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Foley v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2022] QDC 183

Foley v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2022] QDC 183

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Foley v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2022] QDC 183

PARTIES:

RAELEA ROSE FOLEY

(Appellant)

v

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION REGULATOR

(Respondent)

FILE NO:

D30/21

DIVISION:

Criminal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Ipswich

DELIVERED ON:

8 December 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Ipswich

HEARING DATE:

8 April 2022

JUDGE:

Lynch KC DCJ

ORDER:

  1. In respect of each charge, the appeal against conviction is allowed, the conviction and sentence is set aside, and a verdict of not guilty is entered.
  2. The orders for payment of restitution and costs are set aside.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL – s 222 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – where the appellant was convicted after a trial of 29 counts of defrauding a workers’ compensation insurer – where the appellant was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment wholly suspended for an operational period of 18 months, and to pay restitution of $5,863.13 and costs of $23,908.75 – where appeal against conviction for defrauding charges – where appeal by way of rehearing on the evidence – where appeal court to conduct real review of the evidence – where appeal court to draw own inferences based on evidence at trial – whether defendant dishonestly obtained benefit or caused detriment

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL – CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE – where onus on prosecution to exclude rational hypothesis consistent with innocence – whether innocent explanation excluded – where defendant did not give or call evidence – whether relevant to drawing guilty inference – whether circumstances called for explanation by defendant – whether facts peculiarly within knowledge of defendant – whether Weissensteiner v The Queen applies

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL – where discretion to order retrial – whether prosecution should be permitted to supplement defective case

LEGISLATION:

Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 408C

Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 222, 223(1), 225

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ss 533(1), 579

CASES:

Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50

Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) v Fowler (1984) 154 CLR 627

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495

Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129

McLeod v The Queen (2003) 214 CLR 230

Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493

Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234

R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308

R v Dillon; Ex parte Attorney-General [2016] 1 Qd R 56

R v McEwen [2019] QCA 16

RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620

Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573

Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217

COUNSEL:

SOLICITOR:

S Neaves for the Appellant

R Bensted for the Respondent

SOLICITORS:

Ryan Lawyers for the Appellant

Crown Law for the Respondent

Appeal

  1. [1]
    On 17 and 18 June 2021, Raelea Rose Foley (the appellant) was tried before the Magistrates Court at Ipswich upon 29 charges of defrauding WorkCover Queensland.
  1. [2]
    On 14 July 2021, the learned Acting Magistrate found the appellant guilty of all 29 offences. In respect of charge 1, the appellant was sentenced to five months imprisonment, wholly suspended for an operational period of 18 months. For each of the other offences the appellant was convicted and not further punished with convictions recorded. The appellant was also ordered to pay $5,863.13 restitution and to pay $23,908.75 costs; payment of both amounts was referred to SPER. 
  1. [3]
    Ms Foley appeals against the decision of the Acting Magistrate convicting her of the offences on the grounds the verdicts are inconsistent with the evidence, are unsafe and unsatisfactory, and the Acting Magistrate erred in failing to identify a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.
  1. [4]
    For the reasons that follow, I have concluded the appeals should be allowed.

Material

  1. [5]
    The following were admitted as exhibits on the hearing of the appeal.

Exhibit 1: Notice of appeal

Exhibit 2: Appellant’s outline of submissions (dated 29/9/2021)

Exhibit 3: Respondent’s outline of submissions (dated 28/10/2021),

Exhibit 4: Transcript of proceedings of 17, 18 June, 14 July 2021, Exhibits admitted during summary trial

Exhibit 5: Respondent’s further outline of submissions (dated 27/4/2022)

Exhibit 6: Appellant’s further outline of submissions (undated)

