Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

Waters v Odell[2023] QDC 44

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Waters v Odell [2023] QDC 44

PARTIES:

PHILPPA ANNE WATERS

(Applicant)

v

CHRISTINE ODELL (as executor of the estate of Anne Benn deceased)

(Respondent)

FILE NO:

BD No 1017 of 2021

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court of Queensland

DELIVERED ON:

14 June 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATES:

7 – 9 February 2023

JUDGE:

Porter KC DCJ

ORDER:

  1. That further provision be made for the applicant from the estate of Anne Benn deceased in the amount of $280,000.

CATCHWORDS:

SUCCESSION – FAMILY PROVISION – REQUIREMENT FOR ADEQUATE AND PROPER MAINTENANCE – WHETHER APPLICANT LEFT WITH INSUFFICIENT PROVISION CLAIMS BY CHILDREN where the deceased had three children including the applicant and the respondent – where the deceased purchased a home for the applicant in 1995 and allowed the applicant to live in the home rent free until 2019 – where the respondent acted as the enduring power of attorney and primary support person for the deceased – where the respondent had significant control over the finances and life of the deceased where the applicant was evicted from the home on only six days’ notice – where the respondent caused transactions to be made using the deceased’s funds where a number of those transactions were made to the benefit of the respondent where the deceased’s will provided the applicant with a legacy of $20,000, and otherwise distributed equally the residuary of the estate between the respondent and the deceased’s other child – where the applicant applies for adequate provision for their proper maintenance and support under Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 41 – whether the will of the deceased made adequate provision for the applicant and, if not, what adequate provision would be in the circumstance

Legislation

Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 70

District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld)

Enduring Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 87

Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 6, 41

Trusts Act 1973 (Qld)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 r 700A

Cases

Australian Pipeline Limited v Alinta Limited [2007] FCAFC 55

Fenton-Anderson v Power (No 2) [2020] QDC 294

Gersbach v Blake [2011] NSWSC 368

Morgan v Darveniza [2014] QSC 37 [16(b)] [16(c]

Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64

Re McGregor Deceased [1956] St R Qld 596

Tulloch Brae Pty Ltd v Environmental Protection Equipment Pty Ltd [2022] QCA 97

Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434

Secondary Materials

A A Preece, Lee’s Manual of Succession Law (Lawbook Co, 8th ed, 2019)

G E Dal Pont, Law of Sucession (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2021) [P.8]

John de Groot and Bruce Nickel, Family Provision in Australia (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 5th, 2017)

B T Porter, The Jurisdiction of the District Court in Trust and Succession’ (Speech, STEP Queensland Lunchtime Seminar, 21 September 2021).

COUNSEL:

P Hackett for the Applicant

C Brewer and P Coore for the Respondent

SOLICITORS:

Hosic and Partners for the Applicant

Standard Law Co for the Respondent

Contents

SUMMARY5

THE WITNESSES5

Ms Waters6

Ms Odell 7

THE FACTS11

Early family life11

The House prior to December 201912

Mrs Benn and her daughters up to December 201915

Ms Waters is asked to leave the House 16

Did the House have to be sold?16

The conversations on 27 December 202019

Ms Waters vacates the House20

Condition of the House27

The Will and the Declaration28

Joint account and the sale proceeds33

Mrs Benn’s last months36

Ms Odell dealings with Mrs Benn’s funds37

Payments to Ms Odell’s benefit37

Other transactions38

Conclusions on Ms Odell’s conduct40

THE LAW43

SIZE OF THE ESTATE46

The potential claims against Ms Odell46

Estate at the date of death48

Estate at the date of trial49

Costs issues in the value of the estate50

MS WATERS AS APPLICANT52

Need52

Relationship issues53

RODNEY’S POSITION53

Need53

Relationship issues 54

MS ODELL’S POSITION54

Need54

Relationship issues56

ADEQUATE PROVISION NOT MADE 56

PROVISION TO BE MADE60

OTHER ISSUES65

ORDERS67

SUMMARY

  1. [1]
    The applicant (Ms Waters) seeks further provision from the estate of her mother (Mrs Benn) pursuant to s 41(1) Succession Act 1981 (Qld). For the reasons which follow, I have concluded that Mrs Benn’s will of 31 December 2019 (the Will) did not make adequate provision for Ms Waters’ proper maintenance and support as at the date of Mrs Benn’s death. I have also concluded that further provision should be made from Mrs Benn’s estate for Ms Waters in the amount of $280,000.

THE WITNESSES

  1. [2]
    Ms Waters is the respondent’s (Ms Odell) older sister. Rodney is their brother. Their parents were Mrs Benn and her husband Mr Benn (who predeceased Mrs Benn by some years). Although there are many facts to consider in this case, there are two principal areas of factual dispute.
  2. [3]
    The first relates to a house at Skennar’s Head near Byron Bay (the House). As I explain further below from paragraph [34], Mr and Mrs Benn bought the House in about 1995 and Ms Waters lived there rent free as a single parent with her son, Aaron, from that time until Ms Waters was told to move out of the house by her mother on 27 December 2019. She moved out on 3 January 2020. The first area of dispute concerns the character of the dealings between Mrs Benn, Ms Waters and Ms Odell in relation to the House up to Ms Waters’ eviction, and how those dealings impact on Ms Waters’ claim to provision, bearing in mind her long occupation of the House.
  3. [4]
    The second relates to Ms Odell’s dealings with her mother after Ms Waters was required to leave the House. From that time on, (and indeed from a time well before then) Ms Odell was her mother’s principal support and confidant. The dispute is this regard can be summarised as whether, and to what extent, Ms Odell’s version of her dealings with her mother and her mother’s affairs can be accepted. Of particular importance is Ms Odell’s explanation of:
    1. (a)
      Her dealings with Mrs Benn funds generally and the proceeds of sale of the House in particular; and
    2. (b)
      The circumstances of production of a statutory declaration and letter apparently containing Mrs Benn’s instructions which were highly critical of Ms Waters and Ms Waters’ conduct.
  4. [5]
    Though there are uncontentious facts which assist in resolution of the issues arising in these areas, the first area of dispute falls to be resolved primarily by reference to the evidence of Ms Waters and Ms Odell and the second falls to be determined by reference primarily to the evidence of Ms Odell. It is therefore necessary to explain my views on the credibility and reliability of those two witnesses, as those views will inform my approach to the specific findings made in these reasons.

Ms Waters

  1. [6]
    As is usual with cases of this kind, Ms Waters’ evidence in chief was by affidavit. The only opportunity I had to observe her and consider her responses in areas of conflicting evidence was in her cross examination. Mr Hackett, who appeared for Ms Waters, submitted that her credit was not challenged in cross examination. Ms Brewer, who appeared for Ms Odell, did put her client’s version of some of the key events to Ms Waters, though the cross examination was relatively brief. Further, several of the key areas of factual dispute were not explored in cross examination. Some examples are:
    1. (a)
      Ms Odell’s evidence that the house was left in a dilapidated state when Ms Waters left it in December 2019, which was inconsistent with Ms Waters’ evidence; and
    1. (b)
      Ms Odell’s evidence that from 2006, Mrs Benn seemed upset after calls from Ms Waters, that she overheard aggressive conversations between Mrs Benn and Ms Waters after 2017, and that she observed Mrs Benn in a state of apparent fear and distress during telephone calls in late 2019 about the sale of the House, which was also inconsistent with Ms Waters’ evidence.
  2. [7]
    Ms Waters’ affidavit evidence was broadly consistent with the uncontentious facts. Her answers in cross examination were also broadly consistent with such facts. She was not shown in cross examination to have been in error on any important matter and when she said she did not recall matters (which on occasion she did say), those matters seemed to be the sort of matters one might reasonably expect her not to recall in the circumstances of the particular event, given the passage of time.
  3. [8]
    From observing Ms Waters I was in no doubt that she is hostile to her sister, and her oral evidence reflected that at times. She also seemed to me to blame her sister for acts which might well have had their genesis with her mother. Such hostility can affect the reliability of recollection and I take it into account in considering her evidence. Further, her evidence related to some events long past, and points of detail can be easily forgotten or overlooked in that context, especially when the overlay is tense family relationships playing out in litigation. Further, my impression is that Mrs Waters had a sense of entitlement to the House (understandable though that was, given the history of her occupation set out more fully below) and on occasions tended to put the best gloss on her evidence relating to that matter and her dealings with her mother. For example, I think it likely that her conversations with her mother around November 2019 when she was asked to move out were tense and probably angry.[1]
  1. [9]
    However, I do not think any of the issues I have just mentioned provided a basis not to accept her evidence as truthful and substantially reliable. Considering her evidence as a whole, I accept her as a witness who was endeavouring to tell the truth as she recalled it and was generally reliable in her recollections.

Ms Odell

  1. [10]
    A great deal turns in this case on the credibility and reliability of Ms Odell’s evidence. I do not accept her as credible or reliable.
  2. [11]
    As will be seen, it is not in dispute that Ms Odell paid several significant sums (and many small sums) to herself, or for her benefit, from her mother’s funds. Most of these funds were drawn from a joint account she held with her mother (the source of funds paid into this account were indisputably her mother) (the joint account). She explained in her affidavits that those payments were made on her mother’s instructions or for other good reasons, as I will explore further in my detailed findings to follow. However, her evidence about some most these amounts was implausible and very significantly damaged her credibility and reliability. I list just some of those points.
  3. [12]
    First, during cross examination, it was shown that (in addition to the amounts she conceded she had received and sought to explain in her affidavit evidence) she had also received a transfer of $55,000 from the joint account[2] just two days before her mother’s death, and while her mother was in palliative care for the cancer which would soon claim her life. That was a large payment on any view, even more so in the context of her mother’s then resources. However, that payment was never disclosed nor referred to by Ms Odell in her affidavits or correspondence with the applicant’s solicitors. It was first raised with her in cross examination. She cannot possibly have been in any doubt as to the significance, in the context of this trial, of such a large transfer from the joint account, not least because other smaller transfers from the joint account had been contentious in solicitors’ correspondence.
  4. [13]
    Ms Odell could give no credible explanation for that transfer and her answers in cross examination were extremely unconvincing.[3] Her evidence that she could not even recall the transaction was, in my opinion, untrue. I reject it. Her evidence that her mother would have authorised it was, in my view, constructed in the witness box. Further, despite demands from the applicant’s solicitors, Ms Odell only provided the bank statements which showed receipt of this sum into her account during the night preceding the second day of the trial. I find that she sought to conceal that payment, knowing it would damage her if it was revealed. Given the circumstances of the transfer, I do not accept her evidence that she took the money with authority from her mother to do so. The circumstances of that payment, without more, would give me reason not to accept her as a credible or reliable witness.
  1. [14]
    Second, in cross examination Ms Odell tried to explain a series of payments made from the joint account for ordinary personal expenses of her own. These payments were small transactions in about February 2020 totalling some $400.[4] These were explained as being paid from the joint account because she “didn’t have any money left at that time”,[5] because she was caring for her mother full time. Having committed herself to that proposition, she was shown her bank statements which demonstrated that she had some $13,000 of her own funds at around that time. No credible explanation was given for that incongruity.[6] In my view, the evidence that those payments were justified because Ms Odell had no money at the time was created by Ms Odell to try to explain away transactions which were embarrassing to her.
  2. [15]
    Third, on 11 August 2020, Ms Odell transferred $24,138.32 from the joint account to her personal account.[7] The transfer was by electronic transfer and had the note on the transfer “fees funeral”. That transfer and note were done by Ms Odell (her mother died on 8 August 2020). No explanation of that sum was included in Ms Odell’s affidavits.
  3. [16]
    The point was directly raised by Ms Waters solicitors in their correspondence with Ms Odell’s solicitors dated 17 June 2021,[8] where a specific request was made for invoices which supported that payment. However, no invoices were provided to Ms Waters’ solicitors,[9] and no explanation given for the sum transferred.
  4. [17]
    On the morning of Day 2 of the trial, an invoice dated 17 August 2020 was provided.[10] That invoice was for cremation costs of $4,250.[11] No such invoice existed, of course, on 11 August 2020 when Ms Odell transferred money for “fees funeral” out of the joint account. Ms Odell could give no explanation why that invoice was only provided on day 2 of the trial, despite the earlier request.[12]
  5. [18]
    Insofar as the $4,250 amount is concerned, there is, in any event, a question mark over whether this sum has been paid twice. The interim accounts of the estate solicitors show reimbursement of $5,405 to Ms Odell for “Estate Expenses”[13] and it is unclear what else this payment could relate to other than funeral expenses. However, that issue was not explored at trial in evidence further, so I put that to one side.
  1. [19]
    More fundamental is the fact that the invoice leaves some $20,000 unaccounted for. In the witness box, Ms Odell said that this sum was explicable on the basis that it was money to be paid to have her mother’s ashes put with her father’s ashes. This was seemingly a reference to paragraph 6(c) of the Will which provides that “…I direct my Trustee to arrange the direct cremation of my remains and my ashes to be buried at Nowra with my beloved husband…” In evidence Ms Odell said the balance was held on account of the costs of the interment of the ashes, however, she could give no basis to justify the large sum involved. Further, she conceded she had spent the money and would have to find it from her own funds when the time came to give effect to that clause of the Will. And even now, over two years since her mother’s death, Ms Odell has not carried out the instruction in paragraph 6(c). There is good reason to doubt Ms Odell ever intended to carry out that instruction. Ms Odell’s explanations for taking that sum are not credible. The sum taken as funeral fees was, however, exactly the sum required to bring the balance of the joint account to nil.[14]
  2. [20]
    I find that Ms Odell took the “fees funeral” sum without any proper basis to believe that sum was necessary for funeral expenses. Her real purpose was to clear the balance of the joint account. She deliberately avoided explaining the transfer, or providing any invoice to vouch it, because she was conscious that she could not defend it. Her evidence maintaining the validity of the transfer in cross examination, despite the above matters being drawn to her attention, reveals a person who resists conceding the obvious when it is contrary to her interests, even when it is clear that her conduct is indefensible.
  3. [21]
    The above conclusion was confirmed by her untenable position in final submissions. In counsels’ written closing, Ms Odell maintained that I should approach the assessment of the size of the estate based on a “contingent cost of disposal of ashes” estimated to be nearly $20,000.[15] That was despite still having no evidence that anything like that sum would be involved in the seemingly modest task of burying Mrs Benn’s ashes with her husband. Indeed, there is still no evidence that this can even occur.
  4. [22]
    Fourth, as will be seen, one issue which arises in the proceedings is the state of the House when it was handed over by Ms Waters on 3 January 2020. The allegation that the House was in poor condition is central to Ms Odell’s justification for many transactions in the joint account made to her personal benefit between January and August 2020, and indeed to her narrative of events during that period.
  1. [23]
    There was a clear dispute between the parties on their affidavits as to the condition of the House at that time. Contemporaneous photographs of the House could well have cast light on the true position and undermine the credit of the party whose version was inconsistent with the photographs. Ms Odell’s affidavit contained no photographs to sustain her version of events. Ms Waters’ affidavit also lacked photographs to back up her version. The latter point is less significant for Ms Waters if the House was not in poor condition, because she would have no reason to think that she needed to document its condition. The same cannot be said for Ms Odell. However, the lack of photographs from Ms Odell would be unremarkable if there were no photographs to include.
  2. [24]
    Somewhat surprisingly then, in cross examination, Ms Odell said the following:[16]

I’ll diverge now. We’re coming to this shortly. There’s not one photograph in existence of what you’ve just said in evidence, is there?---I sent all the photos and text messages to the litigators, so they have all the copies.

No, no. Madam, please focus on the question?---It does exist, sir, because I have it - - -

Madam - - -

HIS HONOUR: No, no. Hold on a second. Mr Hackett’s question was there’s not a photograph in existence of the fortification of the house that you’ve described?---The fortification?

The nailing up of the doors. You understand what I mean, surely?---Yes. Okay. Nailing of the doors. I’m just trying to think if there’s something in some of the documents.

MR HACKETT: Photograph. Any?---Yeah, probably some photographs. I could look into my phone.

Not disclosed in this proceedings?---No. [underlining added]

  1. [25]
    And doubling down on that evidence, when asked about paragraphs 171 to 174 of her principal affidavit[17] which described the damaged state of the House, she said:[18]

Now, let’s deal with them [indistinct] There’s no photographic evidence of the damage to which you refer, or lack of maintenance, is there?---Yes, there is. I took quite a lot of photos on my phone.

Okay. We’ll deal with it the same way as the last questions and answer. Those photographs have not been disclosed in this proceedings, have they?---Not that I’m aware of. I don’t know if the litigators - - -

Well, you certainly haven’t exhibited them to your affidavit, have you?---It appears not.

  1. [26]
    I gave Ms Odell’s counsel time to take instructions before re-examination. She was then re-examined on some matters. There was no re-examination on her evidence that she had photographs of the House on her telephone, nor on her evidence that she had given copies of such photographs to her solicitors. If she had done so, it is very likely indeed that they would have been included in the affidavit. I reject Ms Odell’s evidence that she had photographs on her telephone and that she had given copies to her solicitors. That evidence was a self-serving embellishment constructed in the witness box.
  2. [27]
    There are numerous other parts of Ms Odell’s evidence which are improbable or unlikely and which reflect on her credibility and reliability which I will refer to during my detailed findings of fact below. However, for the reasons given above alone, I do not consider her credible or reliable as a witness and will not accept her evidence unless it is supported by other evidence that I accept.
  3. [28]
    Ultimately, as will be more fully explained below, the fundamental flaw in Ms Odell’s conduct as attorney, executor and witness is her view that Ms Waters is an undeserving person who should not have benefitted from her mother’s wealth any more than she had up to the time when she moved out of the House. Ms Odell’s conduct criticised in this judgment seems to be explained by that abiding opinion.
  4. [29]
    It is a common enough event that a sibling feels resentment at the way a parent has treated another sibling. And it is frequently a feeling harboured by a sibling who feels they have earnt their parents love and support in a way the other sibling has not. The older son in the parable of the prodigal son is just one famous example.[19] However, it is not a feeling which may properly be indulged by a sibling who is an attorney, personal representative, or witness.

