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Fully Integrated Therapies Pty. Ltd. v Prior and Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)[2015] QIRC 137

Fully Integrated Therapies Pty. Ltd. v Prior and Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)[2015] QIRC 137

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Fully Integrated Therapies Pty Ltd v Prior and Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 137

PARTIES:

Fully Integrated Therapies Pty Ltd

(Applicant)

v

Prior, Michelle

(First Respondent)

and

Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)

(Second Respondent)

CASE NO:

WC/2015/162

PROCEEDING:

Application for leave to appear and be heard

DELIVERED ON:

24 July 2015

HEARING DATE:

20 July 2015

MEMBER:

Deputy President Bloomfield

ORDERS:

  1. The employer's application for leave to appear and be heard is refused.
  2. The employer is to pay the Applicant's costs of, and incidental to, Application WC/2015/162 at the relevant Scale. 

CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW - INDUSTRIAL LAW - Application by employer for leave to be heard -  Consideration of case law concerning s 320 of Industrial Relations Act 1999 - Law requires each application to be considered on its merits - Employer arguments in support of Application - Applicant opposes grant of leave - weighing up of competing arguments - Discretion not exercised to grant employer's Application.

CASES:

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003

Industrial Relations Act 1999, s 320

Society of the Sacred Advent Schools Pty Ltd t/a St Margaret's Anglican School v Sharon Lee Munn and Q-COMP (2007) QGIG 15.

Woolworths Ltd v Dinca and Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 005.

Middleton v Teys Bros (Holdings) Pty Ltd [2001] QIC 1; 166 QGIG 138.

Frazer v Gardner [2001] QIC 43; 167 QGIG 911.

State of Queensland v Squires and WorkCover Queensland [2002] QIC 21; 170 QGIG 20.

The Corporation of the Trustees of the Order of the Sisters of Mercy Queensland Inc trading as Holy Cross Laundry and Krystyna Karas and Q-COMP [2009] QIC 34; 192 QGIG 127.

Queensland Health v Robert Ollier and Q-COMP (WC/2012/268) - Decision .

CJ Burland Pty Ltd v Metropolitan Meat Industry Board [1968] 12 RCLO 400 at 407.

Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd v Transport Workers Union of Australia [1987] 21 IR 288.

Judith Buckley v Queensland Health and Q-COMP (C/2010/13) - Report on Decision - .

Blackwood v Pearce [2015] ICQ 012 at [44].

State of Queensland v Kitchenham(2007) 186 QGIG 689.

APPEARANCES:

Mr M. Long of Counsel, instructed by Ms J. McKenzie of DSS Law, for the Applicant.

Ms S. Anderson of Counsel, instructed by Shine Lawyers for Michelle Prior, the First Respondent. Mr P. O'Neill of Counsel, directly instructed by Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator), the Second Respondent, with Ms R. Jamieson. 

Decision

Background

  1. [1]
    On 19 June 2015 Solicitors acting for Fully Integrated Therapies Pty Ltd (the employer) lodged an Application in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (the Commission) seeking leave to appear and be heard, pursuant to s 320(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (the Act), at the hearing of Appeal number WC/2014/319.  The latter matter involves an Appeal by Ms Michelle Prior against a decision of Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) (the Regulator) to overturn an earlier decision of WorkCover Queensland (WorkCover) to accept an application for compensation in respect of a psychological injury sustained on 15 January 2014 in the course of Ms Prior's then employment with the employer.  The Application for leave to appear and be heard was subsequently amended on 24 June 2015 to be in the form required under Rule 8 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (the IR Rules), rather than Rule 11. 
  1. [2]
    The employer's application to the Commission followed receipt of advice from the Regulator, dated 27 May 2015, to the effect that the Regulator had decided to concede Ms Prior's Appeal on the basis it had reached the conclusion that its prospects of success at the hearing of Ms Prior's Appeal were poor. 
  1. [3]
    The grounds upon which the employer sought leave to appear and be heard in the Appeal were recorded, in summary, as follows:
  • the determination of the Regulator would be binding and preclude the employer taking any further action;
  • there has been no delay by the employer in making this Application, and hearing dates have not been allocated to the Appeal;
  • the employer's pecuniary interest may be directly affected by the outcome of the Appeal in that if the appellant is entitled to seek damages for a psychological injury the employer will have a claim placed against its policy, impacting upon the employer's premium; and
  • the Commission can exercise a discretion pursuant to s 320 of the Act to grant the employer leave to appear and be heard (Society of the Sacred Advent Schools Pty Ltd t/a St Margaret's Anglican School v Sharon Lee Munn and Q-COMP[1]).
  1. [4]
    The employer's Application for leave to appear and be heard is opposed by Ms Prior on merit grounds and also because the Commission does not have the requisite capacity to grant the employer's Application under s 320 of the Act (Woolworths Ltd v Dinca and Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)[2] per Deputy President O'Connor).  The position of the Regulator is that it neither supports nor opposes the employer's Application.  

