Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

Watpac Construction Pty Ltd v The Regulator (under the Work Health and Safety Act)[2021] QIRC 375

Watpac Construction Pty Ltd v The Regulator (under the Work Health and Safety Act)[2021] QIRC 375

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Watpac Construction Pty Ltd v The Regulator (under the Work Health and Safety Act) [2021] QIRC 375

PARTIES: 

Watpac Construction Pty Ltd

(Applicant)

v

The Regulator (under the Work Health and Safety Act)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

WHS/2019/100 & WHS/2019/101

PROCEEDING:

Applications for review

DELIVERED ON:

4 November 2021

MEMBER:

Dwyer IC

HEARING DATES:

2 and 3 March 2020

ORDER:

The applications are dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – WORK HEALTH AND SAFETY – application for external review – reasonable belief – reasonable inquiries – Improvement Notices – adequate particulars – duties of principal contractor

LEGISLATION:

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) ss 18, 20(2), 33, 191, 192, 229B, 229D, 229E

Work Health and Safety Regulations 2011 (Qld) ss 40(d), 314, 315

CASES:

Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658

ENCO PRECAST PTY LTD v Construction Forestry, Mining and Energy Union & Ors [2020] QIRC 188

George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104

Growthbuilt Pty Ltd v WorkSafe NSW [2018] NSWIRComm 1002

King Gee Clothing Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 184

Lindores Construction Logistics Pty Ltd v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 [2018] QIRC 061

Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (No. 2) [2019] QIRC 133

Re: National Retail Association Limited, Union of Employers [2018] QIRC 118

Simon Anthony Green Wilkeen Pty Ltd T/as Razorback Glass v SafeWork NSW [2018] NSWIRComm 1074

Timber World Pty Ltd v Meander Valley Council [2020] TASSC 27

Tobiassen v Reilly (2009) 178 IR 213

APPEARANCES:

Mr T Spence of Counsel instructed by Mr A Ross of DWF Australia for the applicant

Mr S P Gray of Counsel instructed by Mr Clark for the Regulator

Reasons for Decision

Background

  1. [1]
    On 7 August 2019, Watpac Construction Pty Ltd ('Watpac') filed two applications pursuant to s 229B of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) ('the Act').[1] The applications seek a review of two internal review decisions of the Regulator.
  1. [2]
    Throughout 2019, Watpac was the principal contractor for the construction works being conducted at the NQ Stadium project ('the site') in Townsville. On 12 June 2019, Inspectors Elder and Finn of Workplace Health and Safety Queensland attended upon the site to conduct inspections. Inspectors Elder and Finn conducted inspections at various locations around the site, both together and individually.
  1. [3]
    Each of the Inspectors issued an Improvement Notice ('IN') (designated as I1050956 and I1020943) to Watpac in respect of two separate and unrelated inspections conducted on the site on 12 June 2019. The INs constitute the decisions that are the subject of the applications for review.
  1. [4]
    While the two applications for review relate to separate decisions, both applications arise in the same statutory framework, involve a number of similar legal principles, and raise similar issues for consideration. In those circumstances, I propose to deal broadly with the common issues before turning to the specific consideration of each application for review.

Nature of review

  1. [5]
    Section 229D of the Act provides that a review is to be dealt with by way of re-hearing, unaffected by the decision.[2] 
  1. [6]
    Deputy President O'Connor (as he then was) expanded on this in Lindores Construction Logistics Pty Ltd v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011,[3] where he said:

A review under s 229D of the Act is to be dealt with by the Commission "by way of rehearing, unaffected by the decision." In dealing with a similar expression in s 246 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, Martin J observed that the expression "by way of rehearing, unaffected by the decision" involved a certain clumsiness of expression. Martin J wrote:

The language used in s 246 is inconsistent. For an "appeal by way of rehearing" to be successful it ordinarily requires that the original decision-maker be shown to have erred in law or fact. But this section says that the appeal is to be "unaffected by the chief inspector's review decision" which would seem to be inconsistent with the ordinary understanding of an appeal by way of rehearing.

His Honour went on to observe:

In other words, section 246 uses a form of words which is more clearly understood as an appeal de novo. An appeal de novo involves a rehearing of the evidence by the appellate court. It is analogous to a new trial.