THE FACTS

Early family life

  1. [30]
    Ms Waters and her siblings had a stable upbringing. Their father worked in the mining industry and then in various businesses, having some success operating a packaging business. Mrs Benn cared for the family. Rodney is the eldest child. He was born in 1955 and is now 67 years old. Ms Waters was the next child. She was born in 1958 and is 64 years old. Ms Odell was born in 1962 and is 60 years old.
  2. [31]
    Rodney did a boilermaker’s apprenticeship and worked in that field for some years, before taking on a nursery business together with his wife and parents. He later moved to other businesses. Ms Waters left high school in year 10 and had a modest work life. After sporadic employment in the CBA and hospitality, she was a single mother caring for her son Aaron and then supported herself by renting out rooms in the House. Ms Odell became a police officer in NSW and has, post her police career, worked in related areas.
  1. [32]
    The overall impression I obtained from the evidence is that each of the siblings had on-going relationships with their parents, who as will be seen, supported their children in a substantial way from time to time. One of the difficult transitions to adult life is to convert the common experiences of siblings in childhood into enduring adult relationships. It does not appear that the Benn siblings managed that transition. Rather, the relationships between the siblings became rather distant.
  2. [33]
    Mr Benn died in about 1995. I infer that his assets, either by survivorship or by will, passed substantially to Mrs Benn.

The House prior to December 2019

  1. [34]
    At the centre of this case is the House. It is important for several reasons, including its place in informing what is adequate provision for Ms Waters based on her long occupancy and the fate of the proceeds of the House after it was sold. Also, the circumstances leading to the sale of the House and the disposition of the proceeds by Ms Odell are central.
  2. [35]
    As noted above, Ms Waters had limited education and work skills. In about 1992, aged 34, she married Mr William Waters. They had one child, Aaron Waters. In about 1995, Ms Waters and Mr Waters divorced. Aaron lived with his mother from then on as a single parent, though Aaron’s father paid his school fees.
  3. [36]
    Ms Waters received no property settlement and found supporting Aaron difficult on social security. When Aaron was about 3 years old, Ms Waters’ parents bought a block of land and built the House for Ms Waters and Aaron to live in. The House was built in about the second half of 1995. They also bought her a car. Ms Waters efforts to obtain employment once Aaron was “older” (presumably in his teens) were not successful. In her own words:[20]
  1. [45]
    When Aaron was older, I went to TAFE to train in retail. I wasn’t able to stand for long periods of time due to arthritis in my hips and lower back problems so I studied office skills to learn typing to obtain an office job but I couldn’t keep up with the class. As a result, I did not complete the course.
  2. [46]
    After I left TAFE, Centrelink pressured me to take any job I could get so I stopped obtaining Centrelink benefits and rented 2 rooms out a (sic) Skennars Head to cover the costs of living. I rented rooms for approximately 2 months.
  1. [47]
    I sold my engagement ring so I stopped renting rooms lived of (sic) the proceeds to support myself. I then applied for a government disability pension for arthritis and severe depression. Due to these medical conditions, I obtained the disability pension. To date I still receive the disability pension.
  1. [37]
    Aaron continued to live in the House until he completed Year 12.[21] Ms Waters’ parents, then her mother, always permitted her to live there rent free.
  2. [38]
    Ms Waters describes the House as beautiful, with a veggie garden and small orchard which supplied most of her food. It is not hard to accept her evidence that she was happy there. She has always had a very modest income. She could never have afforded to buy a house of any kind. Further, free accommodation plainly underpinned her standard of living, modest though it must have been. On any view of the evidence, the House was the central pillar supporting her lifestyle and standard of living.
  3. [39]
    Ms Waters swore that her parents had assured her at the time that the House was built that it would be hers. She swore her father assured her that the House would be left to her when Mrs and Mr Benn were gone. It is likely that some such statement was made. It appears that, at the time, the Benns were reasonably prosperous. They certainly had the resources at around this time to help their other children, though the precise circumstances and extent of such help are contentious.
  4. [40]
    Further and more compelling is the concrete steps taken subsequently by Mrs Benn which reflect such an assurance. Ms Waters said that in about 2011 her mother investigated transferring the House to her and Mrs Benn took advice from solicitors and accountants on that course. She said that her mother gave up on that course because of the capital gains tax which would be payable and which Ms Waters could not afford to pay. That account is directly supported by a letter from Mrs Benn’s solicitors, with a draft will enclosed, dated 1 February 2011.[22] The letter confirms that Mrs Benn sought advice about transferring the House to Ms Waters including on capital gains tax issues, and that Mrs Benn provided instructions for the preparation of the draft will.
  5. [41]
    The draft will assumes the occurrence of the transfer in that it does not deal with the House in the text. Also, notably, it contains two clauses which can reasonably be assumed to have been based on Mrs Benn’s instructions:
    1. (a)
      By clause 3.2.1, it leaves the residue of the estate to the three siblings equally; and
    2. (b)
      By clause 7, it contains the following statement:

I CONFIRM that I have treated each of my children equally concerning the division of the remaining assets in my estate. All of the children have received benefits from myself and my late husband prior to making of this Will and I recently transferred the property known as 10 Carroll Avenue, Skennars Head to my daughter Phillipa Anne Waters and have forgiven her debt owing in respect of that property. My husband and I previously assisted both Rodney and Christine in acquisition of homes to the extent of over $200,000 each.

  1. [42]
    The draft will also provides a valuable insight into Mrs Benn’s state of mind at the time she gave the instructions referred to by her solicitors. Clause 7, taken with clause 3.2.1, provides a basis to infer that at least in 2011, Mrs Benn did not believe Ms Waters to be undeserving, did not believe her to have been treated better than her siblings, and did not believe she had been abusive or manipulative (in contrast to her apparent beliefs in early 2020, as explained in paragraph [109] - [115] below). Around the time of these events, Ms Odell lived overseas.
  2. [43]
    The transfer did not proceed. Ms Waters said that was because she was not able to afford the capital gains tax payable on the transfer. I accept that evidence, not only because there is no suggestion Ms Waters would have ever had excess funds for such a purpose, but also because Mrs Benn plainly sought to achieve the transfer by a CGT efficient manner, that is by her 20 June 2011 will.
  3. [44]
    On 20 June 2011, Mrs Benn made a will which, by clause 3, left the House to Ms Waters. It also maintained an even split of the residuary between the three siblings. It is common knowledge, at least amongst solicitors, that transfer of assets by will, generally, does not trigger a liability to CGT. It is reasonable to infer that Mrs Benn was given such advice. The draft will is, therefore, consistent with the views identified in paragraph [42] above.
  4. [45]
    The conduct and state of mind revealed by documents prepared with legal advice in 2011 is inconsistent with the hostile indictment of Ms Waters expressed in Mrs Benn’s letter and statutory declaration prepared in early 2020.[23] More on that later.
  5. [46]
    Ms Waters paid the rates on the House[24] and cared for and maintained it, at least to the extent she was financially able to do so. There is a dispute as to the condition of the House at the time that Ms Waters vacated in early January 2020. I deal with that specific matter from paragraph [97] below. However, I am satisfied that Ms Waters did maintain the House to a reasonable standard during her long occupation. Failure to do so over a 25- year period would have left the House in a decrepit state and even Ms Odell’s version does not go that far.
  1. [47]
    I find that from the time the House was constructed, until around late 2019, Ms Waters acted on the assumption, induced by assurances and conduct of her parents, that the House was hers to live in for her life rent free and would come to her after their death.

Mrs Benn and her daughters up to December 2019

  1. [48]
    As I have observed, Mr Benn died in 1995. Mrs Benn appears to have continued living in her apartment which she shared with Mr Benn at Burleigh Heads at the time. There is no other evidence as to her assets then or later.
  2. [49]
    On 18 November 2002, Mrs Benn appointed Ms Odell as her attorney under an Enduring Power of Attorney (the EPA). She was appointed an attorney for financial and for personal and health matters. No terms were added to the standard short form EPA. For each of the wills in evidence, Mrs Benn appointed Ms Odell as executor. This tends to reflect, I think, a view of Mrs Benn that of her children, Ms Odell was the one she preferred to handle her affairs.
  3. [50]
    In about 2006, Mrs Benn was involved in a bus accident and suffered some serious injuries. Ms Odell supported her around this time. Mrs Benn appears to have remined in her Burleigh unit at that stage.
  4. [51]
    At some point, around 2011, or perhaps a bit later, Mrs Benn moved into an apartment in a retirement village at Clear Island Waters on the Gold Coast. The move appears to have correlated with a diagnosis of a form of bone cancer, though Mrs Benn appears to have managed to care mostly for herself for some time thereafter. Ms Waters says that the Burleigh unit was sold, though there is no evidence as to what became of the proceeds of sale. It might be that Mrs Benn, directly or indirectly, used some of the proceeds of sale for daily living expenses.
  5. [52]
    Ms Odell lived overseas for about seven years ending in about 2017,[25] so she was not involved in Mrs Benn’s day-to-day care. Ms Waters said that she had on-going and warm contact with her mother over this period and frequently visited her but does not suggest she acted as her carer.
  6. [53]
    From 2017, Ms Odell returned to live in Australia. She moved to the Gold Coast for work and from then on, she swears she spent a lot of time with her mother, cleaning, cooking and “discussing [her] mother’s life experiences”.[26] Despite my rejection of Ms Odell as a truthful or reliable witness, I accept the gravamen of this evidence. Indeed, the evidence supports the conclusion that from about 2017, Ms Odell became Mrs Benn’s principal relationship and principal personal and emotional support, becoming ever more involved in Mrs Benn’s life and decision making until the events starting in November 2019.
  1. [54]
    Ms Waters swore that after her sister’s return her contact with her mother became more difficult. She gave the following evidence:[27]

Over the last few years, it became increasingly difficult to visit the Deceased as Christine was always present when I saw her. Often, Christine would lecture me about my life and she would bully me. Christine was always saying that, ‘You’re leaching off the government and mum.’ I couldn’t bear it so rather than have arguments with Christine, I stopped visiting and spoke to the Deceased on the telephone instead. I spoke to the deceased by telephone at least three times per week until Christine changed the deceased’s telephone number and told me not to contact her.

  1. [55]
    There was no challenge to this evidence. Further, it has the ring of truth. Ms Odell, in fact, held the view that her sister was leaching off her mother, reflected inter alia in text message she sent to Ms Waters.[28]
  2. [56]
    As I have noted, Mrs Benn appeared to see Ms Odell as most likely to manage her affairs properly out of her three children. As subsequent findings will reveal, Mrs Benn came to rely entirely on Ms Odell in the management of her affairs, financial and personal, as reflected in events from December 2019 until Mrs Benn’s death on 6 August 2020.

Ms Waters is asked to leave the House

Did the House have to be sold?

  1. [57]
    It is uncontentious that on or about 27 December 2019, Mrs Benn and Ms Waters were involved in telephone conversations in which Mrs Benn told Ms Water that she intended to sell the House. Not surprisingly, that precipitated a crisis for Ms Waters. There is no evidence of any prior suggestion that Ms Waters would have to move. The last reliable reference point I have in the evidence as to Mrs Benn’s attitude to the House is the will of June 2011.
  1. [58]
    A question then arises as to why the change of heart occurred and occurred so suddenly. There is evidence that Mrs Benn’s reason for selling was that she needed money for her own purposes:
  1. (a)
    Ms Odell swears that in the 27 December telephone calls, her mother said “Phillipa, the house has to be sold, I need the money...”.
  2. (b)
    The declaration document apparently signed by Mrs Benn and dated 29 January 2020 (the Declaration), purporting to explain her small legacy to Ms Waters in the Will (dealt with in more detail from paragraph [109] – [115] below) stated:[29]

I was a self-funded retiree, however due to the global financial crisis and loss of funds and decreased superannuation, I found that I did not have enough money to survive and I could not obtain an old age pension due to my ownership of my home that Phillipa was living in rent free, I was ineligible.

  1. [59]
    I would not treat these pieces of evidence as reliable without corroboration because:
  1. (a)
    Of my rejection of Ms Odell as a credible or reliable witness;
  2. (b)
    Of my concerns about Ms Odell’s undue influence over the Declaration; and
  3. (c)
    Of the odd nature of the assertions the Declaration contains. The Global Financial Crisis had done its damage to asset values long before June 2011. Yet Mrs Benn clearly had no concerns about her position at that time when she made the 20 June 2011 will.
  1. [60]
    Despite that, I think it more probable than not that concerns about her financial security contributed to her decision to sell the House. There are some factors which might suggest the contrary.
  1. [61]
    First, as I have noted, Mrs Benn sold her unit at Burleigh Heads some time in or about 2011. It is unclear what become of the sale proceeds of that unit. Her Gold Coast retirement unit appears to have cost some $170,000 to acquire (seemingly on some form of lease agreement terms as explained in the refund letter).[30] It seems a unlikely that that would have absorbed all the sale proceeds of even a modest unit in Burleigh Heads. The Benns clearly had considerable resources, around the time that unit was purchased so it is likely it was a comfortable home unit. It is difficult to see what became of the balance of any sale proceeds, though it might have been spent on living costs.
  1. [62]
    Second, Mrs Benn’s bank statement for day to day needs for the period May 2019 to March 2020 show that her inflows and outflows were in substantial equilibrium. The inflows primarily came from a pension or annuity of some kind provided by Australian Retirement Scheme (“ARS”). They were in the form of monthly payments of $1690.83 and occasional advances of other, sometimes larger amounts.[31] The outflows can be seen to be ordinary living expenses. They do show that Mrs Benn was meeting her daily living expenses from her ARS pension as at December 2019, at least insofar as this account was concerned. There was no evidence of any other account held by Mrs Benn, though of course, one might have existed. Nor was there evidence of debts accruing or a large liability looming for Mrs Benn. Ms Odell was cross examined about this apparent economic stability. Her responses were neither direct nor helpful, even when being asked about uncontentious bank statements in her own affidavit.Ultimately, her position was that despite the evidence of those statements, her mother told her that she was running out of money.
  1. [63]
    Despite those two considerations, however, it seems to me that Mrs Benn was concerned about her financial position. There is a good basis to infer that Mrs Benn was reaching the end of her ARS pension. It can be seen from her personal statements that the monthly payments from ARS appear to have stopped in March 2020. There is no evidence of any further such payment that I can locate. Rather, from about June 2020, Mrs Benn starts to receive a Centrelink pension, and in an initial sum suggesting some backdated payments.[32] Further, there is no evidence of any other substantial resources being available to her at that time. It is reasonable to infer that she would have been conscious that her cancer might require financial resources for its treatment and that she might need funds for care as her illness worsened.
  1. [64]
    Mrs Benn managed her own affairs for many years, and it seems to me she was quite capable of understanding her financial position in 2019. I think it more probable than not that Mrs Benn did perceive a need to take steps to improve her financial position towards the end of 2019 and, on the evidence before me, there was no obvious solution other than to sell the House.
  1. [65]
    Of course, Mrs Benn did not just sell the House. There was much more to it than that. Mrs Benn informed Ms Waters, without warning, that she was selling and then seemingly left it to Ms Odell to execute the demand for possession, as will be seen, in a callous and hostile manner accompanied by exclusion from any benefit under the Will made less than a month later.
  1. [66]
    What is the explanation for such a radical change in attitude to Ms Waters from the benevolent position in 2011, even allowing for Mrs Benn’s need to sell the House? In my view, one has to look to Ms Odell’s role to find the answer, as will be explained next.
  1. The conversations on 27 December 2020
  1. [67]
    Ms Waters’ version of the conversations on 27 December 2020 is as follows:[33]
  1. On or about 27 December 2019 the deceased telephoned me to tell me that she had to sell the house at Skennars Head and that I had to move out. I could hear Christine in the background telling mum what to say to me. The deceased and I had a conversation to the following effect:

The Deceased:

I have got something to tell you”.

Me:

Are you okay?

The Deceased:

We have decided to sell the house”.

Me:

What?

  1. I could hear Christine in the background, and I said to the Deceased:

Me:

I can hear Christine. Is she there with you?

The Deceased:

Yes she is

Christine:

What did she say?

The Deceased:

We have decided to sell the property.

Me:

But you said you would never sell it. I have nowhere else to live.

Christine:

What did she say?

Me:

Mum, is Chris telling you what to say?

The Deceased:

No. No.

Me:

Mum, I can’t talk right now. I have to go and speak with Aaron.

  1. I was very upset. After approximately an hour or so I telephoned Mum back and we had a conversation to the following effect:

Me:

Mum, where am I going to go?

The Deceased:

You can live with Christine. She said it was okay.

Me:

But you know we don’t get along.

