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Hickey v Commissioner of Police[2023] QDC 181

Reported at (2023) 3 QDCR 191

Hickey v Commissioner of Police[2023] QDC 181

Reported at (2023) 3 QDCR 191

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Hickey v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 181

PARTIES:

SIMON JOHN HICKEY

(Appellant)

v

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

(Respondent)

FILE NO:

BD No. 610 of 2023

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court in Richlands

DELIVERED ON:

25 August 2023 (ex tempore) 

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

25 August 2023

JUDGE:

Porter KC DCJ

ORDER:

  1. Appeal dismissed;
  2. No order as to costs. 

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – where the appellant was convicted of stalking a complainant – where a learned Magistrate extended a restraining order under s 359F Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) against the appellant naming the complainant as the aggrieved – where the restraining order prevented the appellant from inter alia posting material online about the complainant – where the restraining order was to remain in place for five years – where the appellant was twice convicted for breaching the restraining order prior to the extension application –  where the learned Magistrate ordered that the restraining order be extended for a further two years – where the appellant seeks to appeal from the learned Magistrate’s decision to extend the operation of the restraining order – whether a restraining order may be extended where the application is filed before its expiry but heard after its expiry date – whether an appeal lies to this Court from a decision of a Magistrate to vary a restraining order

Legislation

Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 359B, 359E, 359F

District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld)

Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 222

Magistrates Courts Act 1921 (Qld) s 47

Transport Operations (Road Use Management - Driver Licensing) Regulation 2010 (Qld)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) rr 766(1)(a), 785

Cases

Croll v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 69

Grierson v The King (1938) 60 CLR 431

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1

NH v DPP (2016) 260 CLR 546

Parr v the Department of Transport and Main Roads [2020] QDC 40

R v Johnston [2008] QCA 291

Ralph v Commissioner of Police [2015] QDC 206

Schneider v Curtis [1967] Qd R 300

Vukolic v Browning [2022] QDC 279

SOLICITORS:

No Appearance for the Appellant

Queensland Police Services Legal Unit for the Respondent

Summary

  1. [1]
    Mr Hickey appeals the decision of the learned Magistrate on 21 February 2023 to extend the period of a restraining order made on 25 January 2018, pursuant to section 359F of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) (“the Code”), by two years. The appeal is dismissed, because no appeal lies to this Court from an order under s 359F varying a restraining order. However, even if there was jurisdiction to hear an appeal from his Honour’s order, it would have been dismissed.

Factual Background

  1. [2]
    On 25 January 2018, the appellant was convicted of unlawful stalking, contrary to section 359E of the Criminal Code at the Magistrates Court at Richlands. The appellant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for a period of five years after serving seven days. On that day, the Court also made a restraining order under s 359F of the Code. That order was to remain in force for five years, being until 24 January 2023. The restraining order relevantly provided:

THE ORDER OF THE COURT IS THAT:

Pursuant to S. 359F Criminal Code:

For a period of 5 years.

That the defendant not have contact either directly or indirectly, personally or through any other person with [the complainant] including telephone calls, text messages or social media.

That the defendant not approach or follow [the complainant] at any place.

That the defendant not go to, loiter, enter or remain at the place where [the complainant] is living or working.

That the defendant must remove any content on the internet or in a public place relating to [the complainant].

This Order shall, unless it is sooner varied or revoked, continue in force up to and including the 24th day of January 2023.

  1. [3]
    The order was made after a plea of guilty by Mr Hickey.  The statement of facts that was put before the Court on the sentence following the plea is important material in understanding the context in which the Magistrate considered whether a restraining order should be made against Mr Hickey.  As can be seen from s 359F(6), the Magistrate can have regard to evidence given at the hearing of the charge, and it is reasonable to infer that it was the statement of facts about the stalking offence to which Mr Hickey pleaded guilty that informed the decision to make the restraining order and the terms included.  Relevantly, the statement of facts disclosed there was no personal relationship between Mr Hickey and the complainant in the complaint. 
  2. [4]
    The unlawful stalking arose in the context of the complainant lawfully executing her duties on 4 October 2017 as an investigator of the Fair Trade office. In summary, following some things done by the complainant in that regard, Mr Hickey stalked the complainant by sending abusive, threatening and harassing text messages and emails to her. Importantly, for the merits of the present appeal (remembering that, in fact, no appeal lies to this Court), the appellant posted a blog offering a $1000 reward for providing any personal information about the complainant and some of her colleagues.  He also posted a wanted sign in a neighbourhood in Brisbane containing her photo, her name and derogatory remarks about her, seeking personal information about her. 
  3. [5]
    This is not an appeal against conviction, nor is it an appeal against the making of the original restraining order.  However, it is worth me recording my view that such conduct plainly falls within the scope of unlawful stalking as defined in s 359B of the Code.  In particular, it falls within the definition of the acts which can amount to stalking in s 359B(c) which include:
  1. leaving offensive material where it will be found by, given to or brought to the attention of a person;
  1. publishing offensive material to a person, directly, or indirectly, including by using a website, social media platform or online social network;
  1. giving offensive material to a person, directly or indirectly, including by using a website, social media platform or online social network;
  1. an intimidating harassing, threatening, humiliating or abusive act against a person, whether or not involving violence or a threat of violence.
  1. [6]
    It is also worth observing that in that circumstance, it would plainly be open to a Court to consider that that conduct would:
    1. cause a complainant apprehension or fear reasonably arising in the circumstances of violence to or against the property of the person; or
    2. cause detriment really arising in all the circumstances to the stalked person.
  2. [7]
    Given the nature of the stalking offence, there is no reason why that detriment could not be emotional anguish. Mr Hickey in his appeal submissions seems to overlook this alternative.
  3. [8]
    It is also relevant to observe that, despite pleading guilty to that offence, Mr Hickey appealed against all the orders made by the Magistrates Court on 9 November 2018. It is unclear if that was a sentence appeal or not, but in any event, that appeal was dismissed on 9 November 2018.
  4. [9]
    Some four months later, over about a two-week period between 19 March 2019 and 1 April 2019, Mr Hickey breached the restraining order. Not only was it relevant to his Honour’s extension of the order that the order was breached, but it was also relevant that the breach involved similar conduct. On 12 June 2019, he was convicted for breaching the order. He breached the condition that he was not to post on the internet any material about the complainant On 24 March 2019, police located a 30-minute video with an offensive title. The video included insulting language. It had been posted on the internet by the appellant, and I infer that it plainly referred to or could be identified as having referred to the complainant.
  5. [10]
    On 12 June 2019, Mr Hickey pleaded guilty to breaching the restraining order and was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment and given immediate parole release. His dissatisfaction with his conviction for the stalking offence and the imposition of the restraining order was reflected again in an application for leave to adduce new evidence and presumably for leave to appeal those orders. Again, I do not have before me the basis of that appeal. However, it is relevant, given his Honour’s conclusions in this case, that it was another attempt to overturn the orders made on 25 January 2018. That appeal was dismissed on the 24 April 2020.
  6. [11]
    Subsequently, on the 16 November 2020, Mr Hickey was convicted of another breach of the restraining order, which occurred on 1 September 2020. Again, that breach involved similar conduct to that which underpinned the making of the original restraining order and the first breach. In brief, the appellant breached the condition he was not to post on the internet any material about the complainant. In September 2020, police became aware of a book Mr Hickey had published through Amazon. The book was found to refer to the complainant 29 times, criticising her personally and professionally and using derogatory language to describe her.
  7. [12]
    The order was to continue in force up to and including 24 January 2023. An application was filed to vary the restraining order by extending it for a further five years on 16 January 2023, made returnable on 24 January 2023.

