Vaevae v Queensland Police Service
[2018] QDC 66
To print this judgment please return to the case and click on the PDF icon
next to the
case name. For court use, a full PDF copy is required or preferred.
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
Please Note: You are about to print a copy of the onscreen
version of
this judgment. For court use, a full PDF copy of the judgment is required or preferred. Please
return to
the case for PDF printing options.
- Unreported Judgment
- Vaevae v Queensland Police Service[2018] QDC 66
- Add to List
Vaevae v Queensland Police Service[2018] QDC 66
Vaevae v Queensland Police Service[2018] QDC 66
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Vaevae v Queensland Police Service [2018] QDC 66 |
PARTIES: | BRYCE VAEVAE (appellant) v THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE (respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | APPEAL NO: 51/18 |
DIVISION: | Appellate |
PROCEEDING: | Appeal |
ORIGINATING COURT: | Magistrates Court, Cairns |
DELIVERED ON: | 13 April 2018 |
DELIVERED AT: | Cairns |
HEARING DATE: | 5 April 2018 |
JUDGE: | Morzone QC DCJ |
ORDERS: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL – pursuant to s 222 Justices Act 1886 – conviction on own plea of 14 offences – dangerous operation of a motor, vehicle; enter dwelling and commit indictable offence, burglary and commit indictable offences; unlawfully using a motor vehicle and stealing – appeal against sentence – mode of hearing of appeal – whether sentence manifestly excessive – whether magistrate mistook the facts – whether erroneous consideration of offending aggravated by breach of bail – imprisonment as last resort, youthful offender & mitigation – re-sentence. Legislation Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 222, 223(1) & 227. Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 9. Cases Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 Dwyer v Calco Timbers (2008) 234 CLR 124 Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 Kentwell v R (2014) 252 CLR 60 Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 R v Broadbridge [1994] QCA 278 R v Dance [2009] QCA 371 Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] QCA 84 Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121 |
COUNSEL: | J Trevino for the Appellant E Coker for the Respondent |
SOLICITORS: | Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant The Office of Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent |
- [1]The appellant appeals against the sentence imposed by the Magistrates Court to an effective 18 months for the more serious offences of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and enter dwelling charges, and concurrent lesser terms of imprisonment, with a parole release date set after serving 4 months’ imprisonment, including 67 days of pre-sentence custody.
- [2]The appellant appealed against the sentence on the grounds that the head sentence was manifestly excessive. The respondent has properly conceded the appeal.
- [3]After hearing the parties’ submissions on 5 April 2018, I allowed the appeal and made orders varying the sentence to an effective head sentence of 14 months’ imprisonment for the offences of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle committed on 15 January 2018 (charge 10) and the offences of enter dwelling charges committed on 18 January 2018 (charges 12 & 13). The lesser concurrent terms of imprisonment were undisturbed. All terms of imprisonment sentences were partly suspended after 78 days served by the appellant in pre-sentence custody for an operational period of 18 months.
- [4]I now publish the reasons for those orders.
Background
- [5]The offending occurred between 14 December 2017 and 15 January 2018 when the appellant was 18 years of age.
- [6]On 14 and 16 December 2017 the appellant broke into two homes, stealing car keys, and using those keys to drive away in the cars located at the residence. This offending constituted the offences of burglary and commit indictable offence (charges 1 & 3), and unlawful use of a motor vehicle (charges 2 & 4).
- [7]On 17 December 2017 the appellant re-offended with others to break into a further two homes. They stole car keys, a watch, cigarettes, and taking the two cars in the first home, and a set of keys, and a wallet in the second home. This offending constituted the further two charges of burglary and commit indictable offence (charges 5 & 9), and two of unlawfully using a motor vehicle (charges 6 & 7). Later the offenders refuelled one of the cars at a Parramatta Park service station without paying. This constituted the offence of stealing (charges 8).
