DGE v REU[2023] QDC 35

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Introduction

1. [1]
   On 29 July 2022, in the Magistrates Court at Beenleigh, the learned Magistrate made a protection order directed to DGE, identifying the aggrieved as his wife, REU, and naming the two children of their marriage as named persons. 
2. [2]
   The protection order had the usual mandatory provision in paragraph 1.  It included the usual, general form provision covering named children in paragraph 2.  Paragraphs 3 and 4 contained discretionary provisions that in effect prohibited DGE from approaching to within 100 metres and 50 metres, respectively, of REU except in certain circumstances. 
3. [3]
   Paragraph 5 of the order prohibited DGE from contacting or attempting to contact REU except for certain specific exceptions.  The specific exceptions mostly related to appearing in Court or otherwise having dealings with each other arising out of Court proceedings.  Contact was permitted in respect of the Family Court proceedings and Family Court orders relating to the care of their joint children.  The order was made to continue until July 2027.  The learned Magistrate also dismissed DGE’s application for a protection order directed to REU. 
4. [4]
   DGE appealed the whole of that decision.  He sought to have the domestic violence order in favour of REU and the named children set aside.  He also sought to have the decision dismissing his application set aside. 
5. [5]
   DGE appeared for himself in the matter before the Magistrates Court. REU was represented by solicitors and counsel.  On the appeal, DGE was again self-represented and REU was again represented by solicitors and counsel.  Mr Stephen Jones of counsel appeared for REU.  I record my gratitude for the assistance given by Mr Jones to the Court. 
6. [6]
   DGE challenges the order made in favour of REU on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to prove the acts of domestic violence and, in broad terms, that there were mistakes of fact in the reasons.  He also challenges the dismissal of his application because of errors in his Honour’s reasons. 
7. [7]
   DGE is intelligent and appears to read English competently, though his speaking ability is somewhat less.  His limited ability to express himself in English affected his efficacy in communicating his points.

Nature of the appeal

8. [8]
   DGE sought a de novo hearing before this Court, but I did not consider that to be the correct course in the circumstances.  The matter therefore proceeded as an appeal by way of rehearing.  Decisions in this Court have dictated that that is the nature of an appeal to this Court of a decision of a Magistrate under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (the Act) where the Court does not choose to conduct a de novo trial in the matter.^[1]  
9. [9]
   DGE’s notice of appeal also indicated a wish to adduce fresh evidence both in respect of some child support agency matters and an issue to do with furniture.  He did not ultimately seek leave to tender such evidence.  Rather, he tendered, without objection and with leave:

1. (a)
   A translation of a text message exchange between himself and a Mr Amir Kashani from 17 December 2020, which became exhibit 1 in the appeal; and
2. (b)
   Another document which did not figure in the argument. 

9. [10]
   The hearing before the learned Magistrate proceeded over three days on 8, 12 and 29 July 2022.  The 8 July hearing involved, amongst other things, cross-examination of DGE and cross-examination of REU through a translator.  What passed on 12 July is not clear.  Although the transcript was produced, it was not made available to the respondent in this appeal.  There appears to have been some discussions and submissions on that day.  In any event, on 29 July, there was substantial further hearing and then his Honour gave his reasons. 
10. [11]
    It is important to bear in mind that his Honour saw both witnesses cross-examined and read the material.  As this is an appeal by way of rehearing, there are two further important principles to bear in mind from the start. 
11. [12]
    First, it is necessary to show error.  Second, in circumstances where there has been decisions made about issues of credit, an appeal Court is usually disinclined to form a contrary view on matters that relate to such findings.  However, it is always open to an appeal Court to form a different view on a fact that depended on a finding of credit if a proper basis is identified.  That is, a basis which respects the undoubted advantage of the trial Judge to make such assessments.

The proceedings below

13. [13]
    The acts of domestic violence that REU alleged were committed against her were extremely serious.  They included allegations of rape and of physical abuse by DGE of his young daughter.  His Honour was unpersuaded on the balance of probabilities that those acts occurred. 
14. [14]
    Despite rejecting all the most serious allegations made by REU, his Honour found three acts of domestic violence established:

1. (a)
   That DGE miused his power to impose (or cause REU to believed he had imposed) a ban on her travel out of Iran while she was visiting that country;
2. (b)
   That DGE had sold the couple’s furniture while REU was away; and
3. (c)
   That DGE had refused to pay assessed child support in a manner which amounted to domestic violence under the Act.

