McEnearney v Workers' Compensation Regulator
[2017] QIRC 101
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- Unreported Judgment
- McEnearney v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2017] QIRC 101
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McEnearney v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2017] QIRC 101
McEnearney v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2017] QIRC 101
QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
CITATION: | McEnearney v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 101 |
PARTIES: | Sue-maree McEnearney (appellant) v Workers' Compensation Regulator (respondent) Stephen Laverick (intervenor) |
CASE NO: | WC/2015/118 |
PROCEEDING: | Appeal against decision |
DELIVERED ON: | 21 November 2017 |
HEARING DATES: WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS | 30 - 31 January, 1 - 10 February, 3 October 2017 Appellant – 2 May, 23 October 2017 Respondent – 19 June 2017 |
MEMBER: | The Hon L Kaufman, Deputy President |
ORDERS : |
|
CATCHWORDS: | WORKERS' COMPENSATION – APPEAL AGAINST DECISION – decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator – where appellant has suffered a psychological or psychiatric injury – where injury arose out of or in the course of employment – where appellant alleged employer engaged in fraudulent activities and misleading and deceptive conduct – whether employer instructed the appellant to act fraudulently – whether employer failed to provide sufficient personnel – whether employer failed to properly remunerate and unreasonably withheld remuneration from the appellant – whether employer bullied and harassed the appellant – whether employer failed to act or act appropriately on reports of the appellant – where injury excluded by virtue of s 32(5) – reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way. |
CASES: | Industrial Relations Act 1999 ss 273, 274 Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 ss 32, 558(3) Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 Brisbane City Council v Gillow & Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2016] ICQ 007 Carlton v Blackwood [2017] ICQ 001 Gambaro v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 005 Blackwood v Toward [2015] ICQ 008 |
APPEARANCES: | Ms S McEnearney in person Mr P O'Neill, of counsel, instructed directly by the Workers' Compensation Regulator Mr L Hall, solicitor, for Mr Stephen Laverick, intervening |
Reasons for Decision
- [1]Ms Sue-maree McEnearney has appealed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator to confirm WorkCover's rejection of her application for compensation. The appellant made her application for compensation to WorkCover on 11 September 2013. That application was rejected on 15 October 2013. The appellant filed her application for a review of WorkCover's decision on 16 January 2014. The regulator confirmed the decision of WorkCover on 25 February 2014. WorkCover's initial decision, and the regulator's review and confirmation, held that Ms McEnearney's initial application for compensation had been made out of time.
- [2]Ms McEnearney appealed the regulator's decision of 25 February 2014 to this Commission. The regulator conceded that appeal and the matter was remitted to WorkCover to decide the application on its merits. On 9 September 2014, WorkCover rejected the application on the basis that Ms McEnearney’s psychological or psychiatric injury had arisen out of, or in the course of, reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by her employer. An application for review was filed on 10 December 2014 with the regulator confirming WorkCover's decision on 2 April 2015. Ms McEnearney filed her appeal to the Commission on 4 May 2015. A conference was held on 12 June 2015, followed by a mention on 15 June 2015, after which time the matter was set down for hearing on 27 July 2015.
- [3]On the first day of hearing the appellant's employer, OCS International Pty Ltd (OCSI), and the owners/directors of that company (Messrs John and Stephen Laverick), sought leave to be represented in the proceedings. The President of the Industrial Court of Queensland was, at that time, to hear a matter concerning the Commission's power to grant an employer leave to appear in a worker's appeal against a decision of the regulator. In the circumstances, as was the practice with matters that raised that point, this matter was adjourned pending the President's decision, which was delivered on 4 April 2016. His Honour found that the Commission was not empowered to allow employers to appear in workers' compensation appeals.[1] Accordingly, the employer did not pursue its application to appear in these proceedings.
- [4]On 12 April 2016 this matter was again brought on for mention with the result that the parties were each directed to provide, amongst other things, their respective statements of facts and contentions. The regulator again contended that Ms McEnearney's "entire claim was out of time." That preliminary issue, was dealt with in two hearings before the re-commencement of the substantive matter. Ultimately, following the President's judgment in Blackwood v Toward,[2] I did not allow the regulator to renege on its earlier concession that Ms McEnearney's application had been made within time. Accordingly, the appeal proper eventually proceeded.