Prosecution case

  1. [6]
    Since the appeal is by way of rehearing on the evidence admitted below,[1] it is necessary to set out the evidence in some detail.
  1. [7]
    The prosecution case alleged the appellant received payment from WorkCover Queensland for 29 false claims for reimbursement of travel expenses. It was not in issue the appellant had been injured in the course of her employment and was therefore entitled to compensation for lost wages and to have her medical treatment paid for. The charges represented specific occasions where claims were made for travel to and from appointments for medical treatment. The particulars contained in the complaint for each charge alleged the claims were lodged by the appellant. In opening the prosecution case, the prosecutor informed the Acting Magistrate “the fact that … [the appellant] did not attend those 29 appointments is also not in dispute. The contest in this matter surrounds the process of the lodgement of the claims and the reliability of the witnesses managing her claim on behalf of WorkCover.”[2]
  1. [8]
    The prosecutor tendered a list of admissions (Exhibit 1). The admitted facts included:
  • the appellant was injured in a work accident when thrown from a horse on 3/6/2018;
  • a WorkCover claim was made by the appellant’s employer the next day and listed the appellant’s personal details, including address: 19 Etty St, Dalby, email: [email protected], mobile number: 0474 832366;
  • on about 7/6/2018 WorkCover accepted the claim and the appellant began receiving compensation payments;
  • on about 16/7/2018 the appellant became eligible for compensation for medical expenses only, including travel expenses related to attending such treatment or appointments;
  • on about 21/6/2019 the appellant was again entitled to compensation for lost wages due to incapacity to work;
  • on about 11/11/2019 the appellant’s compensation payments for physical injuries ceased;
  • Cordillo Downs Station in South Australia is approximately 1,446km from Brisbane;
  • for each charge, the appellant did not attend an appointment with the named medical treatment centre on the specified date.
  1. Angela Zahnow
  1. [9]
    Angela Zahnow gave evidence via phone. Ms Zahnow was employed by WorkCover Queensland as manager in quality assurance and technical training. She had knowledge and experience of and access to WorkCover computer operating systems and record management. Ms Zahnow said worker’s compensation claims records were entirely electronic and recorded everything relating to a claim; this included records of communication, travel, expense, wages and payments.[3] Ms Zahnow identified various documents she had produced from the WorkCover computer systems.
  1. [10]
    Exhibit 2 (also identified as AZ1), is the application for compensation submitted by the appellant’s employer.[4] Exhibit 3 (AZ2), consisting of 108 pages, is WorkCover’s communication record regarding the appellant’s claim. Ms Zahnow said this included a summary of WorkCover staff’s actual or attempted communications relating to the claim, including with parties other than the appellant.[5] Ms Zahnow acknowledged however, that it was obvious from details recorded within Exhibit 3 that despite calls being forwarded to Evan Coombes as the claim manager, he made no record of their content.[6] Ms Zahnow also acknowledged that, apart from automatic emails generated by WorkCover computer systems, emails were not recorded in Exhibit 3.[7]
  1. [11]
    Exhibit 4 (AZ3), consisting of 21 pages, is the payments record in respect of the appellant’s claim. Ms Zahnow said this document identifies what a payment is for, to whom it was made, when a claim for payment was processed by WorkCover, the date a service was accessed by the claimant, approval of a payment, and the amount paid.[8] Ms Zahnow confirmed that a claimant was entitled under the scheme to reasonable reimbursement for travel to or from an appointment and that travel payments made to the appellant were recorded in Exhibit 4. Ms Zahnow said the document did not record the date of any actual payment being made to the appellant, and the “Completed” entry in the “Transaction Status” column indicated only that WorkCover had approved the claim. However, she also said “Completed” meant that payment had been made.[9] Ms Zahnow also described that some of the travel claims, as indicated by a minus or negative sign in the amount column, were reversals of approved payments. Ms Zahnow explained this might occur where WorkCover had investigated a claim and determined the claimed travel was not reasonable or not connected with the claim. She said the reversal had the effect of creating a debt owed by the claimant to WorkCover.[10] 
  1. [12]
    Exhibit 5 (AZ4), records details of 36 travel claims and the reversal of some of them. This document shows all of the claims were received from email: [email protected], records the claimed distance travelled and details of the appointment, and where reversed the reason for reversal.[11] Ms Zahnow said this record showed a payment had been completed but did not show when it was actually received by a recipient.[12] Exhibit 6 (AZ5), is a single page containing details of medical appointments for the appellant.[13] Exhibit 7 (AZ6, 8 pages), is a record of requests for payment by medical service providers and the appellant, including her claims for travel expenses. Ms Zahnow said the claims could be made by an external service provider or by the appellant through the Worker Assist app available to claimants for that purpose, or via a website. Ms Zahnow said the use of the Worker Assist app provided the user with a unique identifier; which in the appellant’s case was OPS302186. Ms Zahnow acknowledged however, she could not say whether the unique identifier would also appear if the claim were made from a website.[14] Ms Zahnow also acknowledged that claims could be registered through use of the Worker Assist app, via the website, or by email to a customer adviser. In the case of a claim made via email, Ms Zahnow said the staff member receiving the claim would forward it to “business support” for processing.[15]
  1. [13]
    Ms Zahnow also produced a copy of correspondence dated 31/3/2020 from WorkCover directed to the appellant, and a reply of the same date from the appellant’s email address (admitted as Exhibit 8).[16] Ms Zahnow acknowledged that all claims for expenses submitted by a worker should be checked by WorkCover, but that not all were.[17]
  1. [14]
    Ms Zahnow was taken to various entries in Exhibit 3, the communication records, which showed the appellant’s mother made contact with a WorkCover employee regarding outstanding payments on behalf of the appellant, and that the appellant had specifically authorised her to do so. Ms Zahnow acknowledged Exhibit 3 recorded dates on which contact by the appellant’s mother was made included 31/7/2018, 10/8/2018, 8/2/2019, 14/2/2019 and 20/2/2019.[18] Ms Zahnow accepted there were instances where no record was made in the communications log of contact between WorkCover and the appellant’s mother.[19] Ms Zahnow accepted that where claims for payment were lodged in hard copy, entries in WorkCover computer systems were made by staff members. Ms Zahnow also accepted that authorised persons can assist claimants with processing their claims.[20] In re-examination, Ms Zahnow was asked whether the process for authorising a party to deal with WorkCover on behalf of a claimant differed if the authority was to enquire about claims compared to processing claims. She said she did not believe there was any difference to the authorisation given to the appellant’s mother, referred to in Exhibit 3 at page 102.[21]
  1. Nathan Whybrow
  1. [15]
    Mr Whybrow gave evidence via phone. Mr Whybrow is an Application Support Analyst, employed by WorkCover Queensland. Mr Whybrow said his role included supporting WorkCover systems, he was familiar with WorkCover’s Worker Assist website and mobile app, and he produced a series of screen shots for the purpose of explaining the operation of those systems (admitted as Exhibit 9, also identified as NW1-NW11).[22] Mr Whybrow said that once a claimant was registered on their system, they could utilise the mobile app or the website to process claims electronically, including for reimbursement for travel expenses. He said the website and app had identical features and functionality.[23]
  1. [16]
    Included in Exhibit 9 were terms and conditions of use the user was required to accept before gaining access to the app (page NW1). These included a requirement the user not tell anyone their password and keep it secure and protected. Mr Whybrow acknowledged however, it was possible for claims to be lodged via Worker Assist by anyone who had knowledge of the claimant’s login details, although contrary to the terms and conditions.[24] Exhibit 9 also included the login pages (NW2) for the website and app which required the user to enter their username (email address) and password, and for the app the option of entering a four digit pin code (NW3). Next are example pages providing different options, such as making a claim for travel from the website (NW4, NW6, NW7, NW8), and doing so from the app (NW5, NW9, NW10, NW11).[25] Mr Whybrow said the claimant was able to check prior payments or progress of payments through either system.[26]
  1. [17]
    Mr Whybrow explained claims under a certain amount are processed automatically and then require authorisation by an employee, and claims over the amount are diverted to the “business support” section for manual processing. He said that until such time as claims for larger amounts are processed, they will not appear in the expenses screen (AZ4, Exhibit 5).[27] Mr Whybrow said that an internet connection was necessary to lodge a claim via both the website and the app but that the WorkCover records produced here did not identify which method was used. He said however, the IP address of the device used was recorded and available to him.[28] With regard to entries on Exhibit 5 (AZ4), Mr Whybrow ultimately conceded the “Transaction Date” did not record the date of payment of the claim but instead the date a claim was submitted, and the “Authorised Date” reflected when a WorkCover staff member authorised the payment.[29] Mr Whybrow also accepted the “Completed” entry in the “Status” column in Exhibit 5 was an indication that processing of a claim was complete but did not indicate a date of payment to a claimant, or that in fact payment had been made to a claimant. Mr Whybrow said the same applied for the “Completed” entry in the “Status” column in Exhibit 7 (AZ6).[30]
  1. [18]
    Mr Whybrow acknowledged that a claimant could initiate their claim by phone, or by post, and in each case the claim was created in the WorkCover system by a WorkCover staff member.[31] With reference to Exhibit 7, Mr Whybrow said where the column “Person Entering” recorded the appellant’s unique Work Assist identification number, that indicated the claim was lodged through that system, potentially by anyone with knowledge of the login details.[32]
  1. Evan Peter Coombes
  1. [19]
    Mr Coombes is a customer adviser employed with WorkCover Queensland. Mr Coombes said he was a case manager for WorkCover claims through to finalisation. This included involvement in the workers treatment program, and dealing with the worker, employer and treating health provider.[33] Mr Coombes said workers were advised of their entitlement to travel reimbursement for travel over 20 kilometres in one direction, or over 150 kilometres per week, at a rate of 46 cents per kilometre, as provided under the legislation. He said workers are encouraged to submit claims through the Work Assist app. He said once a claim is made it must come to him for approval, and could not be approved automatically. He said WorkCover only paid travel claims for attendance at the nearest provider to the workers home address, and the claim must relate to appointments for treatment of the work injury.[34] Mr Coombes said approval of travel claims was often made in good faith and without checking that each appointment was attended. This was because the health provider’s claim may come up to two months after the claim for travel expense was received, and because of time constraints given the customer adviser’s case load.[35]
  1. [20]
    Mr Coombes said he became the appellant’s customer adviser from October 2018. He was shown Exhibit 3, within which he identified notes of his communications, commencing from 10/12/2018. Mr Coombes said it was his practice to make notes in that record of all communications, apart from email correspondence. He said there would be no other records or notes of communications.[36] Mr Coombes said he recalled this claim because he was the case manager for six months. He said he requested an additional independent medical examination because the appellant was claiming for a head injury which was not part of the approved claim. He said the appellant was unhappy about that request and as a result he was replaced as customer adviser by Danielle Forbes. He said the appellant was transient and he had to check where she was travelling from. He said the appellant was also seeking to claim for Bowen therapy treatment which was not covered by WorkCover.[37]
  1. [21]
    Mr Coombes was taken to an entry in Exhibit 3 on 20/2/2019, which he acknowledged indicated a call from the appellant’s mother was transferred to him. He said he did not recall speaking with the appellant’s mother and accepted his failure to make note of that communication was an oversight.[38] Mr Coombes acknowledged various other entries indicated the appellant’s mother called chasing up payment of claims, including on 14/2/2019. He accepted a note from that date showed she was seeking to have him call her back, but he did not recall doing so.[39] Asked specifically whether he recalled speaking with the appellant’s mother Mr Coombes said, “I don’t remember that level of detail.”[40]
  1. [22]
    Mr Coombes acknowledged that due to phone reception difficulties, there was a lot of email correspondence with the appellant. He said travel claims were submitted by the appellant via email, but explained that was by her completing a travel reimbursement form which would then be entered into the system by the customer support team.[41] Mr Coombes said there were occasions he was contacted by the appellant by phone and asked to process a travel claim.[42] Mr Coombes also acknowledged he would routinely alter a travel claim where the kilometres claimed was excessive. This was done through the customer support team. He could not recall if he did this for any claim by the appellant. He said otherwise he would not alter a claim and where the wrong location or provider was listed he would reject it and ask the worker to resubmit with correct details.[43]
  1. Danielle Kirsty Forbes
  1. [23]
    Ms Forbes was employed as a work health and injury management co-ordinator. She was previously employed as a customer adviser with WorkCover Queensland which required she administer worker’s compensation claims. She said this involved liaising with injured workers, employers, medical professionals, etc, as necessary.  She assumed responsibility for managing the appellant’s claim from 23/4/2019.[44] Ms Forbes identified Exhibit 3 as the communications record relating to the appellant in which she made some entries. She said her notes were not a verbatim account of a conversation but were designed to reflect the details relevant to the claim. She acknowledged it was possible some communication was not recorded.[45] Ms Forbes said travel expense entitlements were governed by legislation; this included 20 kilometres from home address at a rate of 46 cents per kilometre. She said a worker could claim by completing a form, by having the customer advisor complete the form for them, or by using the Worker Assist app.[46] Ms Forbes said approval of a claim required matching the claim with a known medical appointment and verifying the distance. Ms Forbes said that some travel expenses were automatically approved by the system without the customer adviser having to assess the claim.[47]
  1. [24]
    Ms Forbes identified an email trail of correspondence between herself and the appellant between 15-17/6/2019 (admitted as Exhibit 10, also identified as DF2). Ms Forbes said this correspondence concerned an enquiry by the appellant as to the kilometres that would be paid compared to the actual distance travelled. Ms Forbes said her reply was to the effect that she could only be paid according to the most direct route from point A to B.[48] Ms Forbes was also referred to notes at pages 79-81 in Exhibit 3, concerning a phone conversation she had with the appellant on 15/5/2019. Ms Forbes said at that time she advised the appellant her mother had called WorkCover again because she believed the appellant had by then asked that her mother be removed as an authorised contact. Ms Forbes said she believed the mother had unnecessary involvement in the claim, and the appellant complained her mother had not informed her of the nature of her mother’s interactions with WorkCover.[49]
  1. Jenna Louise Brook
  1. [25]
    Ms Brook gave evidence via phone. Ms Brook is an administration officer with Brook Pastoral Company. She said the company operated cattle stations in Queensland and South Australia.[50] Ms Brook acknowledged she had provided company records relating to the appellant’s employment as a station hand at Cordillo Downs Station, a property located in the north east corner of South Australia (admitted as Exhibit 11). The documents indicate the period of the appellant’s employment was from 6/2/2019 until 12/3/2019. Ms Brooks said the position required the appellant to reside on the property.[51] Ms Brook said there was no mobile phone reception on the station but there was wi-fi internet at the station homestead and staff living quarters. Ms Brook said she was unaware what computer facilities were available for staff and whether the wi-fi was available in February and March 2019.[52]

