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Whap v Commissioner of Police[2023] QDC 128

Whap v Commissioner of Police[2023] QDC 128

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Whap v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 128

PARTIES:

MAITUI ANAU WHAP

(appellant)

v

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

26/23

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court, Cairns

DELIVERED ON:

24 May 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

28 April 2023

JUDGE:

Dearden DCJ

ORDER:

  1. Application for leave to appeal out of time granted;
  2. Appeal granted;
  3. Vacate the parole eligibility date of 17/02/23 imposed at the Cairns Magistrate Court on 17/02/23 in respect of Charges 1-6;
  4. Vacate parole release date of 02/12/22 imposed at the Cairns Magistrates Court on 02/12/22 in respect of Charges 1-6;
  5. Vacate the sentence of 3 months imprisonment imposed on Charge 3 – Sexual Assault on 02/12/22 at Cairns Magistrates Court;
  6. Substitute it for an order of 9 months’ probation, commencing on 24/05/23 in respect of Charge 3 – Sexual Assault:-

Probation order

s. 92(1)(a) Penalties and Sentences Act 1992

Conviction recorded

Order that the offender be released under the supervision of an authorised corrective services officer for a period of 9 months, effectively commencing on 24/05/23, and must comply with the requirements set out in Section 93(1) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 and report within 2 business days from 24/05/23 to an authorised corrective services officer at Cairns; and

  1. Order for suspended sentence

s 144 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992

Conviction recorded

Order that the whole terms of imprisonment imposed in respect of Charges 1,2,4,5 & 6 at Cairns Magistrates Court on 02/12/22 be wholly suspended forthwith; and defendant must not commit another offence punishable by imprisonment within a period of 12 months, effective from 24/05/23 if the defendant is to avoid being dealt with for the suspended term of imprisonment.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – ERROR AT LAW – where a parole release date was imposed on sexual offences – where on the reopening of the proceeding the learned magistrate imposed a parole eligibility date – where the learned magistrate sentenced the appellant to imprisonment in his absence whether the learned magistrate failed to accord procedural fairness

LEGISLATION:

Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld)

Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 222

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ss 160, 160D, 188

CASES:

Bawden v ACI Operations Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 293

R v Cunningham [2005] QCA 321

Dempsey Project Pty Ltd v Perpetual Corporate Trust Limited [2019] QCA 234

EH v QPS; GS v QPS [2020] QDC 205

R v Hyatt [2011] QCA 55

Maxwell v Keun [1928] 1 KB 645

Millar v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 254

R v Rollason [2009] QCA 157

Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625

COUNSEL:

R Logan for the appellant

T Watkins (sol) for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Fisher Dore Lawyers for the appellant

Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent

Background

  1. [1]
    On 2 December 2022 the appellant, Maitui Anau Whap, was sentenced at the Cairns Magistrates Court in respect of the following matters:-

Charge number

Charge

Sentence

1

Enter dwelling with intent (on 4/11/2022) – Criminal Code s 419(1)

9 months imprisonment

2

Common assault (on 4/11/2022) – Criminal Code s 335

1 month imprisonment

3

Sexual assault (on 4/11/2022) – Criminal Code s 352(1)(A)

3 months imprisonment

4

Sexual assault (on 4/11/2022) – Criminal Code s 352(1)(A)

6 months imprisonment

5

Sexual assault (on 4/11/2022) – Criminal Code s 352(1)(A)

6 months imprisonment

6

Sexual assault (on 4/11/2022) – Criminal Code s 352(1)(A)

12 months imprisonment

  1. [2]
    The learned magistrate ordered that the sentences be served concurrently, and set a parole release date of 2 December 2022. 
  2. [3]
    On 24 January 2023, a prosecutor from the Cairns Police Prosecution Corps, made an application to the Magistrates Court at Cairns to reopen the criminal proceedings on the ground that the court had:-

“erroneously imposed a parole release date for the offender in lieu of a parole eligibility date as required under Pt 9, Div 3 [Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld)]; and has accordingly imposed a sentence that is not in accordance with law (s 188(1)(a) Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld).”[1]

