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The Queen v Alastair Scott McDougall[2020] QDCPR 42

The Queen v Alastair Scott McDougall[2020] QDCPR 42

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

The Queen v Alastair Scott McDougall [2020] QDCPR 42

PARTIES:

THE QUEEN

(respondent)

v

ALASTAIR SCOTT MCDOUGALL

(applicant)

FILE NO/S:

1722 of 2019

DIVISION:

Criminal

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

15 May 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

27 April 2020

JUDGE:

Loury QC DCJ

ORDER:

All answers given by the applicant at CCC hearings held on 5 December 2017 and 29 October 2018 other than those which form the particulars of the offence of perjury are excluded from evidence at the applicant’s trial.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – CRIME AND CORRUPTION ACT – PERJURY – COERCIVE HEARINGS – PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION – ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE – EXERCISEABLE DISCRETION – where the applicant gave evidence during coercive hearings – where the applicant is charged with perjury – where the respondent seeks to lead evidence of all of what the applicant said during the coercive hearings – where the applicant makes an application for a ruling that all answers other than those which give rise to the offence of perjury are inadmissible under s 197 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 – whether the admissibility of the answers is restricted under s 197 – whether it would be unfair for the answers to be used in the applicant’s trial

Acts Interpretation Act 1953 ss 14A, 14B

Crime and Corruption Act 2001 ss 5, 25, 26, 176, 190, 194, 197, 331

Evidence Act 1977 ss 15, 130 

Chardon v Bradley [2017] QCA 314

Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543

Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477

Jackson v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552

Potter v Minaham (1908) 7 CLR 277 

Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328

Reg v Boyes (1861) 1 B. & S. 311 [121 ER 730]

Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] AC 547

Sorby v The Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281

COUNSEL:

SC Holt QC and C Eberhardt for the applicant

CW Wallis for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Keir Steele Waldon Lawyers for the applicant

Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) for the respondent

  1. [1]
    The applicant is charged with one count of perjury.  It is alleged that he lied when he gave evidence during a coercive hearing held pursuant to the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (the Act).  Proof of the lie relies upon an intercepted telephone call between the applicant and another man.
  2. [2]
    This application is for a ruling that all answers the applicant gave in the course of the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) hearings on 5 December 2017 and 29 October 2018 are inadmissible against him in his trial other than those questions and answers which form the particulars of the charge.
  3. [3]
    The alleged lie occurred in the hearing of 29 October 2018.  Nothing that the applicant said in the hearing conducted on 5 December 2017 is said to amount to a lie.  The respondent has indicated that they intend to lead all of the evidence that the applicant gave at both commission hearings.

The applicant’s contention

  1. [4]
    The applicant argues firstly, that as a matter of law the evidence he gave other than the questions and answers which give rise to the charge are inadmissible by virtue of the operation of section 197 of the Act.
  2. [5]
    Alternatively, if admissible the applicant argues that I should exercise my discretion to exclude that evidence pursuant to section 130 of the Evidence Act 1977 on the basis that it would be unfair for it to be used against him at his trial.

The respondent’s contention

  1. [6]
    The respondent argues that section 197(3) of the Act specifically precludes reliance upon section 197 by the applicant as he is charged with perjury.  Accordingly, they argue that all questions and answers given on each occasion are admissible, subject to my exercising my discretion.
  2. [7]
    Alternatively, the respondent argues that the precondition in subsection 197(1)(b) is not met because the privilege would not be able to be claimed by virtue of the operation of section 15 of the Evidence Act 1977 or in any event because the answers do not tend to incriminate.  

