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JSA v MPR[2022] QDC 111

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

JSA v MPR [2022] QDC 111

PARTIES:

JSA

(appellant)

v

MPR

(respondent)

FILE NO:

2/22

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates CourtCaloundra

DELIVERED ON:

20 May 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Maroochydore

HEARING DATE:

10 May 2022

HEARD AT:

Maroochydore

JUDGE:

Cash QC DCJ

ORDER:

  1. The appeal is dismissed.
  2. The decision of the Magistrate to dismiss the application and to award costs fixed in the sum of $9,362.30 to the respondent is confirmed.
  3. The respondent file and serve upon the appellant on or before 3 June 2022 any written submissions as to the costs of the appeal, such submissions not to exceed five pages.
  4. The appellant file and serve upon the respondent on or before 10 June 2022 any written submissions as to the costs of the appeal, such submissions not to exceed five pages.
  5. Each party has leave to file and serve on or before 17 June 2022 any application for leave to make oral submissions as to the costs of the appeal.
  6. In the event written submissions as to costs are filed by any party, and in the absence of any application to make oral submissions, I will decide the costs of the appeal on the written submissions and without oral hearing.

CATCHWORDS

FAMILY LAW – DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – APPLICATION FOR A PROTECTION ORDER UNDER THE DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE PROTECTION ACT – APPEAL – where appellant brought an application for a protection order – where matter heard and dismissed – whether the Magistrate failed to give adequate reasons for the decision – whether the decision to dismiss the application was unreasonable or plainly unjust – discretion to award costs of the application for a protection order – whether Magistrate failed to give adequate reasons for finding the application was malicious and vexatious – whether the decision to award costs was unreasonable or plainly unjust

LEGISLATION:

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 38

Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld), s 37, 145, s 157, s 165, s 168, s 169, s 184

CASES:

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 362

Drew v Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 219, [57]-[59]

HBY v WBI & Anor [2020] QDC 81, [16]-[18]

HZA v ZHA [2018] QDC 125

KAV v Magistrate Bentley & Anor [2016] QSC 46

NBE v PRT & Anor [2018] QDC 29, [14], [32]

APPEARANCES:

L Nightingale of Nightingale Law for the appellant

I Munsie instructed by Ferrall and Co. Lawyers for the respondent

Introduction

  1. [1]
    The appellant and respondent were once in a relationship. It ended in April 2021. On 28 June 2021 the appellant filed an application for a protection order pursuant to the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA), citing what she alleged was years of domestic abuse perpetrated by the respondent. The application was heard by a Magistrate at Caloundra on 29 October 2021. The appellant and respondent both gave evidence and were cross-examined. The respondent also relied upon an affidavit from his adult son, who was not required for cross-examination. On 19 November 2021 the Magistrate indicated that she was not satisfied a protection order should be made and gave reasons for her decision. The Magistrate expressed her conclusion that the appellant had “embellished her evidence on several significant issues” and that the application was both vexatious and malicious.[1] The latter finding enlivened the court’s discretion to award costs pursuant to section 157 of the DFVPA. The Magistrate invited submissions on costs and on 3 December 2021 decided that the appellant should pay the respondent’s costs of the application fixed in the sum of $9,362.30. Final orders were then pronounced, with the appellant’s application dismissed and the order for costs made. The appellant immediately indicated her intention to appeal the Magistrate’s decisions and the order for costs was stayed pending a final decision in the appeal.[2]
  2. [2]
    The appellant duly appealed. The notice of appeal was filed on 4 January 2022.[3] While seven discrete grounds were identified in the notice of appeal, at the hearing these were consolidated. The real questions to decide in the appeal can be expressed as follows:
  1. (a)
    Did the Magistrate err in law by not giving adequate reasons for the conclusion that a protection order was not necessary or desirable?
  2. (b)
    Was this conclusion one that was unreasonable or plainly unjust?
  3. (c)
    Did the Magistrate err in law by not given adequate reasons for the conclusion the application was malicious and vexatious?
  4. (d)
    Was the decision to award costs one that was unreasonable or plainly unjust?
  1. [3]
    There was also a complaint to the effect that the Magistrate erred in fact in concluding that the respondent’s evidence about some social media messages was not challenged.[4] However, in supplementary submissions the appellant accepted that “the Magistrate was correct in finding that the Respondent was not challenged about the messages when cross-examined.”
  2. [4]
    Having considered the grounds of appeal that were pressed, I have concluded none are made out. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed. These are my reasons for coming to this decision.