  1. At no stage did Christine offer for me to live with her.
  1. [68]
    During cross examination, it was put to Ms Waters that Mrs Benn told her, during those telephone conversations, that the House needed to be sold because Mrs Benn needed money. Ms Waters rejected that proposition.[34] Ms Odell’s version otherwise differs only in minor respects as to what she overheard and what Ms Waters recalls Mrs Benn saying.
  1. [69]
    I accept Ms Odell’s evidence that Mrs Benn gave a reason for needing to sell the House, despite Ms Waters not accepting that suggestion. I do so because, given my findings as to her financial need, I find it likely Mrs Benn would have said something about that matter. Further, the conversations would have been a shock for Ms Waters and that comment could have been overlooked by her and not recalled. I do not think it unusual Ms Water does not recall this comment.
  1. [70]
    I also accept Ms Odell’s evidence that she suggested to her mother to tell Ms Waters that Ms Waters could move in with her. That is corroborated by Ms Waters. However, I do not think the offer was made bona fide to assist to resolve the situation, rather the contrary. Ms Odell, at this stage, harboured unbridled hostility to her sister, as demonstrated by her text messages and conduct in the succeeding days. I infer she knew her sister would reject such a suggestion out of hand. It was only suggested by Ms Odell to make her sister look worse in her mother’s eyes.
  1. Ms Waters vacates the House
  1. The demand for possession
  1. [71]
    I otherwise do not accept Ms Odell’s evidence about the conversations or her mother’s reaction to them. There is no independent evidence to corroborate her account and some of the statements she ascribes to her mother are self-serving and unlikely. For example, I reject her evidence that Mrs Benn was frightened by the call. Mrs Benn could have been emotional or stressed, but there is no other evidence independent of Ms Odell to justify the conclusion that Mrs Benn feared Ms Waters. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Mrs Benn was an independent and strong-willed woman.
  1. [72]
    From 27 December 2019, Mrs Benn had no further direct dealings with Ms Waters, at least, concerning the property. All dealings were between Ms Waters and Ms Odell. There is no independent evidence of whether, and to what extent, Mrs Benn was involved in what followed. Most of what followed is not contentious, at least in its main features.
  1. [73]
    On 29 December 2019, just two days after the phone conversations, Ms Odell came to the House. Ms Waters says Ms Odell arrived at 6.00am, banged on the door and yelled at Ms Waters “get out I own this property”, and that she left a note on the door that said she had to vacate by 4 January 2020.[35] Ms Odell’s affidavit in response does not cavil with any of those specific allegations and exhibits documents which she says she left in the front door.[36]
  1. [74]
    Ms Waters says she did not see any such documents as are exhibited by Ms Odell. Rather, she says that the document left was handwritten by her sister. I am inclined to accept Ms Waters’ evidence on this matter, given my findings on Ms Odell’s credibility and reliability. However, even if Ms Waters is mistaken about this, the letters propounded by Ms Odell reflect poorly on the drafter.
  1. [75]
    The first document is called “COVER LETTER”. It provides:
  1. To Phillipa Waters c/- 10 Carroll Ave Skennars Head
  1. 29th December 2019
  1. Dear Phillipa
  1. I want you to leave my home at 10 Carroll Avenue Skennars Head
  1. I have asked you to leave my property, and you have refused to do so.
  1. I now have no other option but to use the law to make you leave. Please read the attached Notice to Vacate.
  1. [76]
    The brief conversations on 27 December 2019 provide no reasonable basis to conclude that Ms Waters had refused to leave the House, much less that there was no option but to use the law to make her leave. That letter is a transparent attempt to fabricate facts, not to articulate facts. Further, the statement that there was no option but to use the law to make Ms Waters leave the house, just two days after a demand for possession following decades of uncontested occupation, is risible.
  1. [77]
    The second document is headed “NOTICE TO VACATE”. It provides:
  1. To: Phillipa Waters
  1. About: 10 Carroll Ave Skennars Head
  1. I withdraw permission for you to continue to live in my property.
  1. You should vacate the premises by 4th January 2019.
  1. If you don’t leave by this date you will be in breach of section 4 of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 and will be trespassing on the property.
  1. I will report your trespass to the police and ask the police to remove you from the premises. I may also remove your personal belongings from the property and change the locks without giving you any further warning.
  1. [78]
    This Notice reflects a hyper aggressive and wrongheaded approach to regaining possession. It refers to an irrelevant statute. It assumes that the police would involve themselves in a forced retaking of possession without a Court order, something which is uncommon. It threatens retaking possession and disposal of belongings in a manner which is at least suggestive of doing so regardless of any resistance which might be offered by Ms Waters. There was nothing to justify that threat. More such threats were to follow.
  1. [79]
    This Notice also reflects a callous disregard of the personal position of Ms Waters who had been in occupation of the House for 25 years. There had been no suggestion to Ms Waters of a reconsideration by Mrs Benn of her benign attitude to her occupation of the House until just two days prior. It was cruel and ridiculous to expect Ms Waters to be able to move within the time period nominated.
  1. [80]
    The two letters appear to be signed by Mrs Benn on 29 December 2019.
  2. [81]
    As I have said, I am inclined to accept Ms Waters’ evidence that these documents were not left at the House by Ms Odell on 29 December, though Ms Waters says she does not retain the original of the document that was left behind. Ms Waters might be mistaken. Certainly, a demand to vacate by 4 January 2020 was included in whatever documents were left. However, even if she is mistaken and these documents were delivered, they represent an aggressive, unjustified, callous and deceptive response to the situation. If they were truly adopted and understood by Mrs Benn, then her behaviour was reprehensible. If the true guiding mind of these two documents was Ms Odell, then her behaviour was of the same character.
  3. [82]
    The latter could easily be true because:
    1. (a)
      It is plain from her messages at the time Ms Odell that was an enthusiastic proponent of a callous and aggressive approach to her sister;
    2. (b)
      Ms Odell was, by this time, Mrs Benn’s primary adviser and support; and
    3. (c)
      Ms Odell undoubtedly typed these documents (as she typed the Declaration) because Mrs Benn did not type. This means that Ms Odell had every opportunity to shape the text. She is also the one who found the Act referred to in the Notice.[37]

The text exchanges with Ms Odell: 29 and 30 December

  1. [83]
    On 29 and 30 December, there followed an intense series of texts between Ms Waters and Ms Odell. The exchanges on Sunday, 29 December are of particular significance. They covered just 23 minutes.[38] They proceeded as follows:

Ms Odell:

This is my mob

Mum has clearly stated she will change her Will if you continue to not assist me in selling the house. You need to call me and only me to discuss. Mum is willing to allow you to buy another property up to $500,000 and you will be responsible for your own costs. If you do not contact me by this Tues , the police will be escorting me with a locksmith on the 4th Jan and you will be removed from the house.

She is very firm and angry disappointed hurt that you have treated her like this when she has been nothing but a loving generous and supportive mother all these years. If you continue to block or hinder the sale you will not receive a house and you will need to find your own accommodation.

Ms Waters:

I want everything you just said, on a legal document. Signed by mum., and a lawyer. I will give you contact details of my lawyer when I get one. They are all on holidays. Maybe my lawyer will tell me it won’t stand up in court….. I have no money. No where to go. And have been lied to for 25years by my mother              My loving

family……

Not up to 500 but definitely 500.

Ms Odell:

and ant judge will have you arrested for defrauding the govt for all these years.. getting a disability pension and surfing every day

That will come out and because of that last msg you will not be getting anything… mum has a solicitors appointment Monday to change will.

Ms Waters:

And also that money is to be deposited in my account. As soon as the sale of the house goes through. All in writing signed by mum.

Ms Odell:

Nope you are getting nothing.

Ms Waters:

What. Happened to you to make you such a nasty manipulative person… You need to ask god to help you.

Ms Odell:

Mum has said that if you respond with any demands you are out and no inheritance.

You had better think very carefully about the next message you send me. If I don’t see a humble and appreciative and cooperative response by tomorrow morning the Will will be changed and you will not be entitled to anything further.

You will lose as you have no legal right to stand on.

  1. [84]
    I note the following:
    1. (a)
      First, Ms Waters purported to accept the offer of funds from the sale to secure a further home. She tried to bargain for the maximum amount offered and to secure that with legal documentation that would ensure money would be deposited to her account “as soon as the sale of the house goes through”;
    2. (b)
      Second, Ms Odell again makes intemperate threats of involvement of the police and forcible ejection and threats of arrest for fraud;
    3. (c)
      Third, despite the character of Ms Waters’ response to the offer of funds for another house, Ms Odell reports that her mother has decided Ms Waters is getting nothing; and
    4. (d)
      Fourth, the tone of the messages from Ms Odell suggests that she, as much as her mother, is making decisions about the conduct of Mrs Benn affairs in relation to the House: i.e. If I don’t see a humble….
  1. [85]
    Ms Odell in cross examination suggested that Ms Waters had demanded that the money be paid into her account straightaway and that there was a text to that effect missing from the exchange set out in Ms Waters’ affidavit. When Ms Water’s counsel challenged this she asserted imperiously to the cross examiner: “So there is a message missing sir”.[39] There is no evidence of any such text. In fact, photos of the text exchange appear in her own affidavit.[40] I reject her evidence.
  2. [86]
    The tenor of text messages sent on 30 December is similar and they need not be set out in full. The gravamen of the exchange is as follows:
    1. (a)
      Ms Waters sends a text in the early hours expressing her anxieties about her personal position, having no rental history, no money for bond and having to find accommodation and removalists over the holiday period;
    2. (b)
      Ms Odell responds stating:

Yes you have had a dream life at mums expense for so long and yet you have no compassion for her circumstances… it is time to take responsibility for your life.

You can rent a room on housemates.com or secure a caravan for a couple of months until it is sold… if you changed your attitude and were grateful and reasonable to work with we could have talked.

If when I attend with the real estate agent tomorrow and gardener you don’t interfere you may store your belongings at the house. Put all in one area as I will be living there until it is sold.[41]

  1. (c)
    It is in response to that stinging text that Ms Waters tries to argue her position with her sister. It is only in that context that Ms Waters stated:

I’m not going anywhere till I get legal papers stating everything I ask for including money to move. Its either that or big drama and legal costs for both of us. Its your choice. You’ll have to drag me out. And Aaron will film everything. Assault charges… Avo… That will good when applying for work…. Also I have a legitimate claim to pension. So pull your nasty disrespectful head in.

  1. (d)
    In my view, that response is understandable, if intemperate, given the conduct of Ms Odell (and to the extent she adopted it, Mrs Benn) to that point. However, Ms Odell seizes on that message to send a series of aggressive texts littered with bullying threats. It gives an insight into Ms Odell’s lack of insight into her own aggressive, callous and bullying behaviour that she quotes only that part of Ms Waters’ text correspondence in her affidavit.[42]
  1. (e)
    Ms Odell’s response includes the assertion (made within 5 minutes of Ms Waters’ message referred to in subparagraph (c) above), that “Mum has a new will to sign today”. There is a copy of that will in evidence. It is in materially the same terms as the Will. There is no suggestion it was the subject of any legal advice. The evidence shows that such advice was not taken until 8 January 2020 from Mrs Benn’s long-standing solicitors. There is no evidence as to how that earlier will came to be drawn or executed, or why it had to be done on New Year’s Eve, but clearly in my view, the creation of that new will was in train from before the 27 December call.
  1. [87]
    Ms Odell swore that she “was so concerned for [her] personal safety that [she] arranged to have security attend with [her] on the day the Applicant was due to leave” the House. There is no hint in any evidence before me that Ms Waters was a personal threat to Ms Odell. Ms Odell was consistently the aggressor in her demands and threats before and after the messages set out above. I consider her statement that she was concerned for her personal safety to have been fabricated for self-serving purposes. In this case, to justify the aggressive retaking of possession of the House, which she intended to execute within days.
  2. [88]
    Further, in cross examination Ms Odell gave evidence that her concern was about a threat to set her up (presumably based on Ms Waters statement that she would record evidence of her removal if it occurred using force).[43] Such a “threat” is not a threat to Ms Odell’s personal safety. Again her evidence on this matter was a subtle reconstruction of events designed to justify her own conduct.
  3. [89]
    Finally, on this disreputable text exchange, I note Ms Odell made use of her role as a JP to enhance the credibility of her appalling and her palpable hostility to her sister and her sister’s lifestyle.[44] That is an improper use of that statutory office and calls into question whether Ms Odell is a proper person to hold that office.

Ms Odell retakes possession

  1. [90]
    On 3 January 2020, Ms Odell arrived at the House accompanied by her son, a real estate agent and two security guards.
  2. [91]
    Ms Waters had been given until 4 January 2020 to move out. Ms Odell arrived a day early accompanied by at least three men plus the agent. Ms Waters was no threat to Ms Odell. The only risk was that she might refuse to leave, something which, as a matter of law, she was probably entitled todo on 3 January given the date in the Notice to Vacate was 4 January, if for no other reason. I find that the purpose of Ms Odell’s conduct was to secure compliance by intimidation.
  1. [92]
    Ms Waters called the Police when Ms Odell arrived with her posse. The police officers attended and told Ms Waters to leave. That seems an odd position for the police to have taken. In my experience with bona fide possession disputes, police officers are ordinarily reluctant to take sides. I do not mean to be critical of the officers involved as I do not know what occurred and what they were told. However, if Ms Waters had been capable of stating her position articulately, one might have thought that the officers would have been inclined to wait until a warrant for possession was secured.
  2. [93]
    Ms Waters left without her personal belongings. She returned the next day to collect them. Ms Odell was present with her son and his dog. Ms Waters collected some of her belongings. This minor event would not rate further discussion but for the evidence Ms Odell gave in relation to the dog.
  3. [94]
    Ms Waters, in her affidavit, stated that Ms Odell’s son bred and owned rottweilers and described this dog as a rottweiler.[45] Ms Odell, in her own affidavit, simply asserted that her son had never owned a rottweiler.[46] That evidence was only part of the story and evasive, as emerged in cross examination. In cross examination, Ms Odell accepted that her son did bring his dog, but claimed that it was a “Staffy”, by which I infer she meant a Staffordshire Bull Terrier.[47] Though smaller than a rottweiler, a Staffordshire Bull Terrier may present as an aggressive looking dog.
  4. [95]
    When asked why the dog was at the property, Ms Odell also asserted that her son had brought the dog because he “had to stay over” at the House and “could not leave the dog”. It is wholly unclear why the dog could not have stayed with her son’s family, as she accepted that the rest of her son’s family were staying at her son’s home.[48] Ms Odell’s evidence on this issue is disingenuous and self-serving.
  5. [96]
    Also on that day, Ms Waters says that Ms Odell produced a letter for Ms Waters to sign. The letter said words to the effect of “I waive my rights to any claim on the house now or in the future”. Ms Waters’ evidence was that Ms Odell told her that if she did not sign the letter, she could not take the rest of her belongings from the property. Ms Odell denies this occurred. I reject her evidence. Apart from her lack of credibility, such a document fits comfortably with the series of events set out above.

Condition of the House

  1. [97]
    Ms Odell swore that the House and garden were in poor condition with damage and defects when she took possession on the day after she procured Ms Waters’ ejectment. Ms Odell also says that to prepare the House for sale, she had to repaint the House and replace the carpets, the stove and the oven. Ms Odell swears that she lived in the House for over two months, doing much of the work required to save her mother’s money.[49]
  2. [98]
    The alleged poor condition of the House is disputed by Ms Waters. She concedes that the House was not in new condition given its age, but that the House and garden were immaculate and that there was no damage.
  3. [99]
    It is possible that Ms Waters’ view of the condition of the House might have been affected by her long occupation and her limited resources. But it is not a surprise that repainting and some maintenance might have been required for sale of an older home to try to secure the best price. However, subject to that, I accept Ms Water’s evidence as to the general condition of the House. Further, I accept that she did pay rates and do maintenance and repair work on the House. Her evidence that she did so was unchallenged in cross examination.
  4. [100]
    In my view, Ms Odell’s evidence to the contrary, at best, involves an exaggeration of, perhaps, relatively modest defects and repairs that were required. I reach that conclusion for four reasons:
    1. (a)
      First, her discredited evidence about the alleged photographs, set out at [22] – [26] above, makes her a witness that could not be relied upon on this issue at all; and
    2. (b)
      Second, her version of the state of the House and the work she had to do figures in her justification of an alleged gift of $52,000 made by Mrs Benn to Ms Odell. She said that gift was applied, in part, to travel and other expenses resulting from the sale and rectification of the House.[50] She therefore had an incentive not to be honest on this issue. Ironically, at trial she conceded that that sum ought to be paid back and should be treated as part of the estate: see paragraph [159] below;
    3. (c)
      Third, Ms Odell also made a transfer of $10,000 to her benefit from the joint account on 6 February 2020.[51] She claimed that that payment was reimbursement of amounts she paid on her mother’s behalf to repair the House, again giving her a reason to exaggerate the need for work to be done;
  1. (d)
    Fourth, not one document was disclosed, despite requests,[52] that provides evidence that Ms Odell paid out $10,000 for repairs on the house. She was not re-examined on this transfer and no documents were produced despite her oral evidence that she had them and had given them to her solicitors;
  2. (e)
    Fifth, in the witness box she alleged:[53]

So she’d actually boarded up and nailed all the doors, and we could not get in the house without using a locksmith to actually remove all the - she just nailed, nailed, nailed. She disabled the garage door.

This was not mentioned in her affidavits, despite the fact that the affidavits set out, in some detail, the alleged damage to the House. It was only said when challenged in cross examination about how she could justify the assertion in the Declaration that Ms Waters obstructed the sale of the House.[54]

  1. (f)
    Sixth, there are some very modest sums paid from the joint account apparently for the kinds of purposes associated with fixing up the House incurred in later February 2020.[55] These small sums belie the suggestion that major work was required, or that major sums were spent on such work.
  1. [101]
    Ms Odell might well have paid for some items to tidy up the House after Ms Waters’ sudden eviction. However, I do not accept that any substantial funds were expended. I also reject the proposition that there was any significant or intentional damage to the House at the time when Ms Waters was evicted.

