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Jones v Commissioner of Police[2024] QDC 82

Jones v Commissioner of Police[2024] QDC 82

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Jones v The Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 82

PARTIES:

TAZMAN PERRIER JONES

(appellant)

v

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

(respondent)

FILE NO:

3855 of 2023

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED EX TEMPORE ON:

3 April 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

3 April 2024

JUDGE:

Morzone KC DCJ

ORDER:

  1. 1.
    Appeal allowed;
  1. 2.
    The sentence and orders of the Magistrates Court made in Brisbane on 2 December 2023 are set aside and substituted with the following sentence and orders: 
  1. a.
    For the offence of unlawful use of a motor vehicle at night - 12 months of imprisonment;
  1. b.
    For the offence of drive motor vehicle whilst disqualified - three months’ imprisonment, and the defendant is disqualified from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for two years.  
  1. c.
    The terms of imprisonment and orders for both charges will be served concurrently;
  1. d.
    The whole of the pre‑sentence custody of 124 days from 1 December 2023 to 2 April 2024 is declared to be imprisonment served under the sentences, and the registrar is directed to inform the Commissioner of this declaration;
  1. e.
    A parole release date is set at 3 April 2024 after serving 124 days with conditions of parole pursuant to s 200 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) and a direction that the appellant report to the Parole and Probation Office of Corrective Services at Rockhampton or such other location as directed by Parole and Probation within 36 hours of his release.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – ERROR OF LAW – review pursuant to s 222 Justices Act 1886 – conviction – unlawfully using a motor vehicle in the night and a driving without a licence – mode of hearing of appeal – whether sentence manifestly excessive – benefit of youth – criminal history.

LEGISLATION:

Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 222, 223(1) & 227

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld)

CASES:

Douglass v The Queen (2012) 290 ALR 699

House v The King [1936] 55 CLR 499 R v Kelley [2018] QCA 18.

Kentwell v The Queen [2014] 256 CLR 60

R v Wano; Ex parte Attorney‑General [2018] QCA 117

Russell v Commissioner of Police [2018] QDC 183

SOLICITORS:

T Schafer of Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant.

Christensen N of The Office of Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent.

Summary

  1. [1]
    On the 2nd of December 2023 the appellant was convicted on his own pleas of guilty in the Magistrates Court held in Brisbane of one charge of unlawfully using a motor vehicle in the night and a charge of driving without a licence that had been disqualified by Court order committed on the previous morning on 1 December 2023.
  2. [2]
    With the benefit of representation by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Service on the first return date, in the Saturday morning arrest Court, he was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment for the first charge and three months’ imprisonment coupled with the disqualification of two years from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for the second charge.  The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, and a parole release date was fixed at a point of serving five months of actual imprisonment, being the 1st of May 2024.
  3. [3]
    The appellant now appeals his sentence on the grounds that it is excessive because:
  1. The learned sentencing Magistrate erred by sentencing the appellant on the basis that he was “beyond the point of taking youth into consideration or the prospects of rehabilitation because they don’t seem to exist”; and
  2. The learned sentencing Magistrate erred by placing undue weight on the appellant’s criminal history which resulted in a sentence that was disproportionate to the gravity of the offending.
  1. [4]
    It is argued that, whilst the sentence in respect of the second charge was within range, the sentence of 15 months of imprisonment for the charge of unlawful use of the motor vehicle ought to be set aside and substituted with a sentence of nine months imprisonment with a parole release date set at a third of the sentence.  Notwithstanding that there is no active challenge to the sentence imposed on the disqualified driving offence, matters of totality ought to be taken into account in that respect.
  2. [5]
    The appeal is conceded regarding the remarks of the learned Magistrate during the course of exchange, the subject of the first ground, and an apparent absence of such consideration in the sentencing remarks except by the broad reference to sections 9 and 11 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld).  It is submitted by the respondent that in the re-exercise of this Court’s discretion, a sentence of 12 months imprisonment with a parole release date set at one-third of the sentence would be appropriate.
  3. [6]
    On my review, the sentence is too high and exceeds the permissible range for the offending.  For these reasons, it seems to me that it is excessive due to one or both of the identified errors and requires correction by the re-exercise of this Court’s discretion.  Accordingly, I will allow the appeal.