The nature of the appeal – statutory framework and legal principles

  1. [5]
    It is convenient to begin with a consideration of the nature of the appeal. Such was considered by Moynihan QC DCJ in HBY v WBI & Anor [2020] QDC 81. I agree with his Honour’s analysis at [16] to [18], which I set out below.
  1. [16]
    The power to appeal a relevant decision is found in s 164 of the Act. The appeal is started by filing a notice of appeal and the start of an appeal does not affect the operation of the decision unless there is a further order of the court: see s 165 and 166 of the Act. Section 168 of the Act provides that the ‘hearing procedures’ for the appeal are:

“168  Hearing procedures

  1. (1)
    An appeal must be decided on the evidence and proceedings before the court that made the decision being appealed.
  2. (2)
    However, the appellate court may order that the appeal be heard afresh, in whole or part.”
  1. [17]
    Section 169 of the Act provides that the powers of the appellate court are:

“169  Powers of appellate court

  1. (1)
    In deciding an appeal, the appellate court may—
    1. confirm the decision appealed against; or
    2. vary the decision appealed against; or
    3. set aside the decision and substitute another decision; or
    4. set aside the decision appealed against and remit the matter to the court that made the decision.
  2. (2)
    The decision of the appellate court upon an appeal shall be final and conclusive.”
  1. [18]
    An appeal under s 168(1) of the Act is by way of rehearing: see GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248 at [2]-[3]; Jennifer Glover, Separate Representative v Director, Child Protection Litigation & Ors [2016] QChC 16 at [73]. The powers of the appellate court may be exercised only where the appellant can demonstrate that, having regard to all the evidence before the appellate court, the order that is the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error: see Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118. Section 168(1) is subject to the broad discretion conferred by s 168(2) to order some or all of the evidence be heard afresh, or for further evidence to be relied on: see Glover at [76]. The exercise of the discretion under s 168(2) does not convert the rehearing into a hearing de novo: see Glover at [75] and FY v Department of Child Safety [2009] QCA 67 at [12]-[13]. The circumstances in which s 168(2) applies are not prescribed in the Act. However taking into account the words of s 168 as a whole, in the context of the surrounding provisions relating to the appeal and the Act as a whole including its main objects (see s 3), the interpretation that best achieves the purpose of the Act is that the discretion in s 168(2) is engaged when good reason is shown for there to be an exception made to the rule under s 168(1): see s 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and R v A2 (2019) 373 ALR 214. A determination as to whether there are good reasons is informed by the common law principles that may apply in a particular appeal, for example, those concerning the reception of fresh or new evidence as articulated in Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510 at 519 and the principles for administering the Act, which in this case include “that the safety, protection and wellbeing of people who fear or experience domestic violence, including children, are paramount.”: see s 4(1) of the Act.

The statutory framework for the decision of the Magistrate

  1. [6]
    It is appropriate as well to say something of the framework for the decision of the Magistrate. Section 37 of the DFVPA provides that a court may make a protection order if satisfied that
  1. (a)
    a relevant relationship exists between the aggrieved and the respondent; and
  2. (b)
    the respondent has committed domestic violence against the aggrieved; and

  1. (c)
    the protection order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence.
  1. [7]
    It was admitted in this case that a “relevant relationship” existed. “Domestic violence” is widely defined in Part 2, Division 2 of the DFVPA. In deciding whether a protection order was necessary or desirable, the Magistrate was required to have regard to the principles in section 4 of the DFVPA. One other provision of the DFVPA should be mentioned. Section 145 provides that a court hearing an application for a protection order is not bound by the “rules of evidence” or “any practices or procedures applying to courts of record”. As well, the court need only be satisfied of a matter on the balance of probabilities.

