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HGT v Queensland Police Service[2021] QDC 186

HGT v Queensland Police Service[2021] QDC 186

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

HGT v Queensland Police Service [2021] QDC 186

PARTIES:

HGT

(appellant)

v

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

(respondent)

FILE NO:

126 of 2021

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld)

ORIGINATING COURT:

Redcliffe Magistrates Court

DELIVERED ON:

20 August 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

29 July 2021

JUDGE:

Dearden DCJ

ORDER:

  1. Appeal granted.
  2. Set aside the sentence imposed at the Redcliffe Magistrates Court in respect of the charge of possess modified firearm.
  3. Resentence the appellant to a fine of $1750, with no conviction recorded.
  4. Order that the fine be referred to the Registrar, State Penalties Enforcement Registry.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – s 222 JUSTICES ACT 1880 – where appellant was convicted of one charge of ‘possess modified firearms’ and one charge of ‘authority required to possess explosives’ – where appellant was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended, with an operational period of 24 months, in respect of the ‘possess modified firearm’ charge – where the appellant had no criminal history –  whether the sentence was manifestly excessive – whether reasonable apprehension of bias on the basis of pre-judgment of penalty – whether the magistrate wrongly took into account irrelevant matters – whether magistrate sentenced the appellant on the basis that a mandatory sentence was applicable

LEGISLATION:

Explosives Act 1999 (Qld) s 34(1)

Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 222(1), 223

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9

Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) s 62(1)(b)

CASES:

EH v QPS; GS v QPS [2020] QDC 205

Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132

McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255

R v Moss [1999] QCA 426

COUNSEL:

J A Torcetti (sol) for the appellant

M K Parfitt (sol) for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Murray Torcetti Lawyers for the appellant

Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent

Introduction

  1. [1]
    The appellant, HGT, pleaded guilty at the Redcliffe Magistrates Court on 15 December 2020 to one charge of ‘possess modified firearms’ (Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) (‘Weapons Act’) s.62(1)(b)); and one charge of ‘authority required to possess explosives’ (Explosives Act 1999 (Qld) (‘Explosives Act’) s.34(1)). The appellant was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended, with an operational period of 24 months, in respect of the ‘possess modified firearm’ charge.  The appellant was convicted and not further punished, with a conviction recorded, in respect of the ‘authority required to possess explosives’ charge. The property the subject of each of the charges (the modified firearm and ammunition) was forfeited to the Crown.[1]

Appeal grounds

  1. [2]
    The appellant filed an appeal against sentence in respect of the offence of possess modified firearm.  The sole ground specified in the appeal is:-

“The sentence imposed is manifestly excessive in the circumstances.”

  1. [3]
    The outline of argument on behalf of the appellant[2] identifies three particular grounds of appeal, although no formal process was undertaken to amend the grounds of appeal.  These are as follows:-
  1. The magistrate unduly fettering his sentencing discretion in a way which gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the basis of pre-judgment of penalty;[3]
  2. The magistrate wrongly took into account irrelevant matters;[4] and
  3. The magistrate sentenced the appellant on the basis that a mandatory sentence is attached to the circumstance of aggravation.[5]
  1. [4]
    The respondent raised no issues in respect of the appeal being argued on the specific grounds identified above and provided helpful written and oral submissions addressing each of the identified grounds of appeal in the appellant’s outline of argument.[6] It is appropriate to proceed on that basis.

The law – appeals

  1. [5]
    Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s. 222(1) provides:

If a person feels aggrieved as complainant, defendant or otherwise by an order made by justices or a justice in a summary way on a complaint for an offence or breach of duty, the person may appeal within 1 month after the date of the order to a District Court judge.

