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  4. Sansom v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) - [2015] QIRC 180

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Sansom v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)[2015] QIRC 180

Sansom v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)[2015] QIRC 180

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Sansom v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 180

PARTIES:

Sansom, Warren

(Appellant)

v

Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

WC/2014/108

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against a decision of Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)

DELIVERED ON:

20 October 2015

HEARING DATES:

9 June, 10 June, 11 June 2015

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

MEMBER:

Industrial Commissioner Black

ORDERS:

  1. Appeal dismissed
  2. The decision of the Regulator dated 20 March 2014 is confirmed
  3. Costs are reserved

CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - APPEAL AGAINST DECISION

CASES:

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 32, s 550

WorkCover Queensland v Dreadon [1999] QIC 47; 161 QGIG 775

Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] QCA 48

Croning v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland (1997) 156 QGIG 100

APPEARANCES:

J Sorbello, Counsel instructed by Murphy Schmidt for the Appellant.

Mr S Gray, Counsel instructed by Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator), the Respondent.

   Decision

 Introduction

  1. [1]
    Warren Sansom (the "appellant") appeals a decision of the Review Unit of the Workers' Compensation Regulator ("the regulator") to reject his application for workers' compensation.  The Review Unit decision was issued on 20 March 2014.  The appellant appeals this decision pursuant to s 550 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 ("the Act").
  1. [2]
    The appellant lodged his application for compensation with WorkCover Queensland ("the Insurer") on 11 March 2013.  On his claim form he referred to the injury as "Psychological injury occurring 11 February 2013 as a result of work related issues".  At the time the worker was employed as a Bus Driver with Veolia Transport Queensland Pty Ltd trading as Vivo Connect.  The applicant's employment was primarily associated with the Caval Ridge Mine Project at Moranbah.  His work involved the transportation of construction workers from an accommodation village or camp to work sites.
  1. [3]
    The appellant was employed on a "fly-in/fly-out" arrangement which involved three weeks work at Caval Ridge and one week's leave at Brisbane which was his permanent place of residence.  During his period of duty he was accommodated for the most part in a camp near Moranbah, however he was required from time to time to drive to Dysart and on these occasions he could be accommodated at a camp in Dysart.  While at Moranbah the appellant worked a roster which provided for six days on and one day off.  The cost of accommodation and catering was borne by the appellant's employer as were the costs of flights to and from Brisbane.
  1. [4]
    When the appellant travelled back to Brisbane for his week's leave, he would travel in his own time from Moranbah to Brisbane and return, but for each leg of the travel he would receive payment from his employer for four hours at ordinary time.  While the appellant might work a shift on the day he left the site, he was never required to work on the day that he returned to site.
  1. [5]
    The appellant had commenced employment with Veolia Transport on 29 March 2012.  Around October of that year, Mr Brett Hawkins commenced employment with Veolia in the capacity of bus driver.  It was through their employment with Veolia that Mr Hawkins and the appellant became acquainted.  Mr Hawkins died in his accommodation unit some time in the morning of 31 January 2013.

 Issues for Determination

  1. [6]
    The appellant advanced the case that the appeal could succeed either pursuant to s 32 of the Act, or in the alternative, pursuant to s 35 of the Act.  For the purposes of determination of this matter, s 32 of the Act relevantly provides as follows:

"32  Meaning of injury

  1. (1)
    An injury is personal injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury.

    …

  (5)  Despite subsections (1) and (3), injury does not include a psychiatric or psychological disorder arising out of, or in the course of, any of the following circumstances -

   (a)  reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with the worker's employment;

   (b)  the worker's expectation or perception of reasonable management action being taken against the worker;

   (c)  action by the Authority or an insurer in connection with the workers' application for compensation."

  1. [7]
    A determination under s 32 of the Act requires consideration of whether the appellant's injury occurred in the course of his employment and whether the appellant's employment was a significant contributing factor to the development of his injury.  In broad terms the first question requires a temporal connection between the injury and employment while the second question requires a causal connection.  For the appeal to succeed both questions have to be answered in the affirmative.  Satisfaction of the first question alone is not enough.
  1. [8]
    The appellant submitted that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the injury occurred either during a period of actual work, or in an interlude or interval in an overall period or episode of work.  It was put that a finding that the injury was sustained during the appellant's paid employment hours was supported by the following considerations:
  • the appellant was employed on a fly-in/fly-out basis and was required to travel from Brisbane to Moranbah in order to fulfil his employment responsibilities;
  • the employer paid the appellant wages, albeit limited to four hours, in respect of the appellant's travel time.
  1. [9]
    If the injury was not found to have occurred during paid employment, it was submitted that the appellant's injury should be held to have been sustained during an interval or interlude in an overall period of work.  In this regard it was put that the overall period of work commenced once the appellant departed his Brisbane residence to begin his journey to Moranbah and that this period did not end until the appellant had returned home on completion of his roster cycle. 
  1. [10]
    The appellant also advanced an argument in the alternative that the facts and circumstances of the case were capable of supporting a finding that the appellant sustained his injury whilst on a journey from home to work pursuant to s 35 of the Act.
  1. [11]
    The effect of s 35 is that the appellant's injury could be taken to arise out of, or in the course of, employment if the injury was sustained on a journey between the appellant's home and his place of employment.  If a finding were made to this effect, it is not necessary for the appellant to establish that his employment was a significant contributing factor to his injury.  Schedule 6 of the Act defines "place of employment" in the following terms:

"place of employment means the premises, works, plant, or place for the time being occupied by, or under the control or management of, the employer by whom a worker concerned is employed, and in, on, at, or in connection with which the worker was working when the worker sustained injury".

  Nature of the Appeal

  1. [12]
    The appeal to the Commission is by way of a hearing de novo.  The respondent conceded that the appellant was a worker and that he had sustained a personal injury.  In the circumstances, to succeed with his appeal, the appellant must establish on the balance of probabilities that:
  • His psychological injury arose out of, or in the course of, employment; and
  • His employment was a significant contributing factor to the injury.

Alternatively, the appellant must establish that his injury is compensable pursuant to s 35 of the Act.

 Evidence

  1. [13]
    The following evidence was given in the proceedings:
  • Mr Warren Samson (appellant)
  • Ms Gayle Rook (appellant's partner)
  • Dr Samuels (Psychiatrist)
  • Ms Julie Whitlock (psychologist)
  • Mr Stephen Conrad (Veolia Site Manager)
  • Ms Belinda Cox (Bechtel Corporation Bus Representative)
  • Dr Prabal Kar (Psychiatrist)
  1. [14]
    Further, by consent of the parties, the records of the appellant's attendance on Dr Robyn Barrett, Davidson Trahaire Corpsych, Catalyst Injury Management, the Prince Charles Hospital, the Dysart Hospital and the Moranbah Hospital, were tendered into the evidence.

31 January 2013

  1. [15]
    Following the conclusion of a period of leave the appellant journeyed from Brisbane to Moranbah on 31 January 2013.  He departed his Brisbane residence at approximately 11.00 am and travelled to the Brisbane Airport where he boarded a flight to Moranbah departing about 1.00 pm.  Upon arrival at Moranbah Airport at or around 2.30 pm the appellant left the terminal and boarded a Veolia bus for transport to the camp site.
  1. [16]
    The normal process was for the appellant on arrival at the camp site to go to the administration office, collect his room key, and then proceed to his accommodation unit.  However on this occasion he was informed by a co-worker, Jeff Watson, at the airport that there had been an incident on site and that once he had collected his room key he was to proceed direct to the Veolia office.  Mr Conrad's evidence was a little different.  He said that he told Mr Watson to tell incoming staff that they were to report to the old wet mess area.
  1. [17]
    The appellant arrived on site around 3.00 pm.  As the bus drove through the security gates of the facility, the appellant noticed the presence of police and ambulance vehicles.  The appellant got off the bus and went to the administration building to collect his accommodation keys before proceeding towards the Veolia office.  On the way to the office he was informed by a co-worker that Brett Hawkins had died.
  1. [18]
    The appellant said that he and other workers were not allowed to enter the accommodation area and that during the course of the afternoon and evening they were asked to remain in a tavern area where food and drinks were served.  He said that he observed that parts of the accommodation area were cordoned off with barricades and that security, police and ambulance officers were in attendance.  He agreed that barricading "like a big tarpaulin sheet" had been strung up across the walkway that led to Mr Hawkins' unit.  He said however that he could see through the sheet and that later in the evening after he had been allowed to return to his unit, he walked down the main aisle and passed by the barricaded area and was able to observe ambulance officers in the process of removing Mr Hawkins' body from his unit on a stretcher.  Soon thereafter he arrived at a designated smoking area associated with the tavern where he said that he saw the body being transferred to the coroner's van.
  1. [19]
    The appellant outlined his view about the extent and nature of the barricading at T1-31:

"And you did not actually see Mr Hawkins’ body on the stretcher?‑‑‑Yes, I did, because they only had the sheet up and you could see what was going on inside because it was only a small sheet which just blocked you from walking through, yeah.  When - when they took it off the walkway between the C and D block and they just put it over the entrance to the D block area where Brett was staying, it didn’t even cover that area and you could see down the side and that’s when I went down later on and I saw him being wheeled out.

What time do you say this was, Mr Sansom?‑‑‑I had - well, they had let us to our rooms.  So I had gone up to my room and, I don’t know, approximately 5 pm or something, I don’t know, I had walked back down."