The Will and the Declaration

  1. [102]
    Once Ms Waters left the House, her part in the narrative largely ceases until the proceedings commence. There is a good deal of evidence which might be thought to be relevant to Mrs Benn’s state of mind at around this time (ignoring Ms Odell’s direct evidence, which I do not rely on in this regard). That evidence comprises:
    1. (a)
      The statutory declaration apparently made on 27 December 2019 which recites Mrs Benn’s statements to the effect that Ms Odell was to retake possession of the House and Ms Waters had no right to the House or its proceeds;
    2. (b)
      The will of 31 December 2019;
    3. (c)
      The Declaration apparently dated 29 January 2020; and
    4. (d)
      The Will.
  1. [103]
    The will of 31 December relevantly[56]:
    1. (a)
      Appointed Ms Odell as executor;
    2. (b)
      Provided for distribution of the estate as follows:
    3. 8.
      I direct my Executor to give my three children, the only beneficiaries, the following:
    4. a.
      [Ms Waters] will received $20,000 cash only has had no further right or claim to any property real or financial.
    5. b.
      The remainder of the estate, both real and financial will be equally divided between my two other children [Rodney] and [Ms Odell].
    6. (c)
      Included the following further clause:
    7. Individuals Omitted from Bequests
    8. 9.
      If I have omitted to leave property in this Will to one or more of my heirs as named above, the failure to do so is intentional.
    9. No Contest Provisions
    10. 10.
      If any beneficiary under this Will contests in any court any of the provision of this Will, then each and all such persons shall not be entitled to any devises…under this Will…
  1. [104]
    It also contained the following extraordinary statement above the attestation clause:
  1. We declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the Commonwealth of Australia that the foregoing is true and correct this 31st day of December 2019, at Clear Island Waters, Queensland.
  1. [105]
    The Will abandons some of more peculiar aspects of the 31 December will just described but makes in substance the same provisions. It appoints Ms Odell executor, provides a specific legacy to Ms Waters of $20,000 (without the editorial comment about no further claim) and provides for Rodney and Ms Odell to share the residuary estate evenly. The relevant clauses are clauses 3 and 4 which provide:
  1. I GIVE the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARD (sic) ($20,000.00)to my daughter PHILLIPA ANNE WATERS PROVIDED she survives me for a period of thirty (30) days absolutely and IN THE EVENT my daughter PHILLIPA ANNE WATERS should predecease me or fails to survive me for a period of thirty (30) days leaving issue surviving her then but not otherwise such issue of my deceased daughter as shall survive me and shall take and if more than one equally between them the share which his her or their parent would have taken had she survived me and attained a vested interest.
  1. I GIVE DEVISE AND BEQUEATH the rest and residue of my estate both real and personal of whatever nature and wherever situate UNTO AND TO THE USE OF my Trustee UPON TRUST to sell call in and convert the same into money with power to postpone the sale calling in and conversion of any part for so long as my Trustee thinks fit AND after payment of all my just debts and funeral and testamentary expenses and all death duties payable in respect of my estate TO PAY the balance then remaining (“my residuary estate”) as follows:
    1. (a)
      FIFTY PERCENT (50%) share to my son RODNEY FREDERICK BENN PROVIDED he survives me for a period of thirty (30) days absolutely and IN THE EVENT my son RODNEY FREDERICK BENN should predecease me or fails to survive me for a period of thirty (30) days leaving issue surviving her then but not otherwise such issue of my deceased son RODNEY FREDERICK BENN shall pass to his wife DEBRINA LILLIAN BENN PROVIDED she survives me for a period of thirty (30) days absolutely.
    2. (b)
      FIFTY PERCENT (50%) to my daughter CHRISTINE ODELLPROVIDED she survives me for a period of thirty (30) days absolutely and IN THE EVENT my daughter CHRISTINE ODELL should predecease me or fails to survive me for a period of thirty (30) days leaving issue surviving her then but not otherwise such issue of my deceased daughter as shall survive me and attain shall take and if more than one equally between them the share which his her or their parent would have taken had she survived me and attained a vested interest.
  1. [106]
    There is no evidence independent of Ms Odell of the circumstances of the preparation of any of these documents, though one can infer that the Will (at least) was prepared with involvement of Mrs Benn’s solicitors. The only independent evidence of Mrs Benn’s state of mind in relation to Ms Waters and the House was recorded in a letter from Mrs Benn’s solicitors. However, objection was taken to the tender of the letter and the tender was not pressed. Nor was the solicitor called, despite that possibility being flagged.[57]
  2. [107]
    Comparison of the 31 December 2019 will with the Will reveals little substantive change. Both wills omit the reference to the gifts to each of Rodney and Ms Odell recorded in the June 2011 will. One is left to wonder why Mrs Benn had a change of heart on that issue. Her recollection about those alleged gifts would surely not have improved over the succeeding eight years.
  3. [108]
    What the two wills do appear to show is that Mrs Benn had decided to exclude Ms Waters from any significant testamentary benefit, despite the attitude she clearly held in June 2011. The need for resources of her own, which could only be obtained by sale of the House, does not explain that approach in her testamentary provisions. She could have made provision for Ms Waters to the extent she had assets remaining at her death. She didnot. Clearly then, Mrs Benn decided not only that she needed the money from the House but also that she was going to take a completely different approach to Ms Waters as compared to her approach disclosed in June 2011.
  1. [109]
    The principal document which might cast light on Mrs Benn’s state of mind is the Declaration apparently signed by her on 29 January 2020. There was no objection to the admission of that document into evidence, nor any contention that it was admissible for limited purposes. That is not to say that it is a reliable account of the facts it narrates.
  2. [110]
    Ms Odell’s affidavits do not say anything about how this document was created. Indeed all that is said is that Ms Odell has “reviewed” the Declaration.[58] However, in cross examination a good deal more was revealed. Ms Odell said that:
    1. (a)
      Her mother could not use a computer and that Mrs Benn dictated the document and Ms Odell typed it;
    2. (b)
      Her mother told her that her solicitors had advised her to prepare the document; and
    3. (c)
      Her mother had a friend come in and witness it.
  3. [111]
    The Declaration relevantly provides:
  1. Phillipa was very manipulative and verbally abusive to me and a change was noticed in her manner and behaviour over the years. Phillipa has been combative and threatening and I am saddened at the change in her personality and foundations.

Phillipa resisted and obstructed the sale of my home, which I needed to take place.

I was a self funded retiree, however, due to the global financial crisis and loss of funds and decreased superannuation, I found that I did not have enough money to survive and I could not obtain an old age pension due to my ownership of my home that Phillipa was living in rent free, I was ineligible.

Even though Phillipa was living rent free, she was verbally requested to ensure that rates were paid and the house was kept in good repair. Phillipa failed to do both and at the time of requesting her to cooperate with the sale it was found that the rates were in arrears and she had stopped paying for some time.

I was willing to assist Phillipa in purchasing a lesser property, however her greed took over and she had an unrealistic sense of entitlement that she should receive the entire home and refused to assist me or not obstruct me in selling the property. My daughter Christine offered Phillipa to stay in her property in Burleigh Heads whilst the sale was proceeding, however Phillipa absolutely refused to leave the house insisting that she has entitlement to it as she had been living there for the past 28 years. Even though I asserted that it was my house and I owned it and she had no right to it, Phillipa insisted that she would not leave. I had to then issue a notice to vacate the property. Phillipa then boarded up doors and put up CCTV camera to film and sent my daughter Christine a msg stating she was “going to set you up and have you arrested so that you cannot work and Aaron is going to film it”.

I then had to seek assistance from family to have her removed from the property, using security and a locksmiths and causing an enormous amount of stress to myself and family. Phillipa caused damage to the home which was beyond “wear and tear” there were holes and damage to walls and the total cost to repair this damage was $17,000, which my daughter Christine assisted me to pay to enable me to have the house to an acceptable basic standard to enable it to be sold.

[…]

I have seen the terrible messages sent to my daughter Christine, and clearly Phillipa has lost any sense of moral compass. Phillipa has not come to see me for the past 5 years even though I bought her vehicles and she only lived 1.5hrs away from my retirement home and I have been hospitalised and in ICU on a number of occasions.

Phillipa’s siblings have worked and paid for their homes and at the time of writing this, my daughter Christine has a mortgage on her property.

  1. [112]
    Ms Odell was at pains to say the Declaration was her mother’s document that she simply typed on her mother’s instructions. I reject that evidence. Ms Odell was the one who dealt with Ms Waters. She knew what Ms Waters had said in her texts and what had occurred in the retaking of possession. Yet the Declaration is inconsistent with those texts and events in material respects:
    1. (a)
      First, nothing in the evidence justifies the assertion that Ms Waters resisted and obstructed the sale of the House;
    2. (b)
      Second, the evidence is directly contrary to the proposition that Ms Waters said she should receive the entire home;
    3. (c)
      Third, there is no evidence of any doors being boarded up other than Ms Odell’s unsubstantiated assertion which I have rejected. There is no evidence of any CCTV cameras;
    4. (d)
      Fourth, I do not accept that the House was in bad condition as Mrs Benn asserts for the reasons I have already given, much less that $17,000 was paid to make repairs;
    5. (e)
      Fifth, the evidence supports that Ms Waters was paying the rates;
    6. (f)
      Sixth, there is no credible basis to suggest that Mrs Benn had to issue the Notice to Vacate based on just the short conversations on 27 December;
    7. (g)
      Seventh, there is no evidence (again, other than Ms Odell’s assertion) of Ms Waters being abusive or manipulative. Those allegations were not put to Ms Waters in cross examination;
    8. (h)
      Eighth, while some of Ms Waters’ texts were understandably emotive, any fair reading shows Ms Odell to be the aggressor; and
    9. (i)
      Finally, it must also be noted that Mrs Benn has abandoned her views as to how well Rodney and Ms Odell had done from their parents in the June 2011 will and focussed just on Ms Waters’ position.
  1. [113]
    There is one of two possibilities here. The first is that Ms Odell manipulated her mother’s emotions and selectively presented information about her sister to induce Mrs Benn to adopt the views in the Declaration. The second is that Mrs Benn, free of influence, formed the views in the Declaration.
  2. [114]
    In my view, the former is very much more likely given:
    1. (a)
      Mrs Benn’s reliance on Ms Odell at this stage;
    2. (b)
      Her likely vulnerability arising from her illness and need for funds;
    3. (c)
      The fact that Mrs Benn appeared to have no direct knowledge of much of what appears in the Declaration;
    4. (d)
      Ms Odell’s extravagant hostility to her sister and inability to give truthful or reliable accounts to the Court on that subject; and
    5. (e)
      The calculated and peremptory way the ejection from the House occurred without any evidence of any prior discussions between Mrs Benn and Ms Waters.
  3. [115]
    Either way, the Declaration provides no justification for the limited legacy for Ms Waters.

Joint account and the sale proceeds

  1. [116]
    A joint account was opened in the names of Mrs Benn and Ms Odell on 24 January 2020. Ms Odell swears that her mother instructed her to do this to facilitate her assisting with Mrs Benn’s financial matters. I only have Ms Odell’s evidence that this was Mrs Benn’s initiative. I do not accept that evidence.
  2. [117]
    Mrs Benn had her Retirement Access Account and an Incentive Saver Account. There is no obvious reason why Mrs Benn could not have given Ms Odell access to either of those accounts. Further, the effect of creating a joint account is that Ms Odell would take the balance by survivorship. Given her subsequent behaviour, it is not difficult to ascribe to her an intention to secure that outcome. To my mind there is a real prospect that the joint account was Ms Odell’s initiative. However, it is impossible to be sure exactly how the joint account was established. Whatever Ms Odell’s intentions, she has accepted that the money in the joint account was beneficially owned by her mother at all times.
  1. [118]
    A contract was obtained on the House promptly for a contract price of$770,000 and a deposit of $38,500 was paid. The contract is not in evidence, and it is unclear when it was executed. $20,000 of the deposit was released in February 2020 and paid into the joint account as the initial deposit to that account. The contract settled on 13 March 2020 with $724,608.56 paid to Mrs Benn. Despite the opening of the joint account, the funds were paid into Ms Odell’s personal account. She explained this on the basis that she was asked for an account prior to settlement by the conveyancer and “did not have any details conveniently available at that time of the request (sic)”.[59] This evidence sounds improbable. Why could the joint account details not easily be accessed? Ms Odell plainly had online access to the joint account so the particulars could have been easily obtained. This was not a small sum. My concerns about Ms Odell’s truthfulness on this issue are magnified by what happened to the settlement payment.
  1. [119]
    Ms Odell kept the settlement sum in her account for two weeks and then transferred only $650,000 to the joint account. She kept $74,608.56 in her personal account.              Ms Odell’s explanation for keeping this money is not credible. She swore that:
    1. (a)
      Her mother gifted her $52,000 of that sum in appreciation of her effort and assistance over the previous year and in recognition of the time she had taken off work to support her; and
    2. (b)
      The balance of $20,608.56 was expended on Mrs Benn’s living expenses, either directly or as reimbursement for amounts paid by Ms Odell from her own funds.
  2. [120]
    There is no independent evidence to corroborate her account. There is no evidence as to how much time she had given up in the previous year and there is no suggestion Mrs Benn needed full time care in the year leading up to March 2020. The $52,000 gift is a royal one from a woman concerned about her financial security and with a track record of being fairly frugal. Further, there is no evidential basis to accept that the $20,000 had been paid for Mrs Benn’s needs as of March 2020. I refer to the analysis of Mrs Benn’s daily account in paragraph [57] to [64] above which shows that she appears to have been meeting ordinary living expenses from her ARS pension until March 2020. Finally, when cross examined about this sum, Ms Odell claimed that the money was for the funeral.[60] Obviously that must be wrong: see paragraphs [15] to [21] above.
  1. [121]
    For those reasons Ms Odell’s evidence on both sums is inherently unlikely. I do not accept her evidence that her mother told her to keep any of that money as a gift, much less $52,000. I do not accept that there was an accrued liability for expenses paid by Ms Odell for Mrs Benn of anything like $20,000.
  2. [122]
    It should also be recalled that Ms Odell was Mrs Benn’s EPA and accordingly should not have mixed her funds with Mrs Benn’s. Further, any transaction between Ms Odell (as EPA) and Mrs Benn gives rise to a presumption that Mrs Benn was induced to enter into it by Ms Odell’s undue influence.[61] That does not impact on the assessment of the evidence as such. However, it does highlight the circumstances of Mrs Benn’s relationship with Ms Odell at the time of this transaction. She was fully reliant on Ms Odell. Even if Mrs Benn had said something which might justify the assertion of gift, it is difficult to see how it could have been defended as lawful.
  3. [123]
    By letter dated 20 January 2022, Ms Odell’s solicitors offered on her behalf to add back into the estate the amount of $52,000. That letter relevantly provided:[62]
  1. In your letter of 17 June 2021, following sub-paragraphs (a) to (i), you allege that:

Based on your client’s affidavit evidence she appears to have applied approximately $140,000 from the sale of the Skennars Head property for her own benefit based on the amounts calculated at paragraph (f) to (i) above, and the items disclosed at paragraphs 232 – 234 of your clients Affidavit.

  1. That is a serious allegation of wrongdoing, which is strenuously denied by our client.
  2. Nonetheless, for the purpose of the family provision proceeding, our client has instructed us that she agrees to “add back in”, nationally, to the value of the estate, the sum of $52,000 to reflect the amount deposed to by our client in [232] of our client’s affidavit (Court Doc 16).
  3. We confirm that for the purposes of this proceeding, the value of the estate may be taken to consist of (as at January 2022):
    1. (a)
      $359,656.21 in cash held in our trust account (balance as at 20 January 2022); and
    2. (b)
      $52,000 being the “add back” sum, for a total (notional) value of $411,656.21.
    3. We trust that this notional increased value of the Estate adequately satisfies your client’s misplaced concerns, and adequately addresses your client’s allegations against our client.
  1. [124]
    Not surprisingly, this late and inadequate offer failed to satisfy the applicant. It was a high-handed letter for Ms Odell to instruct her solicitors to send given that Ms Odell must have known there was at least another $55,000 she had taken from Mrs Benn in the last days of her mother’s life which she had not, at that stage, disclosed.

Mrs Benn’s last months

  1. [125]
    Mrs Benn continued to live in her retirement unit at the Gold Coast until May or June 2020. Her care needs were not able to be met in that unit by that time and because of significant worsening of her cancer, Mrs Benn moved into a nursing home at Warana on the Sunshine Coast for palliative care. So much is clear on evidence independent of Ms Odell.
  2. [126]
    Ms Odell gives a more detailed story, about her mother agreeing to move in with her and then deciding to go to Warana. This might have happened, but again, there are points of detail in Ms Odell’s evidence which are problematic. Ms Odell swore that she was buying a new home and that Ms Benn agreed to move into the new home.[63]
  3. [127]
    However, on 1 June 2020, Ms Odell transferred $5,400 from the joint account to her personal account. Its description in the joint account is “DEFT RENT” and Ms Odell accepted in cross examination that she rented a unit in her own name at that time. She said it was for her mother to move into with her. However, I do not accept that that is true.
    1. (a)
      It seems improbable, given Mrs Benn’s increasing care needs, that she would have been willing to move into a unit (or house) which was not physically suitable for her increasing needs;
    2. (b)
      Mrs Benn moved into the Warana premises, at the latest, on 11 June 2020.[64] Ms Odell confirms in her evidence that Mrs Benn was informed in May or June 2020 that she would need to move into palliative care.[65] It is highly unlikely that as at 1 June 2020, there was any realistic prospect that Mrs Benn was ever going to move into Ms Odell’s unit. She gave evidence that the catalyst for Mrs Benn’s change of heart was a fall at the retirement unit just a couple of days before, but that is highly improbable given the timing of the move to Warana;
    3. (c)
      Even if Mrs Benn was going to move in with Ms Odell, it must have been obvious almost immediately after that payment that she would not be doing so. Ms Odell said that she did not repay the money because her mother did not want her to. I do not find Ms Odell sufficiently credible and reliable to accept that vague and self-serving comment, especially as this payment was never disclosed in her initial detailed affidavit in which she gave evidence of gifts from her mother; and
    4. (d)
      Finally, Ms Odell’s evidence about leasing a unit is directly inconsistent with her evidence in her affidavit that she was buying a new home.
  1. [128]
    Ms Odell’s evidence is not reliable on this issue. I do not know what Mrs Benn’s decisions and plans were, other than as demonstrated by the documents. What is clear is that Ms Odell paid $5,400 to her own benefit from the joint account, and kept it, while Mrs Benn received no benefit from it.
  2. [129]
    Mrs Benn died on 8 August 2020. There is no evidence as to her state of health in the days leading up to her death. Ms Odell gives no evidence about that matter. She presumably knows that information as she was her mother’s principal support through this time. Further, as executor, she had a duty to put relevant evidence before the Court as to the proper disposition of the application.[66] Given that she took significant funds from the joint account in the weeks and days prior to Mrs Benn’s death which she says her mother authorised, such evidence is of central importance. What I do know is that Mrs Benn was in palliative care leading up to her death. One might reasonably infer that it is unlikely that in her last days she was in a position to freely exercise judgment about financial affairs, even if she had capacity to do so.