In De Tournouer v Chief Executive, Department of Environment & Resource Management, Fraser JA addressed the meaning to be given to the same expression:

Section 880(2) provides that such an appeal is "by way of rehearing, unaffected by the reviewer's decision." Section 882(1) conferred extensive powers upon the Land Court including, in s 882(1)(e), a power to set aside the review decision and substitute it with a decision that the court considered appropriate. In summary, the Land Court was empowered to exercise afresh the statutory power to grant or refuse to grant a water licence on the applicant's application.

  1. [7]
    Having regard to these findings and the powers granted to the Commission by s 229E of the Act, I am satisfied that the proceedings are in the nature of a hearing de novo and that I am empowered to exercise afresh the statutory power to issue or decline to issue the INs.

Onus

  1. [8]
    In written submissions each party contended that the other bore the onus of proof with respect to their respective positions on the decisions. At the time of making their submissions, neither party had the advantage of Commissioner Hartigan's decision in ENCO PRECAST PTY LTD v Construction Forestry, Mining and Energy Union & Ors ('ENCO').[4]
  1. [9]
    In ENCO, Commissioner Hartigan was asked to resolve the same dispute with respect to the question of onus. Commissioner Hartigan concluded:[5]

Enco and the respondents each respectively contend that the onus rests with the other to establish whether there was (or was not) a reasonable suspicion for the purpose of s 117 of the WHS Act on each of the days of the relevant attempted entries.

The respondents submitted that Enco bears the onus of establishing that the permit holders did not have a reasonable suspicion, on the basis that Enco is the only party seeking orders.

In the alternative, Enco contends that the onus to prove whether the permit holders held a reasonable suspicion, lies with the permit holder. In support of its position, Enco relied on the Explanatory Notes to the Workplace Health and Safety Bill 2011, which identifies that there is an intention that the permit holder be required to prove the suspicion is reasonable, in the following circumstances:

Subclause 117(2) requires the WHS permit holder to reasonably suspect before entering the workplace that the contravention has occurred or is occurring. If this suspicion is disputed by another party, the onus is on the WHS permit holder to prove that the suspicion is reasonable.

Further, Enco submits that as the permit holders were the only persons with the ability to know and prove the facts, they bear the onus of establishing a reasonable suspicion.

It appears, by reference to the Explanatory Notes, that it was parliament's intent that the onus rests with the permit holders to establish reasonable suspicion, if the suspicion is disputed by another party. That intention is consistent with the relevant authorities, in so far as the party who has the ability to know and prove the facts bears the onus of establishing them. Here, it is the permit holders who have the ability to prove the basis of the reasonable suspicion.

Accordingly, it is for the permit holders to discharge the onus to establish that they held a reasonable suspicion, in circumstances where that suspicion is disputed by Enco.

(Underling added) (Citations removed)

  1. [10]
    I concur with the conclusions reached by Commissioner Hartigan. In both applications, Watpac contend inter alia that the relevant Inspectors did not have a reasonable suspicion or make reasonable inquiries. Only Inspector Elder and Finn can comprehensively give evidence on the facts giving rise to their purported reasonable belief leading them to issue the INs. 
  1. [11]
    Notwithstanding this conclusion, I would add that an unduly intense focus on onus in a hearing de novo can often be a distraction. While I accept it is for the Regulator to demonstrate that the INs were appropriately issued and that they ultimately bear the onus, it would be of no utility for Watpac to seek a review of the decisions and then stand idle at a hearing, calling no evidence to support the alleged flaws in the INs, including the assertion that the inspectors did not or could not have held the requisite reasonable belief.
  1. [12]
    The fact that Watpac lead evidence in support of the matters complained of in their Applications for Review demonstrates they are taking this approach to this hearing de novo i.e. regardless of where the onus might technically lie, each party to such proceedings ought to ensure the Commission is fully possessed of all relevant facts necessary to support their respective contentions.

