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Langridge v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2021] QIRC 251

Langridge v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2021] QIRC 251

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Langridge v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 251

PARTIES: 

Langridge, Michael Paul 

(Appellant)

v

Workers' Compensation Regulator

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

WC/2019/205

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator

DELIVERED ON:

23 July 2021

HEARING DATE:

12 February 2021 

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

O'CONNOR VP

Townsville

ORDERS:

  1. The appeal is allowed.
  2. The Appellant's application under s 132A of the Workers' Compensation Rehabilitation Act 2003 for assessment of degree of permanent impairment be decided according to law.
  3. The Respondent pay the Appellant's costs of, and incidental to, the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS' COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION – where application for assessment of degree of permanent impairment under s 132A of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), as at 1 July 2014 rejected – where respondent determined worker was not entitled to compensation as worker had not sustained an injury as defined in s 32 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) – whether s 132A implied an obligatory power for respondent to determine entitlement to compensation prior to referral for assessment under s 179 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) – where respondent did not have capacity to reject appellant's application for assessment under s 132A.

LEGISLATION:

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 32AA

Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 4, s 5, s 6, s 9, s 11, s 32, s 34, s 108, s 132, s 132A, s 179, s 180, s 184, s 185, s 186, s 187, s 188, s 189, s 190, s 237, s 540

Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 132A, s 237, as at 1 July 2014

Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 237, s 258, as at 23 September 2013

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2015 (Qld)

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2015 (Qld)

Explanatory Notes, Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2013 (Qld)

Explanatory Notes, Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2015 (Qld)

CASES:

Andersen v Aged Care Employers Self Insurance [2011] QSC 101

Castillon v P&O Port Limited [2006] 2 Qd R 220

Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd v Hamo Industries Pty Ltd (2010) 78 NSWSLR 393

Dowd v Swift Australia Pty Ltd [2008] QCA 228

IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1

Khoury v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1984) 165 CLR 622; (1984) 54 ALR 639

Langridge v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 048

Mandep Sarkaria v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] ICQ 001

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355

Top Class Turf Pty Ltd v Parfitt [2019] 1 Qd R 390, [2018] QCA 127

Waugh v Kippen (1986) 160 CLR 156; (1986) 64 ALR 195

APPEARANCES:

Mr J. A. Greggery of Queens Counsel, instructed by Organic Legal, for the Appellant.

Mr C. A. Clark of Counsel directly instructed by the Respondent. 

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    On 20 March 2019, an application pursuant to s 132A of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (the WCR Act) was remitted back to WorkCover Queensland with a direction that the Appellant's application for assessment of degree of permanent impairment be decided according to law.  This direction was in accordance with the decision of Langridge v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 048.
  1. [2]
    The original s 132A application, lodged on 24 February 2017, sought an assessment of the degree of permanent impairment suffered by the Appellant under s 179 of the WCR Act, as a result of an injury to his cervical spine occurring during employment in or around August/September 2014.
  1. [3]
    On 17 September 2019, WorkCover rejected the application on the basis that the Appellant had not sustained an injury as defined in s 32 of the WCR Act.  On 20 November 2019, the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator') '...confirmed the decision of WorkCover to reject Mr Langridge's application for assessment of permanent impairment in accordance with s 132A of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 as in force in August and September 2014'.[1]
  1. [4]
    This appeal was subsequently lodged in this Commission on 21 November 2019, with the preliminary question of whether s 132A of the WCR Act, in force at the relevant time, 'implied an obligatory power' to determine whether an applicant suffered an injury within the meaning under s 32 of the WCR Act.[2]

 The issue before the Commission

  1. [5]
    The sole issue before the Commission is the determination of the proper construction of s 132A of the WCR Act. The Appellant has identified the following two possible constructions:
  1. (a)
    That WorkCover is obliged, upon receipt of an application in the approved form and where the applicant has not claimed compensation for the same injury, to refer the applicant for an assessment; or
  1. (b)
    That WorkCover is obliged, upon receipt of an application in the approved form and where the applicant has not claimed compensation for the same injury, to refer the applicant for an assessment if it is also satisfied that the applicant:
  1. (i)
    in fact is a worker; and
  2. (ii)
    in fact suffered an injury.