Travel Ban

15. [15]
    This is the most significant finding made by his Honour and was a central issue in this appeal.
16. [16]
    The alleged travel ban (or threat of such a ban) is said to have arisen out of a text message from DGE to a Mr Kashani (his role is explained below) that was sent on 17 December 2020.  At that time, REU had recently taken the children to Iran for a family visit motivated by illness in REU’s household.  The message has to be put in context. 
17. [17]
    When REU arrived in Iran, DGE retained a lawyer to initiate divorce proceedings in that country.  He gave a power of attorney to the lawyer to initiate any type of claim, to prosecute the claim, to ban his wife from leaving Iran and to pursue steps to divorce her, amongst other matters.  That power of attorney gave DGE’s solicitor power to act on DGE’s behalf to do those things.  It is not evidence that he was instructed by DGE to actually do any of those things. It is not evidence that any of those things could be done as a matter of law.  However, it is evidence that it was within the contemplation of the power of attorney, and therefore, DGE that a travel ban on REU was a possibility.
18. [18]
    Not long after that, it seems, Mr Kashani became involved as a go-between to try and mediate between DGE and REU.  The evidence is that Mr Kashani become involved in the context of ongoing marital strife.  
19. [19]
    For the purposes of the trial in the Magistrates Court, REU contracted a qualified translator to translate part of a text message from DGE to Mr Kashani.  It was not in dispute at the trial or in the hearing that that message was intended to be communicated to REU because Mr Kashani, as I said, was acting as some sort of mediator or go-between.  The words that were given to the translator for translation were translated as:

Barred from leaving country is for avoiding hasty and insane actions

Dear Amir, when the divorce is performed, barred from leaving country will be cancelled automatically and she will return on date of her ticket if she does not complicate the divorce file. (sic)

20. [20]
    The text was sent on 17 December 2020.  The date of REU’s return ticket was April 2021 at that time.   
21. [21]
    Before his Honour there was evidence that REU retained solicitors to deal with DGE’s apparent effecting of a travel ban until an Iranian divorce was agreed.  Solicitors for REU wrote a letter to DGE on 29 January 2021.  That letter asserts that DGE had:

1. (a)
   banned REU from travelling from Iran;
2. (b)
   requested full custody of the children in Iran;
3. (c)
   threatened to prevent REU and the children from travelling to Australia if she did not agree to a divorce; and
4. (d)
   required REU to give up her right to mahr, which as I understand is a form of dowry right in Iran. 

20. [22]
    It was then asserted by REU’s solicitors (arguably correctly) that to threaten a travel ban in this way was domestic violence under the Act.  The letter states:

Please be advised that you have 14 days to lift the travelling ban on our client and the children and send a letter by your lawyer that our client is free to come back to Australia. 

23. [23]
    DGE responded to that letter on 30 January, though the response did not appear to be in the evidence.  Whatever the response said, REU’s solicitor’s replied to the 30 January letter arguing DGE had not really grappled with the travel ban issue.  As a result DGE sent another response in the form of a letter of 8 February in which he said, inter alia:

I am not sure if she is banned from travelling or not.  She might be banned because of having active case in Iran’s court.  My lawyer heard from department of borders that as we migrate together to Australia, I have lost my right to not giving her consent for travelling.  On the other hand, if the divorce takes place, there will be nothing that can stop her from travelling overseas and if she is agreeable to that divorce could have happen in a few days.  I have said before, however, I will help her to come to Australia on her scheduled time if she needs my consent regardless of the divorce finalised or not.  She needs, anyway, to provide some sort of commitment that she will not take the children to a third country instead of coming to Australia. 

[underlining added]

24. [24]
    There is no evidence of any further solicitor’s letter after the 8 February letter.  There is no evidence that there ever was a travel ban actually in existence.  There is no evidence that, as a matter of Iranian law, such a ban could exist.  There is some unanswered evidence in DGE’s email that indicates a travel ban would not have arisen, although one would not form a concluded view on Iranian law based on that hearsay statement. 
25. [25]
    More importantly, there is no suggestion in the material that any such ban or any threat of such ban remained after 8 February, nor that any such ban affected anything that happened thereafter.  His Honour, considering that evidence, correctly concluded that there was no evidence that there was a ban, but held that at the very least:

[DGE] was aware of the state of mind of the aggrieved as to the existence of a ban and he manipulated that belief and he sought to compel her to comply with his divorce application. 