The decision of the Magistrate

  1. [8]
    On 19 November 2021 the Magistrate gave reasons about why she did not intend to make a protection order. These reasons may be summarised as follows.
  2. [9]
    The parties each conceded that there was a relevant relationship between the parties. The appropriate statutory test for the making of a protection order was identified. The Magistrate correctly identified that while the strict rules of evidence did not apply, it was still necessary for there to be sufficient material before the court to permit, as rational conclusions, the findings necessary to make a protection order. The allegations of the appellant as to acts of domestic violence were dealt with by the Magistrate under several headings. First the Magistrate dealt with allegations of verbal abuse. The Magistrate found the appellant’s claim that the respondent verbally abused her each time he was drunk was not made out. The Magistrate cited a lack of detail of the allegations and noted the claim was not pursued at the hearing. The Magistrate did accept that during an argument on the day the relationship ended in April 2021, the respondent swore at the appellant and insulted her. The Magistrate found this was an act of domestic violence. Reference was made to an allegation of verbal abuse, including a physical threat, on an occasion when the appellant and respondent were riding a motorcycle together. The Magistrate thought it was more likely than not that this occurred and that it amounted to domestic violence.
  3. [10]
    These were the only two acts of domestic violence that the Magistrate was satisfied had occurred.
  4. [11]
    The Magistrate was not satisfied that the respondent coerced the appellant to accept a disadvantageous child support arrangement with her former partner. She found that as the appellant’s then partner, the respondent had no reason to persuade her to accept an arrangement that was not to her advantage. Nor was the Magistrate satisfied that the respondent had come between the appellant and her children, noting that the respondent loaned money to and communicated cordially with the appellant’s young adult daughter. The appellant relied upon recordings of two conversations involving the respondent. The Magistrate accepted they were arguments about parenting issues, but thought the respondent appeared relatively calm as he spoke. One recording showed the appellant following the respondent to his car as he tried to leave to prevent him from departing. The Magistrate did not think the recordings assisted the appellant’s case.
  5. [12]
    There was discussion of events after the parties had separated. The Magistrate found that after the relationship ended, the respondent left the home the parties had leased but contributed toward expenses for about a month. At one point he told the appellant she could keep his share of the bond, but in June 2021 asked for its return. The Magistrate noted that the respondent’s share was returned just days before the appellant filed the application for a protection order. The Magistrate did not consider this change of mind to be financial abuse. The appellant alleged that the respondent told her he had been in jail and used this knowledge to threaten her. The respondent accepted that he “adopted such a character in role-playing” with the appellant, but in fact he had no criminal history and had never been to jail. The Magistrate found the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the appellant’s claims that she had been threatened in the way that she claimed.
  6. [13]
    The Magistrate concluded that the appellant had raised some allegations “purely to sully” the respondent’s character. The first of these concerned events in 2014 or 2015 that saw the respondent charged with criminal offences. These charges related to allegations that the respondent had used social media to harass the new partner of the appellant’s ex-husband. The appellant deposed that in 2014 the respondent was arrested and charged with stalking but “the charges were not proceeded with at court”. The Magistrate found this to be a disingenuous statement. The respondent gave evidence that he was charged, but the charges were withdrawn upon the police being satisfied that the respondent had not sent the messages. The Magistrate concluded that the appellant must have been aware of this fact and found the appellant had “deliberately misled [the] Court by including that material in her application” without outlining the full circumstances. The Magistrate also found the appellant was inconsistent in making allegations about the respondent’s drug use while downplaying her own use and “glossing over the fact that her underage daughter uses cannabis in her home”.
  7. [14]
    It was noted that an allegation that the respondent “stalked” the appellant by riding his motorcycle down her street fell away in evidence. The appellant accepted in cross-examination that it was only one occasion and that the appellant was riding along the intersecting street while she happened to be walking outside. Other occasions when the appellant saw the respondent in the local area were explained by the fact that they still lived in the same neighbourhood. The Magistrate identified that there had been only a few messages sent by the respondent to the appellant after the end of the relationship and that they were not abusive or offensive.
  8. [15]
    As the Magistrate had found the respondent committed two acts of domestic violence, she went on to consider if a protection order was necessary or desirable. The Magistrate noted that the respondent had moved to another suburb and there was no ongoing reason for them to contact each other. Given the Magistrate’s findings that most of the allegations were not made out, she was not persuaded that there was a sufficient risk of any future acts of domestic violence. The Magistrate thought that the appellant did not have the genuine fear of the respondent that she claimed. One matter that caused the Magistrate to doubt the appellant’s claim was a recording tendered by the respondent. This was a recording of the appellant made in October 2020. The appellant was intoxicated on drugs and alcohol. She told the respondent that she would “stock up ammunition” in case they separated, and he tried to “fuck her over”. When the relationship ended in April 2020 the appellant seemed to make good on her threat by telephoning the respondent’s ex-wife to tell her that the appellant and respondent had commenced an affair while they were still married. The Magistrate concluded that the appellant “was clearly motivated to seek revenge upon [the respondent] in the event of their separation”.
  9. [16]
    It was for these reasons the Magistrate concluded that the appellant had embellished her claims and brought the application with malice and to vex the respondent.
  10. [17]
    On 3 December 2021 the Magistrate gave further brief reasons as to why she proposed to award costs to the respondent. In these reasons her Honour referred to the findings she had made on 19 November 2021. The effect of these reasons is discussed below.

