Wilson v Queensland Police Service
[2024] QDC 225
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- Wilson v Queensland Police Service[2024] QDC 225
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Wilson v Queensland Police Service[2024] QDC 225
Wilson v Queensland Police Service[2024] QDC 225
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Wilson v Queensland Police Service [2024] QDC 225 |
PARTIES: | WILSON, Pelham Timothy (Appellant) v QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE (Respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | DC 284 of 23 |
DIVISION: | Appellate |
PROCEEDING: | Appeal s 222 (Criminal) |
ORIGINATING COURT: | Magistrates Court at Southport |
DELIVERED ON: | 16 December 2024 |
DELIVERED AT: | Southport |
HEARING DATE: | 6 September 2024 |
JUDGES: | Prskalo KC DCJ |
ORDER: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL – APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION – an appeal against conviction pursuant to s 222 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – where the appellant was convicted of offences under the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 2021 (Qld); an offence under the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld); an offence under the Transport Operations (Road Use Management Act) 1995 (Qld) and two offences under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) – where the appellant challenges the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court and the validity of the prosecution – where the appellant contends he was denied procedural fairness – meaning of ‘simple offences’ under the Criminal Code (Qld) Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 32A, s 44 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) Criminal Code (Qld), s 1, s 2, s 3 Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 222, s 223, s 225 Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), s 20 Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s 790, s 791 Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 2021 (Qld), s 10, s 209 Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld), s 34, s 78, s 123, s 124 Bode v Commissioner of Police [2018] QCA 186 Carnes v Essenberg [1999] QCA 339 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 Masson v Parsons (2019) 266 CLR 554 McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612; [2017] QCA 255 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362 Renwick v Bell [2001] QCA 316 R v Barlow (1997) 188 CLR 1 R v Stoneman [2013] QCA 209 R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216 |
COUNSEL: | The appellant appeared on his own behalf E Haines for the Respondent |
SOLICITORS: | The appellant appeared on his own behalf Director of Public Prosecutions for the Respondent |
Introduction
- [1]The appellant was charged with ten offences alleged to have been committed on 20 January 2023 at Merrimac on the Gold Coast. The appellant was tried in the Magistrates Court at Southport and found guilty of the following offences:
Charge 1 – Things that purport to be, but are not, registration certificates, number plates or permits in contravention of s 209 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 2021 (Qld).
Charge 4 – Vehicles used on roads must be registered except in particular circumstances in contravention of s 10 (1) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 2021 (Qld).
Charge 5 – Offence of driving uninsured vehicle in contravention of s 20 (1) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld).
Charge 6 – Driving of motor vehicle without a driver licence prohibited in contravention of s 78 (1) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management Act) 1995 (Qld).
Charge 7 – Offence to contravene a direction or requirement of police officer in contravention of s 791 (2) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) (PPRA).
Charge 8 – Offence to obstruct a police officer in contravention of s 790 (1)(b) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) (PPRA).
- [2]Police prosecutions offered no evidence on charges 2 and 3. The learned Magistrate found the appellant not guilty of charges 9 and 10.
The proceedings in the Magistrates Court
- [3]The prosecution case was that the appellant had driven a vehicle without a driver licence, and the vehicle was unregistered, uninsured and had attached to it a plate which purported to be, but which was not in fact, a number plate. Further, it was alleged that the appellant contravened a direction to state his full and correct name and obstructed Senior Constable Ireland in the performance of her duties.
- [4]SC Ireland testified that on the 20th of January 2023, she saw the appellant pull up to the pumps of a service station located on Gooding Drive at Merrimac. Her attention was drawn to the plate on the back of the utility because it did not look like a normal number plate. She approached the vehicle and activated her body worn camera.[1] She introduced herself and said she was there to conduct a licence and registration check.