The Commission's powers under section 320 of the Act

  1. [5]
    The capacity of the Commission to grant an employer leave to appear and be heard in appeals under the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (the WCR Act) and its predecessor legislation the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) has been the subject of much debate and controversy for over a decade. 
  1. [6]
    The discussion seems to have first arisen in Middleton v Teys Bros (Holdings) Pty Ltd[3] where Hall P considered an Appeal by Mr Middleton against a decision of an Industrial Magistrate that he had no power to permit Mr Middleton to appear in an employer appeal against a decision of WorkCover to approve his Application for workers' compensation.  In the course of his decision His Honour said:

"There is paucity of authority on the exercise of the power at s. 320 by Industrial Magistrates.  However, there is authority upon the use of the power by the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission.  The cases certainly establish that s. 320(2) vests the commission with a wide ranging power to gather 'evidence'.  In Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association (Queensland Branch) Union of Employees and Others (1994) 145 QGIG 664 at 665 Mackenzie, President said 'The liberty (the commission) has in going about the process of informing itself for the purpose of exercising its jurisdictional powers and the performance of its duties is extremely wide.'.  The cases also establish that in order to inform itself the Commission may hear from a person with no right to be heard, Amalgamated Society of Carpenters, Joiners, Bricklayers, Plasterers, Painters and Decorators of Australasia, Union of Employees, Queensland and Federated Engine Drivers' and Firemens' Association of Australasia Queensland Branch, Union of Employees and Queensland Colliery Employees Union of Employees (1996) 153 QGIG 537 at 538 per De Jersey, President.  Once permitted to appear such a person may, subject to s. 319, be represented by counsel.  The structure of s. 320(2) makes impossible any attempt to argue that the powers of the Industrial Magistrates Court are (relevantly) different to the powers of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission.  Indeed, in contemplating that proceedings in the Industrial Magistrates Court may involve 'a person ordered or permitted to appear' s. 319(1) contemplates that s. 320(2) may be used to permit a person to appear in the Industrial Magistrates Court.  If s. 320(2) does not authorise the Industrial Magistrates Court to permit a person to appear the reference to 'a person . . . permitted to appear' in the Industrial Magistrates Court in s. 319(1) has no content.  The reference is plainly not to an intervener under s. 322.  An intervener under s. 322 is by force of the Act 'a party to the proceedings', see s. 322(3).  The reference cannot be to a person 'permitted to be heard' pursuant to s. 329(b)(v).  Section 329 deals with the powers of 'the Court, Commission and Registrar'.  'Court' is by Schedule 5 defined to be this court.  The noun does not include the Industrial Magistrates Court.  For completeness and in deference to arguments which have been put in this matter, I should emphasise that s. 320(2) vests the Industrial Magistrates Court with a discretion to allow a person to be heard.  There is no obligation to allow a person to be heard.

…

… it is the contention of the respondents (a) that Chapter 9 Part 3 (of the 1996 Act) so limits the participants in appeals to the Industrial Magistrates Court as to exclude the operation of s. 320(2) to allow a person in the position of the appellant to be heard, (b) that Chapter 9 Part 3 establishes a code governing the conduct of appeals to the Industrial Magistrates Court under the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 which leaves no room for the operation of the general provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1999, and (c) that Chapter 9 Part 3 (as part of the code previously referred to) establishes a right of appeal to this court which ousts the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 otherwise conferring upon the appellant a right to appeal and a right to seek what at one time was known as prerogative relief.