The grounds of appeal

  1. [18]
    As may be seen from the above summary of the Magistrate’s decision, her Honour was satisfied of two of the three necessary conditions for making a protection order. The issue on which the appellant failed was whether such an order was necessary or desirable. The complaints of the appellant include that the Magistrate did not give adequate reasons for the conclusion that a protection order was not necessary or desirable or for her conclusion that the application was malicious and vexatious. It is settled law that a court from which an appeal lies must state adequate reasons for its decision. A failure to do so will constitute an error of law. The extent to which a trial judge must expose their reasoning will depend on the nature of the issues for determination and the function to be served by the giving of reasons.[5]
  2. [19]
    The specific complaints of the appellant are that the Magistrate did not refer to the appellant’s expressed fear of the respondent and did not give adequate reasons for conclusion that the application was made “to seek revenge”. I do not accept that either complaint is made out. The Magistrate did refer to the appellant’s evidence of her fear of the respondent. But the Magistrate doubted whether the fear was actually held and thought that even if it was, it was not a reasonable belief in the circumstances. Those circumstances included the Magistrate’s finding that almost all the allegations of domestic violence made by the appellant had not been established. The reasoning of the Magistrate is made clear in the following passage from her reasons.[6]

I find as I have indicated that there was domestic violence in the form of verbal abuse on the date of separation and that there was one incident of further verbal abuse and potential threats to her in January 2020 or, at least, behaviour involving intimidation. Otherwise, I am not satisfied that domestic violence has occurred as [the appellant] has claimed. I turn now to the issue of whether an order is necessary or desirable. I find that it is not necessary or desirable for the following reasons. Other than the findings that I have made, there has been no instances of physical aggression particularised by [the appellant] or disclosed in the evidence.

I do not accept that [the appellant] was or is genuinely terrified, as she used the word, of [the respondent] or that she genuinely believes he will physically harm her, or her children, or her pets. If she does hold such a belief, it is not reasonably held. [The respondent] has not pursued [the appellant] relentlessly through harassment or intimidation post-separation and he has not stalked her. There is therefore no sufficient risk that he is likely to do so in the future. The parties have no ongoing basis for having to communicate with one another. The aggrieved can continue to block the respondent from her phone and all social media platforms.

[The respondent] has now moved out of the suburb in which [the appellant] lives. I do not accept that she is in need of an order to protect her from him.