  1. [20]
    Mr Conrad said that Mr Hawkins had been pronounced dead about 12.00 noon but that it was not until 8.00 pm that evening that the body was taken from the site.  The delay was attributed to the fact that the coroner was required to travel from Mackay.  While ambulance officers were in attendance, it was a requirement that the coroner attend the site and take possession of the body.  As I understood the evidence an ambulance was parked at the end of Mr Hawkins' walkway, opposite to the end that was blocked with sheeting.  It was also at this end that the coroner's van was parked and the point at which Mr Hawkins' body was transferred into the coroner's van.
  1. [21]
    It was Mr Conrad's evidence that staff were positioned to ensure that foot traffic did not enter the main aisle.  He said that thick black plastic had been strung across the walkway between the row of units where Mr Hawkins was accommodated and that the purpose of the plastic was to allow the main aisle to be reopened to foot traffic.  He said that the plastic sheet was about eight feet high and that it covered the opening to the walkway.  Mr Conrad said that general pedestrian traffic down the main aisle resumed about 5.30 pm when workers returned from the construction site.  Mr Conrad accepted that it may have been possible for the appellant to see the ambulance from or near the tavern smoking area where the appellant said that he viewed the body being transferred into the coroner's van.
  1. [22]
    Ms Cox agreed that a barrier had been placed at the end of Mr Hawkins' walkway.  She said that in the first instance a white sheet was used as a barrier to sight, but that later on the sheet had been replaced by black plastic.  She said that particular personnel were stationed to prevent any physical access to the walkway.  She said that the black plastic sheeting extended from ground level to the roof height.
  1. [23]
    The evidence supports a conclusion that while in the first instance the appellant may have observed that a white sheet had been erected across the walkway, by the time that the main aisle had been reopened for pedestrian traffic, black plastic sheeting would have been erected and the appellant would not have been able to gain line of sight vision into Mr Hawkins' unit.  Nor would he have been able to observe the body being removed from the accommodation unit and transferred down the walkway towards the coroner's van.  He may however have seen the stretcher carrying the covered body being loaded into the coroner's van around 8.00 pm at night while he was positioned in a tavern smoking area.
  1. [24]
    The appellant said that he was completely shocked and stunned by Mr Hawkins' passing.  He was also upset by the fact that he had received a missed call from Mr Hawkins while he was in-flight from Brisbane.  However, on the evidence of Mr Conrad who said that Mr Hawkins was pronounced dead about midday, and on the evidence of the appellant that his flight departed Brisbane around 1.00 pm, it was unlikely that Mr Hawkins could have placed a call to the appellant while the appellant was in flight.

When was the Injury Sustained?

  1. [25]
    A difficulty in resolving the temporal connection between the injury and the employment arises from the imprecision in the evidence about when the appellant's psychological injury was sustained.  The difficulty is illustrated by Dr Samuels' evidence that it could take weeks or months to develop a depressive disorder or a post-traumatic stress disorder.  I take it from this evidence that the injury could develop over time and in circumstances where, while it may not be immediately apparent after the precipitating event, it may at some subsequent time reach a fully developed state.
  1. [26]
    In theory the appellant's psychological well-being could have deteriorated while the appellant was driving his bus but also ruminating about the death of Mr Hawkins.  Alternatively the injury could have been sustained during non-working periods when the appellant was more likely to be unoccupied, and preoccupied with rumination.  Finally the injury may not have fully developed until after the appellant had left the site on 19 February 2013.
  1. [27]
    The appellant pressed his case on the basis that the injury may have been sustained on 31 January 2013 as a result of shock and grief experienced on learning of the death of Mr Hawkins; or the injury may have been developed over time in circumstances where the enduring precipitating event was said to be the death of Mr Hawkins.
  1. [28]
    The effect of the appellant's evidence was that he was shocked and very distressed by the news of Mr Hawkins' passing.  Further these immediately felt symptoms were exacerbated by discussions with co-workers about the causes of Mr Hawkins' death and the appellant's sighting of the transfer of the appellant's body from his accommodation unit to the coroner's van.  In regard to the latter consideration, there was a contest in the evidence about whether the appellant could have seen Mr Hawkins' covered body being moved out of his accommodation unit, or being loaded into the coroner's van.  My finding in this regard is that the appellant may have been able to see Mr Hawkins' covered body being transferred from an ambulance stretcher to the coroner's van.  However I do not think a lot turns on this finding because this factor is not mentioned as a stressor in any of the medical evidence, including the evidence of Dr Samuels and Ms Whitlock.
  1. [29]
    While Dr Kar accepted that the sudden and unexpected death of a co-worker was causatively linked to the development of the appellant's condition, he identified the main stressors as the two life-threatening anaphylaxis attacks.  He described the passing of the co-worker as a preceding minor stressor.  He also said that while the death of Mr Hawkins made the appellant anxious, it did not cause him a psychiatric condition or a psychiatric impairment.  The effect of Dr Kar's evidence was that the appellant's injury was not sustained on 31 January 2013. 
  1. [30]
    Other evidence pointing towards a conclusion that the appellant's injury was not sustained until some time after the death of Mr Hawkins includes that the appellant did not report any difficulty associated with grief or shock related to Mr Hawkins' death when he attended on the site doctor on 3 February 2013 or the Dysart Hospital on 11 February 2013.  Neither did it constitute the reason for presenting at the Moranbah Hospital.  Finally, while he was offered counselling after the death of Mr Hawkins, the appellant did not take up his employer's offer until 14 February 2013.
  1. [31]
    While I do not accept that the injury was sustained immediately after learning of the death of Mr Hawkins, the weight of the evidence supports a conclusion that the appellant suffered some form of emotional breakdown during his period of service at Moranbah and Dysart.  This decompensation was evident in the notes of the Moranbah Hospital and is reflected in the appellant's request for counselling on 14 February 2013, his discussion with the Mates in Construction (MIC) program co-ordinator, and the final decision taken jointly to remove him from site before his scheduled departure and return him to Brisbane.  It follows that the evidence supports a finding that the appellant's psychological illness or injury was sustained during his roster cycle at Moranbah or Dysart, but some time on or after 11 February 2013.

Paid Employment

  1. [32]
    While I accept that the appellant's rumination about matters associated with Mr Hawkins' death could have occurred during periods of actual work, any such proposition is too vague in itself to support a conclusion that the injury occurred during a period of actual work.  Further if the injury was sustained some time after 11 February 2013, it is relevant that he did not complete any work between 11 February and 19 February except for 16 and 17 February 2013, and no evidence was led about contributory factors occurring during the performance of work on these two days.
  1. [33]
    The principal proposition advanced by the appellant however was that because he was travelling to work on 31 January 2013 and the employer had made some payment in respect of that time, he should be deemed to have performed work on the day and that, in some way or other, the period of work encompassed the point in time that the appellant became aware of Mr Hawkins' death.  It was not in dispute that the appellant was not required to perform any actual work on the day.
  1. [34]
    I do not accept the appellant's position.  While the appellant received the equivalent of four hours pay for the day on which he commuted from home to site, this payment should be correctly characterised as a travel allowance, and does not support the claim that the appellant was in paid employment for part or whole of the afternoon of 31 January 2013.

Journey Claim

  1. [35]
    Section 35 of the Act applies in the event of an injury sustained on a journey between a worker's home and his place of employment.  The term "place of employment" is defined in Sch 6 of the Act.  On the appellant's version of events, his psychological injury was caused by anxiety or trauma experienced on learning of the death of a co-worker.  It does not necessarily follow however that the anxiety developed into an adjustment disorder or an illness or injury in an immediate sense.  The initial symptoms of grief, loss or anxiety may have increased and developed over time with a result that an illness or injury may not have been suffered until some time after the death of the co-worker.
  1. [36]
    For the appellant's journey claim to qualify for consideration he would need to establish in the first instance that the injury was sustained immediately upon receipt of the news that Mr Hawkins had died.  That is, that the injury was sustained immediately after the appellant had arrived on site around or about 3.00 pm on 31 January 2013.  If this proposition were accepted the matter for determination to be made is whether at this point in time the appellant's journey to work had ended, and he had reached his place of employment.  If so, his journey claim must fail.
  1. [37]
    When the appellant lodged his worker's compensation claim he nominated 11 February 2013 as the date of injury.  If this date were relied on for the purposes of a determination under s 35, the injury could not have been sustained on a journey between the appellant's home and his place of employment.  Further, on all the evidence, I am more disposed to conclude that the appellant's injury was sustained some time after 31 January 2013, rather than on 31 January 2013.  Such a conclusion must also mean that the appellant's journey to work had ended when he sustained his injury.  If I am not correct in this regard however, and if it were found that the injury was sustained on the afternoon of 31 January 2013, a determination would need to be made about whether it was more probable than not that the appellant's journey had ended at that point in time when he was informed of Mr Hawkins' death.
  1. [38]
    The application of the term "place of employment" was considered by his Honour Justice Moynihan in Dreadon[1].  In that matter, at the end of his shift, the worker had proceeded by foot to the car park.  As he arrived at his vehicle, he was approached by a person who assaulted him by hitting him with a baseball bat which caused the injury.  The car park in which the assault occurred was under the control or management of the employer.  Employment was not considered as the significant contributing factor to the injury and the matter for determination was whether or not the worker had commenced his journey between his place of employment and his home.  The reasons for decision of Moynihan J are set out below:

"To argue that the 'place of employment' relates to the physical and geographical boundaries of the area of land or property that is under the control of the employer is flawed.  The definition has two elements.  The 'place of employment' is:-

  1. (1)
    The premises, works, plant or place for the time being occupied by, or under the control or management of, the employer by whom a worker is employed; and
  1. (2)
    The premises, works, plant or place in, on, at, or in connection with which the worker was working when the worker sustained injury.

