Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
  • sclq logo
  1. Caselaw
  2. QDC
  3. 2018
  4. Nixon v Commissioner of Police - [2018] QDC 188

Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

Nixon v Commissioner of Police[2018] QDC 188

Nixon v Commissioner of Police[2018] QDC 188

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Iesha Lillian Nixon v The Commissioner of Police (Qld) [2018] QDC 188

PARTIES:

IESHA LILLIAN NIXON

(Appellant)

v

THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (QLD)

(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

18/2018

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

17 September 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

22 June 2018

JUDGE:

Devereaux SC DCJ

ORDER:

  1. Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – where the appellant pleaded guilty to using a carriage service to make a threat to cause serious harm – appeal pursuant to s 222 Justices Act – whether learned Magistrate erred in recording a conviction – whether recording a conviction was excessive or inexpedient pursuant to s 19B Crimes Act.

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 474.15.

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 16A, 19B.

Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 222.

R v Hooper; ex parte Cth DPP [2008] QCA 308.

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499.

Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky [2001] NSWCCA 332.

Matta v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2000] FCR 729.

COUNSEL:

E Wilson QC, with L Reece, for the appellant

K Milbourne for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Kilroy and Callaghan Lawyers for the appellant

Commissioner of Police, on instruction of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent

  1. [1]
    The appellant made threats during two telephone calls to employees of the Education Department. She was charged under s 474.15 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (‘the Code’) with two counts of using a carriage service to make a threat to cause serious harm. The phone calls occurred on 8 and 24 February 2017. She pleaded guilty to the charges in the Magistrates Court at Maroochydore on 15 January 2018 and was convicted and fined $500 on each charge. She appeals, under s 222 of the Justices Act 1888 (Qld), on the ground that the sentence was excessive “by the recording of a conviction”.
  1. [2]
    The appellant submits the learned Magistrate should have disposed of the charges under s 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), without proceeding to conviction. That submission reduces to the proposition that any other disposition would be excessive; that a proper application of s 19B would compel a court to conclude that it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment, or other than nominal punishment, or that it is expedient to release the appellant on probation.
  1. [3]
    The appellant’s legal representative told the learned magistrate the appellant was aged 38 years at the time of the offences. She was a single mother of three children aged 18, 16 and, at the time of the offences, 7 years. She was, at the time of the sentence hearing, close to having completed a full-time degree course in social work. At the time of the offences she was home-schooling her 7 year old son. She was under “extreme pressure”.
  1. [4]
    In 2012, the appellant was diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, including symptoms of depression, after being the victim of domestic violence for 15 years. In February 2017, she “hit breaking point”.
  1. [5]
    The particular circumstances leading to the offences, as put by the appellant’s representative, were as follows. The appellant “advises that [the 7 year old son] had been racially abused and she had raised those issues with the school in a number of significant ways. She’d applied for a transfer” to another school which has a “specific indigenous program”. She had been told there was no availability but “was aware, through speaking to other parents, that other students had quite easily been able to transfer” to the other school.
  1. [6]
    On 8 February 2017, the appellant telephoned the relevant regional office and spoke to the female complainant/employee, whose role as corporate services officer included complaint management. The call lasted about 45 minutes. The appellant complained about mistreatment of her son on the basis of his race and sought his transfer to the other school; she was aware the catchment enrolment management plan prevented this but sought regional office assistance to overcome the obstacle; alternatively she sought permission to home school the child. The complainant conducted some research and there was discussion for about 40 minutes.
  1. [7]
    The prosecutor’s recitation of the facts continued:

“Towards the end of the conversation, the defendant was stating that mainstream education in Queensland was not culturally relevant to Aboriginal students and that it was for the privileged little white children and then started to talk about an incident where her son took a spear to school, and she felt it was racist that he was not allowed by the school. The victim then said:

Well, we can’t have spears in schools, as it is a weapon and [indistinct] can used to harm people.

This was not stated in a jovial matter – manner. The defendant said:

Now you’re even laughing at me. Why do you white people always think it’s a weapon and it’s violent? It’s only used for ceremonies. It’s not fair my son can’t get a free education like privileged little white children. I should probably just get a gun and go up there. I can understand why people pick up a gun and shoot everyone at school.