  1. [20]
    As for the Magistrate’s conclusion that the application was malicious, vexatious, and motivated by revenge, it is clear from the reasons that her Honour relied upon the recording made by the respondent in October 2020. In this recording the appellant threatened to “stock ammunition”[7] to use in the event the parties separated, and the respondent tried to “fuck her over”. The Magistrate concluded, as she was entitled to, that the appellant made good on this threat when, on the day of separation, she telephoned the respondent’s former wife to reveal the respondent had cheated on her over several years.[8] The Magistrate also reasoned that when the application for a protection order made in late June 2021, there had been no real contact between the parties since May. There was no obvious reason for the application to be made at that time, apart from the respondent’s change of mind about his share of the rental bond and its payment a few days before the application. Taken with the Magistrate’s view that the appellant had embellished her evidence,[9] the reasons for the conclusion that the application was malicious and vexatious were made abundantly clear.
  2. [21]
    The appellant also challenged the Magistrate’s conclusion on the basis that it was unreasonable or plainly unjust. In my view this complaint cannot be sustained. As has been noted, the appellant pursued numerous allegations of domestic violence that were alleged to have occurred over an extended period. The Magistrate was satisfied of only two acts – one in January 2020 and the other April 2021. There were reasons to doubt the appellant’s other claims. She asserted that the respondent had made “relentless” attempts to contact her after the end of the relationship. In fact, there were three messages two days after the separation in mid-April 2021 and a further, probably unintentional, message on 18 June 2021. Despite this, the appellant maintained in cross-examination the attempted contact was relentless.[10] As well, the appellant had claimed the respondent continued to ride past her house, implying an ongoing course of conduct. But in cross-examination the appellant conceded it was only on one occasion that she saw the respondent and that it was as he drove along a cross-street, not the street where the appellant lived.[11] These matters cast doubt on the appellant’s evidence and were enough to permit the conclusion that it was not probable all the events she alleged had occurred. They are also sufficient to sustain the conclusion that the appellant had embellished aspects of her evidence.
  3. [22]
    That being so, it was also open to the Magistrate to conclude, on all the evidence, that the appellant was motivated by malice and a desire for revenge. In this regard it is to be remembered that the Magistrate only needed to be satisfied it was more probable than not that this was the appellant’s motivation.[12] Of course, given the potential consequences of the Magistrate’s finding, the principles in Briginshaw v Briginshaw[13] can be assumed to have applied. But in my view the evidence set out above was sufficiently clear and cogent to permit the Magistrate’s conclusion.
  4. [23]
    The remaining question is whether the decision of the Magistrate to award costs was one that was unreasonable or plainly unjust. Once the Magistrate had heard and dismissed the application, and was satisfied the application was malicious or vexatious, section 157 of the DFVPA conferred a discretion to award costs. The section provides

157 Costs

  1. (1)
    Each party to a proceeding for an application under this Act must bear the party’s own costs for the proceeding.
  1. (2)
    However, the court may award costs against a party who makes an application that the court hears and decides to dismiss on the grounds that the application is malicious, deliberately false, frivolous or vexatious.
  1. (3)
    In this section—

"party" includes an aggrieved.

  1. [24]
    This provision fully expresses the power of a court to award costs upon the dismissal of an application. It may be seen, as Long SC DCJ observed in NBE v PRT & Anor,[14] that section 157 is

consistent with the objects of the DFVPA as set out in s 3 and the principles for administering the Act, as set out in s 4, and in that context, seek[s] to balance the need for absence of discouragement to persons “who fear or experience domestic violence” in approaching the Court but also not leaving the door open to manifestly groundless or mischievous proceedings.

  1. [25]
    The Magistrate was aware that an award of costs was discretionary and did not follow automatically upon her finding that the application was malicious and vexatious.[15] In giving reasons for the decision to award costs the Magistrate referred to her earlier findings, including that the appellant had no grounds for bringing the application and that she had misled the court in her evidence. These were significant findings. The respondent had been required to defend the application in circumstances where the Magistrate found it should not have been commenced. While this was not specifically identified by the Magistrate, it was a powerful factor in favour of awarding costs to the respondent.
  2. [26]
    The appellant relied upon a further statement of Long SC DCJ in NBE v PRT & Anor. In her written submissions the appellant extracted a part of what his Honour stated concerning section 157[16]

However, a cautious approach should be taken to any determination that the power provided in s 157(2) should be applied …

  1. [27]
    This passage is incomplete. Long SC DCJ went on to state

… and particularly, where such determination is sought in the absence of the party against whom the order is sought and when there is no contradictor. A party seeking the exercise of such power should expect to have to justify the conclusion as a clear one and from an objective point of view, rather than as a subjective and potentially contentious point of view.

