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CITE

Unreported Judgment

Metroll Roofing Pty Ltd v Tempest[2020] QDC 273Jarro DCJ
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Metroll Roofing Pty Ltd v Tempest[2020] QDC 273

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:	Metroll Roofing Pty Ltd v Tempest [2020] QDC 273
PARTIES:	METROLL ROOFING PTY LTD ACN 010 065 102 (plaintiff) v MATTHEW CRAIG TEMPEST (defendant)
FILE NO:	BD No. 1521 of 2020
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING:	Trial
ORIGINATING COURT:
DELIVERED ON:	30 October 2020
DELIVERED AT:	Brisbane
HEARING DATE:	9 October 2020
JUDGE:	Jarro DCJ
ORDER:	The plaintiff’s claim is dismissed. I will hear from the parties as to the form of the order, any further orders and costs.
CATCHWORDS:	GUARANTEE AND INDEMNITY – ASSIGNMENT – where the plaintiff was assigned a judgment debt from Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd who obtained default judgment against the defendant’s company MCT Roofing (Qld) Pty Ltd – where the defendant entered into a credit application on behalf of his company with Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd in 2006 - where the defendant entered into a credit application on behalf of his company with the plaintiff in 2013 – where the defendant provided a personal guarantee and indemnity in the 2013 credit application but not in the 2006 credit application - whether the guarantee given by the defendant in 2013 in favour of the plaintiff answers a judgment debt assigned to it by Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd REAL PROPERTY – TORRENS TITLE – CAVEATS AGAINST DEALINGS – REMOVAL – PARTICULAR CASES – where the plaintiff lodged a caveat over the defendant’s interest in the defendant’s land – where the defendant seeks an order that the caveat be removed – where the plaintiff’s claim has been dismissed – whether there is no basis for the caveat upon dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 500 Land Title Act 1994, s 127 Chacmol Holdings Pty Ltd v Handberg (2005) 215 ALR 748, considered Estoril Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1996) 6 BPR 13,146, applied McVeigh (Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Piccolo) v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) ALR 429, applied Olympic Holdings Pty Ltd v Winslow Corporation Pty Ltd (in liq) (2008) 36 WAR 342, cited Watson v Scott [2016] 2 Qd R 484, cited
COUNSEL:	C G C Curtis for the plaintiff G J Barr for the defendant
SOLICITORS:	Kanji & Co Solicitors for the plaintiff Greenhalgh Pickard Solicitors for the defendant

[1]
The plaintiff, Metroll Roofing Pty Ltd, who supplies building materials from Rockhampton, claims against the defendant for liability said to have arisen under a guarantee for an assigned judgment debt.
[2]
The plaintiff was assigned the judgment debt on 14 August 2017 by a related body corporate, Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd, who obtained default judgment against the company known as MCT Roofing (Qld) Pty Ltd, after MCT Roofing (Qld) Pty Ltd fell into arrears for payments for building supplies made by Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd. MCT Roofing (Qld) Pty Ltd was a contract roof plumbing service business controlled by the defendant, who was the sole director and shareholder of MCT Roofing (Qld) from May 2004 until the time of its liquidation in June 2017.
[3]
In around March 2013, the defendant made an application for credit on behalf of his company MCT Roofing (Qld) to the plaintiff (“2013 credit account application”) and provided a personal guarantee and indemnity (“2013 guarantee and indemnity”).
[4]
Relevantly prior to that date, in around July 2006, the defendant made an application for credit on behalf of his company MCT Roofing (Qld) (“2006 credit account application”) to Metroll Queensland. The 2006 credit account application was made to Mr Jason Hawthorne, who was and remains to be the Warana branch manager of Metroll Queensland. Mr Hawthorne was the sales representative managing MCT Roofing (Qld)’s credit account with Metroll Queensland from July 2006 until MCT Roofing (Qld) ceased trading in 2017.^[1]
[5]
The defendant was not required to provide, nor did he provide a personal guarantee and indemnity for the 2006 credit account application to Metroll Queensland. This was unlike the 2013 credit account application where a personal guarantee was given by way of the 2013 guarantee and indemnity.
[6]
The principal issue to be determined is whether the guarantee given by the defendant in 2013 in favour of Metroll Roofing answers a judgment debt assigned to it by Metroll Queensland.