  1. [6]
    Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s. 223 provides:

Appeal generally a rehearing on the evidence

  1. (1)
    An appeal under section 222 is by way of rehearing on the evidence (original evidence) given in the proceeding before the justices.
  2. (2)
    However, the District Court may give leave to adduce fresh, additional or substituted evidence (new evidence) if the court is satisfied there are special grounds for giving leave.
  3. (3)
    If the court gives leave under subsection (2), the appeal is—
    1. by way of rehearing on the original evidence; and
    2. on the new evidence adduced.
  1. [7]
    In McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255, Bowskill J stated:

“It is well established that, on an appeal under [Justices Act] s.222 by way of rehearing, the District Court is required to conduct a real review of the trial, and the magistrate’s reasons, and make its own determination of relevant facts in issue from the evidence, giving due deference and attaching a good deal of weight to the magistrate’s view.  Nevertheless, in order to succeed on such an appeal, the appellant must establish some legal, factual or discretionary error.” [citations deleted][7]

  1. [8]
    In Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132, Sofronoff P stated:

“… an appellate court hearing an appeal by way of rehearing must conduct a real review of the evidence and makeup its own mind about the case.”[8]

Background

  1. [9]
    The appellant initially pleaded guilty on 15 December, 2020 to four charges, namely:-
  1. unlawful possession of weapons category D/H/R weapon;
  2. possess weapon with altered identification marks;
  3. possess modified firearms;
  4. authority required to possess explosives.

However, after the prosecutor commenced his submissions and the magistrate clarified that charges 1, 2 and 3 all related to the same firearm, the prosecutor elected to offer no evidence on charges 1 and 2; the pleas on those charges were vacated and the sentence proceeded only in respect of the offences of ‘possess modified firearms’ and ‘authority required to possess explosives’.[9]

  1. [10]
    The prosecutor identified that the appellant had no criminal history.[10]
  1. [11]
    The prosecutor then outlined the facts. On 6 July 2020, investigators from Moreton Criminal Investigation Branch obtained a search warrant which was executed on that date at the appellant’s residence at Kallangur.  The appellant was not present at the time, but his wife was present. The investigators located a sawn-off .22 calibre rim-fire rifle in the shed of the property in a side storage room on a shelf.  The weapon had been cut down such that it was under the 45-centimetre threshold and was classified as a Category H weapon.  The defendant did not hold a weapons licence and the serial number had been removed from the weapon. The weapon’s barrel had also been modified, threaded with an after-market attachment to accommodate a silencer, which was not a feature that the rifle normally had.[11]
  2. [12]
    Charge 4 related to three rounds of .22 calibre ammunition located in the appellant’s bedroom, further ammunition glad-wrapped to the stock of the firearm as well as ammunition located in a hard black plastic pelican case located on the roof.  The appellant had no lawful authority to possess ammunition.[12]
  3. [13]
    The prosecutor made no submissions on penalty.
  4. [14]
    As the appellant’s solicitor (who also appeared on the appeal in this court) rose to make submissions, the following exchange occurred:-

“BENCH:

Notwithstanding the lack of any criminal history, I am intending to impose a period of nine months’ imprisonment for the modified firearm.  There can be no good reason for anyone having possession of such a firearm apart from bad reasons.

MR TORCETTI:

Your Honour ---

BENCH:

There’s – let me finish… ---

MR TORCETTI:

Sorry

BENCH:

--- if you want procedural fairness and you want to know what I am intending to do.  Otherwise, I’ll just shut up, and then don’t complain about being – not having been afforded procedural fairness.  You go.

MR TORCETTI:

My apologies, Your ---

BENCH:

I am intending to impose nine months on the modified firearm; I was going to explain why.  The ammunition: convicted not further punished, and wholly suspend that for two years, and I won’t bother giving the reasons why.  I’ll take your submissions.”[13]

  1. [15]
    The appellant’s solicitor then tendered a statutory declaration, dated 22 October 2020, under the hand of the appellant, which relevantly stated:-

“I am aware [LN] has been charged with three weapons-related offences.  The offences are connected to an altered handgun and ammunition found on my property.  The handgun and ammunition belong to me. 

[LN] and I commenced a relationship about 4.5 years ago.  [LN] started living with me about 4 years ago.