- [8]The offending relating to the charge of dangerous driving (charge 10) occurred on 18 December 2017. In that event the police found the appellant asleep in the driver’s seat in one of the stolen cars in the parking area of Edmonton PCYC. Police parked a marked police car in front of the stolen car and an unmarked police car at its rear. They also put road spikes behind the right wheel of the stolen car. The officers then woke the appellant as they attempted to enter the car. The appellant then drove the stolen car forward into one of the police cars before reversing into the other and then drove off at speed with a punctured tyre, the result of driving over the spikes. The damage to the two police vehicles was $3772.56 and $2592.63 respectively.
- [9]The appellant was arrested the next day and taken into custody. He made some admissions relating to previous offending, and was released after being issued with a notice to appear before the Cairns Magistrates Court on 20 February 2018.
- [10]On 15 January 2018 the appellant and other co-offenders entered and stole from two adjoining houses at Palm Cove. They stole a laptop and some other property from the first house and stole a mobile phone, a tablet, some money and a set of car keys from the second house. This constituted two further offences of enter dwelling and commit indictable offence (charges 12 & 13). The offenders also took a car from the second house but crashed into a fence whilst reversing down the driveway. This constitutes the offending of unlawful use of a motor vehicle (charge 11).
- [11]The offenders then got away in another stolen car. They collided with a police car after a u–turn manoeuvre then drove away. Police later used road spikes to stop the car. These matters constitute the further offending of unlawful use of a motor vehicle (charge 14). The appellant and his co-offenders then fled. He was later arrested and made admissions about his offending conduct. He was subsequently remanded in custody.
- [12]The appellant had a limited criminal history which involved convictions for two minor offences, and for which no convictions had been recorded and had good behaviour bonds imposed.
- [13]The appellant was convicted on his own plea of guilty of all 14 charges and sentenced in the Magistrates Court on 23 March 2018.
- [14]After hearing submissions from the police prosecutor and the appellant’s solicitor, the learned magistrate sentenced the appellant as follows:
- 18 months’ imprisonment and 6 months’ driver’s licence disqualification for the dangerous operation of a motor vehicle committed (charge 10);
- 18 months’ imprisonment for each offence of enter dwelling and commit indictable offences (charges 12 & 13);
- 12 months’imprisonment for offence of burglary and commit indictable offences (charges 1, 3, 5 & 9);
- 12 months’ imprisonment for each charge of unlawfully using a motor vehicle (charges 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 & 14);
- 1 month for stealing (charge 8);
- All terms of imprisonment were ordered to be served concurrently;
- Pre-sentence custody was declared for 67 days served between the period of 15 January 2018 and 22 March 2018;
- A parole release date was fixed at 15 May 2018, after the appellant serves 4 months of the sentence.
- [15]On 23 March 2018 the appellant appealed against his sentence on the grounds that it is manifestly excessive. He was granted bail on 3 April 2018, and the appeal was heard on 5 April 2018 to this Court.
Appeal against Sentence
- [16]The appellant appeals pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). No new evidence was adduced on the appeal pursuant to section 223.
- [17]For an appeal by way of rehearing ‘The powers of the appellate court are exercisable only where the appellant can demonstrate that, having regard to all the evidence now before the appellate court, the order that is the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error ... At least that is so unless, in the case of an appeal by way of rehearing, there is some statutory provision which indicates that the powers may be exercised whether or not there was error at first instance.’[1]
- [18]But the court does not merely consider whether or not the magistrate has made an error of fact or law. The rehearing requires this court to conduct a real review of the evidence before it, and make up its own mind about the case.[2]
- [19]This court ought not interfere with a sentence unless it is manifestly excessive, it is vitiated by an error of principle, there has been a failure to appreciate a salient feature or there is otherwise a miscarriage of justice. A mere difference of opinion about the way in which the discretion should be exercised is not a sufficient justification for review, it must be shown that the discretion miscarried.[3]
- [20]
"It is not enough that the Judges composing the Appellate Court consider that if they had been in a position of the primary Judge they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the Judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows erroneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the Appellate Court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary Judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts, it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the Appellate Court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the Court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred."
