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Redding v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2019] QIRC 42

Redding v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2019] QIRC 42

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Redding v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 042

PARTIES:

Redding, Karlene Ann

(Appellant)

v

Workers' Compensation Regulator

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

WC/2017/36

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against a decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator

DELIVERED ON:

6 March 2019

HEARING DATE:

23 November 2017 (Kaufman DP)

8 June 2018

7 August 2018

29 August 2018

7 September 2018 (Appellant's submissions)

27 September 2018 (Regulator's submissions)

4 October 2018 (Appellant reply submissions)

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

Swan DP

Brisbane

ORDERS:

1.The Appeal is dismissed.

2.The Appellant is to pay the Regulator's costs of, and incidental to the Appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - APPEAL AGAINST DECISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION REGULATOR - dependency claim filed by Appellant pursuant to s 128D of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 - matters to be considered; "earnings" and whether Appellant was wholly or partly dependent on husband's "earnings"- determine that husband did not have "earnings" for the purposes of the Act and that Appellant was neither wholly or partly dependent upon those "earnings" - Appeal dismissed.

LEGISLATION:

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 3, s 27, s 106, s 128A, s 128B,  s 128C, 128D, s 200.

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Regulations 2014

WorkCover Queensland Act 1996

Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1954 (NSW)

Workers' Compensation Act 1927 (TAS)

Workplace Health and Safety and Other Legislation amendment Bill 2008

Coal and Oil Shale Min Workers' (Superannuation Act) 1941 (NSW)

Transport Accident Act 1986

Accident Compensation Act 1985 (VIC)

CASES:

Cage Developments Pty Ltd (t/a Monaro Mix Specified Concrete v Schubert (1983) 151 CLR 584.

Ebejer v Transport Accident Commission (2009) VCAT 1128.

Fisher v Hebburn (1960) 105 CLR 188.

Fletcher v Q-COMP [2010] QIRC 62.

Gers v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland (1985) 119 QGIG 104.

Kauri Timber Co (Tas) Pty Ltd v Reeman (1973) 128 CLR 177.

Rogers v State Mines Control Authority (1964) 64 S.R. (NSW) 486.

Serdzeff v Victorian WorkCover Authority (2005) 14 VR 43.

Stevens v Frankston Football Cub V.F.A [1972] VR 595.

Toll North Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) & Lamb [2014] QIRC 065.

Toll North Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) & Lamb [2015] ICQ 004.

WorkCover Queensland v Cook (2003) 173 QGIG 1416.

APPEARANCES:

Mr R.J. Armstrong of Counsel instructed by Slater and Gordon Lawyers for the Appellant.

Mr S.P. Gray of Counsel directly instructed by Ms J. Webb of the Workers' Compensation Regulator.

Reasons for Decision

 Background to the Appeal

  1. [1]
    Mr Paul Redding lodged an application for compensation with the Gold Coast City Council Self-Insurer, City Cover (the Self-Insurer) on 3 May 2016 in respect of an injury described as mesothelioma which is said to have arisen out of his employment in various roles with the Gold Coast City Council (GCCC) from about early 1989 until about February 1995. Mr Redding was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma in April 2016.
  1. [2]
    Mr Redding claimed that he had been unaware that he had suffered from mesothelioma before the diagnosis, but he had experienced periods of shortness of breath from around September 2015.
  1. [3]
    On 6 July 2006, the Self-Insurer notified Mr Redding of its reasons for accepting his application for compensation in accordance with s 3 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (the Act).
  1. [4]
    As Mr Redding's injury was a latent onset injury which was a terminal condition, s 128A of the Act provides that Chapter 3, Part 3, Division 4 of the Act applies to the determination of the application.  By s 128B(1) of the Act, Mr Redding was entitled to compensation calculated only under Division 4.
  1. [5]
    The calculation of Mr Redding's entitlement to compensation in accordance with s 128B of the Act was detailed by the Workers' Compensation Regulator (the Regulator) as follows [footnotes replicated hereunder]:

S128B(2)(a)1  $314,920.00

S128B(2)(b)2  $  31,492.00

S128B(2)(c)3 - age 71 $283,430.00

   $629,842.00

   =========

 [Footnote]1 Indexed lump sum payable under s 128B(2)(a).

  [Footnote]2 Additional lump sum compensation for care of 10 percent of the amount payable under s 128B(a).

  [Footnote]3 Additional lump sum compensation payable according to a graduated scale, having regard to the age of the worker when the worker lodges an application for compensation for the latent onset injury.[1]

  1. [6]
    A dependency payment was also claimed, pursuant to s 128D of the Act on the basis that Mr Redding's wife, Mrs Karlene Ann Redding was a dependant in accordance with that section of the Act.  Mrs Redding's application was made at the same time as the determination of Mr Redding's entitlement to a lump sum payment pursuant to s 128B of the Act but prior to that payment being made to Mr Redding.
  1. [7]
    The reasons given by the Self-Insurer for rejecting the application for dependency on 13 September 2016, were because Mrs Redding was not completely or partly dependent upon Mr Redding's earnings and there was insufficient information provided to show that Mr Redding had any earnings or Mrs Redding's dependency on them.
  1. [8]
    An Appeal of the Regulator's review decision was instigated by Mr Redding.  However, Mr Redding passed away on 25 January 2018 and as such the Appeal has been continued in the name of Mr Redding's Executor and Legal Personal Representative, Mrs Redding.
  1. [9]
    This Appeal was commenced in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (the Commission) with Deputy President Kauffman presiding.  Deputy President Kauffman heard the direct evidence and Cross-Examination of Mr Redding on 23 November 2017.
  1. [10]
    In the intervening period, Mr Redding had passed away on 25 January 2018 and Deputy President Kauffman had retired, and as such, the remainder of the matter was then heard by the Commission as constituted and the transcript of Mr Redding's evidence was relied upon by the Commission and the parties as correctly reflecting that evidence.
  1. [11]
    The Review Decision on 15 February 2017, confirmed the Self-Insurer's decision for the same reasons, but the added component to that decision was reference to what was claimed to be "earnings" of Mr Redding.  The decision referred to comments made by Martin J in Toll North Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) & Lamb[2] where His Honour, Martin J stated (considering the question of dependency) that:

The reference to "earnings" merely confines the question of dependence to the earnings of the worker as opposed to any other income which that worker might have from, say, interest or rental income…

 The Legislation

  1. [12]
    The applicable legislation relating to this Appeal pursuant to the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (the Act), is as follows:

128A

This division applies to a worker if a latent onset injury sustained by the worker is a terminal condition.