- [5]SC Ireland asked the appellant to produce his driver licence, which he refused to do. She asked the appellant to open the bonnet of the vehicle, which he refused to do. When the appellant walked to the rear of the vehicle, she leaned in and opened the bonnet. She did this to gain access to the vehicle identification number. The appellant reapproached the front of the vehicle and, as her hands were still under the bonnet, made an action as if to close the bonnet. She informed him he was obstructing her, and that obstruction could cause his arrest. It escalated to the point that SC Ireland arrested the appellant. Other police arrived and SC Ireland made further inquiries, which revealed the vehicle was unregistered and uninsured.
- [6]SC Ireland removed the plates off the vehicle and saw that there was a sticker attached on the inside which identified the plate as a novelty plate.
- [7]Once she had established the vehicle identification number and that its last registered owner was the appellant, she conducted a licence check. Checks revealed that the licence issued to the appellant was under suspension as at the date of interception. As SC Ireland still hadn’t fully identified the male person, she again gave the appellant the requirement to state his correct name, which he refused to do. He did identify himself as Pel.
- [8]Various photographs, as well as certificates issued by the Department of Transport and Main Roads were tendered. One document certified that the appellant’s driver licence was suspended for a period of three months as a result of the accumulation of demerit points, effective from 23 November 2022. On 20 January 2023, there was not in force a driver licence issued to the appellant under the relevant Act. Another document certified that the vehicle’s registration was cancelled on 30 August 2021. In respect of both documents, pursuant to s 123C (1) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld), a certificate is evidence of the matter stated in it.
- [9]The appellant cross-examined SC Ireland on various topics, including that she had adopted a discriminatory attitude toward him, had acted beyond power and had deliberately overcharged.
- [10]The appellant elected not to give or call evidence.
Jurisdictional ground – the hearing in the Magistrates Court
- [11]In the hearing below, the appellant argued that the court did not have jurisdiction over him, invoking notions of a lack of consent and grammatical irregularities in the paperwork, amongst other things. It was also argued that there should be a trial by jury. Prior to the evidence, the learned Magistrate ruled that the argument as to jurisdiction was a matter to be raised in submissions at the conclusion of the evidence, it being relevant to whether the prosecution had discharged its burden of proof.
- [12]During the evidence, the appellant again raised objection to the court’s jurisdiction over him as a man. The learned Magistrate permitted the appellant to advance his argument on the jurisdictional issue. The appellant relied upon various documents, which were placed before the court and marked for identification.
- [13]Amongst other matters, it was argued that the writing of the appellant’s name in capital letters created a dead entity, and he was not dead but was rather a living, breathing man.
- [14]The appellant asserted that he was not a person, a person being a legal fiction. He was a man but did not accept that by being a man he was a human being. This was said to be because a ‘human’ is a monster by definition and therefore a ‘human’ under Black’s Legal Dictionary is a monster which has no right to equity or to rights or ownership of property. Once it was established that the appellant was a living, breathing man, then he was not a person, not a Mister, not a Sir, not a citizen and not a resident; those are all commodities. The appellant appeared in the court under duress, trying to fulfil his duties as an honourable man to protect his country from the interlopers. The interlopers were said to be the evil corporate-based terrorists that have taken over rights and have commodified all the men and women in this country.
- [15]Essentially, the appellant did not consent to the jurisdiction of the court. To support his argument, the appellant cited various extraterritorial and Commonwealth laws, as well as laws from other Australian states. The learned Magistrate refused to consider these for the simple reason that they did not apply to the proceeding.
- [16]The learned Magistrate ruled that, having regard to the definitions in the dictionary, a person and a human being appear to be interchangeable. As there was no dispute that the appellant was a living, breathing man, the learned Magistrate was satisfied that he was, by virtue of those definitions, both a person and a human being.
The appellant’s submissions – defence closing address
- [17]In his closing address, the appellant submitted that police could not initiate the stop of a stationary motor vehicle without a driver in it and which was on private property. In relation to pushing down the bonnet on the officer’s hand, the police officer had already backed away well and truly before the appellant gently placed his hand on the bonnet; that much was clear from the video footage. There was therefore no physical obstruction, and as to the charge of obstruct, there was not a ‘provable cause’ under the PPRA.