Ms Odell dealings with Mrs Benn’s funds

Payments to Ms Odell’s benefit

  1. [130]
    In the course of this judgment, I have referred to a number of transactions by Ms Odell using Mrs Benn’s funds. It is convenient to summarise them, chronologically:
    1. (a)
      On 6 February 2020, Ms Odell transferred $10,000 to herself from the joint account;[67]
    2. (b)
      Throughout February 2020, she paid numerous small amounts for her personal living expenses totalling about $400;[568]
    3. (c)
      On 13 March 2020, Ms Odell paid the whole of the net proceeds from the House into her personal account and held them there for about 2 months, benefitting from the interest on over $720,000,[69] albeit for only 2 weeks;
    4. (d)
      On 2 April 2020, Ms Odell kept some $74,000 of the sale proceeds, $52,000 said to be a gift and $22,000 said to be kept on account of expenses incurred;[70]
    5. (e)
      On 1 June 2020, she transferred $5,400 to pay the “deposit” on a unit she was renting in her own name;[71]
    6. (f)
      On 6 August 2020, just two days before Mrs Benn died, she transferred $55,000 from the joint account to her personal account;[72] and
    7. (g)
      On 11 August 2020, after Mrs Benn’s death, Ms Odell transferred$24,138.32 from the joint account to her personal account putatively for “fees funeral”.[73]
  1. [131]
    But there is more.
  2. [132]
    On 12 March 2020, Ms Odell caused $5,000 to be paid out of the joint account.[74] She revealed for the first time in cross examination that the payment was an investment made on behalf of her mother that did not proceed and was refunded to the respondent’s account.[75] She was not re- examined on this transaction.
  3. [133]
    On 20 July 2020, Ms Odell paid $1,800 towards the rent on her property.[76] The respondent sought to justify the same on the basis that her mother was going to move there with her but conceded she never did so.[77] This was particularly egregious, given the matters explained in paragraphs [126] and[128] above.
  1. [134]
    On 7 August 2020, Ms Odell transferred $1,200 to herself, the day before Mrs Benn died. She could not justify this transfer when cross examined.[78]

Other transactions

  1. [135]
    I have already explained how Ms Odell transferred the sale proceeds into her personal account on settlement of the sale of the House. Even if I accepted her evidence that that was done for convenience (a propositionabout which I have doubts),[79] there are other frequent transactions by Ms Odell by which she transferred funds from the joint account to her personal accounts and back again.
  1. [136]
    Notably, between 22 April 2020 and 23 May 2020, Ms Odell transferred$350,000 out of the joint account. Ms Odell swore that Mrs Benn instructed her to transfer this sum into Ms Odell’s personal RAMS saver account. This was explained as follows:[80]

And 236, are you seriously telling his Honour that what your mother asked you to do was to invest $350,000 into your joint account - sorry, from the joint account into your RAMS saver account?---Yes, because that was the higher in - higher interest, other than what Mum could’ve got in that initial term deposit. And we couldn’t get any higher than the 250. That’s why the next best option was for more money to go into the RAMS, but as you can see, it comes back in.

You’re seriously telling his Honour that this 84 year old woman at this stage, who’s been an astute investor with her husband over these years, wanted to make an investment in your account?---Yes. Absolutely.[81]

  1. [137]
    These funds never return to the joint account. However, Ms Odell said that the capital did find its way back to Mrs Benn when Mrs Benn needed funds to go into the Warana nursing home. The Refundable Accommodation Deposit (“RAD”) payable for entry into that facility was $468,000.[82]
  2. [138]
    In her affidavit, Ms Odell also sought to explain three other transactions as being on account of the RAD.[83] First, on 6 July 2020, Ms Odell transferred$50,000 to her personal account. In respect of that transaction, the account statement contained the description “Tricare fees bond move”.[84] I note that there is a further a transaction on 11 June 2020 for $6,000, which also bears the description “Tricare fees bond move,” however, this transaction is not referred to in the body of Ms Odell’s affidavit, nor was it raised in her oral evidence.[85] Second, on 21 July 2020, Ms Odell again transferred $50,000 to her personal account and the account statement contained the description “funds”.[86]
  1. [139]
    Excluding the $6,000 amount, the above transactions account for $450,000 being paid to Ms Odell on account of the RAD. In respect of the remaining$18,000, there is some difficulty in the evidence. Ultimately, however, I accept that the bulk of the funds referred to above must have been paid towards the RAD, because Mrs Benn did not have sufficient funds of her own to pay the RAD. I am not able to conclude that Ms Odell kept part of the amounts referred to in [136] above as the evidence is incomplete on thisissue. However, it is incomplete because Ms Odell has never given any proper account of her self-interested dealings in her mother’s money.
  1. [140]
    Finally, there is one further large payment of $100,000 to be dealt with. It is explained by Ms Odell as follows:

On or around 5 June 2020 my mother instructed me to transfer $100,000 of her funds to Rodney. I made the transfers from my personal bank account as my mother’s funds were not easily accessible.

The reason for my transfer from my own funds at paragraph 102 was because my mother’s funds were in a term deposit at the time and unable to be accessed immediately, but Rodney needed the funds quite quickly. My mother and I agreed that I would pay from my personal funds and be reimbursed by my mother later.[87]

  1. [141]
    I infer that Ms Odell made sure to be reimbursed. I have some reservations about Ms Odell’s explanation of how this transaction arose. Her evidence was again vague on detail. Further, the payment was offered months after Rodney and his wife had been affected by the early 2020 bushfires. The effect of the offer was to further reduce the estate of Mrs Benn, this time to Rodney’s benefit. This is the only payment for which there is some evidence independent of Ms Odell. It is explained by Rodney as follows:

I spoke with my mother immediately after the bushfires to tell her that my wife and I were safe, and to talk about the extent of the damage to [our] property and how I would have to keep repairing the property bit by bit. At the time, nothing was said about my mother helping me financially and I understood at the time that my mother did not have much money.

Sometime in May or June 2020 my mother called me to offer to help me with some of the costs it would take to repair my house after the bushfires. In this call my mother told me that she had recently sold her house at Skennars Head (in NSW) and could afford to assist me now and offered to pay $100,000 towards repair costs. My mother then said that she would get Christine to make the payment for her.[88]

  1. [142]
    Rodney was cross examined. I have no reason to doubt his evidence on this or any other matter. Ms Waters submitted that Ms Odell had some hand in this gift with a view to frustrating her possible claims on her mother’s estate. While that is possible, I do not think there is sufficient evidence to reach that conclusion, and certainly no evidence Rodney had anything to do with any such plan. Mrs Benn had good reason to want to help Rodney at that time and I do not think the timing of the offer particularly relevant.

Conclusions on Ms Odell’s conduct

  1. [143]
    Central to the resolution of the issues which arise in this proceeding is the relationship between Ms Odell and Mrs Benn, and Ms Odell’s conduct as daughter, sister, EPA and executor. It is necessary to state some conclusions on these issues arising from the above narrative.
  1. [144]
    I accept Ms Odell had a close personal relationship with her mother. I accept that Mrs Benn saw Ms Odell as the sibling most to be relied upon with her affairs, as demonstrated by her consistent choice of Ms Odell as executor and as her EPA. I accept she was her mother’s principal relationship from the time of her return to Australia in 2017 until Mrs Benn’s death. As are result of these circumstances, she had a relationship of special trust and confidence with Mrs Benn.
  2. [145]
    I do not accept that Ms Odell provided significant personal care. While I am willing to assume that Mrs Benn needed some personal assistance in the year leading up to her death, especially around the time of her move to Warana, I do not find Ms Odell’s evidence that she gave up work for an extended period leading up to mother’s death credible. There is no persuasive evidence that Mrs Benn was incapacitated in the years leading up to her admission to the Warana nursing home. If Ms Odell was not working for an extended period, then I do not accept that was primarily because of care obligations for her mother.
  3. [146]
    The consequence of her relationship of trust and confidence with Mrs Benn, however, is that Ms Odell had significant influence over her mother and the opportunity to influence (if not direct) her financial and personal decisions and to manipulate the way Mrs Benn saw events. With that came a heavy responsibility to exercise that influence fairly and disinterestedly. Sadly, Ms Odell failed to discharge that responsibility. Rather, she misused her position of influence to satisfy her sense of grievance against her sister in at least two ways:
    1. (a)
      She actively pursued an aggressive plan to eject her sister from the House and misrepresented to her mother what was occurring in her dealings with Ms Waters on that subject; and
    2. (b)
      She sought to exclude Ms Water from substantial benefit from her mother’s estate and to remove her mother’s funds from her mother’s direct control, for the purpose of obstructing any claim her sister might have on her mother’s estate and vindicating her self-perceived superior entitlement to her mother’s wealth.
  4. [147]
    The first finding is amply established on my analysis of the evidence of Ms Odell’s conduct. The second requires a little more explanation.
  5. [148]
    Ms Odell said that each of the payments she took from her mother’s funds was taken because her mother “instructed” her to make the payment. The word is invoked in a formulaic manner in Ms Odell’s affidavits and is redolent of the suggestion of Mrs Benn’s active consent to in the transactions. However, in no case was Ms Odell able to explain in a credible way the context or content of any conversation with Mrs Benn which explained the conclusory assertion that Mrs Benn “instructed” her to make a certain payment or take certain money. Nor is there the slightest corroboration of any such “instruction”. Further, some of these instructions are said to have been given in unlikely situations (such as two days before Mrs Benn’s death while in palliative care).
  1. [149]
    I reject Ms Odell’s evidence insofar as it asserts that Mrs Benn, free of influence, instructed her to undertake any of the transactions she undertook. I think it possible in some cases that Mrs Benn might have agreed to Ms Odell’s proposals for dealings in Ms Benn’s assets. However, such agreement, if it ever occurred, would be vitiated by Ms Odell’s influence.
  2. [150]
    Despite all that, I do not think that Ms Odell was seeking to cause any financial harm to her mother. To the extent Mrs Benn needed funds, I accept Ms Odell would have made them available (as occurred, for the Warana bond). However, in my view the inference which flows from Ms Odell’s behaviour is that she was determined to prevent, so far as possible, her sister from having any access to her mother’s funds after Mrs Benn’s death.
  3. [151]
    At the heart of Ms Odell’s conduct is her view that her sister was a freeloader who had received more than her fair share from her parents, and that Ms Odell was more deserving than her sister. That sense of grievance grew into a hatred which caused her to pursue a campaign to cut her mother off from her sister, to influence her mother to a negative view of her sister, to cause the aggressive removal of Ms Waters from the House and to seek to appropriate to herself as much of Mrs Benn’s funds as she could to the exclusion of her sister.
  4. [152]
    Whether, and to what extent, Mrs Benn was an active and/or independent participant in Ms Odell’s campaign is difficult to judge given there is almost no evidence independent of Ms Odell on that matter. However, it is plain from Ms Odell’s conduct around the time of the ejection from the House and the presentation of events in the Declaration, that Ms Odell encouraged any tendency which might have existed in Mrs Benn to change her view of Ms Waters from the benign view she held in 2011. Further, Mrs Benn was vulnerable to influence against Ms Waters in late 2019 given her declining health and need for funds. Absent any reliable evidence to the contrary, the facts support the finding that Ms Odell played a key role in persuading her mother to the hostile views of Ms Waters expressed in the Declaration and the dismissive provision in the Will.
  5. [153]
    It is also evident from the above analysis of the evidence that Ms Odell continued her campaign against her sister from the moment of her mother’s death, starting with the clearing out of the joint account on account of the phantom funeral fees. It continued with her obstructive conduct of these proceedings in the face of relevant and direct questions from Ms Waters’ solicitors and her untruthful and unreliable evidence in this case.

THE LAW

  1. [154]
    The general principles applicable to applications under s 41(1) are sufficiently outlined as follows:[89]
  1. [86]
    The applicants apply for further provision from their father’s estate under s 41(1) Succession Act 1991. That section provides:
  1. 41
    Estate of deceased person liable for maintenance
  1. (1)
    If any person (the deceased person) dies whether testate or intestate and in terms of the will or as a result of the intestacy adequate provision is not made from the estate for the proper maintenance and support of the deceased person’s spouse, child or dependant, the court may, in its discretion, on application by or on behalf of the said spouse, child or dependant, order that such provision as the court thinks fit shall be made out of the estate of the deceased person for such spouse, child or dependant.
  1. [87]
    The section dictates, and the authorities confirm, that what is required is a two-stage approach. First, the Court must determine the so-called jurisdictional question: that is (in this case), whether by the terms of the Will, adequate provision is not made for the proper maintenance and support of the applicants, as children of the deceased. Second, if that jurisdictional question is determined in favour of the applicants, then the Court may exercise a discretion to order that such provision as the Court thinks fit be made out of the estate for one or both of the applicants.[90]
  1. [88]
    The jurisdictional issue is determined as at the date of death. The discretion falls to be exercised as at the date of the order. However, the assessment of the two matters may overlap.
  1. [89]
    The primary considerations which arise in applying the provision were conveniently summarised by Martin J in Darveniza v Darveniza [2014] QSC 37 (footnotes omitted):
  1. (1)
    From those, and other, decisions the following may be drawn:
  1. (a)
    The court must determine whether the applicant has been left without adequate provision for his or her proper maintenance, education and advancement in life.
  1. (b)
    When considering the proper level of maintenance, the following, at least, should be taken into account:
  1. (i)
    the applicant’s financial position,
  1. (ii)
    the size and nature of the deceased’s estate,
  1. (iii)
    the totality of the relationship between the applicant and the deceased,
  1. (iv)
    the relationship between the deceased and other persons who have legitimate claims upon his or her bounty,
  1. (v)
    present and future needs including the need to guard against unforeseen contingencies.
  1. (c)
    The use of the word “proper” means that attention may be given, in deciding whether adequate provision has been made, to such matters as what used to be called the “station in life” of the parties and the expectations to which that has given rise, in other words reciprocal claims and duties based upon how the parties lived and might reasonably have expected to live in the future.
  1. (d)
    “Maintenance” may imply a continuity of a pre-existing state of affairs, or provision over and above a mere sufficiency of means upon which to live.
  1. (e)
    “Support”, similarly, may imply provision that exceeds a person’s bare needs. The use of the two terms serves to amplify the powers conferred upon the court. And, furthermore, provision to secure or promote “advancement” would ordinarily be provision beyond that for the mere necessities of life. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which it might appear that sufficient provision for support and maintenance had been made, but that in the circumstances, further provision would be proper to enable a potential beneficiary to improve his or her prospects in life, or to undertake further education. This might be the case where, for example, a promise had been made, or where a claimant reasonably held an expectation that such provision would be made.
  1. (f)
    The totality of the relevant relationship would include:
  1. (i)
    any sacrifices made or services given by the claimant to or for the benefit of the deceased;
  1. (ii)
    any contributions by the claimant to building up the deceased’s estate; and
  1. (iii)
    the conduct of the claimant towards the deceased and of the deceased towards the claimant.
  1. (g)
    Any such sacrifices, services or contributions (whether described as giving rise to a moral duty/moral claim or not) are a relevant consideration (as part of the totality of the relationship between the claimant and the deceased), but are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the making of an order under the Act.
  1. (h)
    A claimant may fail to establish that the disposition of the deceased’s estate was not such as to make adequate provision for his or her proper maintenance, etc, even though no provision was made for him or her in the will.
  1. (i)
    The determination of whether the disposition of the deceased’s estate was not such as to make adequate provision for the proper maintenance, etc, of the claimant will always, as a practical matter, involve anevaluation of the provision, if any, made for the claimant on the one hand, and the claimant’s ‘needs’ that cannot be met from his or her own resources on the other.
  1. (j)
    The adequacy of the disposition is assessed as at the time of the testator’s death. Any order that might be made is considered in the light of the applicant’s circumstances at the time of the trial.
  1. (2)
    Care must be taken not to extend the idea of a “moral claim” beyond the language of the statute. Section 41 does not give a court carte blanche to remake a will in a way that may appear to be more just. It is a power that should be exercised with the restraint dictated by the terms of the section. The predicament in which a court finds itself has been commented upon many times. In Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales Dixon CJ observed that it was never intended by the legislation that “freedom of testamentary disposition should be so encroached upon that a testator’s decision expressed in his will have only a prima facie effect, the real dispositive power being vested in the Court”. Consideration of these applications must always proceed with the understanding that the capacity of a court to make an assessment is necessarily limited, as the deceased cannot explain his or her reasons for the disposition of the estate or respond to the claims of an applicant.
  1. (3)
    While the terms “moral duty” and “moral claim” have been used as shorthand expressions in the consideration of applications for provision they must be used with care. As Gleeson CJ observed in Vigolo:

“The descriptions of references to moral duty or moral obligations as a gloss upon the text was not new. In 1956, in Coates v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd, Fullagar J said: ‘The notion of “moral duty” is found not in the statute but in a gloss upon the statute. It may be a helpful gloss in many cases, but, when a critical question of meaning arises, the question must be answered by reference to the text and not by reference to the gloss.” (citation omitted)

  1. [90]
    In determining both the matters, the Court approaches the statutory tests from the perspective of the wise and just testator, rather than the fond or foolish testator.[91] Care must be taken, however to apply this approach with modesty and bearing in mind the full history of relevant relationships and that there is a range of responses to given facts which could be considered wise and just.
  2. [91]
    This applies particularly to the first stage of the process where a Will is involved, where the Court must sit in judgment on the provisions made by the deceased. In my view, it is in this context where reasons given by a testator for making a will in a certain form are rationally probative.[92] The wisdom and justice of the provisions of a will might be cast in a quitedifferent light where the Court has identified for it, by reference to the reasons taken into account by the deceased, matters which might not be obvious at trial and which are directly relevant to assessing the provisions against the statutory standard.

