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- Parkin v Commissioner of Police[2022] QDC 173
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Parkin v Commissioner of Police[2022] QDC 173
Parkin v Commissioner of Police[2022] QDC 173
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Parkin v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 173 |
PARTIES: | BRENDAN JAMES PARKIN (Appellant) v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (Respondent) |
FILE NO: | 2395 of 2021 |
DIVISION: | Criminal |
PROCEEDING: | Appeal |
ORIGINATING COURT: | Wynnum Magistrates Court |
DELIVERED ON: | 4 February 2022 (ex tempore) |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane District Court |
HEARING DATE: | 4 February 2022 |
JUDGE: | Dearden DCJ |
ORDER: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | MAGISTRATES – APPEAL AND REVIEW – QUEENSLAND – APPEAL – GROUNDS – where the appellant was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment – where a parole eligibility date was imposed with an associated declaration of 100 days’ time served – whether manifestly excessive – whether the parole board delays should have been considered – whether insufficient weight was placed on the pre-sentence custody certificate – where the appellant was convicted and not further punished in respect of possession of counterfeit money – whether the learned magistrate erred in convicting and not further punishing the defendant |
LEGISLATION | Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) ss 209, 219 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 222, 223 Penalties and Sentences Act 1986 (Qld) s 160B |
CASES | Burnett v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 251 Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132 McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255 R v Watson [2021] QCA 225 Stuurman v Queensland Police Service [2021] QDC 80 |
COUNSEL: | J P Feely (for the appellant) S Kingston (for the respondent) |
SOLICITORS: | Fuller & White Solicitors (for the appellant) Office of Director of Public Prosecutions (for the respondent) |
Introduction
- [1]This is an appeal against the sentences imposed by the learned magistrate at Wynnum on 1 September 2021 in respect of the appellant Brendan James Parkin in relation to the following charges:
- (1)Stealing (29 December 2020);
- (2)Enter or be in premises with intent to commit indictable offences by break (between 11 December 2020 and 20 December 2020);
- (3)Enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (9 December 2020);
- (4)Enter or be in premises with the intent to commit indictable offences by break (31 December 2020);
- (5)Enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (19 December 2020);
- (6)Enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (20 December 2020);
- (7)Enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (31 December 2020);
- (8)Enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (between 12 December 2020 and 19 December 2020);
- (9)Enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (19 December 2020);
- (10)Possess tainted property (6 January 2021);
- (11)Possess utensils or pipes, etc, for use (6 January 2021);
- (12)Possess property suspected of having been acquired for the purpose of committing a drug offence (6 January 2021);
- (13)Enter or be in premises with the intent to commit indictable offences by break (between 18 December 2020 and 1 January 2021);
- (14)Driving a motor vehicle without a driver licence, disqualified by Court order – type 2 vehicle related offence (7 July 2020);
- (15)Possess utensils or pipes, etc, for use (24 August 2020);
- (16)While relevant drug is present in blood or saliva drive motor vehicle, tram, train, or vessel (7 July 2020);
- (17)Possessing dangerous drugs (15 August 2020);
- (18)Possessing anything for use in the commission of crime defined in part 2 (15 August 2020);
- (19)Possessing counterfeit property (15 August 2020);
- (20)Enter premises with intent (21 June 2020); and
- (21)Possession of a knife in a public place (19 November 2020).