- [18]Amongst other matters, the appellant argued that a service station is designed for selling fuel, not for driving on; it is a forecourt. The appellant was not on a road but was in a private business. His car was not a prescribed vehicle, and the prosecution was unable to show the court that the law states he must register a private vehicle.
- [19]In respect of driving an uninsured vehicle, the Motor Accident Insurance Act did not have a commencement date. In respect of driving a motor vehicle without a driver licence, the appellant did not believe that he required a licence to travel in his private capacity in a private vehicle.
- [20]Without reciting every facet of the matters raised in defence, there followed extensive submissions, some of a political or philosophical kind regarding the abject plight of modern society. The appellant re-asserted that the court did not have jurisdiction over him, citing various legislative provisions and doctrines. An extract from the Magna Carta was cited in support of his right to a trial by jury.
- [21]The appellant reagitated his original submission regarding the impact of grammatical irregularities in the documents. It was submitted that the police had acted beyond their powers and beyond what was fair and reasonable. Section 9 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act was cited in support of an argument that there were two types of police; those whose powers are derived under common law and police officers who were there to protect commercial property.
The learned Magistrate’s reasons
- [22]The learned Magistrate dismissed the appellant’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the court and his assertion that the law did not apply to him. The Magistrates Court was properly constituted under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). The respective Acts under which the appellant was charged were properly in force and, for each of the offences, the relevant Acts conferred summary jurisdiction.
- [23]The learned Magistrate rejected the argument that the Magna Carta applied to the Magistrates Court, citing binding authority to the contrary: Carnes v Essenberg [1999] QCA 339. The learned Magistrate held that the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) applied to all police officers and no distinction was to be drawn between police constables and police officers.
- [24]It was for the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to each and every charge. The prosecution sought to discharge the burden by way of evidentiary certificates, oral evidence and the body worn camera footage.
- [25]A road is defined in schedule 4 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) and includes an area that is open to or used by the public and is developed for, or has as 1 of its uses, the driving or riding of motor vehicles, whether on payment of a fee or otherwise. The learned Magistrate held that the service station forecourt met the definition of a road under the Act.
- [26]Under s 34 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld), a power is conferred on a police officer to inspect a vehicle that is stationary on a road to check whether the vehicle complies with a transport Act.
- [27]In relation to charge 1, the police officer was authorised to remove the number plate, which proved to be a novelty plate. No reasonable explanation was advanced excusing the appellant’s possession of it. The appellant was guilty of contravening s 209 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 2021 (Qld).
- [28]In respect of charge 4, under s 10 (1) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 2021 (Qld), a vehicle used on roads must be registered except for in particular circumstances. None of the exceptions applied in the appellant’s case, and the vehicle was required to be registered. A certificate was tendered pursuant to the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995, ss 123 and 124 and schedule 1. The certificate, upon satisfaction of the pre-conditions in ss 123 and 124, was conclusive proof that the registration of the vehicle had been cancelled on 30 August 2021, and as at that date the registration was in the appellant’s name.
- [29]In relation to charge 5, under s 20 of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), a person must not drive an uninsured motor vehicle on a road or in a public place. Exhibit 1 proved that the registration of the vehicle had been cancelled on 30 August 2021. ‘Road’ had the same meaning as already identified. An uninsured motor vehicle includes a motor vehicle where there is no CTP insurance in force. Due to the cancellation of the registration, the appellant was uninsured at the relevant time.
- [30]The learned Magistrate noted the reference in the section to the concept of ‘drive’. There was no direct evidence of the appellant driving the vehicle. The vehicle was parked at the bowser when SC Ireland saw it and remained there during their interactions. SC Ireland did not see the appellant driving on the road but, in her peripheral vision, saw the vehicle moving towards the bowser at the service station.