SIZE OF THE ESTATE

The potential claims against Ms Odell

  1. [155]
    There is a strong argument that all the funds Ms Odell took from Mrs Benn’s assets before and after her death should be repaid. The clearest basis for that submission is that all such transactions before death are presumed to be the result of undue influence by Ms Odell because of her status as Mrs Benn’s EPA. Section 87 Enduring Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) provides:

The fact that a transaction is between a principal and 1 or more of the following:

  1. (a)
    an attorney under an enduring power of attorney or advance health directive;
  2. (b)
    a relation, business associate or close friend of the attorney;

gives rise to a presumption in the principal’s favour that the principal was induced to enter the transaction by the attorney’s undue influence.

  1. [156]
    On the evidence before this Court, the prospect of rebutting that presumption is remote for any of the transactions. There is no evidence of independent advice. Further, I have serious doubts over whether Mrs Benn consented to, or even knew of, many of the transfers which occurred.
  2. [157]
    As for the funds transferred after death, they cannot have been authorised by Mrs Benn, nor are they able to be justified on estate administration grounds. These funds were just taken.
  3. [158]
    The total amount of funds diverted to Ms Odell are calculated by the applicant at $139,454.88. The applicant contends that this Court should treat that amount as part of the estate.
  4. [159]
    The respondent resists that approach. She contends as follows:
  1. [14]
    Due to the Applicant’s contentions surrounding the $52,000 gift received by the Respondent,[93] the Respondent agrees to notionally add back that amount to the estate (the “Add Back”).[94]
  2. [15]
    The Applicant will no doubt submit that further funds should be added back to the estate for the purposes of this proceeding. However, in circumstances where:
    1. (a)
      no application to remove the Respondent as executor was brought; and
    2. (b)
      no application for compensation or damages for misuse of a power of attorney have been brought,
    3. the estate simply is what it is.
  1. [160]
    The submission in paragraph [15] is extraordinary from a person owing fiduciary obligations, though presumably it was advanced on the basis that the taking of the other funds by Ms Odell was lawful.
  2. [161]
    The first point to deal with is the proposed add back. There is both legal and practical difficulties with this proposal, which difficulties are inter- related.
  3. [162]
    The factual difficulty is that Ms Odell has not paid $52,000 into estate funds. So the estate does not include that sum. Ms Odell offered no undertaking to pay those funds to the estate if required. Nor did she put evidence before the Court that she had $52,000 that could be paid promptly if required. Rather, her counsel submitted that Ms Odell would have to sell property to pay that sum if required. In those circumstances, if I make orders which require that sum to be paid to Ms Waters, how will that be enforced?
  4. [163]
    This leads me to the legal difficulty. Under s 41(1), the Court is concerned with applying the statutory tests there articulated to the estate of the deceased. This necessarily requires one to identify, as a matter of law, that which comprises the estate of the deceased. It is unclear to me how the proposal by the executor “to add back in notionally, to the value of the estate” a given sum makes that sum an asset of the estate. Without some enforceable promise to pay those funds to the estate, it is not even a chose in action.
  5. [164]
    Similar issues arise in respect of the applicant’s contention about the other funds taken from Mrs Benn by Ms Odell. In my view, properly analysed, the claims against Ms Odell (compelling though they are) remain that: claims against her. These proceedings did not seek judgment against Ms Odell on those claims. As Professor Dal Pont observes, subject to some specific exceptions for trust property and the like which he identifies (footnotes omitted):[95]

[A]ny property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, owned beneficially by a person on his or her death can be effectively devolved by will or form part of the estate under intestacy rules. The same applies to incorporeal rights – such as shares or other securities, debts due to the deceased and licences – to which the deceased remains entitled as at his or her death. A broad characterisation of ‘property’ for that purpose draws support from statutory definitions in several jurisdictions.

  1. [165]
    The claims against Ms Odell are choses in action of the estate. In assessing the value of the estate at the two relevant dates, I need to form a view as to the value of the choses in action. Where a chose in action is a credit in abank account or a share in a reputable publicly listed company, it is counted in the estate at face value. In this case, however, the assessment of the value of the chose in action depends on both the prospects of success on the causes of action against Ms Odell and the prospects of recovery on any judgment. It also depends on the prospects of any such proceedings being brought at all.
  1. [166]
    I find that the estate at the date of death and at the date of trial, had extremely strong prospects of success on claims totalling at least some$139,000 against Ms Odell. In addition, it appears from the evidence in this proceeding that Ms Odell had sufficient assets to meet a judgment of that amount.
  1. [167]
    However, as to the prospects of proceedings being brought, no such proceedings have been brought as yet and none will be brought while Ms Odell remains executor. Further, even if Ms Odell is removed, the prospects of proceedings being brought are speculative. Significant costs would be incurred in the conduct of any such proceedings and it is unlikely Ms Waters has the funds nor the inclination to do so. And further, if she was not appointed administrator of the estate (as she might well not be or not wish to be), a professional appointee would be likely required and there is unlikely to be funds to pay that person’s fees for acting, or if there were, those costs would ultimately render Ms Waters’ claim in these proceedings largely nugatory.
  2. [168]
    Accordingly, any quantification of the value of these choses in action is impossible. I do not value the claims at any amount for the purposes of determining the value of the estate.

Estate at the date of death

  1. [169]
    Ms Odell swore that the assets and liabilities at the date of death were as follows:

Assets

Value (estimated)

Tricare Limited Accommodation Bond

$469,842.33

Tricare Limited Exit Entitlement

$102,735.72

TOTAL (Assets)

$572,578.05

Liabilities

Value (estimated)

PharmaSave – Chemist Account

$201.29

PharmaSave – Chemist Account

$27.55

TOTAL (Liabilities)

$228.84

  1. [170]
    That table is wrong in at least two respects.
  2. [171]
    First, Ms Odell did not contend that she was the beneficial owner of the credit balance in the joint account. At the date of death, Mrs Benn had$27,446.32 in the joint account. It was cleared out by Ms Odell in two transactions by 11 August 2020 for the purpose of bringing that balance to nil, as I have found at paragraph [20] above. That sum was an asset of the estate at the date of death. It must be included. Against that, the costs of cremation can be included as a contingent liability. I see no purpose to including a contingent liability for the obligation created by clause 6(c) of the Will for reasons I have already given.
  1. [172]
    Second, the House was sold in the 2019/2020 tax year. The liability for CGT would have accrued by the date of death. It was the only significant liability of the estate outside the costs of this litigation. It should have been included as a liability of the estate at the date of death. The CGT liability of the estate (there might have been some small component of other income tax as well) was established as at October 2021 as $109,319.65.[96]
  2. [173]
    Doing the best I can, the position of the estate at the date of death then appears to be as follows:

Assets

Value (estimated)

Tricare Limited Accommodation Bond

$469,842.33

Tricare Limited Exit Entitlement

$102,735.72

Joint Account Balance

$27,446.32

TOTAL (Assets)

$600,024.37

Liabilities

Value (estimated)

PharmaSave – Chemist Account

$201.29

PharmaSave – Chemist Account

$27.55

CGT Liability

$109,319.65

Contingent Cremation Cost

$4,250

TOTAL (Liabilities)

$113,798.49

NET POSITION

$486,225.88

  1. [174]
    The estate also included causes of action against Ms Odell for over$130,000, but as I have explained, I value those at nil.

Estate at the date of trial

  1. [175]
    Ms Odell swears that the assets and liabilities of the estate at the date of her second affidavit (filed at trial) was as follows:

Assets

Value (estimated)

Cash

$317,577.13

‘Add Back’ Amount

(per letter of 20 January 2022)

$52,000

TOTAL (Assets)

$369,577.13

Liabilities

Value (estimated)

Ongoing legal fees (litigation – counsel’s fees for a 3 day hearing plus one day preparation)

$33,000

Ongoing legal fees (litigation – solicitor’s fees for a 3 day hearing plus one day preparation)

$22,605

Ongoing legal fees (litigation – counsel’s fees to attend judgment and any costs argument (0.5 day))

$4,125

Ongoing legal fees (litigation – solicitor’s fees to attend judgment and any costs argument (0.5 day))

$3,767

Ongoing Legal Fees (administration)

$1,650

TOTAL (Liabilities)

$69,942

NET POSITION

$304,430.13

  1. [176]
    It can be accepted that the available funds in the estate (ignoring the so- called add back for the reasons I have given at [161] to [163] above) are about $317,577.13. The difference between that amount and the value of the estate at the date of death is $168,648.75. What has become of those funds of the estate since the date of death?
  2. [177]
    The net amount of $23,196.32 ($27,446.32 - $4250) was taken by Ms Odell from the joint account and kept by her. As at March 2021, there had also been approximately $20,000 in estate administration and other costs (though some of these seem to relate to the cremation costs and possibly to the litigation, though it had not been commenced at that time). That leaves about $145,000 unaccounted for.

Costs issues in the value of the estate

  1. [178]
    Ms Odell swore at the date of trial that she was told about $160,000 was needed for costs of the proceedings.[97] Presumably, therefore, much of the$145,000 reduction in the value of the estate has already been paid on account of costs of the executor in defending these proceedings. The applicant estimates the costs of the executor to date at $105,000[98] but that leaves a substantial sum of some $40,000 unaccounted for, at least as I read the evidence. The respondent never swears directly to the amount of costs paid out of the estate for her conduct of the litigation. Nor is it possible to reconcile the fate of the funds at the date of death with the current funds in the estate. It is highly unsatisfactory for the evidence to be left in this state on this issue. So far as I am aware, there has been no order of the court which confirms Ms Odell’s right to indemnity for any such costs.
  1. [179]
    Ms Odell also informs this Court that she will require another $62,000 for costs of litigation until the end of submissions, (along with a modest amount for administration). On that basis, she appears to assert an entitlement to costs of over $200,000 in an estate whose net value began at some $485,000. A reasonable executor properly advised would baulk at such a figure.[99]
  2. [180]
    Ms Waters estimates her costs to the end of trial at $150,000. That is also a large sum. However, some of those costs are likely linked to the need to try to extract accurate information from Ms Odell and to prepare a trial which involved a substantial attack on the credit of the personal representative.
  3. [181]
    If both parties obtained their costs out of the estate, the net estate would be only about $100,000:

Current Estate Position

$317,577.13

Further Estimated Costs of Ms Odell

$69,942

Estimated Costs of Ms Waters

$150,000

NET POSITION AFTER COSTS

$97,635.13

  1. [182]
    Mr Hackett for Ms Waters submitted that the respondent’s costs be limited to a further $35,000 but that concession presumed that I would count the transfers to Ms Odell as part of the estate.
  2. [183]
    Ms Brewer and Ms Coore resisted any order being made on costs issues at this stage. They submitted:
  1. To the extent the Applicant submits the Respondent should not be entitled to an indemnity for her costs of the trial, the Respondent says:
    1. (a)
      that is against the rule that ordinarily an executor is entitled to be indemnified out of the estate for their costs, so long as they have been properly and reasonably incurred;
    2. (b)
      it is impossible for the Court in this proceeding to determine the reasonableness of the Respondent’s conduct. That question would necessarily involve pleadings and a full examination of the conduct of both parties to the litigation and how it has been conducted, including examining any offers that have been exchanged and the genuineness of them (such offers, even when made without prejudice, would be admissible in those proceedings under the Muller v Linsley & Mortimer exception to without prejudice privilege);
    3. (c)
      no application was made to remove the Respondent as executor. If it had been, any Administrator appointed would have also incurred costs of the trial;
    4. (d)
      any attack on the quantum of fees charged by the Respondent’s lawyers cannot be determined in absence of:
    5. (i)
      evidence of what the Applicant’s costs are;
    6. (ii)
      evidence of what market rates are.
  1. [184]
    These submissions go too far. In so far as it is made, I reject the submission that this Court does not have power to make costs orders affecting the executor’s entitlement to indemnity in this proceeding: see rr 700 and 700A Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). I reject the submission that to deal with costs issues would require pleadings. That is almost never ordered in considering costs issues and only rarely should or would be necessary in dealing with costs in family provision cases. I reject the submission that the lack of an application to remove the executor somehow sanitises the misconduct arising from the analysis of the evidence in this case. I also doubt that the conduct of the applicant is necessarily central to this issue, though it might be depending on the submissions to be made.
  2. [185]
    Ultimately, however, I do not intend to make any order at this stage affecting costs issues or Ms Odell’s entitlement to indemnity for costs already paid out of the estate or future costs.
  3. [186]
    However, in this particular case, the potential impact of costs orders on the size of the estate at the date of trial means orders must be fashioned which allow for that impact if possible.

MS WATERS AS APPLICANT

Need

  1. [187]
    Ms Waters is single and has one son, Aaron, who is an adult and who is self-sufficient. I do not think his present difficulties increase Ms Waters’ need for maintenance and support.[100]
  2. [188]
    Ms Waters is a person of limited means. She has no superannuation. She has no other assets of value. She owns a modest car valued at $3000. Her monthly expenses are just covered by her Centrelink pension. She is 65 years old. She has little education and has been a disability pensioner for many years. She says that arthritis and severe depression were the reasons for the grant of the disability pension. She continues to suffer with those ailments. It is safe to assume she is no longer capable of working. Despite Ms Odell’s savage attacks on her sister’s inability to work, there was no challenge to any of this in cross examination. Since she was told to leave the House, she has struggled with obtaining secure housing.

Relationship issues

  1. [189]
    There is no doubt that Ms Waters received significant support from her parents over her life. Indeed their support for her was so constant and significant that I think it fair to say she was dependent on them for most of her life. They provided a home which facilitated a standard of living which would have been impossible if left to her own devices. Further, it is highly likely that Ms Waters was told by her parents that the House was to be hers. The events leading up to the signing of Mrs Benn’s June 2011 will reinforced that position. I find that not only was Ms Waters dependent on her parents, but that by their conduct, and later Mrs Benn’s conduct, they encouraged Ms Waters to conduct her life on the basis that she would be able to live in the House for as long as she wished and would ultimately receive it when Mrs Benn died.
  2. [190]
    I have some reservations about fully accepting Ms Waters evidence about how often she visited and called her mother prior to Ms Odell’s return in 2017. However, there is no evidence to justify the conclusion that she did not have an on-going relationship with her mother, most likely based on her continuing dependence which must, by her early 60s, have become engrained. This might have made it difficult for Ms Waters to see her mother as a vulnerable, older person herself and might possibly have made her reactive if the issue of the House came up in conversation. However, that is speculative and if it did occur, it occurred because Mrs Benn had participated in making Ms Waters dependent on her.

RODNEY’S POSITION

Need

  1. [191]
    Rodney is married with one child who is 37 years old. He is 67. He is retired as is his wife. He has significant orthopaedic difficulties but is otherwise in reasonable health. His wife has more serious health problems which require his care. He and his wife have joint assets as follows:

Assets

Value

Cash in bank

$203,000

Superannuation (Debbrina)

$45,000

Superannuation (Rodney)

$nil

Principal place of residence

$815,000

Total

$1,063,000

Liabilities

Nil

Nil

  1. [192]
    They are modest assets given their age and likely health challenges. Their income is limited to a weekly pension, which is absorbed by living costs. Rodney estimates that he and his wife go backwards by about $25 per week. That sounds like an optimistic assessment given their circumstances.
  1. [193]
    Despite all that, Rodney and his wife have the security of a valuable home, which can provide the capital for other secure accommodation as they age.

Relationship issues

  1. [194]
    Rodney had little to say in his affidavit about his relationship with his mother and father. I inferred from the tenor of his cross examination that their relationship was not particularly warm. Rodney explained his and his wife’s involvement in a nursery business with his parents. Rodney ultimately accepted that while his parents assisted him and his wife into the business, the couple worked very hard for many years with little return until the business and land was sold. This seems to explain the comment in the 2011 will that Rodney had benefitted from his parents in the amount of$200,000. It is difficult on the evidence before me to weigh the extent to which the ultimate benefit on the sale of the nursery business was a gift or, rather, was effectively earnt.
  1. [195]
    Apart from that, Rodney and his wife had only one significant benefit from his mother: the gift of $100,000 following the 2020 bushfires. Rodney frankly conceded that half of the cash the couple held was comprised of that gift. However, I accept his evidence that $45,000 had been spent by the time the money was paid, the net position is only $55,000 to the better given the impact of the bushfire on them.
  2. [196]
    Ultimately, it seems to me that Rodney received modest benefits from his parents other than the $100,000 gift in June 2020, a gift greatly needed given the impact of the fire on their home, which was their only significant asset.

