Keynan Garad v Commissioner of Police
[2024] QDC 216
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- Unreported Judgment
- Keynan Garad v Commissioner of Police[2024] QDC 216
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Keynan Garad v Commissioner of Police[2024] QDC 216
Keynan Garad v Commissioner of Police[2024] QDC 216
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Keynan Garad v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 216 |
PARTIES: | KEYNAN GARAD, Said (appellant) v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | 1039 OF 2024 (Brisbane District Court). |
DIVISION: | Civil. |
PROCEEDING: | Appeal pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). |
ORIGINATING COURT: | Magistrates Court, Richlands. |
DELIVERED ON: | Orders pronounced on 26 August 2024. Reasons published on 9 December 2024. |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 26 August 2024. |
JUDGES: | McCarthy KC DCJ. |
ORDER: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the appellant was sentenced on counts of unlawfully using a motor vehicle, stealing of a motor vehicle, stealing, possessing tainted property and driving related offences – where the effective sentencing outcome imprisoned the appellant for a term of two years and additionally disqualified him from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for two and a half years – whether the resulting sentencing outcome and disqualification period were excessive in combination or individually – whether the magistrate took extraneous and irrelevant facts into account – whether the unrepresented appellant was already punished for one of the offences and failed to plead autrefois convict Criminal Code (Qld) ss. 16, 17. Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s. 34. Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss. 222, 223, 224, 225. Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s. 9. Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) s 90C(1)(2). Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172. Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58. Chakka v Queensland Police Service [2024] QCA 213. Commissioner of Police v James [2013] QCA 403. Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520. House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499. McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612. Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59. R v Tait [1999] 2 Qd R 667. R v Nhu Ly [1996] 1 Qd R 543. Ratcliffe v Queensland Police Service [2019] QDC 144. Rongo v Commissioner of Police [2017] QDC 258. |
COUNSEL: | L Heaney for the appellant L Maleckas for the respondent |
SOLICITORS: | Legal Aid Office Queensland for the appellant Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent |
- Introduction
- [1]The appellant was convicted by his pleas of guilty on 15 November 2023 before the Magistrates Court in Richlands to a series of property related and motor vehicle related offences.
- [2]Some of the convicted offences were committed during the operational period of suspensions of terms of imprisonment imposed by the District Court at Brisbane on 31 October 2022, the Magistrates Court at Holland Park on 11 August 2022, and the Richlands Magistrates Court on 17 October 2022.
- [3]The effect of the sentences imposed by the Magistrate was to impose a term of imprisonment for 20 months for the convicted offences (the first sentences), and the activation of the terms of imprisonment suspended by the relevant Magistrates Courts, a period of imprisonment of 4 months (the second sentences) to be served cumulatively to the first sentences. The resulting sentencing was, in effect, a term of imprisonment for 2 years.
- [4]The appellant had been held on remand and a period of 127 days was declared as pre- sentence custody and so deemed time already served under the sentences. Further orders were made upon relevant offences disqualifying the appellant from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence. The effect of the ordered periods was to disqualify the appellant from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for a period of 2 ½ years.
- [5]A parole release date was set on 11 March 2024: at one third of the effective sentencing.
