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  4. Gleeson v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) - [2015] QIRC 148

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Gleeson v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)[2015] QIRC 148

Gleeson v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)[2015] QIRC 148

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Gleeson v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2015] QIRC 148

PARTIES:

Gleeson, Kevin

(Applicant)

v

State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

TD/2015/18

PROCEEDING:

Application for Reinstatement

DELIVERED ON:

7 August 2015

HEARING DATES:

17 and 18 June 2015

MEMBER:

Industrial Commissioner Fisher

ORDERS:

Within 22 days of this decision, the Respondent pay the Applicant 10 weeks wages, less taxation required by law.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT - ill health retirement - application for reinstatement - alternative remedy compensation - whether dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable - whether dismissal related to capacity - whether opportunity to respond to allegations about capacity - whether decision to dismiss defective - whether respondent complied with s 178 of Public Service Act - whether procedural difficulties with show cause process - applicant did not seek extension of time - whether independent medical examiner had all relevant information before him on which to form his second opinion - whether respondent considered transferring or redeploying applicant in Department or public service generally before deciding to terminate - determined dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable - reinstatement or re-employment impracticable - compensation ordered.

CASES:

Industrial Relations Act 1999, s 73, s 77, s 78, s 79

Public Service Act 2008, s 5, s 6, s 11, s 47, s 100, s 103, Chapter 5, Part 7, s 174, s 175, s 178, s 179, Schedule 4

Workplace Relations Act 1996, s 170CH

APPEARANCES:

Dr A. Collier, Agent for the Applicant.

Mr J.W. Merrell, Counsel instructed by Crown Law for the Respondent.

Decision

  1. [1]
    Kevin Gleeson was retired from the Queensland Public Service (QPS) on the grounds of ill health on 6 February 2015.  There is no dispute between the parties that the ill health retirement constitutes a dismissal under the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (IR Act).  Mr Gleeson contends that his dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable and seeks to be reinstated to his former position of Trade Instructor at the Wolston Correctional Centre (WCC) in Queensland Corrective Services (QCS) as part of the Department of Justice and Attorney-General (the Respondent).  In the event reinstatement or re-employment is found to be impracticable, Mr Gleeson seeks the alternative remedy of compensation.
  1. [2]
    His application is opposed by the Respondent, which contends that the dismissal was not unfair because the delegate of the chief executive was satisfied that Mr Gleeson had been absent from work for over 12 months due to his mental illness or disability and further, it was not reasonably practical to transfer him or redeploy him.  In those circumstances the decision was made to retire Mr Gleeson on the grounds of ill health.

