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  4. John Vincent Hitzke v The Director of Public Prosecutions, The Appeal Costs Board & The Attorney-General of Queensland - [2018] QDCPR 10

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John Vincent Hitzke v The Director of Public Prosecutions, The Appeal Costs Board & The Attorney-General of Queensland[2018] QDCPR 10

John Vincent Hitzke v The Director of Public Prosecutions, The Appeal Costs Board & The Attorney-General of Queensland[2018] QDCPR 10

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Hitzke v Director of Public Prosecutions and Ors [2018] QDCPR 10

PARTIES:

John Vincent Hitzke

(Applicant)

v

The Director of Public Prosecutions

(First Respondent)

and

The Appeal Costs Board

(Second Respondent)

and

The Attorney-General of Queensland

(Third Respondent)

FILE NO:

Indictment 1135/17

DIVISION:

Criminal

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

5 April 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

21 March 2018

JUDGE:

Moynihan QC DCJ

ORDER

  1. The application for a certificate under s 22(2)(c) of the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1973 (Qld) is granted.
  2. The application for a stay of the indictment until the Crown compensates the applicant for the costs thrown away by the adjournment is dismissed.
  3. The application for a permanent stay of the indictment is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – COSTS – COSTS CERTIFICATES – where the applicant is charged with one count of fraud under s 408C(1)(c) and 408C(2)(d) Criminal Code (Qld) – where the applicant’s trial was adjourned so that the Crown could obtain further evidence – where the adjournment was not attributable in any way to the act, neglect or default of the applicant or his legal advisors – where the applicant applies for a certificate under s 22(2)(c) Appeal Costs Fund 1973 (Qld) – whether the court should exercise the authority to grant a certificate 

CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – ADJOURNMENT, STAY OF PROCEEDINGS OR ORDER RESTRAINING PROCEEDINGS – STAY OF PROCEEDINGS – GENERALLY - where the applicant seeks a stay of the indictment until the Crown compensates him for the costs thrown away by an adjournment - whether the court should grant a stay of the indictment

CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – ADJOURNMENT, STAY OF PROCEEDINGS OR ORDER RESTRAINING PROCEEDINGS – STAY OF PROCEEDINGS – GENERALLY - where the applicant seeks a permanent stay of the indictment – whether the continuation of the trial is so unfair or oppressive so as to constitute an abuse of process – whether the court should exercise its inherent power to order a permanent stay of the indictment 

Appeal Costs Fund Act 1973 (Qld), s 22(1)(c)
Criminal Code (Qld), s 408C, 592, 597C, 660, 662
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256, cited 
Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross & Ors (2012) 87 ALJR 131, cited
Jago v The District Court of New South Wales and Ors (1989) 168 CLR 23, cited 

Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534, cited
R v Gibson [2016] QDC 175, cited 
R v His Honour Judge Kimmins; ex parte Attorney-General[1980] Qd R 524, cited 
R v Khoury [2003] QDC 235, cited 
R v Lacey and Lacey [2009] QDC 303, cited 
R v Lewis; ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 2 Qd R 294, cited
R v WAH [2009] QCA 263, cited  
R v Watts [2011] QDC 194, cited 
Re Powell (1894) 6 QLJ 36, cited
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 112 ALR 289, cited 
William v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509, cited

COUNSEL:

A Morris QC with I Munsie for the Applicant

C Heaton QC with K L Overell for the First Respondent

J Farnden for the Second Respondent

C Hartigan for the Third Respondent

SOLICITORS:

Australian Law Partners for the Applicant

Director of Public Prosecutions for the First Respondent

Crown Law for the Second Respondent

The Attorney-General of Queensland for the Third Respondent

  1. [1]
    The applicant is charged on indictment number 1135 of 2017 with one count of fraud under s 408C(1)(c) and 2(d) of the Criminal Code (Qld) (the Code). It is alleged that he dishonestly induced BOQ Equipment Finance Limited (the complainant) to deliver in the order of $780,000 to another person. 
  2. [2]
    The hearing of the applicant’s trial commenced on Monday 29 January 2018.  He was arraigned on that day. On Wednesday 31 January 2018 (the second day of the trial), the Crown applied for an adjournment of the trial under s 592 of the Code in order to obtain additional evidence to prove an element of the offence. 
  3. [3]
    After balancing a number of considerations I was satisfied that, in the interests of justice, it was a proper case to allow the Crown’s application for an adjournment. The reason for the adjournment was not attributable in any way to the act, neglect or default of the applicant or his legal advisors. It was entirely the fault of the Crown that the hearing of the trial stopped at that point. The proceeding was put off to the criminal law list for the allocation of a new trial date before me or another judge.
  4. [4]
    The applicant applies for: a certificate under s 22(2)(c) of the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1973 (Qld) (the ACFA); alternatively, a stay of the indictment until the Crown compensates him for the costs thrown away by the adjournment; alternatively, a permanent stay of the indictment. I will deal with each in turn.
  5. [5]
    First, the applicant contends that the requirements of s 22(2)(c) of the ACFA are satisfied and that I should grant a certificate. 
  6. [6]
    The common law principle in relation to criminal proceedings is that the Crown neither pays nor receives costs: see Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 557. That principle cannot be taken away except by express words or necessary implication in a statute: see Re Powell (1894) 6 QLJ 36 at 38 per Griffith CJ. The criminal law in Queensland is codified, and a specific power to award costs is provided for in Chapter 65, sections 660 and 662 of the Code. That power is not engaged in this case. 
  7. [7]
    Further, in R v His Honour Judge Kimmins; ex parte Attorney-General [1980] Qd R 524, the Full Court considered whether a District Court judge had the power to make an order that the Crown pay the costs of an adjournment of a trial in the courts criminal jurisdiction.  Justice Douglas, with whom W.B. Campbell and Andrews JJ agreed, held in relation to the District Court of Queensland Act 1967-1976 and District Court Rules 1968: “Nowhere in either of those Parts of the Act or Rules does it appear that the prerogative right of the Crown not to pay costs is taken away by express words or necessary implication”. The order for costs was quashed.
  8. [8]
    The ACFA allows for costs to be paid by the Crown in criminal proceedings only in very specific circumstances.
  9. [9]
    Section 22 of the ACFA relevantly provides: 

“(1) …

  (2) Where after the commencement of this Act—

(a) …. ; or

(b)…. ; or

(c) the hearing of any civil or criminal proceeding is discontinued and a new trial ordered by the presiding judge, magistrate or justice for a reason not attributable in any way to the act, neglect or default, in the case of civil proceedings, of any of the parties thereto or their legal representatives, or, in the case of criminal proceedings, of the accused or the accused’s legal representatives, and the presiding judge, magistrate or justice grants a certificate (which certificate the presiding judge, magistrate or justice is hereby authorised to grant)—

  1. (i)
    in the case of civil proceedings— …; or
  2. (ii)
    in the case of criminal proceedings—to the accused stating the reason why the proceedings were discontinued and a new trial ordered and that the reason was not attributable in any way to the act, neglect or default of the accused or the accused’s legal representatives;

any party to the civil proceedings or the accused in the criminal proceedings or the appellant, as the case may be, who pays or is ordered to pay additional costs or on whose behalf additional costs are paid or ordered to be paid by reason of the new trial shall be entitled to be paid from the fund the costs the board considers have been thrown away or partly thrown away by the person or on the person’s behalf in the proceedings.

  1. (3)
    …
  2. (4)
    …
  3. (5)
    For the purposes of this section, where in criminal proceedings a presiding judge, magistrate or justice directs that the proceedings being heard be discontinued with a view to other criminal proceedings based on the facts alleged against the accused being instituted, it shall be deemed that a new trial is ordered.”
  1. [10]
    In construing s 22(2)(c) of the ACFA it is important to keep in mind the words of French CJ and Hayne J in Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross & Ors (2012) 87 ALJR 131 at [23]: 

“It is as well to begin consideration of this issue by re-stating some basic principles. It is convenient to do that by reference to the reasons of the plurality in Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue: 

This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.” (Footnotes omitted)