Exhibits

  1. [26]
    The exhibits admitted in the trial were as referred to above. Most have been sufficiently described. Exhibit 8 consisted of email correspondence between WorkCover and the appellant in which WorkCover enclosed “a list of the travel claims which are alleged to be false or misleading” and invited any response, whilst advising the appellant had no obligation to do so, and that any response might be used in evidence. The list contained details of 65 claims; itemising the date of service, date of invoice, reason for travel, amount claimed, amount paid, and kilometres claimed. The list contained all 29 claims which form the basis of the charges, as well as a further 36 claims which are not charged as instances of fraud.
  1. [27]
    In her reply email, the appellant stated categorically that she had not at any time committed fraud or misled anyone. She stated that she had been instructed by her case manager Evan Coombes to submit all “cost/travel/medications/appointments to the phone app” and the case manager would review them to determine which should be paid. She said, in effect, in circumstances where she was simply following these instructions, she should not be held responsible for any error by the persons approving the payments. The appellant complained about her treatment by WorkCover which she described as “blackmail”, seeking that she repay approximately $10,000 due to errors by those approving payment of claims and threatening legal action in default. The appellant’s email also includes the statements: “My legal team have looked over the cost they claim are not eligible for cover but have found I was in fact entitled to them as each one was a treatment I sought due to my workplace injury.”; and “My legal team have reviewed each entry and found they were in fact eligible to be paid.” Attached to the reply was a letter, also written by the appellant, which detailed complaints about the conduct of WorkCover and particular employees in their dealings with the appellant. The letter identified various medical appointments attended by the appellant. The letter also claimed that as a result of her injuries, the appellant had been reliant upon her mother for assistance with cooking, cleaning, washing and dressing, and described the appellant experiencing memory problems, sleeplessness and daily migraines. The appellant restated she had not at any time acted dishonestly, was entitled to the claims which were genuine, had simply followed instructions in providing treatment details, and any error in approving payments was that of Evan Coombes and/or Danielle Forbes.
  1. [28]
    The appellant did not give or call evidence.

Submissions at trial

  1. [29]
    The prosecution submitted that not attending appointments yet claiming travel allowance for travel to those appointments was unquestionably dishonest.[53] The prosecution contended it should be inferred the payments the subject of the claims were in fact made, in light of WorkCover records indicating the claims were completed, and no issue being raised by the appellant or any service provider that payment of a claim had not been received.[54] In response to a no case submission as to this issue, the prosecution contended that in the event the court was not satisfied payment of the claims had been made, the court would consider whether charges of attempted fraud were proved.[55] The prosecutor identified the real issue as follows: “So really, the only question, in our submission, is whether the [appellant], in fact, submitted the claims.”, and “…the central question which seems to be who submitted these claims”.[56]
  1. [30]
    The prosecution submitted the learned Magistrate would conclude the evidence showed the appellant responsible for all of the claims given they were made with use of the appellant’s unique identifying code.[57] In addition, the prosecution submitted the appellant had been dishonest in a number of her dealings with WorkCover. In particular, it was submitted the records showed the appellant:[58]
  • did not disclose she was working at Cordillo Downs Station, South Australia, in early 2019, but instead told WorkCover she was living at Dalby;
  • told WorkCover she intended moving to Atkinson’s Dam with her mother but told her South Australian employer she had already been living at Atkinson’s Dam;
  • told WorkCover she was unable to work and unable to ride a motor bike but was working in South Australia where her duties included physical labour and working with livestock;
  • told WorkCover she had a job, then changed that to a job interview;
  • told WorkCover her last job had been at the end of 2018 when her employment was terminated, whereas her employment in South Australia ended voluntarily;
  • did not disclose to WorkCover she had employment at Warwick sale yard;
  • did not disclose to WorkCover she had been knocked off a horse and taken to hospital;
  • denied to WorkCover she had any involvement with a charity but later admitted she had;
  • in email response to WorkCover’s enquiry regarding these claims admitted employment in two different positions.

The prosecution contended this dishonesty was relevant to the appellant’s credit in claiming she had acted honestly when making travel claims.[59]

  1. [31]
    The prosecution also contended the Magistrate could use the fact the appellant had not disclosed to WorkCover, nor given or called any evidence, as to who may have lodged the subject claims, as a basis upon which to more safely draw the inference contended for by the prosecution, namely that the appellant was responsible. It was submitted that no such claim was made by the appellant in her email response to the allegations contained within Exhibit 8. In support of this submission, the prosecutor relied upon the decision of the High Court in Weissensteiner v The Queen,[60] and quoted from the draft direction in the Supreme and District Courts Benchbook to similar effect.[61] Later, the prosecutor submitted the information peculiarly within the appellant’s knowledge was as to who else may have had access to her unique identifying code.[62] The prosecution submitted the appellant was the only person who stood to benefit from the subject claims, and on the evidence the possibility someone else had lodged them was fanciful and excluded beyond reasonable doubt. It was submitted it was established the appellant was responsible.[63]
  1. [32]
    For the appellant, it was conceded the charged claims for travel in the appellant’s name were made using the WorkCover Worker Assist program and the appellant had not in fact travelled as per those claims.[64] However, it was disputed the appellant was responsible for lodging those claims.  It was submitted the evidence did not establish the claims were lodged via the mobile app as particularised for each charge, even though the evidence showed it would have been possible for the prosecution to identify the IP address from which the claims originated. The consequence of this, it was submitted, was that it remained possible the claims could have been lodged without the knowledge or involvement of the appellant, by a person who knew or had access to the appellant’s unique identifying code. It was submitted the evidence clearly showed the appellant’s mother had that capacity, was authorised to deal with WorkCover on the appellant’s behalf, actually did so concerning payment of claims, and the appellant complained to WorkCover about the extent and inappropriateness of her mother’s involvement with WorkCover. It was submitted the evidence of Ms Forbes confirmed the appellant’s mother unnecessarily and excessively involved herself in the appellant’s affairs. For the appellant, it was submitted it was hardly fanciful or unlikely that the appellant’s mother knew and used the appellant’s pass code.[65]
  1. [33]
    It was submitted this was not a case where it was appropriate to draw an inference the appellant was responsible for lodging the claims because she had not given evidence as to who had done so. It was submitted that possibility was available on the evidence adduced for the prosecution concerning her mother’s involvement and was not knowledge peculiar to the appellant.[66] The appellant submitted that a rational hypothesis consistent with innocence had not been excluded, namely that the appellant’s mother had lodged the subject claims, and the appellant should be found not guilty.[67]
  1. [34]
    In addition, it was submitted for the appellant the evidence did not establish that any of the claims were in fact paid to the appellant, so that, there was no evidence the appellant received any benefit or WorkCover suffered any detriment.[68] 

Decision of Magistrate

  1. [35]
    The learned Acting Magistrate identified the 29 charges alleged the appellant defrauded an insurer namely, WorkCover. His Honour summarised the particulars for each charge; noting that for all charges it was alleged the appellant did not travel to the appointment as claimed, and that for charges 1, 9, 11, 17 and 24 it was also alleged the business claimed to have been visited did not exist.  The learned Acting Magistrate noted it was alleged in each case that WorkCover paid the appellant the particularised amounts for travel based upon the false claims, compensation to which the appellant was not entitled.[69] His Honour recited the offence provision in s 533(1) of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 and said: “Fraud is defined in section 408C of the Criminal Code.”[70]
  1. [36]
    His Honour next listed the admissions of fact as per Exhibit 1.[71] His Honour identified the onus was upon the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.[72] The learned Acting Magistrate noted that on behalf of the appellant it was conceded that the claims were lodged on the dates alleged using the Worker Assist program and that the travel claimed for each charge was not in fact undertaken. His Honour also noted the defence contentions that what was in issue was whether it was proved the appellant had made the claims, whether the claims had been paid resulting in any benefit or detriment, and whether the claims were proved to have been made using the mobile app.[73]
  1. [37]
    The learned Acting Magistrate next summarised the evidence of the witnesses in detail, including with reference to the exhibits produced and tendered by the witness.[74] The learned Acting Magistrate also summarised the correspondence contained within Exhibit 8; i.e. the letter to the appellant concerning the allegations as well as the appellant’s emailed reply.[75]
  1. [38]
    The learned Acting Magistrate said he was “quite satisfied that, on the evidence as it stands, and the inference could be drawn … that the [appellant] has not always been forthright or honest in her dealings with WorkCover”. His Honour said however, that he needed to consider whether the claims were made by the appellant and whether they were paid.[76]
  1. [39]
    The Acting Magistrate next referred to the issue whether the claims were made using the mobile app and noted the statements by the appellant in her email reply (Exhibit 8) indicated she had used the mobile app to make claims.[77] Noting reference by both counsel to the decision in Weissensteiner, his Honour said:

“I have taken that on board when making – or considering the matters that are before me, but I also note … there is evidence that has come from Mr Whybrow that he did have means of establishing which … instrument was used to lodge these claims, he could have established that, but it was not produced to the court. I have taken those matters into account when reaching that conclusion. As I say, but firstly I need to look at whether or not I am satisfied that the defendant has lodged these claims.”[78]

  1. [40]
    The Acting Magistrate then said: “as it stands you cannot tell where the claims were lodged through, whether it was the app or the computer system.” His Honour then referred to details in the exhibits indicating the claims originated from the appellant with her details, email address, claim number, and unique identifier number and said: “When I look at that, I have formed the view it is certainly open to draw an inference that these claims were lodged by Ms Foley or somebody who has access to Ms Foley’s account details.”[79]
  1. [41]
    Regarding whether or not the claims were in fact paid, the learned Acting Magistrate said he considered the evidence of the WorkCover systems in place, what was shown in the documents put into evidence, and took account of the large number of claims from the appellant. His Honour concluded: “I am certainly satisfied the inference can be drawn that these claims were also paid.”[80]
  1. [42]
    The learned Acting Magistrate next dealt with the issue whether the claims were lodged by the appellant as opposed to anyone else. His Honour acknowledged evidence the appellant’s mother had approval and authority to contact WorkCover on her daughter’s behalf.[81] His Honour concluded, accepting the evidence of the WorkCover employees as credible and reliable, the claims were not lodged by an employee of WorkCover on behalf of the appellant.[82] His Honour said:

I have been asked, of course, to draw an inference that somebody who has access to the details of Ms Foley’s account and her unique identifier numbers could remotely access these claims. Now, of course on the evidence as it stands, that would certainly - and I think it has been conceded - if a person was in possession of the right information, that they may be able to access this information.[83]

  1. [43]
    The learned Acting Magistrate concluded he was satisfied the only reasonable inference was that the appellant was responsible. His Honour said:

But, look, I have formed the view - and I have looked at the whole of the evidence before me and I have certainly taken into account and I have been referred to what was said in the case of Weissensteiner - I am of the view that when considering all the evidence - and there is information there that has come from Ms Foley, while she has not given evidence, in response to an email which was clearly an email that was warning her of her rights and that any response that she may give could be used against her in evidence, that there was no privilege attached to that - when I look at all of that evidence, I reach the - or come to the conclusion that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence I have in front of me and those matters I have referred to is that the entries made have been made by Ms Foley, which in effect means that the claims had been lodged by Ms Foley.

