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State of Queensland (Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service) v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2018] QIRC 62

State of Queensland (Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service) v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2018] QIRC 62

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

State of Queensland (Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2018] QIRC 062

PARTIES:

State of Queensland (Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service)

(applicant)

v

Workers' Compensation Regulator (respondent)

CASE NO:

WC/2018/15

PROCEEDING:

Application for costs

DELIVERED ON:

24 May 2018

HEARING DATE:

6 April 2018

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

O'Connor DP 

Brisbane

ORDER:

  1. Applicant’s application for costs is dismissed.
  2. The order for costs issued on 16 February 2018 be vacated and inserted in lieu thereof an order that each party bear its own costs.
  3. The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs in respect of the hearing on 6 April 2018 fixed in the sum of $776.00.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – APPLICATION FOR COSTS – general costs principles – where application made for costs arising out of an independent medical examination (IME) – where applicant requested IME – where respondent neither consented nor opposed the IME – where applicant now seeks costs on an indemnity basis – whether the conduct of the respondent warrants an award of costs

LEGISLATION:

CASES:

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 schedule 3, part 2, scale E

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 544, s 545, s 554, s 558

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Regulation 2014 (Qld) s 132

AWA Ltd v GR Daniels t/a Deloittes Haskins & Sells Unreported, NSW Sup. Ct, Comm Div, Rogers CJ, 8 October 1992; BC 9201567

Beach Retreat P/L v Mooloolaba Yacht Club Marina Ltd & Ors [2009] QSC 84

Blackwood v Egan [2014] ICQ 020

Carroll v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2016] QIRC 016

Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 031

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534

Stanley & Ors v Layne Christensen Company & Ors [2006] WASCA 56

The Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd (No2) [2007] NSWSC 797

Washbourne v State Energy Commission of Western Australia (1992) 8 WAR 188

Yousif v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 004

APPEARANCES:

Mr R. D. Green of counsel instructed by Shaw McDonald Lawyers, for the applicant.

Mr P. B. O'Neil of counsel directly instructed by the Workers' Compensation Regulator.

Reasons for Decision

  1. [2]
    On 3 April 2018 Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service made an application seeking an order that the Workers' Compensation Regulator pay the applicant:
  1. its costs of and incidental to the Application heard on 16 February 2018 seeking orders relating to an independent medical examination of the worker by Dr. John Chalk, on the indemnity basis
  2. its costs of and incidental to the holding of an independent medical examination of the worker by Dr. John Chalk on 6 March 2018, including the costs of obtaining the worker's medical records, on the indemnity basis;
  3. its costs of and incidental to this Application on the indemnity basis.
  1. [3]
    The applicant seeks costs on an indemnity basis, in the sum of $12,601.74 (excl. GST) for expenses and disbursements incurred in making the application for the IME.
  1. [4]
    The respondent resists the application arguing that the appropriate order is that each party bear their own costs.

Background

  1. [5]
    Carol Guy was employed as the Revenue Manager with the Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service. Ms Carol alleges that she was subjected to workplace bullying by her supervisor over a period of time.   On 18 May 2017 Ms Guy lodged an application for compensation for a psychiatric injury described as severe anxiety and depression. WorkCover rejected the application and a review of the decision was sought by Ms Guy. In a decision dated 19 December 2017 the respondent's Review Unit set aside WorkCover's decision. It is against this decision that the Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service now appeals.
  1. [6]
    On 17 January 2018, the Industrial Registry issued directions to the parties for the conduct of proceedings including an order for formal disclosure. That part of the directions order is due to be completed by 20 June 2018.
  1. [7]
    The medical evidence before the Review Unit included a short medical report and four medical certificates issued by Dr Johannes Schnetler, a General Practitioner at the Bay Surgery.
  1. [8]
    On 25 January 2018 the applicant made a s 556 application to the Commission seeking orders including:
  1. The worker, Carol Guy, undertake an independent medical examination to be conducted by one of the following psychiatrists.
  1. Mrs. Guy is to complete the independent medical examination by no later than 12 March 2018.
  1. The costs of the independent medical examination, including Mrs. Guy's reasonable travel costs to and from the examination, are to be paid by the Applicant.
  1. [9]
    The IME application notes at paragraph 8 the following:

No medical diagnosis has been provided by a qualified psychiatric expert after considering of Mrs Guy’s patient history since 2010, her pre-existing depression or any contributing stressors.