- [5]During the first day's hearing, much of the appellant's evidence-in-chief concerned allegations of fraud, misleading and deceptive conduct, and insider trading against Mr Stephen Laverick, who at relevant times had been the managing director of the employer. Given the potentially serious implications of the allegations, as well as the need for Mr Laverick to be able to obtain advice about self-incrimination when he was giving evidence, I formed the view that, in the interests of natural justice, Mr Laverick should be granted leave to intervene in the proceedings; such leave being limited to matters concerning his alleged illegal conduct.
- [6]I informed the parties:
"[I] expressed the concern years ago about the employer not being represented in these proceedings to be able to deal with these very serious allegations of fraud you’re making against the company, and in particular against Mr Laverick. Having heard your evidence yesterday, you continue to make what are very serious allegations of fraud and other improper behaviour, and despite my warning to you, if you like, about implicating yourself, you’ve decided, as is your right, to continue to give that evidence.
…I’m concerned, and I’m going to make a direction to the regulator, that Mr Laverick’s interests need to be protected if he so desires, and notwithstanding the judgment of the President in Gillow, I am inclined to give leave to Mr Laverick – both Mr Lavericks – to be represented in these proceedings for the limited purpose of protecting their interests. Not otherwise, not for the purpose of participating in the appeal proper, but merely for the purpose of providing them what seems to me to be the required amount of natural justice to enable them to seek legal advice insofar as their potential to incriminate themselves, or be incriminated or accused of fraudulent and illegal behaviour is concerned.
[in relation to giving Mr Laverick leave]…That’s one of the reasons that I’ve come to the conclusion, or the tentative conclusion to which I’ve come. He’s going to be giving evidence. The regulator is seeking to adduce evidence for the purpose of defending the appeal, not for the purpose of protecting Mr Laverick from incriminating himself or otherwise being put in a position where evidence that would suggest that he’s engaged in illegal activity is given."
- [7]It is not necessary to traverse the reasons in Gillow. The leave I granted the Lavericks was not for the purpose of defending the appeal. Gillow does not apply. Mr Stephen Laverick availed himself of the opportunity and was subsequently legally represented. Sections 273(2) and 274(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (the act in force at the relevant time) provide ample power to permit the intervention.
Background
- [8]The appellant finished high school in 1979. She enrolled in a Bachelor of Commerce degree course and upon graduation worked at several different accounting firms as an accountant from 1984 until 1993. From 1994 until 1995 she worked as the chief financial officer for an architectural firm. Ms McEnearney last worked as an accountant in about 1995. Between around 1998 and 2010 her work involved keynote speaking, presenting seminars, training and facilitation. She had also investigated and studied bullying and harassment. Immediately prior to commencing work with OCSI, in 2011, the appellant had been conducting research that related to her speaking and seminar engagements. She had also written a book about communication.
- [9]OCSI was owned by John Laverick, the managing director, and run by his son Stephen Laverick, the general manager. John Laverick and the appellant’s parents were close friends, and so it is the case that the appellant and Stephen Laverick had known each other, and had been friends, since they were young. There was a period when the appellant lived at Stephen Laverick’s house in the early 1990s. John Laverick had mentored her during her last year of school and her early career as an accountant. She worked for one of his companies for a couple of years after graduating in around 1980/81.[3]
Overview
- [10]In July 2011 the appellant began working at OCSI. Her engagement by OCSI came about following an email to her from Stephen Laverick on 13 July 2011:
"Hi Suemaree,
I was walking the dog this morning and thought of an idea that may help you and me, it is no money spinner but the conditions and boss are great, it would pay your rent and food for the next few months and maybe longer. Brad currently looks after the financial side of the camp from China and Julia does some backup work here, they are both paid $25 hour as contractors, we also use dads payments girl in Newcastle to pay out all invoices. As all do other work, sometimes the finances aren't made a priority. I am thinking if you wanted to take over the roles you could work from home and it would leave you time to do and chase other work and if something better comes along you can pass it all back to us…"[4]
- [11]The casual nature of the offer is self-evident. There was evidence to the effect that the offer of employment was made as a result of a request from the late John Laverick to his son.[5] Ms McEnearney was interested and told Mr Laverick that she did not wish to work full time as she had other things going on; she was writing a book and wanted time to write. She told him that two or three days a week would suit her and give her enough money to live on.[6]
- [12]Ms McEnearney accepted the offer and began work the following day at $25 per hour. Initially she worked a couple of days per week, but that quickly changed to a five day per week role and her payment went from an hourly rate to $200 per day. She worked from Mr Stephen Laverick's home sitting beside him at a desk in the living room.[7]
- [13]While it is the employment relationship that is relevant to the workers' compensation claim, the fact that the appellant had an extensive relationship with her employer does colour and provide context to the relationship as a whole. That relationship forms part of the tapestry against which this matter must be considered.
