Street v Queensland Police Service
[2018] QDC 60
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- Unreported Judgment
- Street v Queensland Police Service[2018] QDC 60
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Street v Queensland Police Service[2018] QDC 60
Street v Queensland Police Service[2018] QDC 60
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Street v Queensland Police Service [2018] QDC 60 |
PARTIES: | DUANE ANTHONY STREET (appellant) v QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE (respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | 108 of 2017 |
DIVISION: | Appellate |
PROCEEDING: | Appeal under s 222 Justices Act 1886 |
ORIGINATING COURT: | Magistrates Court, Yarrabah |
DELIVERED ON: | 12 April 2018 |
DELIVERED AT: | Cairns |
HEARING DATE: | 26 March 2018 |
JUDGE: | Fantin DCJ |
ORDER: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – appeal against sentence pursuant to s 222 Justices Act 1886 – whether sentence manifestly excessive – whether specific error – prohibition on possession of liquor in a restricted area contrary to s 168B Liquor Act 1992 (Qld). Legislation Indigenous Communities Liquor Licences Act 2002 (Qld) Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) ss 3, 168B, 173F, 173H Liquor Regulation 2002 (Qld) s 37B, schedule 1J Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 222, 223 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9 Cases AB v R (1999) 198 CLR 111 Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 Callope v Senior Constable B Elsey (510 of 2004 an unreported decision of White DCJ 8 March 2005) Dwyer v Calco Timbers (2008) 234 CLR 124 Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 Kentwell v R (2014) 252 CLR 601 Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 R v Lawley [2007] QCA 243 Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] QCA 84 Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121 |
COUNSEL: | J Sheridan for the Appellant P Nevard, solicitor, for the Respondent |
SOLICITORS: | The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Services for the Appellant The Office of Director of Public Prosecutions for the Respondent |
- [1]On 10 May 2017 the appellant was convicted on his own plea of guilty in the Magistrates Court at Yarrabah of one count of possessing more than the prescribed quantity of liquor in a restricted area without a permit, an offence pursuant to s 168B(1) of the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld), on 17 April 2017. The sentence was adjourned to 14 June 2017.
- [2]That offence was committed in contravention of a community service order imposed on 16 November 2016 when the appellant pleaded guilty to committing the same offence on 29 October 2016. He was ordered to perform 75 hours unpaid community service and a conviction had been recorded. Her Honour resentenced the appellant for that offence.
- [3]On 14 June 2017 the learned Magistrate ordered:
- for the 17 April 2017 offence, 6 months imprisonment wholly suspended for an operational period of 2 years;
- for the 29 October 2016 offence, 3 months imprisonment wholly suspended for an operational period of 2 years; and
- for contravention of the community based order, a fine of $250 referred to the State Penalties and Enforcement Registry; and
- [4]Both sentences of imprisonment were to be served concurrently.
- [5]The appellant appeals against the sentences of imprisonment on the ground that they are manifestly excessive.
- [6]Both parties provided outlines of argument, and made further oral submissions on the hearing of the appeal, which I have considered.
Circumstances of the offending
- [7]By a declaration under s 173H of the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) and s 37B and Schedule 1J of the Liquor Regulation 2002, the type and maximum amount of alcohol a person can carry within the community area of the Yarrabah Shire Council in a vehicle or on a person is 11.25 litres (1 x 30 can carton) of beer in which the concentration of alcohol is less than 4%, or 750ml (one bottle) of unfortified wine. These limits apply to a vehicle regardless of the number of people travelling in it. Cask wine, fortified wine, full strength beer and pre-mixed spirits are not allowed in the restricted area.
- [8]The offending on 29 October 2016 involved the police intercepting a car travelling into Yarrabah at 12:30pm on a Saturday. The appellant was a passenger in the back seat. When police searched the boot they found five 4 litre casks of wine and four 275ml bottles of pre-mixed vodka (a total of 21.1 litres). The appellant volunteered that the alcohol was his. He said he lived in Yarrabah, and knew about the alcohol restrictions. On sentence the appellant’s solicitor submitted that the alcohol was being brought in for the appellant’s niece’s birthday. He was sentenced to 75 hours unpaid community service and a conviction was recorded.