Chronology

  1. [3]
    The following chronology sets out the history leading to the decision to ill health retire Mr Gleeson.  It is largely drawn from the chronology prepared as part of the case conducted by the Respondent in these proceedings but has been expanded to provide greater detail about events which occurred on key dates.  The chronology is generally uncontroversial although the parties have differing perspectives on a few of the events.
  1. [4]
    Mr Gleeson commenced employment in 2001 as a Trade Instructor at the Sir David Longland Correctional Centre and later WCC.
  1. [5]
    Mr Gleeson last worked as a Trade Instructor for QCS on 15 November 2013 due to his depression and distress at the WCC.  He went on sick leave on or about 17 November 2013.
  1. [6]
    On 27 November 2013, QCS made the first attempt for Mr Gleeson to participate in a rehabilitation and graduated return to work process by proposing he supervise a small crew of prisoners on landscaping works.  Mrs Gleeson advised QCS the following day that her husband was too unwell to take part in the first return to work process attempt.
  1. [7]
    Mr Gleeson made an application for workers' compensation on 1 December 2013.  This application was not opposed by QCS and was accepted by WorkCover Queensland.
  1. [8]
    QCS made a second attempt between 3 and 5 March 2014 for Mr Gleeson to participate in a return to work process.  This proposal concerned Mr Gleeson performing administrative duties in the High Risk Offender Management Unit (HROMU) at WCC.  To help assess its suitability, Mr and Mrs Gleeson attended a site visit hosted by QCS.  Mrs Gleeson advised QCS on 7 March 2014 that Mr Gleeson's doctor had not given him clearance to take part in the return to work process placement at HROMU.
  1. [9]
    In or about March 2014, Mr and Mrs Gleeson relocated their residence from Deagon to Stanthorpe.  During March, QCS attempted to find a return to work process placement close to Mr Gleeson's new residence in Stanthorpe, however this was unsuccessful.
  1. [10]
    From approximately May to July 2014 a third attempt was made by QCS for Mr Gleeson to participate in a return to work process by him performing testing and tagging duties of electrical equipment at WCC.  Mr Gleeson was qualified to perform this work and had previously suggested this as an option.  The testing and tagging work did not come to fruition because Mr Gleeson had been issued medical certificates stating that he was unfit for any work.
  1. [11]
    Dr Joseph Hui, Mr Gleeson's General Practitioner, issued a workers' compensation medical certificate on 19 July 2014 stating that Mr Gleeson had no capacity for any type of work from 27 July 2014 until 23 August 2014.  On 21 July 2014, QCS was informed by WorkCover that Mr Gleeson had provided a further workers' compensation medical certificate stating that he would be unfit for any work until 27 August 2014.
  1. [12]
    WorkCover contacted Doug Wait, "Staying Safe" Project Coordinator, QCS, who was primarily responsible for organising Mr Gleeson's return to work, on 6 August 2014 to indicate that Mr Gleeson had advised that his treating practitioners were not prepared to support a return to QCS at that time.  Further, Mr Gleeson had been referred to a Psychiatrist for further advice.
  1. [13]
    On 26 August 2014, Dr Hui issued a further workers' compensation medical certificate stating that Mr Gleeson had no capacity for any type of work from 24 August 2014 until 29 September 2014.
  1. [14]
    On 27 August 2014, Mr Gleeson consulted Dr Adrian Morris, Psychiatrist, after he was referred by Dr Hui.  The following day, Dr Morris provided a written report to Dr Hui about his assessment, opinion and management of Mr Gleeson.
  1. [15]
    QCS decided on 9 September 2014 to refer Mr Gleeson for an Independent Medical Examination (IME) pursuant to Chapter 5, Part 7 (Mental or physical incapacity) of the Public Service Act 2008 (PS Act).  This decision was made in light of the impending finalisation of Mr Gleeson's workers' compensation claim, the unsuccessful attempts to return him to work and that by mid-November he would be absent from work for 12 months.
  1. [16]
    Mr Gleeson's claim for workers' compensation was finalised on 6 October 2014.
  1. [17]
    On 7 October 2014, Dr Hui issued a further medical certificate stating that Mr Gleeson has depression with stress from work and was unfit to continue his usual occupation from 6 October 2014 until 2 November 2014.
  1. [18]
    The following day, Tamara Bambrick, General Manager, WCC, directed Mr Gleeson to attend an IME with Dr Wasim Shaikh, Psychiatrist.  Mr Gleeson attended that IME on 15 October 2014 accompanied by his wife.
  1. [19]
    Dr Shaikh's first report of 22 October 2014 opined that Mr Gleeson presented with a mental illness, namely, major depressive disorder, which adversely affected his work performance or attendance at work.  He said Mr Gleeson was not able to perform his duties as a Trade Instructor for the foreseeable future and, that if he had to return to work to his pre-injury duties, there would be a likely deterioration of his mental health with resultant risks.  He further stated Mr Gleeson's restrictions applied predominantly towards working with QCS and that with support and ongoing treatment he should be capable of participating in a graduated return to alternative employment.  He opined that Mr Gleeson's medical history and condition placed him at markedly increased risk of aggravation if he had to return to his substantive position.
  1. [20]
    An Integrated Case Review Plan (ICRP) Committee meeting was held by officers of QCS on 27 October 2014 concerning Dr Shaikh's first report.  The participants at that meeting included Ms Bambrick, Peter Hollis, Acting Director Human Resources, QCS, David Brady, Senior Advisor Injury Management, Occupational Health and Safety Unit, QCS and Mr Wait.  A decision was made that a recommendation be submitted to the delegate of the chief executive that Mr Gleeson be considered for retirement on the grounds of ill health.  By letter dated 7 November 2014, Mr Hollis asked Mr Gleeson to provide a response as to why he should not be ill health retired on the basis of the information contained in Dr Shaikh's report.
  1. [21]
    On 8 November 2014, Mr Gleeson saw Dr Hui who issued a medical certificate stating that Mr Gleeson has depression with stress from work and he was unfit to continue his usual occupation from 3 November 2014 until 2 December 2014.
  1. [22]
    On 13 November 2014, Mr Gleeson attempted to speak to Ms Bambrick by telephone and left a message with Ms Bambrick's Support Officer advising that he was calling in relation to the correspondence he had received from Mr Hollis.  Mr Gleeson also advised that he wished to return to work.
  1. [23]
    Ms Bambrick returned Mr Gleeson's call on 17 November 2014.  During this call:
  • Mr Gleeson told Ms Bambrick he now wished to return to work;
  • Ms Bambrick informed him that they would accept medical information that countered Dr Shaikh's first report; and
  • Ms Bambrick suggested that Mr Gleeson may want to consider obtaining a report from a general practitioner in the first instance in respect of Dr Shaikh's first report and advise what had changed or what the difference now was.  Ms Bambrick explained that the medical documentation would be considered as part of the decision making process.
  1. [24]
    Ms Bambrick sent an email to Mr Hollis advising that she had a "great call" with Mr Gleeson.  She advised him that Mr Gleeson sounded "happy, health, and upbeat - a far cry from the man I spoke to some time ago."  Ms Bambrick then told him about the information she had conveyed to Mr Gleeson earlier that day.  Ms Bambrick again emailed Mr Hollis the following day to advise that Mr Gleeson was keen to return to work and was going for his own medical to submit against the IME.  Mr Hollis replied to Ms Bambrick advising that the IME was required from Dr Shaikh, not Mr Gleeson's treating General Practitioner.
  1. [25]
    Mr Gleeson followed up the conversation with Ms Bambrick with an email on 18 November 2014 in which he again expressed his desire to return to work.  He advised that he had "undergone numerous appointments with doctors and specialist (sic) in order to help me understand and recover from Depression and Anxiety".  He concluded the email by expressing concern that his response to Mr Hollis was due on Friday 28 November 2014.  Ms Bambrick replied to Mr Gleeson advising that Mr Hollis was abreast of the change in Mr Gleeson's perspective.  Further, she would pass on his email to Mr Hollis so he would be aware that Mr Gleeson would not be responding by 28 November as he was seeking a review of the decision.
  1. [26]
    On 18 November 2014, Mr Gleeson saw Dr Hui who wrote a letter addressed to QCS opining that:
  • Mr Gleeson "… is now feeling that he has overcome the stress and that person is not working there anymore"; and
  • Mr Gleeson is "… keen to go back to work, as a trial for a period of time, in the same position in the same department."
  1. [27]
    Ms Bambrick emailed Mr Gleeson on 21 November 2014 and clarified that he was still required to respond to Mr Hollis by 28 November 2014.  In addition, she said Mr Hollis required Mr Gleeson to write to him expressing a change in his condition and requesting consideration of a further IME.
  1. [28]
    On the same date, Mr Gleeson provided a written response to Mr Hollis' show cause letter and attached Dr Hui's letter dated 18 November 2014.  In his response, Mr Gleeson referred to the medical assistance he had received from doctors, psychologists and specialists and said that as a result he had been able to focus his energy on more positive and productive ambitions and now had a real urge to return to work as a Trade Instructor.  He asked Mr Hollis to consider continuing his employment and the possibility of his revisiting Dr Shaikh for another evaluation.
  1. [29]
    On 2 December 2014, Mr Hollis provided Mr Gleeson's response and Dr Hui's letter to Dr Shaikh for a further report.  Dr Shaikh did not re-examine Mr Gleeson because he had only seen him about six weeks earlier.  On 5 December 2014, Dr Shaikh prepared a supplementary medico-legal report in response to the further information provided to him by QCS.  In that report Dr Shaikh opined, amongst other things, that he did not believe Mr Gleeson would be capable of working in an alternative role/area of QCS and that ill health retirement was the most appropriate option.
  1. [30]
    On 19 December 2014, Mr Brady circulated a copy of Dr Shaikh's supplementary report to a number of departmental stakeholders, most of whom had attended the ICRP Committee meeting in October.  He proposed a number of actions to be taken - a copy of the supplementary report be provided to Mr Gleeson; a memorandum to the Director-General be drafted advising of the decision maker's intention to exercise their delegation to retire Mr Gleeson and a letter advising of the decision to retire Mr Gleeson on the grounds of ill health be drafted for the Deputy Director-General's consideration.  These actions were subsequently taken.
  1. [31]
    QCS delayed sending a copy of Dr Shaikh's supplementary report to Mr Gleeson until after the Christmas period.
  1. [32]
    On 7 January 2015, Mr Brady prepared a draft decision letter and reviewed the draft memorandum to the Director-General of the Respondent in respect of the decision to ill health retire Mr Gleeson for consideration by Mark Rallings, Deputy Director‑General, QCS.
  1. [33]
    On or about 23 January 2015, Mr Rallings endorsed Mr Brady's draft memorandum and forwarded it to the Director-General of the Respondent, recommending Mr Gleeson's ill health retirement for noting.
  1. [34]
    Ms Kerrith McDermott was appointed on 27 January 2015 to the position of Acting Deputy Director-General, QCS due to Mr Rallings' absence on recreation leave.
  1. [35]
    On 28 January 2015 the Director-General noted Mr Rallings' recommendation to ill health retire Mr Gleeson.
  1. [36]
    Ms McDermott reviewed Mr Rallings' recommendation on 3 February 2015 and decided to exercise her delegation to ill health retire Mr Gleeson from the QPS.
  1. [37]
    On 6 February 2015, Mr Gleeson's employment with the QPS was terminated and he was provided five weeks pay in lieu of service.
  1. [38]
    Mr Gleeson saw his treating Psychologist, Dr Christine Hyde, on 12 February 2015 for an assessment.  In her report, Dr Hyde wrote that Mr Gleeson had recovered from his 2014 state and was ready to return to work.
  1. [39]
    On 18 February 2015, Mr Gleeson had a further consultation with Dr Morris who prepared a report opining that Mr Gleeson had substantially recovered from his last presentation on 27 August 2014.  Dr Morris could not see any overt barriers to Mr Gleeson engaging in a return to work program in his position at QCS.