- [31]The learned Magistrate found that it was a reasonable inference that the appellant had driven the vehicle to the service station as he was not in the company of another person. It mattered not because there was evidence of the vehicle being driven towards the bowser, and the definition of a road includes the forecourt of a service station.
- [32]In relation to charge 6, under s 78 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld), a person must not drive a motor vehicle on a road unless the person holds a driver licence authorising the person to drive the vehicle on the road. A tendered certificate was proof that the appellant’s driver licence was suspended from 23 November 2022 until 22 February 2023 for a period of three months, such that the date of the offence fell within the suspension period. The certificate was conclusive proof that the appellant was unlicenced. It could be reasonably inferred that the appellant drove on the road to enter the service station. In any event, he was seen driving in the service station forecourt, which is within the definition of a road.
- [33]In relation to charge 7, SC Ireland had asked the appellant to state his full and correct name, which was authorised under s 40 of the PPRA and in the prescribed circumstances identified in s 41. As such, those pre-conditions were met. The appellant did not comply with the request. The learned Magistrate found him guilty of contravening a direction or requirement under s 791 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld).
- [34]In relation to charge 8, under s 790 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), a person must not obstruct a police officer in the performance of the officer’s duties. Obstruction does not have to be physical. It can include acts that hinder, impede, retard or delay the police officer in the performance of their duties. SC Ireland was lawfully making inquiries in relation to the driver and the vehicle after identifying non-compliance with the registration plates. The learned Magistrate found the appellant was running obstruction with the investigation and, as such, did obstruct SC Ireland in her investigations. The appellant would not answer her questions, he challenged her authority, he disputed her power and claimed that it was a private vehicle and therefore she had no authority. He caused her concerns when she went to open the bonnet. On the latter point, the learned Magistrate accepted what was in the footage over SC Ireland’s evidence.
- [35]It was clear from the footage that SC Ireland had stepped away from the bonnet and at no stage did the appellant touch the bonnet while she was trying to open it. Despite her evidence, it is not alleged that anything physical happened to SC Ireland. The appellant’s actions, though, caused her not to open the bonnet. By his conduct, the appellant hindered SC Ireland during her lawful investigation of the vehicle.
- [36]The learned Magistrate found the prosecution had proved each of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt and found the appellant guilty of charges 1 and 4 to 8.
Notice of appeal
- [37]By notice of appeal filed on 29 September 2023, the appellant appeals against his conviction in respect of charges 1 and 4 to 8.
- [38]The grounds of the appeal are expressed in these terms:
“Important evidence (was) not accepted by the Magistrate. Silence deemed misrepresentation. The Magistrate gave mere opinion with no lawful or legislative reason to ignore my evidence / exhibits raised. No consent given to proceedings. Unsigned statements and oath by police (in brief) and ignored by the Magistrate. Denied natural justice.”
- [39]The appellant filed an outline of submissions on 26 October 2023. In that document, entitled Statement of Truth, it is firstly contended that the Magistrate at no stage rebutted any exhibits supplied by the appellant during the course of the hearing, nor did she invoke Magistrate’s discretion at any time in the verdict and judgment. The following documents were supplied to support the appellant’s position and they remain unrebutted: Treaty, Superior Law, Statutory Acts, Codes, Definitions.
- [40]The appellant complains that the Magistrate tried to dismiss the jurisdictional challenge initially, and then after repeated objections by the appellant, offered to deal with it at the end of the trial. The appellant believes this to be an abuse of process. After further objection by the appellant, the Magistrate halted the proceedings to deal with the challenge. A related complaint is that the Magistrate used non legal definitions (and a personal opinion) to ‘give verdict’ on the interchangeability of the words ‘man, person and human’. This was said to be without ‘supplied evidence’ or ‘lawful basis’. In turn, the Magistrate claimed to have jurisdiction over the appellant as a ‘man’, whilst ignoring his evidence to claim the contrary.