- [2]The appellant entered pleas of guilty and was sentenced as follows:
- (1)Stealing (29 December 2020): three months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (2)Enter or be in premises with intent to commit indictable offences by break (between 11 December 2020 and 20 December 2020): 18 months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (3)Enter premises and commit an indictable offence by break (9 December 2020): 18 months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (4)Enter or be in premises with intent to commit indictable offences by break (31 December 2020): 18 months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (5)Enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (19 December 2020): 18 months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (6)Enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (20 December 2020): 18 months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (7)Enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (31 December 2020): 18 months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (8)Enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (between 12 December 2020 and 19 December 2020): 18 months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (9)Enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (19 December 2020): 18 months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (10)Possess tainted property (6 January 2021): six months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (11)Possess utensils or pipes, etc, for use (6 January 2021): convicted and not further punished;
- (12)Possess property suspected of having been acquired for the purpose of committing a drug offence (6 January 2021): convicted and not further punished;
- (13)Enter or be in premises with the intent to commit indictable offences by break (between 18 December 2020 and 1 January 2021): 18 months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021);
- (14)Driving a motor vehicle without a driver licence disqualifying the Court order – type 2 vehicle related offence (7 July 2020): six months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (15)Possess utensils or pipes, etc, for use (24 August 2020): convicted and not further punished;
- (16)While relevant drug is present in blood or saliva, drive motor vehicle, tram, train, or vessel (7 July 2020): disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for a period of six months from 1 September 2021;
- (17)Possessing dangerous drugs (15 August 2020): three months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (18)Possessing anything for use in the commission of a crime defined in part 2 (15 August 2020): three months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021;
- (19)Possessing counterfeit property (15 August 2020): convicted and not further punished;
- (20)Enter premises with intent (21 June 2020): 18 months imprisonment, parole eligibility date 1 September 2021; and
- (21)Possession of a knife in the public place (19 November 2020): convicted and not further punished.
Grounds of appeal
- [3]The appellant sought and was granted leave to appeal on an amended set of grounds which are as follows:
- (1)The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances;
- (2)The learned magistrate failed to have sufficient regard to the extensive delays currently associated with the Queensland Parole Board considering parole applications;
- (3)The learned magistrate erred by failing to take into account or failing to place sufficient weight on the pre-sentence custody the appellant had served; and
- (4)The learned magistrate erred in convicting and not further punishing the defendant in respect of a charge to which the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (‘Crimes Act’) was applicable.
The law – appeals
- [4]
- [5]In McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255 [47], Bowskill J stated:
“It is well established that, on an appeal under s 222 [Justices Act] by way of rehearing, the District Court is required to conduct a real review of the trial, and the magistrate’s reasons, and make its own determination of relevant facts in issue from the evidence, giving due deference and attaching a good deal of weight to the magistrate’s view. Nevertheless, in order to succeed on such an appeal, the appellant must establish some legal, factual or discretionary error.”[2] [Citations omitted].
- [6]In Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132, Sofronoff P stated:
“…an appellate court hearing an appeal by way of rehearing must conduct a real review of the evidence and make up its own mind about the case.”[3]
Evidence
- [7]The appeal proceeded on the evidence given and the submissions made at the original hearing,[4] but leave was granted to each of the appellant and the respondent, on the appeal, to adduce additional evidence, by way of affidavits, in respect of Parole Board delays (Affidavit of Brittany Nicole White affirmed 13 October 2021; Affidavit of Siobhan Maxwell affirmed 4 February 2022). An updated pre-sentence custody certificate was also tendered as additional evidence on the appeal.[5]
Background
- [8]The offences for which the appellant was dealt with all breached a parole order imposed at the Cleveland Magistrates Court on 17 March 2020, for a variety of offences, including drug, property and Bail Act charges. The effective head sentence imposed on that date was 12 months, and the appellant was arrested and remanded in custody on the current charges the subject of this appeal on the 6th of January 2021.[6]
- [9]At the sentence hearing, the prosecutor submitted for a global head sentence of two years, with parole eligibility after eight months,[7] while the defence solicitor submitted for a head sentence of 18 months, suspended immediately,[8] together with a concurrent probation order, to provide supervision,[9] if required.
- [10]The appellant helpfully summarises the rather complex sentencing outcomes as follows:
“(5) The appellant was sentenced as follows:
- (i)an effective global head sentence of 18 months imprisonment;
- (ii)lesser concurrent terms of imprisonment imposed on some offences or convicted and not further punished;
- (iii)a parole eligibility date was set as at the date of sentence;
- (iv)one hundred days pre-sentence custody was declared;
- (v)the defendant was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for a period of two years;
- (vi)
Ground 4 – The learned magistrate erred in convicting and not further punishing the defendant in respect of a charge to which the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) was applicable.