Consideration and Findings

  1. [40]
    Section 73 of the IR Act provides that a dismissal is unfair if it is harsh, unjust or unreasonable.
  1. [41]
    In deciding whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, s 77 provides that the Commission must consider relevantly:
  • whether the employee was notified of the reason for the dismissal:  s 77(a);
  • whether the dismissal related to the employee's capacity:  s 77(b)(ii);
  • if the dismissal related to the employee's capacity, whether the employee was given an opportunity to respond to the allegation about the capacity:  s 77(c)(ii); and
  • any other matters the commission considers relevant:  s 77(d).

Was Mr Gleeson notified of a reason for the dismissal?

  1. [42]
    Ms McDermott wrote to Mr Gleeson by letter dated 3 February 2015.  Although the letter refers to the show cause process and states that consideration was given to his response, and the medical reports, no conclusion or decision is articulated.  The letter goes on to advise that Mr Gleeson would be paid five weeks pay in lieu of notice effective 6 February 2015.  That letter does not expressly state that a decision had been made to retire him on the grounds of ill health or that it had been made in accordance with s 178 of the PS Act. 
  1. [43]
    However, the show cause letter from Mr Hollis dated 7 November 2014 advises that consideration was being given to retiring Mr Gleeson from the public service pursuant to s 178 and the reasons therefor.  In particular, reference was made to Mr Gleeson's absence from work due to his major depressive disorder, that is, his capacity, and the attempts made to rehabilitate, transfer or redeploy him within QCS.
  1. [44]
    Procedural fairness requires that the employee be notified in advance of the reason for their dismissal so that they have an opportunity to respond to that reason.[1]  This was the course adopted in this case.  Accordingly, despite the letter from Ms McDermott not identifying the reason for Mr Gleeson's dismissal, I am satisfied that he was notified of it in the letter of 7 November 2014.

Did the dismissal relate to Mr Gleeson's capacity?

  1. [45]
    Given the issues raised in the show cause letter, I am also satisfied that the dismissal related to Mr Gleeson's capacity.

Was Mr Gleeson given an opportunity to respond? 