  1. [4]
    As a consequence, on 7 February 2023 the Cairns Magistrates Court Registry sent a Notice of Reopening[2] to Queensland Police Service, Cairns Police Prosecutions, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Service and to the appellant at the address listed on the bench charge sheets of the relevant charges.  The application was listed for hearing on 17 February 2023, at 9am.
  2. [5]
    The application came before the learned magistrate who had originally sentenced the appellant, at 9.17 am on 17 February 2023, with appearances from Police Prosecutions and from a representative of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Service (ATSILS).  An application was made by the ATSILS legal representative to adjourn the proceedings in the absence of the appellant, but this was refused by the learned magistrate, who noted that the Notice to Reopen had been sent on 24 January 2023, that the defendant had been given ample chance to attend and (implicitly) the application for an adjournment was refused.[3] It should be noted that the learned magistrate erroneously stated the date of posting of the Notice of Reopening, which was, in fact, 7 February 2023. The Application to Re-open Criminal Proceedings was filed on 24 January 2023, which explains the source of the error in respect of the dates.
  3. [6]
    The ATSILS legal representative, when queried by the learned magistrate, accepted that a parole eligibility date needed to have been imposed given that the offence of sexual assault required an eligibility date, although the legal representative, upon the learned magistrate indicating an intention to impose a parole eligibility date, asked to be heard on a suspended sentence.  The legal representative submitted that they had limited knowledge of the matter, indicated that if it was the intention for the appellant to remain in the community, then a suspended sentence would have been pressed and on that basis asked the learned magistrate to consider a wholly suspended sentence.  The learned magistrate, in response stated:

“Look, in my view, I, having done the sentence, would certainly have imposed the parole eligibility date, and I would have imposed a parole eligibility date as at the 2nd of December 2022.  That is by operation of the law – by strict operation of the law, and I would not have imposed a suspended sentence to, in effect, defeat the intended operation of the law.”[4]

  1. [7]
    In a hand written affidavit of the appellant filed in the appeal,[5] the appellant identifies that the notice of reopening went to his ex-partner’s address; was dropped off to him about two days before 17 February 2023; that he was late to court on 17 February 2023 because of transportation difficulties; that he arrived at about 9.15am; did not hear his name called over the speakers; spoke to a representative of ATSILS about what was going on; was told that his matter had already been dealt with; was advised to go straight into court; was then called up by the learned magistrate and told that he had to go into custody and apply for parole.  The appellant stated further that he was not contacted by anybody from ATSILS; had received no correspondence; was unaware of his appeal rights; and had complied with parole from 2 December 2022, until he went into custody on 17 February 2023.[6]
  2. [8]
    A Notice of Application for Extension of Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal to a District Court Judge, and a Notice of Appeal to a District Court Judge were both filed on 24 April 2023.  Neither the application for extension of time for filing a notice of appeal, nor the appeal itself, was opposed by the respondent, the Commissioner of Police.
  3. [9]
    Accordingly, when the matter came before me on 28 April 2023, I made the following orders:-
  1. Application for leave to appeal out of time granted.
  2. Appeal granted.
  3. Vacate the parole eligibility date of 17/02/23 imposed at the Cairns Magistrate Court on 17/02/23 in respect of Charges 1-6.
  4. Vacate parole release date of 02/12/22 imposed at the Cairns Magistrates Court on 02/12/22 in respect of Charges 1-6.
  5. Vacate the sentence of 3 months imprisonment imposed on Charge 3 – Sexual Assault made on 02/12/22 at Cairns Magistrates Court.
  6. Substitute it for an order of 10 months’ probation, commencing on 02/12/22 in respect of Charge 3 – Sexual Assault:-

Probation order

s. 92(1)(a) Penalties and Sentences Act 1992

Conviction recorded

Order that the offender be released under the supervision of an authorised corrective services officer for a period of 10 months, effectively commencing on 02/12/22, and must comply with the requirements set out in Section 93(1) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 and report within 2 business days from 28/04/23 to an authorised corrective services officer at Cairns.