Reasonable belief

  1. [13]
    A central feature of each application for review is the assertion by Watpac that that Inspectors Elder and Finn did not hold the requisite 'reasonable belief' of contravention required by s 191 of the Act to warrant the issuing of the INs. The jurisprudence on this term is well settled.
  1. [14]
    In Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (No. 2),[6]  Vice President O'Connor held:

Reasonable belief is not defined in the WHS Act. In George v Rocket & Anor the High Court had to consider what "reasonable grounds" meant in the context of whether or not a Magistrate had reasonable grounds to issue a search warrant. In a unanimous judgment, the Court (Mason CJ., Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) said:

The objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something need to point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to say that the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists: the assent of belief is given on more slender evidence than proof. Belief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.

(Underlining added) (Citations removed)

  1. [15]
    In Growthbuilt Pty Ltd v SafeWork NSW ('Growthbuilt'),[7]  Chief Commissioner Kite held:

I have referred, in these reasons, to additional inquiries the Inspector may have undertaken. I do not intend by those comments to suggest that the Inspector was required to conduct a full investigation. That would be contrary to the authorities such as George v Rockett, Halley v Kershaw and Essential Energy. The Inspector was not required to satisfy himself to the level of proof of a breach of the Act. Prohibition Notices are intended to prevent potential breaches so that is beyond what is required of him.

An inspector is however required to balance the objective information available to him, and is obliged to make reasonable inquiries. If he had attempted to make contact with the engineer and not been able to speak with him, for example, that would provide a different factual matrix than making no attempt to clarify any concerns about an expert engineer's opinion that contradicted his view. A similar point may be made about failing to raise with Mr Radopolous the allegation made by Ace or why the excavator was still in the excavation. The Inspector is not bound by the responses but must take them into account in forming his view.

A reasonable and balanced approach does not allow an inspector to make assumptions and act on them without, at least, attempting to test, in a timely and practical manner, the validity of those assumptions.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [16]
    In ENCO, Commissioner Hartigan, also referring to George v Rockett,[8] held:[9]

In George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 112, the High Court considered the term "reasonable grounds" for a state of mind including suspicion, as follows:

When a statute prescribes that there must be "reasonable grounds" for a state of mind – including suspicion and belief - it requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person.

The New South Wales Industrial Commission in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (New South Wales Branch) v Acciona Infrastructure Australia Pty Ltd & Anor ("Acciona") when considering a similar provision of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW), had regard to the following authorities:

65.  In R v Rondo, an authority relied upon by both parties, the Court of Criminal Appeal considered the term "reasonably suspects" in the context of section 357E of the Crimes Act 1990 which was, at the time of those proceedings, in the following terms:

357E A member of the police force may stop, search and detain:

  1. (a)
    any person whom he or she reasonably suspects of having or conveying any thing stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained or any thing used or intended to be used in the commission of an indictable offence; or
  1. (b)
    any vehicle in which he or she reasonably suspects there is any thing stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained or any thing used or intended to be used in the commission of an indictable offence.

66. After considering the authorities cited in Streat v Bauer; Streat v Blanco (unreported, Supreme court, NSW, Smart J, Nos 13686, 13687 of 1996, 16 March 1998) Smart AJ stated as follows at:

53 These propositions emerge:

  1. (a)
    A reasonable suspicion involves less than a reasonable belief but more than a possibility. There must be something which would create more than a possibility. There must be something which would create in the mind of a reasonable persona an apprehension of fear of one of the state of affairs covered by s. 357E. A reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to consider or look into the possibility of its existence.
  1. (b)
    Reasonable suspicion is not arbitrary. Some factual basis for the suspicion must be show. A suspicion may be based on hearsay material or materials which may be inadmissible in evidence. The materials must have some probative value.
  1. (c)
    What is important is the information in the mind of the police officer stopping the person or the vehicle or making the arrest at the time he did so. Having ascertained that information the question is whether that information afforded reasonable grounds for the suspicion which the police officer formed. In answering that question regard must be had to the source of the information and its content, seen in the light of the whole of the surrounding circumstances.

After considering these authorities, the New South Wales Industrial Commission concluded that:

67.  In the present matter, the question to be answered was whether or not there was some factual basis, some material or materials with probative value, which would create in the mind of a reasonable person a suspicion that Pacifico had contravened, or was contravening, s 19 of the WHS Act by failing to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the psychological health of workers engaged on the Site.