MS ODELL’S POSITION

Need

  1. [197]
    Ms Odell is 60 years old. She married in 1989 and divorced in 1995. She has two children, Ryan (30 years old) and Indy (28 years old). Ryan has the benefit of NDIS funding, though his precise condition is unspecified. Ryan works in lawn mowing and odd jobs. He has a partner and children (it seems) Indy is a business manager. She has some form of neurological condition. It is unclear how serious or long standing, though Ms Odell swore as at the date of trial that in the first part of this year she ceased full time work to help care for her daughter.
  2. [198]
    Given Ms Odell’s lack of reliability as a witness, it is hard to assess how much weight ought to be placed on her general comments about her children’s continued reliance on her. However, one concrete step she seems to have taken is buying a property for Ryan and his family to live in. The arrangement seems to have been that Ryan paid to Ms Odell, as rent, whatever the mortgage payments were. In her affidavit filed the morning of the trial, she swore that since November 2022, her son could not afford topay the mortgage so she assisted the family to move to other, cheaper accommodation and contributed some $8,000 to assist the move.
  1. [199]
    She has a good work history, having been a Police Officer for some years until medially discharged in 2011 with PTSD. She moved into work overseas addressing child exploitation. She is presently employed in a relevant government department. She says the work is stressful and that she is not sure how much longer she could continue to work to the extent she does. Her more recent affidavit describes a less secure work history, though given her long and consistent success in the workforce, I consider she has good prospects of remunerative work into the future.
  2. [200]
    As at March 2021, she estimated her monthly income at that time at $8,750 per month, excluding superannuation. She swears her monthly expenses utilise all but $700 of those funds.[101]
  3. [201]
    She swore to her financial position as at the date of trial as follows:

Assets

Value

Cash in Bank (St George)

$8,208.33

Cash in Bank (RAMS)

$638.42

Motor Vehicle 2017 Mini

$35,000

Clothing, jewellery, and other household contents

$11,000

Principal place of residence

$2,375,000

Second Property

$785,000

Superannuation

$32,000

TOTAL (ASSETS)

$3,246,847

Liabilities

Value (estimated)

Credit Card

$1,092.61

Mortgage on Principal Residence

$124,000

Mortgage on Second Property

$440,000

Total Liabilities

$565,093

NET POSITION

$2,681,754

  1. [202]
    Matters are in hand to transfer the house in which Ryan lived to her daughter. It is unclear what terms the transfer will occur on, nor if it will occur, except to note that it is intended that Indy and her partner take over the mortgage.
  2. [203]
    The ambiguity in Ms Odell’s evidence about her work future and financial position would not normally excite any particular attention, though givenher unsatisfactory evidence in this trial, one is left to wonder what the truth of the position might be where there is uncertainty in her evidence.
  1. [204]
    Ultimately, however, in broad terms it appears that Ms Odell has a good work history, and good work prospects. While she has limited cash and superannuation, she does have a very valuable residence and even allowing for her support for her children, has a modestly secure financial position.

Relationship issues

  1. [205]
    Ms Odell claims that she did not benefit from her parents by any significant capital sum. She accepts she and her then husband received $100,000 from her parents to assist with purchase of a home but that it was repaid when the home was sold in 1995. It is not surprising that a person cannot produce documents to show a repayment in 1995. Ms Odell’s problematic evidence may be cause for scepticism about any assertion she makes in this proceeding, but it is impossible to be certain what happened here. I will assume to her benefit she did pay it back.
  2. [206]
    Other than that, Ms Odell did not appear to have been the beneficiary (prior to 2019) of gifts from her parents, beyond the normal support which flows as part of the on-going role parents often play in the lives of their adult offspring, particularly in difficult moments.
  3. [207]
    That all changed in December 2019 as we have seen. From that time on, Ms Odell made sure that she benefitted significantly from her mother’s finances in the way I have described. She received at least $139,000 between January 2020 and August 2020, so far as was identified on the evidence. Even if this was done with her mother’s fully informed consent (which is very unlikely to be the case), that is a significant capital benefit.
  4. [208]
    As I have found, I accept she also had a close relationship with her mother which was supportive in the last year of her mother’s life. However, with that close relationship came the misconduct towards her sister and her mother which I have explained above.

ADEQUATE PROVISION NOT MADE

  1. [209]
    It can be accepted that, in broad terms, able bodied adult children, without special need, are expected to be able to care for themselves after being given a start in life by their parents. However, the “special need” principle does not command the field and was always inconsistent in any event with the broad nature of the two questions posed by s 41(1) and its cognate provisions. As I observed in Fenton-Anderson v Power (No 2) [2020] QDC 294 on this issue:
  1. [176]
    The applicants are adult children in apparently stable long-term relationships, with children in good health. Neither of them are in desperate financial circumstances. However, it is not necessary to demonstrate desperate financial circumstances to establish thatjurisdiction has arisen to make further provision under s 41(1) Succession Act.
  1. [177]
    The proposition that adult children must show some special need before jurisdiction can arise to make further provision, is no longer the law, if it ever truly was. In Camernik v Reholc [2012] NSWSC 1537 at [159], Justice Hallen summarised the authorities dealing with adult children as follows:
  1. [159]
    In relation to a claim by an adult child, the following principles are useful to remember:
  1. (a)
    The relationship between parent and child changes when the child leaves home. However, a child does not cease to be a natural recipient of parental ties, affection or support, as the bonds of childhood are relaxed.
  1. (b)
    It is impossible to describe in terms of universal application, the obligation, responsibility, or community expectation, of a parent in respect of an adult child. It can be said that, ordinarily, the community expects parents to raise, and educate, their children to the very best of their ability while they remain children; probably to assist them with a tertiary education, where that is feasible; where funds allow, to provide them with a start in life, such as a deposit on a home, although it might well take a different form. The community does not expect a parent, in ordinary circumstances, to provide an unencumbered house, or to set his, or her, children up in a position where they can acquire a house unencumbered, although in a particular case, where assets permit and the relationship between the parties is such as to justify it, there might be such an obligation: McGrath v Eves [2005] NSWSC 1006; Taylor v Farrugia [2009] NSWSC 801.
  1. (c)
    Generally, also, the community does not expect a parent to look after his, or her, child for the rest of the child’s life and into retirement, especially when there is someone else, such as a spouse, who has a primary obligation to do so. Plainly, if an adult child remains a dependent of a parent, the community usually expects the parent to make provision to fulfil that ongoing dependency after death if he or she is able to do so. But where a child, even an adult child, falls on hard times, and where there are assets available, then the community may expect a parent to provide a buffer against contingencies; and where a child has been unable to accumulate superannuation or make otherprovision for their retirement, something to assist in retirement where otherwise they would be left destitute: Taylor v Farrugia.
  1. (d)
    If the applicant has an obligation to support others, such as a parent’s obligation to support a dependent child, that will be a relevant factor in determining what is an appropriate provision for the maintenance of the applicant: Re Buckland Deceased [1966] VR 404 at 411; Hughes v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1979] HCA 2; (1979) 143 CLR 134 at 148; Goodman v Windeyer at 498, 505. But the Act does not permit orders to be made to provide for the support of third persons to whom the applicant, however reasonably, wishes to support, where there is no obligation to support such persons: Re Buckland Deceased at 411; Kleinig v Neal (No 2) [1981] 2 NSWLR 532 at 537; Mayfield v Lloyd-Williams, at [86].
  1. (e)
    There is no need for an applicant adult child to show some special need or some special claim: McCosker v McCosker; Kleinig v Neal (No 2), at 545; Bondelmonte v Blanckensee [1989] WAR 305; and Hawkins v Prestage (1989) 1 WAR 37 per Nicholson J at 45.
  1. (f)
    The adult child’s lack of reserves to meet demands, particularly of ill health, which become more likely with advancing years, is a relevant consideration: MacGregor v MacGregor [2003] WASC 169 (28 August 2003) at [181], [182]; Crossman v Riedel [2004] ACTSC 127 at [49] . Likewise, the need for financial security and a fund to protect against the ordinary vicissitudes of life, is relevant: Marks v Marks [2003] WASCA 297 at [43]. In addition, if the applicant is unable to earn, or has a limited means of earning, an income, this could give rise to an increased call on the estate of the deceased: Christie v Manera [2006] WASC 287 ; Butcher v Craig [2009] WASC 164 at [17].
  1. (g)
    The applicant has the onus of satisfying the court, on the balance of probabilities, of the justification for the claim: Hughes v National Trustees, Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd at 149.
  1. [210]
    This is not an example of the usual adult child case where the applicant is (like the applicants in Fenton-Anderson) self-sufficient but in a precarious or very modest position. In this case, Mrs and Mr Benn, and after his death, Mrs Benn, played the principal part in causing Ms Waters to continue todepend on her parents for her basic needs. They told her that the House would be hers when it was built in 1995 and acted consistently with that position until November 2019. They induced her reasonably to assume it was hers for life and induced her to construct the foundation of her life on that basis. As each year passed, Ms Waters became more dependent on the House as the financial underpinning of her lifestyle and life. By November 2019, the Benns, and then Mrs Benn, had chosen to accustom Ms Waters to that lifestyle and dependence. It is reasonable to characterise Ms Waters as a dependent of her mother, a dependence induced by Mrs Benn.
  1. [211]
    Discussions of what is comprised in provision which is adequate for the proper maintenance and support of an applicant recognise that the test is not absolute. It must take into the account the station in life of the applicant and the role played by the testator in building and maintaining that station in life.[102] Here, the facts support the conclusion that Mrs Benn’s obligation under s 41(1) Succession Act was to ensure that Ms Waters either kept the House or was provided resources to secure some other equivalent home, so far as her assets at death and the competing claims on her permitted. It is understandable that Mrs Benn sold the House when, in her opinion, her own needs seemed to her to compel that course. However, there remained an obligation to assist her functionally dependent daughter to the extent she reasonably could after Mrs Benn’s death. Added to this are two other important considerations;
    1. (a)
      Ms Waters had and has no personal financial resources and no prospect of improving her position; and
    2. (b)
      My finding that Mrs Benn’s change of heart towards Ms Waters (if there truly was a change of heart) was not provoked by anything Ms Waters did.
  2. [212]
    Ms Waters’ position did not much change between the date of death and the trial.
  3. [213]
    As against that, Mrs Benn had to consider the position of her other children. Rodney was not, and is not, in a strong financial position, though he is in a significantly better position than Ms Waters, at least to the extent of having a modest capital buffer and a secure home. He was also not accustomed to being a dependent on Mrs Benn. There is little difference in Rodney’s position as between the date of death and trial.
  4. [214]
    Ms Odell was in the strongest financial position of the siblings at the date of death, with a good earning capacity, some years of work ahead of her and significant net assets, albeit mostly tied up in her home. Her position has worsened somewhat (if her evidence is accepted), particularly as regards her children’s needs. However, in the absence of corroboration, I view that evidence with some caution, despite the lack of challenge to it, given herconduct described in this judgment. She remains in the best position of all three. She also benefitted significantly from her mother’s assets in the last year of her life by receiving the funds described in this judgment.
  1. [215]
    In all those circumstances, a wise and just testator’s compelling testamentary obligation was to make provision for Ms Waters to obtain a home, then to consider Rodney if possible. Given the size of the estate, Ms Odell’s personal position and Ms Odell’s self-help in respect of her mother’s money, Ms Odell had a very modest competing claim on Mrs Benn.
  2. [216]
    The obligation to Ms Waters called for her to make such provision as she could to secure for her a place to live. Provision of a legacy of $20,000 where an estate of about $480,000 was available at the date of death, was not adequate provision for Ms Waters’ proper maintenance and support. It was woefully inadequate.
  3. [217]
    While it is not strictly necessary, I consider it is helpful in this case to identify what adequate provision would have been at the date of death, given the complexities of the costs issues which arise.
  4. [218]
    As explained above, at the date of death the net assets of the estate were valued at approximately $480,000. After allowing generously for costs of administration as a contingent liability, that would be about $450,000. I consider that in those circumstances, adequate provision for Ms Waters at the date of death would have been $330,000 in addition to her existing legacy. That provision should have fallen primarily on Ms Odell’s share of residuary under the Will, such that of the remaining $100,000, Ms Odell received about $25,000 and Rodney about $75,000.

PROVISION TO BE MADE

  1. [219]
    The opportunity to make orders for provision of the kind which were possible at the date of death has passed because of the potential impact of costs orders. That impact is potential at the moment because the impact of costs remains contingent in two respects:
    1. (a)
      First, the Court has not yet exercised its discretion over costs of these proceedings and the parties presently dispute how that discretion should be exercised. So, it is uncertain whether and to what extent any party will obtain an order for costs to be paid out of the estate.
    2. (b)
      Second, the applicant has already challenged the entitlement of the Ms Odell as executor to an indemnity for her costs to the extent of$60,000 and in the circumstances already explained, might be inclined to challenge that entitlement further.
  1. [220]
    In many, perhaps most, family provision applications, the uncertainty as to the impact of costs ultimately on the estate does not have to be grappled with because proper provision can be made without resolving the matter.That can be because the net estate on any view is more than sufficient to meet the Court’s view as to adequate provision or because the costs issues are not in dispute between the parties so can be considered in a practical way by the Court.
  1. [221]
    Unfortunately, that is not the situation here. If one assumed that costs orders would be favourable to all parties, in the sense that all costs were paid out of the estate, the net estate available to the Court would be about $97,000. Given my findings on adequate provision at the date of death, this would be inadequate provision for Ms Waters, even allowing for her to receive her costs from the estate. Indeed, $97,000 is utterly inadequate if further funds are available in the estate. For that reason, I do not think the Court can properly exercise its discretion to make further provision for Ms Waters without considering what the estate is or is likely to be after resolution of costs issues.
  2. [222]
    That is not an easy task given the magnitude of the costs, the position of the parties and the issues arising from my reasons. The range of outcomes is presently wide, and includes:
    1. (a)
      As to Ms Odell’s costs, it is not beyond imagining that Ms Odell would not obtain full indemnity for her costs and might indeed be required to refund amounts already taken on account of costs. If she was required to refund a sum (say $40,000) and was not entitled to further indemnity as claimed of $60,000, there would a further $100,000 available in the estate.
    2. (b)
      As to Ms Waters’ costs, Ms Odell does not concede her entitlement to costs out of the estate. In the event that she was not entitled to her costs out of the estate, it would mean her costs of $150,000 would cease to be a claim on the estate. That would swell the estate available for an order by that amount. The same result would flow if Ms Waters obtained a costs order against Ms Odell personally (rather than as executor) which made her costs a liability of Ms Odell not the estate.
  3. [223]
    The likely range of the value of the estate out of which provision can be made is therefore wide. If everyone gets the whole of the costs out of the estate, there is about $97,000. If no-one does and Ms Odell has to refund a significant sum (say $40,000), there is about $360,000, being the cash in the estate set out at [181] above plus $40,000 refunded. What to do?
  4. [224]
    The Court is confronted with what might appear to be a Catch 22[103] when costs fundamentally affect the size of the estate for the purposes of orderingfurther provision. On the one hand, to decide on what costs orders to make, final orders on the application are required against which the parties’ conduct in relation to the litigation can be compared. On the other hand, final orders can only be made once the final estate is known, including the impact of costs and indemnity orders on the size of that estate.
  1. [225]
    One solution which might be thought to arise is to hear submissions on costs and indemnity issues before making a final order on the application. The difficulties with such an approach are many. First, of course, there would be no final order on the application against which offers could be assessed. Second, it would require without prejudice communications to be made available to the court if it was properly to assess the parties’ conduct. Of course, without prejudice privilege is a joint privilege and the court has no power to order any party to waive it. Third, even if privilege was waived by both parties, the evidence of without prejudice communications might distort findings of fact made on the evidence tendered at trial.
  2. [226]
    Another solution might be to make final orders ignoring the likely impact on costs and indemnity orders on the estate. The problem with that approach is that, where such issues significantly affect the estate out of which provision could be made, the court would be adopting an approach which undermines the purpose of the statute. That purpose is to confer a discretion on the court to make provision as the court thinks fit out of the estate of the testator for persons who demonstrate that they need further provision as provided for by the Parliament.
  3. [227]
    To ignore costs and indemnity issues where those issues materially affect the size of the estate in a way which impacts on what, in any view, would be adequate provision would be to fail to give effect properly to the statutory provision. Indeed by ignoring the impact of costs and indemnity issues, the court would be ordering provision on the basis of an estate which is materially different in size to the estate that in fact exists. In that context, it might be argued that the court’s orders for provision would not be proper in the circumstances of the case. None of this need trouble the Court where costs issues are not materially in dispute or where the estate is of a size that costs issues do not materially impact on the determination of adequate provision. Neither condition applies in this case.
  4. [228]
    The court’s task is to make a final order which makes such provision it considers fit from the estate of the deceased. Where it is necessary to consider costs and indemnity issues in forming a view as to the size of the estate properly to exercise that jurisdiction, it must do so, despite the existence of some uncertainty as to the final size of the estate.
  5. [229]
    It is not open to the Court to make some kind of “interim” order and then make a further order when costs issues are resolved because an order forprovision is a once and for all order. That point is made clear on the terms of the statute. The express provision for variation of an order in the Act is limited to variation of a narrow range of orders such as those made for payment of a periodic sum or similar. Variation can only be made within very limited parameters.[104] That suggests that orders are otherwise final orders.
  1. [230]
    The authorities support that view. In Queensland, the law was stated by the Full Court of the Supreme Court in Re McGregor Deceased [1956] St R Qld 596. In that case the Full Court was considering the validity of an order made under the then applicable Testator Family Maintenance Act 1914. Pursuant to that Act provision was made for an applicant under an order of Hart AJ in 1938. His Honour’s orders reserved leave to any person interested in the estate to apply from time to time to vary the order for provision. Before Brown AJ, this reservation of leave was found to be invalid because an order under that Act was held to be an order made once and for all. Brown AJ undertook a detailed review of the authorities to reach that conclusion. On appeal, Macrossan CJ (with whom Stanley and Hanger JJ agreed, Hanger J adding his own comments), observed:[105]
  1. The appellants are two daughters of the abovenamed William McGregor who died on 9th March, 1937, having made a will of which probate was granted by this court in November 1937. This will made certain provisions for the benefit of the appellants and their brother, one Ian McGregor. In 1938 the appellants and Ian McGregor applied by summons for an order that adequate provision for their proper maintenance and support should be made out of the estate of the testator.
  1. The application was heard by Hart A.J. on 20th May, 1938. He ordered that certain sums should be paid to each of the then three applicants free of duties out of the capital of the estate and further ordered addition to the benefits given to them by the will of the testator. His order also contained the following provision: “And I do further order that leave be reserved to the said Jessie Russell the said Christina McGregor and the said Ian McGregor or any of them and to any other person or Company interested in the estate of the said William McGregor deceased to apply for such variation of this order or for such direction as may be thought fit”.
  1. In a considered judgment in which he reviewed a number of authorities on the construction of The Testator’s Family Maintence Act of 1914 and of similar legislation in the other Australian States and in New Zealand, Brown A.J. came to the conclusion that this court has no power to make an order under the Act reserving leave to an applicant to make a further application for further provision out of the estate and therefore that he had no jurisdiction to make the order sought. Accordingly he dismissed the application. In coming to this conclusion Brown A.J. expressed his agreement with the opinion of Salmond J. in Welsh v. Mulcock ([1924] N.Z. G.L.R. 169, at p. 178), expressed as follows:
  1. If, having regard to the facts at the date of death the testator has fulfilled his whole duty to his family no order under the Act can be made then or at any time thereafter. If, on the contrary, the testator, having regard to such facts, has failed in his duty to any member of his family, the claimant is there and then entitled to a final order in his favour. The provision madeby such an order cannot be subsequently increased although it may be reduced or cancelled under the express and perhaps illogical provisions ofss. 33 subs. 13, of the Act (that is, of the New Zealand Act).
  1. […]
  1. In my opinion the decision of Brown A.J. is correct and I find it unnecessary to add very much to the reasons given by him in his careful judgment.
  1. [231]
    To my mind, there is no material distinction between the provisions before the Full Court and the terms of ss 41 and 42 Succession Act.[106]
  2. [232]
    Recognising that an order under s. 41(1) is a “once and for all” order, it follows that where issues of costs and indemnity arise and are material to the outcome, the Court must do its best in making a final order to accommodate the possibilities that may arise from the determination of costs issues in identifying the estate which is available and the order to make. This is no different in substance from the task of a court making a once and for all order in proceedings for damages in contract or tort, where matters relevant to the nature and extent of loss remain uncertain at the time of judgment. Most recently, the Court of Appeal reiterated the applicable principle:[107]
  1. [42]
    The assessment of damages by the learned trial judge was attended with some difficulties, particularly caused by the limitations of the evidence on some points. However, it has long been held that difficulty in estimating loss does not excuse the court from that task. As was said in Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd:
  1. The settled rule, both here and in England, is that mere difficulty in estimating damages does not relieve a court from the responsibility of estimating them as best it can. Indeed, in Jones v Schiffmann Menzies J. went so far as to say that the “assessment of damages does sometimes, of necessity involve what is guess work rather than estimation”. Where precise evidence is not available the court must do the best it can. And uncertainty as to the profits to be derived from a business by reason of contingencies is not a reason for a court refusing to assess damages.
  1. [233]
    Applying these principles to this case, I have decided that the Court ought to make an order for further provision for Ms Waters in the amount of $280,000 (in addition to her legacy of $20,000).
  1. [234]
    I explain my approach as follows.
  2. [235]
    First, consistent with my analysis of notional provision from the estate at the date of death in paragraphs [209] to [217] above, I consider that where the estate is $300,000 or more, adequate provision requires provision for atotal of $300,000 to Ms Water before further provision is made for Rodney or Ms Odell.
  1. [236]
    Second, there is presently over $300,000 in funds in the estate. There are two principal contingent claims on those funds. Ms Odell’s claims for indemnity for further costs of about $60,000 and Ms Waters costs claims against the estate for about $150,000. Both are contested. Doing the best I can at present, I think there is a real prospect that some limits might be imposed on further indemnity for costs for Ms Odell given my findings. As to Ms Waters’ costs, the worst realistic case scenario for her is that she does not obtain indemnity for her costs. In that case, those funds will remain available in the estate. For those reasons, I consider that an order for provision for $280,000 on top of the existing legacy is a proper one to make, doing the best I can to assess the contingencies which might affect the size of the estate.
  2. [237]
    I am conscious that ultimately, there might be more available in the estate than the funds required to meet the order for further provision. If that occurs, of course, the balance will go to the residuary beneficiaries. Of course, it is possible that orders as to costs and indemnity might mean that the net estate available to meet the order is less than $280,000. If that occurs, it seems to me that the result is that the personal representative would have to meet the order of the Court to the extent it was possible to do so. In Official Receiver v Schultz (1990) 170 CLR 306, the High Court dealt with the character of an order for further provision under s. 41(1) as follows (at 315):
  1. The wide powers conferred by s 41 and the manner in which sub-s (10) is expressed strongly suggest that the effect of an order under the section is not to change the benefits to be expected from the right to due administration arising pursuant to the will, but to superimpose upon the duty of due administration a judicial order made pursuant to statute. In other words, a new and independent obligation is created which has an impact upon the way in which the executor administers the estate pursuant to his or her existing duty, by compelling him or her to comply with the terms of the court's order.
  1. [238]
    Although not expressly stated in Schultz, it must be the case that the personal representative is compelled to comply with the order as part of the due administration of the estate to the extent that the he or she has assets in his or her hands to do so. Of course, if the personal representative cannot meet the order of the Court because of his or her own default after the orders are made, that position will be different.