- [9]The offending on 17 April 2017 involved the police intercepting a vehicle travelling into Yarrabah at 12pm. The vehicle driven by the appellant’s partner. The appellant was a passenger. Police observed liquor in the footwell of the car. They located one 700ml bottle of pre-mixed liquor, seventeen 375ml cans of pre-mixed rum and Coke and two 4 litre casks of wine (a total of 15.075 litres). The defendant told police that the alcohol was his. On sentence his solicitor submitted that the alcohol had been purchased to celebrate a wedding in the community.
- [10]The appellant was 41 years old at the time of the offences and sentence, and is now 42.
- [11]He had a relevant criminal history. On sentence, a notice of intention to allege the following previous convictions was served by the prosecution:
Court and date | Offence | Order |
Yarrabah Magistrates Court 16 November 2016 | Section 168B(1) Prohibition of possession of liquor in restricted area on 29 October 2016 | Conviction recorded Community service 75 hours to be completed within 1 year |
Yarrabah Magistrates Court 22 January 2014 | Section 168B(1) Prohibition of possession of liquor in restricted area on 30 December 2013 | Conviction recorded Fined $300 Time to pay: 28 days |
Yarrabah Magistrates Court 25 September 2013 | Section 168B(1) Prohibition of possession of liquor in restricted area on 21 March 2013 | Conviction recorded Fined $100 Time to pay: 28 days |
Yarrabah Magistrates Court 9 September 2009 | Section 168B(1) Prohibition of possession of liquor in restricted area on 22 August 2009 | Conviction recorded Fined $200 Time to pay: 2 months In default refer to SPER |
Yarrabah Magistrates Court 21 January 2009 | Section 168B(1) Prohibition of possession of liquor in restricted area on 10 January 2009 | Conviction recorded Fined $200 Time to pay: 2 months In default refer to SPER |
Mode of Appeal
- [12]The appellant appeals pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). Pursuant to section 223, the appeal is by way of rehearing on the original evidence, and any new evidence adduced by leave. There was no application to adduce fresh evidence.
- [13]For an appeal by way of rehearing "the powers of the appellate court are exercisable only where the appellant can demonstrate that, having regard to all the evidence now before the appellate court, the order that is the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error ... At least that is so unless, in the case of an appeal by way of rehearing, there is some statutory provision which indicates that the powers may be exercised whether or not there was error at first instance.”[1]
- [14]But the court does not merely consider whether or not the Magistrate has made an error of fact or law. The rehearing requires this court to conduct a real review of the evidence before it, and make up its own mind about the case.[2]
- [15]Its function is to consider each of the grounds of appeal having regard to the evidence and to determine for itself the facts of the case and the legal consequences that follow from such findings. In doing so it ought pay due regard to the advantage that the Magistrate had in seeing the witnesses give evidence, and attach a good deal of weight to the Magistrate’s view.[3]
- [16]This court ought not interfere with a sentence unless it is manifestly excessive, it is vitiated by an error of principle, there has been a failure to appreciate a salient feature or there is otherwise a miscarriage of justice. A mere difference of opinion about the way in which the discretion should be exercised is not a sufficient justification for review. It must be shown that the discretion miscarried.[4]It is not a sufficient basis for this Court to intervene that this Court might have struck a different balance between the competing considerations which had to be weighed in the exercise of the discretion[5].
- [17]
"It is not enough that the Judges composing the Appellate Court consider that if they had been in a position of the primary Judge they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the Judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows erroneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the Appellate Court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary Judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts, it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the Appellate Court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the Court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred."
- [18]
“In the case of specific error, the appellate court’s power to intervene is enlivened and it becomes its duty to re-sentence, unless in the separate and independent exercise of its discretion it concludes that no different sentence should be passed. By contrast, absent specific error, the appellate court may only intervene if it concludes that the sentence falls outside the permissible range of sentences for the offender and the offence.”