I propose to adopt a similar approach in this matter. I will consider whether or not there was some factual basis or material/s with probative value which would create, in the mind of a reasonable person, a suspicion that Enco had contravened, or was contravening, s 19 of the WHS Act.

(Underlining added) (Citations removed)

  1. [17]
    Having regard to the authorities, I propose to adopt a similar approach to that adopted by Commissioner Hartigan, though adding that the standard of belief required leaves room for 'surmise or conjecture' as espoused in George v Rockett.

WHS/2019/100

  1. [18]
    This application for review pertains to the IN numbered I1050956. The IN provides by way of particulars that Inspector Elder reasonably believes that Watpac was contravening regulation "40(D)" of the Work Health and Safety Regulations 2011 (Qld) ('the Regs').
  1. [19]
    In written submissions filed 14 July 2020, Watpac primarily contends that it did not contravene s 40(d) of the Regs,[10] and consequently Inspector Elder could not have held a reasonable belief of contravention.
  1. [20]
    Watpac contends, in its Application for Review, more particularly that:
  1. The Inspector did not hold a reasonable belief of a contravention against Watpac;
  1. The Inspector did not make reasonable inquiries prior to issuing the IN;
  1. The IN inadequately particularises the alleged contravention;
  1. The Inspector took no account of the role of an expert subcontractor engaged by Watpac;
  1. The IN misconceives the elements of s 40(d) of the Regs; and
  1. The IN is void for ambiguity and or duplicity.

Facts

  1. [21]
    The relevant facts giving rise to the issue of this IN are not contentious. On 12 June 2019, Inspector Elder visited the site to conduct inspections pursuant to his powers under the Act. He was accompanied at the relevant time by:
  • Inspector Finn;
  • an employee of Watpac;
  • an employee of KLN Electrical Services (Qld) Pty Ltd ('KLN'); and
  • trade union officials.
  1. [22]
    During the course of the inspection, Inspector Elder had cause to visit an area of the site described in the IN as "Western Stand Ground floor Travels paths between rooms and offices". I understand this to be in the space in the stands beneath the seating, utilised for e.g. offices, meeting rooms, change facilities etc.
  1. [23]
    During the course of construction, this area of the site was supplied with electricity required by workers to power tools and plant used in the construction process. It was not clear whether this primary source of electricity was sourced from mains power or on-site generators, but in any event, the reliability of the primary supply source was not in issue. Relevantly the primary source was also used to power lighting necessary to illuminate the area for persons working in it or passing through. The area was within the confines of the stands structure and generally had little or no source of natural light for illumination. 
  1. [24]
    Inspector Elder indicated in his evidence that he specifically went to this area to investigate an allegation of an absence of emergency lighting.[11] While the inspection was taking place, Inspector Elder observed a KLN contractor descending from a scissor lift. He asked the contractor whether there was battery powered emergency lighting in the area, to which the worker replied 'no'.
  1. [25]
    Shortly after this exchange, for reasons unknown, the lights went out and the area was plunged into darkness. It has never been established who cut the primary source of power, nor does anything turn on that. As an aside, I note that if the power was interrupted deliberately by some person seeking to make a point about the lack of back up lighting, the interruption was itself an act of endangering persons present and likely to amount to a contravention of the WHS Act.  
  1. [26]
    During the period when the lights were off, Inspector Elder observed that there was no emergency lighting operating. Importantly, he also had an opportunity to observe the adequacy of natural light in the area.