- [14]The appellant has consistently maintained that while employed at OCSI she was the "Financial Controller". Mr Laverick has just as consistently denied that this was the case, asserting that the appellant was employed more in a bookkeeping and accounting capacity, as well as providing administrative assistance to him. While I accept that the appellant's role grew from what was originally intended, I do not accept that she performed the role of financial controller, largely for the reasons set out in the regulator's submissions.
The conduct of the case
- [15]At the outset, I observe that Ms McEnearney has a perfectionistic and obsessive personality.[8] She has spent the best part of the last four years laboriously compiling information in a perfectionistic fashion to support her case. She is obsessed, preoccupied and consumed by it.[9] Unfortunately this obsession has rendered her incapable of, not only not being able to see the wood for the trees, but not even being able to see the trees for the twigs. Her obsession has resulted in her not being able to understand what evidence is probative and thereby leading a huge amount of material of peripheral relevance. In particular, despite having been admonished not to do so, she introduced considerable evidence relating to events after the stated date of her decompensation: 10 July 2012. She was assessed on 16 July 2012 by Dr Anura Anderawewa as suffering an adjustment disorder with anxious mood. The doctor noted that she had alleged that her employer had been abusive, bullying and not listening to her concerns; that it had gone from bad to worse, stressful, non-rewarding and extremely difficult to deal with. The doctor further noted that she had had to "pull the pin" the previous Tuesday as she couldn't handle any more; she could not sleep and even thinking about going back made her palpitate and stress.[10]
- [16]The evidence, despite my best, but largely unsuccessful, efforts to control it, ranged far and wide. In her evidence-in-chief, as well as her cross-examination of the regulator's witnesses, Ms McEnearney referred to countless documents which she considered to be relevant to the appeal. Her final written submissions extended well beyond the generous 20-page limit I had set. This understandably required the regulator, in its submissions, also to exceed the limit. After accommodating numerous requests for extensions of the time for filing her reply, Ms McEnearney filed a reply extending to nearly 400 pages. Following receipt of this, after the regulator had objected to the document, I listed the matter for another mention on 3 October 2017 at which time the regulator sought that I reject the submissions in reply. Rather than denying her the opportunity to reply, I acceded to Ms McEnearney's request that I allow her to file a conforming reply. I gave her a further period in which to file a 15-page reply. It was filed within time and extends to 18 pages.
- [17]In her statement of facts and contentions, Ms McEnearney listed the stressors upon which she relies as having caused her decompensation. These establish the boundaries of her case.[11] Her alleged stressors are:
"Part A: Issues of serious concern: Employer fraudulent activities and misleading and deceptive conduct, and the Employer instructing the Appellant to act fraudulently;
Part B: Employer failure to provide sufficient personnel causing excessive workload;
Part C: Employer failure to properly remunerate and unreasonable withholding remuneration from the Appellant;
Part D: Employer bullying and harassment of the Appellant;
Part E: Employer failure to act, or act appropriately, on reports of the Appellant."
- [18]Despite the relatively confined nature of the stressors, Ms McEnearney raised many issues of dubious relevance, which resulted in the hearing extending over 12 days.
- [19]The regulator's submissions deal comprehensively with the myriad issues raised by the appellant. They are well reasoned, fair and accurate. I accept and adopt them as my reasons for decision; although I would not draw the inference suggested at paragraph 20. However, it is necessary that I make some further observations.
- [20]Both the appellant and the regulator accept that the outcome of this case turns on credit. As Ms McEnearney put it in her submissions in reply: "It is clear the outcome of this case rests on the credibility of the Appellant versus the credibility of the employer, specifically the General Manager Mr Stephen Laverick."
- [21]Largely for the reasons put by the regulator, I do not find Ms McEnearney to be a credible witness. She, as the appellant, bears the onus of proof to persuade me, on the balance of probabilities, that she has sustained a compensable injury. This she has not been able to do. Although I accept, having regard to the nature of her accusations against Mr Laverick, that the Briginshaw[12] standard applies, I am not even satisfied that she has made out her case on the general standard of proof.
- [22]Three instances will suffice to demonstrate why I do not find the appellant to be a credible witness. The details of the incidents are dealt with in the regulator’s submissions.