- [21]
“In the case of specific error, the appellate court’s power to intervene is enlivened and it becomes its duty to re-sentence, unless in the separate and independent exercise of its discretion it concludes that no different sentence should be passed. By contrast, absent specific error, the appellate court may only intervene if it concludes that the sentence falls outside the permissible range of sentences for the offender and the offence.”
- [22]The decisions distinguished cases of specific error and manifest excess. Once an appellate court identifies a specific error, the sentence must be set aside and the appellate court must exercise the sentencing discretion afresh, unless, in that separate and independent exercise it concludes that no different sentence should be passed. By contrast, an error may not be discernible; but the sentence is manifestly excessive as being too heavy and lies outside the permissible range. Only then may the appellate court intervene and, in the exercise of its discretion, consider what sentence is to be imposed.
Grounds of Appeal
- [23]The appellant submitted that the learned magistrate made the following errors to result in a manifestly excessive sentence:
- The learned Magistrate mischaracterised the seriousness of the dangerous driving offence committed on 15 January 2018, and the weight of comparative cases.
- The learned Magistrate incorrectly aggravated the offending through the mistaken belief that the appellant was on bail during some of the offending, whilst the defendant was in fact subject to a notice to appear and not a bail undertaking.
- The learned Magistrate erred in failing to recognise that a sentence of imprisonment should be imposed as a last resort pursuant to s 9(2)(a) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, and thereby effectively reversed the onus by implying that exceptional circumstances needed to be established, through the provision of a psychologist report.
- The learned Magistrate failed to correctly consider the mitigating circumstances and to turn his mind to releasing the appellant on parole on the sentence day.
Mistaking the Facts
- [24]The factual basis of the offending was undisputed and reduced to written schedules.
- [25]In relation to the charge of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle (charge 10) the undisputed facts were that, while the appellant was asleep in the stationary vehicle, the police blocked him in by parking a marked vehicle at the front of him and an unmarked vehicle behind him. They then proceeded to wake him as they tried to enter the car, with the result that the appellant drove forward and back, collided with the police cars, and drove away. There was no pursuit.
- [26]It seems to me that the prosecutor’s submissions conveyed the impression that the offending occurred when police intercepted the defendant in the course of a pursuit. The following exchange between the magistrate and the prosecutor exemplifies this:[6]
SGT O'SHEA: In respect to the dangerous-operation charge – victim in this matter is the commissioner of police, your Honour. Driver of a vehicle was the – detailed as the defendant. He was driving a stolen vehicle. He has driven directly into the driver’s door of a marked police D-Max before reversing into the bonnet of an unmarked police sedan in – behind. Tire-deflation devices were deployed, punctured the right rear tire of the driver’s ‑ ‑ ‑
BENCH: So was it in the context of – I know it’s précis-ed version, but – he’s driving a stolen car.
SGT O'SHEA: Yes, your Honour.
BENCH: The marked police car was in pursuit, parked ‑ ‑ ‑
SGT O'SHEA: From my submission, your Honour – the marked police car was blocking the progress of the defendant’s vehicle, and an unmarked police car had boxed him in from behind.
- [27]The appellant’s solicitor attempted to advert to the undisputed facts about the appellant’s slumber and reaction this way:[7]
MS CHO: Your Honour, if I can read the facts – it was actually parked. The vehicle was parked at the PCYC. So it wasn’t in
BENCH: So is there going to be some dispute [indistinct]
MS CHO: No, your Honour. My friend just didn’t mention that the vehicle had been parked. It wasn’t in the middle of a pursuit. They had found the parked vehicle with Mr Veivei inside it, and that’s when Mr Veivei’s dangerous operation [indistinct] happens.
BENCH: Yes, yes. Yes.
MS CHO: Yes, your Honour.