It has been considered, of course, if - that these claims were dishonest. That has been conceded. That as regards the payments, I have certainly given that a lot of consideration and I have come to the view regarding - when you look at the whole history I have in front of me. It is not only the claims in front of me, but certainly the responses that were received from Ms Foley - in my view, it is one where, if there was an innocent explanation, she has been given ample opportunity to disclose that and, in my view, there is just - the evidence regarding the systems, whilst there are some shortcomings - and it is quite evident there are some shortcomings, and perhaps some things could have been done better, but that evidence, in my view - the only inference that could realistically be drawn is that the claims have been made and that the claims were submitted by Ms Foley.

So in that - having come to that conclusion, I am quite satisfied the prosecution has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt in respect of each charge.[84]

Submissions on appeal

  1. [44]
    The grounds of appeal against conviction assert the verdicts of guilty are inconsistent with the evidence and unsafe and unsatisfactory, and the learned Magistrate failed to identify a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. The appellant contends the learned Acting Magistrate erred by relying upon the appellant’s failure to give evidence or otherwise explain who may have been responsible for the lodgement of the subject claims in concluding the appellant must have done so. It was submitted the learned Acting Magistrate thereby effectively reversed the onus of proof.
  1. [45]
    In this context, it was submitted, the appellant’s email response to the Regulator’s list of claims (Exhibit 8) that all claims made by her were honest, could not be regarded as referring to all of the subject claims. It was submitted also that the appellant’s failure to explain fraudulent claims when offered that opportunity could not be of consequence if the appellant had no knowledge of those claims. The appellant submits this correspondence (Exhibit 8) also identified the appellant’s reliance upon her mother in many respects.
  1. [46]
    The appellant submitted the possibility that someone else, such as the appellant’s mother, lodged the claims was raised by the evidence adduced in the prosecution case. That evidence showed the appellant’s mother was authorised to and did engage with WorkCover concerning the appellant’s claims, the WorkCover case manager considered the mother’s involvement unnecessary, the appellant complained about her mother’s involvement, and the appellant complained that she was not being informed of her mother’s involvement. The appellant pointed out that the evidence showed no different authorisation than was given to the appellant’s mother was necessary to enable her to lodge claims on the appellant’s behalf. Yet the prosecution did not call the appellant’s mother as a witness in the proceedings. Further, according to the prosecution evidence, it was possible to establish the IP address from which the subject claims originated, but that evidence also was not produced.
  1. [47]
    The appellant also submitted there was no evidence proving payment by WorkCover of the subject claims. The appellant pointed to evidence of Mr Whybrow to the effect that WorkCover documents recording transactions as completed did not confirm payments had been made. It was submitted the drawing of an inference that payments had been made based upon there being no complaint by the appellant that she had not been paid was misconceived, since the appellant might not know of claims she had not lodged.
  1. [48]
    It was submitted the ultimate question was whether a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the appellant remained. It was submitted that on the evidence adduced at the trial, a rational hypothesis consistent with innocence remained open, namely, that someone other than the appellant lodged the subject claims. The appellant submitted the convictions should be set aside, and since the appeal is a rehearing of the case on the evidence admitted below, verdicts of acquittal should be entered.
  1. [49]
    The respondent submitted the verdicts of guilty were supported by the evidence led in the proceedings below. The respondent submitted that evidence included that it was admitted (Exhibit 1) the charged claims were in respect of travel that did not occur, which was self-evidently dishonest. Further, all of the subject claims were lodged via the Worker Assist app using the appellant’s unique claim code. The respondent submitted the documentary evidence within Exhibits 2-7 showed the processing by WorkCover of various travel reimbursement claims made by the appellant, inclusive of those the subject of the 29 charges. In addition, the respondent submitted the appellant’s response to the allegations of fraudulent travel reimbursement claims (Exhibit 8) did not include any assertion the appellant was not responsible for those claims, but included her acknowledgment she had lodged the claims. The respondent also submitted it could be inferred the subject claims were in fact paid since no complaint was made by the appellant she had not been paid for other multiple claims. Thus the respondent submitted there was direct evidence of payment to the appellant for travel that did not occur. In addition, it was submitted the evidence showed dishonesty by the appellant in her dealings with WorkCover regarding her place of residence, capacity to work, and failure to disclose employment. The respondent submitted the evidence established the appellant committed the offences.
  1. [50]
    The respondent submitted that in this case the appellant did not advise WorkCover at any time that someone else had entered reimbursement claims on her behalf, despite being made aware of suspected fraudulent claims. The respondent submitted that had someone else done so, that fact and the identity of the person who had done so was information peculiarly within the appellant’s knowledge. It was submitted this was knowledge of additional facts that could not have been known to the prosecution. The respondent submitted therefore, consistent with Weissensteiner, it was open to the Acting Magistrate to have regard to the appellant’s failure to provide that information or explanation in determining whether to draw the inference it was the appellant who lodged the subject claims.
  1. [51]
    The respondent submitted that although it was open to establish the IP address of the device used to lodge the subject claims, that information arose only during cross-examination and did not provide a reasonable hypothesis consistent with the appellant’s innocence. It was submitted it was entirely speculative and fanciful to suggest the appellant’s mother may have lodged the claims. It was submitted there was no evidence the appellant’s mother could have benefitted by doing so, or that she had access to the appellant’s unique identifying code, or that she had been approved to lodge claims on the appellant’s behalf. The respondent relied also upon the Acting Magistrate’s conclusion that no WorkCover employee lodged claims on the appellant’s behalf. The respondent submitted the appellant was the person who stood to benefit from the claims. It was submitted the Acting Magistrate was right to conclude the appellant had lodged them. It was submitted the evidence excluded any rational hypothesis consistent with innocence.
  1. [52]
    The respondent also submitted that in the event the court concluded the appeal against conviction should be allowed, because of error in the proceedings below, the proper order of the court was to remit the matter to the Magistrates Court to be retried.

Relevant law

Nature of appeal

  1. [53]
    Section 579(1A) of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act provides for summary trial of the present charges under the Justices Act, and before an industrial magistrate. Section 579(5) provides that a person aggrieved by a decision upon summary hearing of a charge may appeal against the decision to a District Court judge under the Justices Act; i.e. pursuant to s 222. Section 223(1) of the Justices Act provides the appeal is by way of rehearing on the evidence given in the proceedings below. On the hearing of such an appeal, s 225(1), (2) and (3) provide power to “confirm, set aside or vary” the orders appealed against, or make any other order that is just, to remit the matter to the Magistrates Court for rehearing, or to exercise any power that could have been exercised at first instance.
  1. [54]
    In Fox v Percy,[85] the majority explained an appeal by way of rehearing as follows:

The nature of the “rehearing” provided in these and like provisions has been described in many cases. To some extent, its character is indicated by the provisions of the sub-sections quoted. The “rehearing” does not involve a completely fresh hearing by the appellate court of all the evidence. That court proceeds on the basis of the record and any fresh evidence that, exceptionally, it admits. No such fresh evidence was admitted in the present appeal.