…

It may be accepted that Chapter 9 Part 3 establishes a procedural code which largely ousts the procedures, e.g. under the Industrial Court Rules 1997, which would otherwise apply in the Industrial Magistrates Court. But there is a difference between changing a procedural regime and varying the 'basis' of proceedings by sweeping away a worker's opportunity to be heard in defence of his own interests.  In my view there is nothing in Chapter 9 Part 3 to deny the Industrial Magistrate the powers which he would otherwise have had under s. 320(2) to permit the appellant (by counsel if need be) to speak in his own interests."

  1. [7]
    However, in Frazer v Gardner[4] His Honour seemed to (somewhat) resile from his reasoning in Middleton[5] in the course of considering an appeal against a decision of an Industrial Magistrate given under the provisions of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995.  In this decision Hall P said: 

"The matter is not free from difficulty.  The complainant legitimately relies heavily on the exclusion from s. 320 of 'an offence against this Act', see s. 320(1)(b).  The submission is that proceedings for 'an offence against another Act' are not excluded from the operation of s. 320.  For myself, I consider it not to be a correct approach to commence with s. 320(1).  In my view one should commence at s. 320(2) which indicates the scope of s. 320 rather than with the subsection which exempts some proceedings otherwise within its scope.  It is difficult to treat the reference to 'proceedings' in s. 320(2) as referring to anything other than proceedings under the Industrial Relations Act 1999.  Given that the immediately preceding section, viz s. 319, defines 'proceedings' to mean 'proceedings under this Act or another Act being conducted by the court, the commission, an Industrial Magistrates Court or the Registrar' and that the definition is not repeated at s. 320, one would have thought that a different meaning was intended.  It was unnecessary to exclude prosecutions under the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 from the operation of s. 320 because such prosecutions were not otherwise within the section."

  1. [8]
    In the following year, in the matter of State of Queensland v Squires and WorkCover Queensland[6], His Honour stated:

"For reasons advanced in the decision in Middleton and Teys Bros (Holdings) Pty Ltd [2001] QIC 1; (2001) 166 QGIG 138 I am satisfied that the Industrial Magistrate had power to grant the application made by the now appellant.  I accept also, for the reasons advanced in Middleton (ibid.), that the now appellant has locus standi to appeal against the decision of the Industrial Magistrate to this Court."

  1. [9]
    Sometime later, after the enactment of the WCR Act, His Honour again touched on the operation of s 320 of the Act in the course of his decision in The Corporation of the Trustees of the Order of the Sisters of Mercy Queensland Inc trading as Holy Cross Laundry and Krystyna Karas and Q-COMP[7].  In the course of that decision, in which he ruled the employer's appeal was incompetent because it was not "a party" to the proceedings below, His Honour said:

"By an Application for compensation dated 4 December 2006, Ms Krystyna Karas sought statutory benefits under the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (the Act).  She relied on a psychological injury.   WorkCover Queensland rejected the application on the ground that any psychological injury suffered by Ms Karas was withdrawn from the statutory definition of 'injury' by s. 32(5) of the Act.  There was a Statutory Review.  Q-COMP confirmed WorkCover Queensland's decision.  Ms Karas appealed to the Industrial Magistrates Court.  Ms Karas' employer was granted leave to be heard on the express basis that the employer was not being made a party to the proceedings.   I accept that in fact the employer played an active role in the proceedings in the Industrial Magistrates Court, e.g. calling and cross-examining witnesses.  All of that was allowed for by the express terms of the order which expressly denied the employer the status of a party.  In any event, the Industrial Magistrate had no power to grant the employer the status of a party.  For completeness, I should add that each of the decisions of this Court supporting the proposition that an Industrial Magistrate may grant an employer leave to be heard viz., Middleton v Teys Bros (Holdings) Pty Ltd (2001) 166 QGIG 138 and State of Queensland v Squires and WorkCover Queensland [2002] QIC 21; (2002) 170 QGIG 20, were decided on an early version of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996. It may be doubted whether grant of such leave is consistent with s. 449 (sic - should be s 549) of the Workers' Compensation Act 2003 (sic)."