26. [26]
    Until DGE, with some admirable persistence, pointed out the significance of the translation he had tendered in the appeal, I was inclined to agree with his Honour that the apparent travel ban threat in the 17 December 2020 communication could amount to domestic violence. My main concern was how that matter could have informed the conclusion on the legal standard in s 37(1)(c) of the Act that a protection order was necessary or desirable.  Once the effect of DGE’s threat was pointed out he immediately abandoned the threat and it, apparently, had no further consequence.  It seemed to me that given what happened after that, where no further consequence seems to have flowed despite REU remaining in Iran for another four or five months, that it was difficult to see there was any risk of any further acts of domestic violence of that kind. 
27. [27]
    However, the character of the appeal on that point changed when I read a translation of the whole exchange between DGE and Mr Kashani from which extracts in paragraph [19] above were taken.  That full translation is exhibit 1 referred to in paragraph [9](a) above. That full translation puts the two sentences quoted above into quite a different context.  Apart from anything else, the balance of the whole communication:

1. (a)
   Asserts that, in respect of the dowry, Iran’s law is totally in REU’s favour;
2. (b)
   Make various other complaints; and
3. (c)
   The context of the text read as a whole removes a bit of the sting of the two parts that are quoted by REU’s translation which are relied upon as showing domestic violence. 

26. [28]
    However, those aspects pale into insignificance when one notes that the last sentence of the third paragraph of the message was omitted in the version provided to his Honour.  That sentence in the translation in exhibit 1 states:

When they wish to come, they can and if the divorce application is not finalised, I will lift the ban so they can come.

29. [29]
    Interestingly, DGE had not forgotten he had said that already, because in his 8 February letter, he said:

As I said before, I will help her to come to Australia if she needs my consent regardless of the divorce finalised or not.

30. [30]
    In light of this evidence, there was never a basis rationally to conclude that DGE threatened to make use of any law in Iran to stop REU leaving the country. 
31. [31]
    It is a matter of extreme concern to this Court how it came to be that that part of the message was not translated and raised with the trial Judge below.  DGE tried to raise this in cross‑examination with REU at trial.  He tried to raise it in submissions at trial.  The limitations of his abilities in English left his arguments on that point obscure to the Court.  I do not know if I can reach the same conclusion about REU’s understanding during cross-examination.  Looking at the transcript, it might be that REU understood what DGE was trying to say but choose to avoid the question.^[2]
32. [32]
    What I do know is that someone read the whole message in its original Farsi.  That person chose to translate only the two harmful parts and not the exculpatory sentence. 
33. [33]
    Intentionally or not (if it was intentional, there may be an offence committed here) his Honour was misled about the content of the message and the whole context of the so-called travel ban threat.  In the context of the text message as a whole, there is no reasonable suggestion of a threat to prevent REU from leaving Iran until she had agreed to a divorce. Therefore, his Honour erred in concluding that that there was an act of domestic violence arising out of the 17 December message.
34. [34]
    One further point has emerged during the preparation of these reasons which was not noted in my oral reasons.  During the hearing of the appeal, REU sought to explain why only part of the 17 December message was before his Honour.  She, through her counsel, explained that the translation service was expensive, and to avoid the cost she had extracted only those parts that she considered relevant.^[3]  She gave similar evidence when cross examined by DGE about selective translation at the trial.^[4]
35. [35]
    In preparing these reasons for publication it was noticed that the 17 December message was not the only document that REU had paid to have translated.  In fact, exhibited to the affidavit of REU, which was before his Honour, there is about two and a half full pages of translated documents.^[5]  REU had these documents translated by the same person that translated the 17 December message.  These documents contain large sections which are of, at best, marginal relevance to the issues between the parties.   
36. [36]
    Considering this evidence, it seems doubtful that the reason given by REU, through her counsel, for the misleading way in which the 17 December message was selectively translated and tendered to the Court below was accurate.  

