Wells v Queensland Police Service
[2024] QDC 38
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- Wells v Queensland Police Service[2024] QDC 38
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Wells v Queensland Police Service[2024] QDC 38
Wells v Queensland Police Service[2024] QDC 38
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Wells v Queensland Police Service [2024] QDC 38 |
PARTIES: | AMY JANE WELLS (Appellant) v QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE (Respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | 2/2023 |
DIVISION: | Appellate |
PROCEEDING: | Appeal |
ORIGINATING COURT: | Magistrates Court at Beenleigh |
DELIVERED ON: | 8 February 2024 (ex tempore) |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 8 February 2024 |
JUDGE: | Allen KC DCJ |
ORDER: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – where the appellant was convicted of exceeding the speed limit after a trial in the Magistrates Court – where the appellant appealed against conviction pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – where at first instance and on appeal the self-represented appellant made nonsensical pseudolegal submissions totally devoid of merit – where at first instance and on appeal the self-represented appellant made no submissions directed towards the merits of any defence or ground of appeal – whether upon a rehearing the guilt of the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 222 Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld), s 120 Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Road Rules) Regulation 2009 (Qld), s 20 R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216 |
COUNSEL: | Appellant self-represented L T Hall for the respondent |
SOLICITOR: | Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) for the respondent |
- [1]At 16:26 hours on 30 March 2022 at Winnetts Road, Daisy Hill, a speed camera photographed a Toyota dual-cab utility motor vehicle, registration number 458-WII, travelling at a speed of 70 kilometres per hour in a 60-kilometre speed zone. An infringement notice dated 8 April 2022 was duly issued to the appellant, notifying a penalty of one demerit point and a penalty of $183. The infringement notice included a blank statutory declaration should the recipient choose to declare that they were not the driver of the motor vehicle at the time of the traffic infringement. The appellant never completed such statutory declaration and has not at any time asserted that she was not, in fact, the driver of the vehicle at the relevant time. The appellant chose not to pay the penalty of $183.
- [2]A complaint and summons were subsequently issued, alleging that on 30 March 2022 at Daisy Hill in the Magistrates Court’s District of Beenleigh the appellant, being the driver of a motor vehicle, namely a car, drove at a speed over the speed limit, namely 60 kilometres per hour, applying to the driver for the length of the road, namely Winnetts Road, Daisy Hill, where the said driver was driving and it was averred that the said car was a vehicle as defined in schedule 4 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (TORUM Act) and it was averred that the said Winnetts Road was a road as defined in schedule 4 of the TORUM Act, contrary to section 20 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management- Road Rules) Regulation 2009.
- [3]The matter came on for trial before the Magistrates Court at Beenleigh on 27 January 2023. Upon the appellant making pseudolegal assertions in response to the charge, the learned Magistrate entered a plea of not guilty on her behalf. The prosecution case was presented by way of certificates admissible pursuant to section 120 of the TORUM Act which proved the particulars of the offence. The appellant did not object to the admission of those certificates as evidence. The appellant had not foreshadowed any challenge to the accuracy of such evidence and made no submissions as to the merits of the charge.
- [4]Instead, when being called upon to present her defence, the appellant proceeded to make submissions in terms which have been recognised as typical of a particular type of pseudolaw commonly presented to the courts by unqualified persons, often identifying as adherents to “sovereign citizen” ideas: see Young, Hobbs and McIntyre, “The growth of pseudolaw and sovereign citizens in Aotearoa New Zealand courts” [2023] NZLJ 6; “A Kind of Magic: The Origins and Culture of ‘Pseudolaw’”, a paper delivered to the Queensland Magistrates’ State Conference 2022 on 26 May 2022 by His Honour Cash KC; R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216. They included assertions along the lines of the “strawman” argument often presented by such litigants.
- [5]A particular focus was put upon something which was referred to as the “12 presumptions of Roman law.” The appellant challenged the Magistrate that she openly rebuked, rejected and rebutted all 12 presumptions of Roman law and provided further detailed submissions as to those so-called presumptions of “Roman law Canon 3228”. The submissions were, I expect, to the Magistrate, and remain so to me, baffling. I know of no “Roman law Canon 3228” which is part of the law of Queensland. The asserted rebuttal, in its terms, did not seem to, in any way, go towards the merits of the charge before the Court. At the end of the day, I am left wondering what it all meant.
- [6]Ultimately, the learned Magistrate was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, on the basis of the evidentiary certificates and the rejection of the defendant’s arguments, insofar as the learned Magistrate was able to articulate them, of the guilt of the appellant of the offence. He fined her the penalty of $183 for the traffic infringement and ordered that she pay the costs of the summons of $107.95; therefore, a total of $290.95.
- [7]The appellant filed a notice of appeal in this Court pursuant to section 222 of the Justices Act 1886 against her conviction. The ground of appeal was stated as “The Magistrate refused to accept my position as executor and beneficiary”. An outline of submissions filed on 23 March 2023 stated as follows:
My name is Amy and I am a living woman, of sound mind, of god and from nature.