128BEntitlements of worker with terminal condition

  1. (1)
    The worker is entitled to compensation for the latent onset injury calculated only under this division.
  1. (2)
    The worker is entitled to lump sum compensation equal to the sum of the following amounts -

 (a) $200,000;

 (b) additional lump sum compensation for care of 10 percent of the amount payable under paragraph (a);

 (c) additional lump sum compensation of up to $200,000 payable according to a graduated scale prescribed under a regulation, having regard to the age of the worker when the worker lodges an application for compensation for the latent onset injury.

  1. (3)
    However, the amount payable under subsection (2)(a) is subject to any reduction made under section 128C.
  1. (4)
    The worker is also entitled to compensation under chapter 4, part 2, but only until the worker receives lump sum compensation under subsection (2).

128CReduction of amount payable

  1. (1)
    This section applies if any of the following payments have been made in relation to the worker's latent onset injury-
  1. (a)
    a weekly payment of compensation;
  1. (b)
    a redemption payment;
  1. (c)
    a payment of lump sum compensation;
  1. (d)
    a payment of compensation or damages under a law of Queensland, another State or of the Commonwealth.
  1. (2)
    The amount of compensation payable under section 128B(2)(a) must be reduced by the total of all payments mentioned in subsection (1).

128DWorker's Dependants

  1. (3)
    This section applies if the worker has dependants.
  1. (4)
    The worker's dependants are entitled to lump sum compensation equal to the sum of the following amounts -
  1. (a)
    15% of the amount payable under section 200 (2)(a);
  1. (b)
    2% of the amount payable under section 200 (2)(q) for the reasonable expenses of the worker's funeral
  1. (5)
    An insurer may pay the compensation under this section -
  1. (a)
    To the worker; or
  1. (b)
    To the worker's dependants at the same time as the insurer pays the worker lump sum compensation under section 128B.
  1. (6)
    The worker's dependants are not entitled to further compensation under chapter 3, part 11 for the death of the worker.
  1. (7)
    In this section -

dependent of a worker, means a member of the worker's family who is completely or partly dependent on the worker's earnings.

Member of the family, of a worker, means -

  1. (a)
    The worker's -
  1. (i)
    Spouse; or
  1. (ii)
    Parent, grandparent or step-parent; or
  1. (iii)
    Child, grandchild or stepchild; of
  1. (iv)
    Brother, sister, half-brother or half-sister; or
  1. (b)
    If the worker stands in the place of a parent to another person - the other person or;
  1. (c)
    if another person stands in the place of a parent to the worker - the other person.
  1. [13]
    Section 128D of the Act was inserted into the Act in 2008.[3]
  1. [14]
    The Explanatory Notes to that legislation stated that the amendments introduced "new arrangements for dependants of terminal latent onset disease (e.g. mesothelioma) sufferers" and (at page 4) that the amendments "provide a new lump sum entitlement of 15 percent of the maximum death benefit for dependants of a worker who had already received a payment of lump sum compensation or damages for a latent onset injury that is a terminal condition".  At page 20 the amendments introduced a "new benefit to dependants of terminal, latent onset disease suffers" and that the new entitlements "apply to all dependants collectively; dependants are not individually entitled to the amounts specified".  The Act currently, under s 128D details the amount of compensation available to dependants.[4]

 The questions to be determined in this Appeal

  1. [15]
    The issue in the Appeal is whether the Appellant, Mr Redding's wife, was "… a member of the worker's family who was completely or partly dependent on the worker's [viz., Mr Redding's] earnings".  That is:
  1. (a)
    Did Mr Redding have "earnings" as required by the Act?; and
  1. (b)
    If so, was Mrs Redding completely or partly dependent upon those earnings?

 The outcome sought by the Appellant

  1. [16]
    The following dependency benefits sought by Mrs Redding pursuant to s 128D of the Act are:
  1. (a)
    Lump sum compensation of 15 percent of the amount payable under s 200(2)(a) of the Act;
  1. (b)
    Lump sum compensation of 2 percent of the amount payable under s 200(2)(a) of the Act for the reasonable expenses of the Appellant's funeral.
  1. [17]
    It is contended by the Appellant that the whole of the factual circumstances of Mrs Redding's dependency upon Mr Redding is relevant to entitlement under s 128D of the Act.

 Overview of the Appellant's claim

  1. [18]
    Mr Redding married Mrs Redding in December 1972 and had two children who were born in 1974 and 1977.  Mr and Mrs Redding had remained married and lived together until the time of Mr Redding's death in January 2018.
  1. [19]
    Mr Redding provided financial and other benefits to Mrs Redding and their children, until the children moved from home, during that entire period.
  1. [20]
    In his early work life, Mr Redding was employed in a range of occupations.  From the 1960's, Mr Redding was a qualified carpenter tradesperson.  The Appellant says that this work background was helpful in work he had performed in his later years, when he and his wife had shares and/or partnerships in the All Seasons Motor Lodge and the Abel Tasman Motor Inn, both located in Dubbo.
  1. [21]
    From 1997 and for the next 11 years, Mr Redding was self-employed, owning and operating the business, Te Puke Holiday Park in New Zealand.  The Appellant says that this is important as it shows that Mr Redding was often self-employed at various times and he had a familiarity with the business of short-term accommodation.
  1. [22]
    Mr Redding was employed with the GCCC from early 1989 until February 1995.  Mr Redding had been exposed to asbestos dust and fibres during the course of his employment.
  1. [23]
    He became self-employed from March 1995 to about September 1995, operating a business called "Tugun Recyclers".  From about 1999 to about 2012 Mr Redding worked in a self-employed capacity operating his own tipper truck.  Mr Redding retired from this business in 2013.  Up to about July 2015, the Redding's employed a driver to operate the truck until the business was finally closed in July 2015.
  1. [24]
    From about 2004 until mid-2017, as beneficiaries in the Karpaul Unit Trust, the Redding's received a proportion of business income from a motel known as the All Seasons Motor Inn at Dubbo and received a one fifth proportion of the business income.
  1. [25]
    From about 2004, as beneficiaries in the Karpaul Trust, received was a proportion of rental income from the Abel Tasman Motor Inn (a 23.68 percent proportion as at 30 June 2013).
  1. [26]
    From around 2013, the Redding's, as beneficiaries in the Redkar Trust, received was a one-half proportion of business income from a motel known as the All Seasons Motor Inn at Dubbo.
  1. [27]
    The Redding's travelled to Dubbo on average four to five times per year and stayed up to five to seven days each time.
  1. [28]
    Before Mr Redding's death, the Redding's were jointly involved in repairs, maintenance, improvements and other tasks at the Abel Tasman Motor Inn which are mentioned in paragraph [77] of this decision.
  1. [29]
    Prior to being aware that he was suffering from mesothelioma in April 2016, The Redding's had an active involvement in protecting and maximising their business and investment return from the motels. 
  1. [30]
    The submission of the Appellant was that Mrs Redding was "completely or partly dependent" on Mr Redding's earnings.