  1. [10]
    On 16 February 2018 that IME application was listed for hearing at which time the respondent indicated that it did not consent or oppose the orders sought. Ms Guy did not oppose the application. Consequently, the Commission issued an order that Ms Guy attend and participate in an IME. The order issued by the Commission included an order that costs of the application be reserved.

Statutory Framework

Workers Compensation Act

558Powers of appeal body

  1. (1)
    In deciding an appeal, the appeal body may—
  1. (a)
    confirm the decision; or
  2. (b)
    vary the decision; or
  3. (c)
    set aside the decision and substitute another decision; or
  4. (d)
    set aside the decision and return the matter to the respondent with the directions the appeal body considers appropriate.
  1. (2)
    If the appeal body acts under subsection (1)(b) or (c), the decision is taken for this Act, other than this part, to be the decision of the insurer.
  1. (3)
    Costs of the hearing are in the appeal body’s discretion, except to the extent provided under a regulation.

Workers Compensation Regulation

132Costs—proceeding before industrial magistrate or industrial commission

  1. (1)
    A decision to award costs of a proceeding heard by an industrial magistrate or the industrial commission is at the discretion of the magistrate or commission.
  1. (2)
    If the magistrate or commission awards costs—
  1. (a)
    costs in relation to counsel’s or solicitor’s fees are as under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, schedule 3, part 2, scale E; and
  2. (b)
    costs in relation to witnesses’ fees and expenses are as under the Uniform Civil Procedure (Fees) Regulation 2009, part 4; and
  3. (c)
    costs in relation to bailiff’s fees are as under the

Uniform Civil Procedure (Fees) Regulation 2009, schedule 2, part 2.

  1. (3)
    The magistrate or commission may allow costs up to 1.5 times the amounts provided for under subsection (2)(a), in total or in relation to any item, if the magistrate or commission is satisfied the amounts are inadequate having regard to-
  1. (a)
    the work involved; or
  2. (b)
    the importance, difficulty or complexity of the matter to which the proceeding relates.

Power to award costs

  1. [11]
    It is not in contention that the Commission has the discretion to award costs pursuant to           s 558(3) of the Act and s 132 of the Regulation. The Commission has a broad discretion to determine whether to award costs in particular proceedings. If it decides to exercise its discretion to award costs that discretion is constrained by, or by reference to, the amounts specified in the scale of costs set out in schedule 3.
  1. [12]
    As s 132 (1) of the Regulation provides, the costs to be awarded are costs as determined by reference to Schedule 3, Part 2, Scale E of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999.
  1. [13]
    Martin J observed in Blackwood v Egan,[1] that an order for costs is a quintessential exercise of discretion and that the principles in House v The King will apply.[2] The principles that govern an award of costs are well established. In Latoudis v Casey Mason CJ wrote:

It will be seen from what I have already said that, in exercising its discretion to award or refuse costs, a court should look at the matter primarily from the perspective of the defendant.  To do so conforms to fundamental principle.  If one thing is clear in the realm of costs, it is that, in criminal as well as civil proceedings, costs are not awarded by way of punishment of the unsuccessful party.  They are compensatory in the sense that they are awarded to indemnify the successful party against the expense to which he or she has been put by reason of the legal proceedings.[3]

  His Honour the Chief Justice further stated:

Most of the arguments which seek to counter an award of costs against an informant fail to recognize this principle and treat an order for costs against an informant as if it amounted to the imposition of a penalty or punishment.  But these arguments only have force if costs are awarded by reason of misconduct or default on the part of the prosecutor.  Once the principle is established that costs are generally awarded by way of indemnity to a successful defendant, the making of an order for costs against a prosecutor is no more a mark of disapproval of the prosecution than the dismissal of the proceedings.[4]

  McHugh J said:

The rationale of the order is that it is just and reasonable that the party who has caused the other party to incur the costs of litigation should reimburse that party for the liability incurred.  The order is not made to punish the unsuccessful party.  Its function is compensatory.[5]