I am the beneficiary and executor of the (AMY JANE WELLS) TRUST, which was created through the birth registration process on (6th October 1976).
I am appealing the decision made by the Magistrate MAG-00132878/22(6) in the Beenleigh Magistrates Court on 27th January 2023 because:
1/ He refused to accept my position as beneficiary and executor.
2/ I have been governed without my consent.
3/ I formally challenged and rebutted the 12 Presumptions of Roman Law (Canon 3228) via an Affidavit, on the record. They were un-rebutted on the record, on the record and the Magistrate continued to proceed regardless. I did this also at the review mention.
4/ From The Twelve Presumptions Of Roman Law – CANON 3228:
Presumption Three – The Presumption of Public Oath is that;
All members of the Private Bar Guild, ACTING in the capacity of Public Officials, who have sworn a solemn oath, remain bound by that oath and therefore, bound to serve honestly, impartially and fairly, as dictated by their oath
Unless openly challenged and demanded, the PRESUMPTION stands that the Private Bar Guild members have functioned under their public oath, in contradiction to their guild oath.
IF CHALLENGED – such individuals MUST recuse themselves as having a conflict of interest and cannot possibly stand under their public oath.
5/ I rebutted (challenged) the presumption of Public Oath – the third of the Twelve Presumptions of Law. I asked the Magistrate on the record, “To whom do you swear your oath to? The Private Bar Guild or an Oath of Public Office?” To which he replied that he had never heard of that and that he swore his oath to the Queen?
So he did not prove me wrong, therefore, it is a conflict of interest and grounds for dismissal of this case, on the grounds that fraud has been perpetrated on the Court, myself and this case.
- [8]On the hearing of the appeal, the appellant has continued to rely upon her argument as to the 12 Presumptions of Roman law Canon 3228. As mentioned earlier, I find this argument perplexing and legally incoherent. Although I do not pretend to fully understand the argument, I am quite satisfied that it is legal nonsense and provides no possible grounds for allowing an appeal against her conviction. The other, more familiar, pseudolegal arguments as to the “strawman” personality, are the arguments that the appellant has not consented to the government or legislative authority, or that there is no contract demonstrating consent, such that she is not subject to the traffic law is obviously devoid of any merit and provide no possible ground of appeal against conviction.
- [9]The appellant also made submissions in a somewhat scattergun approach as to various reasons why the legislation passed by the Commonwealth and State parliaments is invalid, mostly familiar from previous pseudolegal litigation of this type, all clearly untenable and devoid of merit. I see no reason why further time of this Court should be wasted by dealing with any of those untenable arguments in any detail. Merely stating the terms of such arguments would be to underline their lack of merit.
- [10]The appellant appeared to mount some attack upon the jurisdiction of this Court too, but I am not at all clear how that would have assisted the appellant. In any event, she presented no argument of any legal coherence as to why this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear what her appeal was, calling upon the jurisdiction of this Court.
- [11]The appellant made submissions as to an apparent lack of impartiality of myself in hearing the appeal and assertions as to an abuse of process. Such submissions were entirely devoid of merit.
- [12]The appellant made submissions that she had made a “Calderbank offer” to the respondent to settle the matter, which, by operation of the “postal acceptance rule,” had either compromised the appeal or precluded the ability of the respondent to obtain any judgment in excess of such offer. It is, of course, trite to say that parties to an appeal of this type cannot compromise such. Even if parties make joint submissions as to an outcome, it is still a matter for the Court as to what orders it makes. In this case, insofar as the respondent is concerned, there has been no compromise on the matter. The appellant’s submissions to the contrary are devoid of merit.
- [13]Ultimately, the appellant made no submissions towards the merits of the appeal.
- [14]An appeal pursuant to section 222 of the Justices Act 1886 is an appeal by way of rehearing. An appellate court hearing an appeal by way of a rehearing must conduct a real review of the evidence and make up its own mind about the case, having regard to the evidence led in the Magistrates Court and determining for itself the facts of the case and the legal consequences that follow from such findings of fact.
- [15]I have made such a review of the evidence before the Magistrates Court. It appears to me that there was no reasonable conclusion open to the learned Magistrate other than that the charge was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon a review of the evidence, I am also satisfied with the proof of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
- [16]The appellant has not established any error of fact or law by the learned Magistrate. The appeal must be dismissed.
- [17]There is no reason why the appellant should not pay the costs sought by the respondent, having chosen to litigate an appeal that was totally devoid of any merit.
- [18]It is most unfortunate that the deluded and untenable pseudolegal arguments contended by the appellant appear to have been adopted by her, whether upon her own part or the advice of others. Her unfortunate decision to defend the charge in the Magistrates Court on the basis of such deluded ideas and to appeal the decision of the learned Magistrate in this Court has resulted in a modest traffic fine of $183 escalating to a financial burden more than 10 times as much.
- [19]The orders of the Court are:
- The appeal is dismissed;
- The appellant will pay the costs of the respondent in the sum of $1,800.