BENCH: So
MS CHO: I just wanted to confirm he wasn’t in the middle of a pursuit.
BENCH: So it wasn’t parked police vehicles. The police went to intercept him, discharging their lawful duties to arrest him in a stolen vehicle. And he’s driven deliberately at two vehicles, driven into one [indistinct] and tire-deflation device [indistinct].
- [28]Notwithstanding the efforts of the appellant’s solicitor to reinforce the undisputed facts, the learned magistrate seems to have continued to labour under some misapprehension about the circumstances and seriousness of the offending.
- [29]
“Your conduct is far more serious and more consistent with the decision referred to in Danceof R v Broadbridge, that is, a person fleeing the police, deliberately driving at the police. Here, significant damage to the police vehicle occurred. Your manner of driving clearly placed the police in some real potential for harm.”
- [30]In Dance the Court faced similar offending by a 17 to 18 year old committed over a four-month period in breach of a probation order. The offending included dangerous operation of a motor vehicle which started when the applicant sped away from police pursuing with lights and sirens. He reached speeds of up to 150 km/h in a 60 km/h zone, made an overtaking manoeuvre on the crest of a hill and on the wrong side of the road, braked heavily to avoid hitting another car coming over the crest of the hill, and also drove through a red traffic light. The stolen car had about $400 worth of damage. The applicant made full admissions. On appeal, that appellant’s head sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment was not disturbed, but he was given immediate release on parole after serving about 2 months in custody before the appeal. Proper regard to this decision should have resulted in an order for the applicant’s release on parole after the time he had already served.
- [31]Whilst the offender in Broadbridgewas also a similar age, the circumstances of the offending were markedly distinguishable. In that case the applicant was driving at 145 kph. The radar police officer, wearing a reflector vest and carrying a bright torch, moved out onto the roadway and indicated that to the applicant to stop and pull over. The primary judge found that: "The accused drove his vehicle slightly towards the police officer. I do not believe he was trying to kill the police officer. I believe he was trying to just scare the police officer out of the road so the police officer would be in no position to take his number as he went by or to engage in immediate pursuit". The police officer jumped out of the way and the applicant sped past him. He was eventually forced to stop by another police car. When asked why he drove his vehicle directly at the police officer and the applicant replied "You're lucky I didn't kill you. I wouldn't have stopped". The court of appeal resentenced the applicant to 18 months’ imprisonment with parole release after 6 months.
- [32]In my respectful opinion, the learned magistrate seems to have mistaken the facts by elevating and equating the circumstances with those in Broadbridge, which involved roadside interception in response to high speed travel, deliberately driving at an officer and subsequent pursuit. This has resulted in the imposition of a tariff outside the appropriate sentence range.
Erroneous consideration of offending aggravated by breach of bail
- [33]During his sentencing remarks, His Honour said:
“The burglaries in January were committed after you had been arrested, charged and appeared before the Court and granted bail. That did not seem to deter you, sir.”[11]
And
“Using Dance as a guide, noting the significant number of offences, the serious nature of them, having regard to the aggravating features of the offences being committed while you were on bail in respect of the latter cases, they all suggest that a period of imprisonment similar to that imposed by Dance, after taking into account the pleas of guilty and youth, is appropriate.”[12]
- [34]In fact, at no time during the offending, was the appellant on bail. Instead, he was merely given a notice to appear on 20 February 2018. This perhaps casts light on the higher sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment for the later offences of entering a dwelling and commit an indictable offence.
- [35]I am bound to conclude that the learned magistrate erroneously acted on an aggravating factor of reoffending while on bail, when the defendant did no such thing.
Imprisonment as last resort, youthful offender & mitigation
- [36]During the hearing, the appellant’s solicitor relied upon the statutory principle that imprisonment ought be a last resort, especially for a youthful offender with very minor criminal history and pre-sentence custody.