- [6]The appellant helpfully summarised the sentencing for the first sentences in tabulated form:
Date | Charge | Penalty |
12/11/21 | 1 x Unlawful use of a motor vehicle | 20 months imprisonment |
14/12/22 | 1 x Drive (demerit point) suspended | 3 months imprisonment 6 months disqualification |
14/12/22 | 1 x Possess utensils/pipes etc | 3 months imprisonment |
14/03/23 | 1 x Stealing | 6 months imprisonment |
11/06/23 | 2 x Unlawful use of a motor vehicle – used of an indictable offence | 20 months imprisonment |
11/06/23 | 1 x Driving without a licence repeat offender | 3 months imprisonment 6 months disqualification |
11/06/23 | 1 x Stealing | 6 months imprisonment |
11/06/23 | 1 x Stealing of a vehicle | 20 months imprisonment |
05/07/23 | 1 x Unlawful use of a motor vehicle | 20 months imprisonment |
10/07/23 | 1 x Stealing of a vehicle | 20 months imprisonment |
10/07/23 | 1 x Possess utensils/pipes etc | 3 months imprisonment |
10/07/23 | 1 x Stealing | 6 months imprisonment |
10/07/23 | 1 x Driving without a licence | 3 months imprisonment 3 months disqualification |
11/07/23 | 1 x Driving etc while relevant drug present in blood or saliva | 3 months imprisonment 6 months disqualification |
11/07/23 | 1 x Driving without a licence | 3 months imprisonment 3 months disqualification |
11/07/23 | 1 x Unlawful use of a motor vehicle | 20 months imprisonment |
11/07/23 | 1 x Driving without a licence repeat offender | 3 months imprisonment 6 months disqualification |
11/07/23 | 1 x Stealing | 6 months imprisonment |
11/07/23 | 1 x Possess tainted property | 3 months imprisonment |
Date | Charge | Penalty imposed | Maximum penalty |
14/12/22 | 1 x Drive (demerit point) suspended | 6 months disqualification | 6 months (s. 78(3)(b)) |
11/06/23 | 1 x Driving without a licence repeat offender | 6 months disqualification | 1-6 months (s. 78(3)(h)) |
10/07/23 | 1 x Driving without a licence | 3 months disqualification | No minimum |
11/07/23 | 1 x Driving etc while relevant drug present in blood or saliva | 6 months disqualification | 3-9 months (s. 86(2)(e)) |
11/07/23 | 1 x Driving without a licence | 3 months disqualification | No minimum |
11/07/23 | 1 x Driving without a licence repeat offender | 6 months disqualification | 1-6 months (s. 78(3)(h)) |
- [7]The appellant sought leave to extend the time within which to appeal and appealed on the sole ground that “the sentence (sic) imposed was manifestly excessive”. At the sentencing hearing, the appellant identified specific errors and sought leave to amend the relevant notice of appeal.[1] The respondent did not object to any such amendment, and leave was granted. The additional ground contended that the Magistrate erroneously took into account irrelevant facts for alleged offences of unlawful use of a motor vehicle and unlicenced driving on 17 June 2023 and unlawful use of a motor vehicle on 12 November 2021.
- [8]The respondent conceded both that leave to extend should be granted and the appeal allowed.
- The application for extension of time.
- [9]The appellant filed his notice of appeal almost four months outside of the legislated time limit. By affidavit, the appellant explained the delay due to his lack of knowledge of his appeal rights as he had represented himself at the sentencing, and further his transfer into immigration detention delayed contact with Legal Aid. Whilst the explained delay appeared to have merit, the parties confirmed that they were content for the determination for the application for leave to follow the outcome of the appeal proper.[2]
- Nature of the appeal.
- [10]The appeal has been brought pursuant to s. 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld), and so it is by way of re-hearing on the record.[3] By the Act, the appeal is subject to the constraint that it is to be conducted on the “sole ground that a…punishment was excessive or inadequate”.[4] The onus is upon the appellant to show that there is some relevant error in the decision under appeal.[5] The principles from House v The King[6] apply to an appeal against the exercise of discretion.
- [11]As noted, the appellant was permitted to amend his notice of appeal to plead specific errors. Since the hearing of the appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chakka v Queensland Police Service[7] was delivered. In that decision, her Honour Justice Brown, with whom her Honour President Mullins joined in her reasons, identified a divergence of approaches adopted in relation to the meaning of s. 222(2)(c) in the District Court.[8]
- [12]In Rongo v Commissioner of Police[9], Devereaux DCJ (as his Honour then was) observed that the real question to be determined was whether the sentence was excessive, and the demonstration of specific error made by the Magistrate assisted only to the extent that it may have explained why the sentence was excessive. That approach has found favour in Chakka v Queensland Police Service, and it is required by the appellant to demonstrate error in the exercise of the discretion of the kind recognised by House v The King, and that the error has resulted in a sentence which is excessive.[10
- [13]The approach adopted in this appeal conformed with the decision in Chakka v Queensland Police Service as the identified specific errors advanced the submission that the sentencing disposition was excessive, and properly explained how the Magistrate arrived at a sentencing disposition that was excessive.
- Factual allegations.