Sale of Furniture

37. [37]
    The next matter that his Honour relied on as an act of domestic violence was in respect of DGE’s dealings with furniture.  This arose in the context where DGE, REU and their two children had been sharing a flat.  DGE moved out of that flat while REU and their two children were away in Iran. 
38. [38]
    Before his Honour it was said that merely moving out of the flat was domestic violence.  However, the lease was up and DGE said he did not have the money to keep on with the lease.  His Honour accepted that evidence and concluded that merely moving out was not domestic violence.  I do not need to say any more about that. 
39. [39]
    However there was also a complaint about DGE’s dealing with the furniture in that flat.^[6]  DGE alleged that he moved out of the flat and into a furnished share house.  As a result, he needed to store or sell the furniture.  He claimed that he stored some of the furniture with friends of REU at her instruction, some of the furniture in his friend’s garage, and although he attempted to sell the rest of the furniture, he was only able to sell a sofa for $200. 
40. [40]
    REU gave evidence that she attended a police station some time after her return to Australia.  It appears that she sought the police’s help, in part, to find the furniture.  She gave evidence that ‘in her presence, the police called [DGE],’ they asked if he would return the furniture, and he told them that he had sold everything that had been in the flat.
41. [41]
    Before his Honour, it was put to DGE that he had told police that he had sold ‘some’ of the furniture.  DGE agreed that he had said that but had meant only the sofa and a table that had been in front of the sofa.  His Honour’s finding was this:

I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities the respondent was not honest about the furniture, and, while his story changed later, he – through the police he led the aggrieved to believe that he had sold it all.  Those sorts of actions take control away from people and it is intimidatory. 

42. [42]
    Even on those findings, I do not think it is open to conclude that that conduct is intimidatory.  It could be the sort of action that takes control away from people, I accept, although it might depend on who owned the furniture.  In any event, the real difficulty with that finding is the finding that DGE was not honest about the furniture. 
43. [43]
    His Honour does not say who DGE was not honest to, what he was not honest about or when.  Presumably, as Mr Jones, counsel for REU, sensibly submitted, it must be to the aggrieved.  But the only evidence that DGE told the aggrieved all the furniture had been sold was that of REU herself.  His Honour rejected her evidence in quite fundamental ways.  It is difficult to see what was special about that little comment that made his Honour accept that evidence. 
44. [44]
    It would be different, of course, if there was evidence which tended to corroborate REU’s allegation on this point.  Judges commonly find facts consistent with a witness’ evidence, even when they have doubts about the credibility or reliability of that witness, where that witness’s evidence is corroborated by other facts that make their evidence inherently probable.  The difficulty is, as far as I could tell, looking at the cross-examination of DGE, the only evidence of any significance was in his own affidavit at section A3.  With respect to him, that part of his affidavit is a little unclear, but I do not read it as conceding the version given by REU. 
45. [45]
    I am not satisfied that his Honour was correct to conclude that there was any meaningful act of domestic violence arising out of dealings with the furniture.  I say that recognising that it would be quite a significant concern for a person to come home with two children to take care of and to not have furniture.  I accept that.  But that broad proposition does not turn the circumstances in which the furniture was dealt with here into an act of domestic violence.

Child Support Issue

46. [46]
    The last matter that was relied upon by his Honour was to do with DGE’s failure to pay child support.  His Honour’s finding was that although DGE had challenged an assessment to child support, it had not been overturned.  There was evidence that he could afford to pay, and his non-payment is further evidence of abuse in the form of economic abuse. 
47. [47]
    I accept that it is possible that conduct in respect of child support may be economic abuse.  That is made clear because economic abuse in its extended definition includes ‘withholding or threatening to withhold the financial support necessary for meeting the reasonable living expenses of… a child, if… the child is entirely or predominantly dependent’ on the person for financial support.^[7]  However, that is conditioned in this way.  That act of withholding must be coercive, deceptive, or unreasonably controlling. 
48. [48]
    There is no suggestion that DGE’s challenge to the assessment was not bona fide, nor that it was not being promptly pursued, nor that DGE had in some sustained way shown evidence of living in a way that made the challenge to the assessment, self-evidently, an abuse of process. 
49. [49]
    His Honour also seems to have been persuaded to treat the non-payment of child support as an act of domestic violence that formed part of further evidence of abuse.  I have already found that neither of his Honour’s findings up to this point can be sustained, the most important one being in respect of the 17 December 2020 message (but that, of course, was not his Honour’s error at all).
50. [50]
    On the evidence before his Honour, it might be possible to characterise, as economic abuse, DGE’s decision not to pay child support pending his appeal. I have reservations that that finding was supported by the evidence in the circumstances I have described, though I am not entirely persuaded that his Honour erred in concluding that the conduct in relation to child support could be characterised as an act of domestic violence. 