Approximately six years ago the handgun came into my possession as a friend was going through a difficult time.  I held concerns that should the possession of the weapon remain in their possession [sic] there was a significant risk of harm being caused either to themselves or other people.  I took possession of the gun.

I placed the gun in a box with other tools and car parts in my shed.  The shed is detached from the main residence. The gun was stored with my other belongings in an area [LN] does not attend.  The gun was placed in the box before [LN] commenced living with me.  [LN] would not have been aware of the contents of the tool-box. 

I have been collecting ammunition for a period starting with shell-casings from WWII. I stored the ammunition in the roof of my property. [LN] would not have been aware I had been collecting and storing the ammunition. 

I understand [LN] has been charged with offences relating to my possession of the gun and ammunition. I am the person responsible for the charges as [LN] was unaware of the items’ existence and location in our shared home. I understand as a consequence I will be charged for possessing the gun and ammunition.” [14]

  1. [16]
    The appellant’s solicitor’s plea in mitigation identified that the appellant was 46 years of age, with no criminal record, and was the father of three children aged 24, 12 and 10.  The two youngest of the children he saw on weekends but they resided primarily with their mother.  For the previous three years (as at sentence) the appellant had worked as a trades assistant, working in electronics and fabrication, and worked a week away every three months at Mt Isa, Cloncurry and Townsville.  The appellant was drug-tested every three months. The appellant had been with his current partner for four years.[15]
  2. [17]
    The appellant’s solicitor submitted that the court process had placed a considerable stress upon the appellant; and that his employment was “at very real risk” if a conviction was recorded, which would be inevitable if a suspended sentence was imposed.[16]
  3. [18]
    After an exchange with the learned magistrate, the appellant’s solicitor submitted further that as a person before the court with no other criminal history, the appellant was not a proper vehicle for general deterrence; earned approximately $55,000.00 per year; had significant financial obligations; owned his own home but was responsible for paying credit cards, car loans, debts, rates and utilities; and that a heavy and significant fine was still within a sound sentencing discretion.[17]
  4. [19]
    During the course of the appellant’s solicitor’s submissions, the learned magistrate interposed:-

“BENCH:

We’ve had three shootings on the Peninsula in the last six months, all involving firearms such as this.”[18]

  1. [20]
    The learned magistrate then said:

“I don’t accept it came into [the appellant’s] possession from a friend that was having some difficulty six years ago.  It’s a sawn-off rifle with…with the identification modified and scoring to enable a silencer.  I mean, come on.”[19]

The learned magistrate then said:

“They’re not used for legitimate purposes or not intended to be used for legitimate purposes.”

  1. [21]
    The appellant’s solicitor then submitted that there was nothing to suggest that the appellant’s involvement with the firearm was unlawful, but accepted (in an exchange with the learned magistrate) that the appellant was in possession of the firearm.
  2. [22]
    The learned magistrate then went on to say:-

“And there needs to be significant message of deterrence for people that thinks [sic] it’s OK to have these sorts of weapons in their households.  I note if it had been in public, which it’s not he would do a mandatory 12 months in jail, no ifs or buts – a sentence of not less than 12 months.  It’s not in public, but there’s a big distinction there, and the legislation doesn’t require a mandatory period of imprisonment, but, obviously, parliament takes it very, very seriously in setting the penalties for these sorts of offences and particularly these sorts of firearms.  I think there needs to be a very clear message sent not only to your client, but to the community in general.”[20]

  1. [23]
    The appellant’s solicitor then pointed out that the offence “wasn’t conducted in the commission of an indictable offence”,[21] to which the learned magistrate responded:

“I am aware of that.  Otherwise he would have been trotting off to jail today.”[22]

  1. [24]
    The learned magistrate’s ex tempore sentencing remarks are relatively brief, and it is appropriate to quote them in full:-

“Stand up please.  Taking into account the nature and circumstances of the charges before me, these are serious charges.  There can be no good reason or excuse to possess such a weapon as this that was in your possession which was modified to the extent that it was basically sawn-off with the identification marks altered.  Unfortunately, we are seeing a prevalence of these sorts of offences, and such firearms as the one that was in your possession being used.  I am of the view that there needs to be a very clear message sent to the community.  The possession of this sort of contraband, which it is, that is met with real consequences.