- [11]The learned magistrate disposed of the offence of possession of counterfeit money (15 August 2020) by convicting and not further punishing the appellant,[11] a sentence outcome not available under the Crimes Act. The respondent concedes that the learned magistrate’s error in sentencing this way on this charge, and acknowledges the appeal should be granted in respect of that charge (whilst noting that no concession was made in respect of the other charges), and accepts that the appellant should be re-sentenced.[12] In re-sentencing the appellant, as agreed by both the appellant and the respondent, I will of course have regard to all relevant provisions of Crimes Act s 16A.
Ground 1 - The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances.
Ground 2 - The learned magistrate failed to have sufficient regard to the extensive delays currently associated with the Queensland Parole Board considering parole applications.
Ground 3 - The learned magistrate erred by failing to take into account or failing to place sufficient weight on the pre-sentence custody the appellant had served.
- [12]It is useful, in my view, to consider these grounds collectively, given they represent different aspects of the overall sentencing construct, which the appellant submits results in sentencing error. The appellant submits that the notional global sentence imposed by the learned magistrate (18 months imprisonment) was not, of itself, an error but rather, the consequence of how that sentence was ordered to be served, by way of a parole eligibility date, with an associated declaration of 100 days’ time served resulted in a sentence that was, in its effect and consequences, manifestly excessive.[13]
- [13]As at the date of sentence (1 September 2021), the appellant had served 137 days (approximately 4.5 months) from the date of apprehension (6 January 2021) until 24 May 2021, which all related to his previous sentence, and arose from his breaches of parole constituted by the current offending subject to this.[14] In addition, there was a further 100 days, which was declared, between 24 May 2021 and 1 September 2021.
- [14]With respect, the learned magistrate’s attitude to the effect of the appellant committing offences while on parole, was effectively that it should carry no weight in relation to the sentence on the current offences.[15] That unwillingness to ameliorate the sentence in any way for the consequence of the appellant serving the 137 days of his previous sentence, was then compounded by the learned magistrate declining to impose a sentence which dealt with and/or responded to the clearly identified and acknowledged delays in the Parole Board processing parole applications, which was submitted at sentence to be in the order of six to eight months as at 1 September 2021.[16]
- [15]
- [16]In essence, the submission on behalf of the appellant is that the combined effect of the failure to place greater weight (for that matter, any weight) on the time served but not declared relevant to the previous sentence, as well as the substantial delays predicted (and with the benefit of hindsight, clearly obvious) in the consideration of parole applications (even when, as here, an order was made for an immediate parole eligibility date), resulted in a sentence that was in error, because the consequence was that the appellant would serve a substantially longer period of actual custody than was intended by the learned magistrate, and that was appropriate and proportionate for the offences committed and the circumstances in which they were committed, including of course, being committed while on parole.[19]
- [17]The respondent, quite appropriately of course, identifies the appellant’s significant and relevant criminal history,[20] and submits as follows in respect of the sentence imposed:
“(5.5) In imposing this sentence, the learned magistrate identified the following factors as relevant:
- (1)the appellant’s evident problems with drug addictions;[21]
- (2)the serious, indictable nature of much of the offending;[22]
- (3)the appellant’s status as a recidivist drug and property offender;[23]
- (4)the fact that the appellant had failed to take advantage of opportunities for rehabilitation in the past;[24]
- (5)the fact that the appellant committed the offences whilst on parole;[25]
- (6)
(5.6) During submissions, his Honour also noted the risk posed to the community by offenders who commit [offences] on parole [T1-19] and who drive whilst under the influence of drugs [T-20, L25], and the relevance of denunciation, personal deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of members of the public [T-32, L5].
(5.7) Section 219 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 [(Qld)] provides that if a prisoner is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for further offences committed during the period of a parole order, the order is taken to have been automatically cancelled on the date of the offence. Therefore, the appellant’s parole was taken to have been cancelled as of 21 June 2020, the earliest of his offences.