Appeal

  1. [7]
    The appeal is made pursuant to section 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).  Pursuant to section 223, the appeal is by way of rehearing on the original evidence and any new evidence adduced by leave if there are special grounds for giving leave.  None is sought here.
  2. [8]
    The rehearing requires this court to conduct a real review of the evidence before it, rather than a complete fresh hearing, and make up its own mind about the case.  Its function is to consider each of the grounds of appeal having regard to the evidence and determine for itself the facts of the case and the legal consequences that follow from such findings.  In doing so, it ought to pay due regard to any advantage held by the sentencing Magistrate, which is, of course, dissipated given the nature of the hearing as distinct from a trial.
  3. [9]
    By operation of section 222, subsection (2), paragraph (c) the appellant can “only appeal under this section on the sole ground that a fine, penalty, forfeiture or punishment was excessive or inadequate”; that is, “beyond the acceptable scope of judicial discretion” or “so outside the appropriate range as to demonstrate inconsistency and unfairness”.  To succeed, the appellant must establish some legal, factual or discretionary error.  Such an error may be specifically identifiable, as contended here, but an otherwise undiscernible error may be inferred from the imposition of an excessive sentence.
  4. [10]
    The decisions of House v The King [1936] 55 CLR 499 at 504 and 505 and Kentwell v The Queen [2014] 256 CLR 60 distinguish cases of specific error and indiscernible excess or inadequacy, as the case may be.  In the case of specific error, the appellate court’s power to intervene is enlivened and it is duty bound to resentence unless in a separate and independent exercise of its discretion it concludes that no different sentence should be passed.  By contrast, absent identifiable specific error, the appellant court would only interfere if it concludes that the sentence falls outside the permissible range of sentences for the offender and the offence.
  5. [11]
    Even if this court finds that the sentence was at the extreme end of a permissible range or has a different opinion about the way in which the discretion should be exercised, these are not sufficient justifications for review.  It must be shown that the discretion miscarried resulting in an excessive sentence.  In that context, it may be vitiated by an error of principle or by a failure to appreciate a salient feature or there is otherwise a miscarriage of justice.

Sentence proceedings

  1. [12]
    The sentence proceeded on agreed facts contended by the prosecutor backgrounded by the appellant’s criminal and traffic history and his other antecedents.  The precursor offending occurred between 2.30 am and 2.40 am on 1 December 2023 in the context of unknown offenders having broken into a house and stolen the car, being a black Amarok dual cab utility, which was reported to police.
  2. [13]
    At about 10.20 pm on 1 December 2023, police were patrolling when they saw the car being driven.  A short time later they were assisted by air surveillance, and then about 10.45 pm the car went into a car park at a hotel, where it was parked and the defendant left it and walked towards the hotel entrance.  He walked through the bottle shop at the hotel, around the back suites towards the pool area.  With further assistance of the Dog Squad he was found hiding in bushes around that place, at which time he was arrested.
  3. [14]
    Whilst he merely provided his name and declined to answer other questions, he nevertheless told police where he had discarded the key to the car and it was located accordingly.  At no stage did he have permission to use the car.
  4. [15]
    Subsequent checks of his licensing status showed that he was then disqualified for a period of two years until 2 May 2024 pursuant to an order of the Magistrates Court in Brisbane made on 3 May 2022.  There was no emergency to justify his conduct otherwise.  This offending also occurred during the period of a probation order which was imposed on him by the Magistrates Court at Beenleigh on 31st of August 2023 about domestic violence offending.
  5. [16]
    The prosecutor contended that a sentence of 20 months ought to be imposed, with a parole release date at one-third of that sentence. The prosecutor relied upon the appellant’s lengthy and relevant criminal history, including eight convictions of unlawfully using a motor vehicle and other multiple property offences combined with a commensurate record of traffic offending.
  6. [17]
    The appellant was 20 years old at the time of the offending and sentence.  However, by that stage of his young life he had been convicted of 67 offences across 10 different Courts since May 2021.  Apart from the obvious relevance of like offending, his offending does include other property offences, such as trespass entering or remaining in a dwelling, attempted and actual burglary, receiving tainted property, stealing, fraud, dishonest application of property of another, attempting to do so, as well as other offences indicative of his failure to comply with orders or directions, the latter being relevant to his behaviour after leaving the car.  The prosecutor contended that the appellant was a recidivist offender consequent upon that history.
  7. [18]
    The prosecutor ultimately submitted that imprisonment ought to be imposed in the vicinity of two years, for the appellant to serve one-third, with release after eight months, being in July the following year. 
  8. [19]
    The learned Magistrate immediately recognised that:

“Even with his history, that would be a heavy sentence, probably not entirely out of range."