I do note your plea of guilty. A reduction of penalty is given in recognition of the plea.  I note the relevant matters in ss.9 and 11 of the Penalties and Sentences Act. In particular, I note the relevant principles in s 9(2)(a).  I note you come before the court without any previous history, and I give you credit for that. If you have had [sic] relevant criminal history, you would have been serving a period of actual imprisonment today. Notwithstanding the absence of any prior criminal history and the timely plea of guilty, I am of the view that it is appropriate and no more severe [sic] that you should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment both by way of personal deterrence but more specifically general deterrence.

There needs to be a clear message sent to the community. Only today, I signed off on a crime scene warrant that involved the use of a similar weapon to the one that you were in – that you just pleaded guilty [sic].  It is not an isolated occurrence. It is becoming more problematic.  There seems to be some message that it is acceptable to have these sorts of weapons. I am of the view that a sentence of imprisonment is a sentence that is appropriate and no more severe on all the circumstances. I order that you be convicted and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment. I order that the whole of that term of imprisonment be suspended forthwith.

The operational period during which you must not commit another offence punishable by imprisonment you are to avoid being dealt with for the suspended sentence to be 24 months [sic]. Two years.  I order forfeiture of the items.  In relation to the ammunition offence, I am of the view that I can deal with that by way of convicting and not further punishing, given the sentence I will pass [sic] for the possession of the modified firearm. You can go.”[23]

Discussion – grounds of appeal

The magistrate unduly fettering his sentencing discretion in a way which gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the basis of pre-judgment of penalty

  1. [25]
    The appellant, in respect of this ground, relies on the learned magistrate’s remarks made as the appellant’s solicitor rose to make submissions namely:-

“Notwithstanding the lack of any criminal history, I am intending to impose a period of nine months’ imprisonment for the modified firearm. There can be no good reason for anyone having possession of such a firearm apart for bad reasons.”[24]

  1. [26]
    The appellant notes that the learned magistrate refused to accept the contents of the statutory declaration provided by the appellant to police and tendered at sentence,[25] without the issue being raised in anyway by the prosecution and ( I observe) without adverting in any way to the provisions of Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s. 132C in respect of fact finding on sentencing.
  2. [27]
    The learned magistrate simply rejected the explanation provided in the exhibit and, as the appellant submits on appeal, could not be moved from his expressed opinion by submissions, evidence or arguments. In those circumstances, relying on the decision in EH v QPS; GS v QPS [2020] QDC 205, [17], the appellant submits (quoting that decision) that “a reasonable apprehension of pre-judgment is a denial of procedural fairness and an error of law.”[26]
  3. [28]
    In the cited decision of EH v QPS; GS v QPS [2020] QDC 205, Fantin DCJ identified a similar exchange, although in respect of a different charge, as follows:

[15] In the Magistrates Court, the police prosecutor submitted that the appropriate penalty was a good behaviour bond for a period of 12 months with a recognizance in the amount of $1000. He said “given the prevalence of this type of offending, your Honour, it appears that fines are not acting as a sufficient deterrent.”

[16] The Acting Magistrate interrupted him, saying:

“Yes, look, I can probably say now that it won’t be a good behaviour bond. In my view, it’s far too serious for that. Imprisonment’s not – not out of range, in my view, but a good behaviour bond, in my view, is just not an appropriate penalty for this sort of behaviour. Two of those offences carry a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. And there’s obviously a degree of planning involved. So I can say now, Sergeant, it won’t be a good behaviour bond. And that’s – Mr Bakewell, if you make those submissions that won’t be the case either.” [emphasis added].