The foregoing procedure shapes the requirements, and limitations, of such an appeal. On the one hand, the appellate court is obliged to ‘‘give the judgment which in its opinion ought to have been given in the first instance’’. On the other, it must, of necessity, observe the ‘‘natural limitations’’ that exist in the case of any appellate court proceeding wholly or substantially on the record. These limitations include the disadvantage that the appellate court has when compared with the trial judge in respect of the evaluation of witnesses’ credibility and of the ‘‘feeling’’ of a case which an appellate court, reading the transcript, cannot always fully share. …

…

Within the constraints marked out by the nature of the appellate process, the appellate court is obliged to conduct a real review of the trial and, in cases where the trial was conducted before a judge sitting alone, of that judge’s reasons. Appellate courts are not excused from the task of ‘‘weighing conflicting evidence and drawing [their] own inferences and conclusions, though [they] should always bear in mind that [they have] neither seen nor heard the witnesses, and should make due allowance in this respect’’. …

(Citations removed)

  1. [55]
    More recently, in Lee v Lee,[86] a majority of the High Court restated the task of the appellate court, in the present circumstances, as follows:

A court of appeal is bound to conduct a "real review" of the evidence given at first instance and of the judge's reasons for judgment to determine whether the trial judge has erred in fact or law. Appellate restraint with respect to interference with a trial judge's findings unless they are "glaringly improbable" or "contrary to compelling inferences" is as to factual findings which are likely to have been affected by impressions about the credibility and reliability of witnesses formed by the trial judge as a result of seeing and hearing them give their evidence. It includes findings of secondary facts which are based on a combination of these impressions and other inferences from primary facts. Thereafter, "in general an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to decide on the proper inference to be drawn from facts which are undisputed or which, having been disputed, are established by the findings of the trial judge". …

Having rejected the essential planks of the trial judge's reasoning, it was not to the point for the Court of Appeal to formulate the question as which of the two hypotheses the trial judge considered to be the more probable. Nor was it to the point to consider whether the trial judge had been unduly influenced by the DNA evidence. It was an error for the Court of Appeal to dismiss the appeals in this "very closely balanced" case on the footing that the trial judge's decision was neither glaringly improbable nor contrary to compelling inferences. It was the duty of the Court of Appeal to decide for itself which of the two hypotheses was the more probable. It was the duty of the Court of Appeal to persist in its task of "weighing [the] conflicting evidence and drawing its own inferences and conclusions", and, ultimately, to decide for itself which of the two hypotheses was the more probable. It did not. The appellant's second ground is made good. (Citations removed)

Elements of offences

  1. [56]
    Section 533(1) of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act provides that a person must not in any way defraud or attempt to defraud an insurer. The maximum penalty provided is 500 penalty units or five years imprisonment.
  1. [57]
    The term “defraud” is not defined. However, it was not in issue that in the present case it required proof that as a result of the dishonest conduct of the appellant, either WorkCover suffered a detriment or loss or the appellant gained some benefit or advantage. In this context, proof of dishonesty required the appellant’s conduct was dishonest by the standards of ordinary honest people.[87] There was no dispute that claiming compensation for travel that was not undertaken was dishonest according to that standard. The real issues were whether it was proved beyond reasonable doubt the appellant did the acts relied upon for each charge, i.e. whether it was the appellant who lodged the claims; and whether it was proved beyond reasonable doubt payment of the claims resulted, i.e. whether a detriment or benefit was occasioned.

Circumstantial case

  1. [58]
    The case as presented remained a circumstantial one with respect to the issues of whether the appellant lodged the subject claims, and whether those claims were paid by WorkCover. The prosecution asserted the Acting Magistrate should draw the necessary inferences in order to find the charges proved. It was therefore necessary that guilt should not only be a rational inference but also that it should be the only rational inference that could be drawn from the circumstances.[88] Because guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt, it followed that if, upon consideration of all of the evidence, a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence remained open, the defendant must be found not guilty.[89] And it was necessary the circumstantial evidence be considered in combination with all of the evidence in the case in determining whether all rational hypotheses consistent with innocence had been excluded.[90]

Possible relevance of appellant’s failure to offer an explanation

  1. [59]
    The decision in Weissensteiner v The Queen[91] concerned “whether it is permissible for the trial judge to instruct the jury that inferences available to be drawn from facts proved by the Crown case can be drawn more safely when the accused elects not to give evidence on relevant facts which the jury perceives to be within his or her knowledge”.[92] In deciding it was permissible for the direction to be given and the jury to reason accordingly, Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ, said:[93]

… it has never really been doubted that when a party to litigation fails to accept an opportunity to place before the court evidence of facts within his or her knowledge which, if they exist at all, would explain or contradict the evidence against that party, the court may more readily accept that evidence. It is not just because uncontradicted evidence is easier or safer to accept than contradicted evidence. That is almost a truism. It is because doubts about the reliability of witnesses or about the inferences to be drawn from the evidence may be more readily discounted in the absence of contradictory evidence from a party who might be expected to give or call it. In particular, in a criminal trial, hypotheses consistent with innocence may cease to be rational or reasonable in the absence of evidence to support them when that evidence, if it exists at all, must be within the knowledge of the accused.

Of course, an accused may have reasons not to give evidence other than that the evidence would not assist his or her case. The jury must bear this in mind in determining whether the prosecution case is strengthened by the failure of the accused to give evidence. Ordinarily it is appropriate for the trial judge to warn the jury accordingly.

Not every case calls for explanation or contradiction in the form of evidence from the accused. There may be no facts peculiarly within the accused's knowledge. Even if there are facts peculiarly within the accused's knowledge the deficiencies in the prosecution case may be sufficient to account for the accused remaining silent and relying upon the burden of proof cast upon the prosecution. Much depends upon the circumstances of the particular case and a jury should not be invited to take into account the failure of the accused to give evidence unless that failure is clearly capable of assisting them in the evaluation of the evidence before them.

  1. [60]
    Also in Weissensteiner, Justices Brennan and Toohey expressed the same conclusion:[94]

It follows that, in Queensland and in other jurisdictions where there is no statutory prohibition against judicial comment, a judge may tell the jury that where the facts which they find to be proved by the evidence can support an inference that the accused committed the offence charged and where it is reasonable to expect that, if the truth were consistent with innocence, a denial, explanation or answer would be forthcoming, the jury may take the accused's failure to give evidence into account in determining whether the inference should be drawn. The jury should be told that the onus remains on the prosecution and that the accused is under no obligation to give evidence, but that "it is legitimate to have regard to the fact that the accused has given no evidence or explanation or satisfactory explanation of the Crown case as a consideration making the inference of guilt from the evidence for the prosecution less unsafe than it might otherwise possibly appear". (Citations removed)

  1. [61]
    In RPS v The Queen,[95] the High Court held that comment upon a defendant’s failure to give evidence was not appropriate outside of circumstances such as existed in Weissensteiner, and should not be made where a defendant did not give evidence contradicting a complainant. The majority (Gaudron A-CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ), said:[96]

As the trial judge rightly said, the prosecution must prove the charges it makes and must do so beyond reasonable doubt; an accused person is not obliged to give evidence, and the jury must not conclude that an accused who elects not to give evidence is, for that reason, guilty of the offences charged. There are, as the trial judge said, many reasons why an accused may not wish to give evidence. For present purposes, the most important among those is that the accused may consider that the evidence adduced by the prosecution does not prove the commission of each of the alleged offences beyond reasonable doubt. And although there may be many kinds of reason why that view is held, some cogent and some not, the accused is not bound to give evidence.

…

The present case (and cases of a similar kind) must be contrasted with that considered by this Court in Weissensteiner. There the prosecution case was that the accused's guilt was to be inferred from circumstances, particularly the unexplained disappearance of those whom it was alleged he had murdered, and his possession of the boat and equipment which they owned and from which they had disappeared while on a voyage with the accused. The majority of the Court held that the trial judge in that case had made no error by directing the jury that they could more safely draw the inferences which the prosecution alleged should be drawn "when the accused elects not to give evidence of relevant facts which can be easily perceived to be in his knowledge".

…

The present case depended ultimately upon acceptance of the complainant's evidence, supported, perhaps, by an acceptance of the partial admission allegedly made by the appellant. In those circumstances the trial judge was wrong to direct the jury that they were entitled to conclude from the appellant's election not to give evidence that his evidence would not have assisted him in the trial. The trial judge was also wrong to direct the jury that the election not to put forward any denial or contradiction might lead them more readily to accept the evidence given by the witnesses for the Crown which the appellant was in a position to contradict of his own knowledge. (Citations removed)

  1. [62]
    The decisions in Weissensteiner and RPS, and their application generally, were further explained by the High Court in Azzopardi v The Queen.[97] In that case, the effect of the majority judgement (Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ), was to significantly limit circumstances in which an inference might be drawn from any failure by a defendant to offer an explanation as part of his defence. The majority said:[98]

What was important in Weissensteiner, and what warranted the remarks that were made to the jury in that case, was that, if there were facts which explained or contradicted the evidence against the accused, they were facts which were within the knowledge only of the accused, and thus could not be the subject of evidence from any other person or source. In other words, Weissensteiner was not a case in which the accused simply failed to contradict the direct evidence of other witnesses. If that were sufficient to warrant a direction of the type given in that case, there would be, in truth, no right to silence at trial.

…

There may be cases involving circumstances such that the reasoning in Weissensteiner will justify some comment. However, that will be so only if there is a basis for concluding that, if there are additional facts which would explain or contradict the inference which the prosecution seeks to have the jury draw, and they are facts which (if they exist) would be peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, that a comment on the accused's failure to provide evidence of those facts may be made. The facts which it is suggested could have been, but were not, revealed by evidence from the accused must be additional to those already given in evidence by the witnesses who were called. The fact that the accused could have contradicted evidence already given will not suffice. Mere contradiction would not be evidence of any additional fact. In an accusatorial trial, an accused is not required to explain or contradict matters which are already the subject of evidence at trial. These matters must be assessed by the jury against the requisite standard of proof, without regard to the fact that the accused did not give evidence.

…

The qualification to which reference has just been made is this: as already explained, a judge may comment on evidence, not give directions with respect to the evidence. If the circumstances are such as to permit a comment with respect to the failure to offer an explanation, it should be made plain that it is a comment which the jury are free to disregard. If made, it should be placed in its proper context. That requires identifying the facts which are said to call for an explanation and giving adequate directions to the jury about the onus of proof, the absence of any obligation on the accused to give evidence, and the fact that the accused does not give evidence is not an admission, does not fill gaps in the prosecution's proofs and is not to be used as a make‑weight. And the comment should not go beyond that made in Weissensteiner, as adapted to refer to the failure to offer an explanation rather than the failure to give evidence.

