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Rankine v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)[2015] QIRC 142

Rankine v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)[2015] QIRC 142

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Rankine v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 142

PARTIES:

Rankine, Rhonda as Personal Representative of the Estate of George Rankine

(Appellant)

v

Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)

(Respondent)

Mount Isa Mines Ltd

(Employer)

CASE NO:

WC/2013/423

PROCEEDING:

Application for extension of time

DELIVERED ON:

3 August 2015

HEARING DATES:

12-13 February 2015

2 April 2015 (Appellant Submissions)

14 April 2015 (Employer Submissions)

23 April 2015 (Respondent Submissions)

4 May 2015 (Submissions in Reply)

18 May 2015 (Further Respondent Submissions)

19 May 2015 (Further Employer Submissions)

28 May 2015 (Appellant's Final Submissions)

MEMBER:

Deputy President Swan

ORDERS :

  1. The extension of time is granted.
  2. Matter returned to Regulator to proceed to decide the application for review

[s 558(1)(d)].

CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - APPEAL AGAINST DECISION - Application for extension of time - 'reasonable cause' established - failure of solicitors to lodge a compensation application in time.

CASES:

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003

Quinlivan v Portland Harbour Trust [1963] VR 25 at 28 (Sholl J)

Black v City of South Melbourne [1963] VR 34 at 38 (Full Court)

Quinlivan at 30-31;  Black at 38-39;  Perdis v Nominal Defendant (2003) at 2 Qd R 64 at 12 (Davis JA) and 37-38 (Mackenzie J)

Sophron v Nominal Defendant 1957 HCA 27 96 CLR @ 469

Director-General, Department of Transport Congress Community Development and Education Unit Limited unreported judgment, Land Appeal Court, 25 June 1998 at page 6

Bluescope Steel Ltd v Eason [2007] NSWWCCPD 172

Appo v. Review Unit Q-COMP unreported judgment Industrial Magistrates Court, 15 May 2003 at page 5

Cook v. Q-COMP (2008) 187 QGIG 220 at page 224

APPEARANCES:

Mr T. Pincus, Counsel instructed by Slater and Gordon Solicitors for the Appellant.

Mr S. Gray, Counsel directly instructed by Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator), the Respondent.

Ms J. McClymont, Counsel instructed by Dibbs Barker Lawyers, for the employer/MIM.

Decision

  1. [1]
    This Appeal has been made by Ms Rhonda Rankine as Personal Representative of the Estate of her father, Mr George Rankin (the Appellant) against a decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator (the Respondent) dated 25 November 2013.  The Application for Compensation was lodged some 4 months beyond the statutory limitation of 6 months.  The statutory time limit pursuant to Section 131 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (WCRA) expired on Monday 15 July 2012.
  1. [2]
    Mt Isa Mines Ltd (Employer/MIM), by consent, was granted Leave to be Heard in this matter.  The Employer was given liberty to:
  • Call and adduce evidence in the Appeal in the Commission;
  • Cross examine the Appellant and witnesses called by the Appellant in the Appeal to the Commission;
  • Make submissions and address submissions of the Appellant and/or the Regulator at the hearing of the Appeal to the Commission.
  1. [3]
    Xstrata Queensland Limited (Xstrata), the self-insurer, rejected the Application for Compensation lodged by the Public Trustee of Queensland on behalf of the Estate of the late George Rankin.

Agreed matters between the parties

  1. [4]
    The parties agreed on the following matters:
  • The date of diagnosis for the purposes of Section 36A of the WCRA is 16 January 2012;
  • The date on which the entitlement to compensation arose is 16 January 2012;
  • The statutory time limit pursuant to Section 131 of the WCRA expired on Monday 15 July 2012; and
  • The Application for compensation was not lodged until 20 November 2012.

Background to the Application

  1. [5]
    Mr George Rankin passed away on 7 April 2012, aged 75 years.  On 20 November 2012, the Public Trustee of Queensland lodged a statutory Application for Compensation with Xstrata for an injury defined as "asbestos-related lung cancer", allegedly caused 'over a period of time' from 1978 to 1998 whilst Mr Rankine was working with the 'mill relining crew' and the 'pipe fitting crew' with MIM.

Particulars of the Application

  1. [6]
    The Respondent, in its Review Decision confirmed the decision of Xstrata not to waive the statutory timeframe for lodging the Application for Compensation in accordance with Section 131 of the WCRA.
  1. [7]
    Section 36A(3) of the WCRA states "Section 131 applies to the Application for Compensation as if the entitlement to compensation arose on the day of the Doctor's diagnosis".
  1. [8]
    Section 131(1) of the WCRA states that an Application for Compensation is valid and enforceable only if it is lodged within six months after the entitlement to compensation arises.  If the Application is lodged outside this timeframe, the time for applying may be waived if the failure to lodge the Application was due to one or more of the reasons in Section 131(5) of the WCRA.

 Grounds of Appeal

  1. [9]
    The grounds cited are that the Respondent erred in holding that there was no reasonable excuse for the Statutory Application being late and that the period of time that  had elapsed between 16 July 2012 and the date of the Application should not be waived.

 History of the Application

  1. [10]
    Mr Rankine was employed by MIM from approximately 1973 to 1998 and was diagnosed with lung cancer - "a latent onset injury" as that term is defined in s 36A of the WCRA - on 16 January 2012.
  1. [11]
    Mr Rankine engaged Slater & Gordon (Solicitors) to pursue any entitlement he had to compensation under the WCRA, on or about 21 February 2012.  He signed an Application for Compensation under the WCRA on or about 23 March 2012.  Mr Rankine passed away on 7 April 2012.
  1. [12]
    The Appellant states that the time limit prescribed for the compensation Application by virtue of s 131 of the WCRA expired on 16 July 2012.

Note: (The references e.g. [B101-106] below refer to page numbers in the bundle of    documents relied upon in this hearing - "the Bundle").

  1. [13]
    On 29 November 2012, Mr Rankine's lawyer at Slater & Gordon, Mr Carl Hughes (Senior Associate), lodged an Application for Compensation [B101-106] pursuant to the Act with the self-insurance unit of MIM - XtraCare.
  1. [14]
    This Application was rejected by XtraCare on 27 May 2013, on the grounds, firstly, that it had been lodged outside of the six month time limit prescribed in the WCRA and secondly XtraCare determined not to waive the time limit [s 131(5)].  The reason for this was that the delay in lodgement was not due to a reasonable cause and, if there was a reasonable cause, the discretion was exercised not to waive in light of asserted poor prospects of the Application and prejudice to XtraCare resulting from the delay [B125-128 at paras 8.1 - 8.23] [Appellant's submissions point 1(d)(i) and (ii)].