The victim then said:

It’s inappropriate to speak like that. I’ll put this forward to the principal, advisory complaints management for attention.

The defendant said:

You’re racist too. The school will find out about it when I blow all the privileged little white fucks away.”

  1. [8]
    The defendant then terminated the call. As a result of the call the employee was “left shaken, nearly in tears and genuinely concerned about the welfare of students and staff at the schools”. The employee reported the incident and “processes were enacted at both … schools, placing staff and the school community on high alert.”
  1. [9]
    The second offence was committed on 24 February 2017 but there was some interaction in the meantime with the male complainant/employee. He was familiar with the appellant. The prosecutor gave details of several contacts between the two offence dates. In a text message, the appellant mentioned a meeting with the local Member of Parliament. The employee made inquiries into the appellant’s request. He sent text messages inviting the appellant to call him.
  1. [10]
    On 24 February 2017, the appellant called the complainant. He explained he had just learned that the appellant’s son would not be able to enrol in the appellant’s preferred school because of the limited places available and the family living outside the catchment area. The appellant states the defendant then went on to say and repeat several times:

“I will get a gun and shoot all the little white privileged children and everyone will take notice. I will hang myself from a flagpole at the front of … State College. They do this in the USA. Why not here? I can see why people go into a school and shoot everyone up. What will it take for you to take notice, for me to drive off a cliff?”

The victim states the defendant stated:

“If – if I lived in Victoria – I know where there are guns buried, and I could get one.”

  1. [11]
    The employee, concerned for the safety and welfare of students, reported the incident It seems this upset the appellant. On 3 March, the complainant received calls on his work phone from the appellant which he did not answer. He then received a text message as follows:

“You’re unbelievable, and you wonder why I have no trust for white people at all. I thought I could trust you to understand my frustration that comes from systematic racism. However, you instead use your power and privilege to escalate the matter. My ancestors are coming for you, [the complainant’s name]. Your health will fade like the trust I had for you. You will not sleep for the visions that my ancestors haunt you, and you will go stir-crazy. Have fun with my ancestors. They were once headhunters. They’re coming for you.”

  1. [12]
    This material was led without opposition. It does not form part of a charge. Presumably it was presented to complete the narrative, to support a contention that the threats the subject of the charges were intended to be taken seriously and perhaps to inform an assessment of the appellant’s character.
  1. [13]
    The appellant’s representative told the learned Magistrate the appellant accepted that her behaviour was “completely inappropriate and out of control” and submitted the plea of guilty was early. After the offences, the appellant moved house and the child was now enrolled in a High School successfully engaged in an indigenous program. She was nearing the end of her degree course and was in a placement in the Northern Territory.
  1. [14]
    It was submitted below and on appeal that the appellant should be dealt with under s 19B of the Crimes Act so that she may avoid a recorded conviction. It is useful to set out the relevant part of that provision now. Subsection 19B(1) provides:

“Discharge of offenders without proceeding to conviction

  1. (3)
    Where
  1. (a)
    a person is charged before a court with a federal offence or federal offences; and
  1. (b)
    the court is satisfied, in respect of that charge or more than one of those charges, that the charge is proved, but is of the opinion, having regard to:
  1. (i)
    the character, antecedents, age, health or mental condition of the person;
  1. (ii)
    the extent (if any) to which the offence is of a trivial nature; or
  1. (iii)
    the extent (if any) to which the offence was committed under extenuating circumstances;

that it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment, or to inflict any punishment other than a nominal punishment, or that it is expedient to release the offender on probation;

the court may, by order:

  1. (c)
    dismiss the charge or charges in respect of which the court is so satisfied; or
  1. (d)
    discharge the person, without proceeding to conviction in respect of any charge referred to in paragraph(c), upon his or her giving security, with or without sureties, by recognizance or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the court, that he or she will comply with the following conditions:
  1. (i)
    that he or she will be of good behaviour for such period, not exceeding 3 years, as the court specifies in the order;
  1. (ii)
    that he or she will make such reparation or restitution, or pay such compensation, in respect of the offence or offences concerned (if any), or pay such costs in respect of his or her prosecution for the offence or offences concerned (if any), as the court specifies in the order (being reparation, restitution, compensation or costs that the court is empowered to require the person to make or pay):
  1. (A)
    on or before a date specified in the order; or
  1. (B)
    in the case of reparation or restitution by way of money payment or in the case of the payment of compensation or an amount of costs by specified instalments as provided in the order; and
  1. (iii)
    that he or she will, during a period, not exceeding 2 years, that is specified in the order in accordance with subparagraph(i), comply with such other conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit to specify in the order, which conditions may include the condition that the person will, during the period so specified, be subject to the supervision of a probation officer appointed in accordance with the order and obey all reasonable directions of a probation officer so appointed.
  1. [15]
    Before the learned magistrate it was not submitted that the offences were trivial. As on appeal, the argument was that the appellant’s character, antecedents and mental condition compelled the desired outcome. It was submitted the appellant had come

“from a significantly disadvantaged background … has extremely serious abuse and violence applied to her in relationships and beyond that.” Despite the disadvantage, the appellant had achieved a great deal but would be in jeopardy of “losing it all by having a conviction recorded”.

  1. [16]
    The learned magistrate took into account the plea of guilty and the appellant’s lack of criminal history. His Honour expressed an acceptance of the difficulties faced by members of any minority group in the Australian population but concluded that, in the actions she took and the statements she made when dealing with the problem she faced, the appellant herself had displayed racist views. The expression of this conclusion was unnecessary and led to unedifying exchanges between the magistrate and the appellant. Several times his Honour expressed the view that the appellant’s actions were disgraceful, telling her during the sentencing process that she was being racist, abusive and threatening. Of course, only the last of these constituted the offence. The valid point his Honour made in this context was that the complainants were not decision makers, just employees doing their jobs, it seemed, with care.
  1. [17]
    As to the application of s 19B, the learned magistrate noted that “under Commonwealth law a conviction must be recorded unless we proceed under section 19B.” His Honour concluded the offences were not trivial and this is not contested.
  1. [18]
    The learned magistrate concluded the offences were not committed under extenuating circumstances. On appeal, it was submitted his Honour erred in this regard by focussing on the nature of the charges rather than the appellant’s circumstances. I am not satisfied the remarks display error. His Honour merely compared the present case to one where the victim of the threats had prompted them. Here, the offences involved using the telephone to make threats to innocent parties, namely, the public servants employed to, and who had clearly tried to, assist the appellant and school children. That is, there was no relevant (mitigating) relation between the circumstances the appellant found herself in and the actions she took which amounted to the offences.[1]
  1. [19]
    It was submitted on appeal, but there was no evidence that, the appellant was suffering from impaired judgment at the time. The learned magistrate asked and was told the appellant was taking anti-depressant medication prescribed by her doctor and had on occasion received counselling under a mental health plan.
  1. [20]
    The appellant submits the learned magistrate did not properly consider her antecedents but set off against them her lack of remorse and his view that a potential employer should know about the appellant’s background. His Honour concluded the appellant should not avoid a conviction:

“All that is left is your antecedents and I had some thoughts about the antecedents, about you suffering from PTSD and suffering from depression. But really, your outbursts from the bar table today have absolutely persuaded me that the level of remorse you have is very low. You are still trying to justify what you did on the two wrongs make a right type argument. Because your children have been vilified, everybody deserves to cop a spray from you is basically what you are saying. The antecedents show that, as I say, you do not even appreciate the seriousness of what you have done.

…

The antecedents show that you are an educated person, ironically, almost qualified as a social worker, someone who understands society, the frictions between different people, and here you are carrying on like this. I think any potential employer should absolutely know something about your background.”[2]