  1. [20]
    However, having expressed that view, the learned Magistrate also vocalised his preliminary view that actual imprisonment was warranted, before hearing much of the defence solicitor submissions, His Honour remarked:

“Look, when you reach this stage when you’re 20, you accumulate seven pages of repeated burglaries, unlawful use of motor vehicles and a range of other offences, when you’ve been given eligibility dates in the past because you’ve committed whilst on parole – I note in May 2022 he was given 12‑month sentences for unlawful use of motor vehicles with a parole date, a parole eligibility date.  He was back November ’22.  He got another nine‑month sentence.  It was probably moderated because he was also on parole, so he had another parole eligibility date, and he’s back again today.  I mean, this bloke at 20 is quite correctly classified in my view as a recidivist offender ... he’s beyond the point of taking youth into consideration or the prospects of rehabilitation because they don’t seem to exist.”

  1. [21]
    Those remarks seem to have surprised the defence solicitor, which is not surprising given that he was acting as duty lawyer, this was the first return date of the matter in the Saturday morning arrest Court, and the context of such a day.  Nevertheless, he persisted, providing the Court with the defendant’s antecedents and made submissions accordingly.  He submitted that the defendant was 20 years old with a grade 8 education and currently on JobSeeker allowance.  He described the defendant’s childhood in this way:

“His father passed away when he was nine years old, and he moved from South Australia with his family approximately 10 years ago.  The Department of Child Services took his siblings because his mother suffered from alcoholism and schizophrenia.”

  1. [22]
    It could be inferred from his representation by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Service that the defendant is of Aboriginal or Torres Strait islander descent.  However, that was not expressly conveyed to the court.
  2. [23]
    The contention of the defence solicitor was for a shorter head sentence coupled with immediate release on parole or, alternatively, a shorter head sentence, perhaps one year, with release at one-third.  The latter submission drew this remark from the learned Magistrate - “Yes.  Well, that’s too low, in my view.”
  3. [24]
    Those sentiments expressed during the course of submissions were not largely expressly repeated in the sentencing reasons but were clearly consistent with the reasons and the sentence imposed as follows:

“I take into account the nature and circumstances of the charges before me.  I note the pleas of guilty.  A reduction of penalty is given in recognition of the plea.  I have already made comment on your atrocious criminal and traffic history.  You hit the correct status in my view or the correct description in my view as being a recidivist offender at 20.  You have been convicted of similar offences on numerous occasions in the past.  I have had regard to the plea.  A reduction in penalty is given in recognition of the plea.

I have had regard to the relevant matters in sections 9 and 11 of the Penalties and Sentences Act, and in particular I have turned my mind to section 9, subsection (2), paragraph (a).  I am satisfied that you should be sentenced to terms of imprisonment.  For the unlawful use you are convicted and sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment.  In relation to the disqualified driving you are convicted and sentenced for three months and disqualified for two years.  That sentence will run concurrent with the 15‑month sentence.  I make a pre‑sentence declaration of two days.  I fix a parole release date backdating it until yesterday, that is the 1st of May 2024.”

  1. [25]
    Whilst the content and detail of reasons will vary according to the nature of the jurisdiction and the circumstances, the absence of sufficiently detailed reasons identifying the factual basis as well as the principles of law applied in the main factual findings relied upon by the sentencing Magistrate[1] make it more difficult for a review on appeal.  Sufficiency of reasons serves to properly inform the parties to understand the basis of the decision, including the appellate Court's assistance in discharging its statutory duty on appeal from such a decision.[2]
  2. [26]
    In this case the appellant relies upon grounds drawn by the exposure of thinking from the remarks made during the course of submissions.  There is an apparent overlap in the grounds.  Nevertheless, they warrant further consideration here.

Did the learned Magistrate fail to properly consider the appellant’s youth and prospects of rehabilitation?