  1. Order for suspended sentence

s 144 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992

Conviction recorded

Order that the whole terms of imprisonment imposed in respect of Charges 1,2,4,5 & 6 at Cairns Magistrates Court on 02/12/22 be wholly suspended forthwith; and defendant must not commit another offence punishable by imprisonment within a period of 12 months, effective from 02/12/22 if the defendant is to avoid being dealt with for the suspended term of imprisonment.

  1. Liberty to apply with 3 business days’ notice
  1. Provisions of written reasons for these orders will occur in due course (reasons reserved)
  1. [10]
    On making those orders on 28 April 2023, I indicated that I would in due course provide reasons in respect of the appeal.  These are the reasons for granting that appeal.

The law

  1. [11]
    I refer to and adopt my exposition of the relevant principles as set out in Millar v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 254, [8]-[10].

Grounds of appeal

  1. [12]
    The Notice of Appeal dated 24 April 2023 contains a single ground namely:

“that the sentence imposed on 17 February 2023 was manifestly excessive.”

  1. [13]
    The appellant submits that the sentencing discretion exercised at the reopening on 17 February 2023 miscarried for the following reasons:

“1. The learned magistrate erred at law by failing to accord procedural fairness by sentencing the appellant to imprisonment in his absence, and in doing so, failing to afford the appellant the opportunity to be heard.

  1.  The learned magistrate erred at law by failing to accord procedural fairness by failing to properly establish whether the appellant was given notice of the proceeding.
  1.  The learned magistrate erred at law by failing to provide an adjournment of the proceeding.
  1.  The learned magistrate erred at law by unduly fettering her sentencing discretion by considering that a penalty other than imprisonment with parole eligibility would ‘defeat the intended operation of the law’.
  1.  The learned magistrate erred at law by failing to take into account a relevant consideration, namely how the appellant had been performing on parole.
  1.  The learned magistrate erred at law by failing to provide adequate reasons for her decisions.”[7]

Discussion

  1. [14]
    It is uncontroversial that the learned magistrate erred in the sentence imposed on 2 December 2022 by setting a parole release date for the sexual assault charges (charges 3-6).  A parole release date could not be imposed in respect of the four charges of sexual assault,[8] given that a charge of “sexual assault” is a “sexual offence” pursuant to Sch 1 of the Corrective Services Act 2006.[9]
  1. [15]
    Penalties and Sentences Act s 188(1) relevantly provides:-

“If a court has in … a criminal proceeding … —

  1. (a)
     imposed a sentence that is not in accordance with the law;

…

the court, whether or not differently constituted, may reopen the proceeding.”

  1. [16]
    Penalties and Sentences Act s 188(3) relevantly provides:-

“If a court reopens a proceeding, it—

  1. (a)
     must give the parties an opportunity to be heard; and
  1. (b)
     may resentence the offender—
  1. (i)
     for a reopening under subsection (1)(a)—to a sentence in accordance with law; [and]

…

  1. (c)
     may amend any relevant conviction or order to the extent necessary to take into account the sentence imposed under paragraph (b).”
  1. [17]
    Penalties and Sentences Act s 188(5) relevantly provides that:-

“The court may reopen the proceeding—

…

  1. (b)
     for a reopening under subsection (1)—on the application of a party to the proceeding made within—
  1. (i)
     28 days after the day the sentence was imposed; or
  1. (ii)
     any further time the court may allow on application at any time.”
  1. [18]
    The application to reopen was lodged on 24 January 2023, some 53 days after the original sentence, and in circumstances where there was no explicit application for an extension of time by police prosecutions, nor any consideration by the learned magistrate as to whether the granting of the extension of time was in the interest of justice.[10] Relevantly, there were no submissions made to bring this issue to the attention of the learned magistrate.

Error 1 - did the learned magistrate err at law by failing to accord procedural fairness by sentencing the appellant to imprisonment in his absence, and in doing so, failing to afford the appellant the opportunity to be heard.