[17] In ruling out the possibility of a bond before hearing any further submissions including defence submissions, the Acting Magistrate erred by unduly fettering his sentencing discretion. That was an error. In addition, a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably have apprehended from those remarks that the Acting Magistrate might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided, [Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6] (Gleeson CJ)] because he had prejudged the matter. The remarks showed more than a mere disposition to a particular view. They suggested that the Acting Magistrate’s mind was not ‘open to persuasion’ [Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [71]-[72] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J)] on this penalty option and that he had formed a conclusion incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented by the defence. A reasonable apprehension of prejudgment is a denial of procedural fairness, and an error of law.

  1. [29]
    The respondent submits that the learned magistrate’s remarks during sentencing submissions “cannot be categorised as demonstrating that his Honour had formed a conclusion incapable of alteration”.[27]  The respondent also submits that this court should recognise that the sentence was delivered ex tempore and should give that fact consideration in analysing the sentencing remarks.[28]
  2. [30]
    With respect, it is clear that the learned magistrate took an implacably fixed view, from the outset, prior to hearing any submissions from the appellant’s legal representative, and prior to reading the contents of Sentence Exhibit 1. In those circumstances, the learned magistrate not only unduly fettered his sentencing discretion, but clearly prejudged the matter; was not open to persuasion (he summarily rejected the contents of Sentence Exhibit 1); and in context, clearly denied the appellant procedural fairness.  The learned magistrate did advert to “procedural fairness” in his comments during submissions.[29] However, that comment appeared to give lip service only to the principle of procedural fairness and did not affect his clearly expressed intention not to budge from the sentence that he originally indicated, prior to hearing any defence submissions or viewing the exhibit tendered.
  3. [31]
    A search of the caselaw published on the Supreme Court Library Queensland website[30] for cases citing s.62(1)(b) of the Weapons Act, and/or the phrase "possess modified firearm" yields no results. A search of sentencing remarks published on the Queensland Sentencing Information Service website for the same phrase ("possess modified firearm") yields two results.[31] The first is a single judge decision of her Honour Judge Ryrie at Brisbane District Court on 27 August 2014.[32] Her Honour sentenced the defendant to 6 months imprisonment on the charge of possess modified firearm, with a head sentence on other  more serious charges of 3 years imprisonment, with a parole release date on 1 November 2014 and 459 days in custody declared. The second result is a single judge decision under my own hand at Beenleigh District Court on 22 March 2013.[33] The defendant had been sentenced in the Magistrates Court to a 6 month suspended sentence with an operational period of 18 months, and my sentence dealt, in part, with the breach of that suspended sentence. The defendant was ordered to serve the outstanding 107 days. The defendants in both cases were also being dealt with in the context of more serious offending and each had lengthy and relevant criminal histories. 
  4. [32]
    Although not definitive, a search of Queensland Sentencing Information Service in respect of Weapons Act s 62 offences indicated penalties ranging between fines with no convictions recorded (37.5%) through to prison terms (between 13-18 months, presumably with a parole release date). This represents, however, a small number of sentences in the Queensland Magistrates Court (8 in total) over the period of December 2016 to November 2020, and is, at best, a guide to the range of sentencing outcomes for sentences of Weapon Acts, s 62 offences. It is notable that only 2 of the 8 cases resulted a prison term, either wholly suspended or subject to parole.[34]
  5. [33]
    It follows that the learned magistrate was incorrect in his comments, both as to prevalence and the appropriate penalty. Not only was the appellant not afforded procedural fairness, but the fixed view expressed by the learned magistrate as to penalty was not supported by appellate authority, nor by sentences of fellow magistrates. This ground of appeal succeeds.