  1. [46]
    Mr Gleeson was given the opportunity to respond to the allegation about his capacity by virtue of the show cause letter from Mr Hollis dated 7 November 2014.  However, Mr Gleeson submits that the process was infected by a number of procedural fairness deficiencies.
  1. [47]
    Sections 174 and 175 of the PS Act provide that where a chief executive[2] reasonably suspects that an employee's absence is caused by mental illness or disability, the chief executive may require the employee to submit to an examination by an appointed doctor.  By the time Ms Bambrick, as the authorised delegate, decided to appoint Dr Shaikh and refer Mr Gleeson to him for an IME, Mr Gleeson had been absent from work for 10 months.  It is clear that Ms Bambrick held a reasonable suspicion that Mr Gleeson's absence was due to mental illness or disability because of the various medical certificates that had been provided and her awareness of the unsuccessful attempts to return Mr Gleeson to work.  She was also aware of the background to his absence from work.
  1. [48]
    Mr Gleeson attended the IME accompanied by his wife.  Dr Shaikh's report was unequivocal that Mr Gleeson could not return to his position at QCS.  As a result of this report, the ICRP Committee meeting was held.  The officers attending the meeting decided to recommend to the delegate of the chief executive that Mr Gleeson should be retired from the public service on the grounds of ill health.  Mr Hollis subsequently issued the show cause letter to Mr Gleeson dated 7 November 2014.
  1. [49]
    Up until the point of the ICRP Committee meeting there is little about the process and treatment of Mr Gleeson that can be criticised.  While more will be said about the ICRP Committee meeting later, consideration must be given to what happened after Mr Gleeson contacted Ms Bambrick on receiving Mr Hollis' show cause letter, in particular:
  1. (i)
    the communication exchanges between Ms Bambrick and Mr Gleeson and also between Ms Bambrick and Mr Hollis, the result of which was Mr Gleeson was advised to start with his General Practitioner, seek consideration of a further IME with Dr Shaikh and to respond by 28 November 2014;
  1. (ii)
    Mr Hollis' decision not to inform Dr Shaikh of Mr Gleeson's change of condition as reported by Ms Bambrick; and
  1. (iii)
    Dr Shaikh's decision to not re-examine Mr Gleeson.
  1. [50]
    It is unnecessary to repeat the detail of the communication exchanges which were set out under the heading, "Chronology".  However, the nature and the impact of the advice sought and given requires examination. 
  1. [51]
    In the show cause letter, Mr Gleeson was advised that he could submit as part of his response any material he considered relevant such as a medical report from his treating doctor.  Mr Gleeson contacted Ms Bambrick after receiving the show cause letter to advise that he wanted to return to work.  As a result of that discussion, Ms Bambrick initially advised him to start with his General Practitioner and later to request a further IME. 
  1. [52]
    Mr Gleeson's email to Ms Bambrick of 18 November 2014 advised that he had "undergone numerous appointments with doctors and specialists".  This should have alerted QCS to the possibility of Mr Gleeson having a specialist medical opinion that he could seek.  In addition, Mr Wait had received advice from WorkCover in August that Mr Gleeson had been referred to a psychiatrist.  In light of this I consider that officers of QCS involved in the ill health retirement process had knowledge that Mr Gleeson might have access to a specialist medical opinion.  In those circumstances it is surprising that, given the email and telephone communications between Mr Gleeson, Ms Bambrick and Mr Hollis, no advice was given to Mr Gleeson that he could seek his own specialist medical opinion to submit as part of his response.
  1. [53]
    The Respondent submits that because Mr Gleeson did not seek to stay any process being made about acting on Dr Shaikh's report as he was wanting to obtain a further report from a psychologist or psychiatrist, it cannot be said that Mr Gleeson's dismissal was unfair from a procedural perspective.  Further, at no time did he submit that he was being disadvantaged by the process.
  1. [54]
    Mr Gleeson attempted to obtain an appointment with his psychiatrist, Dr Morris, but was unable to make one until February 2015.  It did not occur to him to mention in his show cause response that he had a treating psychologist and psychiatrist or advise that he could not obtain an early appointment with his psychiatrist. 
  1. [55]
    Mr Gleeson was remiss in not including this information in his response.  However, the advice from Mr Hollis conveyed through Ms Bambrick sent him down a particular path.  Mr Gleeson obtained a letter from his General Practitioner and requested consideration of a further IME with Dr Shaikh and to respond by the due date.  In so doing, Mr Gleeson was complying with Ms Bambrick's advice.  It is to be remembered that Mr Gleeson was unrepresented and had no familiarity with the process.
  1. [56]
    Mr Gleeson also followed advice from Mr Hollis requesting consideration of a further IME with Dr Shaikh.  Although Mr Hollis advised of Mr Gleeson's claim to have recovered and his treating General Practitioner's support for this position, he did not relay to Dr Shaikh the positive communication between Mr Gleeson and Ms Bambrick.  Dr Shaikh said that this information would have encouraged him to undertake another examination of Mr Gleeson.
  1. [57]
    Mr Gleeson complains that he had insufficient time to respond to the show cause letter from Mr Hollis.  The Respondent submits, correctly, that Mr Gleeson did not seek an extension of time.  However, Mr Gleeson's email of 18 November 2014 notified the Respondent of his concern about responding by 28 November 2014.  Ms Bambrick advised Mr Gleeson by email on 18 November 2014 that "for assurance, will pass your email to Peter so that he understands that there will not be a response by the 28th as you are seeking a review of the decision".  Ms Bambrick urged Mr Hollis to "allow the fullness of time for (Mr Gleeson) to take this opportunity, i.e., "to go for his own medical".
  1. [58]
    Mr Hollis suspects he may have had a telephone conversation with Ms Bambrick between 18 and 21 November 2014.  In any event Ms Bambrick responded to Mr Gleeson on 21 November 2014 that "Peter HOLLIS will still require you to write to him with a response" and later, "Therefore, pls write directly to Peter HOLLIS (don't miss your deadline) …".  Although Mr Gleeson did not understand that he could request an extension, the email reply from Ms Bambrick to his concerns about responding by the due date reinforced the requirement to meet the deadline.

 Other relevant matters

  1. [59]
    Was the action taken after the ICRP Committee meeting flawed?:  Mr Gleeson also submits that he was denied procedural fairness because the internal process after the ICRP meeting was flawed.  In particular, it is contended that there is "a degree of uncertainty concerning who may grant an extension of time, who has the relevant authority to do what acts and … informality in the conduct of serious business."
  1. [60]
    In my view it is clear that the authority to grant an extension of time for responding to the show cause rested with Mr Hollis as he had the relevant delegation for the show cause process.
  1. [61]
    The ICRP Committee did not meet again after Dr Shaikh's second report was received.  However, on 19 December 2014, Mr Brady circulated the second report to a number of Departmental staff, most of whom had attended the ICRP Committee meeting.  In his email, Mr Brady comments that Dr Shaikh had not altered his opinion and supports ill health retirement as the appropriate option for Mr Gleeson.  In the circumstances another meeting of the ICRP Committee would not have altered the result.  It remained then for the formal process of retiring Mr Gleeson to occur.  I do not consider that the relative informality of the process after the second report from Dr Shaikh caused the process from that point forwards to be flawed.  By this stage the damage had been done.
  1. [62]
    Was the Respondent open to other medical evidence?: Mr Gleeson submits that the evidence shows that the Respondent was only ever going to accept Dr Shaikh's opinion or one that countered it.  An opinion from the treating General Practitioner was insufficient to change the Respondent's attitude.
  1. [63]
    This submission is based on Mr Hollis' advice to Ms Bambrick that "we will only accept a medical opinion that counters Dr Shaikh's specialist opinion".  In cross‑examination Mr Hollis said he thought Dr Shaikh would take into consideration information from a treating psychologist or General Practitioner when he formed his final opinion.  Mr Hollis acknowledged that in this context the use of the word "counter" was not appropriate.   Mr Hollis' evidence was clear though that heavy reliance was to be placed on Dr Shaikh's opinion.
  1. [64]
    Mr Gleeson further submits that the Respondent had made up its mind before Dr Shaikh's second report to ill health retire him.  This submission is not accepted.  Had the Respondent done so it would have been unnecessary to provide Mr Gleeson's response and supporting letter from Dr Hui to Dr Shaikh for a further opinion or to ask whether a second examination was required.
  1. [65]
    Was the decision to ill health retire Mr Gleeson made in accordance with the PS Act?:  Mr Gleeson submits the decision to dismiss was made by the decision maker without the decision maker having considered the evidence concerning the dismissal of him properly or at all. 
  1. [66]
    In her Affidavit, Ms McDermott states:

"13. In forming my own independent decision as to whether to retire Mr Gleeson on grounds of ill health, I therefore gave careful consideration to the following information:

13.1 Mr Gleeson's absence from the workplace due to a psychological injury since 21 November 2013;

13.2 after 11 months of absence from the workplace, an Independent Medical Examination (IME) was conducted;

13.3 the IME report provided by Dr Shaikh stated that Mr Gleeson developed a permanent impairment and was permanently unable to return to his substantive position, and that Mr Gleeson was not capable of employment with the QCS;

13.4 that an Integrated Case Review Plan meeting was held and that the relevant stakeholders recommended that Mr Gleeson be considered for ill health retirement;

13.5 after Mr Gleeson provided a response, a supplementary report was requested from Dr Shaikh; and

13.6 that Dr Shaikh's supplementary report dated 5 December 2014 confirmed the original diagnosis."