Power to vary after expiry

  1. [13]
    I note that the application to vary the order was filed before the expiry of the order, but was not, ultimately, heard and determined until 24 February 2023 after the expiry of the order. It might be argued that the plenary power in s 359F(7) should be read down, such that an order for variation or revocation can only be made within the period of validity of the initial order.
  2. [14]
    In my respectful view, the plenary power to vary or revoke conferred by s 359F should not be read down in that way. As noted from the subsection, the order can be varied or revoked at any time. If it were intended by Parliament that it could only be revoked at any time within the period of the order, one might have expected to see that included in the provision.
  3. [15]
    I can see no reason to read that limitation into the provision. It would, of course, be a significant discretionary consideration, in most cases, that an applicant (and note it does not necessarily have to be the person bound by the order) was seeking to vary or revoke an order after it had expired. In many, perhaps most circumstances, that would make the application otiose or of no utility, but that is different from saying one should read down the plenary words used by the Parliament in 359F(7). In this case, the application was filed before the expiry of the order and no particular prejudice, that I can identify, flowed from the fact that the matter was not, ultimately, heard and determined until after the order expired. In those circumstances, I cannot see what mischief such a narrow reading of the plenary words would be directed at addressing.

Proceedings before the learned Magistrate

  1. [16]
    The gravamen of Mr Hickey’s arguments before his Honour below was that he had not, during the five years of the order, committed any violence against the complainant, contacted the complainant, seen her or been anywhere near her. He submitted further that the restraining order, to the extent it prevented him from posting material on the internet or in a public place about the complainant was invalid due to being inconsistent with section 21 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (“HRA”). Section 21 relevantly provides:
  1. Every person has the right to hold an opinion without interference.
  1. Every person has the right to freedom of expression which includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, whether within or outside Queensland and whether—

 (a) orally; or

 (b) in writing; or

 (c) in print; or

 (d) by way of art; or

 (e) in another medium chosen by the person.

  1. [17]
    Mr Hickey’s argument about the HRA was really to the effect that the Court should not interfere with his freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds and that included content on the internet or in a public places.
  2. [18]
    In effect, he submitted in his outline to his Honour that he should be able to say whatever he wished without special protection from his opinions being afforded to the complainant. He also, in his written submission to his Honour, urged his Honour to conclude that the restraining order was wrongly made.
  3. [19]
    His Honour granted the extension sought for a period of two years. After setting out the history of the matter in substantially the same terms as set out above, his Honour said this:

On the material I have got today, particularly by Mr Hickey, it is plain to me – in the way in which he has argued his case – plain to me that he still feels deeply aggrieved by what happened to him at the time. He also feels he has been wrongly convicted. He does not accept he has been properly convicted, even though he entered pleas of guilty to these charges. He remains of the view that he has been the victim. And there may have been some things done in the process of the investigation which were out of the ordinary, but he has become, in my view, fixated on this point in time and involving the complainant.

Now, it is true that nothing else has been done by him since August or September 2020, but the way in which he has presented his case today and the fact that he still feels he’s been effectively set-up and persecuted by the State and by [the complainant], as an agent of the State leads me to concern that he might if this order does not exist seek to go about publishing more things about [the complainant] online in order to clear his name. So I think it is necessary and desirable to extend the operation of the order.

  1. [20]
    His Honour did not directly deal in his reasons with the human-rights argument, however, he did deal with it, in his concurring responses to the submissions of the police Prosecutor.[1] Those submissions were to the effect that the human rights legislation does contemplate that there can be proper limitations put on the human rights it identifies.

Submissions on Appeal

No Actual Violence Submission

  1. [21]
    In his outline of argument on this appeal, Mr Hickey largely repeats his arguments that were made below. He argues that he has not done any violence or threatened any violence or otherwise approached the complainant for the five-year period, and that therefore there is no reasonable basis for her to be in fear of her safety. On that basis, he says his Honour’s discretion miscarried in concluding that it was desirable to extend the order. He appealed in that respect to the law relating to domestic and family violence protection orders.
  2. [22]
    I note that, importantly, the scope of the Court’s discretion to grant, vary or revoke an order is articulated under s 359F and must be informed by the statutory provisions which are relevant to that order. That will include, of course, the definition of unlawful stalking in s 359B. Unlawful stalking can include conduct other than threatening violence, doing violence or approaching or hanging around a person. It can include leaving offensive material or giving offensive material to a person, directly or indirectly, and, in the modern age, in my respectful view, clearly can include the posting of material on the electronic public noticeboard which is the internet.
  3. [23]
    Further, such posted material can cause apprehension or fear where violent language or extremely insulting language is used. It is a small comfort to a complainant where there is repeated conduct, even in the face of restraining order, for the respondent to the order to say “I might use intimidatory and very insulting language, but I have never done anything about it in the last five years”, and in any event, such conduct can cause detriment in the form of emotional suffering.
  4. [24]
    Mr Hickey’s submission also proceeds on the basis that the kind of conduct involving posting insulting material cannot be domestic violence under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (“DFVPA”). He says:

While this order was made under section 359F of the Queensland criminal code, similarities can be drawn from orders issued under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection act. Under this act, no order can be issued unless it can be shown that the respondent has committed domestic violence against the aggrieved

In this case, no violence was committed at any time – either before, or subsequent to the order being made.