- [14]The appellant is a 31 year old man. He immigrated from Ethiopia to Australia in 2005. He does not have a family support as he is estranged from his siblings who reside in Australia and his mother has returned to Africa. He suffers from anxiety and depression and at the time of the commission of the offences described feeling alone without any way of seeking help. The appellant had worked as a forklift driver for five years and gained certifications in several differing areas of business practice and trade since leaving school.
- [15]The appellant was introduced to drug offending when 15 years old and “ended up on the streets”. The appellant described that he had a drinking problem and completed a relevant course addressing this issue whilst in custody. The appellant informed the Magistrate of his continued desire to attend to his rehabilitation and requested some clemency in sentencing. The appellant invited the Magistrate to consider any drug programs or other rehabilitation that could be made part of the orders of the Court.
- [16]The appellant has a relevant criminal history. The appellant was convicted for an offence of armed robbery on 12 April 2019 and imprisoned for 8 months with ordered probation for 3 years to follow his imprisonment. In 2021, the appellant committed further offences in breach of the ordered probation. On 11 April 2022, the appellant was sentenced for minor property and drug offending, and notably, the only conviction for the offence of unlawfully using a motor vehicle that appears in his criminal history. The appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months with immediate release upon parole.
- [17]On 11 August 2022 and 17 October 2022, further short terms of imprisonment were imposed for property offending, and on each occasion the sentences were suspended forthwith. It is this context that the present offending occurred, and it is these latter sentences which are breached by the offending to which he pleaded guilty on 15 November 2023.
- [18]The most serious of the offending involved the appellant stealing motor vehicles from people he was in the company of or using stolen motor vehicles. The stealing offences involved “fuel drive offs” and the theft of alcohol from bottle shops. On each occasion associated driving offences were charged for the use of the relevant motor vehicle.
- [19]The appellant was detained in a car on 14 December 2022. He was found in possession of an “ice” pipe. He was suspended from driving through demerit.
- [20]On 14 March 2022, he was playing pokies and borrowed a patron’s phone, and simply walked off with it.
- [21]On 11 June 2023, the appellant took an acquaintance’s Audi without her permission, and took fuel without paying from a service station and stole alcohol from a bottle shop. This conduct was charged as seven discrete offences including offences of unlawfully using a motor vehicle to commit an indictable offence for the use of the car to attend the fuel station and the bottle shop with an intention to steal. The appellant was unlicenced at the time he used the relevant car, and so charged for each passage of driving.
- [22]On 5 July 2023, the appellant was seen walking along the roadside in Buranda and offered a lift to a local hotel by a stranger. The appellant stole this person’s Audi as he drank inside of the hotel.
- [23]On 10 July 2023, the appellant took an acquaintance’s Ford Ranger without his permission. The appellant used the stolen pick-up and took fuel without paying from a service station and was unlicenced. He was later found with the pick-up and had stolen identification and a glass “ice” pipe in his possession. The roadside test identified that the appellant had methylamphetamine in his saliva and he was again unlicenced. This conduct was charged as eight discrete offences.
- The sentencing hearing.
- [24]The appellant was not legally represented at the hearing. The proceedings were conducted with the usual economy which attaches to a short sentence hearing in the Magistrates Court. That does not, of itself constitute an error, but the limited submissions are relevant to explain how the sentencing arrived upon was excessive.
- [25]The police prosecutor tendered a schedule of facts for the sentencing without objection. It is accepted between the parties and evident that the schedule of facts contained detail for offending for which the appellant had not pleaded guilty, that is, offences of unlawfully using a motor vehicle and driving without a licence allegedly committed on 17 June 2023. The police prosecutor repeated the error during submissions that followed, describing that the appellant had committed “these 22 offences” including the two offences to which the appellant had not pleaded guilty. The Magistrate adopted the error at the commencement of his remarks, “You have pleaded guilty to these 22 offences”.
- [26]It is accepted between the parties and evident that the schedule of facts contained details for an offence for which the appellant had already been punished on 11 April 2022, that is, an offence of unlawfully using a motor vehicle committed on 12 November 2021.
- [27]The police prosecutor erroneously informed the court that the appellant had three prior convictions for unlawfully using a motor vehicle and five prior convictions for unlicenced driving. The appellant had only one prior conviction for each of these types of offences.