Legislative Scheme

  1. [6]
    At the applicable time of injury, s 132A of the WCR Act relevantly provided:

132A  Applying for assessment of DPI before applying for compensation

  1. (1)
    This section applies to a worker who has not made an application under section 132.
  1. (2)
    The worker may apply to the insurer to have the worker's injury assessed under section 179 to decide if the worker's injury has resulted in a DPI.

…[3] 

(emphasis added) 

  1. [7]
    Following application for assessment of DPI, s 179 of the WCR Act provides:
  1. Assessment of permanent impairment
  1. (1)
    An insurer may decide, or a worker who has made an application under section 132 may ask the insurer, to have the worker’s injury assessed to decide if the worker’s injury has resulted in a degree of permanent impairment.
  2. (2)
    The insurer must have the degree of permanent impairment assessed – 
  1. (a)
    for industrial deafness – by an audiologist; or
  2. (b)
    for a psychiatric or psychological injury – by a medical assessment tribunal; or
  3. (c)
    for another injury – by a doctor.
  1. (3)
    The degree of permanent impairment must be assessed in accordance with the GEPI to decide the DPI for the injury, and a report complying with the GEPI must be given to the insurer.
  2. (4)
    If the worker sustains permanent impairment from multiple injuries sustained in 1 event—
  1. (a)
    the degree of permanent impairment for the injuries, other than a psychiatric or psychological injury, must be assessed together to decide the DPI for the injuries; and
  2. (b)
    the degree of permanent impairment for the psychiatric or psychological injury must be assessed separately to decide the DPI for the injury.
  1. [8]
    Further to this, s 180 of the WCR Act provides:
  1. Calculation of lump sum compensation
  1. (1)
    If, as a result of an assessment under section 179, a worker is entitled to lump sum compensation, the amount of the lump sum compensation must be calculated under a regulation having regard to the DPI.
  2. (2)
    Without limiting subsection (1), lump sum compensation for injury must not include an amount for a degree of impairment attributable to –
    1. a condition existing before the injury; or
    2. a condition for which the worker is not entitled to compensation.
  3. (3)
    The amount of lump sum compensation is to be calculated as at the day the insurer makes an offer of lump sum compensation to the worker under section 187.
  1. [9]
    Once the lump sum has been calculated, ss 185 and 187 of the WCR Act provides for the worker to be notified of the calculation and offered the amount.  The worker is then required under s 189 of the WCR Act to accept the lump sum or alternatively reject it to seek damages for injury.
  1. [10]
    Section 237 of the WCR Act set out the general limitations for a persons entitlement to seek damages: 

237  General limitation on persons entitled to seek damages

  1. (1)
    The following are the only persons entitled to seek damages for an injury sustained by a worker—
  1. (a)
    the worker, if the worker—
  1. (i)
    has received a notice of assessment from the insurer for the injury and the DPI for the assessed injury is more than 5%; or
  1. (ii)
    has a terminal condition;
  1. (b)
    a dependant of the deceased worker, if the injury results in the worker’s death.
  1. (2)
    The entitlement of a worker, or a dependant of a deceased worker, to seek damages is subject to the provisions of this chapter.
  1. (3)
    If a worker—
  1. (a)
    is required under section 239 to make an election to seek damages for an injury; and
  1. (b)
    has accepted an offer of payment of lump sum compensation under chapter 3, part 10, division 3 for the injury;

the worker is not entitled to seek damages.