[emphasis in original]

  1. [25]
    The analogy between orders under the DFVPA and restraining orders under the Code should be taken too far. In any event, Mr Hickey’s submission is wrong. The definition of domestic violence in the DFVPA is very broad and can include posting intimidatory, inflammatory and extremely insulting material about a person. In any event, whether that is correct or not, the premise of his first argument is wrong. It is not the case that just because there has been no actual violence, there can be no behaviour which justifies the extension of an order.

Human Rights Points

  1. [26]
    Mr Hickey buttresses his argument by reference to s 21 of the HRA. He treats that provision as supporting his proposition that he should be free to make whatever comments he wants about the complainant, so long as they are not false or threatening. He says that if he makes statements that are false or threatening the complainant would have legal avenues to do something about it, and, therefore, there is no reason why limitation on his freedom of expression is justified.
  2. [27]
    That analysis is mistaken. As I indicated above, the discretion under s 359F, must be exercised having regard to the provisions that enliven the discretion. That includes the stalking offence. The effect of Mr Hickey’s argument is that the Court, could not make orders under s 359F to seek to address or prevent the detriment identified in s 359B(d) and caused by conduct of the kind identified in 359B(c)(v)-(viii). That is because, according to Mr Hickey, any such order would certainly impede the rights guaranteed under s 21 of the HRA.
  3. [28]
    There are many other difficulties with Mr Hickey’s argument.
  4. [29]
    The first is that the HRA does not prevent the making of judicial decisions which are contrary to provisions specifying the content of human rights under the HRA. The operative provisions of the HRA can be found in part 3 of that Act, which is titled “Application of Human Rights in Queensland”. Part 3 is the part of the HRA which creates obligations positively rising from the rights guaranteed under the HRA.
  5. [30]
    Part 3, Div 1 describes Parliament’s obligation to prepare statements of compatibility for new Bills and subordinate legislation. Part 3, Div 2 sets out the steps that Parliament must take if it is to produce legislation that is not compatible with human rights. Div 3 describes the way that courts must use human rights in the interpretation of legislation. I will return to that division in a moment.
  6. [31]
    Part 3, Div 4 is the most relevant part of the HRA to the appellant’s argument. It is titled “Obligations on public entities” and begins with s 58, which states:
  1. It is unlawful for a public entity:
  1. to act or make a decision in a way that is not compatible with human rights; or
  1. in making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a human right relevant to the decision.
  1. [32]
    This provision imposes, arguably, the primary substantive obligation under the act. The difficulty is that under s 9(4)(b) HRA, a public entity does not include “a court or tribunal, except when acting in an administrative capacity.” When the learned Magistrate imposed the order in this case, there can be no doubt that His Honour was acting in a judicial capacity. On that basis, the decision is not an act or decision of a public entity and therefore, s 58 does not apply.
  2. [33]
    There are no provisions of the HRA that require the decision of a Magistrate or Judge acting in a judicial capacity to make decisions only when they are compatible with human rights. One might wonder whether such a requirement could ever be enacted consistently with the nature of judicial power described by the High Court in Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1 [96] [661].
  3. [34]
    The second problem with Mr Hickey’s argument is that under s 8 HRA:

An Act, decision or statutory provision is compatible with human rights if the Act, decision or provision––

  1. does not limit a human right; or
  1. limits a human right only to the extent that is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in accordance with section 13.
  1. [35]
    Under s 13 HRA:

A human right may be subject under law only to reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, based on human dignity, equality and freedom.

  1. [36]
    The appellant contends the effect of this provision is that any law or order is invalid if it limits human rights to an extent greater than can be demonstrably justified. As I have said, of course, the difficulty with that is it does not limit or apply to orders of the Court. In any event, even if the HRA applied to the learned Magistrate’s decision to extend the order, I would find the restraining order imposed was compatible with human rights.
  2. [37]
    As I have said, under s 13, human rights may only be subject to reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free, democratic society. Section 13(2) sets out a variety of factors the Court might consider in determining whether the right is subject to reasonable limits. As identified by the appellant, the extended restraining order clearly limits his freedom of expression as it limits his ability to post online about the complainant. However, the limitation is imposed to protect the complainant and her dignity, privacy and reputation from scandalous material that was - and in the view of the Magistrate (a view I share) - might well, in the future, be published by the appellant about her. That is an important purpose which is consistent with a free and democratic society and respects other rights recognised in the HRA such as those referred to in s 25.
  3. [38]
    In addition, the appellant’s right in section 21 is limited only in a very minor way by the restraining order. He can publish material about any other topic as much as he sees fit, subject to the general law. Of course, it appears from the evidence that the one topic he really wants to publish material about is the complainant. That fact does, on one view of it, increase the impact of this particular narrow limitation on the appellant’s freedom of expression, but it also strengthens the justification for imposing the restraining order.
  4. [39]
    One final point should be made before leaving this issue. Although not raised in argument, the appellant might have submitted that the learned Magistrate, in construing the power to impose the restraining order under s 359F of the Code, should have had regard to the HRA. In particular, under section 48(1) of the HRA:

All statutory provisions must, to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose, be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights.

  1. [40]
    In my respectful view, albeit, by implication, his Honour did turn his mind to this question by clearly agreeing in the submission that section 13, in any event, authorised reasonable limits on, inter alia, the appellant’s freedom of expression.
  2. [41]
    In any event, the express words of s 359B identify unlawful stalking as including conduct of the kind prohibited by the order.  In those circumstances, where the Magistrate has turned their mind to the material before him or her and concluded that extension of the order was justified, it seems difficult to conclude that a construction of the statute is open which would excise from the scope of that power making orders of the kind that Mr Hickey objects to.