Necessity and Desirability of a Protection Order

51. [51]
    I now turn to Honour’s conclusion on s 37(1)(c) that a protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence.  His Honour noted that his observation of REU in Court was that she was quite capable of protecting herself, but he recognised that is not the test.  Beyond that, the gravamen of his conclusion that a protection order was necessary or desirable is expressed in this way:

[D]omestic violence can occur indirectly and via behaviour which amounts to coercive control, intimidation, and harassment or financial control, all of which can be done from afar. 

So, in all the circumstances, I am satisfied there is a risk of there being further acts of domestic violence committed by the respondent if no order were made. 

52. [52]
    His Honour seemed to be influenced in coming to that conclusion because of the need of the parties to deal with each other in respect of child rearing issues. 
53. [53]
    I would have had a difficulty with the conclusion that a protection order was necessary or desirable given the matters that his Honour had found because:

1. (a)
   The first act of domestic violence, in the absence of the exhibit put before me in this trial, seemed to be something the effect of which was abandoned immediately.  It was challenged and had no subsequent manifestation.  It suggested a willingness of DGE to respect the law when it was explained to him; 
2. (b)
   The second was a very minor act; and
3. (c)
   The third had the difficulty that so long as the application to set aside the child support application was bona fide and continued to be made, the effect of making an order was to compel the payment of the child support. I note that Mr Jones makes the point that the way the child support regime works is to pay first and argue later and I accept that point. 

52. [54]
    In any event, however, it is not necessary for me to resolve that because in circumstances where two out of three of the matters found by his Honour cannot now be sustained (including the most series act), I am not satisfied that it is possible properly to conclude that a protection order was necessary or desirable. 
53. [55]
    An additional consideration that impugns his Honour’s conclusion on s 37(1)(c), I say with respect, is that it was uncontentious that parenting orders had been made some eight months before and there is no evidence that DGE has breached those orders or caused other difficulties in respect of them.  They contain specific orders requiring in 22 to 25, effectively, respectful behaviour between both parents and the children.  To my mind, it was a significant oversight not to take those circumstances into account in considering the legal standard in s 37(1)(c) of the Act. 
54. [56]
    For all those reasons, it does not seem to me that the protection order in favour of REU can stand, nor that on the evidence before me is there any need for the matter to be referred back to the Magistrates Court for rehearing.  With the one minor factual issue about the furniture, his Honour has made findings of fact and really this judgment involves analysis of those facts, the application of the law to those facts, and, of course, the effect of the further evidence about the translation of the 17 December 2020 messages.  That translation was not challenged in this appeal. 
55. [57]
    However, there are more problems with the protection order made in favour of REU.  Order 2 required DGE to be of good behaviour towards his children, not commit associated domestic violence against the children and not expose the children to domestic violence.  I struggle to see the basis for that order, even bearing in mind that it concerned associated domestic violence, that is, third party exposure to domestic violence, as well as direct acts against the children. 
56. [58]
    It is a bit difficult to see what the justification for that order would be given that no violence against the children was found by his Honour and that the kinds of domestic violence that were found by his Honour would be subtle (to say the least) from the perspective of the children. 
57. [59]
    However, the more significant problem lies with paragraphs 3, 4, and 5.  In paragraph 3 orders were made to stop DGE from approaching to within 100 metres of where REU lives, works or frequents.  Under paragraph 4, DGE could not approach within 50 metres of REU.  A lot of the hearing was taken up with his Honour explaining all this to DGE, but no one seemed to turn their mind to what possible basis there was for such orders to be made.  His Honour had not found that DGE was a violent man to his wife or daughter. There was no suggestion he was stalking his wife nor even that he had taken any concrete intimidatory step. 
58. [60]
    To my mind, there was just no justification for the discretionary inclusion of those orders.  No reasons were given for this (and they should have been in the circumstance of this case) and if his Honour had turned his mind to reasons, I struggle to see how they could have been justified based on his Honour’s findings. Those orders are very significantly burdensome to a respondent.  If a respondent by hir or her conduct justifies such orders, so be it. But orders of that kind should not be included as of course.   
59. [61]
    As to paragraph 5, there was a prohibition on DGE from contacting REU.  Again, there was no evidentiary foundation from findings of fact made by his Honour to justify that.  That order should not have been made and the discretion exercised in at least orders 3, 4, and 5 substantially miscarried. 
60. [62]
    In those circumstances, I order that DGE’s appeal of the protection order made against him be upheld.  I set aside the protection order and I dismiss REU’s application for a protection order.  I should, out of respect to Mr Jones’ submission, note that he suggested the matter should be returned to the Court for a rehearing.  For the reasons I have given, I found that unnecessary. 