2006 Credit Account Application

[7]
Dealing first with the terms of the 2006 credit account application, I note the following matters^[2]:
1. (a)
  “Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd” and the specific ABN (as distinct from the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s ABN) appears on the first page.
2. (b)
  The address of Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd is listed at Richlands.
3. (c)
  The heading on the document is stated as:

“CREDIT ACCOUNT APPLICATION to

METROLL QUEENSLAND PTY LTD (“the Company”)”.

(d)
Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd is “the Company”.
(e)
MCT Roofing is “the Customer”.
(f)
It contains, inter alia, the following terms:

“I/We acknowledge receipt of the Terms and Conditions of Sale of the Company specified on pages 3 and 4. I/We agree that notwithstanding any other document, terms and conditions, and/or anything else except a written agreement signed by me/us and the Company any sale and delivery of goods and services to me/us shall be upon these Terms and Conditions of Sale and no other except for such terms as are implied by or under any law and which cannot be excluded.

…

I/We authorise the Company and its associated companies to obtain personal and/or commercial credit information about me/us from me/us, a credit reporting agency or anyone else primarily for assessing my/our application for a credit account, the subsequent administration and collection of the account. I/We agree and consent to the Company, using and disclosing to the personnel of the Company and others my/our information for these purposes and for credit control generally.”

(g)
No specific reference is made to the plaintiff, Metroll Roofing Pty Ltd. Perhaps an indirect reference is made to the plaintiff in the document by the words “its associated companies” for authorisation to obtain credit information pertaining to MCF Roofing.
(h)
The terms and conditions of sale, which appear on pages 3 and 4 of the 2006 credit account application, commence with the words:

“All goods and services purchased from the Company and any of its divisions are sold subject to the following terms and conditions of sale which shall prevail notwithstanding any other document, terms and conditions and/or anything else except a written agreement signed by the Customer and the Company, except only for such terms, guarantees, indemnities or other obligations as are limited or imposed by or under any law and which cannot be excluded. …”

[8]
Between 2006 and 2012, the defendant only dealt with what he described as “Metroll Warana and so [he] had no other dealings with a Metroll supplier other than Metroll Warana”.^[3] Further between mid-2014 and mid-2017, “the only dealing [he] had for the supply of roofing materials from Metroll was with Jason [Hawthorne] and his staff at Metroll Warana”.^[4] These factual matters however are not determinative with respect to the resolution of the principal issue in dispute.

2013 Credit Account Application

[9]
In about April 2012, MCT Roofing secured a contract to install roofing at various sites located around Emerald and Moranbah, which is some 800 kilometres from the Sunshine Coast where Metroll Queensland and MCT Roofing both operated. It became more convenient for the defendant to deal directly with the plaintiff as the plaintiff operated from Rockhampton.
[10]
Dealing with the terms of the 2013 credit account application, I note the following matters^[5]:
1. (a)
  The plaintiff’s name and relevant ABN (as distinct from “Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd” and relevant ABN) appears on the first page.
2. (b)
  The plaintiff’s address is listed at Parkhurst, which is a suburb of Rockhampton.
3. (c)
  The heading on the document is stated as:

“CREDIT ACCOUNT APPLICATION to

METROLL ROOFING PTY LTD (“the Company”)”.

(d)
The plaintiff is “the Company”.
(e)
MCT Roofing is “the Customer”.
(f)
It contains, inter alia, the following terms (which are identical to the 2006 Credit Account Application), namely:

…

(g)
No specific reference is made to Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd. Similarly like the 2006 credit account application, perhaps an indirect reference is made to Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd in the document by the words “its associated companies” for authorisation to obtain credit information pertaining to MCF Roofing.
(h)
Similarly like the 2006 credit account application, the terms and conditions of sale, which appear on pages 3 and 4 of the 2013 credit account application, commence with the words:

[11]
Dealing with the 2013 guarantee and indemnity, I note, inter alia, the following terms:

“In consideration of the Company … agreeing to supply and/or to continue to supply goods and services to the Customer and at my/our express request forbearing to sue for any monies now owing to the Company by the Customer.