  1. [27]
    It is submitted that the sentencing miscarried because the learned Magistrate gave no weight to the appellant’s youthful age, which was compounded by the expression about the non-existence of his rehabilitative prospects. 
  2. [28]
    It seems that His Honour’s remarks, which I have set out in full above, provide a compilation of the appellant’s presentation with the criminal history and traffic record and performance on past sentences.  As to matters of criminal history, I deal with that later, but there is again an overlap of considerations for this ground.
  3. [29]
    It seems to me that the sentiments expressed by the learned Magistrate in this regard directly contradict both the sentencing guidelines and the mandatory considerations the subject of the governing principles contained in s 9(1) and (2) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). 
  4. [30]
    Section 9(1) includes as one of the only purposes for which sentences may be imposed on an offender that: “(b) to provide conditions in the Court’s order that the Court considers will help the offender to be rehabilitated”.  And, s.9(2)(f) mandates that regard be had to: “...the offender’s character, age and intellectual capacity”.
  5. [31]
    Longstanding principles recognise that age, particularly youthful age, is considered as a mitigating factor on sentence, primarily because of the greater opportunity to effect principles of rehabilitation.[3]  Of course such considerations depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.  Here it is plain that the appellant is not a first‑time or relatively infrequent offender at his youthful age of 20.
  6. [32]
    Whilst the learned Magistrate expressly identifies the appellant’s age of 20 years, he also expressly and only seems to consider the guilty plea as a mitigating factor.  So much is repeated in the short reasons.  His antecedents, which otherwise inform consideration of rehabilitation, were not the subject of express acknowledgment in the reasons, including his education, apparent intellect, his growing up in the absence of his father from nine years old and the need to move interstate with the subsequent care under the Department of Child Services.  Such matters inform the Court of the appellant’s circumstances and prospects of rehabilitation in his youth.
  7. [33]
    A failure to explicitly consider the appellant’s youthfulness in that way required by s 9(1)(b) and (f), in my respectful view bespeaks an error in the exercise of the sentencing discretion.  Indeed, it is not merely an absence that is concerning but, rather, the imposition of the sentence in furtherance of the remarks made during the exchange in submissions.

Did the learned Magistrate give undue weight to the criminal history?

  1. [34]
    It is trite law that the appellant’s criminal history is a relevant matter for properly exercising the sentencing discretion.  In particular, s 9(10) provides:

“In determining the appropriate sentence for an offender who has 1 or more previous convictions, the court must treat each previous conviction as an aggravating factor if the court considers that it can reasonably be treated as such having regard to:

  1. the nature of the previous conviction and its relevance to the current offence; and
  2. the time that has elapsed since the conviction.”
  1. [35]
    Subsection 9(11) provides:

“Despite subsection (10), the sentence imposed must not be disproportionate to the gravity of the current offence.”

  1. [36]
    Clearly enough, the provisions reflect the common law as it stood and proclaimed in Veen v R (No. 2) as follows:

“The antecedent criminal history of an offender is a factor which may be taken into account in determining the sentence to be imposed, but it cannot be given such weight as to lead to the imposition of a penalty which is disproportionate to the gravity of the instant offence.  To do so would be to impose a fresh penalty for past offences ... The antecedent criminal history is relevant, however, to show whether the instant offence is an uncharacteristic aberration or whether the offender has manifested in his commission of the instant offence a continuing attitude of disobedience of the law.  In the latter case, retribution, deterrence and protection of society may all indicate that a more severe penalty is warranted.  It is legitimate to take account of the antecedent criminal history when it illuminates the moral culpability of the offender in the instant case, or shows his dangerous propensity or shows a need to impose condign punishment to deter the offender and other offenders from committing further offences of a like kind.”