The second requirement of the definition indicates that not every piece of land or property occupied or under the control or management of the employer is necessarily every employees 'place of employment'.  There must be a connection between the land or property and the work duties of the employee.  Consequently, the definition must be applied to each case on its own facts.  Whether there is a connection is relative to the nature of employment." 

  1. [39]
    The appellant's job primarily involved the transportation of construction workers from the camp to their work sites.  It can be inferred that the appellant would have commenced his work at the office or bus depot and then would have proceeded to collect construction workers from the designated pick-up points in the camp site.  Bus pick-up points in the camp, the Veolia office, the bus depot and the buses themselves were all structures or places relevant to the elements of the definition of "place of employment".  In Dreadon[2] it was noted that while the car park where the worker was injured did not constitute the place of employment, a different conclusion may have been reached if the worker's duties had, for example, included cleaning the car park.  In some respects the appellant's place of employment and the camp site were interchangeable terms.  This factor increases the prospect that the appellant had arrived at his place of employment when he was told of Mr Hawkins' death.
  1. [40]
    At the point in time that the appellant received the news of the death of Mr Hawkins, he had entered through the main site gates and received a security clearance.  The bus had dropped him off at the camp administration office where he had collected the keys to his accommodation unit.  On a normal day he would proceed to his unit and settle in before attending at the Veolia site office to get his work roster for the following day and days thereafter.  The appellant said that he never commenced work on the day of arrival at the camp but always commenced on the following day.  On 31 January 2013, in accordance with instructions given at the airport, after collecting his accommodation keys the appellant walked towards the office of his employer.  Before he arrived at the office, he was told by a co-worker that Mr Hawkins had died.
  1. [41]
    While the evidence about the precise location of places and structures was not as fulsome as it might have been, and while greater clarity in the relevant evidence may have assisted, I am of the view that, having arrived at the camp site and collected the keys to his accommodation and having reached a point which was proximate to his employer's office when informed of Mr Hawkins' death, a conclusion can be justified to the effect that, had the injury been sustained at that point in time, the appellant had already arrived at his place of employment.  It follows that the appeal cannot succeed pursuant to the terms of s 35 of the Act.

After 31 January 2013

  1. [42]
    At some point during the evening on 31 January 2013 the appellant was informed that he would not be rostered to work until the following afternoon.  He said that he asked his employer to allocate him some work in Dysart if it were available.  He said that he wanted to get away from the camp site.  He said that he left the camp site for Dysart the next day (1 February 2013) about 3.00 pm.  After he arrived at Dysart about 6.30 pm he was then accommodated in the Dysart camp.  He said that later that night he was feeling unwell and was subsequently transported by ambulance to Dysart hospital.
  1. [43]
    In giving his oral testimony the appellant appeared to assert that he was admitted to the Dysart Hospital on 1 February 2013.  However the actual date of presentation at the hospital was some ten days later on 11 February 2013.  The appellant did not explain, or explain in any detail, what transpired between 31 January and 11 February 2013.  While he said that on 31 January 2013 he asked to be assigned to trips travelling to Dysart, the evidence does not establish the extent to which this arrangement was put into place.
  1. [44]
    The appellant lodged a psychological injury claim information summary with WorkCover on 15 March 2013 in support of his application for compensation.  The summary is in the evidence as Exhibit 6.  The summary shows that the appellant stayed in the Dysart camp on 2, 6, and 11 February 2013.  In the summary the appellant states that on the evening of 2 February 2013 he arrived at the Dysart camp and hurt his shoulder while cleaning his bus.
  1. [45]
    The appellant performed work as usual between 1 February 2013 and 11 February 2013.  However Exhibit 6 discloses that during this period he did seek both medical and physiotherapy treatment and experienced problems with site water.  The following information is drawn from Exhibit 6:

2 February 2013  Appellant falls while cleaning his bus and feels sharp pain in neck

3 February 2013  Appellant attends on site doctor in Moranbah for neck pain.  Doctor treats him with voltaren gel and pain tablets

4 February 2013   On-site service for Mr Hawkins at Moranbah camp

5 February 2013   Appellant attends physiotherapy session at Moranbah

6 February 2013   Site water supply interrupted - question about suitability of water for drinking.  Bottled water supplied.

Dysart Hospital

  1. [46]
    The appellant was staying in the Dysart camp on the night of 11 February 2013.  It was his evidence that around dinner time he told a co-worker that he was not very well and asked him to remain contactable in the event that his condition worsened.  The appellant said that he had developed rashes on his arms which subsequently extended to his chin and his jaw.  He said that at some point the rashes started weeping, became very itchy, and caused a burning feeling.  He thought this condition may have been what had caused him to feel unwell.  In any event as the evening progressed the appellant said that his condition worsened and "developed into swelling, which they told me was anaphylaxis.  I had a reaction to something and I couldn’t breathe…"  At this point the appellant called his co-worker who rang an ambulance which conveyed the appellant to the Dysart Hospital.
  1. [47]
    While he was being treated at the hospital the appellant was informed that he had an anaphylactic shock.  Once his condition had settled, Mr Conrad and the hospital nurse asked him whether he wanted to return to the Dysart camp or travel back to the Moranbah camp.  The appellant said that he would prefer to travel back to Moranbah because a medical centre was located in Moranbah and he was close to an airport.  Consequently Mr Conrad then drove him back to the Moranbah camp.  Having regard to the hospital records, this travel must have occurred in the early hours of 12 February 2013.
  1. [48]
    The medical records of the Dysart Hospital are in the evidence as Exhibit 11.  There was no reference in the records that associated the appellant's condition with the death of Mr Hawkins.  The records show that the appellant was admitted to the emergency department at 11.30 pm on 11 February 2013 and departed the facility at 1.10 am on 12 February 2011.  The presenting complaint was described as "allergic reaction - SOB - dizzy - rash - general unwell".  The records also disclose that the following clinical assessment was made by the registered nurse at the hospital:

"Pt BIBA? Allergic reaction. Pt stated he felt a rash come up under his mouth this morning. After resting for 30 mins this evening he woke with a burning sensation to his chin. He was diaphoretic + nauseated at the time paramedic arrived. Pt states he was SOB however did not feel tightness in his throat. He denies eating any new foods or using any new products. Observations charted and stable temp 372, HR 62, R 20, SpO2 97%, pain 0/10. Rash is red + blistered, however no current burning sensation. Dr Sunday called and ordered promethazine 25mg + ibuprofen 400mg. Same given and pt advise to see GP tomorrow. (Collins) RN"

  1. [49]
    The QAS case description was also included in Exhibit 11.  This description recorded the following version of events:             

"53 yom c/o feeling SOB, nausea & vomiting & generally unwell. Pt states he felt a rash coming up on his chin, was quite concerned about it, then felt nauseated. Pt went outside to vomit. Bystander states pt was pale, diaphoretic & c/o weakness or numbness in his legs. Pt states he is in & out of the process of giving up or cutting back on cigarettes. Also pt c/o rash on chin, states it is itchy. Rash seems to be quite red & blistered. Pt denies eating any new foods that he hasn’t had before. Pt state when he was SOB prior to QAS it did not feel tight in his throat, but he felt it was more in his chest. Pt GCS 15, slightly flushed in the face, nil pain, SOB settling & nausea settled after vomit."

  1. [50]
    The appellant submitted that while the appellant's condition was diagnosed or referred to as an anaphylactic reaction, on a retrospective view of the evidence, there was a significant doubt about this diagnosis, and the more likely cause of the appellant's presentation at the Dysart hospital was a panic attack.  It was the appellant's submission at T3-31 that:

" … there doesn’t seem to be any suggestion in any of the records that there was, in fact, a anaphylactic reaction and, in fact, it seems to be more attributable to a panic disorder or panic attack or anxiety.  So in that -and, in my submission, the Commission can be satisfied that the anaphylactic reactions is a red herring in respect of Dr Kar’s opinion that one flows from the other and, therefore, Dr Kar’s opinion that the anaphylactic reactions themselves are the significant contributing factor shouldn’t be accepted."

  1. [51]
    Dr Samuels' evidence on the subject was supportive albeit speculative.  He surmised at T2-6 that the anaphylactic reactions may have amounted to panic or anxiety attacks:

"The anaphylactic reaction is a little hard to know what to make of them.  They could, of course, have been, once again, panic, anxiety, all as a consequence of the learning of the initial death, and of course as he believed that his colleague died because of him -it sounds to me like he had some -sort of slightly odd beliefs about what might have led to the colleague’s death."