…

(“the Guarantors”) hereby JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY GUARANTEE to the Company the due and punctual payment of all moneys owing or remaining unpaid to the Company by the Customer, as follows:

The Guarantors will pay to the Company on demand without deduction or set-off all moneys now payable or may in the future be payable by the Customer including without limitation all interest, administration, collection and legal costs of recovery of such moneys, and the Company need not first take recovery proceedings against the Customer.

This Guarantee shall be a continuing Guarantee to the Company for the whole of the Customer’s indebtedness or liability to the Company from time to time howsoever and whenever arising and shall not be wholly or partially discharged by any payment by the Customer and it will not be affected by:

…

(iii)
any change in the identity or proprietorship of the Customer.

…

The Guarantors may revoke this Guarantee by delivery of a notice of revocation to the Company’s registered office and shall be effective only on receipt at the registered office of such notice and shall operate to discharge the Guarantors from future liability but not from any current or past liability.”

Is the Plaintiff Entitled to the Relief Sought?

[12]
The plaintiff contends that pursuant to the 2013 guarantee and indemnity, especially clause 2, it is entitled to the relief sought.
[13]
The defendant essentially contends that the guarantee which was executed by him on 27 March 2013 relates solely to the plaintiff and not the company Metroll Queensland where he did not provide a personal guarantee. One principal argument related to the definition of “the Company” in the 2013 credit account application. The defendant submits that the plaintiff is effectively attempting to clawback debts incurred by the defendant’s earlier company (which has now been liquidated) in favour of a company which is not the plaintiff.

[14]
The circumstances giving rise to the defendant entering into the 2013 credit account application with the plaintiff were that in about April 2012, MCT Roofing secured work in the Emerald and Moranbah regions, west of Rockhampton. Despite such work being about 800 kilometres away from the Sunshine Coast, MCT Roofing continued to deal with Mr Hawthorne and Metroll Queensland at Warana to source materials.^[6] The placement of orders with Metroll Queensland at Warana by MCT Roofing for the supply of goods in Emerald and Moranbah had a number of practical implications. First, the goods were not supplied directly by Metroll Queensland at Warana, but rather by the plaintiff in Rockhampton. The way that worked was that, having received an order from MCT Roofing, Metroll Queensland would place an order with the plaintiff in Rockhampton. It was highlighted on behalf of the defendant that therefore, the plaintiff’s customer was Metroll Queensland (and not MCT Roofing). That was evident from the delivery paperwork observed by the defendant when goods were delivered to the Emerald and Moranbah sites that showed the “customer” to be Metroll Queensland (and not MCT Roofing).^[7] Secondly, there was a commercial transaction between Metroll Queensland and the plaintiff for goods supplied in Emerald and Moranbah.^[8] A purchase order would be placed by which Metroll Queensland would buy the goods from the plaintiff.^[9] Thirdly, Metroll Queensland would then invoice MCT Roofing for the goods supplied. But in doing so, a mark-up would be applied.^[10] Fourthly, when goods were damaged in transit or if there were any other issues with deliveries, the defendant would have to contact MrHawthorne at Metroll Queensland at Warana, rather than the plaintiff direct because it was the former entity with whom MCT Roofing had contracted for the supply of goods. Mr Hawthorne would then have to liaise with the plaintiff. There was a degree of inefficiency about that.^[11]