- [19]The decisions distinguish cases of specific error and manifest excess. Once an appellate court identifies a specific error, the sentence must be set aside and the appellate court must exercise the sentencing discretion afresh, unless, in that separate and independent exercise it concludes that no different sentence should be passed. By contrast, an error may not be discernible; but the sentence is manifestly excessive as being too heavy and lies outside the permissible range. Only then may the appellate court intervene and, in the exercise of its discretion, consider what sentence is to be imposed.
Statutory framework
- [20]Section 168B of the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) (“the Act”) provides:
168BProhibition on possession of liquor in restricted area
(1)A person must not, in a restricted area to which this section applies because of a declaration under section 173H, have in possession more than the prescribed quantity of a type of liquor for the area, other than under the authority of a restricted area permit.
Maximum penalty—
(a)for a first offence—375 penalty units; or
(b)for a second offence—525 penalty units or 6 months imprisonment; or
(c)for a third or later offence—750 penalty units or 18 months imprisonment.
- [21]This section and other relevant sections were introduced into the Liquor Act by the Indigenous Communities Liquor Licences Act 2002. The objectives of that legislation were to prevent harm in Indigenous community areas caused by alcohol abuse and misuse and associated violence.
- [22]The purposes of the Act in s 3 include, relevantly:
(e) to regulate the sale and supply of liquor in particular areas to minimise harm caused by alcohol abuse and misuse and associated violence;
- [23]The purpose of part 6A of the Act dealing with restricted areas is set out in s 173F:
173F Purpose of pt 6A
The purpose of this part is to provide for the declaration of areas for minimising—
(a)harm caused by alcohol abuse and misuse and associated violence; and
(b)alcohol-related disturbances, or public disorder, in a locality.
- [24]
“[7]In my view therefore the sentencing exercise in respect of such offences requires the sentencing court to look closely at the purpose of the legislation in assessing the seriousness of the offence and in arriving at an appropriate punishment. It would be abhorrent if this legislation were to inadvertently become an instrument of oppression against the residents of Aboriginal communities by further aggravating an existing over-representation of Aboriginal people in the prison population or by further driving down an already poor standard of living by the imposition of substantial fines.
[8]Therefore in assessing the seriousness of a particular offence it will be particularly important to see if there are circumstances involved which demonstrate a potential for the particular offence under consideration to undermine the stated purpose of the legislation. Such features might appear in the quantity of alcohol involved, the circumstances of the commission of the offence, or the criminal history of the offender. I do not suggest for a moment that unless there is some relationship between the offence and the purpose of the Act that no punishment at all should be imposed. Nor do I suggest that it is necessary in order for such a relationship to exist that an immediate or clear danger of the offender engaging in public disorder or domestic violence appears in the circumstances, but in my view there should be something to show at least a potential risk of such things occurring.”
- [25]I respectfully agree with those remarks.
- [26]In this case, the appellant has a criminal history. However the only relevant previous convictions are those referred to above (in the notice to allege previous). With those exceptions, the history is very dated. In 1992, when the appellant was 17 years old, he was convicted of some minor property offences for which he received probation. In 1996, when he was 21 years old, he was convicted of obstruct police for which he was fined $150, for breach of probation and breach of a fine option order. In 1998, when he was 23 years old, he had a conviction for minor street offences for which he was fined $100.
- [27]Before the sentences the subject of this appeal, he had never been sentenced to a period of imprisonment. Significantly, there is no offending of any kind from 1998 until 2009. Since 2009, the only entries in his criminal history (with one exception) are the convictions for possession of liquor in a restricted area referred to above. There is a conviction in the Mareeba Magistrates Court on 8 February 2010 for assault or obstruct police for which the appellant was fined $1,000. No facts were placed before me to identify the circumstances of that offence. However, I note that this offence was at Mareeba, which is not a restricted area subject to an alcohol management plan.