OTHER ISSUES

  1. [239]
    Given Ms Odell’s conduct so far as EPA, executor and witness in these proceedings, there are compelling reasons to doubt that she can be relied upon properly to carry out the further administration of the estate in accordance with the Court’s orders and the law. Her counsel submitted that Ms Odell had never been removed as executor. However, that factualcircumstance can hardly absolve Ms Odell of her conduct as attorney and propounded while executor, which is described in these reasons.
  1. [240]
    This Court does not have general trust or succession jurisdiction. Plenary jurisdiction to resolve issues arising in the administration of deceased estates is conferred most directly and efficiently by provisions of the Succession Act. The most prominent example is s 6(1) Succession Act. That jurisdiction in not conferred on this Court. Further, this Court is not a “Court” under the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld). As I have written elsewhere, this Court’s specific trust and administration jurisdiction is of limited scope.[108] It is highly improbable that this Court has original jurisdiction to, inter alia, remove an executor. However, that is not the end of the inquiry in this particular situation.
  1. [241]
    Section 69 District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) (DCA) provides:
  1. 69
    Powers of District Court
  1. (1)
    Subject to this Act and to the rules of court, the District Court has, for the purposes of exercising the jurisdiction conferred by this part, all the powers and authorities of the Supreme Court, including the powers and authorities conferred on the Supreme Court by an Act, and may in any proceeding in like manner and to like extent—
    1. (a)
      grant such relief or remedy; and
    1. (b)
      make any order, including an order for attachment or committal in consequence of disobedience to an order; and
    1. (c)
      give effect to every ground of defence or matter of set-off whether equitable or legal;
  1. as may and ought to be done in like cases by a judge of the Supreme Court.
  1. Example of power conferred on the Supreme Court by an Act—
  1. The power of the Supreme Court under the Land Title Act 1994, section 127 (Removing a caveat) to order that a caveat be removed.
  1. (2)
    Without affecting the generality of subsection (1), the District Court shall, in any proceedings in which jurisdiction is conferred under this part, have power to grant relief—
    1. (a)
      by way of a declaration of rights of the parties; and
    1. (b)
      by way of injunction, whether interim, interlocutory or final, in the proceedings; and
    1. (c)
      by staying the proceedings or part thereof; and
    1. (d)
      by appointing a receiver including an interim receiver.
  1. [242]
    It is the essence of judicial power that decisions of a court are binding, authoritative and carried into effect. In Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434, 451, Barton J adopted the following definition of judicial power which had been given by Justice Miller of the Supreme Court of the United States:
  1. It is the power of a Court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision.
  1. [243]
    Barton J then said:
  1. It is important to observe that the judicial power includes with the decision and the pronouncement of judgment the power to carry that judgment into effect between the contending parties. Whether the power of enforcement is essential to be conferred or not, when it is conferred as part of the whole the judicial power is undeniably complete.
  1. [244]
    Similarly, in Australian Pipeline Limited v Alinta Limited [2007] FCAFC 55 [83], Finkelstein J stated:
  1. to be "binding and authoritative", a decision must be enforceable. The doctrine of enforcement is of ancient pedigree. It is the formal process by which a party entitled to the benefit of a judgment may obtain that benefit. It is the “practical forcing power of the law” which carries the judgment into effect: Freeman on Executions, 2nd ed, 1888, 2. In Re A Company [1915] 1 Ch 520, 527 Phillimore LJ explained that “it is the old common law process by which the sheriff in obedience to one of the common law writs procures for a judgment creditor the fruits of his judgment.”
  1. [245]
    If after hearing the parties on the matter, the Court were to conclude that it was unlikely that the estate would be properly administered by Ms Odell to give effect to the orders made by the Court on the application, the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction on the application will likely be frustrated. My tentative view is that, consistent with s 69 and the authorities stated above, in this particular case the powers of the Supreme Court to remove Ms Odell as executor and appoint another personal representative would arise under that section. I flag that merely as a matter for the parties to consider.
  2. [246]
    I will also hear the parties as to the further directions required to resolve the other issues which arise from this judgment on questions of costs of the applicant or the respondent and on any entitlement to indemnity for the respondent’s costs from the estate.

ORDERS

  1. [247]
    I order that further provision be made for the applicant in the amount of $280,000.
  1. [248]
    I will hear the parties as to costs and any other issues arising from these reasons.

Footnotes

[1]See Ms Waters description of the conversation at TS1-100 to 101.

[2]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 64.

[3]TS2-77 to 82.

[4]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, pages 55 to 56.

[5]TS2-71.43.

[6]TS2-73.

[7]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 65.

[8]Exhibit 9, Bundle of Correspondence from Hosie and Partners.

[9]TS2-6 to 7.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Exhibit 10, Invoice for Funeral Expenses dated 17 August 2020.

[12]TS2-15.

[13]Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021, page 26.

[14]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 65.

[15]Respondent’s submissions at [13]. The submissions estimate a cost of disposal of $19,888.18 being the total amount of the “fees funeral” transfer minus the cremation cost of $4,250.

[16]TS2-68.

[17]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021.

[18]TS2-69.

[19]Luke 15:11-32.

[20]Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021.

[21]Exhibit 1, Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021 at [40].

[22]Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021, page 122 126.

[23]See from paragraph [109] [115] below.

[24] There was a challenge to Ms Waters’ evidence on the rates in an inadmissible form by Ms Odell. In any event, the evidence shows she regularly paid the rates in the period from 2014 to 2019: see Exhibit 3, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 12 August 2021 at [4(b)] and the documents referred to there.

[25]TS2-29.

[26]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 at [144].

[27]Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021 at [58].

[28] See, for example, the text sent by Ms Odell at 6.30am on 30 December 2019 in Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021, page 9 (“Yes you have had a dream life at mums expense for so long and yet you have no compassion for her circumstances”). See also the vituperative text cited at page 12 of the same affidavit:

I should inform you that I am a justice of the peace and work every weds on these matters… greedy children trying to wrought every last dime from their sick elderly mother that has allowed her to live rent free in her house for 28 years while she goes surfing every day and collects a disability pension…

[29]Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021, page 43.

[30]Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021, page 2.

[31]Note that the one off credits have the same account number as the ARS monthly payments, just organised differently. See for example the $5000 advance on 7 January 2020 and the monthly payment on 17 January 2020: Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 137.

[32]See 14 July 2020 payment of $2,792.24 at Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 60.

[33]Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021 at [59].

[34]TS1-100.

[35]Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021 at [60] [61].

[36]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 at [165].

[37]TS2-63. Cf TS2-61.42.

[38]Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021 at [62].

[39]TS-66.26.

[40]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 pages 46 47, 50.

[41]Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021 at [62].

[42]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 [166].

[43]TS2-65.15. I note, as an aside, it is difficult to be “set up” for a crime that you commit, which could easily have occurred if Ms Odell used the threat of force to retake possession.

[44]See the text message extracted at footnote 28 above.

[45]Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021 at [67].

[46]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 at [220].

[47]TS2-83.

[48]TS2-83.

[49]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 at [171] [173].

[50]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 at [38].

[51]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 55.

[52]Exhibit 9, Bundle of Correspondence from Hosie and Partners.

[53]TS2-67.44.

[54]This evidence does echo something said in the Declaration (but not sworn to by Ms Odell), but that sentence in the Declaration goes on to include another assertion which seems entirely fanciful (the alleged CCTV camera, see paragraph [111] below).

[55]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 56.

[56]Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 29 April 2021, pages 172 to 175

[57]TS1-61.25 to 62.8.

[58]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 [110(a)]. It might be wondered whether this was sufficient to prove the document at all.

[59]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 at [230].

[60]TS2-45.1.

[61]Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 87.

[62]Exhibit 8, Affidavit of Christine O'Dell sworn 7 February 2023, page 1.

[63]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 at [184] [188].

[64]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 7.

[65]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 at [187].

[66]John de Groot and Bruce Nickel, Family Provision in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th, 2017) [6.7].

[67]TS2-71.5.

[68]TS2-71 and 2-72.

[69]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 at [229] [248].

[70]TS2-45.6 and 2-84.5.

[71]TS2-76 and 2-77.

[72]TS2-77 and 2-78.

[73]TS2-18.

[74]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 56.

[75]TS2-76.

[76]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 60.

[77]TS2-77.

[78]TS2-92.28.

[79]See [118] above.

[80]TS2-84.21 to 30.

[81]TS2.84.

[82]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 1.

[83]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 at [242] [244].

[84]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 59.

[85]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 58.

[86]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021, page 60.

[87]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 at [102] [103].

[88]Exhibit 6, Affidavit of Rodney Frederick Benn dated 3 February 2023 at [44] [45].

[89]Fenton-Anderson v Power (No 2) [2020] QDC 294.

[90]Gersbach v Blake [2011] NSWSC 368 [94] [96].

[91] John de Groot and Bruce Nickel, Family Provision in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2016) [7.11].

[92]See the useful discussion on the admissibility and use of such statements in A A Preece, Lee’s Manual of Succession Law (Lawbook Co, 8th ed, 2019) [13.300].

[93]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 at [232].

[94]Exhibit 8, Affidavit of Christine O'Dell sworn 7 February 2023 [6] and page 1.

[95]G E Dal Pont, Law of Sucession (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2021) [P.8].

[96]Exhibit 8, Affidavit of Christine O'Dell sworn 7 February 2023 [9].

[97]Exhibit 8, Affidavit of Christine O'Dell sworn 7 February 2023 at [3(b)].

[98]Submissions of the Applicant dated 9 February 2023 at [29].

[99]Notably, the evidence set out here indicates Ms Odell’s advice sworn in paragraph 3(b) is incorrect by the time one gets to paragraph 5.

[100]See Exhibit 5, Affidavit of Phillipa Anne Waters dated 30 January 2023 at [9] [13].

[101]Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Christine Odell dated 5 June 2021 [225]. I note that Ms Odell produced an updated estimate of her income and expenses on 7 February 2023. Her income has dropped to nil while her expenses have remained exactly the same. Curiously, those expenses still include $2,000 per month as “Tax on Income”, despite there being no income.

[102]See Morgan v Darveniza [2014] QSC 37 [16(b)] [16(c]; G E Dal Pont, Law of Sucession (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2021) [17.67].

[103]“There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern for one's safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn't, but if he were sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to, but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle.” Joseph Heller, Catch 22 (Vintage 2004 ) Ch. 5, page 52.

[104]See Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 42(1)

[105]Re McGregor Deceased [1956] St R Qld 596, 607 608.

[106]That is also the position in Victoria: see In re Butler [1948] VLR 434, 435.3, where the Full Court adopted the more detailed statement in In re Breen [1933] VLR 455. See also Cotton v Owen [1999] SASC 391, applying those cases in South Australia.

[107]Tulloch Brae Pty Ltd v Environmental Protection Equipment Pty Ltd [2022] QCA 97.

[108]Judge Bernard Porter, ‘The Jurisdiction of the District Court in Trust and Succession’ (Speech, STEP Queensland Lunchtime Seminar, 21 September 2021) [45] [65].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Waters v Odell

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Waters v Odell

  • MNC:

    [2023] QDC 44

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Porter KC DCJ

  • Date:

    14 Jun 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Australian Pipeline Limited v Alinta Limited [2007] FCAFC 55
2 citations
Bondelmonte v Blanckensee (1989) WAR 305
1 citation
Butcher v Craig [2009] WASC 164
1 citation
Camernik v Reholc [2012] NSWSC 1537
1 citation
Christie v Manera [2006] WASC 287
1 citation
Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64
1 citation
Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd [1956] St R Qld 596
3 citations
Cotton v Owen [1999] SASC 391
1 citation
Crossman v Riedel [2004] ACTSC 127
1 citation
Darveniza v Darveniza [2014] QSC 37
3 citations
Federation of Australia v JW Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434
2 citations
Fenton-Anderson & Anor v Power & Anor (No 2) [2020] QDC 294
3 citations
Gersbach v Blake [2011] NSWSC 368
2 citations
Hawkins v Prestage (1989) 1 WAR 37
1 citation
Hughes v National Trustees, (1979) 143 C.L.R 134
2 citations
Hughes v National Trustees, Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1979] HCA 2
1 citation
In re a Company [1915] 1 Ch 520
1 citation
In re Butler [1948] VLR 434
1 citation
Kleinig v Neal (No. 2) (1981) 2 NSWLR 532
1 citation
MacGregor v MacGregor [2003] WASC 169
1 citation
Marks v Marks [2003] WASCA 297
1 citation
McGrath v Eves [2005] NSWSC 1006
1 citation
Official Receiver in Bankruptcy v Schultz (1990) 170 CLR 306
1 citation
Re Breen [1933] VLR 455
1 citation
Re Buckland, Deceased (1966) VR 404
1 citation
Taylor v Farrugia [2009] NSWSC 801
1 citation
Tulloch Brae Pty Ltd v Environmental Protection Equipment Pty Ltd [2022] QCA 97
2 citations
Welsh v Mulcock [1924] N.Z. G.L.R. 169
1 citation

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Day v Peake [No 2](2023) 3 QDCR 301; [2023] QDC 2004 citations
Diamantina Shire Council v Rosecove Pty Ltd [2025] QDC 291 citation
Taylor v Brinin [2024] QDC 842 citations
Waters v Odell (No 2) [2023] QDC 1441 citation
1

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.