 Relevant Legislation

  1. [15]
    Section 32 of the WCRA defines "injury" as:

  "32 Meaning of injury

  1. An injury is personal injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if -
  1. for an injury other than a psychiatric or psychological disorder - the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury; or
  2. for a psychiatric or psychological disorder - the employment is the major significant contributing factor to the injury.
  1. However, employment need not be a contributing factor to the injury if section 34(2) or 35(2) applies.
  1. Injury includes the following -
  1. a disease contracted in the course of employment, whether at or away from the place of employment, if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the disease;
  2. an aggravation of the following, if the aggravation arises out of or in the course of, employment and the employment is a significant contributing factor to the aggravation;
  1. (i)
    a personal injury other than a psychiatric or psychological disorder:
  2. (ii)
    a disease;
  3. (iii)
    a medical condition other than a psychiatric or psychological disorder, if the condition becomes a personal injury or disease because of the aggravation;

    ba) an aggravation of a psychiatric or psychological disorder, if the aggravation arises out of, or in the course of, employment

  1. loss of hearing resulting in industrial deafness if the employment is a significant contributing factor to causing the loss of hearing;
  2. death from injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if the employment is a significant contributing factor to casing the injury;
  3. death from a disease mentioned in paragraph a), if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the disease;
  4. death from an aggravation mentioned in paragraph b), if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the aggravation.
  1. For subsection (3)(b) and (ba), to remove any doubt, it is declared that an aggravation mentioned in the provision is an injury only to the extent of the effects of the aggravation.
  1. …"
  1. [16]
    Section 36A provides:

"36A Date of injury

  1. (1)
    This section applies if a person -
  1. (a)
    is diagnosed by a doctor after the commencement of this section as having a latent onset injury; and
  2. (b)
    applies for compensation for the latent onset injury.

  …

  1. (3)
    Section 131 applies to the Application for compensation as if the entitlement to compensation arose on the day of the Doctor's diagnosis."
  1. [17]
    Section131 provides:

"131 Time for applying

  1. (1)
    An Application for compensation is valid and enforceable only if the Application is lodged by the claimant within 6 months after the entitlement to compensation arises.
  1. (2)
    If an Application is lodged more than 20 business days after the entitlement to compensation arises, the extent of the insurer's liability to pay compensation is limited to a period starting no earlier than 20 business days before the day on which the valid Application is lodged.
  1. (3)
    Subsection (2) does not apply if death is, or results from, the injury.
  1. (4)
    An insurer must waive subsection (1) for a particular Application if it is satisfied that special circumstances of a medical nature, decided by a medical assessment tribunal, exist.
  1. (5)
    An insurer may waive subsection (1) or (2) for a particular Application if the insurer is satisfied that a claimant's failure to lodge the Application was due to -
  1. (a)
    mistake; or
  1. (b)
    the claimant's absence from the State; or
  1. (c)
    a reasonable cause."

The Appellant's claim

  1. [18]
    Mr Rankine engaged Slater & Gordon in a timely way to handle his compensation claim, and reasonably entrusted the conduct of the claim to the firm.
  1. [19]
    The late lodgement of the Application is attributable to Slater & Gordon, and there is "no reason to sheet home to Mr Rankine or his estate the consequences of the firm's delay" [Appellant's submissions Point 4b].
  1. [20]
    The Appellant also submits that there is no other factor sufficient to outweigh the reasonable cause established by the facts of the situation.

Mr Rankine's Claim History

  1. [21]
    Mr Rankine left school at 13 years of age and worked as a stockman, or similar, until he commenced working for MIM in or about 1973.  He had no formal education after leaving school and was unfamiliar with legal matters.
  1. [22]
    During his working life at MIM he worked in the pipe and pump fitting crew until 1998.
  1. [23]
    Mr Rankin was nearly 75 years old when he was diagnosed with lung cancer on 16 January 2012.  He had prior health problems including a heart attack and prostate cancer and was, 6 months prior to his diagnosis, in a state of declining physical and mental health.
  1. [24]
    Ms Rhonda Rankine (Mr Rankine's daughter) gave evidence as to her knowledge around issues concerning Mr Rankine and his Application.  Ms Rankine had lived with her father as his carer since late 2011.  She was appointed as Mr Rankine's Executor and, after her father's death, she was doing what was required to advance his claim.
  1. [25]
    Mr Rankine commenced chemotherapy which ultimately had to be ceased because of his declining health.  He had his first and only meeting with Mr Hughes on 27 February 2012 and this was 5 weeks before he passed away.  At the time of the interview he was "in his hospital bed hooked up to oxygen and other sorts of apparatus" [T2-9].
  1. [26]
    Mr Rankine believed that his lung cancer may have been associated with asbestos exposure during his employment with MIM.  In sufficient time, Mr Rankine entrusted Slater & Gordon with doing whatever was required to advance his claim.
  1. [27]
    Ms Rankine's evidence was that Slater & Gordon was contacted because she was aware of its relevant expertise concerning compensation claims arising from asbestos exposure and also that the firm was a large national firm.
  1. [28]
    While the subsequent authorization of the Public Trustee to administer Mr Rankine's estate occurred, this did not interfere with the estate's reliance upon Slater & Gordon to advance Mr Rankine's claim.
  1. [29]
    Mr Hughes had carriage of the claim.  He had experience in personal injuries and worker's compensation claims including those associated with asbestos. Mr Hughes said that he had limited assistance in dealing with this matter from Ms Sears (lawyer) and Ms Sakaria (legal assistant).
  1. [30]
    Prior to the lodgement of the Application on 20 November 2012, Mr Hughes and Slater & Gordon did not have any other communication with Mr Rankine, Ms Rankine or the Public Trustee in writing or otherwise concerning the time limitation period for compensation claims under the WCRA [T1-21; T 2-8; B8-31; B99; B86; B103 and T2 - 11, 24, 46, 48].  There had been no discussion between the abovementioned persons as to whether lodgement of the compensation Application would or should be delayed, after Mr Rankine had signed it on 23 March 2012, pending the receipt of a causation opinion from a medical specialist.
  1. [31]
    As it transpired, the limitation period expired and Mr Rankine's Application for Compensation had not been lodged. 
  1. [32]
    Reference was made to correspondence sent from Slater & Gordon on 14 March 2012, to Mr Rankine with confirmation that Mr Hughes would have responsibility for the matter but that Ms Sears would have the day-to-day conduct of his file under Mr Hughes' supervision.  Ms Sears said that she had nothing to do with the conduct of the Application either before or after the letter of 14 March 2012 had been sent and she knew nothing further until after the Application had been rejected [T2-3].  Ms Sears had never met Mr Rankine.
  1. [33]
    It was only after the Application was rejected that Ms Sears sought to obtain further medical evidence in support of the Application.  To this end, correspondence, with relevant documents and information, was sent to Professor Breslin from Slater & Gordon seeking a medical report. Ms Sears agreed that this was the first occasion upon which a medical opinion had been sought from Professor Breslin [T2 - 5]. 
  1. [34]
    Mr Hughes' evidence was that he was employed by Slater & Gordon predominantly dealing with personal injuries matters.  The focus of his practice from 2008 to 2013 related solely to asbestos litigation.  During 2012 Mr Hughes was employed as a Senior Associate.
  1. [35]
    Mr Hughes said that at any time he could have in excess of 100 files to manage and this required monitoring of files, new enquiries in relation to diagnosis or the progression of an asbestos related disease. Of those files, around 30 would be active files.   Ms Joanne Wade was his supervisor.
  1. [36]
    A filing system was utilised at Slater & Gordon which recorded on going matters relating to a particular file.  Files recorded relevant limitation periods.  The type of delays which could be associated with these files included waiting for further information in which case, sometimes limitation periods were not met.
  1. [37]
    Mr Hughes recalled his meeting with Mr Rankine when he was in Hospital in Mount Isa.  He also recalled meeting Mr Rankine's daughter, Ms Rankine.
  1. [38]
    MIM and the Appellant made reference to a number of documents which set out communications from Mr Hughes to either Mr or Ms Rankine and various responses together with other documentary information.  It is not necessary to detail all documentation, however, the "Trial Bundle" shows that communication between Ms Rankine and Slater & Gordon was extensive and consistent covering a period from 21 February 2012 up until on or about November 2012.  Generally those documents show:

21 February 2012  Mr Hughes spoke to Ms Rankine to gain initial instructions.

21 February 2012  Ms Rankine sent Mr Hughes a Discharge Summary form relating to her father's discharge from Townsville Hospital.

21 February 2012  XtraCare sent Mr Hughes a copy of the Application for Compensation form.

27 February 2012  Mr Hughes had an appointment with Mr Rankine to ascertain his claim.

1 March 2012   This relates to an email sent from Mr Hughes to his Supervisor, Ms Wade at Slater & Gordon.  Mr Hughes said that the purpose of the email was to gain advice and direction from Ms Wade in relation to whether or not Mr Rankine had a successful claim in light of the diagnosis of lung cancer and the importance of proving there were asbestos markers on any of the radiological evidence that may have been provided.

1 March 2012   Ms Wade sent a file note to Mr Hughes relating to the conversation she had with him.  In summary, Mr Hughes said the note advised him to obtain further medical evidence from Professor Henderson.

2 March 2012   Ms Rankine contacted Mr Hughes forwarding a number of radiology reports.

9 March 2012   A file note is recorded on this date of a discussion with Ms Rankine describing the type of work her father had done.  The note advised Mr Hughes that the Public Trustee was named as the Executor of her father's estate and that Ms Rankine held the Power of Attorney for her father.

13 March 2012   Mr Hughes communicated with the Townsville Hospital seeking a copy of pathology material relating to Mr Rankine and that this material be forwarded urgently to Professor Henderson.

14 March 2012   Mr Hughes sent a letter to Mr Rankine with the introductory paragraph:

     "I refer to the above matter and as promised, I am writing to confirm the matters you discussed with myself on Monday 27 February 2012 including your retainer of Slater & Gordon to act on your behalf in relation to a claim for compensation arising from your past exposure to asbestos."

     The Commission's attention was drawn to various parts of that correspondence through questioning by Mr Pincus of Mr Hughes. 

     Page 2 of that letter (page 50 of the bundle) states inter alia that:

     "I confirm your instructions that you wish us to act on your behalf and I advise that, in accordance with your instructions, I have lodged an Application for Compensation through Xstrata.  I have now instituted a Common Law claim in the Supreme Court of Queensland to preserve your rights and those of your family.  Those Common Law proceedings will NOT be served at this time, but will be held in abeyance."

     Attached to that correspondence was a Statutory Declaration form and an Application for Compensation form.  Mr Hughes' evidence, which was not challenged, was that the forms had been signed by Mr Rankine on 23 March 2012 [T2-21].

  1. [39]
    Mr Hughes' evidence was that once the forms were signed, he would seek to obtain medical evidence in relation to causation and also to diagnosis issues and then advise Mr Rankine of his chances of success.
  1. [40]
    On the XtraCare form (page 103 of the Bundle) the first two dot points under the heading of "Important Information Please Read before signing this Form" related to time limitations concerning the Application for Compensation.  The first reminder was that the form must be lodged within 28 days from the date of entitlement and an Application for Compensation lodged 6 months after the date of entitlement may not be valid.  Mr Hughes did not recall advising his client of this [T2-22].  Mr Hughes did not believe that either Mr or Ms Rankine had any knowledge of the time limitations relating to this matter.
  1. [41]
    It was agreed between the parties at the commencement of the hearing that the actual diagnosis of Mr Rankine's cancer was provided on 16 January 2012.  Mr Hughes' evidence was the 6 months commenced from the date of the work related injury or the diagnosis of the work related injury.  At this point he stated Mr Rankine merely had lung cancer and that wasn't necessarily an injury that arose out of the course of his employment [T2-23].
  1. [42]
    Documentation produced showed that Mr Hughes, after the death of Mr Rankine, was awaiting further medical information from Dr Joshi whom he thought was either Mr Rankine's General Practitioner or some other treatment provider [T2-25].  As of 4 May 2012, Mr Hughes had contacted Ms Rankine advising that he was still seeking further medical reports.
  1. [43]
    Mr Hughes said that after the death of Mr Rankine he was attempting to find out whether Mr Rankine had made a Will and the identity of  the Executor.  Being informed about the involvement of the Public Trustee, Mr Hughes sought to obtain instructions from them.  Mr Hughes had not found it unusual that he was receiving documents from Ms Rankin rather than from the Public Trustee as it was his experience that the Public Trustee would often take a back-seat in relation to the ongoing management of this type of claim [T2-29].
  1. [44]
    Correspondence from the Public Trustee on 23 July 2012 to Mr Hughes confirmed that Ms Rankine had renounced her position as Executor of Mr Rankine's estate and instructed the Public Trustee to administer the estate.  To Mr Hughes this meant that instructions would now come from the Public Trustee.  On 1 August 2012, Mr Hughes sent an email to Dr Joshi attaching again his letter of 13 April 2012.  On the same date, Mr Hughes contacted the Public Trustee stating that proceedings in the matter of Mr Rankine and his claim had been instituted but "they have yet to be served as we are in the process of obtaining further medical records as to the extent of the late Mr Rankine's asbestos disease." The letter further states:

"The death Certificate refers to the cause of death as lung cancer with multiple metastases.  We are in the process of obtaining medical records from the Townsville Hospital as to the extent of his asbestos related disease and the impact it had on his diagnosis of lung cancer.  If it can be proved that the extent of his asbestos exposure was such that it caused or materially contributed to the development of his lung cancer then the estate would have a viable claim for Common Law Damages".

  1. [45]
    As of 27 August 2012 Ms Sakaria was still awaiting a response from Dr Joshi and had contacted his associate to that effect.
  1. [46]
    Mr Hughes received correspondence from Dr Joshi on 25 October 2012 which stated that he believed Mr Rankine's exposure to asbestos "has been significant and it cannot be ruled out as an etiological or causative factor."  Mr Hughes sent a copy of this correspondence to Ms Rankine on 29 October 2012.  Mr Hughes believed that he still required instructions from Ms Rankine before lodging the statutory Application.  A file note confirmed that Ms Rankine in November 2012 had approved him proceeding with the lodgement of that Application.
  1. [47]
    By Registered Post on 19 November 2012, Slater & Gordon sent to XtraCare its Application for a lump sum benefit.  The letter made no mention of the time limitation period.  This claim was rejected by XtraCare on 27 May 2013.
  1. [48]
    On 21 December 2012, Dibbs Barker Solicitors acting for MIM wrote to Slater & Gordon advising that its client had lodged its Application outside of the period stipulated by Section 131(1) of the WCRA and asked if Slater & Gordon could explain the reason(s) for its client's failure to lodge the Application within time.  That letter also sought confirmation that Ms Rankine was the personal legal representative of Mr Rankine and, if not that Slater & Gordon identify the personal legal representative.
  1. [49]
    MIM states that the 'reasonable cause' relied upon by the Appellant is that Mr Rankine and his daughter, Ms Rankine entrusted this matter to a Solicitor whom they believed was competent and qualified.  The late lodgement of Mr Rankine's Application is attributable to his solicitors, Slater & Gordon.  MIM says it agrees that much of the responsibility falls on Slater & Gordon [MIM 8].M submissions paragraph 8

 MIM submissions

  1. [50]
    MIM submits that it was the Solicitor's correspondence of 14 March 2012, which indicates that it was then the intention (as communicated to Mr Rankine) that the Application for Compensation be lodged immediately.  MIM submits that the relevant parts of that letter show that:

  i. The stated intention was to lodge the Application (indeed, the mistaken statement that the Application had already been lodged) and that it was expected to be successful;

  ii. The evidence that Mr Hughes was clearly conscious of the applicable time limits.  Notably, he filed a Supreme Court Claim and Statement of Claim "to preserve your rights" even though there were no instructions to pursue that claim at that time;

  iii. The statements in the letter of 14 March 2012, that the solicitors would send the pathology material to a specialist in South Australia for an opinion.  In fact, the solicitors made one request for the pathology material, were told it was at another clinic, then (as far as the evidence reveals) did nothing more.  So far as the evidence reveals, Slater & Gordon never referred the pathology material to a specialist in South Australia.

This process did not proceed and MIM says there is no explanation for any change in plan or update to Mr or Ms Rankine.
    1. [52]
      The fact that the Solicitors delayed lodgement of the Application for Compensation pending receipt of Dr Joshi's medical report was unreasonable as:
    • [51]

        "a. Mr Rankine clearly had, at the very least, a suspicion that his work duties contributed to the condition of cancer because he sought legal advice in relation to a claim.

        b. Mr Hughes had already formed the opinion (as expressed to Mr Rankine) that the Application would be successful.

        c. When he filed the Claim and Statement of Claim, Mr Hughes had a belief that it was arguable that Mr Rankine's asbestos exposure was a cause of his lung cancer.

        d. All that was required to be lodged with the Application was a medical certificate [s 132(3)(a)].  The solicitors did not ever attempt to obtain a medical certificate." [MIM 9(iii), 11d, 12].MIM submissions 9(iii), 11d, 12

      1. [53]
        MIM also submitted that even if it was reasonable to await a report, the actual delay rendered the situation unreasonable.   It was unreasonable because:
      • Only one attempt was made to obtain the Pathology report.
      • Notwithstanding that the solicitor said he would obtain a report from Dr Henderson, there appeared to be no attempt to do so.
      • Rather than await Dr Joshi's report, the solicitor could have obtained another report from another Doctor.  MIM says that Dr Joshi's office was never advised that receipt of the report was urgent.
      • By this time, MIM said Ms Rankine had telephoned the solicitors to determine how the matter was proceeding.  No reasonable response was provided by Mr Hughes.
      • As to "reasonable reliance upon the conduct of the solicitor", MIM said that both Mr and Ms Rhonda Rankine ought to have appreciated that the case was not proceeding as promised.
      • As Ms Rankine handed matters over to the Public Trustee on 8 June 2012, Mr Hughes understood that the Public Trustee would have to be involved, but there was only one communication with them after the expiration of the time limit.
      • While Mr Hughes advised that the Public Trustee often took a' back seat' in matters such as this and left the management of the matter in the hands of the Solicitors, MIM says there is nothing to show that any arrangement had been made by the Solicitors with the Public Trustee to that effect.
      1. [54]
        The Respondent detailed its reasons for the dismissal of the Appeal:
      1. it is accepted that for  the period that he was alive, Mr Rankine could demonstrate reasonable cause;
      1. reasonable cause has not been demonstrated for the period that Ms Rankine was Executor of the estate;
      1. there was no evidence as to what steps were taken or not taken by the Public Trustee in the period when it was responsible for the administration of the estate which would allow the Commission to make any finding at all as to reasonable cause; and
      1. if the Commission determined that reasonable cause has been demonstrated, the circumstances of this case do not warrant the discretion being granted to waive the limitation period.