- [28]In considering his criminal history in the context of the purpose of the legislation set out in s 173H, it is significant that the appellant has no convictions for offences associated with alcohol abuse or misuse or associated violence (including domestic violence), or alcohol related disturbances or public disorder, in the relevant locality.
- [29]There is nothing in his criminal history to demonstrate that the commission of the offences has the potential to undermine the purpose of the legislation. There is no evidence of the existence of a domestic violence protection order against the appellant. In the last 10 years, the only relevant offences for which he has been convicted are liquor offences under s 168B at Yarrabah. The appellant’s solicitor submitted to the Magistrate that the appellant had an alcohol problem but was certainly not a problem in the community[10]. His criminal history bears that out. In effect, the introduction of this legislation has criminalised his alcohol use in his own community.
- [30]Prior convictions for similar offences are usually an aggravating feature that may well be taken into account in sentencing for further similar offences. However care must be taken not to give too much weight to the prior commission of similar offences and nor to the circumstances of them, because the offender has already been punished for the prior offences. He cannot be punished again by increasing the penalty for the subsequent offence to a level which is out of proportion to the seriousness of that particular offence. No matter how many times before a person may have been convicted of similar offences, that cannot convert what is otherwise a minor offence into a serious offence.
- [31]There is no doubt that the court has the discretion to impose greater maximum penalties for second and subsequent offences. The section is structured such that the maximum penalties increase for the second and subsequent offences. The maximum penalty for second offence is 525 penalty units or 6 months imprisonment and for a third or later offence, 750 penalty units or 18 months imprisonment.
- [32]The offence on 17 April 2017 was the appellant’s sixth offence. That is no doubt an aggravating feature and would warrant a greater penalty for this offence than the penalty for a first offence. However it involved a lesser total quantity of alcohol than the previous offence, for which he received a community service order.
- [33]There is nothing in the circumstances of the offending on either occasion to suggest the appellant was intoxicated or behaving in an angry, aggressive or violent fashion during the offending. He was travelling as a passenger in a car driven by another person into Yarrabah in the middle of the day.
- [34]The only matter that could potentially suggest a risk that the commission of the offence could undermine the purpose of the legislation is the quantity of alcohol involved. Possession of a large quantity of alcohol suggesting it might be consumed by a number of people could be enough to suggest a risk that the commission of the offence could undermine the purpose of the legislation. For the 17 April 2017 offence, the appellant’s solicitor submitted to the learned Magistrate that the alcohol was for consumption by the appellant and his partner at a wedding. There was no suggestion of commercial supply to third parties. The solicitor rejected a suggestion by the Magistrate that the appellant was bringing it in for consumption by other people. The Magistrate appeared to doubt that submission[11]. Based on the quantity seized, it was open to the learned Magistrate to sentence on the basis that some of the alcohol might be consumed by others.
- [35]That offending was in breach of a community service order made on 16 November 2016. At the date of the sentence in June 2017, the appellant still had 5 months within which to complete the balance of the community service.
- [36]The prosecutor submitted to the Magistrate that “He was provided a sentence of community service, which he’s not engaged in and he said he hasn’t completed any of those hours. It certainly makes it difficult in relation to the options that – restricts the options that your Honour may impose”[12]. The prosecutor’s submission that the appellant had not completed any hours of his community service was incorrect.
- [37]There was a Court Report dated 24 May 2017 before the Magistrate. It stated that initially the appellant failed to attend as directed, that as at the date of the report he had completed 14 hours of the 75 hours of community service ordered, and that his supervisor reported that he worked well when he attended the project. The report nonetheless recommended that, due to his poor engagement, the community service order be revoked and the appellant be resentenced for the original offence. Corrective Services could have breached the appellant for the contravention of the community service order. They elected not to do so. The contravention is constituted by the further offence.