  1. [11]
    The apparent purpose of s 22 of the ACFA is to allow the defendant in a criminal trial to be compensated for their reasonable costs thrown away in circumstances where, through no fault on their part, their trial does not continue, so that they are not unfairly subjected to the financial burden of a new trial. Section 22(2)(a) of the ACFA is engaged when the criminal proceeding is aborted due to the death or ill health of the judicial officer or by disagreement on the part of the jury. Section 22(2)(c) is engaged where: first, the hearing of any criminal proceeding is discontinued; and secondly, a new trial is ordered; and thirdly, it is for a reason not attributable in any way to the act, neglect or default of the accused or the accused’s legal representatives. In that event the judge is authorised, not mandated, to grant a certificate. The authority must be exercised judicially.
  2. [12]
    A ‘criminal proceeding’ is not defined in the ACFA but the requirement for a ‘hearing’ works to limit the operation of the section to where the matter is presented before a tribunal i.e. the trial. The condition that the criminal proceeding be ‘discontinued’ requires the hearing to have commenced and then ceased, terminated or stopped.  The term ‘discontinued’ is not defined in the ACFA, but its ordinary meaning is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary 6th Edition (2013) to mean: 1. To cause to cease; put an end to. 2. …  3. Law to terminate or abandon (a suit etc.)… 4. To come to an end or stop…  
  3. [13]
    Section 597C of the Code provides that the trial is deemed to begin and the accused person is deemed to be brought to trial when the person is called upon to plead to the indictment, and to say whether he or she is guilty or not guilty of the charge: see R v Lewis; ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 2 Qd R 294 at 302-303, 307 and R v WAH [2009] QCA 263.
  4. [14]
    Section 22(2)(c) is not engaged when the defendant has not been arraigned: see R v Dinh & Anor [2015] QSC 282; R v Lacey and Lacey [2009] QDC 303 and R v Watts [2011] QDC 194. In Lacey, Judge Rafter SC made clear at [17]: “…the trial that has not commenced, cannot be said to have been discontinued”.  In response to a submission that the defendant be arraigned before the proceeding was adjourned His Honour observed: “In my view, even if the defendants had been arraigned, that would not necessarily mean that the trial was ‘discontinued and a new trial ordered’… The mere arraignment of the defendants would not mean that the trial had commenced in a practical sense.”  It is clear that for the hearing of the trial to be discontinued it must have actually, not just technically, commenced. R v Khoury [2003] QDC 235 and R v Gibson [2016] QDC 175 are examples of cases in the latter category where the defendant had been arraigned but the hearing of the trial was not expected to start, and had not actually started, when the judge heard the application for an adjournment. I agree that adjournments allowed after an arraignment but before the hearing of the trial actually commences do not constitute a discontinuance of the hearing of the trial. However, where the hearing of the trial has actually commenced in a practical sense then it is the nature and effect of the act on the hearing, not its name, which is determinative. There are ordinarily adjournments before and during the hearing of a trial that cause delay but do not stop the hearing. But where the effect of allowing an application for an adjournment made during the hearing of the actual trial means the trial cannot, and does not, continue and it is to begin afresh at a different time before the same or different judge then in my view the hearing has been discontinued and a new trial must begin within the meaning in the section.
  5. [15]
    In the present case, the applicant is funding his own defence and is represented by Queen’s Counsel and a junior. The applicant’s trial was listed for hearing on 29 January 2018 and was estimated to run five to 10 days. The parties appeared at a trial review on 19 January 2018 and the trial remained as listed.  The applicant attended court on 29 January 2018 for the purposes of his trial. The applicant’s trial commenced on 29 January 2018 when he was arraigned in the absence of the jury panel and pleaded not guilty. His co-offender pleaded guilty. The applicant’s trial was adjourned for a short time so that his co-offender could be sentenced. When the applicant’s trial resumed I heard legal argument concerning two applications: one by the defendant, the other by the Crown. The trial continued and I gave a ruling in relation to the defendant’s application on 31 January 2018. After that, the Crown unexpectedly made, and I allowed, an application for an adjournment so that the Crown could obtain further evidence it needed to prove an element of the offence. The Crown’s application was opposed by the applicant who wanted his trial to continue and to avoid his legal costs being thrown away. The Crown’s request for an adjournment for that reason, at that stage in the trial, was not attributable in any way to the act, neglect or default of the applicant or his legal advisors. The jury panel was sent away, the trial stopped and the matter was sent to the criminal law list so that a date for a new trial before me or a different judge could be allocated. 
  6. [16]
    I am satisfied in the circumstances of this case I should exercise the authority to grant a certificate.
  7. [17]
    In that event the applicant concedes that I do not need to consider his second application for a stay of the indictment until the Crown compensates him for the costs thrown away by the adjournment.
  8. [18]
    The third application is for the exercise of this court’s inherent power to stay the indictment as an abuse of process. The power is to be exercised in exceptional or extreme cases. The court must be satisfied that the continuation of the proceedings would be so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive as to constitute an abuse of process. The question for the court is whether, in all the circumstances, the continuation of the proceedings before the tribunal would involve unacceptable injustice or unfairness: see Walton v Gardiner (1993) 112 ALR 289 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ at 298. 
  9. [19]
    In Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256 the majority of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ said at 266-267:

“However, in this Court much attention has been given to the nature and extent of the inherent power to deal with abuse of process. In Ridgeway v The Queen, Gaudron J explained:

The powers to prevent an abuse of process have traditionally been seen as including a power to stay proceedings instituted for an improper purpose, as well as proceedings that are ‘frivolous, vexatious or oppressive’. This notwithstanding, there is no very precise notion of what is vexatious or oppressive or what otherwise constitutes an abuse of process. Indeed, the courts have resisted, and even warned against, laying down hard and fast definitions in that regard. That is necessarily so. Abuse of process cannot be restricted to ‘defined and closed categories’ because notions of justice and injustice, as well as other considerations that bear on public confidence in the administration of justice, must reflect contemporary values and, as well, take account of the circumstances of the case. That is not to say that the concept of ‘abuse of process’ is at large or, indeed, without meaning. As already indicated, it extends to proceedings that are instituted for an improper purpose and it is clear that it extends to proceedings that are ‘seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging’ or ‘productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment’.”

Earlier, in Rogers v The Queen, McHugh J observed:

Although the categories of abuse of procedure remain open, abuses of procedure usually fall into one of three categories: (1) the court’s procedures are invoked for an illegitimate purpose; (2) the use of the court’s procedures is unjustifiably oppressive to one of the parties; or (3) the use of the court’s procedures would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.” (Footnotes omitted)

  1. [20]
    In the context of criminal proceedings the fundamental policy considerations include the court protecting its ability to function as a court of law by ensuring that its processes are used fairly by State and citizen alike; and that unless the court protects its ability to function in that way public confidence will be eroded due to a concern that the court’s processes may lend themselves to oppression and injustice: see William v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 at 520.
  2. [21]
    In relation to cases where delay in proceeding is primarily relied on as causing unfairness, Mason CJ said in Jago v The District Court of New South Wales and Ors (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 33-34: 

“The test of fairness which must be applied involves a balancing process, for the interests of the accused cannot be considered in isolation without regard to the community's right to expect that persons charged with criminal offences are brought to trial: see Barton; Sang; Carver v. Attorney-General (NSW). At the same time, it should not be overlooked that the community expects trials to be fair and to take place within a reasonable time after a person has been charged. The factors which need to be taken into account in deciding whether a permanent stay is needed in order to vindicate the accused's right to be protected against unfairness in the course of criminal proceedings cannot be precisely defined in a way which will cover every case. But they will generally include such matters as the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the accused's responsibility for asserting his rights and, of course, the prejudice suffered by the accused: Barker v. Wingo; Bell v. Director of Public Prosecutions, as explained in Watson, and Gorman v. Fitzpatrick. In any event, a permanent stay should be ordered only in an extreme case and the making of such an order on the basis of delay alone will accordingly be very rare: Re Cooney.

To justify a permanent stay of criminal proceedings, there must be a fundamental defect which goes to the root of the trial "of such a nature that nothing that a trial judge can do in the conduct of the trial can relieve against its unfair consequences": Barton, per Wilson J. Where delay is the sole ground of complaint, an accused seeking a permanent stay must be "able to show that the lapse of time is such that any trial is necessarily unfair so that any conviction would bring the administration of justice into disrepute": Clarkson.” (Footnotes omitted)