- [37]The following exchange occurred between the learned magistrate and the appellant’s solicitor:[13]
MS CHO: Your Honour can also take into consideration that there was no physical violence involved and there is no violence in his history so can consider section 9 of the Penalties and Sentences Act, where – imprisonment should be imposed as a last resort and that rehabilitation in the community is something that should be considered, especially for youthful offenders, and the case law does speak about that too. Your Honour, he is on a good-behaviour order, and he has breached that, and he also understands that he will have to pay the recog of $300.
MS CHO: Your Honour, if I can address you on the case law – as I fore-shadowed, your Honour, in my submission, R v Dance is of higher seriousness than the case before your Honour today, and that’s because he was on a probation order. He had been given that opportunity, and he was given that probation order for unlawful-use-of-motor-vehicle charges, but then on probation he committed similar offences and quite a lot of offences. He was dealt with in the District Court on a 16-count indictment, and there was a further three-count indictment. And there was also three driving offences as summary matters that had been transmitted. In that occasion he was subject to probation for two years, which was imposed on the 12th of October. And unfortunately – he committed similar offences whilst on probation. Your Honour will notice that on page 5 of R v Dance it talks about the sentencing principles of section 9, and then in page 6 it quotes Justice Holmes in R v Kingston-Smith and Connor, ex parte
BENCH: I read all of that.
MS CHO: Yes. Thank your Honour.
BENCH: Mr Dance had assessments from psychologists [indistinct] rehabilitation. Didn’t he.
MS CHO: Yes, your Honour.
BENCH: That’s absent here.
MS CHO: It is absent here, and that is conceded, but your Honour can be satisfied that he does have work prospects, and that is written in the reference that have been tendered.
BENCH: Yes. But he’s – but Mr Dance had some other
MS CHO: The difference that I can only see is the psychologist’s report that was tendered at sentence. But, your Honour, the principles of considering youthful offenders with limited criminal histories and their promising prospects of rehabilitation still apply in this matter, even without that psychologist report. And your Honour can take into consideration that there were co-offenders also.
- [38]The appellant’s solicitor was relying the remarks of Atkinson J (with whom the other judges agreed) in Dance, where her Honour referred to s 9(2)(a) and youthful offenders as follows:
“[23] Subsection 9(2) provides a number of matters to which the court must have regard when sentencing an offender. The first of those is found in subsection 9(2)(a) which mandates that the court must have regard to the principles that a sentence of imprisonment should be imposed as a last resort and that a sentence that allows the offender to stay in the community is preferable. …
[24] The other matters relevant to sentence are set out in subsection 9(2) of the Penalties and Sentences Act. Importantly for this matter they include the age of the offender. The age of the offender is relevant even with youthful offenders who have committed violent offences. In R v Kinersen-Smith & Connor; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2009] QCA 153 at [26] Holmes JA referred to the emphasis the court places when sentencing on the community interest in the rehabilitation of young offenders. Her Honour quoted from R v Mules [2007] QCA 47 at [21]:
“youthful offenders with limited criminal histories and promising prospects of rehabilitation who have pleaded guilty and cooperated with the administration of justice, even where they have committed serious offences like [robbery with violence], should receive more leniency from courts than would otherwise be appropriate.”
- [39]It seems that the learned magistrate was at cross purposes by apparently relying upon the absence of a psychological report (unlike Dance) somehow negated those mitigating and relevant considerations.
- [40]Further, the learned magistrate did not advert to the apposite and mandatory principle that a sentence of imprisonment should only be imposed as a last resort and a sentence that allows the offender to stay in the community is preferable in accordance with s 9(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992. That, in my respectful opinion, bespeaks an error in the exercise of the sentencing discretion.
Conclusion
- [41]For these reasons, in my respectful view, the learned magistrate erred in exercising the sentencing discretion by:
- Mistaking the facts so as to proceed on the basis that the interception, as described by the prosecutor, was one in which involved police interception, failing to stop from high speed and police pursuit.