       Submissions

      1. [55]
        The Appellant stated that there was no legal principle where the issue of the negligence or dilatory conduct of a Solicitor could never be ascribed to the client.  In Sophron v Nominal Defendant, the High Court stated:

        "No one, of course, doubts that such a consideration as the blamelessness of the claimant and the responsibility of his solicitor is very material.  But every case must be determined on its own facts."[1]

      1. [56]
        The Appellant said that Ms Rankine should have appreciated that the case was not proceeding as assured.  Ms Rankine handed the responsibility of her father's estate on to the Public Trustee before 8 June 2012 and Mr Hughes had understood this to mean that the Public Trustee would have kept Ms Rankine informed in relation to the claim [T2-52].  Notwithstanding Mr Hughes' comments concerning the Public Trustee and his belief that it would take a 'back seat' in terms of the handling of the matter, there was no evidence of any arrangements made between Mr Hughes and the Public Trustee in this regard.
      1. [57]
        Mr Hughes had been unable to confirm that he had given Mr and Ms Rankine advice about limitation periods, but said that it had been his normal practice to do so [T2-37].  His file note of the meeting on 27 February 2012, did not record what advice he may have given to Mr and Ms Rankine.
      1. [58]
        Ms Rankine's evidence was that she had read all documentation provided by her solicitor and she understood the importance of ensuring that documentation prepared for a legal claim was accurate.
      1. [59]
        In March 2012, Mr Hughes had advised Ms Rankine in writing that he had lodged an Application for Compensation, advising her that he thought the claim would be successful.  He also advised that he would send pathology material to a medical specialist in South Australia.  In that correspondence he had also included an Application for Compensation and requested it be completed and returned.
      1. [60]
        The time limit for lodgement of the claim was printed on the front of the form which Ms Rankine said she had read.  She made some amendments to the form and returned it to Slater & Gordon.  She understood that, according to the letter of 14 March 2012, that the Application had been lodged.
      1. [61]
        In later correspondence to the solicitors, Ms Rankine had not enquired about the time limits for the Application to be lodged.
      1. [62]
        Ms Rankine, while not being sure of the date, agreed that prior to 8 June 2012, she determined to hand over everything relating to Mr Rankine's estate to the Public Trustee and understood that it would liaise with her solicitors.
      1. [63]
        In its view, MIM believed that Ms Rankine was complicit in permitting the Application to lapse because she had done nothing to press for information about the progress of the claim [MIM Submissions - page 6 of 9].
      1. [64]
        MIM said that Ms Rankine made no attempt to contact her solicitors between 18 July and October 2012.
      1. [65]
        MIM stated that the conduct of the Appellant's solicitors were 'entirely unsatisfactory' with regard to:

      "a. The content of the letter of 14 March 2012 was misleading …;

      b. Ms Rankine's enquiries to the firm were not answered;

      c. Steps were not taken in accordance with the advice given to the client, and no further instructions were sought from the client as to the new plan (to seek a report from Dr Joshi and withhold filing the Application until that was done);

      d. No attempt was made to seek instructions to act from the Public Trustee in a timely fashion once the matter was transferred by Ms Rankine to the Public Trustee."

      1. [66]
        However, in saying that, MIM says that Ms Rankine cannot be said to have acted reasonably.  Essentially, with her knowledge of actions said to have been taken by her solicitors, she should have been concerned about the lack of a response to an Application she believed had been lodged.
      1. [67]
        MIM says that the delay in lodgement of the Application for Compensation, after the date the Public Trustee had assumed conduct of the administration, remains unexplained.  There has been a lack of evidence to show what arrangements had been made between Slater & Gordon and the Public Trustee concerning the affairs of Mr Rankine. 
      1. [68]
        If the Commission was to find that a reasonable cause existed relating to the late lodgement of the Application, then the Commission should exercise its discretion in not waiving the Application time limit in favour of the Appellant.
      1. [69]
        In response to the submissions made by MIM, the Appellant states as follows:
      1. (a)
        "Reasonable" within the context of this matter refers to "a cause which a reasonable man would regard as sufficient, a cause consistent with a reasonable standard of conduct, the kind of thing which might be expected to delay the giving of notice by a reasonable man"[2].
      1. (b)
        In the course of assessing "reasonable cause", an Appellant is not to be identified with his/her solicitor - instead, it is a reasonable excuse for an Appellant to have "in sufficient time - entrusted the matter to a person who was reasonably believed to be (or "apparently") competent to do whatever is necessary, but who did not do so."[3] 
      1. (c)
        The Appellant submitted that the well-established principle stated in Perdis may be qualified if, after the matter is entrusted to the solicitor, "there is something which would cause a reasonable person in the position of the claimant to make further inquiry to take other steps"[4] to protect his/her own interests or, for example, the claimant "had failed to respond to requests by the solicitor to take appropriate steps or provide information for the purpose of enabling the claim to be advanced".
      1. (d)
        The 'thing' that happens, to overcome an initial reasonable entrusting, has to be such as reasonably to require that initial entrusting to be displaced.  Perdis recognises that something might occur which subsequently makes it unreasonable for some further enquiry to not be made.

      The initial trust in the Solicitors to conduct the matter efficiently and appropriately would remain and there is nothing to support a much more onerous test where the claimant becomes a deceased estate.