It is to be emphasised that cases in which a judge may comment on the failure of an accused to offer an explanation will be both rare and exceptional. They will occur only if the evidence is capable of explanation by disclosure of additional facts known only to the accused. A comment will never be warranted merely because the accused has failed to contradict some aspect of the prosecution case. Once that is appreciated, the supposed tension between Weissensteiner and RPS disappears. In Weissensteiner, the comment related to the absence of evidence of additional facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused; in RPS, there was no question of any additional fact known only to the accused merely the failure to contradict aspects of the prosecution case.

  1. [63]
    An example where comment by the trial judge consistent with Weissensteiner was held appropriate is provided by the Queensland Court of Appeal decision of R v McEwan.[99] In that case the appellant, charged with fraud offences against his employer, was alleged to have rendered false invoices for supply of fruit and vegetables to his employer by two entities of which he was the proprietor, when in truth no such supplies occurred. The defence case was that the goods were in fact supplied. The defendant did not give any explanation how the supplies were effected without the knowledge of other employees. In those circumstances the conclusion of the Court of Appeal was that:[100]

… the appellant was in a position to explain additional facts which were within his knowledge, namely, how fruit and vegetables were delivered to [his employer] without people who would be expected to have knowledge of such deliveries and having any such knowledge.

Consideration

  1. [64]
    The appellant faced trial in respect of 29 charges, each alleging she defrauded an insurer, namely WorkCover Queensland. It was accepted this required proof for each charge that the appellant dishonestly obtained a benefit from, or caused a detriment to, WorkCover Queensland.
  1. [65]
    At trial it was admitted that on 3 June 2018, the appellant suffered an injury in the course of her employment which entitled her to worker’s compensation. It was also admitted that from about 16 July 2018, the appellant became eligible for compensation which included travel expenses for attendance at medical appointments. For each of the 29 charges it was alleged the appellant claimed, and was paid a sum of money, for travel to a medical appointment that she did not in fact attend. The appellant admitted she did not attend each of the 29 appointments. It was not disputed that claiming payment for travel which was not undertaken was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary honest persons. However, the appellant denied she was responsible for lodging the 29 claims. Also in issue at the trial was whether payment of the subject claims had been proved so as to have resulted in a benefit to the appellant or detriment to WorkCover.
  1. [66]
    The evidence before the learned Acting Magistrate was not in dispute. The learned Acting Magistrate specifically acknowledged the honesty of the WorkCover employees called to give evidence and concluded they had not lodged the subject claims on behalf of the appellant. The learned Acting Magistrate was right to so conclude since the case presented on behalf of the appellant did not attack the credit of the WorkCover employees, nor suggest any of them was responsible for lodging the subject claims. This was despite the appellant’s response, contained in Exhibit 8, being highly critical of WorkCover staff. Consistent with my obligation upon this rehearing, I should respect the conclusion of the Acting Magistrate concerning credit. Accepting that finding by the learned Acting Magistrate, I am “in as good a position as the trial judge to decide on the proper inference to be drawn from facts which are undisputed”.[101]
  1. [67]
    The case presented against the appellant is a circumstantial one. No direct evidence was admitted identifying the appellant as having lodged any of the subject claims or showing that they were actually paid. In the end, the real issue before the Acting Magistrate, and on this rehearing, is what inferences should be drawn from the evidence presented against the appellant. In order to find the charges proved, it is necessary that guilt is the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstances. If, upon consideration of all of the evidence, a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence remains open, the defendant must be found not guilty.
  1. [68]
    As is obvious, the learned Acting Magistrate drew the inference the claims the subject of the 29 charges were in fact all paid by WorkCover Queensland. His Honour also drew the inference the appellant lodged each of the false claims. However, upon this rehearing, it is my duty “to persist in [the] task of weighing the … evidence and drawing [my] own inferences and conclusions and ultimately to decide for [myself] which of the two hypotheses [is] the more probable”.[102]

Whether payment of subject claims made

  1. [69]
    The first question is whether the evidence proves WorkCover Queensland actually paid the claims which are subject of the charges. Unless payment of the claims is established, there is no proof of the appellant obtaining a benefit, or WorkCover suffering a detriment, as required to show WorkCover was defrauded.
  1. [70]
    Ms Zahnow produced various documents generated from WorkCover’s electronic record of the appellant’s compensation claim and which referred to all subject claims as being “completed”. These included Exhibit 4, the payments history, which identified each of the subject claims as having been processed, approved, and listed an amount paid. Exhibit 5 also listed details of travel claims, including those the subject of the charges. This document, according to Ms Zahnow, showed that payment of the claims had been completed but not when payment was received. Despite this evidence, Ms Zahnow also suggested that “completed” on these records was only an indication that the claim had been approved, rather than confirming payment had been made. Mr Whybrow, also asked about Exhibit 5, confirmed the entries indicated a claim was assessed, approved and processing completed, but not that payment of the claim had been made. Mr Whybrow said the same applied for Exhibit 7 which listed payments to the appellant as well as medical service providers.
  1. [71]
    Exhibit 3 contains record of communications between WorkCover employees and the appellant and others during the currency of the appellant’s compensation case. As was pointed out for the respondent, this record does not identify any complaint by the appellant or a service provider that a claim remained unpaid. The respondent acknowledged below that payment of some claims was followed up but contended that all such enquiries were ultimately resolved. The respondent also points to Exhibit 8, the appellant’s response to the Regulator’s letter listing suspected fraudulent claims, as containing statements by the appellant that all claims had been paid. The respondent submits the evidence permits drawing an inference the subject claims were in fact paid to the exclusion of any competing inference.
  1. [72]
    For the appellant it was submitted that it was not open on the evidence to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that any of the subject claims had actually been paid. The appellant relied upon the failure to produce any bank records which might show movement of funds from a WorkCover account, or receipt of funds into an account of the appellant. The appellant also submitted that it was no answer to argue that no complaint was made by the appellant about non-payment of the subject claims since her case was that she had not made those claims so could not be expected to complain about that of which she was unaware.
  1. [73]
    In light of the concessions by Mr Whybrow and the uncertainty expressed by Ms Zahnow, I conclude the WorkCover records showing the claims as “completed”, on their own, are insufficient to show the subject claims were in fact paid. However, those records, in combination with the communication records (Exhibit 3), satisfy me the only reasonable inference is that all of the claims, including those the subject of the 29 charges, were in fact paid.
  1. [74]
    I accept that failure by the appellant to complain about non-payment of the charged claims could only be relevant if it were also proved the appellant at least knew of them. The Regulator’s letter detailing suspicious claims included those the subject of the charges but also detailed a further 36 claims. The appellant’s response (Exhibit 8) does not include examination of the detail of any claims nor discriminate between them. The appellant maintained she acted honestly and in accordance with WorkCover instructions at all times when lodging travel claims. Although asserting all claims as genuine, in the absence of specific reference to any charged claim, as opposed to the other 36 listed in the correspondence, this cannot be regarded as an admission all listed claims were made by the appellant or that she was aware of their details.
  1. [75]
    However, the WorkCover records demonstrate that many other claims apart from those alleged as false were processed to completion. The appellant and medical service providers were identified as the payee of these claims. Although some of these were subject of enquiry to chase up payment, ultimately none appeared outstanding or left unpaid. The WorkCover records therefore apparently correctly record all of those claims as being approved, processed, and “completed”. The appellant clearly admitted making legitimate claims. The appellant’s failure to complain about non-payment of legitimate claims supports the conclusion those claims were in fact paid. So too the lack of complaint by any service provider. There is no basis to regard the records concerning the subject claims any differently to those concerning legitimate claims. Since the WorkCover records accurately reflect payment of legitimate claims, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt payment of the subject claims also occurred. Having regard to all of the evidence, I am satisfied there is no reasonable possibility the subject claims were not paid.

