned magistrate fell into error in imposing a fine of $100,000 in default two years’ imprisonment. The appeal, insofar as it relates to the quantum of the fine imposed, fails.

Restitution

  1. [60]
    Pursuant to the PSA s. 37(b), the maximum period that the learned magistrate could impose in default of payment of restitution under s. 36(1)(a) was a period of six months. The learned magistrate did not impose a default period in respect of the five orders for restitution, but simply referred the orders to the registrar of the State Penalties Enforcement Registry for recovery action.
  1. [61]
    The effect of such a referral, as outlined above, is a default period, if no payment was made and if an arrest and imprisonment warrant was issued, of 1,789 days (i.e. approximately four years and 11 months). Given that that period would be served cumulatively on the two year default period for the fine, the appellant is at risk (if no payments are made in respect of the fine and restitution orders), of a total default period of imprisonment of six years and 11 months.
  1. [62]
    In R v Matauaina [2011] QCA 344, Fraser JA identified that:

“…the consequences for a debtor of non-payment, even if that is merely a consequent of poverty, might extend to the imposition of a further term of imprisonment without any intervention by the sentencing court.”[54]

  1. [63]
    Fraser JA noted further that:

“…the potentially punitive consequences of such an order [the issue of an arrest and imprisonment warrant] are certainly relevant in considering the appropriateness of the overall sentence.” (Citations deleted).[55]

  1. [64]
    Mr Minnery submits that the steps that apply to enforcement of the restitution amount in the current case are such that, effectively, the appellant would be given every opportunity to pay the fine and the restitution, that the SPEA charter mandates the use of imprisonment as the least preferable option; that enforcement orders permit seizing and selling property, placing a charge over real property, suspending a driver’s license and taking other steps to recover the debt, and the issue of an arrest and imprisonment warrant is a discretionary and, effectively final option, with the period in custody being reduced by any payments made. In those circumstances Mr Minnery submits that the appeal, insofar as it relates to the restitution order, should also fail.
  1. [65]
    In respect of the quantum of the restitution orders, the work undertaken by the appellant was, at best worthless. In such circumstances, restitution fixed at the amount each set of complainants paid for their worthless works is the best and fairest assessment of their entitlement to restitution. The learned magistrate did not fall into error in using those amounts as the basis for the restitution orders.
  1. [66]
    Mr Menolotto, however, stresses (with some significant force), that the overall effect of the cumulative default periods of the five restitution orders, cumulative in turn on the two year default period for the fine, constitutes a crushing penalty, unable to be ameliorated by parole, and represents 50 percent of a 14 year sentence.
  1. [67]
    In my view, the decision in R v Matauainiclearly indicates that the ultimate effect of non-payment of restitution in these circumstances resulting in potential cumulative imprisonment periods, must be taken into account in assessing the overall impact of the sentence imposed.[56]
  1. [68]
    Given the cumulative effect of the restitution default periods, I consider the appropriate order is to set aside the learned magistrate’s order that there be no period of default in respect of each of the orders of restitution, and instead substitute a default period in respect of each restitution order of two months’ imprisonment.
  1. [69]
    The overall effect of such an order on appeal would be that non-payment (in total) of the fine imposed and the restitution would be imprisonment for a period of two years and 10 months. That consequence, in my view, operates as a significant general and personal deterrent, but the overall effect is not a crushing or disproportionate sentence if, ultimately, the appellant cannot or does not make any payment on either the fine or the restitution orders.

Conclusion

  1. [70]
    Accordingly I make the following orders:
  1. Appeal granted.
  1. Order that a default period of two months’ imprisonment be imposed in respect of each of the following restitution orders (for which no default period was imposed in the Magistrates Court):

Roberts$45,618.75

Heckenberg$70,899.89

Watkins$37,125.00

Taplin$28,500

Grainger$43,500

  1. Otherwise confirm the orders made by the learned magistrate at Caboolture on 13 February, 2017.

Footnotes

[1]Exhibit 1 – copies of letters to Christopher and Christine Watkins; Rodney and Suzanne Roberts; Julia Heckenberg; Reynold and Lucrecia Granger; and William and Jeanette Taplin.

[2]McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255 per Bowskill J at [47].

[3]Notice of Appeal filed 10 March 2017.

[4]Appeal Exhibit 7.

[5]Appeal Exhibit 4 - Sentence submissions 1-3.

[6]Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 6.

[7]Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 6.

[8]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 7.

[9]Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 7.

[10]Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 7.

[11]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 8.

[12]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 8.

[13]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 8.

[14]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 9.

[15]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 9, 1 – 10.

[16]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 10.

[17]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 10.

[18]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 11.

[19]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 11.

[20]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 13.

[21]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 14.

[22]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 14.

[23]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 15.

[24]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 15.

[25]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 15.

[26]Sentence Exhibit 6.

[27]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 17.

[28]Appeal Exhibit 4 Sentence submissions 1 – 18.

[29]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 2.

[30]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 2.

[31]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 3.

[32] Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 3.

[33]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 3.

[34]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 3.

[35]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 3.

[36]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 3.

[37]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 3.

[38]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 3.

[39]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 3.

[40]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 4.

[41]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 4.

[42]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 4.

[43]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 4.

[44]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 4.

[45]Appeal Exhibit 5 – Decision p. 4.

[46]State Penalties Enforcement Regulation 2014 s. 25 - $60 for the first payment and $30 per fortnight thereafter.

[47]Appeal Exhibit 9 (Outline of Submissions – SPER enforcement process and calculation, pp 4 – 5).

[48]SPEA s. 52(2).

[49]SPEA s. 155(1)(c)(iv) and see R v Matauina [2011] QCA 344 per Fraser JA at [33].

[50]Appeal Exhibit 4 – Sentencing Submissions p. 1-15.

[51]Penalties and Sentences Act s. 48(1)(a).

[52]Penalties and Sentences Act s. 48(1)(b).

[53]Penalties and Sentences Act s. 48(1).

[54]R v Matauaini [2011] QCA 344 per Fraser JA at [33].

[55]R v Matauaini [2011] QCA 344 per Fraser JA at [35].

[56]R v Matauaini [2011] QCA 344, at [35].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Mar v Queensland Building & Construction Commission

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Mar v Queensland Building & Construction Commission

  • MNC:

    [2017] QDC 304

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Dearden DCJ

  • Date:

    15 Dec 2017

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Commissioner of Police v Al Shakarji [2013] QCA 319
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCA 319
Dwyer v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 124
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2008) 234 CLR 124
Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] QCA 132
Cite 2 - [2017] QCA 132
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 214 CLR 118
Cite 2 - (2003) 214 CLR 118
Cite 3 - (2003) 214 CLR 118
McDonald v Queensland Police Service[2018] 2 Qd R 612; [2017] QCA 255
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] QCA 255
Cite 2 - [2017] QCA 255
Cite 3 - [2017] QCA 255
R v Matauaina [2011] QCA 344
6 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCA 344
Cite 2 - [2011] QCA 344
Cite 3 - [2011] QCA 344
Cite 4 - [2011] QCA 344
Cite 5 - [2011] QCA 344
Cite 6 - [2011] QCA 344
Rowe v Kemper[2009] 1 Qd R 247; [2008] QCA 175
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] 1 Qd R 247
Teelow v Commissioner of Police[2009] 2 Qd R 489; [2009] QCA 84
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] 2 Qd R 489
Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1979) 142 CLR 531
White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QCA 121
Cite 2 - [2014] QCA 121

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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