  1. [21]
    The remarks in the second paragraph quoted are wide enough to include reference to the appellant’s actions in committing the offences and her response to the second complainant after he reported the matter.
  1. [22]
    But for her lawyer’s assertion that the appellant accepted that her behaviour was completely inappropriate, there was no indication of remorse and I think the magistrate was not wrong to conclude that the level of remorse was very low. Of course, a show of remorse is not one of the matters listed in s 19B(1)(b)(i) and the lack of it need not exclude the application of the provision. An explanation for the commission of the offence might be just as useful in assessing a person’s character and antecedents insofar as the latter might indicate a reduced likelihood of repeat offending. In this case, the appellant explained her motivation – she felt her son was “at threat for not being given access to education. His livelihood [therefore] … was at threat.”  His participation in society was not being met and although it was government policy to “close the gap on education for aboriginal children, yet a policy for catchment area was prioritised over that” as so, she felt, her child’s livelihood was threatened.[3]
  1. [23]
    This is not the time to examine the nature of remorse and its appropriateness as a consideration relevant to sentencing. Section 16A of the Crimes Act includes the concept this way:
  1. (f)
    the degree to which the person has shown contrition for the offence:
  1. (i)
    by taking action to make reparation for any injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence; or
  2. (ii)
    in any other manner.
  1. [24]
    Given the context, his Honour’s remarks were about all of the matters in s 19B(1)(b)(i). The demonstration of remorse, or lack of it, may indicate character.
  1. [25]
    The final statement in the remarks quoted above responds specifically to the claim at the heart of the submissions put to the learned magistrate. I will return to that point.
  1. [26]
    If it were necessary or useful for the appellant to demonstrate error in the sentencing process, I would not be satisfied it is shown in these remarks.
  1. [27]
    Unlike some sentencing legislation, the Crimes Act does not list in order of ascending seriousness the dispositions open to a sentencing court.[4]Section 16A provides that a court must impose a sentence of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence and then lists matters the court must take into account in sentencing. Section 16C mentions fines. It requires the court to take into account the financial circumstances of the person being sentenced. Corporal punishment may not be imposed (s 16D). Section 17A enjoins a court from passing a sentence of imprisonment unless, after having considered all other available sentences, it is satisfied that no other sentence is appropriate. A sentence of imprisonment of under three years must, subject to stated exceptions, include a recognizance release order (s 19AC) and, by subs 20(1)(b), a court may sentence a convicted person to imprisonment but immediately release the person upon security to be of good behaviour or comply with other conditions which might include the supervision of a probation officer. A court may, by subs 20(1)(a), release the person, without passing sentence, upon security to be of good behaviour or other conditions such as the payment of compensation or reparation or supervision of a probation officer. Section 20AB makes available the range of community based orders available under State legislation.
  1. [28]
    As Mackenzie AJA commented in R v Hooper; ex parte Cth DPP [2008] QCA 308 at [2], the practical difference between the order under s. 20(1)(a) and the order the appellant sought under s 19B is the conviction. Therefore, proceeding to conviction is “punishment”, indeed more than “a nominal punishment”, in the scheme of the sentencing provisions of the Crimes Act.
  1. [29]
    An appeal against sentence after a plea of guilty, under s 222(2)(c) of the Justices Act, is an appeal against the exercise of discretion limited to the ground that the result - the sentence - was excessive. If an appellant demonstrates any specific error in the exercise of sentencing discretion by the magistrate, the question remains whether the result was excessive based on the record, subject to the appeal judge allowing new evidence under s 225. The appellant did not seek to lead further evidence.
  1. [30]
    The Justices Act does not give a District Court judge power to review the sentences of Magistrates.
  1. [31]
    As to how an appeal judge assesses excess or inadequacy, the well-known passage in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504 provides guidance. The joint reasons of Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ include:

But the judgment complained of, namely, sentence to a term of imprisonment, depends upon the exercise of a judicial discretion by the court imposing it. The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred. Unlike courts of criminal appeal, this court has not been given a special or particular power to review sentences imposed upon convicted persons. Its authority to do so belongs to it only in virtue of its general appellate power. But even with respect to the particular jurisdiction conferred on courts of criminal appeal, limitations upon the manner in which it will be exercised have been formulated. Lord Alverstone L.C.J. said that it must appear that the judge imposing the sentence had proceeded upon wrong principles or given undue weight to some of the facts (R. v. Sidlow). Lord Reading L.C.J. said the court will not interfere because its members would have given a less sentence, but only if the sentence appealed from is manifestly wrong (R. v. Wolff). Lord Hewart L.C.J. has said that the court only interferes on matters of principle and on the ground of substantial miscarriage of justice (R. v. Dunbar). See, further, Skinner v. The King and Whittaker v. The King.[5]