The legislative framework 

  1. [8]
    The first of the two main purposes of the Act is to combat and reduce the incidence of major crime.  One of the ways in which that can be achieved is described in section 5(2).  The commission is to have investigative powers, not ordinarily available to the police service, that enable it to effectively investigate major crime and criminal organisations and their participants.
  2. [9]
    One of the CCC’s functions is to investigate major crime[1] which involves gathering evidence for the prosecution of persons for offences and recovering the proceeds of major crime, property liable to forfeiture and unexplained wealth.[2]  Its function also involves providing information about major crime to other law enforcement agencies and prosecuting authorities.[3]  
  3. [10]
    The commission has the power to hold hearings in relation to any matter relevant to the performance of its functions.[4]   
  4. [11]
    Pursuant to section 190 of the Act a witness at a commission hearing in relation to a crime investigation must answer a question put to them at the hearing unless the person has a reasonable excuse.  A witness is not entitled to remain silent or to refuse to answer the question on the ground of privilege (other than legal professional privilege).  Privilege is defined to mean in this context, self-incrimination privilege and legal professional privilege.  Self-incrimination privilege is also defined in the Act as the privilege an individual may claim at common law on the ground of selfincrimination.  
  5. [12]
    The privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental right which has been described as a “cardinal principle of our system of justice”[5] and “deeply ingrained in the common law.”[6]  It affords protection against the risk of incrimination by direct and indirect (that is, derivative) evidence.  In Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd,[7] Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ said of the privilege “in the end, [the privilege] is based upon the deep-seated belief that those who allege the commission of a crime should prove it themselves and should not be able to compel the accused to provide proof against himself.” 
  6. [13]
    The Act clearly abrogates this privilege, a fundamental right, with “irresistible clearness”.[8] Section 190(2) removes any entitlement to rely on the self-incrimination privilege.   Later provisions in the Act[9] demonstrate that the privilege is abrogated even if there are criminal proceedings on foot and the question/s concern the subject matter of the charge.  Section 190(2) does not distinguish between the prospect of self-incrimination by direct use of the answers given and through the derivative use of the answers given. Subsection (7) expressly provides for admissibility of evidence obtained through the derivative use of any answers given.
  1. [14]
    The express abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination also, by implication, abrogates the penalty privilege.[10] The penalty privilege is regarded as distinct from the privilege against self-incrimination. The penalty privilege protects against self-exposure to a penalty.
  2. [15]
    The abrogation of the self-incrimination privilege is a significant aspect of a hearing held under the Act.  It is designed to enable the true facts to be ascertained in relation to organised crime.  In that respect the legislature has taken the view that the public interest in ascertaining such facts outweighs the rights of the individual.   The use of this power to compel a person to incriminate themselves is however balanced by the inclusion of safeguards found in section 197 of the Act restricting the use of such material.  
  3. [16]
    Section 197 of the Act states:

     “197    Restriction on use of privileged answers, documents, things or statements disclosed or produced under compulsion

  1. (1)
    This section applies if—
    1. before an individual answers a question put to the individual by the commission or a commission officer or produces a document or thing or a written statement of information to the commission or a commission officer, the individual claims selfincrimination privilege in relation to the answer or production; and
    2. apart from this Act, the individual would not be required to answer the question or produce the document, thing or statement in a proceeding if the individual claimed self-incrimination privilege in relation to the answer or production; and
    3. the individual is required to answer the question or produce the document, thing or statement.
  2. (2)
    The answer, document, thing or statement given or produced is not admissible in evidence against the individual in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding.
  3. (3)
    However, the answer, document, thing or statement is admissible in a civil, criminal or administrative proceeding—
    1. with the individual’s consent; or
    2. if the proceeding is about—
    1. the falsity or misleading nature of an answer, document, thing or statement mentioned in subsection (1) and given or produced by the individual; or
    2. an offence against this Act; or
    3. a contempt of a person conducting the hearing; or
    1. if the proceeding is a proceeding, other than a proceeding for the prosecution of an offence, under the Confiscation Act and the answer, document, thing or statement is admissible under section 265 of that Act.
  4. (4)
    Also, the document is admissible in a civil proceeding about a right or liability conferred or imposed by the document.
  5. (5)
    In a commission hearing, the presiding officer may order that all answers or a class of answer given by an individual or that all documents or things or a class of document or thing produced by an individual is to be regarded as having been given or produced on objection by the individual.
  6. (6)
    If the presiding officer makes an order under subsection (5), the individual is taken to have objected to the giving of each answer, or to the producing of each document or thing, the subject of the order.
  7. (7)
    Subsection (2) does not prevent any information, document or other thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the individual giving or producing the answer, document, thing or statement from being admissible in evidence against the individual in a civil, criminal or administrative proceeding.”
  1. [17]
    Section 197(1) creates three pre-conditions for the application of the section.  Those conditions are: firstly, that the person has to in fact make a claim of privilege in relation to the question; secondly, the claim is a valid one in that, but for the operation of the Act, the person would be able to rely upon the privilege; and thirdly the person is, despite that claim of privilege, compelled to answer the question by the presiding officer.    
  2. [18]
    Subsection (2) protects against the direct use of the person’s answer in any later proceeding.  
  3. [19]
    Subsection (3) creates some exceptions to that general prohibition against direct use of the compelled answer where answering has been objected to on the basis of the self-incrimination privilege. The relevant exception and the one on which the respondent relies is (b)(i), that is, if the later proceeding is about the falsity of an answer.