      1. (e)
        Miller v Nominal & Piper says that the test to be applied is an 'objective' one.
      1. (f)
        The Appellant has not contended that a Solicitor acting unreasonably automatically ensures that the claimant's actions need not be considered.  In effect, there has been no suggestion that the negligence of a Solicitor can never be ascribed to the client.
      1. (g)
        None of the authorities relied upon by MIM contradict the Perdis principles.  The authority of Sophron and cases referred to in Keir were not cases relating to a statutory threshold which was required to be met before a discretion arises. 
      1. (h)
        Similarly for authorities mentioned by the Respondent (General Department of Transport v Congress Community Development and Education Unit[5]; Bluescope Steel[6], Appo v. Review Unit Q-COMP[7], and Cook v. Q-COMP[8].  These decisions relate to discretely different facts from this matter.
      1. (i)
        The Appellant accepts the Respondent's submissions that the circumstances of the delay between the actual expiry date and the eventual lodgement of the Application can be taken into account in the exercise of the Commission's discretion as to whether or not waive the time limit.
      1. (j)
        In this regard, the Appellant states that the principles in Perdis continue to be relevant to the period after the expiration of the six months.
      1. [70]
        Any reference to Mr Rankine by MIM in terms of whether or not he should have known that the case was not proceeding according to instructions, ignores the fact that Mr Rankine, after giving instructions to his solicitor, died less than 7 weeks after engaging the solicitor.  This submission by the Appellant is palpably correct.  The Regulator accepts that proposition as well [Respondent Submissions 14(a) and 28].
      1. [71]
        With regard to Ms Rankine, the same assertion is made by MIM and the Regulator that she should have reasonably made further enquiries concerning the claim.  MIM specifically stated that Ms Rankine gave evidence that she telephoned Slater & Gordon on a number of occasions to ask what was happening about the lodgement of the Application for Compensation.
      1. [72]
        While that is the assertion, the transcript of the evidence does not establish that point.  Rather, the transcript shows that in response to the question from Counsel for the Appellant:

      "Did you know at the time of this letter whether or not the Application which had been signed, as we've established, by your father, had actually been lodged?" Ms Rankine responded "I had thought so at that time" [T1-20].

       Counsel - "You believed it had been?"  Ms Rankine responded, "I had" [T1-20].

      1. [73]
        Ms Rankine made calls to Slater & Gordon in respect of the Application but had not received a satisfactory answer [T1-35, 36].  To this the Appellant stated:

      "In those circumstances, the lack of satisfactory explanation by Slater & Gordon to Ms Rankine as to the status and progress of the claim could not possibly displace the reasonableness of the initial entrusting of the matter to the firm.  Instead, if anything, it is just an illustration of the firm "letting the estate down" (to adapt the language from Quinlivan quoted by Davies JA in Perdis at [11]).  Indeed, to apply what was said by Mackenzie J in Pervis at [38], the fact that Ms Rankine "inquired about the progress of the matter from time to time" puts the estate "in a particularly strong situation".

      1. [74]
        Concerning whether Ms Rankine knew about the time limit is largely academic when one considers her evidence that she had always believed that the Application had been lodged by Slater & Gordon.  Even if she had read the small print on the compensation form, the wording was in fine print and made reference to the fact that the Application 'may' be invalid if lodged outside of the six month time period.  The Appellant submits that this does not displace the established reasonable cause - i.e. her belief at all times that the Application had been lodged.
      1. [75]
        In my view, that submission is justified.  I have accepted that Ms Rankine did not concern herself with the issue of time limits because she had always believed that the Application had been lodged by Slater & Gordon.  There had been no evidence produced to show that there had been any link between obtaining medical evidence and the lodgement of the Application.
      1. [76]
        A further component of MIM and the Respondent's claim relates to the involvement of the Public Trustee.  The Respondent's submissions state that Ms Rankine took the claim out of the hands of Slater & Gordon because she had made calls and the responses she had received "did not reassure her that [the firm was] acting in the way they should".
      1. [77]
        The Appellant states that the transcript, at T1-36 lines 20-45 as referenced by the Respondent, does not suggest or state this.  Ms Rankine's evidence was that she had referred the matter to the Public Trustee because she had been under emotional strain from the death of her father and she was unable to sort out his "will stuff".  There was no mention of her being unable to sort out the compensation claim with Slater & Gordon.
      1. [78]
        At T1-36 of the transcript, Counsel for MIM asked Ms Rankine: 

      MIM: "You must have been starting to get a bit concerned about whether Slater and Gordon were doing what they should be doing to handle these claims?" 

         Ms Rankine: "Well, I - yes, and I would have made a couple of calls".

      MIM: "And those calls wouldn't have done anything to reassure you about …"

      Ms Rankine: "No … "

      MIM: "whether Slater and Gordon were acting the way they should". 

      Ms Rankine: "No".

      1. [79]
        Ms Rankin refers to not being in a good state after her father died "At that time I probably wouldn't have been in a very good state to be - it took me awhile to get to the Public Trustee and, to me, I wouldn't have been as careful as I've always been in the past about things, like, making the notes, making - trying to remember dates and all of that sort of stuff" [T1-33].
      1. [80]
        When MIM queried further about the 'lodgement' of the claim, question posed as follows Ms Rankine said, "Nobody had told me that it hadn't been lodged" [T-36].
      1. [81]
        Ms Rankine said the Public Trustee had told her that she did not have any more rights because she had handed the matter over to them.  Ms Rankine said they told her that she deals with them and they deal with Slater & Gordon [T1-37].  So therefore, she did not chase Slater & Gordon any more [T1 - 37].
      1. [82]
        MIM submitted that the issue of the matter being handed to the Public Trustee by Ms Rankine and the delay in lodgement of the Application remained "simply unexplained."  In effect, what is submitted is that there was no evidence to show why the Public Trustee had not taken steps to lodge the Application between June 2012 and 16 July 2012 (when the six months had expired).
      1. [83]
        In response to this claim, the Appellant said the reliance placed by Ms Rankine in Slater & Gordon had not been displaced.
      1. [84]
        The documentary evidence shows that on 8 June 2012, Ms Rankine told Slater & Gordon that she had handed matters relating to her late father over to the Public Trustee but she had asked that Slater & Gordon keep her informed as to how things were going with the estate [B84].
      1. [85]
        On 19 June 2012, Ms Rankin wrote to Slater & Gordon providing further instructions and documentation for the purpose of pursuing the Application for Compensation [B85, T1-18].  No mention had been made of the Public Trustee at that stage.
      1. [86]
        On 18 July 2012, Ms Rankine called Mr Hughes and asked if there had been any progress with the compensation claim and no complaint had been made of any delay or a discussion about the six month time limit (it had expired two days prior to this correspondence).  The Appellant states that this was because Ms Rankine still retained the belief that the Application had been lodged by Slater & Gordon.
      1. [87]
        On 23 July 2012, the Public Trustee sent its first letter to Slater & Gordon noting Ms Rankine's request that the Public Trustee administer the estate and asking to be advised as to the "current position with respect of the deceased's claim" [B86A].
      1. [88]
        The Appellant submits that this would confirm the initial view held by Mr Hughes that the Public Trustee's involvement would be relatively minimal and that Slater & Gordon would retain the receipt of practical instructions from Ms Rankine [T2-29].
      1. [89]
        On 1 August 2012, Mr Hughes replied to the Public Trustee's 23 July 2012, correspondence stating that "proceedings have been instituted (but) they are yet to be served as we are in the process of obtaining further medical records" [B91].  This letter related to the common law proceedings and not to the compensation claim [T2‑30].