  1. [67]
    Mr Gleeson's concerns about whether the decision to retire him was properly made arise because, despite the above evidence, under cross-examination, Ms McDermott could not recall whether she had read Dr Shaikh's original or supplementary report.  At one point, her evidence was she "would have" read all of the information provided.  She had subsequently read them and, although they sounded familiar, she would not swear she had read them at the time.  In those circumstances it is submitted that Ms McDermott's decision was "perfunctory and a mere formality involving acquiescence to the decision made by her subordinates and was therefore not a proper exercise of power."
  1. [68]
    The Affidavit of Mr Brady sheds some light on the material before Ms McDermott.  Mr Brady states that in addition to the Memorandum to the Director‑General and the draft letter to Mr Gleeson, he provided a folder to the Deputy Director-General (Mr Rallings) enclosing for his consideration the two reports of Dr Shaikh, the ICRP Committee meeting minutes dated 27 October 2014 and Mr Gleeson's response attaching Dr Hui's letter.
  1. [69]
    I am satisfied that Ms McDermott had before her the documents initially provided by Mr Brady to Mr Rallings.  Ms McDermott's evidence was that she had read all of the documents in the folder provided.  This evidence, together with her other evidence that the documents were familiar on subsequently reading them, leads me to conclude that she read all of the documents before making the decision to ill health retire Mr Gleeson. 
  1. [70]
    Mr Gleeson also contends that the Respondent failed in its duty under s 178(1) of the PS Act because it did not attempt or consider transferring or redeploying him after receipt of the IME report.  In particular, Ms McDermott was not provided with any material concerning him being transferred or redeployed.  As a result, she was not in a position to consider and cannot have considered these requirements prior to making her decision to dismiss Mr Gleeson.  Such a decision is a necessary precondition to her exercising her power to ill health retire Mr Gleeson pursuant to s 179 of the PS Act.
  1. [71]
    It is further contended that either of these two acts or omissions means that the Respondent did not comply with the requirements of s 100(2)[3] or s 178 of the PS Act and is sufficient to find the decision to dismiss was defective.
  1. [72]
    Section 178 of the PS Act provides:

 "Action following report

  1. (1)
    If, after considering the report of the medical examination, the chief executive is reasonably satisfied the employee's absence or unsatisfactory performance is caused by mental or physical illness or disability, the chief executive may -
  1. (a)
    transfer or deploy the employee; or
  1. (b)
    if it is not reasonably practicable to transfer or redeploy the employee - retire the employee from the public service.
  1. (2)
    Subsection (1) does not limit the action that may be taken relating to the employee."
  1. [73]
    This section requires the chief executive (or their delegate) to firstly consider transferring or redeploying the employee.  This is because only after reaching a view that either of these outcomes is not reasonably practicable, may the chief executive retire the employee from the public service. 
  1. [74]
    In her oral evidence Ms McDermott said she relied on the minutes of the ICRP Committee meeting, Dr Shaikh's opinion and Mr Gleeson's history in making her decision to ill health retire him.  The minutes of the ICRP Meeting of 27 October 2014 record:

 "Other Points Considered

  • An Independent Section 174 Medical Examination was conducted by Dr Wasim Shaikh Consultant Psychiatrist on 15 October 2014.  Dr Shaikh states, 'Mr Gleeson's medical history and condition place him at a markedly increased risk of aggravation if he had to return to his substantive position.  The risk is significant enough to recommend against returning to his role.'
  • In regards to Mr Gleeson's capability of employment in a workplace rehabilitation program to return to performing the full duties of a trade instructor, Dr Shaikh states, 'I believe that Mr Gleeson's restrictions apply predominately towards working with Queensland Corrective Services'.
  • In consideration of the above, the ICRP Committee must also take in account whether transfer/redeployment is a realistic prospect given the inability to transfer/redeploy Mr Gleeson within Queensland Corrective Services, making the option of transfer or redeployment not reasonably practicable.

   Recommendation

  After careful consideration of the above information and the provisions of s 178 of the Public Service Act 2008, the committee recommends:

  1. Due to Mr Gleeson's inability to perform the duties of a trade instructor/CCO or other duties within the centre, the return to the substantive position of Trade Instructor or CCO is not a viable or realistic option.
  2. As indicated in Dr Shaikh's IME report, Mr Gleeson is medically restricted from working within QCS, making transfer/redeployment options not reasonably practicable; and
  3. That the chief executive (level 3 delegation) takes into consideration the above and decides pursuant to s 178 of the Public Service Act 2008, whether to:
  1. Transfer or redeploy the employee; or
  2. If it is not reasonably practicable to transfer or redeploy the employee - retire the employee from the public service."
  1. [75]
    That the ICRP Committee only considered transfer or redeployment within QCS is confirmed by Mr Hollis' Affidavit where he states:

"Notably, in his report Dr Shaikh opined that 'Mr Gleeson's restrictions apply predominantly towards working with Queensland Corrective Services.'  The committee were therefore of the view that transfer or redeployment was not reasonably practicable, given there are no provisions for redeployment to other departments or divisions."