  1. [22]
    The applicant contends that the power to stay the indictment should be exercised in this case because: the trial has been de-listed on four previous occasions; the prosecution has presented a new indictment and provided different particulars on occasions; the time that has passed since the offences were alleged to have been committed between 11 August 2009 and 29 March 2012; the matter is truly a civil dispute; the significant emotional impact on the defendant who is 73 years old, has no criminal history, suffers some health problems and has a good work history; the fact the defendant did not receive the material the subject of the adjournment application on 29 January 2018 until after 5 March 2018; and the applicant has suffered the burden of the costs thrown away by that adjournment and will be unable to fund future representation.
  2. [23]
    The parties accept that the ‘chronology of events’ set out in exhibit B to the affidavit of Katrina Overell accurately sets out the history of the matter in this  court. In summary, the history of the matter is as follows.
  3. [24]
    The original indictment number 805 of 2016 was presented on 21 April 2016, and the trial was listed that day to commence in the week of 12 September 2016. The applicant does not contend that the Crown improperly delayed in presenting the original indictment. It is not uncommon for indictments to be presented well after the offence is alleged to have happened. The Crown did apply to set aside the first trial listing because it was awaiting further material from the Queensland Police Service. However, the applicant’s present solicitors only came into the matter after 1 September 2016, and did not oppose the application to set aside the trial listing. The applicant accepts that, in any event, the first trial listing was premature. 
  1. [25]
    The matter was then listed for trial on 6 February 2017, 17 July 2017 and 23 October 2017. Each listing was set aside until the trial ultimately started on 29 January 2018. 
  2. [26]
    The Crown’s piecemeal and late disclosure of material contributed to the three trial listings in 2017 being set aside. The Crown did disclose further material on 23 November 2016, 30 January 2017 and 24 May 2017. The Crown accepts it did not comply with directions given on 28 February 2017 that it provide to the applicant by 13 April 2017 particulars, a list of witnesses, a paginated bundle of exhibits and a list of admissions. These were not provided until 18 May 2017. On 2 June 2017 the Crown was warned by the court that it was unlikely the trial would be adjourned again.  
  3. [27]
    However, the delay in this case is not entirely the Crown’s fault. In relation to setting aside the trial date of 6 February 2017, the applicant informed the court in November 2016 that he was conducting his own investigations and intended to make a submission to the Director of Public Prosecutions that the prosecution should not continue. And, in late January 2017, the applicant informed the court he was obtaining expert evidence which would not be ready in time for the trial. The Crown did provide particulars in relation to the charge on 24 January 2017, in time for any trial, and the proposed new indictment (which was not presented until 26 May 2017) related to the same matters, facts and circumstances but pleaded the Crown’s case under s 408C(1)(c) rather than 408C(1)(d) of the Code. It was the applicant who applied to set aside the trial listing of 6 February 2017.
  4. [28]
    After the 6 February 2017 listing was set aside, a mention of the matter was held on 28 February 2017, whereupon a new trial date of 17 July 2017 was set and the court gave the directions outlined above. However, while the Crown accepts it did not comply with those directions in the time set, no real prejudice flows from that because on 24 January 2017 the Crown had already provided the particulars, the Crown’s list of witnesses, and it advised it was preparing a bundle of documents already in the applicant’s possession to be tendered in the trial. The Crown had disclosed to the applicant all materials in their possession by 31 January 2017.  It was on 18 May 2017, in response to the court’s directions, that the Crown again provided the applicant with the proposed new indictment, particulars, and witness list. Further, a list of exhibits and proposed admissions were then provided. 
  5. [29]
    In relation to setting aside the trial listing of 17 July 2017, it was the applicant’s expert who indicated on 23 May 2017 that he would not be able to provide his report in time for the trial on 17 July 2017, notwithstanding the court had been told in January 2017 it would take six to eight weeks. The Crown provided some further material on 24 May 2017 and at a mention of the matter on 26 May 2017, the new indictment was formally presented and the applicant applied to have the trial date set aside. The trial remained as listed until it was mentioned again on 1 June 2017, and de-listed at the request of the applicant because his expert could not provide a report in time. At that mention the trial was listed to commence on 23 October 2017 and the applicant was directed to file and serve their expert’s report by 1 August 2017.
  6. [30]
    In relation to setting aside the trial listing of 23 October 2017, it was the applicant who failed to comply with the direction to file his expert’s report by 1 August 2017. At a mention of the matter on 3 August 2017 the applicant said he was having trouble getting material under subpoena to be relied on in his defence from financial institutions and that the report would be completed two weeks after receiving that material. He incorrectly told the court he had not received the draft admissions provided by the Crown on 18 May 2017. The expert’s report was disclosed to the Crown on 12 October 2017. At the trial review on 13 October 2017, the Crown, despite earlier not taking issue with the applicant’s delay in providing the report, sought to de-list the trial so it could consider the report. The applicant did not oppose that application. The trial was then listed to commence on 29 January 2018. A pretrial hearing scheduled for 12 December 2017 was not required when the applicant conceded parts of the report were inadmissible in the trial. 
  7. [31]
    The applicant is charged with a serious offence. The presentation of the new indictment did not change the substance of the Crown case and the Crown has particularised its case against the defendant and disclosed all material in its possession including the material acquired after the trial was adjourned on 31 January 2018, in proper time for a new trial. In fact the applicant has had all material relied on by the Crown (other than that acquired as a result of the adjournment on 31 January 2018) since 24 May 2017 at the latest. The Crown case may narrow further as the applicant’s co-offender has now pleaded guilty and is to give evidence against him. The adjournment of the hearing of the trial in its second day on 31 January 2018 was granted in the interests of justice. The Crown has contributed to the delay in bringing the applicant to trial but it was not entirely their fault. That the complainant may also have a civil claim against the applicant does not demonstrate that prosecution is for an improper or illegitimate purpose. The defendant’s age and health are not such that he is prejudiced in providing instructions or properly taking part in his trial. I will grant a certificate under s 22(2)(c) of the ACFA, which means that if the applicant pays additional costs by reason of the new trial he shall be entitled to be paid from the fund the costs the Board considers have been thrown away or partly thrown away by him in the proceedings.
  8. [32]
    I am not, in all the circumstances, satisfied that the continuation of the trial is so unfair or oppressive so as to constitute an abuse of process, or that any conviction would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
  9. [33]
    The orders are: 
    1. The application for a certificate under s 22(2)(c) of the ACFA is granted.
    2. The application for a stay of the indictment until the Crown compensates the applicant for the costs thrown away by the adjournment is dismissed. 
    3. The application for a permanent stay of the indictment is dismissed.
  1. [34]
    It should also be noted that the Appeal Costs Board appeared and made no submissions other than to indicate it would abide the order of the court. The Attorney-General appeared to make submissions only in relation to the jurisdiction of this court to hear an application for a declaration as to the application of the ACFA. The Attorney-General withdrew when the application for a declaration was abandoned.
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Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    John Vincent Hitzke v The Director of Public Prosecutions, The Appeal Costs Board & The Attorney-General of Queensland