  1. [37]
    As I said, the appellant has an extensive criminal history, including prior like offences since May 2021.  On 22 October 2021 he was sentenced for multiple property offences, including burglary and committing an indictable offence, attempted burglary offences, receiving tainted property and stealing, alongside, more relevantly, four unlawful use of motor vehicle, aircraft or vessels use committed on 2 August 2021, 3 October 2021, 7 October 2021 and 11 October 2021.  Also on 2 August 2021 he committed the offence of dangerous operation of a vehicle.  He was variously sentenced to terms of imprisonment with a parole release date after serving seven days in pre‑sentence custody.  On 3 May 2022 the appellant was further dealt with for multiple offences of a similar kind, such as multiple burglaries, attempted burglaries, fraud, dishonestly obtained property, stealing and receiving tainted property.  More relevantly, there are four further offences of unlawful use of a motor vehicle, aircraft or vessels‑use committed on 17 January 2022, 21 of January 2022, 25 January 2022 and 1 February 2022.  Again he was sentenced to imprisonment with a declaration of serving time in custody but with a parole eligibility date set at 29 July 2022, having spent 92 days in pre‑sentence custody. 
  2. [38]
    From this history, it seems that the learned Magistrate formed the view that the appellant’s rehabilitation prospects were non-existent.
  3. [39]
    When a closer analysis is undertaken of the appellant’s criminal history, it is demonstrable of multiple and regular offences about property of others more broadly.  However, offences of a like nature occur within confined periods.  Despite his youth, it is also apparent that the appellant has been the subject of custodial sentences in circumstances where it is difficult to see, nor was the court informed by, any report about the practical opportunities to receive rehabilitative measures subject to probation or parole.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how and when the appellant was the subject of rehabilitative measures in his relatively short adult life to the date of the subject sentence.  In my view, such a consideration is more indicative of a greater need for rehabilitation beyond the institutional confinement of a correctional centre.  However, in the course of such consideration, there must be an adherence to the aggravation of past relevant offending and matters of retribution, deterrence and protection of the community warranting a greater sentence.
  4. [40]
    Regarding the learned Magistrate’s remarks and characterisation of the appellant’s past offending and the nature and extent of the offending before him, it seems that his Honour did allow the criminal history to overwhelm his sentencing discretion.  In that way, in my respectful view, I think the learned Magistrate erroneously allowed the matters both particularly and generally relevant past offending to guide or affect him such that he failed to consider a material consideration of youth and prospects of rehabilitation, which resulted in an excessive sentence outside the permissible range in the circumstances of this case.

Is the sentence otherwise excessive? 

  1. [41]
    Excess may be exposed absent any identifiable error, although I have found such errors here, by considering all of the matters that are relevant to fixing the sentence, particularly the nature of the offending and the sentences imposed in the most closely comparable cases.
  2. [42]
    Here, the court below, and now on appeal, was not greatly assisted by comparable cases given the scope and nature of the offending.  Ultimately, the appropriate sentence will necessarily depend on the circumstances of the offending and the degree of culpability of the appellant.  In this case, it is instructive to look at the appellant’s particular circumstances and the combination of offences.  His offending occurs against a background of the appellant’s severe disadvantage, low education, an efforts but poor job prospects; the loss of a father figure at nine years old, movement interstate when about 10 years old and the appellant’s plight under the care of the Department of Child Services because of his mother’s ill‑health.  All of these, albeit in short compass, are in the context of the appellant’s Aboriginality; that is, a further consideration under s 9(2)(p) of submissions made by a representative of the Community Justice Group in the offender’s community, but that was neither sought nor capable of being provided in the short time of dealing with the sentence.  It is likely, but still unknown, that such matters could have cast light on the appellant’s past contact with the criminal justice system.
  3. [43]
    Focusing on the matters before the Court here, in my respectful view, the learned sentencing Magistrate erred in exercising the sentencing discretion by acting upon the wrong principle that the appellant was beyond the point of considering youth and that his prospects of rehabilitation were non-existent. He allowed himself to be overwhelmed by the appellant’s criminal history, including indicia as to prospects of rehabilitation.
  4. [44]
    In the result it seems to me that the indicative sentencing range was in the order of imprisonment of 12 to 15 months in the ordinary course, but with appropriate consideration of the appellant’s youth and prospects of rehabilitation in these circumstances, the sentence ought fall in the lower end of that range.  This could be reflected by an earlier release on parole than the usual one‑third or otherwise a reduction of the head sentence.
  5. [45]
    However, in the result here, the learned Magistrate imposed a head sentence of 15 months imprisonment, taking into account matters of totality with the concurrent sentence of three months but with no apparent reduction of the head sentence or an otherwise earlier release on parole.  That has resulted in a manifestly excessive sentence outside the permissible range in the circumstances of this case.

Resentence. 