- [28]The Magistrate observed that the appellant was being sentenced for “six unlawful use of motor vehicles and two stealing of motor vehicles”; there were in fact only five in the schedule of facts and one of those, as observed, was not an offence for which the appellant should have been punished. The numerical quantum of offences assumed some importance in the determination of the appropriate sentences, as inferred from the Magistrate’s explanation of the principal of proportionality; “if you do 50 stealings, you don’t get the same penalty as three or five stealings”. The Magistrate observed that the court needed to consider the “totality of the criminality”.
- [29]The Magistrate properly observed that the appellant had pleaded guilty, shown remorse, that there was no violence, the offending was brazen and opportunistic, and that the appellant had committed the offences whilst “on suspended sentences” for property offending.
- Submissions on appeal.
- [30]The appellant’s submission was that the effective sentence of imprisonment for 24 months coupled with the aggregate of the disqualification period was excessive and was not supported by more or less comparable authority.[11] The appellant submitted that the Magistrate’s error in sentencing was explained by the erroneous information provided to the court, which elevated both the relative seriousness of the appellant’s prior criminal history and the offences for which he had been involved and was to be sentenced.
- [31]The appellant submitted that it was important where there have been offences charged, arising out of the same conduct, that is taken into account, so as to ensure that the offender is not twice punished, but rather punished appropriately for those facets of conduct attributable to each of the offences.
- [32]The appellant recognised that there was a mandatory requirement for some of the periods of disqualification to be cumulative, however there was required to be some moderation in the individual periods of disqualification imposed to ensure that the resulting disqualification period was “not crushing”. It was submitted that the Magistrate had placed too much emphasis upon community protection, as evident from his remarks and the imposition of the maximum period of disqualification for two of the offences.
- [33]The appellant referred to the observations of Macrossan CJ in R v Nhu Ly[12], that the disqualification period is not meant to be a gratuitous addition to other available punishments, and that there should be some apparent purpose in disqualification as such, rather than would be served by a heavier fine or longer period of imprisonment.
- [34]The appellant submitted that a period of imprisonment of 18 months was appropriate and any disqualification period longer than 9 months “lacks proper purpose”. It was submitted that the periods of imprisonment ordered to be suspended, and breached by this offending, should be activated but ordered to be served concurrently with the first sentences.
- [35]The respondent conceded that the sentences were excessive and invited this court to “re-sentence afresh” because of the identified errors in the sentencing proceeding. The respondent conceded that the Magistrate had failed to properly apply the totality principle when imposing terms of imprisonment in addition to the lengthy period of disqualification.
- Consideration.
- [36]The total sentence should be consistent with and proportionate to the criminality of the offending conduct.[13] That aggregation of effect of the total sentence is not limited to the imposed periods of imprisonment but also the disqualification periods for which the appellant was not entitled to obtain or hold a driver licence. To adopt the words of Chief Justice Macrossan, “Although the discretion which arises is a broad one, it can be accepted that the disqualification, whilst it will operate as an additional penalty is not meant to be simply a gratuitous addition to other available punishments”.[14]
- [37]Whilst the appellant is to be sentenced for 19 offences (not 22 offences), it must be borne in mind by the sentencer that it was important where there have been offences charged, arising out of the same conduct, that this feature is recognised. The sentencer should properly ensure that the offender is not twice punished, but rather punished appropriately for those facets of conduct attributable to each of the offences. This was a case in which there was some allure in numerical evaluation of the offending.
- [38]There is no “range” of sentences for a particular offence committed in particular objective circumstances, the sentence must be judged on the basis of individual factors in each case before the sentencer.[15] As observed by the plurality in Hili v The Queen[16], in seeking consistency sentencing judges must have regard to what has been done in other cases. Those other cases may well establish a range of sentences which have been imposed. But that history does not establish that the sentences which have been imposed mark the outer bounds of the permissible discretion. The history stands against which to examine a proposed sentence. What is important is the unifying principles which those sentences both reveal and reflect.