- [23]Ms McEnearney alleges that she was kidnapped by Mr Laverick on New Year’s Eve, 2011. Even the assertion is fanciful given that she continued working for him for another seven months. I am prepared to accept that this incident was connected with her employment and thus arose in connection therewith. The background to this incident is Ms McEnearney had been working in Port Douglas prior to 31 December 2011 on matters associated with Mr Laverick’s business affairs. The work had been completed prior to that date, but she remained in Port Douglas pending the arrival of Mr Laverick and others. She was invited to join the group for a New Year’s Eve dinner at Palm Cove. She accepted the invitation and a lift in Mr Laverick’s car. Against the appellant’s wishes the group detoured on the way to Palm Cove to visit the son of a member of the group. She wished to first go to her accommodation to freshen-up, but that request was denied. Despite the appellant having had ample opportunity to leave the group, she alleges that the failure to adhere to what she believed was the original plan constituted a deprivation of her liberty.[13]
- [24]Ms McEnearney alleges that Mr Laverick engaged in insider trading when he was provided with confidential information from the joint venture partners relating to proposals from other tenderers.[14] That this information was provided in order that OCSI could complete the construction of a camp in Papua New Guinea that the original tenderer had been unable to complete,[15] did not sway Ms McEnearney in her belief that Mr Laverick had engaged in unlawful conduct.
- [25]In a similar vein, she asserted that Mr Laverick had engaged in copyright fraud when he caused the logo of OCSI to be placed on some building drawings that had been prepared by another company. Ms McEnearney refused to accept Mr Laverick’s assurances that he had permission from the copyright holder to do so. She seems to have maintained this belief despite Mr Glenn Smith, the CEO of the copyright owner, confirming what Mr Laverick had said.[16]
- [26]It is necessary to remember that the appellant is an obsessive perfectionist. Stephen Laverick is the antithesis. He was running a business, OCSI, from the living room of his home on the Gold Coast, that involved tendering for multi-million dollar contracts for the construction of mining camps and other facilities in Australia and Papua New Guinea. Prior to hiring the appellant, Stephen Laverick and Ms Julia Luyten were the only people in the "office". The finance for his business came largely from his father's company, Odour Control Systems (OCS). Despite Ms McEnearney's contentions, to the contrary, the financial control of OCSI remained with the Newcastle office of OCS. It would be accurate to describe the manner in which OCSI was run as a "tin-pot operation". Checks and balances were few and documentation was, at best, minimal. Given the contrasting personalities of the slapdash Stephen Laverick and the obsessive perfectionist Sue-maree McEnearney, set against the backdrop of a lifelong friendship, tension was inevitable.
- [27]Her first stressor alleges that she was forced to participate in her employer's fraudulent, misleading and deceptive conduct. She has not persuaded me that her employer engaged in these activities. She has not persuaded me that her employer instructed her to act fraudulently. More importantly, she has not persuaded me that the alleged activities contributed to her eventual decompensation. The regulator, in its submissions, has amply demonstrated that the alleged illegal activities were barely, if at all, raised until after Ms McEnearney had stopped working and had had the opportunity to trawl through her employer's documents. Her "issues of serious concern" did not, on my view of the evidence, as particularized in the regulator’s submissions, relate to these matters. At the hearing Ms McEnearney claimed that the expression "issues of serious concern" was meant to encompass the employer's alleged fraudulent and/or misleading and deceptive conduct. Terminology aside, the voluminous amount of evidence tendered does not support a finding that Ms McEnearney raised these "issues of serious concern" during her employment. I have extracted a relevant portion of the evidence below:
MR O'NEILL: Can I put this fundamental proposition to you, Ms McEnearney, that in those almost 3,000 pages of disclosure there is not one piece of documentary evidence – a contemporaneous piece of documentary evidence during the course of your employment, from July 2011 to July 2012, whether it be an email, whether it be a file note, whether it be a diary note, whether it be a text message, where you have raised an allegation of fraudulent conduct with anyone?‑‑‑There ‑ ‑ ‑
That’s true, isn’t it?‑‑‑There was the – I wrote – I put concerns to Mr Laverick in writing on 24 July 2012.
After you had walked out?‑‑‑I was stressed after the events of the 10th of July, but as you know I continued to do some work up to the 27th, and it was on the 24th of July that I – and in fact when I spoke to the doctor I said I would put my concerns to him in writing, and I did on the 24th of July.