 The Appellant's substantive claim

  1. [31]
    The Appellant, at the outset, submitted that it adopted (where relevant) the interpretation of s 128D in Fletcher v Q-COMP[5] (Fletcher).
  1. [32]
    It had been found in that case that dependency was to be determined at the date of Mr Fletcher's death because:
  1. (a)
    Mr Fletcher was diagnosed with mesothelioma on 19 March 2008.
  1. (b)
    Mr Fletcher had become unfit for work about 21 years before he was diagnosed with mesothelioma.
  1. (c)
    Mr Fletcher was in receipt of a disability support pension and Mrs Fletcher also received a disability support pension and later a carer's benefit.
  1. (d)
    Mr Fletcher lodged an application for statutory compensation on 19 March 2008.
  1. (e)
    In or about June 2008, the Workers' Compensation insurer determined that Mr Fletcher was entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of s 128B of the Act and benefits were paid.
  1. (f)
    On 25 November 2008, s 128D of the Act commenced.
  1. (g)
    Following Mr Fletcher's death, his wife applied for compensation as a dependant in accordance with s 128D of the Act, which entitlement had arisen after 25 November 2008 and after the lump sum benefits had been paid to Mr Fletcher.
  1. [33]
    The Appellant submitted that in Fletcher[6], it was considered that the payment made to Mr Fletcher pursuant to s 128(b)(2) of the Act appeared to be "one made in lieu of the loss of the ability to earn income from an employer in return for personal exertion, i.e. "earnings'."  It was determined that "earnings" were from personal exertion.  The Regulator says that the Appellant has not questioned that element of the finding.
  1. [34]
    Fletcher involved s 128D of the 2003 Act.   Some cases mentioned by the Regulator involved different legislative provisions.
  1. [35]
    In the years preceding Mr Fletcher's diagnosis mesothelioma, he had experienced breathing difficulties and chest pain and was in receipt of a disability support pension.  Mr Fletcher's wife also received a disability support pension and later a carer's benefit.
  1. [36]
    The Appellant contends that in Fletcher it was held that it was not intended that s 128D of the 2003 Act:

… should be confined to cases where persons were dependent upon the personal exertion income of a mesothelioma sufferer at the time of the sufferer's death (there was no such qualification for entitlement under 128D).  Further, the whole of the factual circumstances of the Appellant's dependency was relevant including the earnings at the time when the deceased was exposed to the asbestos.  It was found that had the deceased not been forced to stop work because of symptoms common to an eventual diagnosis of mesothelioma, the evidence is that he would have kept working to support this wife and children.[7] 

  1. [37]
    Fletcher also found that the component in the lump sum payment made in lieu of the loss of ability to earn income from an employer in return for personal exertion (s 128B(2)(a) of the 2003 Act) was relevant to the concept of "earnings".
  1. [38]
    From Fletcher, the Appellant submitted that when s 128D was inserted into the 2003 Act in 2008, the Legislature had not included a definition of "earnings" in the Act.  There was also no assistance provided in the explanatory notes.
  1. [39]
    The Appellant submits out that that while the 2003 Act provides a definition for "wages" it has not linked that definition to "earnings".
  1. [40]
    Submitted was that the word "earnings" was to be interpreted in a broader manner than "wages" under the 2003 Act.  As well, the interpretation of "earnings" should be considered within a contemporary context within the 2003 Act. 
  1. [41]
    The Appellant, in reference to cases relied upon by the Regulator [hereunder] in terms of interpreting the word "earnings", had to be considered within a historical and legislative context.
  1. [42]
    Reference was made by the Appellant to the Macquarie Dictionary definition of "earnings" which included, amongst other things:

 1.the act of someone who earns 2. (plural) money earned; wages; profits.

 Overview of Regulator's response

  1. [43]
    The factual elements of the submissions of the Appellant are accepted by the Regulator as to:
  • Mrs Redding is Mr Redding's spouse and is a member of the family as defined in s 128D of the Act;
  • reference to various decisions from the Self-Insurer and the Review decision of the Regulator leading up to this Appeal;
  • Mr Redding's employment record with the GCCC; and
  • that Mr Redding was exposed to asbestos and fibres during the course of his employment with GCCC.
  1. [44]
    The focus of the Regulator's rejection of the claim related to Mr Redding's "earnings" for the purpose of s 128D of the Act and matters of alleged dependency on Mrs Redding's part.
  1. [45]
    For the purpose of clarity in terms of submissions made by the Regulator, listed below is an overview of its case.
  1. [46]
    The Regulator contends that Mrs Redding is not dependent on the Appellant's "earnings", as at 6 July 2016 because:
  1. (a)
    The Appellant did not have a protracted period of illness which prevented him from performing his usual work duties throughout his periods of employment as a worker or in self-employment;
  1. (b)
    The Appellant was not forced to retire prematurely because of the injury which may be causally connected with his employment with the GCCC;
  1. (c)
    The Appellant is a self-funded retiree and his source of income is from the various trust entities with which he is associated;
  1. (d)
    The Appellant is not in receipt of any pension or like payments;
  1. (e)
    The Appellant's application for dependency was made contemporaneously with the decision by City Cover to accept his application for compensation and before any payment had been made for the assessed compensation;
  1. (f)
    At the time the application for dependency was made, Mrs Redding was not dependent on any income associated with the investment of that lump sum amount; and
  1. (g)
    As the Appellant had been retired for a period of three years prior to his application for compensation, the payments which have been made to the Appellant in accordance with the provisions of s 128(2) of the Act are not compensation for "loss of earning capacity".  