- Acting upon a wrong principle, or failing to apply the mandatory statutory sentencing principle that the imposition of prison is a last resort and a sentence that allows the offender to stay in the community is preferable.
- Allowing erroneous or irrelevant matters about offending while on bail to guide or affect him.
- [42]In those circumstances, this Court is required to allow the appeal and to re-exercise the sentencing discretion.
Resentence
- [43]The purpose and guidelines of sentences are those prescribed in s 9 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). The sentence must be appropriate punishment in the circumstances, facilitate avenues of rehabilitation, deter others from committing a similar offence, make it clear that the community denounces the conduct in this offence, and protect the community.[14]Further, in the absence of violent or sexual offending, a sentence of imprisonment should only be imposed as a last resort and a sentence that allows the offender to remain in the community is preferable.[15]
- [44]The appellant was 18 years old at the time of the offending, and he has just turned 19.
- [45]I have had regard to the material before the magistrate, including the schedules of facts summarised above, criminal history and pre-sentence custody. The appellant youthful with a very limited criminal history, who has pleaded guilty, cooperated with the administration of justice, and has promising prospects of rehabilitation.
- [46]It seems to me that the nature and seriousness of offending in both comparative cases of Dance and Broadbridgeare distinguishable in circumstances where they both involved high speeds, failing to stop when pursued, and dangerous manoeuvres risking police and others.
- [47]He has also served 78 days in presentence custody in an adult correctional centre, which has no doubt been a very salutary experience at his age and maturity.
- [48]It seems to me that the head sentence for the serious offences in charges 10, 12 and 13 committed on 18 December 2017 and 15 January 2018 is in the order of 14 months’ imprisonment. I see no purpose to be served in returning the appellant to serve further actual custody.
Order
- [49]For these reasons, I make the following orders:
1The appeal against sentence is allowed.
2The sentence of the Magistrates Court imposed on 23 March 2018 is varied as follows:
- (a)For the offence of dangerous operation of a vehicle, committed on 18 December 2017 – substitute 14 months’ imprisonment in lieu 18 months of imprisonment;
- (b)For each of the two offences of entering a dwelling and commit indictable offence, both committed on 15 January 2018 - substitute a term of 14 months’ imprisonment in lieu of 18 months of imprisonment;
- (c)All terms of imprisonment to be served concurrently;
- (d)That 78 days spent in pre-sentence custody from 15 January 2018 to 3 April 2018 inclusive are declared to be time served already under the sentence. The Registrar is directed to inform the commission of that declaration;
- (e)The court ordered parole order setting the parole release date of 15 May 2018 is discharged;
- (f)The terms of imprisonment be partly suspended after the defendant serves 78 days’ imprisonment, for an operational period of 18 months.
3Otherwise all the orders made by the Magistrates’ Court on 23 March 2018 are affirmed including the orders for disqualification.
Judge DP Morzone QC
Footnotes
[1]Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172, [22] – [23] followed in Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] QCA 84, [4] per Muir J (Fraser JA & Mullins J agreed). See also White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121, [8] per Morrison JA (Muir JA & Atkinson J agreed), but contrast Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132, 5 per Sofronoff P (Gotterson JA, Morrison JA agreed).
[2]Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; Dwyer v Calco Timbers (2008) 234 CLR 124; applied in Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132, 5.
[3]House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505; Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170, 176-178; Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513, 517-519.
[4](1936) 55 CLR 499, 504 and 505.
[5]Kentwell v R (2014) 252 CLR 60, [35], adopting AB v R (1999) 198 CLR 111, [130] per Hayne J (minority).
[6]T1-6/7-25.
[7]T1-10/40-45.
[8]R v Dance [2009] QCA 371 at [37].
[9]R v Broadbridge [1994] QCA 278.
[10]T1-3/5-10.
[11]T1-2/20.
[12]T1-3/15.
[13]T1-9/35 – T1-10/30.
[14]Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 9(1).
[15]Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 9(2)(a).