(5.8) The learned magistrate gave due consideration to the appellant’s cooperation with police and timely pleas [D-4, L40]. Nevertheless, his Honour considered a period of actual custody was warranted, alongside some supervision upon the appellant’s release into the community.
(5.9) In circumstances where his Honour had reached this conclusion, his Honour then correctly identified that a parole eligibility date must be set under s 160B of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1986 [(Qld)].
(5.10) The transcript of sentence proceedings demonstrates the application of appropriate judicial sentencing discretion and proper consideration of all the relevant circumstances by the learned sentencing magistrate.”[27]
- [18]In respect of the Parole Board delays, the respondent submits further:
“(5.16) The respondent submits that his Honour’s decision to prioritise matters such as personal and general deterrence and the need for the appellant to be supervised and assisted in rehabilitation upon release into the community over a notional period of delay in the appellant’s parole application being considered was a proper use of his Honour’s sentencing discretion.”[28]
- [19]In short, the respondent does not concede that the effect of the learned magistrate’s sentence could be considered manifestly excessive.
Discussion
- [20]At the original sentence, the learned magistrate was clearly appraised of the importance of giving some weight to the time spent serving the previous sentence (approximately 4.5 months), the consequence of declaring the 100 days from 24 May up to 1 September 2021; namely, that a parole eligibility date would be required to be set pursuant to Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) s 209(1) and Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 160B);[29] and further, the combination of a suspended sentence and the probation order would impose an appropriate sentence, without the uncertainty of a substantial delay in the Parole Board considering the appellant’s parole application.
- [21]The appellant has now served the 100 days that was served and declared at the sentence on 1 September 2021 and a further 156 days since then, a total of 256 days (approximately 8.5 months).[30] The appellant, as previously identified, also served 137 days (approximately 4.5 months) of the previous sentence after coming into custody when apprehended for the current matters.
- [22]In total, the appellant has served, to date, some 13 months since apprehension. I have no information as of the date of this appeal as to when his application for parole will be considered, and so it is clear that he still faces an uncertain release date, and there are still some months from the estimate provided as at the sentence date as to when parole might be considered.
- [23]With respect, such an outcome, clearly flagged to the learned magistrate at the date of sentence and confirmed with the benefit of hindsight at this appeal, is in my view, unfair and in its consequence, manifestly excessive. In those circumstances, I consider that the appeal should be granted, not only of course in respect of the counterfeit money charge (which both parties agree should be the subject of the re-sentence), but also in relation to all other charges.
- [24]The difficulty that then arises is how to deal with the re-sentence of the appellant, in light of the time already served, whether declarable or strictly not declarable, given the combined effect of the provisions of Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) s 209(1) and Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 160B, and what I consider (and in this respect I adopt the submissions of the respondent) to be the clear and obvious need for ongoing supervision on release from secure custody.
- [25]The appellant’s counsel, Mr Feely, submits that an appropriate reduction of the current outstanding sentence of 9.5 months still to serve (were this appeal not granted), without declarations for any time actually served, and by giving some amelioration (but by no means in total) for the 137 days served with respect to the previous sentence, would be a head sentence, to be imposed today, of eight months imprisonment. He submits that could be attached to the enter premises charges (identified as charges 2-9, 13, 20 under the heading “Sentence” on p.2 of the amended notice of appeal filed today). Mr Feely acknowledges the need for supervision and submits that the sentences imposed on all other charges should be set aside (that would as a matter of convenience of course also include those charges which were originally the subject of a “convicted and not further punished” outcome) and be replaced by a single probation order.
- [26]He submits further, the declarations of time served should be set aside, but that the licence disqualification and forfeiture orders should stand.
- [27]In respect of the Commonwealth charge of possess counterfeit money, the parties effectively submit collectively that a re-sentence pursuant to s 21A Crimes Act, being a recognisance with conviction recorded in the sum of $300 for a period of 12 months good behaviour would be appropriate.
Orders
- [28]I make the following orders:
- (1)Appeal allowed.
- (2)Set aside all sentences imposed on all charges at the Wynnum Magistrates Court on 1 September 2021.