The magistrate wrongly took into account irrelevant matters

  1. [34]
    The learned magistrate identified during the sentencing hearing that he regarded the principle of general deterrence as being particularly important because:

“We’ve had three shootings on the Peninsula in the last six months, all involving firearms such as this.”[35]

Further, during the course of his sentencing remarks, the learned magistrate referred to signing off “on a crime scene warrant that involved the use of a similar weapon.”[36]

  1. [35]
    The appellant submits (correctly in my view) that the dangers of sentencing based on informal statistics was identified as a potential error by the Court of Appeal in R v Moss [1999] QCA 426 per Davies JA who said:

“… there’s nothing wrong with looking at statistics or with looking at the prevalence of offences, but that should be done sensibly and on the basis of reliable statistics, and I agree with the remarks of the presiding judge that the statistics in this case weren’t reliable.”[37]

  1. [36]
    The appellant submits that the learned magistrate “did not defer [sic] to any objective statistics, reports and independently reviewed documents to support the increase in penalty and the penalty warranting an emphasis on general deterrence.”[38]
  2. [37]
    The respondent’s counsel accepts that there was no evidence before the court in respect of prevalence and that those matters should not have been taken into account.[39]
  3. [38]
    Neither the learned magistrate’s view about prevalence (not supported in any way by the information from the Queensland Sentencing Information Service – see [32] above), nor  his anecdotal experience in signing off on crime scene warrants, justified using this appellant as a vehicle to exemplify general deterrence.
  4. [39]
    It follows that the learned magistrate took into account irrelevant matters, and this ground of appeal also succeeds.

The magistrate sentenced the appellant on the basis a mandatory sentence is attached to the circumstance of aggravation

  1. [40]
    Although the appellant’s solicitor pressed this matter on appeal, I’m not satisfied that the learned magistrate did sentence the appellant on the basis that a mandatory sentence was applicable. The appellant was not charged with a circumstance of aggravation and the learned magistrate’s view about the appropriate penalty did not arise from any misunderstanding of the provisions in respect of mandatory minimum sentencing pursuant to the Weapons Act. This ground of appeal fails.

Resentence

  1. [41]
    The appellant submits that, giving due deference to the sentencing guidelines set out, in particular, in Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(1) and (2), and taking into account the following matters, a fine or probation with no conviction recorded is within the sentencing discretion of the court.
  2. [42]
    The appellant’s solicitor stresses these matters:
  1. The appellant is a mature man with no criminal history;
  2. The appellant took active steps to seek out and take responsibility for the offending by providing an inculpatory statement to the police (when his partner was initially charged with the relevant offences);
  3. The appellant had expressed remorse for his behaviour;
  4. The appellant entered his plea at the very first opportunity;
  5. The appellant has fulltime employment;
  6. The weapon was not used in public, nor in the facilitation of an indictable offence.
  1. [43]
    It should also be noted that, as submitted before the learned magistrate, there is the potential effect of a conviction being recorded on the appellant’s employment; the appellant is the father of three children, only one of whom was an adult; and that it was unlikely that the appellant would commit any further criminal offences.
  2. [44]
    The respondent, on the other hand, although appropriately conceding the learned magistrate had erred by taking irrelevant matters into account, submits that the same penalty (i.e. 9 months imprisonment, wholly suspended) should be imposed on a resentence. The respondent stresses the relevant maximum penalty for the firearms charge (four years imprisonment);[40] the presence of a significant quantity of ammunition together with the firearm; and identifies community protection, denunciation, and general deterrence as important considerations.[41]
  3. [45]
    Although I acknowledge that the possession of a modified firearm, in the context of possession of ammunition of the same calibre, is a significant concern, those facts need to be balanced against the appellant’s explanation for that possession (which is not inherently unbelievable); and the appellant’s otherwise excellent antecedents, (including his age, personal circumstances, lack of criminal history), and his cooperation with the administration of justice.
  4. [46]
    In those circumstances, I consider (in the absence of appellate authority) that the seriousness of the offence itself could be appropriately dealt with by way of a substantial fine, but the matters raised in mitigation justify, in this appellant’s context, an order that no conviction should be recorded.