The arguments

  1. [14]
    The applicant argues that had they been made aware that the worker had previously been psychiatrically and psychologically examined or treated by suitably qualified medical professionals it would not have proceeded with the IME.
  1. [15]
    The following is extracted from the applicant's outline of submissions:
  1. (a)
    prior to making its review decision on 19 December 2017, the Respondent should have provided written notice to Workcover Queensland, in its capacity as the decision maker, requiring it to provide further information that was clearly and usually required to make a fully informed and balanced review decision within 5 business days, namely the worker's general medical practitioner notes from the Shelly Beach medical centre, the Bay Surgery and the Fraser Coast medical centre, at the expense of Workcover Queensland in accordance with section 554(1)(b) of the WCRA.
  1. (b)
    in the absence of any medical records of the worker being considered by Workcover Queensland in reaching its decision dated 1 August 2017 that the Respondent should have set aside the decision and returned the matter to Workcover Queensland with directions to obtain and consider those medical records on the basis it believed on reasonable grounds that Workcover Queensland did not have satisfactory evidence or information to make its decision in accordance with sections 545(1)(d) and (1A)(b) of the WCRA: Pryzlak v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QSC 286.
  1. (c)
    had the respondent exercised any of its powers provided by sections 544(1)(b), 545(1)(d) or 545(1)(b) of the WCRA the existence and contents of the worker's medical records from the various medical centres and practitioners referred to in paragraph 17 herein would have been disclosed and:
  1. (i)
    Considered by Workcover Queensland prior to its decision;
  2. (ii)
    Considered by the Respondent prior to its review decision; and
  3. (iii)
    Not misled the applicant to believe there was a total absence of any medical treatment or opinions relating to the worker's alleged injury from suitably qualified medical practitioners prior to its Application for an independent medical examination.
  1. [16]
    Ms Ruth Jamieson, an appeals officer with the respondent deposes that the only medical evidence available at the time of the review was in the form of four medical certificates and a report of the general practitioner, Dr Schnetler.[6] Both the medical certificates and the medical report were referred to in the review decision dated 19 December 2017.
  1. [17]
    The applicant did not raise any issue with respect to the sufficiency of the medical evidence in its review submissions of 28 November 2017.
  1. [18]
    On 21 December 2017 the solicitor for the appellant sought copies of the medical certificates and report. The material was supplied by the respondent on 9 January 2018.
  1. [19]
    Ms Jamieson further deposes that in light of the medical evidence before the Review Officer there was no basis for the Review Officer to seek additional evidence pursuant to s 544 of the Act.[7] Section 544 gives the regulator a discretionary power to request that the decision maker, in this case WorkCover, to produce information and documents should the regulator request it. 
  1. [20]
    The applicant submits that the regulator should have exercised this discretionary power and to support this proposition cites the decision of Neate IC in Carroll v Workers' Compensation Regulator:

The Respondent submits that a proper analysis of a psychiatric condition requires consideration of a range of factors including the patient's full psychiatric and personal history, a thorough examination of the apparent stressors, a mental state examination, possibly psychological and/or pharmaceutical testing, and then a clinical impression based on expertise and training.  That process is necessary both for establishing a diagnosis and for establishing the aetiology of any condition.[8]

  1. [21]
    The affidavit of Leisha Shield-Paranihi, team leader for the "review and appeals unit" of WorkCover details the circumstances in which the review unit would request further information from the insurer in accordance with s 544. She states:
  1. If it is evident from the available evidence before the Review Officer that there is a question or uncertainty regarding the medical evidence that can be easily be remedied by a brief report request to the medical practitioner.
  1. If there is no question or uncertainty regarding the medical evidence before the Review Officer, there is no requirement or need for the Review Officer to investigate further information.
  1. Once the regulation is met in regards to the application for compensation, there is no further requirement or need for the Review Officer to make a request under s 544 of the Act.
  1. [22]
    The applicant contends that having regard to sections 544(1)(b), 545(1)(d), 545(1A)(B), and in the absence of medical records, the respondent should have set aside the decision and returned the matter back to WorkCover, with directions to obtain further medical records. 
  1. [23]
    Relevantly, s 132 the Act requires any application for compensation to be in the approved form and accompanied by a certificate in the approved form by a doctor who attended the person making the claim. Section 102 of the Act sets out, for the purposes of s 132(3)(b), the evidence or particulars required for an application for compensation. Ms Guy has complied with those provisions.
  1. [24]
    In making this costs application, the applicant's predominant claim concerns the manner in which the respondent came to its decision to accept Ms Guy's application for compensation. Yet the ambit of the Commission's jurisdiction is confined to the "reviewable decision" that is the decision that was before the respondent, namely, the decision to set aside WorkCover’s determination to reject Ms Guy's application for compensation and to substitute a new decision to accept Ms Guy's application in accordance with s 32(5) of the Act.
  1. [25]
    The applicant's submission raises a broader concern with the current application. The problem with the applicant's submission is that ultimately whether the regulator chooses to exercise its discretion pursuant to s 544 is a matter solely for the regulator. Section 544 is a provision that concerns only the regulator and WorkCover. It is not a provision that invites the Commission to question, on application, the exercise of the respondent’s discretion to seek more information. 
  1. [26]
    In Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator), the Industrial Court of Queensland was called upon to determine whether the Commission had power to decide as a preliminary issue whether or not a claim for compensation was out of time. The Regulator contended that the application originally lodged was outside the statutory time limit and that the Commission had jurisdiction to determine whether s 131 had been complied with irrespective of the "waiver" of the time limit. At first instance the Commissioner held that the Commission had the jurisdiction to decide that issue and found that the application for compensation was not valid and enforceable as it had been made out of time. On appeal, Martin J observed:

…the lodging of an appeal to the Commission does not "open the gates" for both parties to the appeal to request the Commission to determine "any number of preliminary issues". The ambit of such a hearing is determined by the case which was before the Regulator. It is also determined by any specific statutory provision which impinges upon the boundaries of the issue to be determined.[9]

(underlining added)

  1. [27]
    Martin J also stated in Yousif v Workers' Compensation Regulator:

An appeal under the Act is not the time for a broad ranging inquiry into an unlimited number of complaints or grievances.[10]

  1. [28]
    The applicant states that this application is essentially founded on a failure on the part of the respondent to meet its statutory obligations. Therefore, in the circumstances it will be necessary to examine the respondent's conduct to determine if an award of costs is warranted.
  1. [29]
    It was submitted by the applicant that had it been advised by either Ms Guy, her solicitors, WorkCover, or the respondent that Ms Guy had been psychiatrically and psychologically examined and treated by suitably qualified medical professionals prior to the date of the application for the IME then they would not have sought the IME.[11]
  1. [30]
    At the time that Ms Guy lodged her application for review with the respondent, the only medical evidence that the respondent's review unit had available was the evidence that had been provided to WorkCover that being the four medical certificates from the treating general practitioner, Dr Schnetler, with an accompanying report. That medical evidence was provided to the applicant on 9 January 2018.
  1. [31]
    The material before the Commission demonstrates that the applicant was, prior to the application for the IME, in possession of a medical report of Dr Schnetler and four workers’ compensation medical certificates. Each of the four certificates identified the fact that Ms Guy was undergoing treatment with Dr Alistair Gilbert, a consultant psychiatrist.
  1. [32]
    The medical certificate of 5 May 2017 identifies that Ms Guy was prescribed Lexapro and had been referred to Dr Gilbert under a mental health plan. The medical certificate of 23 May 2017 identified that Ms Guy was receiving treatment from Ms Maria Humberdross a psychologist and again by the psychiatrist, Dr Gilbert. The medical certificate of 19 June 2017 notes that the psychiatrist had prescribed "new medication". Finally, on 17 July 2017 the certificate reveals that Ms Guy was continuing to receive treatment with a psychiatrist and had been prescribed Lexapro and Lyrica.
  1. [33]
    The medical certificates and, in particular, the notations of Dr Schnetler under Part C – Medical management plan on each of the four medical certificates should have put the applicant on notice that Ms Guy was receiving treatment from a psychologist and a psychiatrist.
  1. [34]
    The respondent is a statutory body and one of its main functions is to conduct and defend proceedings under the Act before a court or tribunal.[12] It has wide powers to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its functions.[13]
  1. [35]
    The respondent submits that the function of the review unit is to conduct an administrative review on the papers and it accepts evidence at face value and it does not have an investigatory function nor the power to do so. It is submitted that in relation to an injury, medical certificates from a general practitioner are sufficient evidence if there are no issues raised by the employer and no competing medical evidence.
  1. [36]
    The respondent further submits that there were other means by which the applicant could have obtained Ms Guy's medical history. For example, the applicant could have served notices to produce on Ms Guy's treating practitioners; or, on the Department of Human Services to obtain Ms Guy's Medicare records for the last seven years.
  1. [37]
    Ultimately, the applicant made a forensic decision to seek an order for an IME. In my view, it did so prematurely and without paying careful attention to the medical certificates. 
  1. [38]
    It was not the responsibility of the respondent to advise the applicant that there was perhaps more economical and appropriate means by which the applicant could have obtained the information it sought.
  1. [39]
    The respondent contends that the applicant has sought an indulgence by seeking an order for the IME. Where an indulgence is sought, the general rule is that the party seeking the indulgence will be required to pay the costs of the application.[14]
  1. [40]
    In light of the evidence before the Commission, it would, in my view be unreasonable to impose on the respondent an award of costs as a direct result of the applicant's forensic decision to seek an IME. I am not persuaded that I should exercise my discretion to award costs associated with the order for an IME.