  1. [76]
    In his oral evidence Mr Hollis confirmed that the ICRP Committee relied exclusively on Dr Shaikh's advice in forming the view about the impracticability of transfer and redeployment.
  1. [77]
    Ms McDermott had before her both of Dr Shaikh's reports which deal with the issue of Mr Gleeson's capacity to return to work at QCS.  In his first report he opines that Mr Gleeson is unable to perform the duties of a Trade Instructor for the foreseeable future.  Mr Gleeson's restrictions apply predominantly towards working with QCS.  Although Dr Shaikh was unequivocal in his opinion about Mr Gleeson not returning to work at QCS, he commented on his ability to work in some form of employment outside QCS and provided appropriate recommendations for a graduated return to work. 
  1. [78]
    In his second report Dr Shaikh confirmed his opinion that Mr Gleeson would not be capable of working in an alternative role/area at QCS.  He believed a retirement on the grounds of ill health to be appropriate.  Somewhat inconsistently, Dr Shaikh also confirmed his earlier advice that Mr Gleeson was capable of working in alternative employment outside QCS and noted his earlier recommendations to this effect. 
  1. [79]
    Ms McDermott said she had considered whether Mr Gleeson could be transferred or redeployed to another position with QCS.  She formed the view that these options were not available based on Dr Shaikh's supplementary report which was referred to in the memorandum to the Director-General.  She decided to exercise her delegation to retire Mr Gleeson based on Dr Shaikh's medical opinion.  However, that opinion allowed Mr Gleeson to return to work outside QCS.
  1. [80]
    Ms McDermott's evidence is silent on whether she turned her mind to transferring or redeploying him elsewhere in the Department or to another agency.  The only documentation provided is the ICRP Committee minutes.  Those minutes show that only consideration was given to transfer or redeployment with QCS.  The briefing documents provided to Ms McDermott do not address any consideration that might have been given to these options. 
  1. [81]
    In light of Dr Shaikh's opinion that Mr Gleeson was capable of working outside QCS Ms McDermott's decision that it was not reasonably practicable to transfer or redeploy Mr Gleeson was not open to her.  She did not consider or explore other options both within the Respondent or the QPS more broadly.  Only after this was done could Ms McDermott reach a view that it was not reasonably practicable to transfer or redeploy Mr Gleeson.
  1. [82]
     I also cannot accept Mr Hollis' evidence that neither transfer nor redeployment was reasonably practicable because there are no provisions for redeployment to other departments or divisions.  The term "public service" is defined in Schedule 4 of the PS Act to mean "the Queensland Public Service".  This Schedule refers to s 5 for the meaning of the "Queensland Public Service", which provides that the QPS consists of persons employed under the PS Act called public service employees.  A public service employee is employed in a department[4] and a chief executive of a department is responsible for the employment of public service employees in that department.[5]  In my view, there is nothing in the PS Act which limits the consideration by a chief executive to a transfer or redeployment to the division in which the public service employee is employed.
  1. [83]
    While the chief executive is responsible for the employment of public service employees in their department, there is nothing in the PS Act, including the definitions of "transfer" and redeploy" found in the Schedule 4 to the PS Act, which constrains a chief executive from seeking out transfer or redeployment opportunities in other departments. 
  1. [84]
    This view is supported by the Commission Chief Executive Guideline 03/13:  Mental or Physical Incapacity, where at paragraph 10.3 the following is found:

"Where reasonable adjustment is not possible, transfer and redeployment must be considered.  This can include liaison with other agencies to determine whether a cross agency transfer or redeployment is reasonably practicable.  The decision maker should document their decisions and reasons, including why (if applicable) transfer and/or redeployment is not reasonably practicable."

  1. [85]
    Although a Guideline is for guidance only,[6] and is not binding, it nonetheless is a ruling[7] of the Commission Chief Executive which provides guidance on the implementation of Chapter 5, Part 7 (Mental or physical incapacity) of the PS Act.
  1. [86]
    A finding that it is not reasonably practicable to transfer or redeploy Mr Gleeson is a legislative pre-condition that must be satisfied before Mr Gleeson could be retired from the public service.  The evidence is that the ICRP Committee did not consider transfer or redeployment to other departments or divisions within the Respondent on the basis that there are no provisions to do so.  For the reasons given that view is incorrect.  There is also no evidence from the decision maker that she considered options outside QCS. 
  1. [87]
    Section 178(2) provides that the action that can be taken in relation to the employee is not limited to that set out in s 178(1).  The Respondent did not provide any evidence that any other action was considered in relation to Mr Gleeson.
  1. [88]
    In the circumstances I am not satisfied that the Respondent complied with s 178 of the PS Act.

Conclusion

  1. [89]
    Earlier I found that Mr Gleeson was notified of the reason for his dismissal and that reason related to his capacity. 
  1. [90]
    I accept that Mr Gleeson was given an opportunity to respond to the allegations made against him, that is, that his absence from work was reasonably considered to be because of mental illness or disability and as a result he did not have the capacity to be continued in employment.
  1. [91]
    Some procedural difficulties have been identified with the show cause process.  These concern the advice given to Mr Gleeson about the evidence he should submit in response to the show cause letter and to respond by the due date.  I accept that the obligation on the Respondent was to invite Mr Gleeson to show cause by providing relevant information and respond by a particular date within which it might be considered reasonable for an employee to gather relevant evidence.  QCS advised Mr Gleeson that he could submit a medical report from his treating practitioner and gave him a period of three weeks in which to respond.  Although Mr Gleeson contends the time frame was too short, I note that is longer than the seven day period nominated in the Guideline. 
  1. [92]
    I also accept that having discharged that obligation, the responsibility then rests with the employee to respond providing all relevant information which can be considered in reaching a decision. Where an employee has difficulty understanding what is required or in obtaining the relevant information, a number of options are open to the employee including seeking external advice, approaching their employer for advice or asking for an extension of time in which to provide the information.  Mr Gleeson attempted to see his psychiatrist but did not disclose to his employer that he wished to seek a medical report from his treating psychiatrist or psychologist.  Neither did he seek an extension of time for the purpose of seeking an alternative opinion.  These omissions weigh against a finding that the dismissal was unfair.
  1. [93]
    I have reached the view though that the contents of the email from Ms Bambrick had the effect of misleading Mr Gleeson.  This was not done with any intent to disadvantage Mr Gleeson and may be the result of Mr Gleeson involving in the show cause process a manager external to it viz., Ms Bambrick.  Based on the advice received from Mr Hollis via Ms Bambrick, Mr Gleeson requested consideration of another IME with Dr Shaikh.  Although Mr Hollis provided Mr Gleeson's response and letter from Dr Hui to Dr Shaikh, he did not request a second IME be undertaken.  Rather, he sought Dr Shaikh's opinion about this without disclosing the apparent change in Mr Gleeson's state of mind as identified by Ms Bambrick.  Had Dr Shaikh been informed of this, he most likely would have examined Mr Gleeson again.  That Mr Gleeson was not re‑examined meant that Dr Shaikh did not have all relevant information before him on which to form his second opinion.
  1. [94]
    While it is unwise to speculate on the outcome of a second examination, it is clear that Mr Gleeson was denied an opportunity to demonstrate his fitness (or otherwise) to return to work to the employer selected medical specialist who was to provide an opinion to his employer on this matter.  The evidence establishes that Dr Shaikh's opinion was to be very influential in determining his future employment, if any, in QCS.
  1. [95]
    Finally, I am not satisfied that Ms McDermott considered transferring, redeploying or taking other action in respect of Mr Gleeson before making the decision to terminate his employment.  The various return to work attempts all concerned QCS and, despite Dr Shaikh's opinion that a graduated return to alternative employment would be successful, options within the broader department or the QPS generally were not considered as required by s 178 of the PS Act.
  1. [96]
    For these reasons, I find the dismissal of Mr Gleeson was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