       The Appellant stated:

      "It made no reference at all to any issue of timing or urgency in relation to either claim, nor to the fact that the compensation claim had not been filed, as we know Ms Rankine reasonably believed that it had, within the six months which had expired on 16 July 2012.  It provided no reason for any concern on the part of the Public Trustee."

      1. [90]
        On 16 October 2012, an order was made authorising the Public Trustee to administer Mr Rankine's will [B98A].
      1. [91]
        On 29 October 2012, Mr Hughes had received Dr Joshi's report and sent this to Ms Rankine (and not to the Public Trustee) and asked Ms Rankine to contact him to discuss the matter [B99].  Mr Hugh's file note of 15 November 2012, records his being instructed to lodge the compensation claim [B100].  Ms Rankine had recalled the letter of 29 October 2012, but not a call relating to what had been contained in Mr Hughes' file note.  She continued to hold the belief that the Application had been lodged.  Mr Hughes did not recall if any instructions had been sought from the Public Trustee.
      1. [92]
        The Application was lodged on 19 November 2012 by Slater & Gordon.
      1. [93]
        On 21 December 2012, MIM's solicitors wrote to Slater & Gordon noting the compensation Application had been lodged out of time and asked for an explanation.
      1. [94]
        Slater & Gordon said nothing about the issue to the Public Trustee when writing on 14 January 2013, but merely asked whether the Public Trustee's "ongoing instructions are such that the Application for Compensation be pursued" [B110A and T2 - 34].  The Appellant states that "the clear inference is that the failure to lodge the Application within time, and the subsequent delay, were never brought to the Public Trustee's attention at any relevant time
      1. [95]
        The Appellant submits that the Commission should find that nothing had happened between the Public Trustee becoming involved and the lodgement of the Application, which made it unreasonable for it to not make some further enquiry or to take other steps as to displace the established reasonableness of the entrusting of the matter to Slater & Gordon.
      1. [96]
        The Respondent says that the issue concerning the Public Trustee must be considered within the context of the Appellant explaining all matters concerning the period of time from 16 January 2012 until 20 November 2012.  It was not sufficient to rely only upon the period of time when the matter was in the hands of Slater & Gordon.  MIM submits that Bluescope Steel Ltd v Eason states that "It is not the worker who is to be reasonable, it is the cause".  The Respondent submitted that Perdis should be considered within the context that the claimant had personal carriage of the application for the entire relevant period.  The qualification in that case has been previously stated in this decision but relates to whether something exists which would cause a reasonable person in the position of the claimant to make further inquiry or to take further steps.  However, that consideration depended upon the circumstances of the case.
      1. [97]
        In response to submissions made by both MIM and the Respondent concerning the Public Trustee (i.e. effectively, that there is no evidence from the Public Trustee that it relied on Slater & Gordon), the Appellant replied as follows:
      1. In this case, the initial reasonable reliance remained in place unless something happened which made it obvious that the solicitors were not doing what they had been entrusted to do.  "The test is objective, so that it cannot be necessary for each embodiment of a claimant estate to give evidence of its subjective position vis-à-vis the solicitors".

      b) There had been a lack of anything happening during the period when the estate was embodied in the Public Trustee which would displace the prima facie position which had arisen (Perdis) or would justify an exercise of discretion against waiver.

      1. [98]
        The Appellant summarised the particulars of the evidence as it relates to this matter:
      1. On 8 June 2012, Ms Rankine told Slater & Gordon that she had 'handed' everything to do with "Mr Rankine's estate over to the Public Trustee to handle", but, nevertheless, she asked that the firm keep her up to date on how things were going with the estate's claims [B84].
      1. On 19 June 2012, Ms Rankine wrote to Slater & Gordon, without any apparent copy to or mention of the Public Trustee, providing further instructions and documentation for the purpose of pursuit of the application for compensation (which, again, she believed had been made) [B85; T1-18 lines 17-24].
      1. On 18 July 2012, Ms Rankine spoke to Mr Hughes to see if there had been any progress with the compensation claim.  There was no suggestion of complaint about any delay of questions relating to time limits.  Ms Rankine believed that the application had been lodged and there would have been no reason for her to have expressed a complaint of that nature to the Public Trustee.
      1. On 23 July 2012, when the six month time period had elapsed, the Public Trustee sent correspondence to Slater & Gordon mentioning prior correspondence from the firm to Ms Rankine with regard to a "possible asbestos claim" for Mr Rankine's estate.  The Public Trustee asked to be advised concerning the current position with regard to the deceased's claim [B86A].
      1. Mr Hughes' evidence was that the Public Trustee would thereafter be kept informed but "from previous experience, their involvement would be relatively minimal" and Slater & Gordon "would probably still be getting, on a day-to-day basis practical instructions from Ms Rankine" [T2-29].  There was nothing to suggest that the documents submitted to the Commission were incomplete, and the Appellant says that Mr Hughes may have "attempted to speak to the Public Trustee but apparently did not otherwise seek or obtain any instructions therefrom" [T2-28].
      1. On 1 August 2012, Mr Hughes replied to the Public Trustee's letter of 23 July 2012 saying that "proceedings have been instituted [but] they are yet to be served as we are in the process of obtaining further medical records…" and foreshadowing future advice, once those records had been received, as to prospects of success [B91,T2-30].  There had been no reference regarding time or urgency concerning both claims, nor to the fact that the compensation claim had not been lodged, as believed by Ms Rankine, within the six month time limit which had expired on 16 July 2012.  The Appellant states that there was no reason for any concern on the part of the Public Trustee with regard to these interactions.
      1. On 16 October 2012, an order was made authorising the Public Trustee to administer Mr Rankine's Will [B98A].
      1. On 29 October 2012, Dr Joshi's report was received.  Mr Hughes sent it to Ms Rankine but not the Public Trustee, asking her to contact Mr Hughes [B99].  Mr Hughes file note of 15 November 2012 shows being instructed to lodge the compensation claim [B100] (noting that Ms Rankine recalled the 29 October 2012 letter but not a subsequent call of the kind referred to in the note and, again, believed that the application had long ago been lodged) [T1-19, 20].  Mr Hughes stated that he believed that he needed instructions to lodge the Application from Ms Rankine, but did not recall if any instructions were sought from the Public Trustee [T2-32, 33].  He thought there was some discussion with Ms Rankine as to keeping the Public Trustee informed.
      1. The Application was lodged - (see Slater & Gordon's letter dated 19 November 2012) [B101].