[NOTE: The Appellant retired from GCCC in February 1999 and then continued working, retiring from his tipper truck business in July 2015.]

 Did Mr Redding have "earnings" as required by the Act?

  1. [47]
    Section 128D of the Act requires that the dependency on the worker's earnings be made at the relevant time the application is made.
  1. [48]
    Considering past earnings which had long ceased does not demonstrate dependency of earnings as contemplated by the Act.  However, the Appellant added that what may have happened to past earnings is relevant to determining dependency.
  1. [49]
    The Appellant contends that the interpretation of "earnings" should be considered in respect of the purpose of s 128D within a contemporary context relevant to dependency as identified in the following cases.[8]
  1. [50]
    A definition of "earnings" was made by President Hall in WorkCover Queensland v Cook[9] (Cook).  In that matter, a worker had suffered a physical injury and claimed compensation under the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996.  Upon the cessation of the WorkCover payments, the worker received QSuper income incapacity payments which were commuted to a lump sum.  The worker committed suicide a little over two months later.
  1. [51]
    President Hall held, pursuant to s 29 of the 1996 Act, that while the deceased "did not (literally) have any earnings upon which her spouse' might have been dependent at the time of her death", the deceased had "earnings" by way of workers' compensation payments and the Q Super payments before her death.
  1. [52]
    The matter of Fisher v Hebburn Limited[10] (Fisher) considers the question of "earnings" within the context of workers' compensation matters.
  1. [53]
    In this case, Mr Fisher ceased work in 1949 after becoming totally incapacitated because of a non-compensable disease. Because of the industry in which he had worked, Mr Fisher was compulsorily retired and commenced receiving a pension pursuant to the relevant Act viz., Coal and Oil Shale Mine Workers' (Superannuation Act) 1941, (NSW).
  1. [54]
    After later being certified as being totally incapacitated for work because of a noncompensable disease, Mr Fisher applied for compensation.
  1. [55]
    July 1995 was deemed to be the date upon which Mr Fisher's incapacitation occurred.
  1. [56]
    Fisher[11] was distinguished by President Hall on the basis that the worker in that matter had no earnings for over six years prior to his death, whereas in Cook[12], Mrs Cook had ceased to have earnings only a little over two months prior to her death.  Those earnings had ceased because she had taken a lump sum payment in settlement of her entitlement to future "earnings" because of superannuation payments.
  1. [57]
    In Cook, President Hall referred to cases where a pension income might be considered "earnings" as well as fortnightly superannuation payments under other legislation.  However, he stated that dependency is to be considered within a broad and practical manner having regard to what has occurred in the past and what would probably happen in the future but for the death.

 The Regulator's submissions as to Mr Redding's work history

  1. [58]
    It was evident that Mr and Mrs Redding, during their married life, had accumulated wealth by way of assets and investments.
  1. [59]
    In the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1954 (NSW), s 9(1)(b) provided:
  1. (a)
    In addition to the compensation payable under paragraph (a), a weekly payment during the incapacity of -

 Two pounds per week in respect of the wife of the worker who is totally or mainly dependent on the earnings of the worker at the date of injury….[13] 

  1. [60]
    It is accepted that while the definition of "wages" is to be found in the Dictionary of the Act there is no specific definition of "earnings" in the Dictionary.
  1. [61]
    The High Court has considered the word "earnings" as constituting personal exertion in employment.  In the case of Fisher, it was determined that Mr Fisher did not have "earnings" at the date of his notional incapacity.  Consequently, Mrs Fisher was not considered as one who was dependent upon Mr Fisher's earnings.
  1. [62]
     Fullager J wrote:

… He can only be so entitled if his wife was "dependent on his earnings" at the date of the certification of the Medical Board.  At that time he was earning nothing, but was, as has been said, in receipt of a pension.  His wife may be said to have been dependent on his pension, but she cannot be said to have been dependent on non-existent earnings…[14]

  1. [63]
     Windeyer J agreed:

…At all material times the appellant was a married man.  Until he ceased work in April 1940, his wife was totally dependent on his earnings.  She has been totally dependent on him ever since, except in so far as she may have been in receipt of a pension of her own; but his means have been confined to a pension or pensions.  At the date when his notional incapacity from pneumoconiosis is to be taken as having resulted, namely, 7th July 1955, he had no earnings, and his wife therefore could not be described as dependent on his earnings.  Accordingly, the award to which the appellant was entitled could not properly include any additional compensation under par (b).[15]

  1. [64]
    Similar references to "earnings" can be found in other decisions. For example, Rogers v State Mines Control Authority[16] includes, inter alia, the following commentary:

what is earned by the worker - the rewards which he receives for his efforts - in employment or, as will be seen, in some business which he carries on….

… but it is clear that the "earnings" of which the definition speaks are current earnings such as are dependent upon the continuance of a capacity to earn and cease when that capacity ceasesIt is not to be taken … that payments of workers' compensation are in fact earnings.  They are in truth a compensation for loss of the capacity to earn; and a miner's pension, of the kind here in question and having the characteristics which it possesses under the statute, may be described as a compensation for the compulsory abandonment of an habitual mode of earning.  The view that neither is earnings in the relevant sense is supported by Fisher as to a miner's pension, and by Gough v Crawshay Brothers Ltd and Hardie v Hardie as to workers' compensation.

  1. [65]
    In the Regulator's submissions, the matter of Stevens v Frankston Football Club V.F.A[17]. is apposite to the case at hand.
  1. [66]
    In this matter, the Victorian Court of Appeal considered what constituted "earnings" in respect to a deceased worker who had two concurrent contracts of employment; working by day with another employer and in the evening with the respondent.  The issue to be considered was whether "earnings" was restricted to only earnings received from the respondent employer or whether it includes any other and what income received by the worker.
  1. [67]
    In the joint judgement (Winneke, C.J., Smith and Lush, JJ) the following was stated:

Mr Connor, who appeared with Mr O'Bryan for the respondent club argued that the word "earnings" in the expression quoted from cl. 1(a)(i) meant earnings in the service of the employer from whom compensation was claimed.  He expressed his argument first in terms that some words must be introduced to limit the word "earnings", because otherwise it would cover matters which he submitted must be beyond the purview of the Act, e.g. interest on capital and the gains of speculative investment.  We think that it is true that not all receipts will come within the concept of "earnings" or of "earnings of a worker", but that consideration only gives rise to questions whether particular receipts can be described as earnings and does not introduce any limitation upon the meaning of the word….