Consideration

  1. [20]
    In both hearings the presiding officers each gave the applicant what is often referred to as a blanket protection order.  On 5 December 2017 the presiding officer said: 

“Now, you have to answer all questions, as I said. And because you have to answer all the questions it includes questions which may incriminate you.  You’re obviously familiar with what incriminate means.  But I intend to give you what’s called a blanket protection order which has the effect of directing you to answer every question as if you have objected.  And that means that the answer you give can’t then be used against you in any subsequent criminal, civil or administrative proceedings, with the exception of perjury proceedings or breaches of the Act or also in respect to civil confiscation under the Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act. Other than that if you tell us the truth the answers cannot be used against you.”  

  1. [21]
    On 29 October 2018 the presiding officer who is the Chairperson of the CCC said: 

“I need to tell you about your rights and obligations.  Uh you have an obligation whilst here to answer any question asked of you.  Not only is there no right to silence but a failure to answer questions is itself a criminal offence and can be uh something that’s called contempt. By failing to answer questions can mean that you may be imprisoned until you answer those questions. Um from what I understand of the matter and the matters that are going to be raised with you and the evidence that’s already been gathered in this hearing, for you to answer truthfully some of the things that you’re asked here may expose you to self-incrimination.  As you know, this hearing is not about gathering evidence against you, it’s about clarifying matters in relation to others.  And what you say here can’t be used against you.  I’m going to, because of what I know about the way this will progress, I‘m going to make a blanket protection order.  

So pursuant to section 197(5) of the CCC Act 2001 I order that all answers given by you are to be regarded as answers given over objection by you on the basis of a claim of self-incrimination privilege.  I nonetheless override that objection and direct that you must answer all such questions.”

  1. [22]
    Section 197(5) of the Act provides that in a commission hearing, the presiding officer may order that all answers or a class of answer given by an individual are to be regarded as having been given on objection by the individual.  Sub-section (6) provides that if such an order is made the person is taken to have objected to the giving of each answer, the subject of the order.  
  2. [23]
    The effect of the orders given under section 197(5) by each of the presiding officers means that the applicant is taken to have objected to the answering of each question on the grounds of self-incrimination privilege.  The applicant was nonetheless required to answer the questions.   
  3. [24]
    The respondent’s contention is that section 197 does not apply to a perjury proceeding by virtue of the operation of section 197(3).  They draw attention to the use of the words “the answer” in the introductory line to the sub-section and the use of the words “an answer” in sub-section (b)(i).  The argument is that there is a distinction drawn by the use of those words between the individual answer which is allegedly false and an answer that is given during the course of the hearing.  Once a proceeding has commenced about the falsity of an answer, that answer as well as all others are admissible because it is a proceeding about an answer that is alleged to be false.  
  1. [25]
    The answer referred to in the opening line of subsection (3) is a reference to the answer referred to in subsection (1).  The pre-conditions to the application of the section all refer to “the answer”.  That is, the section only applies if the answer is objected to and the answer would not have to be given if a claim of privilege was made and the answer is compelled to be given.  It is the same answer which is not admissible pursuant to subsection (2) and it is the same answer that may be admissible if there is a proceeding about the falsity of an answer.   The respondent’s contention requires the word “an” to be equated with “any”.  That is, the answer is admissible if the proceeding is about the falsity of any answer given.  
  2. [26]
    Section 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 relevantly provides that in interpreting a provision of an Act the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation.  It is permissible in accordance with section 14B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 to have regard to the extrinsic materials as defined in interpreting a provision. It states:

“14B    Use of extrinsic material in interpretation

  1. (1)
    Subject to subsection (2), in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, consideration may be given to extrinsic material capable of assisting in the interpretation—
  1. (a)
    if the provision is ambiguous or obscure—to provide an interpretation of it; or
  1. (b)
    if the ordinary meaning of the provision leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable—to provide an interpretation that avoids such a result; or
  2. (c)
    in any other case—to confirm the interpretation conveyed by the ordinary meaning of the provision.”
  1. [27]
    Ordinary meaning is defined to mean under the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 as the ordinary meaning conveyed by a provision having regard to its context in the Act and to the purpose of the Act.  
  2. [28]
    The relevant extrinsic material to which I have been referred is the explanatory note to the introduction of section 197. It reads: 

“Restriction on use of privileged answers, documents and things disclosed or produced under compulsion [CJA, s 96; CCA, s 110]

Clause 197 –– provides that when a witness is compelled to answer a question or produce a document, and a ground of privilege against selfincrimination would otherwise apply, the answer may not be used against the person at a later criminal or civil proceeding if before being compelled the person claims that answering the question or producing the document or thing might tend to incriminate them. There are a number of exceptions to this protection; such as if there is consent or if the proceeding is about the falsity of the answer.”

  1. [29]
    The explanatory note demonstrates that the intention of the legislature was to protect all answers given other than in a proceeding about the falsity of the answer.   That confirms to me that the interpretation that I consider is conveyed by the ordinary meaning of the provision, having regard to its context, was intended by parliament.  The provision was intended to provide an exception only for those answers which are alleged to be lies.  
  2. [30]
    The applicant argues that the construction of the provision as contended for by the respondent would result in an absurdity. Subsection (3)(b)(i) creates an exception to the general rule that the answers are not admissible, only with respect to a criminal proceeding about the falsity of an answer.  If a person gave evidence before a commission hearing and gave a false answer although not in respect of a question over which a claim of privilege had been made, on the respondent’s contention section 197 would have no application because there was a proceeding for perjury and all answers including matters tending to or even in fact inculpating the person in a criminal offence although unrelated to the alleged perjury would be admissible.  Such an unreasonable or absurd result cannot have been the intention of the legislature.    
  3. [31]
    A further argument made against construing the provision in the manner in which the respondent contends is that, given that the rules of evidence do not apply in a hearing conducted pursuant to the Act, that counsel assisting in addition to asking the questions which give rise to the alleged false statement could also cross-examine with a view to proving that the false statement was deliberately false.   Indeed such a course of cross-examination was undertaken by counsel assisting.  Proof of the alleged lie is a matter for the prosecuting authority.  Proving that the statement made by the applicant was a deliberate lie was not a matter that went to a function of the CCC. Proof the applicant deliberately lied was not a matter that was capable of providing evidence of a major crime as defined.  It is unlikely that the intention of the legislature was to allow proof of an essential element of the offence to be proven by coerced evidence.  
  4. [32]
    The alternative proposition advanced by the respondent is that the pre-condition in section 197(1)(b) is not met because the answers given are not such that the applicant otherwise had a valid claim of self-incrimination privilege.  
  5. [33]
    In Sorby v The Commonwealth[11] Gibbs CJ said: 

“It has been a firmly established rule of the common law, since the seventeenth century, that no person can be compelled to incriminate himself.  A person may refuse to answer any question, or to produce any document or thing, if to do so ‘may tend to bring him into the peril and possibility of being convicted as a criminal’: Lamb v Munster. The mere fact that the witness swears that be believes that the answer will incriminate him is not sufficient; ‘to entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the Court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is a reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer’: Reg v Boyes”. (citations omitted)