Appeals to the District Court

  1. [42]
    I now turn to an interesting point that arises in this appeal. Mr O'Brien submits that the appeal should be dismissed because the Court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision of a Magistrate to vary a restraining order under s 359F. That submission might, at first, seem an improbable one, but an analysis of the law, in my respectful view, demonstrates it is correct. There is no appeal to this Court from such a decision, nor, indeed, from a decision to impose a restraining order.
  2. [43]
    The starting point is the case of R v Johnston [2008] QCA 291. That case involved an appeal to the Court of Appeal from a decision in this Court to impose a restraining order. Fraser JA gave the leading judgment with which Keane JA and Atkinson J agreed.
  3. [44]
    In that case, as in this, the applicant was convicted on his own plea of guilty of one offence of unlawful stalking and, a month or so later, was sentenced to two and a-half years’ imprisonment for the offence. The sentencing Judge also made a restraining order in favour of the complainants and some of their family members. The analysis of the question of the power of the Court of Appeal to hear the application for leave to appeal is set out at [4] to [9] of his Honour’s judgment where his Honour states:

[4] The applicant seeks to challenge the restraining order concerning Ms Owen. With that in mind, the applicant filed an application for leave to appeal against sentence on 28 February 2008. The grounds of appeal are restricted to challenges against the restraining order. It is clear that the applicant only seeks to challenge the restraining order concerning Ms Owen.

[5] Section 668D(1)(c) of the Criminal Code confers a right to apply for leave to appeal “against the sentence passed on the person’s conviction”. In my opinion the restraining order is not a sentence against which an appeal may be brought under s 668D(1)(c) of the Code. The term “sentence” is defined in s 668(1) as including “any order made by the court of trial on conviction of a person with reference to the person’s person or property, whether or not the person is adversely affected thereby and whether or not the order is made instead of passing sentence”. The words “on conviction” mean “in consequence of conviction”: see R v Blow [1963] QWN 1 per Gibbs J at 4, following R v Harman [1959] 2 QB 134. R v Blow was followed in R v Marriner [2007] 1 Qd R 179; [2006] QCA 32, in which McPherson JA observed that it is not every order following chronologically after conviction that amounts to a “sentence” on conviction: “There must be a relationship of some discernible kind between the two in order to make it an order or “sentence” in the defined sense.”

[6] As to that, s 359F(2) of the Code provides:

“(2)  Whether the person is found guilty or not guilty or the prosecution ends in another way, if the presiding judge or magistrate considers it desirable, the judge or magistrate may constitute the court to consider whether a restraining order should be made against the person.”

[7] The judge or magistrate may act under that provision on application by the Crown or an interested person or on the judge’s or magistrate’s own initiative: s 359F(3). Subsection 359F(6) provides that the court may make a restraining order if it considers it desirable to do so having regard to the evidence given at the hearing of the charge and any application under subsection (3) and any further evidence the court may admit. Further, s 359F(10) of the Code provides that a restraining order proceeding is not a criminal proceeding. That perhaps explains why s 359F(2) includes what otherwise appears to be the unnecessary provision for the judge or magistrate hearing a charge to “constitute the court to consider whether a restraining order should be made against the person”.

[8] Those provisions make it plain that a restraining order is not a sentence. A restraining order lacks the requisite relationship with a conviction and it is made in the exercise of the relevant court’s civil jurisdiction rather than its criminal jurisdiction. It follows that the applicant had no right to apply for leave to appeal under s 668D(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

[9] However, because the order was made in the exercise of the District Court’s civil jurisdiction s 118(1)(a) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) did not exclude an appeal from the order under s 118(3). That provision therefore conferred upon the applicant a right to apply for leave to appeal from the restraining order. Importantly though, numerous authorities establish that leave to appeal under s 118(3) is ordinarily granted only where an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice to the applicant and there is a reasonable argument that there is an error to be corrected: see, for example, Pickering v McArthur [2005] QCA 294.

  1. [45]
    His Honour’s conclusion that a restraining order is not a sentence because it is made in the exercise of the Court’s civil jurisdiction and does not have as a condition of its making the conviction on the stalking offence is directly relevant to the analysis here.The effect of his Honour’s judgment is that there can be no appeal from the making of a restraining order based on rights to appeal against sentence.
  2. [46]
    Mr Hickey did not fall into that error, however. His appeal is brought under section 222(1) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). That section provides:

If a person feels aggrieved as complainant, defendant or otherwise by an order made by justices or a justice in a summary way on a complaint for an offence or breach of duty the person may appeal within 1 month after the date of the order to a District Court judge.

  1. [47]
    That section is obviously in quite different terms from s 668D(1)(c) of the Code, as relied on in passage from Johnston, quoted above. However, s 222 has been authoritatively determined by the Full Court of the Supreme Court in Schneider v Curtis [1967] Qd R 300 as not including any and every order made by a Magistrate on a complaint, but is limited in this way:

The question we have to decide is whether an appeal under s. 222 of the Justices Act lies in the present case. That section gives a right of appeal not from an order but only from “any order made… upon a complaint for an offence or breach of duty.” The section does not give a right of appeal from any order made in proceedings commenced by a complaint but only from “an order made upon a complaint.” These words (which are similar to the words of the definition of “order” originally contained in s. 4 of The Justices Act of 1886, whose effect was discussed by Griffith C.J. in Castlemaine Brewery and Quinlan Gray & Co. Brisbane Limited v. Collings Ex parte Collings (1896) 6 Q.L.J 273, at p. 275 in my opinion refer to an order disposing of the complaint itself and do not include an order upon an application made during the course of the proceedings instituted by the complaint.

[underlining added]

  1. [48]
    I am not aware and Mr O'Brien, who appeared for the Commissioner, is not aware of any Court of Appeal decision which departs from this construction of s 222. Neither would one expect there to be, given, in my respectful view, the construction by the Court is clearly correct. The effect of the reasoning in both Johnston and Schneider is that it is impossible to characterise an order that imposes or varies a restraining order as an order which disposes of the complaint.
  2. [49]
    A contrary view was suggested in two cases in this Court, Ralph v Commissioner of Police [2015] QDC 206 [40] – [41] and Croll v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 69 [42]. In both of those cases, the learned trial Judges were concerned with appeals from convictions for stalking offences. The principal part of both judgments was concerned with considering the appeal against the convictions. In each case, their Honours, having resolved that the conviction should be set aside, also dismissed the restraining orders.
  3. [50]
    Both learned Judges adopted the view that, if a conviction for a stalking offence was set aside, and it was evident on the record that the restraining order was made on the basis of the facts found proved by the Magistrate in the trial of the stalking offence, the restraining orders automatically fell (see Ralph [40]; Croll [42]).
  4. [51]
    Ralph is the only decision which contains any reasoning to that conclusion.  That appears at [41] of the learned trial Judge’s reasons. In that paragraph, his Honour refers to Johnston and Schneider and observes as follows:

It is therefore not necessary for me to resolve the argument between the parties on this issue. Because of the wide definition of “order” in the Justices Act 1886; there maybe some merit in the argument that the reasoning in R v Johnson can be distinguished. The decision in Schneider v Curtis [1967] Qd. R. 300, and particularly the statement of Gibbs J (as his Honour then was) at p 305 i.e. that “order” in s 222 refers “to an order disposing of the complaint itself”, which decision has been followed frequently since: see for example Coulter v Ryan [2006] QCA 567, probably favours the respondent’s argument that no appeal lies under s 222 from the making of a restraining order under s 359F of the Criminal Code. The application under s 359F is a separate proceeding, not criminal, albeit connected to the complaint of stalking, and the same result may follow as it did in Johnson, that an appeal may lie to this Court under s 45 of the Magistrates Court Act 1921.

  1. [52]
    Respectfully, that seems to support the conclusion that there can be no appeal of a restraining order made under the Code pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act. With respect then, I do not understand what the legal foundation is for the conclusion that if a conviction is set aside, the restraining order, itself, automatically falls.
  2. [53]
    There seems to me to be two problems with that proposition quite apart from the question of power to overturn those decisions.
  3. [54]
    First, a restraining order can be made, whether a person is “found guilty or not guilty or the prosecution ends in another way, if the presiding judge or magistrate considers it desirable to do so”.
  4. [55]
    The learned Magistrate can make that order, under s 359F(6), and conclude that it is desirable to make the order, having regard to evidence given at the hearing of the charge, necessarily even if that evidence cannot sustain a conviction of the charge. On that basis, respectfully, it does not seem to me to follow that setting aside a conviction of stalking automatically means the restraining order falls. To put the point another way, the facts which must be proved to convict a defendant of stalking, are different to the facts which must be proved for a judge or magistrate to impose a restraining order under s 359F.
  5. [56]
    What is made clear by s 359F is that the restraining order is not a criminal proceeding. As such, any question of fact in a restraining order proceeding must be decided on the balance of probabilities. Therefore, the fact that a stalking offence is not made out beyond reasonable doubt would not prevent a Magistrate from reasoning, on the basis of facts they found proved on the balance of probabilities (whether charged acts or not), that it is desirable to impose a restraining order.[2]
  6. [57]
    So, with great respect to their Honours, I do not agree that overturning a conviction on a stalking offence ipso facto means there is any error in fact-finding for the purposes of imposing a restraining order.
  7. [58]
    Second, if there is no appeal under s 222 of the Justices Act of a restraining order, how can there be a power on an appeal of a conviction for stalking to overturn the restraining order? As is made clear by s 359F(2), not only is this a civil proceeding, but the Court is constituted as a civil Court. I cannot see any reason then why the mere fact that there is a proper appeal of the conviction under s 222 somehow avoids the legal reality that no appeal of the restraining order arises under that section.
  8. [59]
    I am conscious of my own observations in Vukolic v Browning [2022] QDC 279 from [117] of that judgment, that a Judge should ordinarily not depart from a decision of a Judge of the same court on the proper construction of legislation where the departure could be characterised as a constructional choice, rather than a circumstance where the other construction is untenable. Bearing that in mind, however, it does not seem to me that either judgment contains (and I say this respectfully and without criticism, bearing in mind the pressure of work on Judges in this Court) a reasoned analysis in support of the construction preferred. In any event, if forced to say so, I would take the view that this is not a matter of constructional choice. Rather, the proposition that a restraining order can be the subject of appeal under s 222 of the Justices Act, in circumstances where it is associated with an appeal of a conviction, but not otherwise, is plainly incorrect.
  9. [60]
    For all those reasons, I conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction, under section 222 of the Justices Act, to hear an appeal from the making, varying or revoking of a restraining order whether associated with an appeal against conviction or not.
  10. [61]
    His Honour, in Ralph flagged the possibility that an appeal might lie to the District Court in respect of the civil restraining order, under section 45 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1921 (Qld). In my respectful view, no such appeal lies.
  11. [62]
    In Parr v the Department of Transport and Main Roads [2020] QDC 40, Judge Horneman-Wren SC was dealing with an appeal from the refusal of a Magistrate to make a special hardship order, under the Transport Operations (Road Use Management - Driver Licensing) Regulation 2010 (Qld). Part 40 of that Regulation provides a regime under which a person whose open or provisional driver’s licence has been suspended for accumulation of demerit points may obtain, on application to a Magistrate’s Court, a special hardship order authorising the person to continue to drive motor vehicles under the licence in stated circumstances.
  12. [63]
    In the matter before his Honour, the appellant had had his licence suspended for accumulated demerit points and made an application for a special hardship order, which was not successful. In that case, the department contended there was no right of appeal from a decision refusing to make a special hardship order, relevantly under the Magistrates Courts Act 1921.  The first point his Honour dealt with was the effect of the fact that the relevant regulations did not expressly provide for a right of appeal. He observed:

[15] There is certainly no express statutory conferral of a right of appeal under the Act or Regulation. There is, however, a legislative presumption expressed by the High Court in Electric Light and Power Supply Corporation Ltd v Electricity Commission of New South Wales (1956) 94 CLR 554, 560 as:

“When the legislature finds that a specific question of a judicial nature arises but that there is at hand an established court to the determination of which the question may be appropriately submitted, it may be supposed that if the legislature does not mean to take the court as it finds it with all its incidents including the liability to appeal, it will say so.

[16] McPherson JA in State of Queensland v Mowburn Nominees Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 195, 198-199 observed that in the Electric Light case the justices of the High Court set out a number of passages from the speeches of their Lordships in the House of Lords in National Telephone Co Ltd v Post Master General [1913] AC 546.  McPherson JA contented himself to refer to only one, that of Lord Parker of Waddington in which his Lordship said:

“Where by statute matters are referred to the determination of a court of record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the court will determine the matters, as a court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged, but all the incidents of such jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same.”

[17] Therefore, in referring to the Magistrate’s Court the determination of applications for special hardship orders, the legislature is presumed to have done so with all the incidents of the jurisdiction of that court, including any appeal rights, as might exist.