  1. [19]
    It is clear, as Keane JA identified in R v Cunningham [2005] QCA 321, pp 5-6:-

“To impose a penalty without allowing the person affected to have an opportunity to respond is a clear breach of the rule of natural justice that a court is required to follow.  As Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, in a passage approved by this Court in Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 [2004] 1 Qd R 40; [2003] QCA 249 at 49, said in Re Hamilton; Re Forrest [1981] AC 1038 at 1045:

‘One of the principles of natural justice is that a person is entitled to adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before any judicial order is pronounced against him, so that he, or someone acting on his behalf, may make such representations, if any, as he sees fit. That is the rule of audi alteram partem which applies to all judicial proceedings, unless its application to a particular class of proceedings has been excluded by Parliament expressly or by necessary implication.’

It has been recognised in previous decisions of this Court that the principle described by Lord Fraser is as applicable to sentencing as it is to any other judicial proceeding. See, for example, R v Moodie [1999] QCA 125; CA No 439 of 1998, 14 April 1999.”

  1. [20]
    As the appellant identifies in the Outline of Submissions on behalf of the Appellant,[11] there is no indication that the appellant’s name was called prior to, or during the reopening hearing, and it is clear that he was not present.[12] 
  1. [21]
    The appellant submits, and I accept, that the effect of substituting a parole eligibility date for the parole release date, in the absence of the appellant, resulted in an immediate liability for custody, with no opportunity for the appellant to make submissions. The ATSILS legal representative who appeared before the learned magistrate did not have the appellant’s instructions, and despite lacking instructions, made brief submissions for a suspended sentence which were peremptorily dismissed by the learned magistrate.  In short, the appellant lost his liberty without the opportunity of being heard, and undoubtably the learned magistrate erred by failing to accord him procedural fairness in these circumstances.

Error 2 - did the learned magistrate err at law by failing to accord procedural fairness by failing to properly establish whether the appellant was given notice of the proceeding.

  1. [22]
    The application to reopen the proceedings was listed for hearing on 17 February 2023. Nothing on the transcript reflects the learned magistrate having considered whether the appellant was properly given notice, nor was the appellant’s name called at any time during the hearing.[13]  As the appellant’s affidavit[14] identifies, the appellant was no longer living at the address on the bench charge sheet, which was his ex-partner’s address, and he only received the notice to re-open proceedings “about two days before 17 February 2023”.[15]
  2. [23]
    I consider that the learned magistrate erred in failing to properly establish whether the appellant had been given notice of the proceeding. It would have been prudent, and compliant with principles of procedural fairness, if the learned magistrate had sought to establish whether the application had been brought to the appellant’s attention. The obvious next step should have been to adjourn the application to a future date, with a requirement that police prosecutions serve a notice on the appellant that his appearance was required.  Despite the ATSILS legal representative indicating that no instructions had been received, the learned magistrate refused the application for an adjournment.

Error 3 - did the learned magistrate err at law by failing to provide an adjournment of the proceeding.

  1. [24]
    Although appellate courts are slow to interfere with the discretion of the court to refuse an adjournment, an appellate court will do so where the refusal of the adjournment results in the denial of justice.[16]
  2. [25]
    As indicated above, the ATSILS legal representative made an adjournment application, which was refused, by inference, without the learned magistrate providing any reasons, and in circumstances where the ATSILS legal representative was given no opportunity to contact the appellant and obtain instructions.
  3. [26]
    Again, the learned magistrate has fallen into error in these circumstances by denying the appellant the opportunity to be heard.

Error 4 – did the learned magistrate err at law by unduly fettering her sentencing discretion by considering that a penalty other than imprisonment with parole eligibility would “defeat the intended operation of the law”.

  1. [27]
    The appellant submits that the statement by the learned magistrate that the imposition of a parole eligibility date occurred “by strict operation of the law”, and that imposing a suspended sentence would have defeated the intended operation of the law, was an erroneous belief in respect of the sentencing discretion which unduly fettered that discretion.[17]
  2. [28]
    It was clear that at the original sentence, and on the reopening, it was open to the learned magistrate to partly or fully suspend all prison sentences imposed; to partly or fully suspend all but one of the prison sentences and impose a probation order on one of the charges; to place a parole release date on the non-sexual offences (charges 1 and 2) and fully or partly suspend the four sexual assault charges; or impose (with the appellant’s consent) an intensive correction order in respect of all or some of the offences.  With all of those options available (subject, of course, where appropriate to the appellant’s consent and to an assessment of the utility and appropriateness of each of those options), it is clear that the learned magistrate has fallen into error by unduly fettering her sentencing discretion.