  1. (4)
    However, subsection (3) does not prevent a worker from seeking damages under section 266.
  1. (5)
    To remove any doubt, it is declared that subsection (1) abolishes any entitlement of a person not mentioned in the subsection to seek damages for an injury sustained by a worker.[4]
  1. [11]
    Section 108 of the WCR Act sets out the grounds for compensation entitlement:

108  Compensation entitlement

  1. (1)
    Compensation is payable under this Act for an injury sustained by a worker.
  1. (2)
    However, if a worker’s injury is an aggravation mentioned in section 32(3)(b) or (ba), the worker is entitled to compensation for the injury only to the extent of the effects of the aggravation.
  1. [12]
    The meaning of injury is defined under s 32 of the WCR Act, which relevantly states, 'an injury is personal injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if … the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury'.

Appellant's case

  1. [13]
    The Appellant contends that on a proper construction of s 132A, WorkCover is obliged, upon the receipt of an application in the approved form and where the applicant has not claimed compensation for the same injury, to refer the applicant for an assessment.[5]
  2. [14]
    The Appellant submits that s 132A of the WCR Act establishes a procedure whereby a person who has not made an application for compensation under s 132 of the WCR Act, and is therefore not entitled to workers' compensation for the injury, can obtain an assessment of permanent impairment for their claimed injury.
  1. [15]
    An assessment of permanent impairment under s 179 of the WCR Act enables a calculation of the lump sum compensation under s 180(1) of the WCR Act.
  1. [16]
    The assessment of DPI could be obtained by a worker for the purpose of deciding whether to commence a claim for damages having regard to the DPI threshold.  It is submitted that this inference can be drawn from the Explanatory Notes to the Bill which introduced the section:

Clause 9 inserts a new section 132A outlining the process for applying to an insurer for an assessment of the degree of permanent impairment in situations where an application for statutory compensation has not been made, for example if the applicant is seeking to lodge a notice of claim for damages.[6]

  1. [17]
    Simultaneous with the introduction of s 132A, s 237 of the WCR Act was amended to introduce a minimum DPI threshold of 5% in order to claim damages. The Appellant contends this to be indicative of a removal of the requirement, at the time, to determine 'worker' and 'injury' in an application for assessment of permanent impairment where the applicant was not entitled to workers' compensation.
  1. [18]
    Prior to the amended 2013 Act, s 237(1)(b)[7] permitted a worker who had not lodged an application for compensation to pursue a claim for damages.  However, s 258[8] precluded a claimant from proceeding until WorkCover determined the claimant was a worker, injured and given a notice of assessment. 
  1. [19]
    The amended 2013 Act omitted s 258 and at the same time re-defined the entitlement to commence proceedings for damages as follows:
  1. (a)
    the worker, if the worker –
  1. (i)
    has received a notice of assessment from the insurer for the injury and the DPI for the assessed injury is more than 5%; or
  2. (ii)
    has a terminal condition; ... [9]
  1. [20]
    It is the Appellant's submission that s 132A operates as a mechanistic gateway to a common law claim for damages and the proposed construction meets the generally beneficial nature of the legislation.

Respondent's case

  1. [21]
    The Respondent argues that based upon a proper consideration of the whole of the statutory scheme set out in the WCR Act, WorkCover must be able to determine the qualifying issues of 'worker' and 'injury' before the process of assessment of DPI is engaged.  It is submitted that position is so, even at the time of the pre-amended form.
  1. [22]
    To support that proposition, the Respondent relies on two provisions within the WCR Act:
  1. (a)
    Sections 4, 5 and 6 as set out in Part 2 – Objects; and
  2. (b)
    Section 32 – Meaning of Injury.
  1. [23]
    The Respondent refers to the objects of the WCR Act as an aid in the interpretation of its provisions and highlights the following:

5  Workers' compensation scheme

  1. (1)
    This Act establishes a workers' compensation scheme for Queensland –
    1. providing benefits for workers who sustain injury in their employment …

…

  1. (2)
    The main provisions of the scheme provide the following for injuries sustained by workers in their employment –
    1. compensation;
    2. regulation of access to damages;

…

  1. (e)
    management of compensation claims by insurers;