  1. [64]
    The analogy with the present situation is strong. Section 359F confers power on the Magistrates Court, sitting in its civil jurisdiction, to make a restraining order. There is no specific provision for appeal from that order in the Criminal Code. However, applying the observations cited by Horneman-Wren J above, it seems to me there is no reason why one would not assume the legislature to intend the Magistrates Court sitting in its civil jurisdiction to exercise that power with all the incidents of that jurisdiction, including the rights of appeal.
  2. [65]
    The difficulty is whether, in fact, any such appeal arises.  In considering whether any appeal arises from the making of a civil restraining order, two provisions of the Magistrates Courts Act are important.  The first is section 43, which provides:
  1. Subject to this Act, all judgments and orders made by a Magistrates Court shall be final and conclusive.
  1. Except as provided by this Act, or by or pursuant to any other Act now in force or hereafter to be passed, a judgment given by a Magistrates Court, or an action brought before it or depending therein, shall not be removed by appeal, motion, writ of error or certiorari, or otherwise into any other court.
  1. [66]
    An exception contemplated by s 43(2) is found in section 45, which provides:
  1. Subject to this Act, any party who is dissatisfied with the judgment or order of a Magistrates Court—
  1. in an action in which the amount, value or damage involved is more than the minor civil dispute limit; or
  1. in an action for the recovery of possession of land if—
  1. the value of the land is more than the minor civil dispute limit; or
  1. the annual rental of the land is more than the minor civil dispute limit; or
  1. in proceedings in interpleader in which the amount or damages claimed, or the value of the goods in question, is more than the minor civil dispute limit; or
  1. in a proceeding under the Property Law Act 1974, part 19, division 4, subdivision 1;

may appeal to the District Court as prescribed by the rules.

(2) Provided that—

  1. where in any of the cases above referred to in subsection (1) the amount, damage or value is not more than the minor civil dispute limit, an appeal shall lie by leave of the District Court or a District Court judge, who shall not grant such leave to appeal unless the court or judge is satisfied that some important principle of law or justice is involved;
  1. an appeal shall not lie from the decision of the Magistrates Court if, before the decision is pronounced, both parties agree, in writing signed by themselves or their lawyers or agents, that the decision of the court shall be final.

[…]

(5) In this section—

minor civil dispute limit means the amount that is, for the time being, the prescribed amount under the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009.

  1. [67]
    The first point to note is 43(1). It affirms the general common law position that all judgments of a Court are final, and that rights of appeal must be found in statute.[3] It is worth contrasting section 43(1) with the equivalent provision in section 118 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld).  Under s 118:
  1. This section—
  1. does not apply to an appeal from a judgment of the District Court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction under part 4; but
  1. does apply to an appeal from other judgments of the District Court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, including on an appeal brought before the court under the Justices Act 1886, section 222.
  1. A party who is dissatisfied with a final or interlocutory judgment of the District Court in its original jurisdiction may appeal to the Court of Appeal if the judgment—
  1. is given for an amount equal to or more than the Magistrates Courts jurisdictional limit; or
  1. relates to a claim for, or relating to, property that has a value equal to or more than the Magistrates Courts jurisdictional limit.
  1. Subject to sections 118A and 118B, a party who is dissatisfied with any other judgment of the District Court, whether in the court’s original or appellate jurisdiction, may appeal to the Court of Appeal with the leave of that court.
  1. [68]
    Read with sections 118A and 118B, which for present purposes are immaterial, the default position is that an appeal can be brought from any judgment or order, either as a right or with leave. As I have said, the contrast with section 43(1) of the Magistrates Courts Act is clear. It also has the consequence that the device by which Fraser JA proceeded to deal with the appeal of the restraining order before the Court of Appeal in Johnston will only be available to the District Court in an appeal from the imposition or extension of a restraining order under the Code in circumstances where a specific appeal is authorised from the Magistrates Court to the District Court in its civil jurisdiction, under s 45 of the Magistrates Courts Act.
  2. [69]
    In my respectful submission, no such appeal lies for two reasons:
    1. The first, it appears strongly arguable that the appeal against the making or extension of a restraining order is not an action within the meaning of that term, as used in section 45 of the Magistrates Courts Act.
    2. The second is that, even if it is, it is plainly not an action of any of the kinds identified in s 45(1)(a) to (d). That second point requires no further explanation.[4]
  3. [70]
    Of more interest, however, is the first question, whether a restraining order is a judgment or order “in an action”. It is in that area that Parr is of assistance. His Honour reviews the law in the area at length, from [22] to [42] of his Honour’s reasons. His Honour concludes, on the basis of that analysis, as follows:

[43] Both the definition of “action” in Halsbury’s Laws of England (by then in its fourth edition) and the statement by Kennedy LJ in Johnson v Refuge Assurance Co (1913) 1 KB 259, were referred to by Master Lee (as his Honour then was) in Ariadne Properties Limited v Russell [1989] 1 Qd R 491, 495, in support of his Honour’s view that “an action is its natural meaning refers to any proceeding in the nature of litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant” (emphasis added). His Honour would repeat that view in the subsequent case of Lebon v Lake Placid Resort Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 24, 32.

[44] In Winch v Kendall [2002] Qd R 560, 568, Thomas JA observed that those proceedings brought under s 9 of the Crimes Act were analogous with proceedings that could formerly have been brought under s 39 of the Justices Act, and that such proceedings required any person who may have a claim to the property to be given notice of the proceeding. His Honour further observed that in R v Otto (1996) 90 A Crim R 492 it was recognised that the ownership of property may be altered by the procedure. The relevant issue in Otto was whether the police officer who had brought the original application could have standing as a “person aggrieved” for the purpose of bringing an appeal from the Magistrate’s decision under s 209 of the Justices Act. It was held that he could. It should be noted that the appeal in question was an appeal by way of order to review in the Supreme Court. Section 209 has since been repealed. As already noted, a decision of a magistrate in respect of a special hardship order may be reviewable by the Supreme Court under Part 5 of the Judicial Review Act if made in jurisdictional error.