  1. [10]
    Shortly after the decision immediately above, which called into question the correctness of both Middleton[8] and Squires[9] in light of the provisions of s 549 of the WCR Act, Vice President Linnane forwarded a Case Stated to the Industrial Court, pursuant to s 282 of the Act, in relation to her jurisdiction to consider an application for leave to appear and be heard pursuant to s 320 of the Act in connection with a Workers' Compensation Appeal then before her.  In setting aside the matter before him His Honour, Hall P said:

"In my view, there is no controversy properly before me.  I set aside the Case Stated.  I affirm that on the current state of the authorities, the status quo position is that s. 320 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 does vest the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (the Commission) and an Industrial Magistrate with the authority to grant interested parties leave to be heard (as a matter of discretion) and subject to such restrictions as the Commission or Industrial Magistrate thinks fit.".

  1. [11]
    Subsequently, in a matter involving Queensland Health v Robert Ollier and Q-COMP[10], delivered on 17 September 2012, the Commission as presently constituted was called upon to consider and decide an Application by the employer for leave to appear and be heard in an Appeal by Mr Ollier against a decision of Q-COMP to confirm an earlier decision of WorkCover to refuse his Application for workers' compensation.  In the course of that case Mr Watson of Counsel, who represented Mr Ollier, presented a well-argued and persuasive case to the effect that the "enhanced" provisions at s 549 of the WCR Act, when compared to s 498 of the 1996 Act, were structured in such a way as to remove any discretion that the Commission might previously have had to consider an employer Application for leave to appear and be heard in an employee appeal under the WCR Act. 
  1. [12]
    In this respect, Mr Watson argued that it was notable that while the 2003 Act:
  • permitted a worker to become a party to the appeal if the appellant was an employer; and
  • permitted an insurer to become a party to an appeal in certain circumstances (see s 54(3)(b)); and
  • permitted an employer to become a party to an appeal if the appellant was WorkCover,

there was no express provision enabling an employer to become a party to the Appeal if a worker was the appellant.

  1. [13]
    Mr Watson also argued that the Latin maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applied in this situation.  If there was no specific power granted to the Commission to allow a particular entity to appear as a party, the Commission could not draw on other perceived powers to override the provision: CJ Burland Pty Ltd v Metropolitan Meat Industry Board[11]; Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd v Transport Workers Union of Australia[12].
  1. [14]
    Additional support for the argument that the Commission could not utilise the general provisions at s 320(2) of the Act to permit an employer to become a party to Mr Ollier's Appeal, Mr Watson argued, could be found at s 553 and s 561, respectively, of the WCR Act.  By contrast, an Industrial Magistrate was able to utilise the provisions of s 320 of the Act to consider an employer application for leave to appear and be heard because of the operation of s 582 of the WCR Act which, relevantly, provides:

"582Powers of industrial magistrate

  1. (1)
    For this Act, an industrial magistrate has all the powers conferred on an industrial magistrate by the Industrial Relations Act 1999 or by the rules of court or a regulation made for that Act, so far as those powers are appropriate to matters arising under this Act.

…".

  1. [15]
    In the ultimate, I ruled that I was bound to follow the (then) President's decision in Buckley v Queensland Health and Q-COMP[13] and proceeded to consider the employer's application for leave to appear and be heard on its merits. 
  1. [16]
    However, while I am conscious of the fact that I am bound to follow decisions of the Industrial Court of Queensland (see Blackwood v Pearce[14]) I, nonetheless, harbour doubts about the outcome in Buckley[15] as a consequence of my consideration of the arguments presented in Ollier[16].  (In passing, I also note that Deputy President O'Connor has expressed similar reservations in Woolworths Ltd v Dinca and Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)[17]. 
  1. [17]
    Consequently, having decided that I am bound by the decision of the Industrial Court in Buckley[18] to accept that s 320 of the Act permits an employer to apply for leave to appear and be heard in a workers' compensation Appeal, I now turn to consider the Application by Fully Integrated Therapies Pty Ltd for leave to appear and be heard in Ms Prior's Appeal to the Commission. 