Conclusion

  1. [47]
    Accordingly, I conclude that the appeal should be granted, the original sentence should be set aside, and the appellant should be resentenced to a fine of $1750, with no conviction recorded.[42]

Orders

  1. Appeal granted.
  2. Set aside the sentence imposed at the Redcliffe Magistrates Court in respect of the charge of possess modified firearm.
  3. Resentence the appellant to a fine of $1750, with no conviction recorded.
  4. Order that the fine be referred to the Registrar, State Penalties Enforcement Registry.

Costs

  1. [48]
    I will hear the parties on costs.

Footnotes

[1]Verdict and judgment record 15/12/2020.

[2]Filed 12 March 2021 (Document 3).

[3]Outline of argument on behalf of the appellant (Document 3), [7]-[12].

[4]Outline of argument on behalf of the appellant (Document 3), [13]-[18].

[5]Outline of argument on behalf of the appellant (Document 3), [19]-[21].

[6]Outline of submissions on behalf of the respondent (Document 4), [15]-[21] (first ground of appeal); [22]-[24] (second ground of appeal) and [26]-[28] (third ground of appeal).

[7]McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255, [47].

[8]Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132 per Sofronoff P at p.5.

[9]T1-4, 1-5.

[10]T1-3, l 20.

[11]T1-3, ll 21-43.

[12]T1-5, ll 5-14.

[13]T1-5, ll 21-40.

[14]Sentence Exhibit 1.

[15]T1-6, ll 37-45.

[16]T1-7, ll 3-8.

[17]T1-8, ll 6-20.

[18]T1-7, ll 10-11.

[19]T1-7, ll 20-23.

[20]T1-7, ll 38-46.

[21]T1-8, ll 1-2.

[22]T1-8, l 4.

[23]Decision p.2, ll 2-35.

[24]T1-5, ll 21-23.

[25]Sentence Exhibit 1.

[26]Outline of argument on behalf of the appellant (Document 3), [12].

[27]Outline of submissions on behalf of the respondent (Document 4), [21].

[28]Outline of submissions on behalf of the respondent (Document 4), [21].

[29]T1-5, ll 21-33.

[30]Supreme Court Library Queensland, ‘CaseLaw’, (Web Page, August 2021) .

[31]Supreme Court Library Queensland, ‘Sentencing Remarks’, Queensland Sentencing Information Service (QSIS) (Web Page, August 2021) .

[32]R v Jamie Allan Cahill.

[33]R v Aaron Wayne Stout.

[34]Supreme Court Library Queensland, ‘Weapons Act 1990 (QLD) s 62 — modify construction or action of firearms, or possess modified firearm, or acquire or sell modified firearm, Sentences from Dec 2016 to Nov 2020’, Queensland Sentencing Information Service (QSIS) (Web Page, May 2021) .

[35]T1-7, l 10.

[36]Decision p.2 ll 21-22.

[37]R v Moss [1999] QCA 426

[38]Outline of argument on behalf of the appellant (Document 3), [16].

[39]Outline of submissions on behalf of the respondent (Document 4), [25].

[40]Weapons Act s. 62(1).

[41]Outline of submissions on behalf of the respondent (Document 4), [31].

[42]It should be noted that in submissions at the sentencing hearing, the appellant’s solicitor indicated that the appellant did have capacity to pay a substantial fine – see T1-8, ll 15-24.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    HGT v Queensland Police Service

  • Shortened Case Name:

    HGT v Queensland Police Service

  • MNC:

    [2021] QDC 186

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Dearden DCJ

  • Date:

    20 Aug 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
1 citation
EH v Queensland Police Service; GS v Queensland Police Service [2020] QDC 205
3 citations
Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132
3 citations
McDonald v Queensland Police Service[2018] 2 Qd R 612; [2017] QCA 255
3 citations
Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507
1 citation
R v Moss [1999] QCA 426
3 citations

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
DNY v Director of Public Prosecutions [2021] QCHC 484 citations
JMC v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 2282 citations
1

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