Error 5 - did the learned magistrate err at law by failing to take into account a relevant consideration, namely how the appellant had been performing on parole.

  1. [29]
    The appellant identifies that between the sentence date (2 December, 2022) and the reopening hearing (17 February, 2023), the appellant had been on parole for 77 days.  The appellant himself in his affidavit[18] opined that he was doing well on parole.  It would have been a straightforward exercise for the learned magistrate to have obtained either a written or oral report as to the appellant’s performance on parole, and in that respect, it would have been appropriate to adjourn the reopening hearing pending obtaining such a report.  The failure to take into account the performance by the appellant on parole, which would have informed the learned magistrate as to the progress of the appellant’s rehabilitation on parole, is an error, given the obvious relevance of a parole supervision report to the reopening process.

Error 6 – did the learned magistrate err at law by failing to provide adequate reasons for her decision.

  1. [30]
    As the appellant identifies, it is well established that there is a duty on the part of judicial tribunals to give reasons for their decisions, and failure to give reasons which ought to have been given can amount to an appellable error.[19]  It is also clear that sentencing remarks are required not only to communicate with the offender, the victim and the public, but should be “able to withstand the scrutiny of appellate courts”, and a “sentencing court may more easily infer error when reasons are not expressed.”[20]
  2. [31]
    With respect, the learned magistrate’s reasons for the imposition of the parole eligibility date (without identification of and consideration of the alternatives which were clearly open and available) represented an error in the circumstances of this matter.

Conclusion

  1. [32]
    In the light of the view this court takes on appeal in respect of the errors identified above, it is clear that the sentence imposed by way of reopening on 17 February 2023 should be set aside and the appellant sentenced afresh.  After hearing submissions on that resentence, and with the appellant being present for the process, I made the orders set out at [9], above.
  2. [33]
    However, in the Further Outline of Submissions on behalf of the Appellant,[21] the appellant, relying on Hemmett v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 318, [20] – [21] and Gallaher v Commissioner of Queensland Police Service [2014] QDC 26, [31], submits that the orders made on 28 April , 2023 (see [9] above) should be varied, so as to operate from the date of delivery of these further reasons, and adjusted to practically reflect the delay between those orders and the delivery of these further reasons. The respondent does not oppose that course.

Orders

  1. [34]
    Accordingly, I make the following amended orders, which substitute for the orders set out at [9] above made on 28 April, 2023:-
  1. Application for leave to appeal out of time granted;
  2. Appeal granted;
  3. Vacate the parole eligibility date of 17/02/23 imposed at the Cairns Magistrate Court on 17/02/23 in respect of Charges 1-6;
  4. Vacate parole release date of 02/12/22 imposed at the Cairns Magistrates Court on 02/12/22 in respect of Charges 1-6;
  5. Vacate the sentence of 3 months imprisonment imposed on Charge 3 – Sexual Assault on 02/12/22 at Cairns Magistrates Court;
  6. Substitute it for an order of 9 months’ probation, commencing on 24/05/23 in respect of Charge 3 – Sexual Assault:

Probation order

s. 92(1)(a) Penalties and Sentences Act 1992

Conviction recorded

Order that the offender be released under the supervision of an authorised corrective services officer for a period of 9 months, effectively commencing on 24/05/23, and must comply with the requirements set out in Section 93(1) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 and report within 2 business days from 24/05/23 to an authorised corrective services officer at Cairns; and

  1. Order for suspended sentence

s 144 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992

Conviction recorded

Order that the whole terms of imprisonment imposed in respect of Charges 1,2,4,5 & 6 at Cairns Magistrates Court on 02/12/22 be wholly suspended forthwith; and defendant must not commit another offence punishable by imprisonment within a period of 12 months, effective from 24/05/23 if the defendant is to avoid being dealt with for the suspended term of imprisonment.

Footnotes

[1]  Application to Re-open Criminal Proceeding filed 24 January 2023.

[2]  Notice of Reopening, 7 February 2023.