- [38]The prosecutor then submitted: “Certainly, given the number of prior offences, it is certainly a question, your Honour, in relation to whether – if he’s not going to perform any community type of service, then whether probation is something that would be considered, otherwise …”.[13]The prosecutor went on to submit for a period of a suspended sentence, relying on the number of previous offences and the amount of liquor involved[14].
- [39]The solicitor for Corrective Services confirmed that the appellant had completed 14 hours of community service, noted that “There has been a family tragedy which implicated some of his motivation to attend” and submitted that the appellant be resentenced for the original offence the subject of the community service order.
- [40]The appellant’s solicitor noted that there were still some months of the community service order to go. She corroborated the Corrective Services’ submission about a family tragedy, stating that a young person who had been very close relative of the appellant had taken his own life, that there had been a lot of grieving in the community as a result of that and that the appellant had not attended programs as a result[15]. On its face this appears to be a reasonable, indeed some might say compelling, explanation for a delay in completing the community service order.
- [41]The learned Magistrate did not refer at all to the reason given (by both Corrective Services and the defence) for the appellant not yet completing the community services order and in doing so, failed to give weight to a relevant consideration.
- [42]The following exchange then took place with respect to the appellant’s suitability for a community based order[16]:
BENCH: Well, I can’t give him probation here, can I?
MS BOWEN: Well, that’s – whether or not he could comply with probation – he does know he has an alcohol problem.
BENCH: Well, Mr Dresden, you’re from Community Corrections. He wouldn’t do his community service. Are you happy to have him on probation? Is he suitable for probation, if he doesn’t do his community service?
MS DRESDEN: I’m always willing to give people a chance, your Honour. But he’ll be - come back before the court, if he doesn’t do the right thing.
BENCH: Well, you’re the first – I must say, you are the first officer before me from your department to say that. Generally I’ve been told that the department aren’t happy to have people – if he’s appearing on a breach of community service order, he’s been given the opportunity to do his community service, still didn’t do it, I wouldn’t have thought he was suitable.
MS BOWEN: Your Honour, there is still, as I said, five months of that order. He – there has been a very difficult time this year, with the family member taking their own life and it – a very young person, and there’s been a lot of sorry business. But he does accept that he has a problem with alcohol. If there are any programs, he’s quite happy to attend.
- [43]The appellant had completed 14 of the 75 hours community service, there was a reasonable explanation for his failure to engage for at least part of the period, the appellant still had 5 months within which to complete the balance of the community service order and the Corrective Service representative had indicated that they were prepared to give the appellant another chance with a community based order in the form of probation.
- [44]It was clearly open to the learned Magistrate, both on the report and the oral submissions, to impose a further community based order for both offences, including a longer period of community service or a period of probation.
- [45]Notwithstanding that, it is clear that the Magistrate considered herself precluded from imposing a further community based order. On the basis that the appellant had not completed his existing community service order, she found that he was unsuitable for a further community based order. In impermissibly excluding the option of probation, her Honour made an error of law.
- [46]The appellant was 41 years of age. He entered early pleas of guilty. He was in a de facto relationship. He was doing a construction course and was receiving Centrelink benefit of $565 per fortnight. He had a limited capacity to pay a fine.
- [47]Her Honour said: “Doesn't the legislation, in effect, tell me to take into account previous because I need to take into the maximum penalties in relation to the offences. Maximum penalty is different from – for a first offence, a second offence … and a third offence. So I take into account the previous offences. I’m aware of [indistinct] but I’m also aware that the legislation itself increases the maximum penalties … depending on what the previous is.”[17]
- [48]Her Honour then imposed a sentence of imprisonment. She did not refer to the principle in s 9(2)(a) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 that a sentence of imprisonment should only be imposed as a last resort.
- [49]At the start of her decision, her Honour said:
“All right. Stand up, Mr Street. This is a serious matter. There is a very good reason why these liquor restrictions are in the community because of the damage that is caused in the community by alcohol to the women who are often getting assaulted by men that are drinking, to the children and to the men themselves. Today I have already had to send two men to custody for alcohol-related offences to Lotus. That is an absolute travesty and was unnecessary if the alcohol was able to be kept out of the community.”