  1. [52]
    In the history provided to Dr Kar the appellant said that while he was admitted to the Prince Charles Hospital with a suspected heart attack, after investigation "his heart was found to be all right" and he "was diagnosed with a panic attack".  The appellant said that "the doctors there told him that his previous two attacks were also panic attacks".  According to Dr Samuels' report, the appellant said that when he was admitted to the Prince Charles Hospital he was told that he did not have a heart attack but that he had an "anxiety attack".
  1. [53]
    The proposition that the appellant had been diagnosed with a panic attack was included in the notes of the appellant's consultation on Dr Barrett on 4 March 2013 and referred to in the QAS records associated with the appellant's presentation at the Prince Charles Hospital on 1 March 2013.  However, on my examination of the records, a diagnosis of "panic attack" was not entered by nursing or medical staff at the Prince Charles Hospital.  The predominant investigations were related to a suspected heart condition.  The only reference to a panic attack was that which was included in the QAS records, and a reading of these records suggest that the term "panic attack" was either used by the appellant when he provided a history to the ambulance officers, or that the ambulance officers may have surmised that a panic attack was a possibility in their discussions with the appellant.  There is no reference to the term in the hospital records (as distinct from the QAS records) and there does not appear to be any clinical evidence supporting the appellant's recollections. 

Moranbah Hospital

  1. [54]
    Soon after his return to the Moranbah camp on the morning of 12 February 2014, the appellant said that he attended at the site medical centre where he remained most of the day.  He said that while he was at the centre he was monitored by a nurse.  He said that when he went back to his room at the end of the day he started feeling unwell again and informed the nurse accordingly.  He said that he then found himself "in the ambulance again going to Moranbah Hospital with anaphylactic shock".  As it transpired the site doctor had prepared a referral letter for the hospital in which he had set out his assessment of the appellant's condition.
  1. [55]
    The appellant arrived at the emergency department of the Moranbah Hospital at 9.50 pm.  The registered nurse recorded a clinical assessment of the patient at 11.00 pm.  The effect of the assessment was that the appellant complained of swollen lips, swollen tongue and difficulty breathing.  He said that he had cut himself shaving the previous day and developed a rash on his chin.  That evening he developed difficulty breathing, experienced a swollen mouth and tongue, was vomiting, and feeling generally unwell.  He was treated for these symptoms at the Dysart Hospital.  Recurrent problems led to presentation at Moranbah Hospital.  The record said that on examination the appellant was found to have no obvious tongue swelling but a slightly swollen lower lip.  The appellant was also treated with ice packs when he complained about a tight feeling in his throat and burning around his neck.  The record noted that the appellant had made an appointment to see his own GP in Brisbane on Thursday.
  1. [56]
    The appellant was admitted to a hospital ward at 11.55 pm.  The hospital progress notes included an entry made at 6.45 am the following morning (13 February 2013).  The effect of the entry was that the appellant had said that he was upset at the death of a workmate.  The workmate's funeral was to be held that day.  The appellant was crying at this stage.  He was worried that his partner was unaware of his admission to hospital.  The appellant declined an offer of a social worker saying that he was planning on returning to Brisbane the next day (14 February).
  1. [57]
    The Discharge Summary of the Moranbah Hospital records (Exhibit 1) stated the reason for admission as "52yr old male patient presents to the Moranbah Hospital complaining of wheeze, swollen lips and tongue ? allergic reaction affecting lower face."  A principal diagnosis of "Hypersensitivity reaction" was entered.  "Hypertension" was noted as another active problem.  In respect to previous medical history the records stated "Hypertension and "Smoker 25/day". 
  1. [58]
    The notes of the hospital doctor's review of the appellant on 13 February 2013 disclose that the doctor found the patient to be well and that no swelling was present.  The notes also appear (writing not easily decipherable) to include the following entry:

"PSTD - Coworker had heart attack - For counselling - Has appointment with GP. Will pursue it."

  1. [59]
    An entry made by the attending nurse some time after the doctor's review included a reference to a complaint by the appellant that his face felt red and burning and that the appellant had been given a script by the hospital doctor for prednisone.
  1. [60]
    The association between the appellant's presenting condition and the grief and distress experienced as a result of the passing of a co-worker was only superficially made out on the medical records.  The fact that the appellant told ambulance officers, nursing staff or doctors of the grief or distress did not lead to any diagnosis of anxiety or depression and does not diminish from the fact that the motivating reason for attending at the Moranbah Hospital was the anaphylactic condition.
  1. [61]
    Following his discharge from Moranbah Hospital on 13 February 2014 the appellant visited the site doctor who gave him a medical certificate allowing time off work on 13 and 14 February 2013.  On 14 February 2013 the appellant had accessed his employer's employee assistance program and talked to a counsellor from Davidson Trahaire Corpsych.  This counselling service had been made available to employees following the death of Mr Hawkins.  The appellant also attended on this counsellor in Brisbane on 22 and 25 February 2013 and on 4 March 2013.
  1. [62]
    The appellant was rostered off work on 15 February 2013 but resumed work on 16 February 2013.  He then completed his normal shifts on 16 and 17 February 2013, but around 6.30 pm on 18 February 2013 he sought access to an on-site support program called "Mates in Construction" (MIC).  The appellant's evidence about these circumstances is recorded at T1-16:

"I was very upset because we had a bit of a funeral thing for Brett and I just said I can’t go on, I’m not well.  I’m on all these tablets.  I shouldn’t be driving.  I can’t handle it and Belinda wasn’t qualified, but she got on to a lady called Jenny Dowell, I think Jenny’s name was, and Jenny came to see me and said you -I’m sending you home, mate.  I said, well, I’m supposed to go home on the 20th, I think this was the 18th, and Jenny I’ll go and see them.  We’ll get you out as soon as we can and she came back and she said don’t worry about it, we’ll send you home with another driver and you’re going home tomorrow."

  1. [63]
    The appellant's evidence that he became upset after attending a site service for Mr Hawkins is not consistent with the facts.  The on-site service for Mr Hawkins had been held some two weeks earlier on 4 February 2013 while Mr Hawkins' funeral in Brisbane took place on 13 February 2013.

Return to Brisbane

  1. [64]
    The appellant flew from Moranbah to Brisbane on 19 February 2013.  He said that he had not given his partner, Ms Rook, any prior notice of his illness nor of Mr Hawkins' death.  He informed her of all these matters when he returned home that day.  He also said that prior to leaving Moranbah, the site doctor had written him a letter to be given to his regular general practitioner, Dr Barrett.  His evidence was given at T1-17:

" … - the doctor at - on site at the BMAAV camp wrote me a letter for my GP, because I rang her and I told her I was coming home and I needed her to check me out and the doctor said you’ve got to go and have tests and we’ll find out what this anaphylaxis is and what all that is, what’s it all about and find out what’s wrong with you because Veolia had sent me home sick and I went to see her and ‑ ‑ ‑ ".

  1. [65]
    Gayle Rook had been the appellant’s partner for approximately nine years from 2004 to 2013.  She said that she observed that after the appellant had returned from the site he lost motivation, “stayed in bed all the time”, and was “very teary and became very withdrawn”.  She contrasted the appellant's demeanour before and after his period of service at Moranbah and said that after his return from Moranbah the appellant was extremely withdrawn and non-motivated.

Dr Robyn Barrett

  1. [66]
    The medical records in the evidence as Exhibit 12 disclose that the appellant had been attending on Dr Barrett since 2006.  A review of his history indicates that the appellant has presented with various complaints some of which may be relevant to the proceedings.  The record for the consultation on 4 January 2006 noted that the appellant was still smoking and had a strong family history of heart disease.  On 23 July 2010 the records state that the appellant had stopped smoking "because he couldn't breathe".  The record of 27 July 2011 noted that the appellant had resumed smoking.
  1. [67]
    The appellant had made an appointment to see Dr Barrett on 22 February 2013 prior to his departure from Moranbah.  The notes of the consultation on 22 February 2013 included the following:

"Issues at mining site, 37 yr old partner died at work (?AMI), then had 2 sequential nights of anaphylaxis rxns, taken to hospital, on reducing does of pred, not coping as pred causing insomnia/irritability/redness etc, been on it for 10 days now, Plan stop pred, refer allergy medical, has counselling through workplace."

  1. [68]
    Dr Barrett was not called to give evidence and her notes are to be construed without the benefit of any oral explanation on her part.  I am reluctant to interpret the entry set out above to mean that the death of the co-worker was the cause of the anaphylactic reactions.  Apart from any ambiguity in the expression, such a diagnosis about causation was not supported by the contemporaneous records of the Dysart and Moranbah Hospitals or the notes of the site doctor.  Additionally it may have been that the appellant did not inform Dr Barrett that 10 days had elapsed between the death of Mr Hawkins and his date of presentation at Dysart Hospital.  Beyond these considerations, it is noted that Dr Barrett's identification of the adverse affects of prednisone and her decision to withdraw the medication was consistent with Dr Kar's opinion of the negative impacts of the drug. 
  1. [69]
    Dr Barrett referred the appellant to Allergy Medical on 22 February 2013.  In her referral note she indicated that the appellant had suffered two anaphylactic reactions two days in a row and that he was also concerned that the reactions may have been related to site water which caused a burning sensation after showering or shaving.  She also said that the appellant had been given phenergan and a course of prednisolone and said that the prednisolone and the events had caused the appellant to become "quite anxious, irritable and has insomnia".
  1. [70]
    The Allergy Medical report dated 7 March 2013 (Exhibit 12) said that "the cause of anaphylaxis is unclear but it can be a combination of having an infection, stress, food chemicals, non-steroidal anti-inflammatory medication and topical Voltaren". 
  1. [71]
    Dr Barrett issued the appellant with a Worker's Compensation Medical Certificate on 8 March 2013.  The certificate indicated that the appellant was first seen at the practice for the injury on 8 March 2013.  The certificate recorded a diagnosis of "anxiety/depression and angioedema", recorded a worker's stated date of injury of 11 February 2013, and recorded a worker's stated cause of injury of "work related issues". 
  1. [72]
    The appellant subsequently attended on Dr Barrett on 8 March 2013, 13 March 2013, 20 March 2013, 27 March 2013, 24 April 2013, 22 May 2013 and 24 May 2013.  Dr Barrett referred the appellant to Ms Whitlock on 27 March 2013.  In the mental health care plan Dr Barrett recorded inter alia that the appellant had been working in Moranbah when he had an "allergic reaction then had severe 'breakdown' and returned to Brisbane, not planning to return to the mines, does not feel he can work at the moment".