Whether appellant lodged subject claims

  1. [76]
    The prosecution case was that the appellant defrauded WorkCover Queensland by dishonestly making a false travel claim for each of the 29 charges. Proof of the identity of the person lodging the claim was an element of each charge and was put in issue by reason of the appellant’s pleas of not guilty. The prosecution particulars for each charge asserted “the defendant submitted a claim for travel”. No formal admission the appellant lodged the claims was contained in Exhibit 1, although it was admitted the appellant had not attended any of the 29 medical appointments for which payment for travel was claimed. No direct evidence the subject claims were lodged by the appellant was led. In those circumstances, in order to prove beyond reasonable doubt the appellant had lodged the claims, the prosecution was required to exclude any reasonable alternative.
  1. [77]
    The prosecution led evidence detailing the larger compensation claim by the appellant. This included producing documents sourced from WorkCover Queensland records with details of claims made and apparently approved and paid. These were set out in Exhibit 4 the payments history, Exhibit 5 a record of travel claims, and Exhibit 7 listing payments to the appellant and service providers. It is clear the subject claims are identified within those records as having been lodged, approved, and processed to completion by WorkCover, as part of the insurer’s overall obligations arising from the appellant’s work injury. Clearly, within those records there is evidence the subject claims were made in the appellant’s name, and by use of the Worker Assist app, utilising the appellant’s identification code.
  1. [78]
    The evidence of Ms Zahnow was to the effect that claims could be lodged via the WorkCover website, via the Worker Assist app, or via email to a customer adviser who would facilitate the lodgement. However, Mr Whybrow, who had greater familiarity with operation of the WorkCover systems, described that use of the Worker Assist lodgement program could be accessed via the website or the mobile app, which he maintained had identical features and functionality. He acknowledged also that a claim could be initiated by phone or through the post and processed by a staff member. Customer adviser Mr Coombes acknowledged that on occasions the appellant lodged travel claims via email or over the phone. Mr Whybrow said the conditions of use of the Worker Assist program required a user not share the user’s password. Mr Whybrow acknowledged that despite this requirement, anyone with knowledge of a claimant’s login details or identification number could lodge a claim in that person’s name. Mr Whybrow also acknowledged that an internet connection was necessary to lodge a claim via the website and the mobile app. He said the IP address of the device used for lodgement was available within WorkCover records but was not produced in any of the WorkCover documents admitted into evidence.
  1. [79]
    Also included in the evidence was the WorkCover communication record (Exhibit 3). Ms Zahnow acknowledged this document was not a complete record of communications between WorkCover and others, and did not record all contact with the appellant’s mother. Mr Coombes, the appellant’s customer adviser for about six months from October 2018, acknowledged Exhibit 3 did not record all of his contact with the appellant’s mother. Ms Forbes, the appellant’s customer adviser from April 2019, also accepted the communication record was not complete. Ms Zahnow acknowledged Exhibit 3 showed the appellant’s mother was approved to communicate with WorkCover on the appellant’s behalf regarding claims, and that this authority was the same as for a person authorised to lodge claims on behalf of an injured worker. Ms Zahnow acknowledged this record showed the appellant’s mother contacted WorkCover a number of times on her daughter’s behalf regarding payment of claims. Ms Forbes said Exhibit 3 recorded her conversations with the appellant on 15/5/2019, wherein she advised the appellant her mother had again called WorkCover. Ms Forbes said by this time the appellant had asked her mother be removed as an authorised contact because her mother had not informed her of her interactions with WorkCover. Ms Forbes expressed the view the appellant’s mother had unnecessary involvement regarding claims.
  1. [80]
    The prosecution relied also upon evidence of the appellant’s apparent dishonesty in her dealings with WorkCover regarding her fitness for, and whether she undertook, work over the relevant period. No contrary argument was advanced on behalf of the appellant. Upon the evidence and in accordance with these submissions the learned Acting Magistrate correctly accepted the appellant had not been honest.  It was not asserted for the prosecution that lies told by the appellant were evidence of a consciousness of guilt and therefore capable of proof of the charged offences and the learned Acting Magistrate did not reason to that effect. The appellant’s dishonesty therefore was relevant only concerning the weight to be attached to her denials that she committed any offence.
  1. [81]
    The prosecution submitted below, and maintained on this rehearing, this was an appropriate case in which the inference the appellant was the person who lodged the subject claims could more safely be drawn in light of the appellant’s failure to explain “whether someone else had her unique login details and the identity of that person.”[103] In the majority judgement in Weissensteiner it was acknowledged that such an inference might only be drawn where relevant facts explaining the circumstances were expected to be within the peculiar knowledge of the accused. As explained in RPS, such an inference may not be drawn where a defendant simply fails to contradict the direct assertions of guilt. And as confirmed in Azzopardi, the relevant explanation must be only available from the accused, not some other source, and of additional facts to those already in evidence. In Azzopardi, it was acknowledged that circumstances where such an inference will be available will be “both rare and exceptional” and then only “if the evidence is capable of explanation by disclosure of additional facts known only to the accused”.
  1. [82]
    In the present case proof the appellant lodged the relevant claim was alleged as an element of each charge. In opening the prosecution case, the prosecutor identified the “contest” was as to “the process of the lodgement of the claims”. The defence case, presented through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, squarely raised the prospect of the appellant’s mother having used the appellant’s login details to lodge the subject claims through the Worker Assist app. Mr Whybrow expressly conceded it was possible for a person with knowledge of the appellant’s password to have done so. Prosecution witnesses accepted the communications record showed the appellant’s mother had been authorised to, and did, deal with WorkCover with respect to the appellant’s travel claims. Evidence of Ms Forbes was to the effect the appellant’s mother did so unnecessarily, that the appellant complained about her mother’s involvement in respect of claims, and sought the withdrawal of her authority. It takes no imagination to conceive the appellant’s mother knew the password. The effect of the cross-examination was to demonstrate, based upon the evidence presented by the prosecution, an alternative innocent explanation was available. Unsurprisingly, in closing submissions the prosecutor identified the only real issue as being whether the appellant submitted the claims.
  1. [83]
    Further, the respondent’s submissions assume if the innocent explanation were true, the appellant must have been aware her mother had used her password to lodge false claims. However, the prosecution case was the appellant was not living with her mother at relevant times, and there existed obvious tension between them. The appellant specifically complained she was unaware of the detail of her mother’s involvement. There is no basis to conclude the appellant must have known of her mother’s actions.
  1. [84]
    This analysis demonstrates that reliance upon Weissensteiner in order that the guilty inference contended for by the prosecution might more safely be drawn, was entirely misplaced. The innocent explanation, that the appellant’s mother had access to her password and lodged the subject claims, was not additional information peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant. That explanation arose by virtue of the prosecution case. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to disprove that possibility as being reasonably open if it were to succeed. I conclude the learned Acting Magistrate was in error in placing reliance upon the appellant’s failure to provide information of who had access to the password to more safely infer the appellant had lodged the subject claims. I reject the submission I too can more safely draw the guilty inference on that basis.
  1. [85]
    The ultimate question is whether, taking account of all of the evidence, the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstances is that the appellant lodged each of the subject claims. The possibility the appellant’s mother lodged claims is neither speculative nor fanciful. The appellant’s mother’s capacity to have done so is demonstrated by her actual involvement. The prosecution could have sought to exclude that possibility by producing evidence of the IP address from which the subject claims originated, but did not do so. Clearly, that evidence was available to the prosecution. Also, the prosecution could have sought to disprove the innocent explanation by calling the appellant’s mother as a witness, assuming she would say she did not lodge the claims, but did not do so. No adjournment was sought for either purpose. Although the respondent now complains the prosecution were taken by surprise by the defence case, that assertion cannot be accepted given that proof the appellant lodged the claims was a fundamental element of the charges and the real issue was clearly identified by the prosecutor at the trial.
  1. [86]
    The respondent submits that no one, apart from the appellant, stood to benefit from making the subject claims. However, the evidence shows the appellant relied upon her mother with respect to her dealings with WorkCover, and the appellant’s response to the allegations referenced her physical difficulties and dependence upon her mother for daily assistance in many respects. The prosecution case asserted the appellant was not physically living with her mother over all of the relevant period. Even discounting the appellant’s claims regarding the extent of her reliance upon her mother, it remains far from fanciful the appellant’s mother was also able to access her bank account. No evidence was adduced, such as bank records, showing expenditure of funds received by the appellant and which might have excluded the appellant’s mother as accessing or using those funds.
  1. [87]
    The respondent also submits the appellant’s response to the allegations (in Exhibit 8) included admissions she lodged the subject claims. As explained above, this submission assumes those statements referenced the false travel claims, yet the Regulator’s letter detailed an additional 36 items. No evidence suggests any of those was false. The appellant’s response did not discriminate between those apparently legitimate and those now alleged as false, or otherwise acknowledge any claims were false. And, unless it is shown the appellant was aware of false claims, her statements cannot be regarded as acceptance she had lodged them. The only basis upon which such an inference could be drawn is if the rest of the evidence compels that conclusion. I conclude it does not.
  1. [88]
    The appellant was dishonest in failing to inform WorkCover of her fitness for, and engagement in, employment. But it is not legitimate to treat that dishonesty as proof of the charges. Discounting the appellant’s denials of offending, the question is whether the evidence led by the prosecution excludes beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant’s mother lodged the subject claims. In my view, for the reasons expressed above, that possibility remains reasonably open. I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt the appellant lodged each of the subject claims. It follows, it is my conclusion having regard to the evidence adduced in the proceedings below, the appellant should be found not guilty of each charge. 
  2. [89]
    The respondent submitted that if I were of the opinion there had been error demonstrated in the proceedings before the Acting Magistrate, the appropriate course was to remit the charges to the Magistrates Court for retrial. The appellant submitted, since the appeal is by way of rehearing, verdicts of not guilty should be entered.
  1. [90]
    Power to remit the charges for rehearing before the Magistrates Court exists where the order of the Magistrate is set aside.[104] In Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) v Fowler,[105] the High Court considered the discretionary power to order a new trial upon successful appeal against conviction. The majority said:[106]

The power to grant a new trial is a discretionary one and in deciding whether to exercise it the court which has quashed the conviction must decide whether the interests of justice require a new trial to be had. In so deciding, the court should first consider whether the admissible evidence given at the original trial was sufficiently cogent to justify a conviction, for if it was not it would be wrong by making an order for a new trial to give the prosecution an opportunity to supplement a defective case. In the present case, the admissible evidence given at the trial satisfies this test. Then the court must take into account any circumstances that might render it unjust to the accused to make him stand trial again, remembering however that the public interest in the proper administration of justice must be considered as well as the interests of the individual accused.

  1. [91]
    Consistent with my conclusions, the case presented by the prosecution at trial was insufficient to justify conviction of the charges. In those circumstances it would be oppressive to permit an opportunity to improve the prosecution case. The appropriate order is to enter verdicts of acquittal for each charge.