…

  1. [24]
    The objects of the legislative framework as expressed in s 5 of the WCR Act is to provide a statutory basis for a scheme of benefits and entitlements for 'workers who sustain injury in their employment'.
  1. [25]
    The administration of this scheme is entrusted upon both WorkCover and the Workers' Compensation Regulator by s 6 of the WCR Act.
  1. [26]
    Section 132A of the WCR Act, provides a 'worker may apply to the insurer to have the worker's injury assessed' under s 179 and to determine whether the worker's injury has resulted in a DPI.
  1. [27]
    The Respondent argues that the term 'injury' as defined in s 32 must be established in the process of a s 132A application.  The Respondent submits that it is a basic tenet of statutory interpretation that where an Act prescribes a particular meaning to a word, that meaning should be applied in construing any provision which includes that particular word.
  1. [28]
    To support the submission, the Respondent referred the Commission's attention to the Acts Interpretation Act,[10] and in particular, s 32AA which states, 'a definition in or applying to an Act applies to the entire Act'.  They contend that in reliance on the objects of the WCR Act and the meaning given to 'injury' under s 32 of the WCR Act, there is no basis to suggest that the word 'injury' as it appears in s 132A should have any other meaning other than as set out in s 32.
  1. [29]
    The Respondent further contends that it would never have been the intention of the legislature to have a provision which permitted an applicant to seek assessment of a DPI in the absence of the qualifying requirements of 'worker' or 'injury'.
  1. [30]
    It is the Respondent's submission that a proper construction of the WCR Act and consideration of the whole statutory scheme indicates that the power to make determinations of 'worker' and 'injury' can be readily found within the sections above.  Such a construction is consistent with the effective administration of the statutory scheme.

Considerations

Implication of Amendments

  1. [31]
    On 31 January 2015, s 132A of the WCR Act was amended to insert sub-sections (6) to (12). Within this, s 132A(7) of the WCR Act provides that the insurer can decide to reject the application if they are satisfied the worker is not a worker or has not sustained an injury.
  1. [32]
    The amending 2015 Act[11] also removed the 5% DPI threshold from s 237 and a right of review to the Regulator from an insurer's decision was provided for in s 132A(10) and inserted in s 540(1)(a)(viiia) of the WCR Act.
  1. [33]
    The Appellant submits that as a matter of logic, the requirement to be satisfied of the negative propositions could only occur if the application was not prima facie evidence of the facts of worker or injury.  Some contradictory evidence would be required before the insurer could be so satisfied.[12]
  1. [34]
    Therefore, if s 132A of the WCR Act implied a power to determine the question of injury at the relevant time prior to amendment, the insertion of sub-section (6) to (12) on 31 January 2015 would have been unnecessary.
  1. [35]
    This is supported by the Explanatory Notes, accompanying the Bill[13] which introduced s 132A (6) to (12) of the WCR Act, which state:

Clause 4 amends section 132A of the Act to specify the decisions the insurer must make in determining the application, the time the decision must be made within, and that the decision of an insurer is reviewable. The amendment also clarifies that the decision of the insurer does not entitle a worker to compensation for the injury.[14]

Purpose of s 132A of the WCR Act

  1. [36]
    In Top Class Turf Pty Ltd v Parfitt,[15] Brown J, (Gotterson and Morrison JJA agreeing), accepted the submission that:

… s 132A does not provide any entitlement to damages but rather is merely a mechanism whereby a person can apply for an assessment of the injury where they have not made an application for compensation under s 132 of the Act.[16]

  1. [37]
    Her Honour further states that:

Section 132A is an enabling provision which provides for a party to make a request for an assessment under s 179 of the Act where no application for compensation has been made.[17]