Prince Charles Hospital

  1. [73]
    The appellant explained his condition upon his return to Brisbane but before his admission to Prince Charles Hospital (PCH) in the following terms (T1-18):

"And how were you feeling in that period between arriving back in Brisbane and going to the Prince Charles Hospital?‑‑‑Not good at all.  I thought I was dying.  Brett had -Brett had died.  I didn’t know why and there was just a lot of unanswered questions and I was sick and nothing added up.  I didn’t know why I was sick.  There was nothing wrong with me until I landed at the airport, yeah.  There was nothing wrong with me at all.  I was the fittest I’d been in years."

  1. [74]
    The appellant was admitted to the PCH on 1 March 2013 with chest pain.  The appellant's evidence about the circumstances was recorded at T1-17:

"… and then I had an old work mate I used to work with years ago, he had died and I was having these panic attacks all the time and I think it was the last day of March or something, I was yelling out to Gayle, because her and kids were upstairs, and told her to call an ambulance.  I was out the front trying to breathe and it felt like I was dying and Gayle rang an ambulance and I ended up in the Prince Charles Hospital for a couple of days and it wasn’t anaphylaxis that time.  It ended up a -deemed it was all because of a -anxiety, depression and a panic attack and I went through all the stress tests and all that."

  1. [75]
    The QAS records included the following entry under the heading of "Case Description":

"Patient has a HX of panic attacks, anxiety and has been under a lot of stress of late.  This episode similar to last panic attack."

  1. [76]
    The QAS records also indicated that the "patient believes he is allergic to ? washing powder and was treated at Dysart Hospital on the 12 Feb 2013 for allergic reaction.  Today he was helping his partner doing the washing and believes this may have contributed to the above".
  1. [77]
    The PCH medical records are in the evidence as Exhibit 3.  The records show that the appellant presented at the hospital at 2.02 am on 1 March 2013.  It was noted that the appellant had been complaining of chest pain since 9.00 pm and that he had experienced a gradual worsening of shortness of breath.  The information conveyed by the medical records included the following:
  • -That the chest pain resolved while the appellant was in the ambulance
  • -The appellant undertook an exercise stress test
  • -That the patient recently had an allergic reaction which was likely due to some impurities in the water due to recent flooding
  • -That the appellant had been stressed lately as one of his friends died in a mining camp in January
  • -That the condition may likely be attributable to anxiety and stress; that there was a need to exclude cardiac causes of chest pain; and that patient led stressors included unfitness and limited exercise.
  1. [78]
    In the Emergency Observation Chart the appellant's presenting complaint was described as chest tightness and shortness of breath.  There was a reference to anxiety and to similar presentations of the same type.  Recent stressors were recorded as the sudden death of a close friend.

JL Whitlock (Psychologist)

  1. [79]
    The appellant attended on Ms Whitlock on nine occasions between 8 April 2013 and 15 July 2013.  In her evidence Ms Whitlock said that the appellant informed her that he had been hospitalised on two occasions because of an anaphylactic reaction.  He also informed her of the death of a colleague and referred to a number of other workplace events.  The appellant said that he would not be able to return to the workplace environment because that was the place where his colleague had died.
  1. [80]
    Ms Whitlock said that during the consultations she worked with the appellant to "identify the events that precipitated" the appellant's decline in mental health.  She said that these events were clearly attributable to the appellant's workplace experiences.  In report back correspondence to Dr Barrett on 17 June 2013 Ms Whitlock said that the appellant was struggling from anxiety and depression and she said that the underlying causes "include the following factor, workplace stress resulting in extreme levels of anxiety".
  1. [81]
    Arising from her treatment of the appellant, Ms Whitlock prepared a report for WorkCover dated 9 September 2013.  The report was admitted into the evidence as Exhibit 10.  Ms Whitlock said in the report that the appellant "reported feeling extreme distress upon hearing of the death of his friend" and that the news of his friend's death resulted in "a severe panic attack, which at the time was thought to be a heart attack".  If the appellant was asserting in giving this history that the panic attack or suspected heart attack occurred at or around the time of Mr Hawkins' death, he was not giving a correct history to Ms Whitlock. 
  1. [82]
    While Mr Hawkins died on 31 January 2013, the appellant did not present at the PCH with a suspected heart attack until 1 March 2013.  Further on the appellant's own evidence his suspected heart attack followed news of the death of a co-worker other than Mr Hawkins.  It is open to conclude that the flawed mixing of facts and circumstances was intended to emphasise a connection with the death of Mr Hawkins and to assist in the prosecution of the appellant's worker's compensation claim in circumstances where, at the time of his first attendance on Ms Whitlock on 8 April 2013, the appellant's WorkCover claim had been rejected and he was in the process of seeking a review.

Dr Kar

  1. [83]
    Dr Kar assessed the appellant on 18 October 2013 and prepared a report arising from his assessment on the same day.  Dr Kar's opinion (page 11 of his report) was that while the appellant's initial work related condition was causatively linked to the sudden and unexpected death of a co-worker which made the appellant anxious, it did not "cause him a psychiatric condition or psychiatric impairment." He said that anaphylaxis is associated with severe acute anxiety and that the attacks aggravated the appellant's fear of sudden death. It was his opinion that the main stressor impacting on the appellant's condition was the two life-threatening anaphylaxis attacks.  He said that it was possible that the appellant's "recent experience with the death of a co-worker and the two anaphylactic reactions, and the side effects of prednisone, had increased his anxiety and fear of death".
  1. [84]
    In his report Dr Kar responded to a question which sought his opinion on whether the appellant's employment was a significant contributing factor to any diagnosed condition.  His answer was expressed in the following terms: 

"The factors causatively linked to the development of the diagnosed initial work-related condition is the sudden unexpected death of a co-worker.  Even though Mr Sansom was not present when the co-worker died, I believe it likely made him anxious.  It did not cause him a psychiatric condition or psychiatric impairment.

Unfortunately, shortly after the co-worker passed away, Mr Sansom had two non-work related anaphylactic reactions.  These were non-work-related but aggravated his fear of sudden death.  Anaphylaxis is associated with severe acute anxiety.  Sudden death is a genuine potential outcome in anaphylaxis unless immediate treatment is provided.

Treatment for anaphylaxis includes drugs like prednisolone, which can itself cause adverse psychiatric effects.  Having two successive anaphylaxis attacks so soon after his knowledge of a co-worker suddenly dying, may have caused Mr Sansom more anxiety about his own death.  When Mr Sansom was about to return to work, he had a full-blown panic attack and he had subsequent panic attacks."

  1. [85]
    While Dr Samuels surmised that the appellant's presentation at the Dysart Hospital was driven by anxiety over Mr Hawkins' death, It was Dr Kar's opinion that the death of Mr Hawkins was a background stressor, that the anaphylactic reactions were not work related, and that the more important consideration was the extent to which the reactions increased the appellant's level of anxiety and accentuated his fear of dying a similar death to Mr Hawkins.  It was Dr Kar's opinion at page 6 of his report that the central cause of the appellant's descent into illness or depression was the impact of the anaphylactic reactions:

"In this setting, when at the back of his mind the passing of his co-worker was worrying him and he was worried about his own health, Mr Sansom had two successive severe allergic reactions.  These were diagnosed as anaphylactic reactions.  He was given medication for management of this condition, including a high dose of prednisone.  This drug has psychiatric side-effects.

Anaphylaxis is a life-threatening reaction.  The angioedema, which is the swelling of the lining of the upper airways, can make it difficult to breathe and can actually cause death.  A person struggling to breathe can become extremely panicked.  It is an extremely unpleasant anxiety provoking and life-threatening situation.  Mr Sansom had two incidents of this type within days, both requiring hospitalisation."

Dr Samuels

  1. [86]
    Dr Samuels examined the appellant on 5 June 2014 arising from which he prepared a report dated 12 June 2014.  He diagnosed the appellant with a major depressive disorder.  While Dr Samuels accepted that the applicant’s psychological injury would have been the product of “multi-factorial events”, it was his opinion that Mr Hawkins' death was a significant contributing factor to the development of the appellant's depressive illness.
  1. [87]
    Dr Samuels said that there was no evidence that the appellant had suffered from a psychological or psychiatric illness prior to the incident at the Moranbah camp, and noted that the appellant had not previously been treated with anti-depressant medication.
  1. [88]
    Dr Samuels' evidence is considered in a context where his opinions were formed arising from an examination of the appellant in relation to precipitating events that had occurred 16 months prior to the consultation, and in circumstances where the appellant's workers compensation claim had been rejected by the regulator on 20 March 2014, and an appeal from the regulator's decision was probably under consideration.
  1. [89]
    While Dr Kar specifically attached significance to the appellant's condition immediately after 31 January 2013 and leading up to his presentation on the Dysart Hospital on 11 February 2013, Dr Samuels took a more straightforward view of the chronological order of events and articulated a view that everything was to be traced back to the death of Mr Hawkins.  He explained his position at T2-8 in the following terms:

"There may well be a, you know, range of other background issues I’m not familiar with, but, you know, from the history he’s given and the documents I’ve reviewed, it’s a fairly cogent story that up until this day he functioning quite well.  He learnt of this experience and this went downhill.  And of course, to develop a depressive disorder or a post-traumatic disorder or any of those conditions can take weeks, months or even longer, so I’m not [indistinct]  I’m not -you know, at the point that he actually lodged the claim, well, obviously things were much worse by then.  Yes, a number of compounding events had occurred, but there does seem to be a, sort of, casual chain, to me, stemming from learning of the -of the -of the man’s death."