- [41]The appellant seeks justice. He seeks a fair and reasonable outcome. He wants to be free to travel in his private capacity unhindered and without threat, coercive force, debt, burden, and loss of liberty placed upon him when there is no victim and no ‘qualifying offence’.
- [42]The appellant further seeks disciplinary action against various people, a formal acknowledgment of the errors of the Magistrates Court, and restitution.
- [43]Finally, the appellant seeks to have his rights and status as a ‘living man’ respected and acknowledged by the court formally so that this situation can be avoided in the future. In turn, this is to avoid further ongoing threats, intimidation, coercive force, stress, debt, and loss of liberty.
- [44]The grounds of appeal can broadly be understood as a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court over the appellant.
- [45]By further outline of submissions filed on 3 September 2024, the appellant asserts that the Magistrates Court proceedings were affected by errors of law and that he was denied procedural fairness. Amongst other complaints, the primary overreaching argument was that no ‘qualifying offence’ had been committed.
Nature of appeal
- [46]Section 222 (1) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) provides for a right of appeal against conviction to the District Court. Section 223 (1) provides that such an appeal is by way of rehearing on the original evidence on the record, although pursuant to s 223 (2) the court may give leave to adduce, fresh, additional or substituted (new) evidence if the court is satisfied there are special grounds for giving leave. Section 225 of the Act empowers a judge to confirm, set aside or vary an appealed order, or make any other order considered just.
- [47]The nature of the ‘rehearing’ provided in these and like provisions has been described in many cases. The rehearing does not involve a completely fresh hearing by the appellate court of all the evidence. The court proceeds on the basis of the record and any fresh evidence, that, exceptionally it admits: Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [22].
- [48]It is well established that, on an appeal under s 222 by way of rehearing, the District Court is required to conduct a real review of the trial, and the Magistrate’s reasons, and make its own determination of relevant facts in issue from the evidence, giving due deference and attaching a good deal of weight to the Magistrate’s view. Nevertheless, in order to succeed on such an appeal, the appellant must establish some legal, factual or discretionary error: McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612; [2017] QCA 255 per Bowskill JA at [47].
- [49]A court of appeal conducting an appeal by way of rehearing is bound to conduct a real review of the evidence given at first instance and of the judge’s reasons for judgment to determine whether the judge has erred in fact or law. If the court of appeal concludes that the judge has erred in fact, it is required to make its own findings of fact and to formulate its own reasoning based on those findings: Bode v Commissioner of Police [2018] QCA 186 per McMurdo JA at [42], citing Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679.
Jurisdictional ground – the appellant’s submissions on the appeal
- [50]The crux of the appellant’s argument is that the offences of which he was convicted do not exist. The appellant ought not to have been asked to enter a plea without the court first considering if the offences were known to law.
- [51]The argument was cast as follows. The ‘qualifying offences’ did not exist under the superior Code, which is the Criminal Code (Qld). All other arguments were a distraction from this vital point.
- [52]A proper construction of ss 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code meant that he required a trial by jury, and the Magistrates Court was not qualified to hear the matter. Such a result logically and reasonably is the outcome of importing the definition of ‘liable’, as expressed in s 1, into s 2. Accordingly, the definition of an offence in s 2 is to be read as follows:
An act or omission which renders the person doing the act or making the omission liable on conviction upon indictment to punishment is called an offence.
- [53]The appellant argues that upon the proper construction of the Criminal Code, in his case there was no indictment and therefore no ‘qualifying offence’. The appellant did not press that there was not an offence in a summary court. But he did argue that there existed an inconsistency, which had become the subject of manipulation by the courts. In the result, the courts were acting in an untoward way against an unprepared, ill-informed, and uneducated opponent. In the appellant’s opinion, such conduct by the courts was taking advantage of him, as well as taking away his liberty.
The definition and classification of offences
- [54]Pursuant to s 2 of the Criminal Code, an act or omission which renders the person doing the act or making the omission liable to punishment is called an offence.
- [55]Section 3 of the Criminal Code states:
- Offences are of 2 kinds, namely, criminal offences and regulatory offences.