Closing submissions of Watpac

  1. [27]
    In its closing submissions filed 14 July 2020, Watpac argues that the IN I1050956 should be set aside and cancelled because it did not contravene s 40(d) of the Act.
  1. [28]
    Mr O'Rourke, construction site manager of the Western stand at the site, appeared as a witness for Watpac. In its submissions, Watpac highlighted the following evidence given by Mr O'Rourke at the hearing:
  • Watpac did not have employees directly engaged in construction work on the site and KLN were engaged through a contract with Watpac.[12] KLN undertook electrical and data installation and installed a "temporary services electrical work" including "temporary power and access lighting throughout the job" in accordance with the contract;[13] and
  • Mr O'Rourke stated that Inspector Elder never asked him questions about Watpac's relationship with KLN, and that emergency backup lighting and access lighting in a work area was the responsibility of KLN as the subcontractor, not Watpac.[14]
  1. [29]
    Mr Jones, Project Safety Coordinator for Watpac at the site, also appeared as a witness for Watpac. In its submissions, Watpac noted the following evidence given by Mr Jones at the hearing:
  • Mr Jones advised Inspector Elder that KLN were responsible for the electrical work and installation of emergency lighting during the construction of the project;[15]
  • The backup lights look exactly the same as the normal non-backup lights so there is no way to differentiate them from the ground;[16] and
  • The work which would comply with the improvement notice was being undertaken at the time of the inspection, as there was a KLN electrician installing a "second run of access lighting" and "emergency lighting sequencing" at the time of the inspection.[17]
  1. [30]
    In Watpac's submissions, it highlighted the following evidence given by Inspector Elder at the hearing:
  • He did not see any emergency lighting when the lights went off.[18] He did not provide any evidence about the lux levels as he did not have a lux metre,[19] yet directed Watpac to the code of practice which specified lux levels;[20]
  • The photos of the lighting taken by Inspector Elder during the inspection should not be given any weight as they do not provide any reliable measurement of the illumination levels;[21]
  • His measurement regarding lux levels were based on natural sight which cannot be measured with the naked eye;[22] and
  • He was aware that KLN were "handling all the electronics … including the lighting",[23] yet did not ask for the contract between KLN and Watpac and did not make any enquires to the KLN electrician beyond asking "if he knew if these lights were on an emergency backup system or on a battery system".[24]
  1. [31]
    Inspector Finn gave evidence that the emergency lighting "didn't kick in" when the lights went off,[25] but did not give evidence that a lux metre was used to measure the level of illumination.
  1. [32]
    The principles set out by Chief Commissioner Kite in Growthbuilt,[26] adopted in Simon Anthony Green Wilkeen Pty Ltd T/as Razorback Glass v SafeWork NSW ('Razorback Glass'),[27] are appropriate to determine whether or not Inspector Elder held a 'reasonable belief' that Watpac was contravening s 40(d) of the Regs.
  2. [33]
    Watpac submits that Inspector Elder's opinion was speculative, and no statutory notice should have been issued in circumstances where he was not supplied with the equipment to take light measurements and formed a subjective and speculative opinion which was not tested in a meaningful way.[28] He could not have formed an objectively 'reasonable belief' that Watpac was contravening s 40(d) of the Regs as he had no capacity to objectively test his perceptions.
  1. [34]
    In the alternative, Watpac argue that even if the lux meter used demonstrated that the standard has not been met, this would be a failure to meet a recommended, not mandatory standard, and this failure could not constitute a contravention of s 40(d) of the Regs.
  1. [35]
    Watpac argues that, per s 18 of the Act, it was 'reasonably practicable' for it to rely on KLN to install access lighting and emergency lighting in accordance with the contract and KLN's contractual obligations to comply with the Project Safety Management Plan[29] and Codes of Practice.[30] It was known to Inspector Elder that KLN were the contractor responsible for installing access lighting and emergency lighting, and this was noted in the IN issued.
  1. [36]
    If Inspector Elder made reasonable enquiries during the inspection, Mr Jones could have confirmed that more access lighting and emergency backup lighting was, or was to be, installed,[31] and that monthly lighting inspections were conducted.
  1. [37]
    Prior to the inspection of the site on 12 June 2019, Mr O'Rourke gave evidence that only matters relating to emergency backup lighting for task lighting had been raised,[32] and that he had knowledge of KLN's monthly inspections of their emergency backup lights.[33] Watpac submits that prior to the inspection, there was nothing to indicate that KLN lacked the expertise or that it would not carry out the work in a safe manner or that additional expert advice was required.[34]
  1. [38]
    Accordingly, Watpac submits that it fulfilled its duty in accordance with s 40(d) of the Regs to ensure the lighting installed by KLN enabled workers to work and people to move within the workplace without risk to health and safety and safely evacuate. Therefore, the Inspector could not have formed a reasonable belief that Watpac contravened s 40(d) of the Regs.
  1. [39]
    In the alternative, Watpac submits that, it complied with its duties as principle contractor per ch 6 part 6.4, specifically s 314 of the Regs. Under cross-examination, Inspector Elder did not allege that it was in contravention of this section.
  1. [40]
    It was further submitted that the specific provision of s 314 of the Regs which applies to Watpac as the principle contractor will prevail over the general provision of s 40(d) of the Regs, in accordance with the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant where the two conflict.[35] By engaging an expert contractor to install access and emergency lighting, Watpac complied with the duty imposed by s 314 of the Regs and thus, it cannot be determined that it contravened the general provision of s 40(d) of the Regs.
  1. [41]
    Watpac submits that the IN has inadequate particularisation of the alleged contravention,[36] contrary to the requirements in s 192 of the Act. It submits that Inspector Elder's directions for providing sufficient lighting was based on an untested assumption regarding illumination and the direction was of no real effect as there was no reasonable basis to assert the lighting was not already sufficient. It says the IN is flawed as the directions required Watpac to address a deficiency that had not been objectively determined to be in existence prior to issuing the IN.[37]