  1. [68]
    Ultimately, in that matter, the finding made referred to both contracts of employment within which the Appellant was engaged.  In Queensland, the Regulations requires that a worker's net weekly earnings are calculated by reference to all of the worker's earnings under concurrent contracts of employment with two or more employers.
  1. [69]
    In WorkCover Queensland v Cook[18], President Hall wrote:

In Gers v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland. Matthews, President considered the counterpart provision of the Workers' Compensation Act 1916 and concluded (at 105):

 Dependency is determined at the time of the worker's death.  (Brazewell v Emmott and Wallshaw Limited (45 TLR 1984)).  In the instant case the worker had not been living at home for some three years prior to his death except for odd periods between jobs and one should not therefore go back to the time when he was living at home to determine the question of dependency.  One is not, of course, confined to the date of death and one is entitled to look at past events if by doing so one is assisted to reach a conclusion in respect of the question of whether there was dependency at the time of death but I think His Worship was quite correct when he confined his consideration to that particular period of about three years.  Moreover, dependency is to be on the earnings of the deceased (Fisher v Hebburn Limited (1960) 105 CLR 188).  This restriction to reliance upon earnings continues to be applied in Queensland although in some other States, for example New South Wales, the effect of Fisher has by amendment of the legislation been nullified.  Capital outlays benefiting a person as distinct from maintenance items do not evidence dependency.  Campbell v Westcourt Coal Co.  In this respect there is no suggestion in the evidence that the purchase of the motor car evidenced any dependency of the appellant although payment of the sums necessary to register and insure a motor vehicle and some maintenance of the house would in my opinion go towards establishing it.

  1. [70]
    President Hall added, inter alia that:

The authorities established that the matter of dependency is to be looked at in a broad and practical way having regard to what had happened in the past and what would probably have happened in the future but for the death.[19]

  1. [71]
    The Regulator submits that there are "limits" as to what may be termed to be "earnings".  This point was addressed by Industrial Commissioner Neate in Toll North Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) & Lamb.[20]  Industrial Commissioner Neate, in considering the matter of "dependency" stated, by reference to Fisher:

[Fisher] indicates the limits of the word "earnings" and is apparently still authority in Queensland on that point.

  1. [72]
    In an Appeal on that decision, Martin J wrote:

The reference to "earnings" merely confines the question of dependence to the earnings of the worker as opposed to any other income which that worker might have from, say, interest or rental income…[21]

  1. [73]
    Further consideration of "dependency" within the context of workers' compensation claims generally was made by Deputy President Coghlan in Ebejer v Transport Accident Commission[22]  In that mater, Deputy President Coghlan was considering the Transport Accident Act 1986 which specifically made reference to "income from personal exertion" as not including the words "dividends".  He further stated:

A dividend represents a distribution of the profits made by the company.  The dividend was allocated to Mr Ebejer in his capacity as the owner of the share capital of the company, not in his capacity as someone who earned the profit by personal exertion.[23]

  1. [74]
    The Regulator submits that those circumstances are not found in this matter because "the application for dependency payments pursuant to s 128D was made at the same time as the determination of Mr Redding's entitlement to [a] lump sum [payment] pursuant to s 128B of the Act".
  1. [75]
    The High Court decision in Cage Developments Pty Ltd (t/a Monaro Mix Specified Concrete v Schubert[24] was summarised by the Commission in Fletcher where the following was stated:

… that in relation to the phrase "is earnings" the reference in s. 11(1)(a) in the Workers' Compensation Act (NSW) to the "amount" which a worker "is earning", or is able to "earn" was a reference to the amount which he is earning or able to earn as a worker, that is to say, by his own physical and mental exertions  In that case, the profits of the business carried on by the partnership were earned by the utilisation of both capital and labour and were apparently divided between the respondent and his wife without regard to the relative value of the respective contributions of both or either.  In those circumstances neither the net profits of the business nor the respondent's share therein could properly be regarded as representing an "amount" which he was "earning" by his labour.  The respondent was not, for the purposes of s. 11(1)(a), "earning" any such "amount" or, for that matter, any other quantified "amount".

  1. [76]
    The Regulator says that the comparison between the factual issues in that matter and this case are markedly similar and submits that there are references in the Act at Chapter 3, s 106 which define "normal weekly earnings" and envisages that those earnings come from employment.

 The Appellant identified the following as representing "earnings"

  1. [77]
    The Appellant submitted that the work undertaken at the Abel Tasman Motor Inn by the Reddings included repairs, maintenance, improvements and other tasks including:
  1. (i)
    Installation of new curtains to all 38 motel rooms;
  2. (ii)
    Repairing cabinetry and furnishings;
  3. (iii)
    Building a pool pump shed;
  4. (iv)
    Pruning and replanting gardens;
  5. (v)
    Repairing plumbing fixtures;
  6. (vi)
    Re-grouting vanity/sink bench tops;
  7. (vii)
    Negotiating with sign-writer and new graphic artwork;
  8. (viii)
    Organising for rooms to be refurbished with new furnishing fabrics;
  9. (ix)
    Meetings with motel accountant;
  10. (x)
    Liaising with motel managers on a weekly basis on performance and improvements;
  11. (xi)
    Regular communication with the other partner in the business operations of the motel on performance and improvements.[25]

 The Claimed "earnings"