  1. [38]
    The Appellant makes further reference to Andersen v Aged Care Employers Self Insurance[18] where Dalton J, comparing Castillon v P&O Port Limited[19] and Dowd v Swift Australia Pty Ltd,[20] found that under the provision of s 179 of the WCR Act, it is not the task of a doctor, assessing an injury or impairment, 'to make findings about what events caused the injury or the date those events might have occurred'.[21]
  1. [39]
    The Appellant submits that the WCR Act is beneficial legislation.  In Mandep Sarkaria v Workers' Compensation Regulator ('Sarkaria'),[22] Martin J, in considering s 34(1)(c) of the WCR Act, said:

First, there is the general rule of interpretation applied to statutes of this kind.  The Act is properly described as being "beneficial" legislation.  As such, it should be construed so as to give the fullest relief which the fair meaning of its language will allow.[23]

  1. [40]
    However, the approach described by Martin J in Sarkaria is not without constraint.  The interpretation adopted 'must be restrained within the confines of the actual language employed and what is fairly open on the words used'.[24]
  1. [41]
    In Waugh v Kippen[25] it was observed that, where there are two principles of interpretation in conflict, the provision 'should not be construed so strictly as to deprive the worker of the protection which Parliament intended that he should have'.
  1. [42]
    In IW v City of Perth[26] Brennan CJ and McHugh J expressed the approach to the construction of beneficial legislation in the following terms:

… beneficial and remedial legislation, like the [Equal Opportunity] Act, is to be given a liberal construction. It is to be given “a fair, large and liberal” interpretation rather than one which is “literal or technical”. Nevertheless, the task remains one of statutory construction. Although a provision of the Act must be given a liberal and beneficial construction, a court or tribunal is not at liberty to give it a construction that is unreasonable or unnatural.[27] (citations omitted)

  1. [43]
    Lord Steyn emphasised: 'The starting point must be the text itself. The primacy of the text is the first principle of interpretation'.[28]
  1. [44]
    The words of s 132A of the WCR Act are clear.  Section 132A establishes a procedure whereby a person who had not made an application for compensation under s 132 of the WCR Act, and was therefore not entitled to workers' compensation for the injury, could obtain under s 179 of the WCR Act, an assessment of permanent impairment for their claimed injury.
  1. [45]
    The words of s 179(2) of the WCR Act are written in an imperative manner: 'the insurer must have the degree of permanent impairment assessed…'.  Further, s 179 then proceeds to set out how the assessment is to be determined.
  1. [46]
    The use of imperative language was considered in Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd v Hamo Industries Pty Ltd.[29]  The words of s 17 of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) were in issue.  Section 17(2) commenced with these words: 'An adjudication application to which subsection (1)(b) applies cannot be made unless: …'.
  1. [47]
    In considering the meaning of those words, Spigelman CJ referred to the High Court’s decision in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority[30] and said:

[40] The first textual indicator that is always of significance is the mode of expression of the element directly in issue. Substantial, indeed often, but not always, determinative, weight must be given to language which is in mandatory form. See, for example:

'David Grant v Westpac supra esp at 276-277, where the formulation was "may only".

City of Enfield supra at [6], [28] and [32]-[33], where the formulation was "must not be granted".

SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs at [68], [136], [173] and [206], where the language "must give" was described as "imperative".'

  [41]  The element under consideration in the present case – 'cannot be made unless' – has a similar mandatory import. To adapt the words of Gummow J in David Grant v Westpac at 277:

‘... it is impossible to identify the function or utility of the words – “cannot be made” – if (they do) not mean what (they) say.'[31]

(citations omitted)

  1. [48]
    The provisions of s 179 are of a similar import.  The words are designed to provide a clear direction to the insurer the steps it is required to take when an application for assessment under s 132A is sought.
  1. [49]
    The Respondent argues that sections 184 to 190 of the WCR Act provide that after an assessment of permanent impairment has been undertaken, an insurer is obligated to make an offer to the worker as to whether or not that offer of lump sum compensation will be accepted.
  1. [50]
    In short, Part 10 Division 3 of the WCR Act[32] sets out the requirements for giving a notice following a s 179 assessment including: the time within which the notice of assessment is to be issued and the form of the notice;[33] the mechanism for the worker to dispute the assessment of permanent impairment;[34] the offer of lump sum compensation[35]; the worker's decision about a lump sum compensation in circumstances where a DPI assessment is more than or less than 20%;[36] and, a provision dealing with no further compensation after a fixed time.[37]
  1. [51]
    Section 187 of the WCR Act provides the following:

  187  Offer of lump sum compensation

If the worker has an entitlement to lump sum compensation under section 180, the insurer must include, in the notice of assessment, an offer of lump sum compensation to the worker (the offer). (Emphasis added)

  1. [52]
    Section 180 of the WCR Act provides:

180  Calculation of lump sum compensation

  1. (1)
    If, as a result of an assessment under section 179, a worker is entitled to a lump sum compensation, the amount of the lump sum compensation must be calculated under a regulation having regard to the DPI.

… (Emphasis added)

  1. [53]
    An assessment under 179 does not grant an entitlement to compensation. Its function is to determine if a worker has a permanent impairment and, if so, the degree of permanent impairment.
  1. [54]
    Both sections 188(1)(b) and 189(1)(a)(ii) of the WCR Act provide that the section applies only if the worker has an entitlement to lump sum compensation.  Section 189(1)(b) also deals with the circumstances where no DPI is assessed.
  1. [55]
    Section 108 provides a general statement regarding entitlement. Under s 108(1), the entitlement to compensation is only payable for an injury sustained by a worker.[38]  In my view, what is required to enliven the entitlement is an injury within the meaning of s 32 of the WCR Act and that the person is a worker within the meaning given to that term by s 11 of the WCR Act.
  1. [56]
    It is at that point that the assessment is undertaken to determine whether or not a person, who has been assessed in accordance with s 179 of the WCR Act, has an entitlement to compensation under s 108.  The definition of compensation in s 9 of the WCR Act includes lump sum compensation.
  1. [57]
    In order to give effect to the statutory scheme, WorkCover would need to be satisfied that the claimant was a worker and suffered an injury within the meaning of the WCR Act.
  1. [58]
    Contrary to the submission of the Respondent, an insurer is not obligated to pay a lump sum compensation until the claimant has established an entitlement.
  1. [59]
    The amendments to the WCR Act brought about by the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2015 now give the insurer under s 132A(7), at the time of making the application for assessment of DPI, the capacity to reject a person who is not a worker or who has not sustained an injury.
  2. [60]
    Having regard to the legislative history and the clear words of s 132A, WorkCover was  obliged: upon receipt of an application in the approved form, accompanied by a certificate and any other evidence or particulars prescribed by a regulation; where the applicant has not made an application under s 132; to refer the applicant for an assessment under s 179.
  1. [61]
    Section 132A in its pre-amended form did not, in my view, give the Respondent the capacity to reject the Appellant's application for assessment.

Orders

  1. [62]
    I make the following orders:
  1. The appeal is allowed.
  2. The Appellant's application under s 132A of the Workers' Compensation Rehabilitation Act 2003 for assessment of degree of permanent impairment be decided according to law.
  3. The Respondent pay the Appellant's costs of, and incidental to, the appeal.

Footnotes

[1] WorkCover Queensland Reasons for Decision dated 20 November 2019.

[2] Submissions of the Appellant filed 10 February 2021, [4].

[3] As at 1 July 2014.

[4] As at 1 July 2014.

[5] Submissions of the Appellant filed 10 February 2021, [13].

[6] Explanatory Notes, Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2013 (Qld) 4.

[7] As at 23 September 2013.

[8] As at 23 September 2013.

[9] As at 1 July 2014.

[10] Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 32AA.

[11] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2015 (Qld).

[12] Submissions of the Appellant filed 10 February 2021, [11].

[13] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2015 (Qld).

[14] Explanatory Notes, Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2015 (Qld) 5.