  1. [34]
    Reg v Boyes[12] decided in 1861 has been frequently cited as representing the state of the law. 
  2. [35]
    The presiding officer in each of the hearings was apprised of much evidence that had been gathered in relation to the investigation which was in relation to organised crime.  The relevance of the applicant’s evidence to the investigation was said to be in his representation of Lam Ta on drug trafficking charges dealt with in the Supreme Court of Queensland.  The applicant appeared at the sentence as junior counsel led by another. Following Mr Ta’s sentence there was a lunch at which a number of lawyers and other persons were present at which drugs were allegedly consumed. Cash payments to barristers, particularly the applicant’s leader, was a topic about which the applicant was cross-examined.  It is apparent on the face of the transcript of the hearings that documentary evidence had been gathered.  The applicant and his legal advisers were unaware of that material.  Indeed I am not aware of what material had been gathered and was or is available.  It may well be that this investigation is ongoing and further evidence has been gathered.  
  3. [36]
    Incriminating questions can be of two kinds.  The first is where the question itself reveals that the answer or material sought is of an incriminating nature.  The second is where the question might appear on its face to be quite innocent however the answer or material it seeks may form a link in a chain of incriminating material.[13]
  4. [37]
    Each of the presiding officers formed the view that it was appropriate for an order pursuant to section 197(5) to be made, that is an order that all questions were taken to have been objected to on the basis of the incrimination privilege.  The applicant was therefore taken to have objected to the giving of each answer pursuant to s 197(6). 
  5. [38]
    At the second hearing the presiding officer, the Chairperson of the CCC indicated that from the evidence that had already been gathered (clearly of which he was aware) that some of the questions the applicant would be asked would expose him to selfincrimination.  
  6. [39]
    Clearly enough, each of the presiding officers were of the opinion that the applicant’s answers had the tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or other penalty. 
  7. [40]
    In Chardon v Bradley[14] Morrison JA (with whom Fraser and McMurdo JJA agreed) applied the test in Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation[15] in determining a claim of privilege based on self-incrimination.  

“[B]efore a claim for privilege is upheld the court must be satisfied that there is a real and genuine basis for the assertion by the witness that he will tend to be exposed to proceedings or penalties.  The precise measure or degree of the risk to the witness is something which the court is not called upon to assess as long as there is a degree of risk which cannot be dismissed as tenuous or illusory or so improbable as to be virtually without substance.  The question is, whether there is a recognisable risk?  The principle which protects a witness from obligatory self-incrimination is not to be qualified by or weighed against any opposing principle or expedient consideration, so long as the risk of self-incrimination is real in the sense that what is a potential danger may reasonably be regarded as one which may become actual, if the witness is required to answer the questions or produce the documents for which privilege is claimed.”

  1. [41]
    Clearly enough there was a degree of risk to the applicant which was considered by each of two presiding officers not to be tenuous or illusory or improbable such that a blanket protection order was made.  
  2. [42]
    The respondent’s contention would mean that a person giving evidence in a coercive hearing under the Act would not in fact know whether his/her incriminating evidence was genuinely protected under section 197 until a later point in time when a Crown Prosecutor, or indeed someone in another proceeding, wanted to use the evidence. That is contrary to the very purpose of the provision.  
  1. [43]
    The precondition in section 197(1)(b) in my view, has been met.  
  2. [44]
    The respondent’s next contention is that apart from the Act that the applicant would not be able to claim privilege if he gave evidence at his trial because of section 15 of the Evidence Act 1977.  
  3. [45]
    Section 15(1) of the Evidence Act 1977 states: 

“15    Questioning a person charged in a criminal proceeding

  1. (1)
    Where in a criminal proceeding a person charged gives evidence, the person shall not be entitled to refuse to answer a question or produce a document or thing on the ground that to do so would tend to prove the commission by the person of the offence with which the person is there charged.”   
  1. [46]
    In relation to the applicant, section 15(1) at most could only potentially apply to the questions that tend to prove the offence charged, either directly or indirectly, which is perjury.  Most of the questioning does not tend to prove the commission of the offence of perjury.  Indeed until the questions which give rise to the offence of perjury were in fact asked nothing that was asked prior to those questions tends to prove the offence of perjury, either directly or indirectly.  The earlier questioning was not directed towards a conversation that the applicant had with the other man (which is said to provide proof of the offence) but rather was directed to the payment of invoices, the payment of other barristers and the conduct of those present at a lunch.  
  2. [47]
    There is another difficulty with the respondent’s contention in this regard.  If a person was questioned directly at a coercive hearing held under the Act about an offence of which they were ultimately charged, for example, money-laundering and they answered questions under objection which directly implicated that person in the offence of money-laundering; then on the respondent’s argument, that evidence would become admissible against them at their trial for money-laundering because if they chose to give evidence in their trial they would not be able to refuse to answer the very same questions because of section 15(1) of the Evidence Act 1977.  If that contention were correct the very purpose of section 197 would be nullified.  
  3. [48]
    I do not accept the respondent’s contentions as to the construction of section 197. The provision protects all of the applicant’s answers other than those which form the particulars of the charge.  
  1. [49]
    If I am wrong in my construction of the provision then there remains the question of discretionary exclusion of the evidence pursuant to section 130 of the Evidence Act 1977.  The applicant was told in no uncertain terms that all of his answers were protected because they risked incriminating him based upon the evidence known only to the presiding officers, counsel assisting the presiding officer and investigating officers at the CCC.  At the second of the hearings the Chairperson said after giving the applicant the protection under section 195 of the Act: 