  1. [32]
    Assessing whether a federal sentence was excessive requires the appeal court to consider the maximum penalty and all matters in s 16A as “are relevant and known to the court”.
  1. [33]
    It was not submitted that the disposition was outside an established range. It was not, indeed, submitted that the sentence was excessive except in that the sentencing court proceeded to conviction.
  1. [34]
    On appeal, the appellant argued that s 19B was engaged because of her character, antecedents, age, health or mental condition (subs 19B(1)(b)(ii)) and because the offences were committed under extenuating circumstances (subs 19B(1)(iii)).
  1. [35]
    The respondent accepted the appellant’s antecedents were “quite compelling and can be considered sufficient to address the first stage of the test under section 19B and enliven consideration of the discretion.”[6]The respondent submits that having regard to all s 19B and s 16A(2) matters it is not expedient to deal with the appellant under s 19B.
  1. [36]
    The appellant points to her age, position as a single mother, the stress involved in single-parenting including home-schooling her young son, studying and being on placement in the Northern Territory, her lack of criminal history and the diagnosis of PTSD against a long background of domestic violence. She submits the offences were committed under extenuating circumstances given that the matters just listed coincided with her fruitless attempts to ensure appropriate schooling for her son.
  1. [37]
    The end-point of the “character and antecedents” argument was that the sentence was excessive because the appellant had achieved a great deal, having suffered significant disadvantage, and the conviction would cause the loss of the benefit of her studies.
  1. [38]
    In Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky [2001] NSWCCA 332, where the appellant was a barrister who had been convicted of failing to lodge tax returns, at [35], Spigelman CJ said,

The professional status of an offender is within the broad approach to "antecedents" to which I have referred. This word is used in both s 19B(1)(b)(i) and s 16A(2)(m). Furthermore, the effect of a conviction on the offender is a material consideration when exercising the s 19B discretion. It arises both with respect to personal deterrence under s 16A(2)(j) and on the issue of adequacy of punishment under s 16A(2)(k). It arises generally on the application of the test of "inexpediency".

  1. [39]
    At [38], Spigelman CJ said –

The fact that a person is subject to additional adverse consequences by reason of the recording of a conviction is a relevant consideration in the exercise of the statutory discretion. The reason this is so was stated by Gleeson CJ in R v Ingrassia (1996) 41 NSWLR 447 when his Honour said:

"The essence of s 556A[7]is that it empowers a court which considers that a charge has been proved, in certain circumstances, to take certain steps `without proceeding without conviction'. The legal and social consequences of being convicted of an offence often extend beyond any penalty imposed by a court."

  1. [40]
    The difficulty with a submission that a court should not proceed to conviction because that result would affect the offender’s prospect of practising in a chosen profession is that it engages the court in consideration of whether the governing body of the profession, or perhaps the person’s future clients, could have so little interest in being able to learn of the conduct constituting the offence that the matter should end without record. This might require an assessment of the relevance of the conduct to the intended practice. Where, as in the present case, this was the substantive argument for not proceeding to conviction, the court may expect something more than a bare assertion that the conviction would destroy the person’s prospects.[8]
  1. [41]
    Returning to the learned magistrate’s expression of opinion that any potential employer should know about the appellant’s background, in Matta v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2000] FCR 729, where the sentencing judge rejected a submission that a conviction ought not be recorded because it would prejudice his registration as an optician, Kiefel J[9]said:

Although the question of the appellant’s ability to follow his profession was actually raised by the appellant’s counsel in submissions before his Honour, it was submitted before this Court that it was not relevant to an exercise of s 19B that the authorities, or possible employers, be informed of the conviction. To the contrary, however, it has been accepted as a proper consideration that the public, the authorities, and potential employers should know of what is, after all, the truth of the matter: see Re Briese (1997) 92 A Crim R 75.[10]That is not to say that it stands as the reason that a conviction be recorded, but rather that the submission that a conviction be withheld from the information of the public and others should be rejected.[11]

  1. [42]
    Relevant s 16A factors include the nature and circumstances of the offences; matters personal to the appellant; the course of conduct; effects on victims; contrition; the timely pleas of guilty; deterrence of the appellant and others; the appellant’s character, antecedents, age and health; the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation.
  1. [43]
    The charges were brought under s 474.15 of the Code. The relevant part provides:

“Threat to cause serious harm

  1. (2)
    A person (the first person) commits an offence if:
  1. (a)
    the first person uses a carriage service to make to another person (the second person) a threat to cause serious harm to the second person or a third person; and
  1. (b)
    the first person intends the second person to fear that the threat will be carried out.