Submissions of the employer

  1. [18]
    Mr M. Long of Counsel, who represented the employer, noted that the power of the Commission to grant the Application for leave to appear and be heard is, of course, discretionary and that any decision about whether leave should be granted will turn on the facts of each particular case.  Relevant considerations in determining such Applications can include (State of Queensland v Kitchenham[19] at [692] per Deputy President Swan):
  • consideration of whether the Applicant's interests may be adversely affected by the outcome of the litigation; and
  • weighing the assistance which the Applicant for leave to be heard may be able to give to the Commission informing its mind and achieving justice against any delay in the proceedings. 
  1. [19]
    Mr Long said the position of the employer was that the initial decision of the Regulator to reject Ms Prior's Application for workers' compensation should be confirmed because Ms Prior was not an employee and, further or alternatively, if she suffered the injury alleged (which the employer is unable to presently take a position on) it is excluded under s 32(5) of the WCR Act. 
  1. [20]
    In addition, Mr Long submitted, leave should be granted because: the employer's interests may be adversely affected by the outcome of the Appeal; the Application for leave to appear and be heard has been made promptly; and, there are no compelling factors that weigh against a grant of leave.  The employer's interests may be affected because:
  • a successful Appeal may impact upon its workers' compensation premium levels;
  • being a claim for psychiatric injury arising out of management action, it is the very acts and omissions of the employer that are under direct scrutiny;
  • the appeal may impact upon the employer's reputation, as well as that of individuals employed by it;
  • a successful Appeal may result in Ms Prior becoming entitled to claim Common Law damages against the employer; and
  • a successful appeal may result in WorkCover claiming further amounts from the employer, as it did before the original decision was set aside by the Regulator in the amount of just over $18,000.  
  1. [21]
    Importantly, in Mr Long's submission, given the Regulator's stated position on the Appeal, the employer would assume primary responsibility for the case in opposition to the Appeal, with the length of any trial unlikely to be altered if the employer is granted leave to appear and be heard.  Notably, he said, Ms Prior's Appeal to the Commission is the only available opportunity for the employer to oppose Ms Prior's Appeal.  If she succeeds in her Appeal, either by concession of the Regulator or decision of the Commission, the employer would not be able to Appeal that outcome to the Industrial Court of Queensland. 
  1. [22]
    As noted above, the employer's Application for leave to appear and be heard is strongly opposed by Ms Prior through her Counsel, Ms S. Anderson.  In the course of her argument, Ms Anderson noted:
  • the hearing of this matter was set down for five days commencing on 16 February 2015;
  • on the morning of the first day of hearing an adjournment was requested by the Regulator to allow it to consider a revised Statement of Stressors, filed by Ms Prior on 13 February 2015, which identified a single stressor as the cause of her psychological or psychiatric condition;
  • that identified stressor has since been the subject of detailed consideration by the Regulator, including interview of witnesses;
  • on 26 May 2015 the Regulator informed the Commission, and Ms Prior, of its intention to concede the appeal and that it had advised the employer of its position;
  • it was clear, from information filed in relation to the present Application for leave to appear and be heard, that the employer did not have a workers' compensation insurance policy at the time of Ms Prior's injury, as required by s 48 of the WCR Act;
  • it was also clear that the employer's Application for leave to appear and be heard was an attempt to protect the employer against being required to repay the workers' compensation payments made to Ms Prior by WorkCover (see s 57 of the WCR Act);
  • the only way for the employer to avoid repaying these amounts is if it is successful in a claim that Ms Prior was not an employee at the time of her injury - which is a new argument that would seem to have no prospect of success;
  • the employer has admitted to using Ms Prior's service provider numbers for health services provided to clients by other staff, which is the cause of Ms Prior's psychological or psychiatric injury, on the basis that "Medicare said it was OK";
  • given that the Regulator has said it will concede the Appeal there is no utility in granting the employer a right of appearance; and
  • granting the employer leave to appear and be heard will cause Ms Prior to incur costs, even in the event she is successful.  Further, the employer does not offer to indemnify her for her costs if it is unsuccessful.

Costs

  1. [23]
    In the course of hearing the employer's Application for leave to appear and be heard, I asked Mr Long to obtain instructions from his client about its attitude to the issue of costs in connection with both the present Application and the eventual hearing if his client's application for leave to appear and be heard was granted.  By way of email advice, my Associate received the following response from Solicitors representing the employer:

"If the Commission is minded to make the orders sought in the application only upon the condition that the following additional Orders are also made, then our client will consent to the following additional Orders being made:

  1. That the Employer pay Ms Prior’s costs of the Application filed 24 June 2015; and
  1. That the Employer will not be at liberty to seek costs from Ms Prior at the completion of the hearing of Matter No. WC/2014/320 (sic - should be WC/2014/319) unless allowed by the presiding officer hearing the matter.