“As you know, what that simply means is that as long as you tell the truth here you’ve got nothing to fear and that whatever you say, if it is selfincriminatory, cannot be used against you in any criminal, civil or administrative proceedings.”   

  1. [50]
    The applicant was represented at the hearing by a legal practitioner who was present when both the protection and words referred to in the preceding paragraph were given.  Each of them no doubt genuinely accepted the correctness of what the presiding officers said at each of the hearings and acted accordingly.  Had the applicant and his legal representative known of the possible construction of the legislation as contended for by the respondent and the result that his answers may not have been protected in the way in which each of them was informed by the presiding officers and genuinely believed, alternative legal advice might have been given.  The applicant might have claimed a reasonable excuse for not answering a particular question pursuant to section 194 of the Act.  That would require a ruling by the presiding officer after hearing submissions.  If ruled against, an appeal avenue would have been open to the Supreme Court of Queensland for a final determination of the objection.   It, in my view, would be unfair for the respondent to use the answers against the applicant in his trial when he was told that all of his answers were protected.
  2. [51]
    Accordingly, if I am wrong in my construction of section 197 I would, nonetheless, exercise my discretion to rule the evidence given by the applicant at the coercive hearings other than those questions and answers which give rise to the offence of perjury, be excluded from evidence at his trial.

Footnotes

[1] Section 25.

[2] Section 26.

[3] Section 26(c).

[4] Section 176.

[5] Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 294.

[6] Ibid at 309.

[7] (1993) 178 CLR 477 at 53

[8] Potter v Minaham (1908) 7 CLR 277 at 204.

[9] Section 331.

[10] Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328 at 345 per Mason ACJ, Wilson and    Dawson JJ. See also Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 at 559 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ.

[11] (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 288.

[12] (1861) 1 B. & S. 311 at pp329-330 [121 ER 730 at p 738].

[13] Jackson v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552.

[14] [2017] QCA 314.

[15] [1978] AC 547 at 647.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    The Queen v Alastair Scott McDougall

  • Shortened Case Name:

    The Queen v Alastair Scott McDougall

  • MNC:

    [2020] QDCPR 42

  • Court:

    QDCPR

  • Judge(s):

    Loury QC DCJ

  • Date:

    15 May 2020

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Chardon v Bradley [2017] QCA 314
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] QCA 314
Cite 2 - [2017] QCA 314
Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v ACCC (2002) 213 CLR 543
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2002) 213 CLR 543
Cite 2 - (2002) 213 CLR 543
Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1993) 178 CLR 477
Cite 2 - (1993) 178 CLR 477
Jackson v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1983] 1 VR 552
Cite 2 - [1983] 1 VR 552
Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 C.L.R. 277
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1908) 7 C.L.R. 277
Cite 2 - (1908) 7 C.L.R. 277
Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1983) 152 CLR 328
Cite 2 - (1983) 152 CLR 328
R v Boyes (1861) 121 ER 730
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1861) 121 ER 730
Cite 2 - (1861) 121 ER 730
Reg. v Boyes (1861) 1 B & S 311
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1861) 1 B & S 311
Cite 2 - (1861) 1 B & S 311
Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation (1978) AC 547
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1978) AC 547
Cite 2 - (1978) AC 547
Sorby v The Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1983) 152 CLR 281
Cite 2 - (1983) 152 CLR 281
Cite 3 - (1983) 152 CLR 281
Cite 4 - (1983) 152 CLR 281

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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