 Remedy

  1. [97]
    Mr Gleeson seeks the primary remedy of reinstatement to his former position.
  1. [98]
    The Respondent referred to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Blackadder v Ramsay Butchering Services Pty Ltd[8] where Hayne J explained the meaning of "reinstatement" in the context of s 170CH(3)(a) of the former Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WR Act).  Hayne J referred to the meaning of "position" and concluded:

"[43] 'Position', when used in s 170CH(3)(a), refers to the place in the employer's commercial structure which the employee occupied before termination.  It refers not only to the pay and other benefits which an employee may earn in a position, but also to the work which the person filling that position does.  It follows that an employer, ordered to reinstate an employee by reappointing the employee to the position in which the employee was employed immediately before termination, not only must recommence paying or providing financial or other benefits attached to the position, but also must put the employee back to the performance of those duties which the employee was fulfilling before termination."

  1. [99]
    Section 170CH(3)(a) of the former WR Act provided that the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) may order the employer to reinstate the employee by reappointing the employee to the position in which the employee was employed immediately before the termination.  Section 78(2) of the IR Act is in different terms but nonetheless refers to the employee being reinstated to the employee's former position on terms at least as favourable as the conditions on which the employee was employed immediately before dismissal.  Although differences exist between the two provisions, the Commission is satisfied that the analysis by Hayne J as to the meaning of the word "position" is apposite to the IR Act provision.  Accordingly, the reinstatement of Mr Gleeson requires that he perform the duties of a Trade Instructor.
  1. [100]
    The Respondent concedes there would be no barrier to Mr Gleeson being reinstated on conduct or performance grounds.  Because this case concerns the capacity of Mr Gleeson, unique consideration must be given to the issue of impracticability.  In this regard, the Respondent relies on the decision of the AIRC in Smith and Kimball v Moore Paragon Australia[9] where a Full Bench stated in relation to s 170CH(3) of the former WR Act:

"[51] The weight to be accorded to ongoing incapacity on the part of an employee when considering whether reinstatement pursuant to s.170CH(3) is appropriate will depend upon all the circumstances of the case.  However, when considering whether reinstatement is appropriate for an employee who has an ongoing incapacity arising from illness or injury, the guiding principle ought be that generally reinstatement of a materially incapacitated employee will not be appropriate where:

  • further performance of the employee's contractual obligations in the future would either be impossible or would be a thing radically different from that undertaken by him or her and accepted by the employer under the agreed terms of his or her contract of employment;
  • reinstatement would involve imposing a material future productivity burden or some other unreasonable burden on the employerhttp://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AIRC/2004/57.html - P529_59696; or
  • reinstatement would impose an unreasonable burden on other employees.

Exceptional circumstances would be necessary before reinstatement could properly be regarded as appropriate in such cases." (references omitted)