 Amendments made by Mr Redding

  1. [78]
    Clarifications were made by Mr Redding at the commencement of the hearing before Deputy President Kauffman regarding his original statement.  One related to his prior comment that he had retired in 2013.  That was amended to say that Mr Redding had not realised how much work had been involved in his work at the Motels in Dubbo.  While it had been claimed in the Appellant's statement that Mrs Redding had ceased work when she turned 60 years of age, Mr Redding said that she was still working beyond that age.  Further, Mr Redding had challenged a claim in his statement (which was said to have been added by his solicitor) that he had become the sole provider as "we both worked together", correcting the inaccuracy prior to adopting the statement in the hearing.
  1. [79]
    It is contended by the Appellant that the whole of the factual circumstances of Mrs Redding's dependency upon Mr Redding is relevant to entitlement under s 128D of the Act.  This is detailed hereunder:
  • For the purposes of s 128D of the Act, the Appellant states that the income derived from the personal exertion at the Council together with the personal income derived from Mr Redding's self-employment was "earnings".
  • The relief work undertaken by Mr Redding during February 2016 at the All Seasons Motor Lodge was "earnings" for the purposes of s 128D of the Act.
  • Claimed was that Mrs Redding had depended upon Mr Redding's earnings during the entire period of their marriage including the period of time that Mr Redding was exposed to asbestos when he worked for the GCCC.
  • Further claimed was that, but for Mr Redding's personal exertion during his working lifetime, Mrs Redding would not have had an interest in assets and investments jointly held with Mr Redding.
  1. [80]
    The Appellant referred to the history of sharing the joint earnings of the Redding's since 1972 as follows:
  • Employment earnings from about early 1989 until about February 1995 at the GCCC.
  • Business income from March 1995 to about September 1998 from operating a business called Tugun Recyclers.
  • Business income from about 1999 to about 2012/2013 from owning and operating a tipper truck.
  • Business income from about 2014 until 2017, as a beneficiary in the Karpaul Unit Trust, where he and Mrs Redding as beneficiaries were receiving a proportion of business income from the All Seasons Motor Lodge at Dubbo New South Wales.
  • Business income from about 2013, as beneficiaries in the Redkar Trust, where he and Mrs Redding were receiving a one-half proportion of business income from the motel operations of the Abel Tasman Motor Inn.
  • Part of the amount of $629,845 referable to the component of $200,000 (and income arising from investment of that sum) received from the Self-Insurer as a lump sum compensation payment for the latent onset injury under s 128B(2)(a) of the Act.
  • Extra payment during February 2016 for undertaking relief work at the All Seasons Motor Lodge.
  1. [81]
    While the Appellant accepts that, as a consequence of Martin J's statement in Toll North v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) & Lamb[26] with respect to "rental" receipts not constituting "earnings" for the purposes of the Act, it was only the personal exertion of Mr Redding during his working life which permitted the Redding's to acquire motel assets and investments during their marriage.  Consequently, the previous "rental" claims were taken out of the "earnings" category.
  1. [82]
    The Appellant stated:

The work that Mr Redding did was to a proper workmanlike standard, for the benefit of the business of the motel.  If he had not done that work, the business would have had to pay for that work to be done by someone else which would have diminished the shared profit which was derived from the motel operations.[27]

 All Seasons Motor Lodge

  1. [83]
    During 2014, Mrs Redding's evidence was that she and Mr Redding had the option to purchase shares at this motor lodge.  Both agreed to do this and they paid $60,000 for their share of the lease.  The business was leased from the Dubbo Bowling Club.  Mr and Mrs Redding held their shares in the business until 2017.  Karpaul Unit Trust was established and, as beneficiaries, both Mr and Mrs Redding received a portion of the income.
  1. [84]
    There were 19 motel rooms and the motor lodge had managers and two staff members as house maids.[28] 
  1. [85]
    The All Seasons Motor Lodge had been sold in 2017.[29] 

 Abel Tasman Motor Inn

  1. [86]
    At the time of hearing this matter, the Abel Tasman Motor Inn was still operating.
  1. [87]
    The motor inn has 38 motel rooms.  Mrs Redding's evidence was that the partnership bought the freehold of that motor inn in 2004.
  1. [88]
    There were various owners in the business and during that time, Mr and Mrs Redding purchased some of the shares from two of the other partners. 
  1. [89]
    In 2013, there was change in the business arrangement when Mr and Mrs Redding and Mr and Mrs Moalem purchased all of the business shares.
  1. [90]
    Prior to that time, the managers were also partners in the business but from 2013, new managers were installed and those managers then became responsible for the maintenance that had previously been supervised by the then managers.
  1. [91]
    Notwithstanding that, the evidence was that if maintenance of particular jobs could be delayed until the Reddings drove to Dubbo or alternatively when Mr and Mrs Moalem visited Dubbo, then it would be put off until then.
  1. [92]
    If maintenance work was performed by the Redding's or the Moalems, they were reimbursed for any expenses incurred.[30]
  1. [93]
    In 2013, Mr and Mrs Redding purchased a 50 percent interest in the Abel Tasman Motor Inn at a cost of $750,000.00 which they had mortgaged against their house and from that they opened a line of credit. 
  1. [94]
    Other entities were associated with the motel business - they were Mount Carmel whose directors were Mr and Mrs Redding and Mr and Mrs Moalem and an entity named Angel Park[31]
  1. [95]
    The partners would pay rent for the business as they were renting the business from the partnership, while paying themselves a dividend of $500.00 per week.
  1. [96]
    The Redcar Trust would receive the income from the Abel Tasman Motor Inn. The rent was distributed on a one-fifth basis and the business income on a one-half basis.[32] 
  1. [97]
    The Moalems were managers with an Employment Agreement and the they received 50 percent of the revenue from the business.  The Moalems' role as managers included managing the motor inn; managing bookings and dealing with maintenance matters.[33]
  1. [98]
    The Regulator stated that since the passing of Mr Redding, the income from the Abel Tasman Motor Inn continues to be paid to the Redkar Trust and, as determined in Mr Redding's Will, Mrs Redding owns all of the interest in those trusts.
  1. [99]
    Further, it is claimed by the Regulator that there have been no changes made to the manner in which the agreement had been made concerning the income from the business.  The rent is paid to Karpaul Unit Trust on the one-fifth arrangement and this has not changed.  The situation as existed in 2013 has continued. [34]

 Work performed by Mr and Mrs Redding (and others) in the motel businesses

  1. [100]
    The Regulator referred to the Unit Holders Agreement for the Motor Inn where there was a requirement for all partners to use their best endeavours to promote the interests of the joint venture.  It is submitted that when the Redding's drove to Dubbo to perform the type of maintenance work as described, they were doing that as part of their obligations under the Agreement.[35]
  1. [101]
    While it has been submitted that Mr Redding had performed most of the work at the Motels, the Appellant's submissions were to the effect that the work performed was done equally by Mr and Mrs Redding.
  1. [102]
    Mr Moalem (who is an electrician) also undertook work at the Abel Tasman Motor Inn but in his view more work was undertaken by the Mr Redding. The Regulator submitted that any work performed by the Redding's and the Moalems was for the benefit of the business[36] and that the partners reaped the benefits of those rewards.  Mrs Redding accepted the proposition that the work performed was in conformity with the Unit Agreement and for the purpose of ensuring that the business retained its AA rating.