- [39]The commission of the offences whilst within the operational period of the suspension of sentences of imprisonment for property offending was a serious aspect to the offending. The appellant’s prior criminal record, however, revealed only a single prior conviction for unlawfully using a motor vehicle and unlicenced driving. The limited nature of these prior convictions, make it difficult to apprehend proper purpose and proportionality in imposing orders that prevent the appellant from holding or obtaining a driver licence for 2 ½ years. The effect of the accumulation of the orders was excessive.
- [40]I accept that protection of the community is an important aspect of the sentencing, but it can be recognised that rehabilitation of the appellant also serves to protect the community. A judicious balance must then be achieved between determining the appropriate period for which the appellant should be deprived of the privilege of driving as a punishment and to advance the protection for the community, and the appropriate time to return to him the opportunity of the privilege of driving, to support his future rehabilitation and advance the protection of the community.
- [41]The appropriate and proportionate orders, in all the circumstances, are those which effectively prevent the appellant from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for 12 months.
- [42]The appellant had explained his offending because of his abuse of drugs and alcohol for which he had sought treatment and intended to continue seeking treatment. It can be accepted that the appellant was remorseful and co-operated with the authorities at the earliest opportunity, indeed, before the appellant sought legal representation.
- [43]Ratcliffe v Queensland Police Service[17] and the authorities referred to within that judgment, suggest that a mature offender in comparable circumstances with demonstrated recidivism for like offending should expect condign sentencing of the nature imposed by the Magistrate. The appellant was not a recidivist offender for like offending.
- [44]I accept the submission that the erroneous information provided to the court, elevated both the relative seriousness of the appellant’s prior criminal history and the offences for which he had been involved and was to be sentenced. It, if necessary, explained why the sentencing was excessive.
- [45]The sentences imposed were excessive. I consider that the appropriate approach in the circumstances is to globally consider the criminality involved in the offending.
- [46]For the most serious of the offending, the offending relating to the theft and unlawful use of motor vehicles, I have determined that the appropriate penalties are terms of 17 months imprisonment, to reflect the overall criminality of the appellant’s offending. I have imposed lesser concurrent penalties on the remaining indictable offences. As the overall criminality is reflected in these sentences, the summary offences will attract sentences of being convicted and not further punished.
- [47]The commission of the offences whilst within the operational period of the suspension of sentences of imprisonment was an aggravating feature of the offending and I have determined to reflect that feature in fixing the penalty for the more serious of the offending, without an accumulation for the activated portion of those original sentences. It is appropriate to order that the appellant serve those terms of imprisonment that had been wholly suspended and order the activated terms to be served concurrently with the sentences I have imposed. I am cognisant that the activated term of imprisonment of 1 month for an offence against the Bail Act, is required to be ordered to be served cumulatively to the sentences I have imposed.
- [48]At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the relevant date set for release upon parole had expired and the appellant had been released upon parole and into immigration detention. The parties did not agitate for any variation in that date set.
- [49]A judge may confirm, set aside, or vary the appealed order or make any other order in the matter the judge considers just on the hearing of an appeal.[18] In the course of doing so, the judge may exercise any power that could have been exercised by whoever made the order appealed against.
- [50]s. 17 of the Criminal Code provides a defence to a charge where a person has been previously convicted, which reflects the common law defence of autrefois convict. s. 16 of the Criminal Code prevents a person from being punished twice for the “same act or omission”. This latter statutory prohibition, in the sense of preventing punishment twice for the “same offence” is now also recognised in s. 34 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The subtle distinction between the terms “same act or omission” and “same offence” is unnecessary to consider for the purposes of disposing of this appeal.
- [51]As stated above, it was accepted between the parties that defence was available to the appellant in respect of an offence of unlawfully using a motor vehicle committed on 12 November 2021. The Magistrate’s attention was not drawn to the issue by either party in the first instance, and notably the appellant was not legally represented.
- [52]The respondent was given leave to file and read an affidavit, and exhibiting annexures proved the relevant error.[19]
- [53]I accepted the submission of the parties, and the appropriate remedy was discussed in the hearing. Further written submissions were provided on the issue.