Indemnity Costs

  1. [41]
    Having regard to the reasons above it is not necessary for me to deal with the question of indemnity costs. However, I will for completeness, deal with the issue of indemnity costs.
  1. [42]
    As noted above, any award of costs is to be determined in accordance with s 132 of the Regulation. Nothing within s 558 of the Act or s 132 of the Regulation supports a conclusion that indemnity costs can be granted.
  1. [43]
    There is, however, a capacity in s 132(3) of the Regulation for the Commission to allow costs up to 1.5 times the amounts provided for under s 132(2)(a) of s 132, in total or in relation to any item, if the Commission is satisfied the amounts are inadequate having regard to the work involved; or, the importance, difficulty or complexity of the matter to which the proceeding relates.
  1. [44]
    If the Commission is contemplating awarding costs over and above the scale then, in determining what is just and reasonable, the scale must be used as a guide in the calculation of the quantum of costs above the scale. As Ipp J observed in Washbourne v State Energy Commission of Western Australia:

The starting point is that the amount of the costs are to be in accordance with the scale prescribed. If however the special difficulty, complexity, or importance of the case leads the court to order higher costs than those laid down in the scale, the court is empowered to order costs in excess of the amount for scale items; nevertheless, the scale items are to be the basic guidelines in determining the amount of costs to be ordered.[15]

  1. [45]
    In the present circumstances there is nothing to suggest there exists a "special difficulty", "complexity", or "importance" such that it brings into play s 132(3) of the Regulation.
  1. [46]
    In AWA Ltd v GR Daniels t/a Deloittes Haskins & Sells,  Rogers CJ identified four broad categories of case in which indemnity costs have been awarded:
  1. (a)
    Where there has been misconduct or inappropriate conduct, by a party in the course of the litigation. This could include deliberately delaying the proceedings by putting a knowingly false defence, or bringing proceedings for an ulterior motive (cf Degman v Wright (No 2) [1983] 2 NSWLR 354; Packer v Meagher [1984] 3 NSWLR 486).
  1. (b)
    Where the claim had such a remote prospect of success that the action should not have been brought or continued. In Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 Woodward J said (at 410): "I believe that it is appropriate to consider awarding ‘solicitor and client’ or ‘indemnity’ costs, whenever it appears that an action has been commenced or continued in circumstances where the applicant, properly advised, should have known that he had no chance of success. In such cases the action must be presumed to have been commenced or continued for some ulterior motive, or because of some wilful disregard of the known facts or the clearly established law. Such cases are, fortunately, rare. But when they occur, the court will need to consider how it should exercise its unfettered discretion."
  1. (c)
    Where the proceedings were brought in the public interest or as a test case (cf Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations v Tobacco Institute of Australia Limited (1991) 100 ALR 568, Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon ("The Mikhail Lemontov") (1991) 22 NSWLR 1).
  1. (d)
    Where an offer or compromise or formal settlement offer has been rejected. This area has now been taken over by the explicit provisions in the UCPR.[16]
  1. [47]
    In The Beach Retreat P/L v Mooloolaba Yacht Club Marina Ltd & Ors Martin J wrote:

A continuing refrain in many of these cases is to the effect that an indemnity costs order is not to be made as a matter of course. There are many of these warnings which should be applied here there is no provision in the rules (such as for unaccepted offers) to the contrary. In general, a court should not make such an order unless satisfied that there is a "special case", a "special reason", or "clearly exceptional circumstances" and so on.[17]

  1. [48]
    Even if it was considered that this matter was one in which the Commission should exercise its discretion to award costs and that there is a capacity to make an order of indemnity costs, there is nothing before the Commission to suggest that this is a "special case", a "special reason", or "clearly exceptional circumstances".