 Relief work

  1. [103]
    Mr Redding's evidence was that he and his wife were required at times to work as relief managers because those managing the property (viz., Mr and Mrs Horne), required a break, every two to-three months.  Mr Redding, by way of clarification stated that there were also other relief managers who covered for the usual managers and it was only in an emergency situation when the current managers could not find any other relief worker, that the Redding's would go to Dubbo for a period of 5-7 days as other partners in the business had not been able to assist at that time.[37]
  1. [104]
    While they carried out this relief work, the Redding's were paid from the Redkar Trust, but they did not receive any payment for the week's training which appeared to have occurred on one occasion. 
  1. [105]
    It is unclear from the evidence exactly how many times the Redding's went to Dubbo for the purpose of performing maintenance work.  However, it is accepted that they did attend as relief managers on some occasions and during that time and on other occasions, maintenance work was performed by both Redding's and also Mr Moelem.[38] 
Joint Account
  1. [106]
    Mrs Redding said that the line of credit used to pay the Redding's living expenses came from the joint account and she explained that she also had her own separate bank account into which payments made by overseas students who stayed with her were made.
Lump Sum payment
  1. [107]
    Payments from the workers' compensation payment were made into their business affairs and also into making a payment to the Australian Taxation Office.[39] 
  1. [108]
    The Appellant stated that the contribution of income into the "family pool" from which the Redding's paid their living expenses did not diminish the dependency of Mrs Redding upon Mr Redding's share of the income.[40] 

 Consideration of the Evidence and Conclusion

  1. [109]
    While s 27 of the Act, "Meaning of dependent", relates to the worker's earnings relevant at the time of the worker's death, s 128D of the Act, "Worker's dependants", requires dependency as at the time the application is made.
  1. [110]
    The Regulator submitted that there can be no consideration of any past earnings pursuant to s 128B (as contemplated by the Act) which had long since ceased, however what may have happened to past earnings was a relevant point in determining dependency.
  1. [111]
    The Regulator stated that while past earnings were considered in Fletcher[41], at the relevant time, both Mr and Mrs Fletcher were receiving pensions and those pensions were considered within the context of "earnings".  This case, however, is different as the Redding's had retired from their normal employment many years prior and were also not in receipt of pensions.  What the Redding's had relied upon was benefits paid from their self-funded superannuation arrangements.
  1. [112]
    I have accepted the Regulator's submissions that the income generated through the motel business was not earned through personal exertion.  The money received was in fact a return on an investment.
  1. [113]
    The facts relating Fletcher's case are significantly different to those in this matter, as previously mentioned.
  1. [114]
    The decisions in Toll[42], at first instance and upheld on appeal, refer to the limitations placed upon the interpretation of "earnings" in the Act.
  1. [115]
    If it was the case that there would have been some additional profits to the business as a consequence of not having to engage other persons to perform that occasional work, then any increased profits were made to all partners and not simply to Mr Redding.
  1. [116]
    The relief work undertaken by the Redding's occurred in circumstances when the usual managers could not find alternative managers.  The Regulator rightly, in my view, submits that any income received was not able to be proved on the material available but also that on the occasions when the Redding's visited Dubbo for those purposes they were isolated events and could not represent a recurring source of income.  Significantly submitted was that it is not the type of regular "earnings" as contemplated by the Act upon which Mrs Redding could be dependent.

 Is Mrs Redding wholly or partly dependent upon those "earnings"?

  1. [117]
    In Kauri Timber Co (Tas) Pty Ltd v Reeman[43] the matter for determination related to whether an applicant was "wholly dependent" on the earnings of the worker, as required by the Workers' Compensation Act 1927 (TAS).  Barwick CJ wrote:

But it must be decided by answering the question whether she relied for her maintenance and support as distinct from all the advantages she may have or enjoy entirely on the earnings of her husband.

  1. [118]
    Gibbs J made the following comments:

… The word "dependent" is not defined in the Act, although there is a definition of "dependants" which does not assist in deciding the present question.  However, in its relevant sense, the adjective "dependent" as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary, means that the person to whom it is applied depends or has to rely on something else for support, supply, or what is needed.[44]

… The effect of the authorities was summed up in a sentence by Fullager J in Fenton v Batten when he wrote: "If the evidence establishes that the alleged "dependant" relied or relies on another as the source, wholly or in part, of his or her means of subsistence, then dependency is established.[45]

  1. [119]
    In Serdzeff v Victorian Workcover Authority[46], the appellant was a registered nurse who claimed dependency arising from the death of her domestic partner, who lived with the appellant in a house owned by her.  The appellant's partner, employed in a low-paid part-time job, had occasionally been contributing small amounts of cash for the joint household expenses and for the appellant's motor vehicle running costs.
  1. [120]
    Section 5 of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (VIC) defined a dependant to be a person who was "wholly, mainly or partly dependent on the earnings of the worker".  That Act also provided that in determining whether a partner was wholly or mainly dependent on the worker's earnings at the date of his or her death, the earnings of the partner from personal exertion, and any savings from such earnings, are to be disregarded.  The Judge at first instance dismissed the Appellant's application on the basis that she was not dependent on her partner's earnings.
  1. [121]
    Allowing the Appeal, Chernov JA, with whom Maxwell P and Charles JA agreed wrote:

Thus, I consider that in the present case, his Honour was required to undertake the two-step analysis, to which I have referred, before the question of quantum could become relevant.  Strictly, his Honour's failure to deal with the claim in this way constituted error on his part.  On the other hand, there is much force in Mr O'Loghlen's contention that, in a case such as the present, the determination of the question whether the widow claimant is a ‘dependent partner', ordinarily also resolved the question of her entitlement to compensation for the purposes of s 82(2).  Thus, for example, if it is concluded that, notwithstanding the application of the statutory fiction, such a claimant is not a "dependent partner", her application would necessarily fail because she would not come within any of the categories of persons described in the various subsections of s 92A in respect of whom amounts of compensation are prescribed.  For obvious reasons, there would then be no need to consider whether the requirements of s 82(2) had been made out.