  1. [71]
    His Honour then concluded that the application with the special hardship order could not be characterised as an action, in the sense of “a proceeding in the nature of litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant”.
  2. [72]
    His Honour also found that it could not be said that that kind of proceeding before the Magistrates Court was conducted in the same way as other inter partes litigation. He explained:

[46]  Unlike an order under s 9 of the Excise Act, as in Wynch v Ketchell [2002] 2 Qd R 560, or an order under s 39 of the Justices Act, as considered in R v Otto, a proceeding for a special hardship order cannot affect ownership of property. Although an applicant is required to give the Chief Executive a copy of the application and the Chief Executive is entitled to appear on the hearing of the application, give and call evidence and examine and cross-examine witnesses, they are not required to do so. The Magistrates Court may itself require the applicant to attend as a witness to give evidence in relation to relevant matters and the applicant may be liable to cross-examination, presumably by the court itself. No doubt, any such cross examination must be directed towards those matters prescribed by s 111 of which the court must be satisfied before being empowered to make the special hardship order, including those matters to which the affidavit required by s 111(2) to be filed must address.

[47]  In my view, such a proceeding is antithetical to litigation inter partes. There is no demand or right being asserted by the applicant. There is no alleged infringement of any right by anyone in the nature of a defendant. It is a proceedings brought on the initiative of one party, which does not require there to be a contradictor, in which a discretion may be exercised in the applicant’s favour upon a magistrate reaching a state of satisfaction as to specified statutory criteria.

[48]  Although in Wynch v Ketchell Thomas JA adopted what was said in Clarke v Bradlaugh (1881) 7 QBD 38 (and Bradlaugh v Clarke) about an action being, in its proper legal sense, a generic term, it could only be if it, literally, included every sort of legal proceeding that an application for a special hardship order could be considered an action. As can be seen from the analysis above, Clarke v Bradlaugh was a case in which there was no issue as to a suit being able to be brought by one party against another, only the identity of the proper suitor, and in Wynch v Ketchell itself, it was a case in which the final ownership of property might be determined.

[49]  In my view, “action” as used in s 45(1) cannot, literally, include every sort of legal proceeding because of the qualifying words “in which the amount involved is more than the minor civil dispute amount.” Those words of qualification narrow the use of the term “action” to proceedings to which a value can be ascribed. An application for a special hardship order is not such a proceeding. A special hardship order is not able to be ascribed a value. It is not analogous to a proceeding for the quantification of a right to statutory compensation as was the case in State of Queensland v Mowburn Nominees Pty Ltd [2005] Qd R 195. Nor is it analogous to an application for a forfeiture order of certain property under the Crimes Act, to which property of value may also be ascribed, as was the case in Wynch v Ketchell.

  1. [73]
    I agree with those observations.  As his Honour says, “action”, as used in s 45(1), cannot include every sort of legal proceedings.  Based on his Honour’s construction of what amounts to an action under s 45(1), I think it strongly arguable that a proceeding under s 359F is also not an action.  The order does not require, for example, the commencement of any civil proceeding.  It arises on the hearing of a charge of unlawful stalking.  In that sense, it is not commenced by any civil process.  Further, a restraining order is not necessarily made on the application of an applicant directed to a defendant.  It can be seen from s 359F(3) that the order may be made on the application of the Crown or some interested person or, indeed, without any application from any person, but, rather, on the Magistrates own initiative. 
  2. [74]
    It is also difficult to see how the hearing leading to a restraining order involves litigation or any pre-existing right litigated between a plaintiff and defendant.  In my respectful view, there is a strong argument that the proceeding in which a restraining order is made not a judgment or order in an action within the meaning of s 45(1).
  3. [75]
    Of course, even if I was wrong in that analysis, it is not an action with a characteristic of any of the actions described in s 45(1).  Therefore, in my view, there is no entitlement to appeal to this Court under section 45 of the Magistrates Courts Act from the making, varying or revoking of a restraining order.  And there is no other basis for appeal.
  4. [76]
    It is odd, some might think, that the situation is different in respect of an order making or varying a restraining order where the order is made in the District Court.  However, as indicated above, that is the consequence of the proper construction of section 118 of the District Court Act 1867, as interpreted by the Court of Appeal.  As I have explained, the terms of ss 43 and 45 of the Magistrates Courts Act are quite different. In fact, those provisions tend to disclose an intention in Parliament that Magistrates Court judgments be final in many cases. If the Parliament wants to change the position, it can certainly change section 43 and/or 45.
  5. [77]
    Where does that leave the disappointed object of a restraining order made by Magistrate who wishes to challenge the order? The answer is, with very little scope to do so.
  6. [78]
    As Horneman-Wren J observed in Parr, a decision of a Magistrate may be reviewable by the Supreme Court, under part 5 of the Judicial Review Act if affected by jurisdictional error.  That, in my respectful view, would apply just as much to a restraining order, as to a special hardship order. The reason I say it does not leave much scope challenge is that the grounds for obtaining an order to review under part 5 of the Judicial Review Act are quite limited where that application is directed to a Court.
  7. [79]
    It is trite law that Courts are authorised to make errors of law within jurisdiction.  It would only be errors of law going to jurisdiction to hear and determine which would give rise to a review under part 5. It is difficult to see what the jurisdictional error permitting such a review would be, other than highly improbable circumstances, such as bad faith or the making or varying of a restraining order in circumstances outside the scope for doing so under the statute. In that regard, I have already considered that it is not an error, much less an error going to jurisdiction, to make an order varying or revoking a restraining order under s 359F(7) in circumstances where the application to vary is filed before the expiry of the order.
  8. [80]
    There is another possibility which should be dealt with. It is to be noted that there is no express words constraining when and how an application to vary or revoke under s 359F(7) might be made. In my respectful view, however, that leaves very little, if any, room to, in effect, appeal the making of the order by the device of seeking to vary it. It is clear from these reasons and from R v Johnston, that this is a civil matter.
  9. [81]
    Although a restraining order might not properly be characterised as an interlocutory civil order, it has the characteristics of an interlocutory civil order because of the ability for it to be varied or revoked at any time. In my view, a civil order of that kind, if not truly interlocutory, is analogous to an interlocutory order and is one which should attract the same principles. In Heritage Bank v Gleeson (No 3) [2020] QDC 217 from [47], I dealt with the proposition that successive applications to vary or revoke an interlocutory order, where there has been no material change in circumstances from those existing when the order was made, can be an abuse of process which can be restrained by the Court in which those successive applications are brought. In my respectful view, those principles would apply equally to applications to vary or revoke a restraining order.
  10. [82]
    Where there has been no material change of circumstances, the bringing of such an application will, in my view, ordinarily be an abuse of process. A Court can summarily dismiss such an application as an abuse of process or can make an order, in protecting its processes from abuse, which prohibit a person from making further such applications absolutely or without leave by the Court. Generally, such orders can require leave to be sought before service of anything on any respondent to such application. It can be seen from this analysis that the prospect of variation or revocation will ordinarily not give rise to a right to seek to go behind the restraining order by a process analogous to an appeal by way of re-hearing.
  11. [83]
    It is consistent with general civil law principles that once an order is made, it stands, even if it is defeasible by subsequent order, unless there has been a material change of circumstances. The consequence is that an attempt to achieve an appeal by a variation application ought ordinarily to be dismissed as an abuse of process, unless there is a material change in circumstances.