  1. [90]
    It was Dr Samuels' evidence that the appellant "spent a lot of time ruminating and worrying and thinking it could have been him and should have been him".  In his report at page 10 he concluded that the appellant had "a strong identification with the kind of signs and symptoms that Brett supposedly had prior to his death and feels that he had similar symptoms."  At page 8 of his report Dr Samuels records, in referring to the appellant's presentation at Moranbah Hospital, that "Mr Sansom described that his neck had swollen and that his tongue was swollen and he was told that when Brett died, Brett had experienced similar symptoms".  Further in terms of a concern about contaminants in the site water Dr Samuels gave the following evidence at T2-7:

"… I think he identifies with the colleague, and I think that when the colleague died, I suspect his imagination went into overdrive and he probably was beginning to fear for his own mortality and thinking the two of them had been affected in some way by the water …"

  1. [91]
    The history provided by appellant to Dr Samuels included some inconsistencies.  The appellant told Dr Samuels that around 16 February 2013 he became quite distressed after attending a site memorial service for Mr Hawkins and that his distress caused him to access the Mates in Construction counselling service.  The appellant's evidence in Exhibit 6 however was that the site service for Mr Hawkins had been held at least twelve days earlier on 4 February 2013.  The appellant also said that stress had been diagnosed as the cause of his neck pain notwithstanding that he said in Exhibit 6 that the neck pain was caused by a fall in the bus.

Other Medical Evidence

  1. [92]
    The appellant said that a couple of days after Mr Hawkins' death, Veolia had told employees that Ms Treloar from Davidson Trahaire Corpsych was available if anyone "needed any help or we needed to talk to someone".  The appellant subsequently spoke to Ms Treloar on 14 February 2013.  He also attended on Ms Treloar in Brisbane on 22 February, 25 February, and 4 March 2013.  Brief notes of the sessions held in Brisbane are in the evidence as Exhibit 8.  Notes of the 22 February 2013 consultation disclose that in terms of a presenting problem, the appellant had medical issues pending and that there had been a critical incident at work.  In terms of prior history and treatment, the notes refer to counselling on site from the Mates in Construction (MIC) organisation.  The notes of the session on 25 February 2013 refer to "stress after traumatic incident" and "health anxiety".  The notes of 4 March 2013 disclose that the appellant had been advised of the death of person who he had met in previous employment. 
  1. [93]
    No records of the appellant's contact with MIC were tendered into the evidence, nor did anyone from the organisation give evidence in the proceedings.  As I followed the appellant's version of events as set out in Exhibit 6, he approached Ms Cox about 6.30 pm on 18 February 2013 and asked her to facilitate contact with MIC.  This request led to a discussion with a Bechtel employee who was a MIC co-ordinator.  She concluded that it would be best if the appellant returned home and arrangements were made for that to occur the following day.
  1. [94]
    While the appellant attended on the site doctor during his time on site in February 2013, the doctor did not give evidence in the proceedings, nor were his medical records tendered.  According to the information included by the appellant in Exhibit 6, he attended on the site doctor on 3 February 2013 for neck pain; on 12 February 2013 following his discharge from Dysart Hospital; and on 13 February 2013 following his discharge from Moranbah Hospital.  In his oral testimony the appellant said that on the morning following his admission to Dysart hospital and after he had returned to Moranbah, he was monitored in the medical centre for most of the day before feeling unwell again and being transferred to the Moranbah Hospital.  To facilitate the transfer, the site doctor had written a referral letter which is included as part of the hospital records (Exhibit 1).  The main body of the handwritten referral letter is set out below:

"Thank-you for reviewing this gentleman who presented yesterday with Anaphylaxis ? cause.

He has recently lost a work colleague.

He works as a bus driver driving between Dysart + BMAAV camp Moranbah.

Yesterday he noticed his chin was weeping. He had a shave + noticed his face burning + itching. Later on in the day he noticed his face tongue + lips swelled up and he presented to Dysart hospital.

He was given Brufen + ? Phenergan 25mg. PO.

He thought he was ok and discharged himself. He had symptoms of slurred speech, vomiting tingling in hands and feet. This morning he was still unwell + presented with swelling in the tongue, lips + face.

The rash on his face looks like herpes simplex (he has a history of cold sores)

He has been treated recently for hemorrhoids + a sore neck after falling.  he has a history of hypertension and is taking ezetrol, meloxicam, karvezide + zanidip.  I'm thinking it maybe due to his recent taking of different anti inflammatories + would think he should refrain from this.

His ECG tonight is normal.

OE. BP - 140/86-P-97 Sats-93%.

Chest wheezing throat not hoarse.

Lips swollen. Tongue swollen.

He has been given prednisone 50mg PO this morning + Telfast this morning.

Also Telfast after tea. 1930

Then he had 25mg Phenergan PO 2100 + 5mg Ventolin at 2100.

He feels unwell. He has an epipen.

He is presenting for observation as he has been observed here all day. ECG normal."

  1. [95]
    The appellant was referred to Allergy Medical by Dr Barrett.  The appellant said in Exhibit 6 that he attended Allergy Medical on 7 March 2013 for allergy tests and was referred for blood tests.  The report of Allergy Medical, which is included in Exhibit 12, states inter alia that the appellant presented with a history of anaphylaxis.  The report indicated that skin prick testing to a range of food and allergens, and to camp water, was negative.
  1. [96]
    The notes of Catalyst Injury Management (CIM) are in the evidence as Exhibit 2.  The first record in the notes is dated 27 February 2013.  Before referring to a neck injury this record states that a phone call had been received from a Veolia supervisor who said that the appellant "requires a review following health issues following his colleague passing away at work.  Wanting a review to ensure fitness for duty before returning to work as a bus driver".  Notes of the appellant's treatment by CIM indicate that the appellant completed a functional capacity evaluation on 5 March 2013.  The available information about the 11 March 2013 consultation suggests that the main focus of treatment was physiotherapy for the appellant's neck injury.

Significant Contributing Factor

  1. [97]
    For the appellant to succeed he must make out the necessary causal connection between his injury and his employment.  In particular he must establish that his employment was a significant contributing factor to the development of his injury.  This element of s 32(1) of the Act was discussed by Justice Keane in Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd[3]:

" [41]… I should also observe in passing that the fact that an injury has been suffered arising out of employment, or in the course of employment, is not sufficient to establish that the employment has been 'a significant contributing factor to the injury'.  To read s 32 of the WCRA in that way would be to read the latter words out of the section, and in my respectful opinion to accord scant respect to the evident intention of the legislature to require a more substantial connection between employment and injury than is required by the phrases 'arising out of employment' or 'in the course of employment'.

[42]Further, there is no warrant in the language of s 32 of the WCRA for reading the words 'if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury' as lessening the stringency of the requirement that the injury 'arise out of the employment', as was suggested in the course of argument on the appeal.  It is clear, as a matter of language, that the words 'if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury' are intended to be a requirement of connection between employment and injury additional to each of the requirements that the injury occur in the course of employment or arising out of the employment.  It cannot, in my respectful opinion, sensibly be read as lessening the stringency of the latter or increasing the stringency of the former."

  1. [98]
    What is contemplated by the term or concept of "employment" was explained by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd[4]:

"It cannot be disputed that, when s 32 of the WCRA speaks of "employment" contributing to the worker's injury, it is referring to employment as a set of circumstances, that is to the exigencies of the employment of the worker by the employer.  The legislation is referring to "what the worker in fact does during the course of employment"[5].  The requirement of s 32 of the WCRA that the employment significantly contribute to the injury is apt to require that the exigencies of the employment must contribute in some significant way to the occurrence of the injury which the claimant asserts was caused by the breach of duty of the person (not the employer) against whom the claim is made."