But what if such a claimant establishes that she is a "dependent partner"?  Will that also establish that she is at least partly dependent on the deceased worker's earnings at the relevant time and thus entitled to compensation pursuant to s 82(2)?  I think that, ordinarily, the answer would be, yes.  Clearly if the claimant has no relevant income of her own, a determination that she was a "dependent partner" would necessarily mean that she was wholly or mainly dependent on the deceased worker's earnings.  It would follow, in such a case, that the lower threshold for dependants for the purposes of s 82(2) - "partly dependent" - would also be made out.  The more difficult question arises where the claimant had relevant income but it was disregarded for the purposes of s 92A(2) and it was held that she was a "dependent partner".  I consider that, in such a case, a determination that the claimant was a "dependent partner" would also ordinarily carry with it the conclusion that the deceased worker had provided at least some maintenance and support for the claimant out of his or her earnings.  Were it otherwise - if the deceased provided no such maintenance - it could not have been properly concluded that the claimant was even "mainly" dependent on the earnings of the deceased worker for the purposes of the definition of "dependent partner".  Thus, a finding, in circumstances where the claimant's relevant income is disregarded, that he or she is a "dependent partner" ordinarily means, as I have said, that the deceased worker made at least some provision for his or her maintenance and support.  Consequently, in those circumstances, it would follow that the claimant was a least "partly" dependent on the deceased's earnings.  No matter how small the extent of the claimant's dependence may have been on the deceased worker's earnings - short of de minimis - it would ordinarily amount at least to partial dependence sufficient to satisfy the requirements of s 82(2).

Notwithstanding the strength of Mr O'Loghlen's claim that, here, it was sufficient for the judge to resolve only the issue whether the appellant was a "dependent partner", I am of the view that the court was obliged to follow the two-stage process that is prescribed by the Act.  The court must first determine the question of the partner's entitlement to compensation pursuant to s 82(2).  The statutory fiction has no application at this stage, but dependency will be established by showing no more than that the partner was partly dependent on the worker's earnings.  Once dependency - and hence entitlement - is established, the court then proceeds to the second stage, namely, to determine whether the claimant is a "dependent partner" for the purposes of s 92A(1).  It may be that the answer to the second question may also resolve the issue of entitlement, but I consider that the court hearing an application such as this must, nevertheless, address each of those questions.

Dealing with the first stage of the analysis, I consider that, for the purpose of determining if the appellant was entitled to compensation pursuant to s 82(2) - notwithstanding that this issue is to be determined in the absence of statutory fiction - the evidence to which I have referred makes it plain that the appellant was, at least to some extent, dependent on the deceased's earnings.  She was, in short, partly dependent on his earnings, and that is sufficient for her to be treated as a "dependent" as defined by s 5(1) and entitled to compensation under s 82(2) of the Act.[47]

  1. [122]
    In the circumstances of this case, Mrs Redding was not a wholly dependent partner of Mr Redding.  Nor is it the case, in my view, that Mrs Redding was partly dependent upon Mr Redding's "earnings".
  1. [123]
    The Regulator states that:

 Putting all of these matters aside, the most compelling evidence to demonstrate that the income from the motel businesses is not Mr Redding's "earnings" is that since his death, the payments have continued, the only difference being that they now go solely to Mrs Redding.  The entitlement to the payment is because of the shareholding, not any personal exertion.[48]

  1. [124]
    I have accepted that submission as accurately reflecting the situation.
  1. [125]
    In the circumstances of this case, the income received by the Redding's had been put into one joint bank account which was used for their maintenance and payment of expenses.  Now, all of that income goes directly to Mrs Redding.  This is the case since all of Mr Redding's interests in trusts and a superannuation fund have been transferred to Mrs Redding on his death. 
  1. [126]
    In forming these views, I have taken into account the views expressed by President Hall, in WorkCover Queensland v Cook that:

The authorities established that the matter of dependency is to be looked at in a broad and practical way having regard to what had happened in the past and what would probably have happened in the future but for the death.[49]

  1. [127]
    I have found that there has been no loss of dependency when the "earnings" have been maintained.
  1. [128]
    For the abovementioned reasons, the Appeal is dismissed.
  1. [129]
    The Appellant is to pay the Regulator's costs of, and incidental to the Appeal.

ORDERS

1. The Appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellant is to pay the Regulator's costs of, and incidental to the Appeal.

Footnotes

[1] Regulator's submissions, p 1, [4].

[2] [2015] ICQ 004.

[3] Act No. 61 of 2008.

[4] Explanatory Notes, Workplace Health and Safety and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2008, p 2.

[5] [2010] QIRC 62.

[6] Fletcher v Q-COMP [2010] QIRC 62.

[7] Appellant's submissions, p 14, [43].

[8] Appellant's submissions, p 10, [29].

[9] (2003) 173 QGIG 1416.

[10] (1960) 105 CLR 188.

[11] Fisher v Hebburn (1960) 105 CLR 188.

[12] WorkCover Queensland v Cook (2003) 173 QGIG 1416.

[13] Regulator's submissions, p 5, [25].

[14] Fisher v Hebburn (1960) 105 CLR 188, p 197.

[15] Fisher v Hebburn (1960) 105 CLR 188, p 206.

[16] (1964) 64 S.R. (NSW) 486.

[17] [1972] VR 595.

[18] (2003) 173 QGIG 1416.

[19] WorkCover Queensland v Cook (2003) 173 QGIG 1416.

[20] [2014] QIRC 065.

[21] [2015] ICQ 004.

[22] (2009) VCAT 1128.

[23] Ebejer v Transport Accident Commission (2009) VCAT 1128, [18].

[24] (1983) 151 CLR 584.

[25] Exhibit 3.

[26] [2015] ICQ 004.

[27] Appellant's submissions, p 18, [58].

[28] T3-8.

[29] T1-17.

[30] T3-39.

[31] T3-11.

[32] T3-11.

[33] T3-37.

[34] T3-38.

[35] T1-18.

[36] T1-20.

[37] T1-17.

[38] T3-46

[39] T1-13.

[40] Appellant's submissions, p 10, [26].

[41] Fletcher v Q-COMP [2010] QIRC 62.

[42] Toll North Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) & Lamb [2014] QIRC 065; and Toll North Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) & Lamb [2015] ICQ 004.

[43] (1973) 128 CLR 177.

[44] Ibid, p 187.

[45] Ibid, p 189.

[46] (2005) 14 VR 43.

[47] Serdzeff v Victorian Workcover Authority (2005) 14 VR 43, P 51.

[48] Regulator's submissions, p 14, [81].

[49] (2003) 173 QGIG 1416.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Redding v Workers' Compensation Regulator

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Redding v Workers' Compensation Regulator

  • MNC:

    [2019] QIRC 42

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Swan DP

  • Date:

    06 Mar 2019

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

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