Merits of the Appeal

  1. [84]
    I have found the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, either under the Justices Act or under the Magistrates Courts Act. I can think of no other source of statutory appeal right, and, therefore, the appeal should necessarily be dismissed.
  2. [85]
    I should deal briefly, however, with the merits of the appeal. In that regard, I have already explained that the HRA provides no basis for the argument that there is an error by his Honour in making a further order that restrained posting of material about the complainant. Beyond that, it needs to be recalled that his Honour’s order was an order which had an evaluative element, that is, whether it was desirable to vary the order. That is a condition which one would read into s 359F(9), bearing in mind the terms of s 359F(6). Once his Honour made a decision on that evaluative standard, there is a true discretion as to whether he makes the order at all. Both a legal standard, which involves evaluative judgments and a true discretion are apt to attract the principles in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499. The well-known passage relevantly provides:

The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution, for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.

  1. [86]
    I have already explained that I do not think there was any error of law in his Honour’s approach arising out of the HRA and how it might apply (or not apply) in this case. Further, I would have reached the same conclusion as his Honour based on the material put before the Court in that hearing.
  2. [87]
    I think his Honour’s observations, not only about the material that was filed, but what was said by Mr Hickey in the transcript of the hearing, powerfully support his view that in the absence of this order, Mr Hickey would, indeed, seek to post more material of an insulting kind about the complainant. That is not least because of his belief (asserted, yet again, before his Honour) that the previous convictions were somehow unsound, and that he has a legal right to post as he wishes about the complainant. Even if I thought I should reconsider the matter on the merits, I would have made the same order as his Honour, largely for the reasons his Honour gave, though I might have been inclined to extend for a further five years, not two.
  3. [88]
    For those reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

Footnotes

[1] Transcript of Hearing 1-25, 1-26.

[2] See Ralph [40].

[3] Grierson v The King (1938) 60 CLR 431, 436 (Dixon J); NH v DPP (2016) 260 CLR 546 [94] (Nettle and Gordon JJ).

[4] I do note however, that in Parr, Horneman-Wren J reached the same conclusion in respect of the refusal to grant a special hardship order, because it was not an order within s 45.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Hickey v Commissioner of Police

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Hickey v Commissioner of Police

  • Reported Citation:

    (2023) 3 QDCR 191

  • MNC:

    [2023] QDC 181

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Porter KC DCJ

  • Date:

    25 Aug 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Ariadne Properties Ltd v Russell [1989] 1 Qd R 491
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1989] 1 Qd R 491
Castlemaine Brewery and Quinlan Gray & Co. Brisbane Limited v Callings Ex parte Ceilings (1896) 6 Q.L.J. 273
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1896) 6 Q.L.J. 273
Clarke v Bradlaugh (1881) 7 QBD 38
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1881) 7 QBD 38
Coulter v Ryan[2007] 2 Qd R 302; [2006] QCA 567
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2006] QCA 567
Croll v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 69
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QDC 69
Cite 2 - [2023] QDC 69
Grierson v R (1938) 60 CLR 431
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1938) 60 CLR 431
Cite 2 - (1938) 60 CLR 431
Heritage Bank Ltd v Gleeson (No 3) [2020] QDC 217
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QDC 217
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Cite 2 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Johnson v Refuge Assurance Company Limited (1913) 1 KB 259
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1913) 1 KB 259
Ketchell v Wynch[2002] 2 Qd R 560; [2001] QCA 391
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] 2 Qd R 560
Lebon v Lake Placid Resort Pty Ltd[1995] 1 Qd R 24; [1993] QSC 421
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1995] 1 Qd R 24
Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2011) 245 CLR 1
Cite 2 - (2011) 245 CLR 1
National Telephone Co Ltd v Postmaster-General (1913) AC 546
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1913) AC 546
NH v Director of Public Prosecutions (2016) 260 CLR 546
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2016) 260 CLR 546
Cite 2 - (2016) 260 CLR 546
Parr v Department of Transport and Main Roads [2020] QDC 40
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QDC 40
Cite 2 - [2020] QDC 40
Pickering v McArthur [2005] QCA 294
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 294
Power Supply Corporation Ltd v Electricity Commission of New South Wales (1956) 94 C.L.R 554
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1956) 94 C.L.R 554
R v Blow [1963] QWN 1
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1963] QWN 1
R v Harman (1959) 2 QB 134
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1959) 2 QB 134
R v Johnston [2008] QCA 291
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] QCA 291
Cite 2 - [2008] QCA 291
R v Marriner[2007] 1 Qd R 179; [2006] QCA 32
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2006] QCA 32
Cite 2 - [2007] 1 Qd R 179
R. v Otto (1996) 90 A Crim R 492
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1996) 90 A Crim R 492
Ralph v Commissioner of Police [2015] QDC 206
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QDC 206
Cite 2 - [2015] QDC 206
Schneider v Curtis [1967] Qd R 300
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1967] Qd R 300
Cite 2 - [1967] Qd R 300
Cite 3 - [1967] Qd R 300
State of Queensland v Mowburn Nominees Pty Ltd[2005] 1 Qd R 195; [2004] QCA 212
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] 1 Qd R 195
State of Queensland v Mowburn Nominees Pty Ltd [2005] Qd R 195
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] Qd R 195
Vukolic v Browning [2022] QDC 279
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QDC 279
Cite 2 - [2022] QDC 279
Wynch v Ketchell [2002] Qd R 560
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] Qd R 560

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Morris v Commissioner of Police [2025] QDC 1112 citations
1

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