- (3)Set aside the sentence of “convicted and not further punished” in respect of the charge of “possessing counterfeit money” (15 August 2020).
- (4)Set aside all declarations of pre-sentence custody made on 1 September 2021.
- (5)In respect of the following charges (p.2 amended notice of appeal to a District Court judge, items 2-9, 13, 20) namely, 2. enter or be in premises with intent to commit indictable offences by break (between 11 December 2020 and 20 December 2020); 4. enter or be in premises with intent to commit indictable offences by break (31 December 2020); 13. enter or be in premises with intent to commit indictable offences by break (between 18 December 2020 and 1 January 2021, and in respect of 3. enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (9 December 2020); 5. enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (19 December 2020); 6. enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (20 December 2020); 7. enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (31 December 2020); 8. enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (between 12 December 2020 and 19 December 2020); 9. enter premises and commit indictable offence by break (19 December 2020); and 20. enter premises with intent (21 June 2020); re-sentenced to eight months imprisonment on each charge, concurrent. All sentences to be suspended forthwith, with an operational period of two years.
- (6)In respect of the “possessing counterfeit money” (15 August 2020) charge, order the appellant be convicted, however, by order, released without passing sentence upon the appellant given security by recognisance in the sum of $300, conditioned that he be of good behaviour for a period of 12 months.
- (7)In respect of all other charges, order that the appellant be placed on probation for a period of two years, subject to the provisions of Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 93(1)(a)-(g), and further:
- (a)that the appellant report to the Brisbane office of the Probation and Parole Service, Spring Hill, within two business days of his release from custody;
- (b)that the defendant submit to such for medical, psychological or psychiatric treatment and/or counselling and/or programs in respect of mental health issues and drug and alcohol issues or any other matter considered relevant by an authorised Corrective Services, as directed by an authorised Corrective Services Officer.
- (c)the appellant shall abstain from the consumption, inhalation or administration of a dangerous drug as defined in the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) or other illicit substances while subject to this order (without lawful excuse) and undergo drug testing (including urine analysis testing) as required by an authorised Corrective Services Officer, and any positive results shall be deemed a contravention of the order.
- (d)conviction recorded in respect of all charges on which the appellant is placed on probation.
- (8)The sentences imposed on 1 September 2021 are otherwise confirmed.
Footnotes
[1]Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 223.
[2]McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255 [47].
[3]Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132.
[4]Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 223(1).
[5]Exhibit 6 – Pre-sentence custody certificate.
[6]T1-28 l 3.
[7]T-23 l 7.
[8]T-31 l 22.
[9]T-38 ll 17-20.
[10]D-4-5; D-3 l 28; Exhibit 1 – Outline of submissions on behalf of the appellant [5].
[11]D-5 l 42.
[12]Exhibit 4 – Outline of submissions on behalf of the respondent [5.24] – [5.26].
[13]Exhibit 1 – Outline of submissions on behalf of the appellant [28].
[14]Exhibit 1 – Outline of submissions on behalf of the appellant [7].
[15]T27 ll 1-25.
[16]Exhibit 1 – Outline of submissions on behalf of the appellant [14]; T-31 l 2; D-4 l 27.
[17]Stuurman v Queensland Police Service [2021] QDC 80; Burnett v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 251 [34]-[35].
[18]R v Watson [2021] QCA 225.
[19]Exhibit 1 – Outline of submissions on behalf of the appellant [22], [28], [31].
[20]Exhibit 4 – Outline of submissions on behalf of the respondent [5.2]-[5.4].
[21]D-2-3.
[22]D-2 l 40.
[23]D-3 l 45.
[24]D-3 l 45.
[25]D-3 l 35.
[26]D-4 l 45.
[27]Exhibit 4 – Outline of submissions on behalf of the respondent [5.5]-[5.10].
[28]Exhibit 4 – Outline of submissions on behalf of the respondent [5.16].
[29]T1-26 ll 44-47; T1-39 ll 4-9.
[30]Exhibit 6 – Pre-sentence custody certificate.