  1. [101]
    The Respondent submits that reinstatement is impracticable because there is no evidence that Mr Gleeson is well enough to return to his former position at WCC as a Trade Instructor.  Not only does Dr Shaikh opine against a return to work in that position but the evidence of Dr Morris and Dr Hyde must be treated with caution.
  1. [102]
    In this regard, Dr Morris' opinion and evidence to the Commission is that Mr Gleeson would be capable of a return to work program in his position with QCS.  I note that the nature of the return to work program and the time frame accompanying that was not provided.
  1. [103]
    Further, Dr Hyde's opinion as to Mr Gleeson's capabilities were limited to a point in time, i.e., 12 February 2015.  She said "Kevin appears to have recovered well from his 2014 state and is showing signs of being ready (to find work or return to work)."  In cross-examination, Dr Hyde demurred from her Witness Statement and said she was unable to state that he could return to the position of Trade Instructor specifically.
  1. [104]
    In my view, the evidence of Dr Morris and Dr Hyde is unsatisfactory.  Dr Morris' evidence concerns Mr Gleeson being engaged in a return to work program whereas Dr Hyde states that Mr Gleeson "appears" to have recovered well.  Dr Hyde was uncertain whether he could return to work in his former position of Trade Instructor. 
  1. [105]
    Dr Shaikh said in cross‑examination that the report of Dr Morris did not "discuss what would happen if Mr Gleeson had to return to the work environment which, in a sense, was the stressor really to invite deterioration of his mental health."  Further, Dr Shaikh did not consider any portion of his supplementary report needed to be revised in light of the opinions of Drs Hyde and Morris.
  1. [106]
    The state of the medical evidence before the Commission is such that I cannot be satisfied that Mr Gleeson is fit to be immediately and permanently capable of performing all of the duties of the position of Trade Instructor.
  1. [107]
    In the case of Smith and Kimball the Full Bench of the AIRC was considering the practicability of reinstating two employees who had been successfully working in a reduced capacity for many years before being dismissed.  The Full Bench also listed factors considered relevant to the weight to be accorded to an employee's ongoing incapacity arising from injury or illness when considering the practicability of reinstatement.[10]  
  1. [108]
    All of these matters have been considered.  However, I consider Smith and Kimball can be distinguished from the present matter.  Here, the Commission is being asked to reinstate Mr Gleeson to a position from which he has been absent for more than 18 months and the only definitive medical evidence is that he should not return to it.  Were reinstatement to be ordered there is a real risk of injury to Mr Gleeson.  This makes an order for reinstatement impracticable.[11]  Further, the evidence from Ms Bambrick is that a medical clearance would be required before Mr Gleeson could return to work in his former position.  In my view, it is not practicable to reinstate Mr Gleeson, only for him to not perform work for a period pending a further assessment as to his capacity.
  1. [109]
    The last matter that militates against reinstatement is the presence of the person in the workplace who is said to have caused Mr Gleeson's injury.  Although I note Mr Gleeson's assertion that the person responsible for causing Mr Gleeson's condition is no longer in the workplace, I accept the Respondent's submissions that there is no evidence from any of the Respondent's witnesses to the person being absent indefinitely.  Further, I note in the second briefing letter to Dr Shaikh, Mr Hollis advised the person was returning to the workplace after a short period of leave.
  1. [110]
    For these reasons I have decided that reinstatement is impracticable.
  1. [111]
    I am also satisfied that re-employment is impracticable.  No evidence was adduced by Mr Gleeson as to the positions that the QCS in particular, the Respondent or the QPS more broadly, might have available.  It is the role of the Applicant, not the Respondent, to lead such evidence.  Further, it is not for the Commission to determine a suitable position for an applicant in the absence of evidence.
  1. [112]
    I also consider that finding an alternative position for Mr Gleeson would not be without its difficulties.  There would be few other positions with the Respondent specifically or the QPS generally that would utilise the skills and qualifications of a Trade Instructor.  Further, Mr Gleeson has dyslexia which, according to his evidence, makes the performance of administrative work difficult for him.
  1. [113]
    Accordingly, having determined reinstatement and re‑employment are impracticable, of, the remedy of compensation remains.
  1. [114]
    Section 79(1) of the IR Act provides that compensation is limited to a maximum of six months wages that the employer would have been liable to pay after the dismissal, calculated at the rate the employee received before the dismissal.  The six month limitation is an arbitrary cap on the amount that may be awarded.  The starting point is to calculate what the employee has lost.[12] Various decisions of the Commission have set out the types of factors taken into account in calculating compensation and include such matters as the age of the applicant, the nature of the employment, qualifications, loss of leave credits and the requirement that the employee take reasonable steps to mitigate their loss.[13] The assessment of the loss should include deductions for contingencies such as the whether the employee would have remained in employment.[14]
  1. [115]
    The position of Trade Instructor was secure, ongoing employment.  Mr Gleeson had held that position since 2001.  He is presently 53 years of age and, absent his incapacity, could have expected to continue in his position until retirement.  While these factors support the awarding of significant compensation, deductions must be made for the following reasons.  I have been unable to be satisfied that Mr Gleeson is capable of performing the duties of the position of Trade Instructor immediately and permanently.  Whether he would have been able to be transferred or redeployed is unknown.  For the reasons given earlier, his prospects of redeployment must be regarded as slight.  These factors lead to the conclusion that any period of employment in the QPS would be limited. 
  1. [116]
    Added to this is that both Dr Shaikh and Dr Morris considered that Mr Gleeson should return to work on a graduated basis.  This means that he would not have been immediately returned to full time work.  Dr Shaikh, in his first report, recommended the return to work be over a period of three months.
  1. [117]
    The limited period of any future employment together with the graduated return to work over a period of three months has the effect of substantially reducing the amount of compensation to be awarded.
  1. [118]
    Mr Gleeson was dismissed with the payment of five weeks wages.  This amount is to be taken into consideration in calculating compensation but does not necessarily mean that it is to be deducted.[15]  He has also earned a total amount of $4,483.43 in wages for two periods of employment following his dismissal.  Mr Gleeson left the first employer because he did not like the employer or the working environment.  He discontinued his employment with second employer because he was more focussed on this case.  By the time of the hearing on 17 and 18 June 2015, Mr Gleeson was not working.  Although Mr Gleeson made some early attempts to mitigate his loss, these were not ongoing.  Whether an employee has made reasonable attempts to mitigate their loss and the amounts earned in mitigation are factors to be taken into account in determining compensation.
  1. [119]
    Because of the complexity of the issues involved, it is difficult to provide a formula setting out the calculation of the amount of compensation in this case.  Bearing in mind the competing considerations I have reached the view that Mr Gleeson should be awarded a global sum of compensation of 10 weeks wages, less taxation required by law.  This amount takes into account the notice paid and the income received after his termination.  Such amount is to be paid by the Respondent to Mr Gleeson within 22 days of the date of this decision.

Footnotes

[1] Crozier v Palazzo Corp Pty Ltd (2000) 98 IR 137, 151 [70]-[73].

[2] This power is able to be delegated:  Public Service Act 2008, s 103.

[3] Which requires the chief executive to act independently, impartially and fairly.

[4] Public Service Act 2008, s 6.

[5] Public Service Act 2008, s 11(1).

[6] Public Service Act 2008, s 47(5).

[7] Public Service Act 2008, s 47(4).

[8] Blackadder v Ramsay Butchering Services Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 22; (2005) 221 CLR 539.

[9] Smith and Kimball v Moore Paragon Australia [2004] AIRC 47; (2004) 130 IR 446.

[10] Smith and Kimball v Moore Paragon Australia [2004] AIRC 47 [54]; (2004) 130 IR 446 [54].

[11] James Patterson v Newcrest Mining Limited [1996] ICRA 265.

[12] Stewart v Creekgold Pty Ltd[2003] QIC 152; 174 QGIG 104.

[13] Barsha v Motor Finance Wizard (Sales) Pty Ltd [2002] IR Comm 164; (2002) 171 QGIG 139.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Section 79(3) IR Act; Stewart v Creekgold [2003] QIC 152; 174 QGIG 104.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Gleeson v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Gleeson v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)

  • MNC:

    [2015] QIRC 148

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Member Fisher IC

  • Date:

    07 Aug 2015

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Barsha v Motor Finance Wizard (Sales) Pty Ltd (2002) 171 QGIG 139
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2002) 171 QGIG 139
Barsha v Motor Finance Wizard (Sales) Pty Ltd [2002] IR Comm 164
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] IR Comm 164
Blackadder v Ramsey Butchering Services Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 539
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) 221 CLR 539
James Patterson v Newcrest Mining Limited [1996] ICRA 265
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1996] ICRA 265
Peter Crozier v Palazzo Corporation Pty Ltd (2000) 98 IR 137
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 98 IR 137
Smith and Kimball v Moore Paragon Australia [2004] AIRC 47
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2004] AIRC 47
Cite 2 - [2004] AIRC 47
Smith and Kimball v Moore Paragon Australia (2004) 130 IR 446
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2004) 130 IR 446
Cite 2 - (2004) 130 IR 446
Stephen Blackadder v Ramsey Butchering Services Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 22
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] HCA 22
Stewart v Creekgold Pty Ltd [2003] QIC 152
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QIC 152
Cite 2 - [2003] QIC 152

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Erian v State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries)(No. 2) [2019] QIRC 2021 citation
Smith v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2) [2024] QIRC 212 citations
1

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