…
DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Ms McEnearney, Mr O'Neill put to you that in the 3,000 or so pages of disclosure there was no contemporaneous piece of paper where you raised an allegation of fraudulent conduct or misrepresentation and deceptive conduct. You said there is and it was in your letter of the 24th of July. That’s not the case. It’s just not there?‑‑‑I – the – the word "fraud" was not used in my vocabulary.
…
Well I – I didn’t – the – the word "fraud" first came into the paperwork 12 months or so after my claim for workers compensation began, when a lawyer that I had engaged at that time started to use the word “fraud.” That’s where the word "fraud" first came to be used. Up until that time I had used the terminology issues, concerns and issues of serious concerns. And in the other documentations that I put to the employer in writing, that’s exactly what they said – issues of serious concern, and that is actually the Origin policy that they have in place for dealing with issues of serious concern, and that – because we were – we had signed that contract on the 5th of July, we were required to follow their processes, including their process for dealing with "issues of serious concern".[17]
- [28]Similarly, the medical evidence does not support a finding that Ms McEnearney raised the alleged fraudulent and/or misleading and deceptive conduct, or a requirement that she participate in it, as a stressor with her treating practitioners.
- [29]The next stressor asserts that OCSI failed to provide sufficient personnel thereby causing the appellant to suffer an excessive workload. Whilst I accept that her workload increased, as evidenced by her moving from part time work to full time work, I am not satisfied that there was a shortage of personnel, at least not such that placed an excessive workload on Ms McEnearney's shoulders. I infer that her perfectionistic and obsessive personality led to her spending more time than necessary on her work. Further, she involved herself in matters that were not within her role. For example, Ms McEnearney took issue with the employment arrangement of an electrician working in New Guinea and formed the view that he required an employment contract and an orientation pack. The appellant claims that when she confronted Mr Laverick about this he told her "that's not your concern, you just concentrate on your own work and leave me to do mine".[18] In her evidence Ms McEnearney stated she had concerns with a "worker being sent to work in the remote highlands of Papa New Guinea which is an inherently dangerous place". In his evidence Mr Laverick provided a plausible explanation as to the employment circumstances of the electrician and that the head contractor had a management plan in place for workers. He further stated that the appellant had no involvement in the contractual arrangements for new employees.[19] Not only does this example demonstrate Ms McEnearney involving herself with matters that were not within her role, it also demonstrates her tendency to assume the worst in a given situation.
- [30]The third stressor alleges that OCSI failed to properly remunerate her and unreasonably withheld remuneration from her. Again, the regulator has comprehensively dealt with this stressor. The regulator seems to accept, as do I, that Ms McEnearney's belief that she was the financial controller of OCSI and that she should have been remunerated accordingly, was the major reason for her decompensation; she became somewhat obsessed with securing the remuneration she believed she was worth. The regulator has sufficiently demonstrated that Ms McEnearney was not working in the role of financial controller. However, it is the case that her role had expanded from what was originally intended. Mr Laverick accepted that this was the case and agreed to review her salary. In the interim, he gave her a $10,000 payment, pending that review. Although Ms McEnearney insists that it was agreed that she would be paid a salary of $140000,[20] in accordance with the "Hays Salary Guide" for a financial controller, I do not find that to be the case. I accept Mr Laverick’s evidence as to this. In any event, it is inherently unlikely, given the nature of the business of OCSI, that Mr Laverick would have agreed to such a large increase in the appellant’s salary.
- [31]In the fourth stressor Ms McEnearney alleges that she was bullied and harassed by her employer.
- [32]In addition to the reasons provided in the regulator's submissions, I am far from persuaded that Ms McEnearney was offended or upset by the language she alleges Mr Laverick used, which was largely said to have constituted the bullying and harassment. I note that he generally denied having spoken in the manner alleged. Given the long and close relationship between the protagonists, a degree of familiarity was inevitable. Further, it appears that at some stage in her career, Ms McEnearney had performed as a stand-up comic. Mr Laverick had been invited, along with other family and friends, to one of her performances. According to him, she told such filthy jokes that he was shocked and walked out.[21] In cross-examination she put to him that he clearly did not understand her routine because it was satire.[22] Whilst there may well have been inappropriate language used by both Mr Laverick and Ms McEnearney, I do not accept, even had Mr Laverick used the language attributed to him, that that distressed Ms McEnearney. The regulator submitted that after the appellant left her employment on 10 July 2012, she trawled through the massive amount of material she had obtained from OCSI to identify any material of an incriminating nature she could use to bolster her case. I accept that submission and consider that Ms McEnearney's complaints about Mr Laverick's language also fall into that category. Further, several witnesses for the regulator gave evidence about Ms McEnearney swearing during her employment.[23]
- [33]Her final stressor is that OCSI failed to act, or act appropriately on the reports of the appellant in relation to the first four stressors. The only matters of substance that could constitute reports by the appellant are her complaints of under-resourcing and being overworked and inadequately remunerated. Mr Laverick indicated that he would review the staffing situation once the two large tenders had been completed as well as reviewing Ms McEnearney's salary. In relation to each of these matters, again for the reasons articulated by the regulator, I find that, having regard to the circumstances that prevailed at the time, Mr Laverick engaged in reasonable management action, taken in a reasonable way.