Cross-Application

63. [63]
    I now turn to DGE’s cross-application.  It might have been thought that once success on his appeal of the protection order was assured, DGE may not have wished to continue to pursue his cross-application.  However, he said that he did.  I asked him what acts of domestic violence he alleged in respect of REU.  It was only at that point which the significance of exhibit 1 emerged. 
64. [64]
    His submission, and it was not one lacking credibility, was that to misuse Court proceedings to intimidate or manipulate can comprise domestic violence.  So much was the basis of his Honour’s finding, in effect, in respect of the travel ban.  His submission was that REU put only part of the 17 December 2020 text message before the Court and omitted his statement that if the family wished to return to Australia, they could, even if the application for divorce was not finalised.  He said that the omission of that part of the message, I should infer, was deliberate and was done so as to use the proceedings to get an order against him. 
65. [65]
    The difficulty I have with accepting DGE’s argument is that depending on how the relevant sections came to be omitted, the omission may or may not be a very serious act.  DGE did try to raise this issue before his Honour and as I explained, his own limits in English made it difficult for him to properly articulate the point and I do not think his Honour ever really understood it.  However, it is a matter which might amount to domestic violence.  Depending on the circumstances, it might be a serious consideration.  For that reason alone, it seems to me, his cross-application has not been considered according to law. 
66. [66]
    Mr Jones made the point that DGE did not effectively raise the point before his Honour, and I think he is right.  But importantly, DGE did try to raise it.  I think that is clear once one understands the point he was trying to make.  It would not be just to a litigant in person trying to do their best to somehow hold him to his inability to raise a point of such importance.  For that reason alone, I do not think the dismissal of his cross-application can stand.  It is quite clear from his Honour’s reasons that he did not understand that point at all, although as I say, I do not blame his Honour for that. 
67. [67]
    DGE indicated in open Court that one of the reasons he might seek to pursue his cross-application was to assist him in legal proceedings in Iran that impact on his obligations to pay a dowry.  Mr Jones made the submission that I should not remit the matter for further hearing because it would be futile, that purpose being an abuse of the process of the Court.  That is an arguable proposition, but it is not one which I am sufficiently persuaded of, in the absence of evidence about that, to refuse leave.  It might be an improper purpose or, depending on its context, it might not. 
68. [68]
    I say that bearing in the mind the definition of economic abuse, which is ‘behaviour by a person that is coercive, deceptive, or unreasonably controls another person without the second person’s consent in a way that denies the second person the economic or financial autonomy the second person would have had but for that behaviour.’^[8]  If the conduct in respect of the 17 December message can amount to domestic violence, it may be able to be linked to the circumstances in Iran so as to make out an act of domestic violence.  I am not suggesting that I have formed a view that DGE’s cross-application is meritorious, but it seems to me that in the unique circumstances of this case where an important and fundamental matter said to be an act of domestic violence was not understood and dealt with by the Court, that matter needs to go back before the Court. 
69. [69]
    Accordingly, I set aside the Magistrate’s dismissal of DGE’s cross‑application and I remit the matter to the Magistrates Court for further consideration, which consideration should occur having first read these reasons which I will put in a proper form and publish and provide to the parties as soon as my overworked Associate can get it done.   
70. [70]
    I will also make an order that any order for costs made by the Magistrates Court be set aside.  
71. [71]
    Finally, I add the following warning.  There is reason to be suspicious that REU might have omitted the key exculpatory sentence from her translation of DGE’s 17 December message to improve her case against him.  If she did so, she ought to be extremely careful not to repeat that conduct.  Such behaviour can amount to a contempt of court and can also give rise to criminal offences.