Penalty: Imprisonment for 7 years.

  1. [44]
    The appellant came to be sentenced for using the telephone to make threats to cause serious harm to innocent third parties, namely children, intending that the receiver of the threats would fear that they would be carried out. When, despite the efforts of the department, things did not work out as she wished, she offended again. The maximum penalty shows the potential seriousness of the offences. These were not trivial examples of the offence. In my respectful opinion, the proper consideration of the matters contained in s 16A would cause a court to proceed to conviction. Another judicial officer might have applied s 20(1)(a) and released the appellant without sentence on recognizance. But that is not the submission here.
  1. [45]
    I am not satisfied the learned magistrate erred in any significant way in the exercise of the sentencing discretion. There is no doubt the learned magistrate was aware of the provisions of s 19B. His remarks are consistent only with the finding that it was not inexpedient to proceed to conviction. I do not think the absence of an express conclusion that it was not expedient to proceed under s 19B shows error in this case because his honour, having examined the s 19B(1) matters was not persuaded any of them called for consideration of the so-called second step. However busy a court, it will always be preferable to refer expressly to the central questions in s 19B, namely whether it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment, or to inflict any punishment other than a nominal punishment, or that it is expedient to release the offender on probation. In any case, even with the appellant’s antecedents and character, and taking into account the circumstances in which she found herself at the time of the offences, it has not been shown that it was inexpedient to inflict any punishment or other than nominal punishment.
  1. [46]
    Given the appellant’s age and circumstances it was not expedient to place her on probation. Probation was not sought on appeal or below – it was raised only at the end of submissions before the learned magistrate and with the caveat that it would create difficulties with the Northern Territory placement.
  1. [47]
    It has not been shown that the sentence imposed was excessive. The appeal must be dismissed.

Footnotes

[1] Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky [2001] NSWCCA 332 at [47].

[2]  Transcript of decision at 6.

[3]  Transcript at 1-10.5.

[4]  But see the National Judicial College of Australia’s Commonwealth Sentencing Database: https://csd.njca.com.au/principles-practice/sentencing-options/sentencing_options/.

[5]  Citations omitted; underlining added.

[6]  Respondent’s Outline of Submissions at [69].

[7] Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 556A, relevantly similar to Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 19B.

[8] R v Abdi [1994] QCA 402; R v Cay, Gersch and Schell; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2005] QCA 467 at [8].

[9]  As the Chief Justice then was.

[10]  Briese is also reported at [1998] 1 Qd R 487.

[11]  At [13].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Iesha Lillian Nixon v The Commissioner of Police (Qld)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Nixon v Commissioner of Police

  • MNC:

    [2018] QDC 188

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Devereaux SC DCJ

  • Date:

    17 Sep 2018

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky [2001] NSWCCA 332
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] NSWCCA 332
Cite 2 - [2001] NSWCCA 332
Cite 3 - [2001] NSWCCA 332
Cite 4 - [2001] NSWCCA 332
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Cite 2 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Matta v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2000] FCR 729
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] FCR 729
Cite 2 - [2000] FCR 729
R v Briese ex parte A-G (1997) 92 A Crim R 75
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1997) 92 A Crim R 75
R v Briese; Ex parte Attorney-General[1998] 1 Qd R 487; [1997] QCA 10
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1998] 1 Qd R 487
Cite 2 - [1998] 1 Qd R 487
R v Cay, Gersch & Schell; ex parte Attorney-General [2005] QCA 467
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 467
R v Hooper; ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) [2008] QCA 308
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] QCA 308
Cite 2 - [2008] QCA 308
R v Ingrassia (1996) 41 NSWLR 447
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1996) 41 NSWLR 447
The Queen v Abdi [1994] QCA 402
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1994] QCA 402

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.