[15]
In March 2013, the defendant spoke with Mr Hawthorne about the practical implications and difficulties of getting goods supplied to Emerald and Moranbah. Irrespective of whether that discussion occurred over the telephone or in person, I am satisfied that the discussion between the two individuals then caused the defendant and MCT Roofing to deal directly with the plaintiff rather than Metroll Queensland at Warana (if it had wanted to). Although he could not precisely recall, Mr Hawthorne conceded in his evidence that he would have used words to the defendant to the effect that the manager of the plaintiff “runs his own show”.^[12]
[16]
I pause at this juncture to note that Metroll Queensland operated branches located in Brisbane, Toowoomba, Sunshine Coast (Warana), Bundaberg and Cairns. The plaintiff operated branches located in Rockhampton, Mackay and Townsville. The plaintiff was and is a separate legal entity to Metroll Queensland.
[17]
Between April 2013 and March 2014, MCT Roofing purchased goods from the plaintiff to perform work in Emerald and Moranabah.^[13] The last invoice issued by the plaintiff to MCT Roofing was dated 21 March 2014. There were a total of 46 invoices issued by the plaintiff over that time, and all of those invoices were paid in full. The plaintiff had no further dealings with MCT Roofing or the defendant after payment of the final invoice.
[18]
As to whether the guarantee should be construed so as to cover the assigned judgment debt, it was highlighted on behalf of the plaintiff that the guarantee was, in the broadest terms, in relation to the types of debts covered when incurred and has no ambiguity. General principles of construction of a guarantee are raised. In Watson v Scott^[14] McMurdo P (Morrison and Philippides JJA agreeing) stated:

“…in construing the terms of the agreement, this Court must discover the objective intention of the parties as embodied in the words used in the agreement. The parties’ subjective intentions are irrelevant. The meaning of the agreement is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood the terms to mean; evidence of pre-contractual negotiations is only admissible if it provides knowledge of surrounding circumstances and relates to objective facts known directly or inferentially to both parties. The agreement should be construed in a commercially sensible way although minds may differ as to what equates to ‘business common sense’. In construing a contractual contract, a court should know the commercial purpose of the contract. This will usually require knowledge of the background and the context to the transaction. The apparent purpose or object can be inferred from the express or implied terms of the contract and from any admissible evidence of surrounding circumstances. But evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in the interpretation of a contract only if the language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one interpretation; it is not admissible to contradict the language of the contract when it has a plain meaning. Where the terms of the agreement are unambiguous, extrinsic evidence may inform, but cannot contradict, the meaning of the contract. Courts in construing an agreement, must find the objective meaning of what the parties agreed to, not what they meant to agree to.”

[19]
It seems to me the objective intention of the parties as embodied in the language used in the 2013 guarantee and indemnity was that the defendant guaranteed to the plaintiff payment of all moneys, owing or remaining unpaid to the company for the whole of MCT Roofing’s indebtedness or liability to the company. A reasonable person would have understood that the defendant guaranteed MCT Roofing’s indebtedness to the plaintiff from the 2013 credit account application, in other words, the plaintiff’s sale and supply of goods to MCT Roofing.^[15] I do not consider the language to be ambiguous or susceptible of more than one interpretation. It is therefore unnecessary to look towards the evidence of the surrounding circumstances.^[16] However the surrounding circumstances would not cause me to form a contrary view.
[20]
Regarding the effect of an ‘all moneys’ clause, I was greatly assisted by the submissions of MrCurtis of Counsel. It was highlighted that more recent authority has confirmed that formulaic approaches are to be deprecated and, instead, general principles of contractual construction should apply. In Olympic Holdings Pty Ltd v Winslow Corporation Pty Ltd (in liq)^[17], after reviewing previous authorities at length, Buss JA (Steylar J agreeing) stated:

“The ambit or reach of an ‘all moneys’ clause in an instrument of security is to be determined according to ordinary principles of contractual construction (including those applicable to the resolution of an ambiguity); in particular, by reference to the language of the clause in the context of the express and implied terms of the instrument as a whole, the surrounding circumstances known to the parties when the instrument was executed, and the apparent purpose and object of the transaction. The task of construing an ‘all moneys’ clause is not to be approached with a ‘pre-disposition’ as to its intended ambit or reach. So there is no ‘pre-disposition’ that an instrument of security is not intended to secure pre-assignment unsecured indebtedness of a mortgagor to an assignee of the original mortgagee, and is not intended to secure an unsecured indebtedness of a mortgagor to a third party which is assigned by the third party to the mortgagee over the execution of the instrument. In any case, whether or not indebtedness of the kind I have just mentioned is secured by an ‘all moneys’ clause depends on the language of the clause, construed in the context of the instrument of security as a whole, any admissible evidence as to the surrounding circumstances, and the apparent purpose and object of the transaction.”

(Emphasis added)

[21]
Further Chacmol Holdings Pty Ltd v Handberg^[18] considered a clause similar to clause 2 of the 2013 guarantee and indemnity, which was described by Tamberlin J as follows:

“The first operative part of the deed of charge is that the purchaser will pay the vendor all moneys now owing or payable on any account whatsoever. These words on their ordinary and natural English meaning encompass all moneys payable on any account.”^[19]

[22]
I accept the purchaser, in this case MCT Roofing and indeed the defendant, is required to pay the plaintiff all moneys on any account whatsoever to the extent that it relates to the plaintiff. That account though is the account of the plaintiff, not Metroll Queensland. I consider the language of the instrument to be plain, clear and unambiguous. Whilst I accept the proposition that clause 2(iii) of the 2013 guarantee and indemnity will cover liabilities even if the identity or proprietorship of the “customer” changed hands, that does not, in my view, extend to the assignment of the debt from another company to the plaintiff company. The issue must therefore be resolved in favour of the defendant.^[20]
[23]
I further note that on 15 May 2017, Metroll Queensland served upon MCT Roofing, a creditor’s statutory demand for payment of debt.^[21] On 6 June 2017, MCT Roofing was placed into liquidation. Metroll Queensland assigned the judgment debt to the plaintiff. It was the judgment debt that was assigned as opposed to Metroll Queensland’s rights to recover amounts owing to it for the supply of goods to MCT Roofing. As at the date of the assignment, Metroll Queensland had no entitlement itself to enforce payment of the judgment debt against MCT Roofing by action or proceeding, except with the leave of the Supreme Court of Queensland because of the prohibition against the same imposed by s 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
[24]
The defendant relied upon the authority of Fountain v Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association^[22]. In that decision, it was said of all moneys clauses in guarantees and mortgages:

“They must be confined in their operation by reference to the context in which they appear and by reference to the commercial purpose which they were intended to serve.”

[25]
Mr Barr of Counsel usefully highlighted that such observations were endorsed in Estoril Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation^[23] where the Court went on to summarise nine guidelines that were observed to illustrate how courts approached, what was referred to in the American cases as “dragnet clauses” (the equivalent of an “all moneys” clause), namely:
1. (a)
  The mortgage will only secure advances made or debts incurred in the future if the past debts were identified;
2. (b)
  Only debts of the same type or character as the original debt are secured by the mortgage;
3. (c)
  The dragnet clause will often cover future debts only if documents evidencing those debts specifically refer back to the clause;
4. (d)
  If the future debt is separately secured it may be assumed that the parties do not intend that it also be secured by the dragnet mortgage;
5. (e)
  The clause is inapplicable to debts which were originally owed by mortgagor to third parties and which were assigned to or purchased by the mortgagee;
6. (f)
  If there are several joint mortgagors only future debts on which all of the mortgagors are obligated or at least of which all were aware will be covered by the dragnet clause;
7. (g)
  Once the original debt has been fully discharged, the mortgage is extinguished and cannot secure further loans;
8. (h)
  If the mortgagor transfers the land to a third party, any debts which the original mortgagor incurs thereafter are not secured by the mortgage;
9. (i)
  If the real estate is transferred by the mortgagor, advances subsequently made to the transferee are not secured by the mortgage, even if the transferee expressly assumed the mortgage.
[26]
The principles enunciated in Estoril cause me to reach the view that the plaintiff ought not be entitled to the relief it seeks.^[24] In reaching that view, I have considered the reference to the context and commercial purpose of the clause contained within the agreement.^[25] I am not persuaded the objective intention was that an assigned debt from a third party, being Metroll Queensland, could have been contemplated from the “all moneys” clause in the 2013 guarantee and indemnity, nor should it.
[27]
The plaintiff is a distinct legal entity from Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd. Whilst they operate under a similar banner, separate companies exist. As noted earlier, the plaintiff operated at three locations being Townsville, Mackay and Rockhampton. Metroll Queensland operated six locations being Brisbane, Toowoomba, Cairns, Bundaberg, Warana and Darwin. Other companies operating under a similar banner exist in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia. I accept the submission on behalf of the defendant that the Court should not countenance an approach by the plaintiff and Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd in these proceedings that suggests the distinction between the entities is nominal or illusory such that they are but one entity as some sort of justification for the assignment, now that it might suit them to do so. It was necessary for the defendant to enter into the 2013 credit account application with the plaintiff and thus the guarantee and indemnity. This was to enable MCT Roofing, at the time, to obtain goods on credit terms from the plaintiff; otherwise the terms of the 2006 credit account application would have sufficed. A reasonable business person in such a situation would construe the language and effect of the 2013 credit account application and 2013 guarantee and indemnity as different to the 2006 credit account application to the extent, at least, that separate and distinct entities were contemplated by the agreements.