- [34]In her submissions in reply, Ms McEnearney attacked Mr Laverick's credibility by referring to numerous alleged inconsistencies in Mr Laverick's evidence. This was also an attempt to demonstrate that he had in fact engaged in the fraudulent and illegal conduct of which she accused him.
- [35]As I have previously noted, Mr Laverick was somewhat cavalier in the manner in which he conducted his business affairs. His evidence was in some respects also unsatisfactory. However, he does not bear the onus of proof.
- [36]Ms McEnarney does not seem to appreciate that this case is not about whether Mr Laverick engaged in fraudulent or illegal conduct. Even if some of the inconsistencies in his evidence to which she points are made out, for the reasons previously given, I am not satisfied that Ms McEnearney was concerned about them, or that they occasioned her to be stressed. Nor am I satisfied that she was aware, during the course of her employment, of many of the matters of which she now complains. I repeat that, in my view, she discovered most of these matters when she trawled through OCSI's records after she left her employment on 10 May 2012.
Conclusion
- [37]Given the regulator's concession, I am satisfied that the appellant was a worker for the purposes of the Act. Further, in my opinion, Ms McEnearney’s psychological or psychiatric condition arose out of, or in connection with her employment and the employment was the major contributing factor to her injury. The particular aspect of the employment that constituted that factor was the manner in which Mr Laverick dealt with the appellant’s desire for more staff and more money. Accordingly, it follows, that her injury arose out of, or in the course of management action, being the dealing by Mr Laverick with those matters. As I have found that the manner in which Mr Laverick dealt with those issues constitutes reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way, the appellant’s psychiatric or psychological injury is excluded from the s 32 definition of injury by operation of s 32(5)(a).
- [38]The appeal should be dismissed.
- [39]Mr Laverick has sought costs. Although s 558(3) of the Act seems to empower the making of such an order, given the manner in which Mr Laverick conducted his business affairs, I am not minded to make an award of costs in his favour. Although Ms McEnearney often jumped to the wrong conclusions, this may partially be attributed to the state of OCSI's financial record keeping.
- [40]Ms McEnearney submits that costs should not be awarded against her, citing Gambaro v Workers' Compensation Regulator.[24] That case involved an appeal that purported to be made under the Industrial Relations Act 2016. That is not the case here. Accordingly, there is no reason why the usual course in appeals of this nature should not pertain in this matter.
Orders
- [41]Accordingly, I make the following orders:
- The appeal is dismissed.
- The decision of the respondent dated 2 April 2015 is confirmed.
- The appellant is to pay the regulator’s costs of and incidental to this appeal to be agreed or failing agreement to be the subject of a further application to the Commission.
Footnotes
[1] Brisbane City Council v Gillow & Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2016] ICQ 007, [57].
[2] [2015] ICQ 008.
[3] T 2-53, line 15-25.
[4] Exhibit R 4.
[5] T 8-86, lines 10-11.
[6] T 8-86, lines 40-47; T 8-87, lines 1-5.
[7] Exhibit A48.
[8] Exhibit A49, pp 2, 3.
[9] Exhibit A9, p 2.
[10] Exhibit R1.
[11] Carlton v Blackwood [2017] ICQ 001 at [18].
[12] Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336.
[13] Appellant's Closing Submissions, paras 29–35.
[14] Appellant's Closing Submissions, paras 135–137.
[15] T 3-26, lines 3-5.
[16]T 3-89, lines 13-35.
[17] T 3-13-15.
[18] T 1-29, lines 25-27.
[19] T 8-90, lines 18-33.
[20] T 3-20, line 3.
[21] T 9-21, line 2.
[22] T 11-28, line 1.
[23] See the evidence of G. Harkness T6-36 and L. Wade T6-68 and S. Laverick T9-21.
[24] [2017] ICQ 005.