- [50]No doubt those statements were accurate based on her Honour’s experience as the Magistrate at Yarrabah. However the matters referred to were unrelated to the offending committed by this appellant.
- [51]A sentence of imprisonment, even if wholly suspended, is a very serious penalty. In my view, the learned Magistrate erred in law in:
- failing to take into account relevant considerations: that there was a reasonable explanation for the appellant’s failure to complete more of his community service hours at the date of the sentence and that Corrective Services was prepared to give the appellant a chance with a further community based order;
- finding that it would not be open to impose a further community based order;
- giving too much weight to the purpose of the legislation without relating that purpose to the circumstances of the particular offences under consideration;
- giving too much weight to the appellant’s previous convictions for similar offences; and
- failing to have regard to the principle that a sentence of imprisonment should only be imposed as a last resort.
- [52]Having identified specific error, the sentence must be set aside and this court must exercise the sentencing discretion afresh, unless, in that separate and independent exercise I conclude that no different sentence should be passed.
- [53]In my view, taking all the relevant circumstances into account, the circumstances of the offences and the appellant’s criminal history, the appropriate range for the 17 April 2017 offence should have been a community service order for a longer period (eg.100 hours) or a period of probation of 9 to 12 months, and a lesser concurrent period of probation for the resentence of the 29 October 2016 offence.
- [54]The sentences were imposed on 14 June 2017. There was a delay in prosecuting the appeal. I was informed that it was due to delays in obtaining legal aid and in obtaining the transcript of the Magistrates Court proceedings, which coincided with the Christmas holiday period. By the time of the hearing of the appeal in March 2018, the appellant had already served a period of imprisonment, wholly suspended, for 9 months.
- [55]The appellant submits that because he has had the suspended sentence hanging over his head for 9 months during which period he has not committed any further offences, that is sufficient punishment and it would be appropriate to convict and not further punish. The respondent submits that the court would impose a further penalty such as a probationary period (reduced to reflect the operational period of the suspended sentence already served) or a fine.
- [56]Having served 9 months of the operational period of a suspended sentence, without further offending, is a significant penalty. The appellant has very limited capacity to pay a fine. I consider that it would be unduly harsh to now require the appellant to serve a further period of community service or probation given that he has successfully completed 9 months of a suspended sentence of imprisonment.
- [57]No challenge was made on appeal to the recording of convictions.
- [58]I allow the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Magistrates court and order that for both the offences under section 168B(1) on 29 October 2016 and 24 April 2017, the appellant is convicted and not further punished.
Footnotes
[1] Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172, [22] – [23] followed in Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] QCA 84, [4] per Muir J (Fraser JA & Mullins J agreed). See also White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121, [8] per Morrison JA (Muir JA & Atkinson J agreed).
[2] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; Dwyer v Calco Timbers (2008) 234 CLR 124; applied in Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132, 5.
[3]White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121, [5]-[8] per Morrison JA (Muir JA & Atkinson J agreed); Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132, 5 & 6.
[4]House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505; Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170, 176-178; Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513, 517-519
[5] R v Lawley [2007] QCA 243 at [18]
[6] (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504 and 505
[7] Kentwell v R (2014) 252 CLR 601, [35], adopting AB v R (1999) 198 CLR 111, [130] per Hayne J (minority).
[8] Unreported, District Court of Queensland, White DCJ, Cairns 8 March 2005
[9] Ibid at [6]
[10] TS proceeding 1-8 lines 30-37
[11] TS proceedings 1-6 lines 20-45 and 1-7 lines 1-6
[12] TS proceedings 1-3 lines 33-35
[13] TS proceedings 1-3 lines 40-44
[14] TS proceedings 1-4 lines 29-45
[15] TS proceeding 1-5 lines 26-30
[16] TS proceeding 1-8 line 42-45, 1-9 lines 1-20
[17] TS proceedings 1-10 lines 31-44