- Criminal offences comprise crimes, misdemeanours and simple offences.
- Crimes and misdemeanours are indictable offences; that is to say, the offenders can not, unless otherwise expressly stated, be prosecuted or convicted except upon indictment.
- A person guilty of a regulatory offence or a simple offence may be summarily convicted by a Magistrates Court.
- An offence not otherwise designated is a simple offence.
- [56]Under the definitions in s 1 of the Criminal Code:
‘Liable, used alone, means liable on conviction upon indictment.’
The rules of statutory construction
- [57]The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute: Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69].
- [58]In SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362 at [14], Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ said:
“The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.” (footnotes omitted)
- [59]There are well established rules which apply when construing the provisions of a code. Like any other enactment, the imputed will of parliament must be derived from the language of the enactment, understood in its context and, so far as possible, in order to give effect to its apparent purposes. Courts must give the language of a code, like any other legislation, its natural meaning. If that meaning is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect: R v Barlow (1997) 188 CLR 1 per Kirby J at 31.
- [60]A court will not construe a provision in a way that departs from its natural and ordinary meaning unless it is plain that Parliament intended it to have some different meaning: see Masson v Parsons (2019) 266 CLR 554 at [26].
Disposition – jurisdictional ground challenging the existence of a ‘qualifying offence’
- [61]Sections 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code are to be construed so that they are consistent with each other and consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the Code. The text of s 2 is clear and unambiguous. The term ‘offence’ in s 2 means all acts and omissions punishable under the criminal law of Queensland. Having defined what constitutes an offence in s 2, by s 3 the Criminal Code divides offences into categories which determine whether the offence is to be dealt with on indictment or by summary disposition.
- [62]Construed consistently with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the Code, the context indicates that the definition of ‘liable’ in s 1 does not apply to s 2. Such an approach is permitted pursuant to s 32A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), which provides that definitions in or applicable to an Act apply except so far as the context or subject matter otherwise indicates or requires.
- [63]It is not necessary for the purposes of this appeal to determine where else in the Code the definition of liable (as expressed in s 1) might apply. However, for the sake of completeness, in my view the answer lies in the distinction between conviction upon indictment and summary conviction as it applies to the offence provisions.
- [64]The term ‘liable, used alone’ applies to any offence provision in the Code which does not expressly provide for liability upon summary conviction. In other words, an offence provision, unless expressly allowing for summary conviction, means conviction upon indictment. The definition of ‘liable’ in s 1 may have had more work to do prior to the enactment of Chapter 58A of the Criminal Code by Act No 3 of 1997, which provided a comprehensive scheme for dealing with indictable offences summarily. The amending provisions replaced the old provisions and other specific provisions which had provided for the summary disposal of indictable offences and which had also been repealed by Act No 3 of 1997.
- [65]Irrespectively, the appellant was not charged with an indictable offence and was not therefore entitled to be tried before a jury. In his case, by the operation of s 44 (1) and (2) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), each proceeding for each of the specific offence provisions charged was deemed to be a summary proceeding under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).
- [66]The term simple offence is not defined in the Criminal Code. Under the definitions in s 4 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld):
simple offence means any offence (indictable or not) punishable, on summary conviction before a Magistrates Court, by fine, imprisonment, or otherwise.
- [67]In Renwick v Bell [2001] QCA 316 at [16], Davies JA observed that the term simple offence in the Criminal Code was plainly intended to have the same meaning as that term bore in the Justices Act, the definition in that Act having survived the enactment of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld).
- [68]Upon a proper construction of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code each offence charged against the appellant was a simple offence punishable on summary conviction before a Magistrate.
- [69]A related complaint is that the appellant did not give consent for the proceedings, nor for a plea to be entered on his behalf. Section 348 of the Criminal Code is cited in aid of this argument.[2] There being no ‘qualifying offence’, the appellant maintains that he was not obliged to enter a plea, and nor should one have been entered by the Magistrate on his behalf. The appellant argues that he was denied procedural fairness when he was denied the opportunity to explain why he wasn’t entering a plea.