We have been informed that the Regulator does not intend to seek its costs of the Application from our client."

 Consideration and conclusion

  1. [24]
    The arguments for and against granting of the employer's Application for leave to appear and be heard in Ms Prior's matter are finally balanced.  On the one hand, the employer points to:
  • the actual and potential impact which acceptance of Ms Prior's Appeal would have on its pecuniary interests being:
  • an increase in its worker's compensation premium levels; and
  • the potential for WorkCover to seek to recover, pursuant to s 57 of the WCR Act, any payments made to Ms Prior;
  • damage to its reputation and that of its employees; and
  • the fact that Ms Prior's Appeal to the Commission is the only opportunity the employer will have to challenge her Application for workers' compensation. 
  1. [25]
    On the other, counsel for Ms Prior argues, inter alia, that:
  • the Regulator has carefully investigated the relevant stressors and, after such investigation, has decided to concede the Appeal;
  • Ms Prior will be forced to incur further costs in pursuing her Appeal if the employer is granted leave to appear and be heard, in circumstances where:
  • the employer has declined to indemnify her if it is unsuccessful; and
  • the grounds of opposition foreshadowed by the employer have either not been raised to date or seem to be inconsistent with previous admissions of fact made by it. 
  1. [26]
    At the end of the day, after carefully considering the competing arguments, I have decided not to exercise my discretion to grant the employer's Application for leave to appear and be heard. 
  1. [27]
    In so deciding, I have taken into account the following facts and factors;
  • any decision to grant an application by an employer, pursuant to s 320(2) of the Act, is discretionary and is to be decided on the facts of each particular case;
  • in this matter, there is only one identified stressor - which relates to the employer's use of Ms Prior's health provider numbers without her knowledge or consent;
  • the Regulator has carefully considered the grounds of Appeal, which included interviewing witnesses and obtaining information from the employer, and has decided to concede the Appeal;
  • the position of the Regulator reverses its previous decision to overturn the decision of WorkCover, which decided Ms Prior's Application for workers' compensation was one for acceptance;
  • although one of the employer's stated grounds for seeking leave to appear and be heard is that Ms Prior was not an employee, Mr Long was not in a position to confirm whether that point would be pressed at trial - saying it was still under review;
  • at the time of Ms Prior's injury the employer did not have workers' compensation insurance;
  • a primary motivating factor as to why the employer seeks leave to appear and be heard is to reduce its actual, or potential, liabilities should WorkCover choose to pursue, pursuant to s 57 of the WCR Act, workers' compensation payments and any Common Law damages which may be awarded to Ms Prior;
  • the employer's concerns about the potential impact on its reputation, and that of its employees, will be negated if there is no trial; and
  • whether, in the circumstances of this case, Ms Prior should be forced to expend further monies to "defend" the settlement of her Appeal with the Regulator, especially where the employer has not agreed not to seek costs against her if it is successful or offered to meet her costs on an indemnity basis if it is unsuccessful.    
  1. [28]
    For the foregoing reasons I refuse the employer's Application for leave to appear and be heard in Matter No. WC/2014/319.  I dismiss Application No. WC/2015/162. 
  1. [29]
    After noting that the authorities establish that the employer had the right to pursue the present Application for leave to appear and be heard and that that Application has been refused on discretionary grounds, I determine that the employer is to pay Ms Prior's costs of, and incidental to, the Application at the relevant Scale.  Unless I am informed that the Regulator is also seeking its costs in relation to the employer's Application I make no order as to costs (at this time) insofar as the Regulator is concerned. 
  1. [30]
    I determine and Order accordingly.

Footnotes

[1] Society of the Sacred Advent Schools Pty Ltd t/a St Margaret's Anglican School v Sharon Lee Munn and

Q-COMP (2007) QGIG 15.

[2] Woolworths Ltd v Dinca and Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 005.

[3] Middleton v Teys Bros (Holdings) Pty Ltd [2001] QIC 1; 166 QGIG 138 (23 January 2001).

[4] Frazer v Gardner [2001] QIC 43; 167 QGIG 911 (21 August 2001).

[5] Middleton v Teys Bros (Holdings) Pty Ltd [2001] QIC 1; 166 QGIG 138 (23 January 2001).