      j) On 21 December 2012, MIM's solicitors wrote to Slater & Gordon noting that the Compensation Application had been lodged out of time and requesting an application [B108].  Notwithstanding this, Slater & Gordon did not discuss this issue with the Public Trustee when it wrote to them on 14 January 2013, but instead asked the Public Trustee "whether the Public Trustee's ongoing instructions are such that the Application for Compensation be pursued" [B110A].  The Appellant said that what could be drawn from this was "that the failure to lodge the application within time, and the subsequent delay, were never brought to the Public Trustee's attention at any relevant time."

      1. [99]
        The Appellant states that the documentary history and evidence shows that nothing happened, in the period between the Public Trustee becoming involved  and the lodgement of the application "which made it unreasonable for it to not make some further enquiry or take other steps so as to displace the established reasonableness of the entrusting the matter to Slater & Gordon."
      1. [100]
        In my view, I have accepted that the failure to lodge the Compensation Application within time was due to a reasonable cause and the time limit in s 131(1) of the Act should be waived.  "Reasonable" within the context of this matter refers to "a cause which a reasonable man would regard as sufficient, a cause consistent with a reasonable standard of conduct, the kind of thing which might be expected to delay the giving of notice by a reasonable man."[9]  The circumstances of this case satisfy that criterion.
      1. [101]
        It is the case that the Appellant entrusted the application to Slater & Gordon in sufficient time.  I have not accepted the submission that Ms Rankine was required to do more than she had done in the pursuit of her application.  I have accepted Ms Rankine as a truthful witness who genuinely held the belief that the Appellant's Application for Compensation had been appropriately lodged within time and at no stage did she express any concern about the question of time limits.
      1. [102]
        Ms Rankine took appropriate interest in the application and required up-dates on occasions from her Solicitors, but in my view, her evidence satisfactorily shows that she put the matter in the hands of the Public Trustee primarily because of her difficulty in dealing with her father's Will.  In the case of Mr and Ms Rankine, they trusted their Solicitors to perform their duties with regard to the compensation claim, and nothing happened which made them (specifically Ms Rankine) think any differently.
      1. [103]
        In terms of the issues concerning the Public Trustee, the Appellant's submission are accepted in that nothing had happened sufficient to deem it unreasonable for Ms Rankine not to have made any further enquiries, specifically relating to time limitation matters.  As well, correspondence passing between the Public Trustee and Slater & Gordon gave no indication that the Public Trustee should be aware of any time limitations relating to the compensation claim.
      1. [104]
        I have determined that the failure to lodge the compensation application within time was due to a 'reasonable cause' and that the time limit in s 131(1) should be waived.
      1. [105]
        I have determined to set aside the Regulator's decision and to substitute it with another decision as stated in paragraph 104 above, pursuant to s 558 (1)(c) of the Act.  I return the matter to the Regulator, directing it to proceed to decide the application for review made to it on the above basis pursuant to s 558 (1)(d).
      1. [106]
        Order accordingly.

    Footnotes

    [1] Sophron v Nominal Defendant 1957 HCA 27 96 CLR @ 469

    [2] Quinlivan v Portland Harbour Trust [[1963] VR 25 at 28 (Sholl J); Black v City of South Melbourne [1963] VR 34 at 38 (Full Court)

    [3] (Quinlivan at 30-31;  Black at 38-39;  Perdis v Nominal Defendant (2003) at 2 Qd R 64 at 12 (Davis JA) and 37-38 (Mackenzie J)

    [4] Perdis v Nominal Defendant (2003) at 2 Qd R 64 at 12 (Davis JA)

    [5]Director-General, Department of Transport Congress Community Development and Education Unit Limited unreported judgment, Land Appeal Court, 25 June 1998 at page 6

    [6]Bluescope Steel Ltd v Eason [2007] NSWWCCPD 172

    [7]Appo v. Review Unit Q-COMP unreported judgment Industrial Magistrates Court, 15 May 2003 at page 5

    [8]Cook v. Q-COMP (2008) 187 QGIG 220 at page 224

    [9] Quinlivan v Portland Harbour Trust [[1963] VR 25 at 28 (Sholl J); Black v City of South Melbourne [1963] VR 34 at 38 (Full Court)

    Close

    Editorial Notes

    • Published Case Name:

      Rankine v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)

    • Shortened Case Name:

      Rankine v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)

    • MNC:

      [2015] QIRC 142

    • Court:

      QIRC

    • Judge(s):

      Member Deputy President Swan

    • Date:

      03 Aug 2015

    Appeal Status

    Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

    Cases Cited

    Case NameFull CitationFrequency
    Black v City of South Melbourne (1963) VR 34
    3 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - (1963) VR 34
    Cite 2 - (1963) VR 34
    Cite 3 - (1963) VR 34
    Bluescope Steel Ltd v Eason [2007] NSWWCCPD 172
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2007] NSWWCCPD 172
    Cite 2 - [2007] NSWWCCPD 172
    Cook v Q-COMP (2008) 187 QGIG 220
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - (2008) 187 QGIG 220
    Cite 2 - (2008) 187 QGIG 220
    Quinlivan v Portland Harbour Trust (1963) VR 25
    3 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - (1963) VR 25
    Cite 2 - (1963) VR 25
    Cite 3 - (1963) VR 25

    Cases Citing

    Case NameFull CitationFrequency
    Murray v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2016] QIRC 813 citations
    1

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