- [54]The respondent submitted, through detailed written submissions, that this was one of the rare cases in which I should determine that the plea was not unequivocal in the sense that the appellant “did not appreciate the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty”, and in essence to permit the appellant to formulate an appeal against conviction, and that appeal should be granted.[20]
- [55]I concluded that the powers held by the judge in disposing of the appeal were sufficiently broad to permit an order that the sentence be set aside for that offence, and that the conviction be quashed. It was submitted that the use of the power, as I have so employed, was precedent upon my determination that the sentences were excessive, that is, as an ancillary power, as the appellant was prohibited from appealing against his conviction pursuant to the Act where a plea had been entered.
- Orders
- [56]My orders are:
- 1.The application for an extension of time within which to appeal is granted.
- 2.The appeal is allowed.
- 3.The sentence imposed for Charge 1 of MAG00194322/21(6) is set aside and the conviction is quashed.
- 4.Set aside the sentences ordered in the Richlands Magistrates Court on 15 November 2023.
- 5.In their stead, the following sentences are imposed:
- Charges 1, 4, 7, 8 and 11 of MAG00119504/23(6) – sentenced to 17 months imprisonment
- Charge 1 on MAG00159405/23(1) – sentenced to 17 months imprisonment
- Charge 1 on MAG00119407/23(1) – sentenced to 3 months imprisonment
- Charges 5 and 9 on MAG00119504/23(6) – sentenced to 3 months imprisonment
- Charge 1 on MAG00170728/23(8) – sentenced to 3 months imprisonment
- Charges 2, 3, 6 and 10 on MAG00119504/23(6) – convicted and not further punished
- Charges 1, 2 on MAG00125185/23(1) – convicted and not further punished
- Charge 2 on MAG00170728/23(8) – convicted and not further punished
- Charges 1 and 2 on MAG00214423/22(7) – convicted and not further punished
- 6.Declare that 127 days between 11 July 2023 and 14 November 2023 be deemed time already served under the sentences imposed.
- 7.Order that the sentences imposed be served concurrently with each other.
- 8.Order the parole release date fixed on 11 March 2024.
- 9.Amend the orders to serve the whole of the suspended sentences in each instance, to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed, except for the order to serve the whole of the suspended sentence for the offence of failing to appear in accordance with the undertaking for which the appellant was convicted on 11 April 2022, a period of one month imprisonment.
- 10.Set aside the disqualification periods ordered in the Richlands Magistrates Court on 15 November 2023 and in their stead order:
- (i)Charge 2 on MAG00170728/23(8) – no disqualification period
- (ii)Charge 2 on MAG00214423/22(7) – disqualified from obtaining or holding a driver licence for a period of six months
- (iii)Charge 1 on MAG00125185/23(1) – disqualified from obtaining or holding a driver licence for a period of nine months[21]
- (iv)Charge 2 on MAG00125185/23(1) – disqualified from obtaining or holding a driver licence for a period of three months
- (v)Charge 6 on MAG00119504/23(6) – disqualified from obtaining or holding a driver licence for a period of three months
- (vi)Charge 10 on MAG00119504/23(6) – disqualified from obtaining or holding a driver licence for a period of one month
- 11.No order as to costs.
Footnotes
[1]s. 224(1)(c) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).
[2]R v Tait [1999] 2 Qd R 667.
[3]s. 223(1) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).
[4]s. 222(2)(c) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).
[5]Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at [23]; McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612 at [47].
[6]House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505.
[7][2024] QCA 213.
[8]Chakka v Queensland Police Service, ibid at [49].
[9][2017] QDC 258 at [22]-[24].
[10]Chakka v Queensland Police Service, ibid at [87]-[88].
[11]Ratcliffe v Queensland Police Service [2019] QDC 144.
[12][1996] 1 Qd R 543 at 547.
[13]Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59 at p 62-63.
[14]R v Nhu Ly, ibid.
[15]Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58 at [28], [34]-[35], [38].
[16]Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520 at 536-537 [53]-[54].
[17]Ratcliffe v Queensland Police Service, ibid.
[18]s. 225 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).
[19]s. 223(2) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).
[20]This approach is confronted by the impediment of the application of s. 222(1)(b) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) and decided authority: Commissioner of Police v James [2013] QCA 403 at [11]-[12].
[21]s. 90C(1)(3) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) requires the disqualification for the offence of Driving etc while relevant drug present in blood or saliva to be served cumulatively with the disqualification order for the offence of Driving while unlicenced, where the acts comprising the offence were committed at the same time.