Respondent’s Cost of the Application

  1. [49]
    The respondent does not contend that it should receive its costs associated with the application on 16 February 2018. However, it does seek its costs of this application calculated on Magistrates Court scale E in the sum of $776.00 as set out below:

            Scale E

 Item 6(b) To settle affidavit (X 2 @ $103.50)   $207.00

 Item 6(j) Appearance on the application in a proceeding $186.00

 Item 10 Applications to the Court    $383.00

 TOTAL         $776.00

  1. [50]
    The relevant principle for this application is that costs are not awarded by way of punishment or disapproval of the unsuccessful party but are to compensate the successful party against the expense to which that party has been put by reason of the legal proceedings.
  1. [51]
    Even if the applicant had succeeded in relation to convincing the Commission that this was an appropriate occasion in which to exercise its discretion to award costs, it still had a significant obstacle to overcome (in the form of s 558(3) of the Act and s 132 of the Regulation) before it could obtain an order for indemnity costs.
  1. [52]
    Having considered the matters before the Commission I am of the view that it is fair and reasonable that the respondent have its costs of and incidental to this application fixed in the sum of $776.00.
  1. [53]
    I find that the appropriate order is that in respect of the hearing on 16 February 2018 that each party bear its own costs. In respect of the current application and the hearing on 6 April 2018, the applicant is to pay the respondent's costs. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

Orders

  1. Applicant’s application for costs is dismissed.
  2. The order for costs issued on 16 February 2018 be vacated and inserted in lieu thereof an order that each party bear its own costs.
  3. The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs in respect of the hearing on 6 April 2018 fixed in the sum of $776.00.

Footnotes

[1] Blackwood v Egan [2014] ICQ 020.

[2] (1936) 55 CLR 499

[3] Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534, 543.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid, 567.

[6] Affidavit of R Jamieson dated 5 April 2018, para 13.

[7] Ibid, para 15. 

[8] [2016] QIRC 016, [172].

[9] [2015] ICQ 031, [33].

[10] [2017] ICQ 004, [19].

[11] See Submissions of the Applicant dated 6 April 2018 at para 19.

[12] Workers Compensation Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 327(n).

[13] Ibid, s 328.

[14] Stanley & Ors v Layne Christensen Company & Ors [2006] WASCA 56; The Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd (No2) [2007] NSWSC 797.

[15] (1992) 8 WAR 188.

[16] Unreported, NSW Sup. Ct, Comm Div, Rogers CJ, 8 October 1992; BC 9201567.

[17] [2009] QSC 84 at [88].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    State of Queensland (Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service) v Workers' Compensation Regulator

  • Shortened Case Name:

    State of Queensland (Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service) v Workers' Compensation Regulator

  • MNC:

    [2018] QIRC 62

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    O'Connor DP

  • Date:

    24 May 2018

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon ("The Mikhail Lemontov") (1991) 22 NSWLR 1
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1991) 22 NSWLR 1
Belal Yousif v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 4
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] ICQ 4
Cite 2 - [2017] ICQ 4
Blackwood v Egan [2014] ICQ 20
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] ICQ 20
Cite 2 - [2014] ICQ 20
Carroll v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2016] QIRC 16
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QIRC 16
Cite 2 - [2016] QIRC 16
Church v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2015] ICQ 31
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] ICQ 31
Cite 2 - [2015] ICQ 31
Consumer Organisations Inc. v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (1991) 100 ALR 568
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1991) 100 ALR 568
Degman Pty Ltd (in liq) v Wright (No. 2) (1983) 2 NSWLR 354
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1983) 2 NSWLR 354
Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1988) 81 ALR 397
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Cite 2 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) 170 CLR 534
Cite 2 - (1990) 170 CLR 534
Cite 3 - (1990) 170 CLR 534
Packer v Meagher (1984) 3 NSWLR 486
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1984) 3 NSWLR 486
Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd (No2) [2007] NSWSC 797
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2007] NSWSC 797
Cite 2 - [2007] NSWSC 797
Pryszlak v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QSC 286
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] QSC 286
Stanley v Layne Christensen Company [2006] WASCA 56
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2006] WASCA 56
Cite 2 - [2006] WASCA 56
The Beach Retreat Pty Ltd v Mooloolaba Yacht Club Marina Ltd[2009] 2 Qd R 356; [2009] QSC 84
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] QSC 84
Cite 2 - [2009] QSC 84
Washbourne v State Energy Commission (WA) (1992) 8 WAR 188
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992) 8 WAR 188
Cite 2 - (1992) 8 WAR 188

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

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