Closing submissions of the Regulator

  1. [42]
    In its closing submissions filed on 28 July 2020, the Regulator argues that IN I1050956 is valid because Watpac contravened s 40(d) of the Act.
  1. [43]
    The enquiries undertaken by Inspector Elder can be contrasted with those undertaken by Inspector Mann in Growthbuilt. The Regulator submits that Inspector Elder's enquiries were comprehensive and demonstrated that the emergency backup lighting was not operational.
  1. [44]
    Watpac's submissions do not challenge the fact that backup lighting was not operational at the time of inspection, instead it argued that there was no evidence emergency lighting was not already installed by the time the IN was sent.
  1. [45]
    Watpac's submission that Inspector Elder could have confirmed that more lighting was, or was to be installed if he made reasonable enquiries is not supported by the evidence. This is supported by the evidence given by Mr Jones' regarding discussions between Inspector Elder, Mr Jones and a KLN electrician that neither could answer his question regarding whether the "battery backup was connected".[38] Further, Inspector Elder's belief was satisfied when the power was disconnected and the emergency backup lights did not operate.
  1. [46]
    Watpac's submission that s 314 of the Regs should apply instead of s 40(d) of the Regs is misguided. Firstly, the Regulator submits that s 40(d) is not a general provision and is contained within part 3.2 of the Regs which imposes specific "general workplace activities". Therefore, it is a specific requirement under the Regs for risk management that must be complied with by Watpac.
  1. [47]
    Secondly, the Regulator submits that the additional duties imposed on the applicant, as the principle contractor for a construction project, do not detract from the specific requirements of the Regs. Thirdly, the reasoning of O'Connor DP (as he then was) in Re: National Retail Association Limited, Union of Employers can be distinguished as His Honour was dealing with specific provisions within an act intended to be exhaustive.[39] In this dispute, part 6 imposes additional duties on Watpac. It was not absolved of its duties under chapter 3 of the Regs.
  1. [48]
    Lastly, the Regulator submits that the inference cannot be drawn that the emergency lighting was already installed by the time the IN was sent to Watpac. No evidence was lead from KLN to specifically address this claim and the Commission can draw an adverse inference against Watpac for the failure to call a witness regarding this claim.

Consideration

  1. [49]
    Watpac takes issue with the IN on multiple alternative grounds. A number of these grounds can be condensed and can be dealt with quite simply.
  1. [50]
    Firstly, Watpac's contention that s 314 of the Regs is the prevailing regulatory provision over s 40(d) is incorrect. Section 314 and s 40(d) relevantly provides as follows:

314 Further health and safety duties—specific sections

The principal contractor for a construction project must put in place arrangements for ensuring compliance at the workplace with the following—

  1. (a)
    part 3.2, division 2;

Maximum penalty—60 penalty units.