  • Shortened Case Name:

    John Vincent Hitzke v The Director of Public Prosecutions, The Appeal Costs Board & The Attorney-General of Queensland

  • MNC:

    [2018] QDCPR 10

  • Court:

    QDCPR

  • Judge(s):

    Moynihan QC DCJ

  • Date:

    05 Apr 2018

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2006) 226 CLR 256
Cite 2 - (2006) 226 CLR 256
Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross (2012) 87 ALJR 131
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2012) 87 ALJR 131
Cite 2 - (2012) 87 ALJR 131
Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 C.L.R 23
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1989) 168 C.L.R 23
Cite 2 - (1989) 168 C.L.R 23
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) 170 CLR 534
Cite 2 - (1990) 170 CLR 534
R v Dinh and Le [2015] QSC 282
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QSC 282
R v EQH [2016] QDC 175
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QDC 175
Cite 2 - [2016] QDC 175
R v His Honour Judge Kimmins; ex parte Attorney-General [1980] Qd R 524
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1980] Qd R 524
Cite 2 - [1980] Qd R 524
R v Khoury [2003] QDC 235
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QDC 235
Cite 2 - [2003] QDC 235
R v Lacey [2009] QDC 303
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] QDC 303
Cite 2 - [2009] QDC 303
R v Lewis; ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 2 Qd R 294
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1991] 2 Qd R 294
Cite 2 - [1991] 2 Qd R 294
R v WAH [2009] QCA 263
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] QCA 263
Cite 2 - [2009] QCA 263
R v Watts [2011] QDC 194
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QDC 194
Cite 2 - [2011] QDC 194
Re Powell (1894) 6 Q.L.J. 36
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1894) 6 Q.L.J. 36
Cite 2 - (1894) 6 Q.L.J. 36
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 112 ALR 289
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1993) 112 ALR 289
Cite 2 - (1993) 112 ALR 289
Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992) 174 CLR 509
Cite 2 - (1992) 174 CLR 509

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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