  1. [46]
    Having reached that conclusion, it is incumbent on this court to re-exercise the discretion.  The only purpose for which a sentence may be imposed by virtue of s 9(1) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) to punish an offender to an extent or in a way that is just in all of the circumstances, facilitates avenues of rehabilitation, deters the offender and others from committing a similar offence, makes it clear that the community denounces the conduct in the offending and protects the community.  The relevant factors to which the Court must have regard are in subsequent subsections of s 9 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), in particular those matters about which I have already remarked above.
  2. [47]
    It is trite to say that considerations of youthfulness and rehabilitation are relevant here.  The appropriate sentence will depend on the particular circumstances of the offending and the degree of culpability of the appellant.  The nature of a penalty, albeit beyond the threshold of the presumption that imprisonment would not otherwise be imposed as a first measure, still sounds loudly in this case that time subject of parole on release will provide greater opportunity and capacity for rehabilitation.  The gravity of this offending can also be gleaned by the relative minimum and maximum penalties,  Due regard must be had to the factors of youth and the need for personal deterrence in light of the appellant’s criminal history and commensurate traffic history.  For this offending it is also relevant that imprisonment should only be imposed as a last resort and a sentence that allows the appellant to stay in the community is preferable.  In the circumstances of this case, actual custody is warranted to reflect matters of deterrence and denunciation.
  3. [48]
    The appellant is an Indigenous young man aged 20 years old at the time of the offending and at sentence.  His childhood has been challenging and one of disadvantage.  His past record of adult offending reflects his errant ways of survival contrary to the rules of society and damaging to those who have been impacted.  Those features continue to be relevant to the current offending.  He left school at about grade 8, and his job prospects seem poor as he continues on JobSeeker support benefits.  His unstable lifestyle and lack of certainty and support is reflected in his reckless and criminal behaviour revealed in his criminal and traffic histories.
  4. [49]
    The appellant has now served 124 days in custody, from 1 December 2023 to 2 April 2024 inclusive.  That equates to a little over four months in actual custody. 
  5. [50]
    Having regard to the adherence of the sentence imposed for the second charge of drive motor vehicle whilst disqualified of three months imprisonment and approaching the sentence with totality, it seems to me a concurrent sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment is just and appropriate and not too crushing and disproportionate.  Such a sentence reflects a reduction at the top of that range in relation to matters of youth and rehabilitation.  Having approached the sentence in that way, I think it is appropriate to set a parole release date at approximately one-third.  Since the appellant has already served slightly in excess of one-third, the parole release date is set at today.

Order. 

  1. [51]
    For these reasons, I will allow the appeal and set aside the orders made by the Magistrates Court on the 1st of December 2023 and substitute the following sentence and orders.
  2. [52]
    Therefore, the orders will be: 
  1. Appeal allowed;
  2. The sentence and orders of the Magistrates Court made in Brisbane on 2 December 2023 are set aside and substituted with the following sentence and orders: 
    1. for the offence of unlawful use of a motor vehicle at night - 12 months of imprisonment;
    2. for the offence of drive motor vehicle whilst disqualified - three months’ imprisonment, and the defendant is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's license for two years.  
    3. the terms of imprisonment and orders for both charges will be served concurrently;
    4. the whole of the pre-sentence custody of 124 days from 1 December 2023 to 2 April 2024 is declared to be imprisonment served under the sentences, and the registrar is directed to inform the Commissioner of this declaration;
    5. a parole release date is set at 3 April 2024 after serving 124 days with conditions of parole pursuant to section 200 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) and a direction that the appellant report to the parole and probation office of Corrective Services at Rockhampton or such other location as directed by Parole and Probation within 36 hours of his release.

Jones v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 82

Judge DP Morzone KC

Footnotes

[1]  Cf. Douglass v The Queen (2012) 290 ALR 699 at 702, [8]

[2]Justices Act 1886 (Qld), ss 222 & 223.  Cf. Douglass v The Queen (2012) 290 ALR 699 at 702, [14]

[3]  See, for example, Russell v Commissioner of Police [2018] QDC 183 at 17 to 29; R v Wano; Ex parte Attorney‑General [2018] QCA 117 at 49 to 50; and R v Kelley [2018] QCA 18 at 47 and 48

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Jones v The Commissioner of Police

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Jones v Commissioner of Police

  • MNC:

    [2024] QDC 82

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Morzone KC DCJ

  • Date:

    03 Apr 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Douglass v The Queen (2012) 290 ALR 699
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2012) 290 ALR 699
Cite 2 - (2012) 290 ALR 699
Cite 3 - (2012) 290 ALR 699
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Cite 2 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Kentwell v The Queen [2014] 256 CLR 60
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] 256 CLR 60
Cite 2 - [2014] 256 CLR 60
R v Kelley [2018] QCA 18
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QCA 18
Cite 2 - [2018] QCA 18
R v Wano; ex parte Attorney-General [2018] QCA 117
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QCA 117
Cite 2 - [2018] QCA 117
Russell v Commissioner of Police [2018] QDC 183
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QDC 183
Cite 2 - [2018] QDC 183

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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