- [70]The proceeding in the Magistrates Court did not require the appellant’s consent, nor did the entry of a plea of not guilty result in a denial of procedural fairness. That remains the case whether the plea was entered at an earlier review or mention (as here) or whether at the commencement of the trial. The learned Magistrate presiding over the trial was not required to deal with the jurisdictional challenge prior to the evidence, nor even during it. Nevertheless, the appellant was permitted to agitate the point during the hearing and at length in his closing address. In the result, the appellant was not denied procedural fairness.
- [71]This ground of appeal fails.
Disposition – jurisdictional ground on the meaning of a ‘person’
- [72]The appellant essentially argues that he is not a ‘person’ for the purposes of either s 2 of the Criminal Code or for any of the offence provisions with which he was charged.
- [73]A similar argument was agitated in R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216 and held in that case to be without merit.
- [74]Schedule 1 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) defines the meaning of commonly used words and expressions. The word ‘person’ includes an individual and a corporation.
- [75]A court will not construe a provision in a way that departs from its natural and ordinary meaning unless it is plain that Parliament intended it to have some different meaning: see Masson v Parsons (2019) 266 CLR 554 at [26].
- [76]Applying the definition of a ‘person’ in schedule 1 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), the appellant is an individual. Like every other individual, the appellant is subject to the provisions of the Criminal Code, in particular s 2, and each of the offence provisions charged against him.
- [77]Beyond the construction point, the appellant’s ancillary arguments seek to entangle the court into a realm of political or philosophical musings. In the task of statutory construction, it is not to the point that the appellant is unhappy with the state of the law or that he seeks salvation from its reach. It is not the function of this court, and nor is it within power, to rescue such people from their predicament.
- [78]The supremacy of Parliament to make law contrary to what had been the common law is expressly recognised by the courts. There is a complete acceptance by the courts that an act of parliament is binding upon them: Carnes v Essenberg [1999] QCA 339.
- [79]Adopting the words of Chesterman J in Carnes v Essenberg, the appellant has a right to be tried according to the laws of the State of Queensland. In my view, he was justly tried in accordance with those laws.
- [80]This ground of appeal fails.
Disposition – the remaining submissions
- [81]By written submissions filed on 26 October 2023, it is asserted that the learned Magistrate at no stage rebutted any ‘exhibits’ supplied by the appellant during the course of the hearing and verdict.
- [82]The appellant provided a large number of documents to the court. The majority were provided during submissions, and some were filed later. The appellant argues that the documents, which support his position, remain unrebutted. The documents refer to various legislative provisions, some extraterritorial, as well as the Magna Carta and the Clearfield Doctrine amongst other matters. The application of the Clearfield Doctrine was further agitated during oral argument on the hearing of the appeal.
- [83]By written submissions filed on 3 September 2023, the appellant complains, amongst other things, that the learned Magistrate gave no consideration to s 45 of the Criminal Code – Innocent intentions.
- [84]Section 45 operates to limit the scope of behaviour proscribed by the definition in s 44 of ‘seditious intention’, relevant to the offence of sedition. The appellant is not charged with sedition and s 45 does not apply. As such, the learned Magistrate was not required to consider s 45.
- [85]The learned Magistrate was certainly not bound to answer every incomprehensible contention raised by the appellant when the unremarkable proposition that he was bound by the statutory law of Queensland was a complete answer to all his claims: see R v Stoneman [2013] QCA 209 at 5.
Conclusion
- [86]Upon a review of the evidence at first instance and of the learned Magistrate’s reasons, I have not identified any legal, factual or discretionary error. In my determination, the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt all the facts necessary to establish the elements of each offence of which the appellant was found guilty. The evidence did not disclose any authorisation, justification or excuse which could have exculpated the appellant from liability.
Orders
- [87]The appeal is dismissed.
- [88]There is no order as to costs.