[15] Top Class Turf Pty Ltd v Parfitt [2019] 1 Qd R 390, [2018] QCA 127.

[16] Ibid [44].

[17] Ibid [46].

[18] [2011] QSC 101.

[19] [2006] 2 Qd R 220, [30].

[20] [2008] QCA 228, [9], [10] and [13].

[21] Andersen v Aged Care Employers Self Insurance [2011] QSC 101, [28].

[22] [2019] ICQ 001.

[23] Ibid [27].

[24] Khoury v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1984) 165 CLR 622; (1984) 54 ALR 639, 651.

[25] (1986) 160 CLR 156; (1986) 64 ALR 195, 201.

[26] (1997) 191 CLR 1.

[27] Ibid [12].

[28] Johan Steyn, 'Dynamic Interpretation Amidst an Orgy of Statutes' (2003) 35 Ottawa Law Review 163, 165.

[29] (2010) 78 NSWSLR 393.

[30] [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355.

[31] Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd v Hamo Industries Pty Ltd (2010) 78 NSWSLR 393.

[32] WCR Act s 184.

[33] WCR Act s 185.

[34] WCR Act s 186.

[35] WCR Act s 187.

[36] WCR Act ss 188, 189.

[37] WCR Act s 190.

[38] WCR Act s 9 (definition of 'compensation').

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Langridge v Workers' Compensation Regulator

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Langridge v Workers' Compensation Regulator

  • MNC:

    [2021] QIRC 251

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Member O'CONNOR VP

  • Date:

    23 Jul 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
A Top Class Turf Pty Ltd v Parfitt[2019] 1 Qd R 390; [2018] QCA 127
6 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QCA 127
Cite 2 - [2018] QCA 127
Cite 3 - [2019] 1 Qd R 390
Cite 4 - [2019] 1 Qd R 390
Cite 5 - [2019] 1 Qd R 390
Cite 6 - [2019] 1 Qd R 390
Andersen v Aged Care Employers Self Insurance [2011] QSC 101
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QSC 101
Cite 2 - [2011] QSC 101
Cite 3 - [2011] QSC 101
Castillon v P & O Ports Ltd[2006] 2 Qd R 220; [2005] QCA 406
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2006] 2 Qd R 220
Cite 2 - [2006] 2 Qd R 220
Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd v Hamo Industries Pty Ltd (2010) 78 NSWSLR 393
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2010) 78 NSWSLR 393
Cite 2 - (2010) 78 NSWSLR 393
Cite 3 - (2010) 78 NSWSLR 393
Dowd v Swift Australia Pty Ltd [2008] QCA 228
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] QCA 228
Cite 2 - [2008] QCA 228
IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1997) 191 CLR 1
Cite 2 - (1997) 191 CLR 1
Cite 3 - (1997) 191 CLR 1
Khoury v G.I.O. of N.S.W. (1984) 54 ALR 639
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1984) 54 ALR 639
Cite 2 - (1984) 54 ALR 639
Khoury v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1984) 165 CLR 622
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1984) 165 CLR 622
Cite 2 - (1984) 165 CLR 622
Khoury v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (2003) 35 Ottawa Law Review 163
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 35 Ottawa Law Review 163
Langridge v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 48
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 48
Cite 2 - [2019] QIRC 48
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1998] HCA 28
Cite 2 - [1998] HCA 28
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 C.L.R 355
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1998) 194 C.L.R 355
Cite 2 - (1998) 194 C.L.R 355
Sarkaria v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] ICQ 1
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] ICQ 1
Cite 2 - [2019] ICQ 1
Cite 3 - [2019] ICQ 1
Waugh v Kippen (1986) 160 CLR 156
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) 160 CLR 156
Cite 2 - (1986) 160 CLR 156
Waugh v Kippen (1986) 64 ALR 195
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) 64 ALR 195
Cite 2 - (1986) 64 ALR 195

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Gay v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 1412 citations
Workers' Compensation Regulator v Langridge [2025] ICQ 84 citations
1

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