[6] State of Queensland v Squires and WorkCover Queensland [2002] QIC 21; 170 QGIG 20 (7 May 2002).

[7] The Corporation of the Trustees of the Order of the Sisters of Mercy Queensland Inc trading as Holy Cross Laundry and Krystyna Karas and Q-COMP [2009] QIC 34; 192 QGIG 127 (6 October 2009).

[8] Middleton v Teys Bros (Holdings) Pty Ltd [2001] QIC 1; 166 QGIG 138 (23 January 2001).

[9] State of Queensland v Squires and WorkCover Queensland [2002] QIC 21; 170 QGIG 20 (7 May 2002).

[10] Queensland Health v Robert Ollier and Q-COMP (WC/2012/268) - Decision .

[11] CJ Burland Pty Ltd v Metropolitan Meat Industry Board [1968] 12 RCLO 400 at 407.

[12] Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd v Transport Workers Union of Australia [1987] 21 IR 288.

[13] Judith Buckley v Queensland Health and Q-COMP (C/2010/13) - Report on Decision - .

[14] Blackwood v Pearce [2015] ICQ 012 at [44].

[15] Op. Cit.

[16] Queensland Health v Robert Ollier and Q-COMP (WC/2012/268) - Decision .

[17] Woolworths Ltd v Dinca and Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 005.

[18] Op. Cit.

[19] State of Queensland v Kitchenham (2007) 186 QGIG 689.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Fully Integrated Therapies Pty. Ltd. v Prior and Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Fully Integrated Therapies Pty. Ltd. v Prior and Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)

  • MNC:

    [2015] QIRC 137

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Member Deputy President Bloomfield

  • Date:

    24 Jul 2015

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Brisbane City Council v Gillow (1996) 153 QGIG 537
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1996) 153 QGIG 537
Brisbane City Council v Gillow & Simon Blackwood (1994) 145 QGIG 664
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1994) 145 QGIG 664
Decision . CJ Burland Pty Ltd v Metropolitan Meat Industry Board [1968] 12 RCLO 400
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1968] 12 RCLO 400
Cite 2 - [1968] 12 RCLO 400
Frazer v Gardner [2001] QIC 43
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] QIC 43
Cite 2 - [2001] QIC 43
Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd v Transport Workers Union of Australia [1987] 21 IR 288
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1987] 21 IR 288
Cite 2 - [1987] 21 IR 288
Margaret's Anglican School v Sharon Lee Munn and Q-COMP (2007) QGIG 15
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2007) QGIG 15
Cite 2 - (2007) QGIG 15
Middleton and Teys Bros (Holdings) Pty Ltd (2001) 166 QGIG 138
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 166 QGIG 138
Cite 2 - (2001) 166 QGIG 138
Middleton v Teys Bros (Holdings) Pty Ltd [2001] QIC 1
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] QIC 1
Cite 2 - [2001] QIC 1
Cite 3 - [2001] QIC 1
Cite 4 - [2001] QIC 1
Cite 5 - [2001] QIC 1
State of Queensland v Kitchenham (2007) 186 QGIG 689
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (2007) 186 QGIG 689
Cite 2 - (2007) 186 QGIG 689
State of Queensland v Squires & WorkCover (2002) 170 QGIG 20
1 citation
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Cite 1 - (2002) 170 QGIG 20
State of Queensland v Squires and WorkCover Queensland [2002] QIC 21
4 citations
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Cite 1 - [2002] QIC 21
Cite 2 - [2002] QIC 21
Cite 3 - [2002] QIC 21
Cite 4 - [2002] QIC 21
The Corporation of the Trustees of the Order of the Sisters of Mercy Queensland Inc trading as Holy Cross Laundry and Krystyna Karas and Q-COMP [2009] QIC 34
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2009] QIC 34
Cite 2 - [2009] QIC 34
Woolworths Ltd v Dinca & Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 5
3 citations
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Cite 1 - [2014] QIRC 5
Cite 2 - [2014] QIRC 5
Cite 3 - [2014] QIRC 5
Workers' Compensation Regulator v Pearce [2015] ICQ 12
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2015] ICQ 12
Cite 2 - [2015] ICQ 12

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Brisbane City Council v Gillow [2016] ICQ 72 citations
1

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