  1. [99]
    A review of all the evidence discloses that a considerable number of factors may have been causatively linked to symptoms of stress or anxiety experienced by the appellant during the relevant period including the following (acknowledging that some of these factors are inter-related):
  • Grief and shock associated with the loss of a co-worker and friend;
  • Neck pain caused by a fall in the bus which was treated with voltaren by the site doctor on 3 February 2013 and led to a referral for physiotherapy;
  • Allergic conditions manifesting themselves in skin or facial burning and itching, rashes to his neck and face; face, tongue and lip swelling; slurred speech, vomiting, tingling in hands and feet;
  • Anaphylactic reactions causing hospitalisation on two successive nights;
  • Concern about exposure to contaminants in site water;
  • Anxiety and apprehension arising from rumination about his own mortality;
  • Fear of sudden death driven by an identification with the symptoms suffered by Mr Hawkins;
  • The adverse effects of medications taken;
  • Distress and/or shock arising from news of the death of another friend who had been a co-worker in previous employment;
  • Shortness of breath and suspected heart attack leading to presentation at the Prince Charles Hospital;
  • A medical history including shortness of breath, hypertension or high blood pressure, a family history of heart disease and lifestyle factors such as heavy smoking and general unfitness.
  1. [100]
    In terms of causation the appellant maintained that a review of the medical evidence established that the prevalent entries in the records connect the death of Mr Hawkins with stress and anxiety or fatigue consequentially suffered by the appellant.  In this regard the appellant relied on parts of the records of the Moranbah Hospital including the handwritten note of the site doctor and the progress notes of the attending nurse on 13 February 2013; the history of presenting complaint and the summary impressions included in the records of the Prince Charles Hospital;  the notes of the appellant's attendance on Davidson Trahaire Corpsych on 25 February 2013 which refer to "stress after traumatic incident with health anxiety"; and to the notes of the appellant's consultation with Dr Barrett on 22 February 2013.
  1. [101]
    The effect of the respondent's submission however was that while the death of Mr Hawkins may have caused symptoms of grief and anxiety, the incapacitating events occurred some time after the death and were primarily related to other factors.  Alternatively it was argued that the connection between the death of Mr Hawkins and the appellant's employment was not sufficient, and that the appellant's employment should correctly be considered the setting, not the real effective cause of the injury.
  1. [102]
    In terms of any analysis of the causal chain the starting point is a consideration of the circumstances immediately after the death of Mr Hawkins and prior to 11 February 2013 when the appellant attended on the Dysart Hospital.  The subsequent consideration relates to the series of events which occurred some time after Mr Hawkins' death and before Dr Barrett made a diagnosis of "anxiety/depression and angioedema" on 8 March 2013.
  1. [103]
    The significant difference in the reports of Dr Kar and Dr Samuels relates to the opinions about the period immediately following the death of Mr Hawkins.  Dr Kar took the view that while the appellant was anxious in this period he worked normally until the first anaphylactic attack and it was the two successive anaphylactic attacks which were the significant precipitating events.  Dr Samuels on the other hand did not consider the period significant and he saw the death of Mr Hawkins as the important precipitating event and an event that may have caused the anaphylactic reactions.  In his view the death of Mr Hawkins was the root cause of the appellant's psychological injury.
  1. [104]
    Dr Kar's opinion that Mr Hawkins' death did not cause any psychiatric condition or impairment is consistent with the following facts and circumstances:
  1. (i)
    The appellant continued to work as normal between 1 February 2013 and 11 February 2013.  While he told Dr Kar that he was affected by Mr Hawkins' death and was thinking about it, these are expected and understandable responses;
  1. (ii)
    The extent and nature of the appellant's grief should be considered in a context where his friendship with Mr Hawkins was probably overstated.  The appellant had only known Mr Hawkins for a few months and no evidence was adduced establishing that the appellant socialised with Mr Hawkins while on leave in Brisbane, or that he knew Mr Hawkins' family.  He did not attend Mr Hawkins' funeral in Brisbane on 13 February 2013.  Also Dr Kar had formed the view based on the history given to him by the appellant that the appellant was not close to Mr Hawkins; 
  1. (iii)
    The appellant did not report symptoms of anxiety or distress when he attended on the site doctor with neck pain on 3 February 2013;
  1. (iv)
    The appellant's presentation at the emergency department of the Dysart Hospital did not give rise to any entry in the medical records alluding to anxiety or distress related to the death of a co-worker;
  1. (v)
    While all employees were offered access to counselling by their employer after the death of Mr Hawkins, the appellant did not take up this offer until 14 February 2013.
  1. [105]
    Given Dr Kar's opinion and the supporting facts and circumstances it is open to find that the development of the appellant's injury did not commence until on or after his presentation at Dysart Hospital with anaphylaxis.  It is in this context that subsequent events are considered.
  1. (i)
    Notwithstanding that the site doctor had treated the appellant on 3 February 2013 and 12 February 2013 and that the appellant had been monitored by the site doctor's medical centre staff for most of the day on 12 February, the referral note prepared by the site doctor for the Moranbah hospital did not, on the surface, attribute significant weight or make any overt causal connection between the death of the co-worker and the appellant's condition.  The contents of the referral note provide the most reliable evidence of the extent and nature of the medical assessment of the appellant's condition as at 12 February 2013.  On my reading of the note, the co-worker's death appears to be mentioned as a background factor, not as a factor causative of the appellant's condition;
  1. (ii)
    It is open to conclude that the appellant's identification with the symptoms thought to have caused Mr Hawkins' death commenced after his attendance at Dysart and Moranbah Hospitals.  This outcome is evident in the linking by the appellant of the symptoms he experienced on 11 and 12 February 2013 and the symptoms that he thought may have been associated with Mr Hawkins' death.  This link is referred to at page 8 of Dr Samuels' report where he recorded that the appellant had said that "what really scared him was a mate said 'I looked exactly the same as Brett'.  Mr Sansom described that his neck had swollen and that his tongue was swollen and he was told that when Brett died, Brett had experienced similar symptoms.  He began to wonder if Brett had also had some form of anaphylaxis."  When the appellant is describing his own symptoms he is describing the symptoms associated with his presentation at the Dysart and/or Moranbah Hospitals on 11 and 12 February 2013.  It is arising from these associations that the appellant began to become fearful of his own sudden death;
  1. (iii)
    It was Dr Kar's evidence that anaphylaxis may cause severe acute anxiety because of the potential fatal consequences of such events.  He said that sudden death is a genuine potential outcome in anaphylaxis unless immediate treatment is provided.  It was his opinion that the anaphylactic reactions may have increased the appellant's fear of a sudden death;
  1. (iv)
    The effect of alleged contaminants in site water contributed to the appellant's anxiety.  In discussing his reaction to site water in Exhibit 6, the appellant said that "whenever he showered or used any tap water, my skin would start tingling and felt like my skin was burning, I would relieve it by washing myself with bottled water and a clean fresh towel.  I am very scared that I may have another attack, but my medication and treatment seem to be controlling it."  While the appellant said in Exhibit 6 that he did not recall when this reaction to site water occurred, the fact that he said he thought he may have another attack suggests it happened after 11 February 2013;
  1. (v)
    Whatever negative impact the site water had on the appellant it was compounded by the fact that Mr Hawkins experienced similar problems with the water as canvassed by Dr Samuels in his evidence at T2-6:

" … but from the way he described the problem in the water and stuff, both he and the colleague were affected by the water.  I think he identifies with the colleague, and I think that when the colleague died, I suspect his imagination went into overdrive and he probably was beginning to fear for his own mortality and thinking the two of them had been affected in some way by the water or -I suspect he’s misconstrued a number of facts, but -and then I would imagine he’s learned another colleague had died and it would’ve fed into his anxiety even more …

… but it does seem that he became quite focused on the water and other factors and seemed to believe that he did - at some level, he was perceiving himself as being at some risk of, perhaps dying of a [indistinct] or in the long-term, because of, perhaps, being exposed to the same situation."

  1. (vi)
    The adverse effects of prednisone and other medications was a factor contributing to the appellant's anxiety.  He was treated with prednisone following his attendance at Dysart Hospital.  Further the notes of the site doctor disclose a concern at the totality of the appellant's medications.  The notes referred to the appellant's "recent taking of different anti inflammatories" and recorded that the appellant had been recently treated for hemorrhoids and a sore neck.  Additionally the appellant was taking various medications for hypertension and in addition to prednisone was being treated with Telfast, Phenergan and Ventolin.

Dr Barrett noted that the appellant was not coping because the prednisone was causing insomnia, irritability and redness.  In his report Dr Kar noted that the drug can cause mood disorders and other psychiatric symptoms and conditions.  He said that:

"It is my opinion, that the experience at that time caused Mr Sansom to develop anticipatory anxiety because he was afraid of going back to work in the same environment while his underlying anxiety had not resolved.  Prednisolone can cause mood disorders and other psychiatric symptoms and conditions.  That he was feeling suicidal at one time is significant.  The website drugs.com gives the side-effects of prednisolone to include the following among others - More common -agitation, anxiety, fast, slow, pounding, or irregular heartbeat or pulse, headache, irritability, mental depression, mood changes, nervousness, shortness of breath, trouble thinking, speaking, or walking, troubled breathing at rest."

  1. (vii)
    Prior to, or on 1 March 2013, the appellant was informed of the death of another co-worker;
  1. (viii)
    On 1 March 2013 the appellant was admitted to Prince Charles Hospital with a suspected heart attack after he was having trouble breathing.  He said that "it felt like he was dying".  He also thought that his condition may have been attributable to a reaction to washing powder.
  1. [106]
    The opinions of Dr Kar and Dr Samuels are broadly consistent in terms of their evaluation of the appellant's condition after he suffered the two anaphylactic reactions.  Both agreed that these events and other subsequent events would have worsened the appellant's psychological condition.  Dr Samuels agreed in his evidence that many things would have altered the cause of the appellant's illness after the death of Mr Hawkins.  He said at T2-6 that from his perspective the precipitant was the initial death "then a whole bunch of other things may have occurred to make the situation worse".  These other things included the reaction to site water, the anaphylaxis, and the death of another colleague.
  1. [107]
    A consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances supports a balance of probabilities conclusion that the factors which were predominantly causative of the appellant's emotional breakdown were factors occurring on or after 11 February 2013, and that the key precipitating events were the successive anaphylactic reactions. 