Orders

  1. [92]
    The orders of the Court are:
  1. In respect of each charge, the appeal against conviction is allowed, the conviction and sentence is set aside, and a verdict of not guilty is entered.
  1. The orders for payment of restitution and costs are set aside.

Footnotes

[1] Section 223(1) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).

[2] Exhibit 4 (17/6/2021) 1-8 lines 16-19.

[3] Ex 4 1-8 line 30 – 1-9 line 10.

[4] Ex 4 1-13 line 1 – 1-15 line 20.

[5] Ex 4 1-15 line 22 – 1-18 line 28.

[6] Ex 4 1-40 line 32 – 1-41 line 34.

[7] Ex 4 1-43 line 8 – 1-44 line 15.

[8] Ex 4 1-18 line 30 – 1-21 line 10.

[9] Ex 4 1-21 line 30 – 1-23 line 3; 1-44 line 17 – 1-45 line 14.

[10] Ex 4 1-23 line 5 – 1-24 line 12.

[11] Ex 4 1-24 line 21 – 1-28 line 15.

[12] Ex 4 1-53 line 39 – 1-54 line 5.

[13] Ex 4 1-28 line 17 – 1-29 line 42.

[14] Ex 4 1-29 line 44 – 1-32 line 32; 1-42 lines 5-20.

[15] Ex 4 1-46 line 25 – 1-47 line 45.

[16] Ex 4 1-32 line 36 – 1-33 line 13.

[17] Ex 4 1-34 lines 4-21.

[18] Ex 4 1-36 line 25 – 1-41 line 2.

[19] Ex 4 1-41 lines 31-34.

[20] Ex 4 1-55 line 40 – 1-57 line 3.

[21] Ex 4 1-58 line 28 – 1-59 line 7.

[22] Ex 4 1-60 line40 – 1-61 line 30.

[23] Ex 4 1-61 line 46 – 1-62 line 22.

[24] Ex 4 1-73 line 42 – 1-74 line 15; 1-76 line 33 – 1-77 line 14.

[25] Ex 4 1-62 line 24 – 1-67 line 9.

[26] Ex 4 1-67 lines 11-40.

[27] Ex 4 1-68 line 18 – 1-69 line 14.

[28] Ex 4 1-69 lines 16-37; 1-78 lines 1-25.

[29] Ex 4 1-70 line 1 – 1-70 line 4.

[30] Ex 4 1-71 line 16 – 1-72 line 5; 1-74 line 40 – 1-75 line 35.

[31] Ex 4 1-72 lines 7-42.

[32] Ex 4 1-76 line 33 – 1-77 line 14.

[33] Ex 4 1-79 line 25 – 1-79 line 14.

[34] Ex 4 1-80 line 25 – 1-81 line 26.

[35] Ex 4 1-81 line 28 – 1-82 line 10.

[36] Ex 4 1-82 line 12 – 1-85 line 29.

[37] Ex 4 1-85 line 31 – 1-86 line 14.

[38] Ex 4 1-89 line 28 – 1-90 line 11.

[39] Ex 4 1-87 line 37 – 1-89 line 26.

[40] Ex 4 1-87 lines 28-30.

[41] Ex 4 1-90 line 23-44.

[42] Ex 4 1-91 lines 32-44.

[43] Ex 4 1-91 line 22 – 1-93 line 47; 1-94 lines 13-26.

[44] Ex 4 1-95 lines 6-28.

[45] Ex 4 1-95 line 30 – 1-97 line 13.

[46] Ex 4 1-97 lines 15-39.

[47] Ex 4 1-97 line 41 – 1-98 line 25.

[48] Ex 4 1-98 line 30 – 1-99 line 19.

[49] Ex 4 1-99 line 21 – 1-101 line 16; 1-102 line 17 – 1-103 line 4.

[50] Ex 4 1-104 lines 6-45.

[51] Ex 4 1-105 line 5 – 1-109 line 24.

[52] Ex 4 1-110 lines 4-39.

[53] Ex 4 (18/6/2021) 1-8 lines 42-45.

[54] Ex 4 1-8 line 46 – 1-9 line 15.

[55] Ex 4 1-4 lines 33-38.

[56] Ex 4 1-8 lines 45-46; 1-9 lines 16-17.

[57] Ex 4 1-13 lines 4-5.

[58] Ex 4 1-13 line 22 – 1-17 line 22.

[59] Ex 4 1-17 lines 1-9.

[60] (1993) 178 CLR 217.

[61] Ex 4 1-17 line 24 – 1-18 line 15.

[62] Ex 4 1-21 lines 35-45.

[63] Ex 4 1-18 lines

[64] Ex 4 1-18 lines 27-33; 1-19 lines 3-5.

[65] Ex 4 1-18 line 35 – 1-20 line 42.

[66] Ex 4 1-20 line 44 – 1-21 line 21.

[67] Ex 4 1-19 lines 15-19; 1-21 lines 21-27.

[68] Ex 4 1-18 line 46 – 1-19 line 3. See also submissions made that no case to answer on this basis at Ex 4 1-2 line 12 – 1-4 line 9.

[69] Decision 2 lines 1-32.

[70] Decision 2 lines 33-36. Although it is not correct that “fraud” is defined in s 408C of the Code, there was no issue at trial or on the hearing of the appeal as to the elements of the offences.

[71] Decision 2 line 38 – 3 line 14.

[72] Decision 2 lines 16-33.

[73] Decision 3 lines 36-44.

[74]Decision 3 line 46 – 23 line 46.

[75] Decision 23 line 46 – 26 line 17.

[76] Decision 26 lines 28-39.

[77] Decision 26 lines 39-44.

[78] Decision 26 line 46 – 27 line 7;

[79] Decision 27 lines 8-29.

[80] Decision 27 lines 31-39.

[81] Decision 27 lines 41-46; 28 lines 15-16.

[82] Decision 28 lines 1-15.

[83] Decision 28 lines 16-22.

[84] Decision 28 line 26 – 29 line 6.

[85] (2003) 214 CLR 118, per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby JJ at 125-126, [22], [23], [25].

[86] (2019) 266 CLR 129, per Bell, Gageler, Nettle, Edelman JJ at 148-149, [55]-[56].

[87] Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493, McLeod v The Queen (2003) 214 CLR 230, R v Dillon; Ex parte Attorney-General [2016] 1 Qd R 56.

[88] Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 252, Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573 at 578, R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308 at 323-324, [46].

[89] Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495 at 503.

[90] Baden-Clay at [47].

[91] (1993) 178 CLR 217.

[92] At 228.

[93] At 227-228.

[94] At 236.

[95] (2000) 199 CLR 620.

[96] At 634, [33].

[97] (2001) 205 CLR 50.

[98] At 73, 74, 75; [61], [64], [67]-[68].

[99] [2019] QCA 16.

[100] Per Brown J at [67], Sofronoff P and Morrison JA agreeing.

[101] Lee v Lee at 149 [55].

[102] Lee v Lee at 149 [56].

[103] Ex 3, Respondent’s written submissions at para 20.

[104] Section 225(2) of the Justices Act 1886.

[105] (1984) 154 CLR 627.

[106] At 630.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Foley v Workers' Compensation Regulator

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Foley v Workers' Compensation Regulator

  • MNC:

    [2022] QDC 183

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Lynch KC DCJ

  • Date:

    08 Dec 2022

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 205 CLR 50
Cite 2 - (2001) 205 CLR 50
Cite 3 - (2001) 205 CLR 50
Director of Public Prosecutions v Fowler (1984) 154 CLR 627
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1984) 154 CLR 627
Cite 2 - (1984) 154 CLR 627
Cite 3 - (1984) 154 CLR 627
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 214 CLR 118
Cite 2 - (2003) 214 CLR 118
Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2019) 266 CLR 129
Cite 2 - (2019) 266 CLR 129
Cite 3 - (2019) 266 CLR 129
Cite 4 - (2019) 266 CLR 129
Macleod v The Queen (2003) 214 CLR 230
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 214 CLR 230
Cite 2 - (2003) 214 CLR 230
Peters v R (1998) 192 CLR 493
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1998) 192 CLR 493
Cite 2 - (1998) 192 CLR 493
Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1963) 110 CLR 234
Cite 2 - (1963) 110 CLR 234
R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2016) 258 CLR 308
Cite 2 - (2016) 258 CLR 308
Cite 3 - (2016) 258 CLR 308
R v Dillon; ex parte Attorney-General[2016] 1 Qd R 56; [2015] QCA 155
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] 1 Qd R 56
Cite 2 - [2016] 1 Qd R 56
R v Knight (1992) 175 CLR 495
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992) 175 CLR 495
Cite 2 - (1992) 175 CLR 495
R v McEwan [2019] QCA 16
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QCA 16
Cite 2 - [2019] QCA 16
Cite 3 - [2019] QCA 16
R v Weissensteiner (1993) 178 C.L.R 217
6 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1993) 178 C.L.R 217
Cite 2 - (1993) 178 C.L.R 217
Cite 3 - (1993) 178 C.L.R 217
Cite 4 - (1993) 178 C.L.R 217
Cite 5 - (1993) 178 C.L.R 217
Cite 6 - (1993) 178 C.L.R 217
RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 199 CLR 620
Cite 2 - (2000) 199 CLR 620
Cite 3 - (2000) 199 CLR 620
Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) 170 CLR 573
Cite 2 - (1990) 170 CLR 573

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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