[3]  Exhibit MJF-9, T1-4 ll1-26, affidavit of Michael James Finch affirmed 24 April 2023.

[4]  Exhibit MJF-9, T1-4 l44 – 1-5 l12, affidavit of Michael James Finch affirmed 24 April 2023.  It should be noted that a perusal of Exhibit MJF-9, affidavit of Michael James Finch affirmed 24 April 2023 (the transcript of the submissions on the reopening), and Exhibit MJF-10, affidavit of Michael James Finch affirmed 24 April 2023 (the decision on the reopening application) indicates that at no time in that process was the appellant’s name required to be called, nor actually called.

[5]  Appeal Ex. 2 – Affidavit of Maitui Anau Whap sworn 26 April 2023.

[6]  Appeal Ex. 2 – Affidavit of Maitui Anau Whap sworn 26 April 2023.

[7]  Appeal Ex. 3 – Outline of Submissions of the Appellant, [12].

[8] Penalties and Sentences Act s 160D.

[9] Penalties and Sentences Act s 160 – definition of “sexual offence”; Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) s 4, Sch 4 and Sch 1.

[10] R v Rollason [2009] QCA 157, [2].

[11]  Appeal Ex. 3 - Outline of Submissions of the Appellant, [13]-[15].

[12]  Exhibit MJF-9, T1-1 – 1-5, affidavit of Michael James Finch affirmed 24 April 2023.

[13]  Exhibit MJF-9, T1-1 – 1-5, affidavit of Michael James Finch affirmed 24 April 2023.

[14]  Appeal Ex. 2 - Affidavit of Maitui Anau Whap sworn 26 April 2023.

[15]  Appeal Ex. 2 - Affidavit of Maitui Anau Whap sworn 26 April 2023, [3].

[16] Dempsey Project Pty Ltd v Perpetual Corporate Trust Limited [2019] QCA 234, [37]-[40] citing Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625, 628; Maxwell v Keun [1928] 1 KB 645, 650, 657-678.

[17]  Appeal Ex. 3 – Outline of Submissions of the Appellant, [50] – [58]; EH v QPS; GS v QPS [2020] QDC 205, [17].

[18]  Appeal Ex. 2 - Affidavit of Maitui Anau Whap sworn 26 April 2023, [13].

[19] Bawden v ACI Operations Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 293, [29].

[20] R v Hyatt [2011] QCA 55, [11] (per Wilson AJA).

[21] Appeal Ex. 4 – Further Outline of Submissions on behalf of the Appellant. 

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Whap v Commissioner of Police

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Whap v Commissioner of Police

  • MNC:

    [2023] QDC 128

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Dearden DCJ

  • Date:

    24 May 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Bawden v ACI Operations Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 293
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QCA 293
Cite 2 - [2003] QCA 293
Dempsey Project Pty Ltd v Perpetual Corporate Trust Ltd [2019] QCA 234
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QCA 234
Cite 2 - [2019] QCA 234
EH v Queensland Police Service; GS v Queensland Police Service [2020] QDC 205
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QDC 205
Cite 2 - [2020] QDC 205
Gallaher v Commissioner of Queensland Police Service [2014] QDC 26
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QDC 26
Hemmett v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 318
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QDC 318
In re Hamilton; In re Forrest [1981] AC 1038
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1981] AC 1038
Maxwell v Keun (1928) 1 KB 645
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1928) 1 KB 645
Cite 2 - (1928) 1 KB 645
Millar v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 254
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QDC 254
Cite 2 - [2022] QDC 254
R v Cunningham [2005] QCA 321
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 321
Cite 2 - [2005] QCA 321
R v Hyatt [2011] QCA 55
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCA 55
Cite 2 - [2011] QCA 55
R v Moodie [1999] QCA 125
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1999] QCA 125
R v Rollason [2009] QCA 157
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] QCA 157
Cite 2 - [2009] QCA 157
Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Qld)[2004] 1 Qd R 40; [2003] QCA 249
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QCA 249
Cite 2 - [2004] 1 Qd R 40
Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1993) 116 ALR 625
Cite 2 - (1993) 116 ALR 625

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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