  1. [28]
    The full statement of his Honour reflected the circumstance of NBE v PRT & Anor where a costs order was made against an aggrieved who was not present for the hearing and based solely on the ex-parte evidence of the respondent. That was a situation far removed from this case. That is not to say that caution is unnecessary when deciding whether to award costs in a proceeding under the DFVPA. But the circumstances that justified the award being set aside in NBE v PRT & Anor do not arise here.
  2. [29]
    The Magistrate was referred to and considered NBE v PRT & Anor. She was also referred to KAV v Magistrate Bentley & Anor [2016] QSC 46. KAV is of no assistance in this appeal. It was an application to the Supreme Court for the judicial review of a decision to refuse an application to withdraw an application under the DFVPA. A consequence of the success of that application was that an award of costs was also set aside. In KAV, Henry J noted that section 157 of the DFVPA is not engaged unless there has been a hearing, a dismissal, and a finding in accordance with section 157(2). His Honour otherwise said nothing about the principles that are engaged when a court is exercising the discretion conferred by section 157.
  3. [30]
    In my view, the findings of the Magistrate about the appellant’s motivation were sufficient to justify an award of costs to the respondent so that he might be indemnified for the expense of defending a malicious and vexatious proceeding. The amount of costs was agreed between the parties and there is no warrant for this court to interfere with the decision of the Magistrate.

Conclusion and orders

  1. [31]
    As the appellant has not made out any of the grounds of appeal, the appeal must be dismissed. The final decision in the appeal will have the effect of lifting the stay ordered by the Magistrate pursuant to section 166 of the DFVPA.
  2. [32]
    The costs of the appeal are probably governed by the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld).[17] If that is so, costs would usually follow the event[18] and the respondent would have a prima facie entitlement to the benefit of a costs order. I would invite the parties to consider if they can reach agreement as to the costs of the appeal. To dispose of the appeal and make provision for argument about costs, should it be necessary, I make the following orders.
  1. The appeal is dismissed.
  2. The decisions of the Magistrate to dismiss the application and to award costs fixed in the sum of $9,362.30 to the respondent are confirmed.
  3. The respondent file and serve upon the appellant on or before 3 June 2022 any written submissions as to the costs of the appeal, such submissions not to exceed five pages.
  4. The appellant file and serve upon the respondent on or before 10 June 2022 any written submissions as to the costs of the appeal, such submissions not to exceed five pages.
  5. Each party has leave to file and serve on or before 17 June 2022 any application for leave to make oral submissions as to the costs of the appeal.
  6. In the event written submission as to costs are filed by any party, and in the absence of any application to make oral submissions, I will decide the costs of the appeal on the written submissions and without oral hearing.

Footnotes

[1]Transcript of decision (court document 9), p. 12.

[2]DFVPA, section 166.

[3]The notice was required by section 165(4) of the DFVPA to be filed within 28 days of the decision. Because of the closure of the registry during the Christmas court vacation, and pursuant to section 38 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), the notice was filed within time.

[4]Transcript of decision (court document 9), p. 5, line 5-6.

[5]Drew v Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 219, [57]-[59], citing Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 and Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Company Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 247.

[6]Transcript of decision (court document), p. 10, lines 20-39.

[7]Clearly in a metaphorical and not literal sense.

[8]There was unchallenged evidence of this telephone call from the respondent and his son.

[9]Transcript of decision (court document 9), p. 12, lines 5-7.

[10]Transcript of hearing (court document 8), T.1-25.33-45.

[11]Transcript of hearing (court document 8), T.1-33.8-16; T.1-34.5-45.

[12]DFVPA, section 145.

[13](1938) 60 CLR 336.

[14][2018] QDC 29, [14].

[15]Transcript of costs decision (court document 10), p. 2, lines 15-17.

[16]NBE v PRT & Anor, [32].

[17]HZA v ZHA [2018] QDC 125.

[18]Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), rule 681.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    JSA v MPR

  • Shortened Case Name:

    JSA v MPR

  • MNC:

    [2022] QDC 111

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Cash QC DCJ

  • Date:

    20 May 2022

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

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