[28]
Objectively, since 2006, MCT Roofing had been operating under the terms of trade contained in the 2006 credit account application. That defined the relationship between the defendant and Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd and set out their respective rights and liabilities. The defendant was not sued by Metroll Queensland nor was he a party to the default judgment obtained by Metroll Queensland against MCT Roofing (because Metroll Queensland did not have an enforceable personal guarantee from him).

[29]
A separate credit account application was made in 2013. A guarantee and indemnity was also executed at the same time in 2013. I am not persuaded that the parties contemplated that the 2013 guarantee and indemnity would extend to assigned debts in favour of the plaintiff company.^[26] Moreover the commercial purpose of the 2013 guarantee and indemnity was to secure payment for goods supplied by the plaintiff to MCT Roofing. It did not extend to any other party, unless of course there was a specific provision in the guarantee relating to a change to the identity of the plaintiff. Further, the assigned judgment debt was fundamentally different to that which was captured by the 2013 credit account application and guarantee such that the guarantee does not answer the judgment debt.
[30]
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim fails and should be dismissed.
[31]
By counterclaim the defendant seeks an order that the caveat lodged against the interests of the defendant in the defendant’s land on or about 21 August 2017 be removed pursuant to an order under s 127 of the Land Title Act 1994. Given I have dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, I am satisfied that the plaintiff does not have a caveatable interest in the defendant’s land. Therefore the caveat should be removed.
[32]
I will hear from the parties as to the form of the order, any further orders and costs.

Footnotes

[1]Affidavit of Mr Hawthorne affirmed 22 June 2020, [18].

[2]Affidavit of Mr Hawthorne affirmed 22 June 2020 at “JH-1”, pp 1-4.

[3]Affidavit of the defendant sworn 14 July 2020, [17] and [18].

[4]Affidavit of the defendant sworn 14 July 2020, [44].

[5]Affidavit of Mr Ghensi affirmed 18 June 2020 at “LG-1”, pp 1-2.

[6]Affidavit of the defendant, [20].

[7]Affidavit of the defendant, [22].

[8]T1-14, line 24.

[9]For example see affidavit of Mr Hawthorne, Exhibit JH-1, pp 70-73, being purchase order 77989. In the example the amount payable by Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd to the plaintiff was $7,159.85 (excluding GST). See also T1-11 – T1-13.

[10]In the example used, the amount invoiced by Metroll Queensland Pty Ltd to MCT Roofing was $7,827.22 (excluding GST): see affidavit of Mr Hawthorne, Exhibit JH-1, pp74-77. That is a mark-up of $547.37 which equates to approximately 7.6 per cent. See also T1-11 – T1-13.