 Conclusion

  1. [108]
    The determination of whether the necessary causal connection exists between the appellant's injury and his employment raises three key questions for consideration.  The first question involves a consideration of whether the death of Mr Hawkins could be related to the exigencies of the appellant's employment.
  1. [109]
    In his report Dr Samuels concluded that Mr Hawkins' death "was a significant contributing factor to the development of his depressive illness".  It is not self-evident to me however that, in the circumstances of this case, "death" is interchangeable with "employment".  The loss of life is a personal tragedy for Mr Hawkins and his family and friends, but I doubt that the association of this event with the exigencies of the appellant's employment can be made out on the basis that the appellant was a co-worker of Mr Hawkins and both men were accommodated in the same work camp.  Significantly, the appellant was in Brisbane when Mr Hawkins died and had not been on site for a week.  While Mr Hawkins body had not been removed from the site when the appellant arrived, the physical connection was limited to a fleeting sighting of the body as it was transferred to the coroner's van. 
  1. [110]
    The substance of the connection between the death and the appellant's employment was questioned by the respondent in its submissions and I am inclined to accept the reasoning advanced (T3-37):

"… it’s true that Mr Sansom heard about the death of his co-worker, but, as I heard the evidence, that, if Mr Sansom had have learnt of the death of Mr Hawkins when he was on a day off, he would have had the same reaction.  It has got nothing to do with the BMA work camp.  It has got to do with him hearing of the death of Mr Hawkins and his reaction to that and consideration of his own mortality.  Now, those might well be natural reactions, but they do not have the necessary causal connection between his employment - the necessary requirement for section 32(1) of the Act specifically in respect of whether his employment is a significant contributing factor to the development of that injury because the employment is simply the setting in which he comes to work with Mr Hawkins and Mr Hawkins passes away in the work camp."

  1. [111]
    The apparent contradiction in finding that the employment was not a significant contributing factor when but for the circumstances of employment the injury could never have happened was explained and resolved by President de Jersey in the case of Croning[6].  In that matter his Honour considered an appeal from a decision in which a TAFE teacher unsuccessfully claimed compensation for a psychological injury.  The teacher's injury was sustained arising out of differences of opinions about mandated operating practices including the student/teacher ratio.  The decision appealed against had found in effect that the employment was not a significant contributing factor to the injury and that the injury was mainly attributable to the teacher's failure to accept the legitimacy or appropriateness of the operating practices imposed on him.
  1. [112]
    In his decision the President noted that while the conditions in which the work was to be performed by the appellant obviously contributed to the appellant’s condition, the magistrate nevertheless found that that the contribution was not "significant".  In deciding the appeal his Honour accepted the magistrate's conclusion that while the employment provided the setting in which the problem crystallised or the psychological injury developed, these circumstances did not compel a conclusion that the employment was a significant contributing factor.  The reasoning applied by his Honour is disclosed in the following extracts from the decision:

Now but for those work conditions, this particular appellant’s problem would not have arisen.  That does not however necessarily mean that the work conditions were a significant contributing cause of the condition.  Compare the distinction between a causa sine qua non and a causa causans or proximate cause (see Tophams Ltd v Sefton (1966) 1 All E.R. 1039, 1044 and Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd (1953) A.C. 663, 687).  The necessity for the former does not mean that on an ultimate assessment, it must be regarded as a significant cause.  As said in Tophams, the latter is the "real effective cause", the former "merely an incident which precedes in the history or narrative of events".  There may of course be two or more factors which might each be regarded as "significant" contributors to the development of a condition.  The determination of which of a number of contributing causes is or are significant, involves a factual exercise.

…

The work conditions did, as I have said, certainly provide the setting or background against which the appellant’s particular disposition came into play.  Although no doubt one should conclude then that the system operating at the place of employment was in that sense a "contributing factor", it was not necessarily, as indeed the Magistrate must be taken to have found, a "significant" one - the only significant contributing factor in accordance with his findings being the appellant’s own disposition.

  1. [113]
    The second question involves a consideration of whether the appellant's injury was best explained by his cognitive processes and what amounted to a very personal interpretation on what Mr Hawkins' death meant to him as an individual, not as an employee of Veolia.  In this process initial feelings of grief and loss for Mr Hawkins transitioned into a real fear for his own well-being.  Both the reports of Dr Kar and Dr Samuels convey a very strong association between the deterioration in the appellant's condition and his ruminations about the implications for himself of Mr Hawkins' death.
  1. [114]
    A conclusion that the appellant's very personal and individual response to Mr Hawkins passing is not related to the appellant's employment is consistent with the my finding that his injury did not develop until after the anaphylactic reactions. The opinions of both Dr Kar and Dr Samuels about how the appellant identifed with Mr Hawkins symptoms and developed a fear of his own sudden death are, in my view, evidence of factors peculiar to the appellant's state of mind and how he rationalised or processed events, not evidence of an association between his condition and his employment.
  1. [115]
    The third question which involves a consideration of whether the medical evidence supports a finding that the appellant's injury was caused by a deterioration in the appellant's mental health following the anaphylactic reactions, has already been resolved by me.  The effect of my finding was that the two successive reactions shifted the focus of the determination to be made away from factors of grief or loss, and towards the matters that preoccupied the appellant's thinking after 11 February 2013, and which led him to become fearful of his own well-being.
  1. [116]
    While the death of Mr Hawkins remained a background cause of anxiety, it was the implications of the anaphylactic reactions on his health, well-being and mortality, and his heightened fear of dying which raised the appellant's anxiety to a level which led to his emotional breakdown or decompensation.  His initial ruminations about Mr Hawkins' death were seriously transformed by the anaphylactic attacks and the adverse effects of his medications regime.
  1. [117]
    I have preferred the evidence of Dr Kar to the evidence of Dr Samuels to the extent of any inconsistency.  It is important in a proceeding such as this, to give discrete consideration to events or circumstances occurring immediately after Mr Hawkins' death including the appellant's capacity to work for the ten or eleven days following Mr Hawkins' death.  Dr Kar gave more forensic consideration to these events and circumstances than Dr Samuels.  I also have a reservation about the timing of the appellant's consultation with Dr Samuels and whether, given the gap in time, Dr Samuels diagnosed the same injury as that diagnosed by Dr Kar some eight or nine months earlier. 
  1. [118]
    Dr Kar's assessment of the appellant in October 2013 was that the adjustment disorder had resolved; that there was no current psychiatric condition; that the appellant reported feeling well and he was ready to return to work.  However Dr Samuels said that at the time of his assessment, the appellant was "moderately/severely depressed" and that he did not consider that the appellant was capable of undertaking paid employment at that time.  While in broad terms Dr Samuels' report canvasses a similar patient history, it would appear inevitable that different factors were causative of the major depression diagnosed by Dr Samuels in June 2014.  It was sixteen months since Mr Hawkins had died, the appellant had never returned to the Moranbah camp, and his fear of dying of the same causes as Mr Hawkins had presumably passed or considerably abated.
  1. [119]
    While the development of the injury enjoyed a temporal connection with the employment, a consideration of the nature and extent of the individual factors causative of the appellant's depression, does not lead to a balance of probabilities finding that the appellant's employment was a significant contributing factor to his injury.  The number and gravity of the events occurring after Mr Hawkins' death and before the diagnosis of depression, and the multi-factorial nature of the problem to be solved, diminish from the prospects that the employment was a significant contributing factor to the appellant's injury.
  1. [120]
    Having concluded that the employment was not a significant factor in the development of the injury, it is unnecessary to enter a finding whether the appellant's injury occurred arising out of the employment or in the course of employment. 
  1. [121]
    The appeal is dismissed.  I order accordingly.

Footnotes

[1] WorkCover Queensland v Dreadon [1999] QIC 47; 161 QGIG 775

[2] WorkCover Queensland v Dreadon [1999] QIC 47; 161 QGIG 775

[3] Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] QCA 48

[4] Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] QCA 48

[5] Federal Broom Co. Pty. Ltd. V. Semlitch  (1964 HCA 34); Mercer v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2000] NSWCA

[6] Croning v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland (1997) 156 QGIG 100

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Sansom v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Sansom v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)

  • MNC:

    [2015] QIRC 180

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Member Black IC

  • Date:

    20 Oct 2015

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Croning v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland (1997) 156 QGIG 100
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1997) 156 QGIG 100
Cite 2 - (1997) 156 QGIG 100
Federal Broom Company Pty Limited v Semlitch (1964) HCA 34
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1964) HCA 34
Mercer v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2000] NSWCA 138
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] NSWCA 138
Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd[2006] 1 Qd R 519; [2006] QCA 48
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2006] QCA 48
Cite 2 - [2006] QCA 48
Cite 3 - [2006] QCA 48
Statley v Gypsum Mines Ltd. (1953) AC 663
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1953) AC 663
Tophams Ltd v Sefton (1966) 1 All E. R. 1039
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1966) 1 All E. R. 1039
WorkCover Queensland v Dreadon [1999] QIC 47
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1999] QIC 47
Cite 2 - [1999] QIC 47
Cite 3 - [1999] QIC 47
WorkCover Queensland v Dreadon (1999) 161 QGIG 775
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1999) 161 QGIG 775
Cite 2 - (1999) 161 QGIG 775
Cite 3 - (1999) 161 QGIG 775

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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