[11]See Affidavit of the defendant, [27], [28] and [30] (cf T1-14, lines 39-44).

[12]T1-15.

[13]See the running account statement at the Affidavit of Mr Ghensi, Exhibit LG-1, pp 12-14.

[14][2016] 2 Qd R 484 at 495, [30].

[15]See [11] of these reasons.

[16]See for instance Crossley v SEA Trek Dive Services Pty Lt & Anor [2020] QCA 35 at [26] (per Mullins JA (Sofronoff P and Morrison JA agreeing)).

[17](2008) 36 WAR 342.

[18](2005) 215 ALR 748 per Tamberlin, North and Dowsett JJ.

[19]At 755 [27].

[20]See for instance, Ankar Pty Ltd v Arnick Holdings Ltd v National Westminster Finance (Australia) Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 549.

[21]See exhibit of Mr Hawthorne at JH-1, pp 105-107.

[22](1992) 5 BPR 11, 817 per Gleeson CJ at 11, 819; comments recited with approval by Andrews SC DCJ in Ridout & Anor v Rich [2017] QDC 129 at [163].

[23](1993) 6 BPR 13, 146 per Young J at 13,151.

[24]See McVeigh (Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Piccolo) v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) ALR 429.

[25]Ibid, per Kenny J at 453, [84].

[26]See Estoril Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1993) 6 BPR 13, 146; Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Coma (1993) 5 BPR 11, 748 and Clark’s Refrigerated Transport Pty Ltd (in Liq) [1982] VR 989.

Editorial Notes

Published Case Name:
Metroll Roofing Pty Ltd v Tempest
Shortened Case Name:
Metroll Roofing Pty Ltd v Tempest
MNC:
[2020] QDC 273
Court:
QDC
Judge(s):
Jarro DCJ
Date:
30 Oct 2020

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Cases Cited List of Cases Cited by this judgment

Case Name	Full Citation	Frequency
Ankar Pty Ltd v National Westminster Finance (Australia) Ltd	View on:JADE(1987) 162 CLR 549	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - (1987) 162 CLR 549
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Coma	(1993) 5 BPR 11,748	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - (1993) 5 BPR 11,748
Chacmol Holdings Pty Ltd v Handberg	(2005) 215 ALR 748	3 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2005) 215 ALR 748 Cite 2 - (2005) 215 ALR 748 Cite 3 - (2005) 215 ALR 748
Crossley v Sea Trek Dive Services Pty Ltd	[2020] QCA 35	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - [2020] QCA 35
Estoril Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation	(1996) 6 BPR 13,146	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - (1996) 6 BPR 13,146
Fountain v Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association	(1992) 5 BPR 11,817	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - (1992) 5 BPR 11,817
Investments Ply Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation	(1993) 6 BPR 13, 146	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1993) 6 BPR 13, 146 Cite 2 - (1993) 6 BPR 13, 146
McVeigh (trustee of the bankrupt estate of Piccolo) v National Australia Bank Ltd	(2000) 278 ALR 429	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2000) 278 ALR 429 Cite 2 - (2000) 278 ALR 429
McVeigh (Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Piccolo) v National Australia Bank Ltd	(2000) ALR 429	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - (2000) ALR 429
Olympic Holdings Pty Ltd v Windslow Corporation Pty Ltd (in liq)	(2008) 36 WAR 342	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2008) 36 WAR 342 Cite 2 - (2008) 36 WAR 342
Re Clark's Refrigerated Transport Pty Ltd in Liquidation	View on:VR(1982) VR 989	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - (1982) VR 989
Ridout v Rich	[2017] QDC 129	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - [2017] QDC 129
Watson v Scott	[2016] 2 Qd R 484; [2015] QCA 267	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2016] 2 Qd R 484 Cite 2 - [2016] 2 Qd R 484

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Metroll Roofing Pty Ltd v Tempest[2020] QDC 273