40 Duty in relation to general workplace facilities

A person conducting a business or undertaking at a workplace must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the following—

  1. (d)
    lighting enables—
  1. (i)
    each worker to carry out work without risk to health and safety; and
  2. (ii)
    persons to move within the workplace without risk to health and safety; and
  3. (iii)
    safe evacuation in an emergency;

  1. [51]
    The two provisions have very distinct applications. Section 40(d) applies to 'persons conducting a business or undertaking' at a workplace and then descends into quite specific obligations with respect to the provision of lighting.  Section 314 of the Regs applies only to principal contractors but then similarly imposes multiple duties of a specific nature, including the duty imposed by s 40(d).
  1. [52]
    Section 40(d) and s 314 of the Regs are each specific provisions that operate independently. They are not one general and one specific provision and further, there is no conflict between them as Watpac contends. They are different provisions imposing the same duty on different duty holders. The syntactical presumption of generalia specialibus non derogant has no application.
  1. [53]
    Further, it is uncontroversial that Watpac is both a principal contractor and a person conducting a business or undertaking at a workplace for the purposes of the WHS Act and the Regs. Watpac plainly has more than one duty by virtue of being in more than one class of duty holder, which is a scenario clearly contemplated by the WHS Act.[40]
  1. [54]
    If a contravention of s 314 had been suspected or alleged, then Watpac might have had it open to them to argue that that they discharged their duty by virtue of the contractual arrangements in place with KLN. If such an argument had been accepted, then Watpac might have been able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of a court that they had discharged the duty imposed on them by s 314. But such an outcome would not in any way displace the duty owed by Watpac pursuant to s 40(d). It is therefore irrelevant whether Watpac discharged its duty under s 314 as a principal contractor.
  1. [55]
    Importantly, the IN was issued in respect of a suspected contravention by Watpac of its duty as a person conducting a business or undertaking pursuant to s 40(d), not s 314.  
  1. [56]
    There is no dispute that Watpac was a person conducting a business or undertaking at a workplace for the purposes of the WHS Act. As such, Watpac was a duty holder and cannot delegate its duties under the WHS Act by the mere execution of a commercial contract (or at all).[41] No matter what contractual obligations or collateral duties of other entities might exist, Watpac remained a duty holder with respect to the requirement to provide sufficient lighting in accordance with s 40(d) of the Regs.
  1. [57]
    The submission from Watpac that attracts the greater requirement for more complex consideration is the submission that the inspector did not have the requisite 'reasonable belief' necessary to issue the IN.  
  1. [58]
    The object of the WHS Act is to ensure the safety of inter alia workers and visitors at workplaces such as the site that is the subject of these proceedings.[42] Injuries and deaths were historically an all too common experience, and the WHS Act serves a critical function in the prevention of such outcomes. The role of inspectors performing duties under the WHS Act is to serve in the 'frontline' to ensure that those who hold duties under the WHS Act are appropriately discharging them.
  1. [59]
    The powers granted to inspectors under the WHS Act are broad and varied. The power to issue an IN is exercised in a variety of contexts. There will be occasions where INs will be issued in circumstances where the urgency for compliance is mitigated by e.g. unsafe machinery being disabled or removed in the interim, or by the absence of workers or visitors at a site where a risk has been identified.
  1. [60]
    Conversely, there will be circumstances where the risk of injury or death is elevated such that an inspector must act with urgency to ensure risk is managed and injury or death are prevented. In this latter context an inspector's most effective option to prevent risk of injury or death will be to issue an IN with a minimum of delay or hesitation. It is in the context of the objects of the WHS Act and the often urgent circumstances that confront inspectors that the notion of 'reasonable belief' must be considered.
  1. [61]
    The functions of an inspector ought not to be impeded by unnecessarily onerous obligations requiring them to 'go down every dry gully' searching for possible evidence to consider before they can  reach a conclusion that a contravention of the WHS Act is occurring. The authorities outlined above confirm that 'reasonable belief' allows for circumstances where a reasonable belief sufficient to warrant the issuing of an IN might arise in the absence of some relevant information.[43] .
  1. [62]
    While an inspector must have regard to evidence plainly available in coming to a reasonable belief, the extent to which an inspector might be required to descend into further investigative tasks before issuing an IN must be balanced against the relative urgency of the need to eliminate the risk, albeit a perceived one. The extent of investigation necessary to achieve the 'reasonable and balanced' approach contemplated in Growthbuilt[44] will depend on the circumstances of each case and will require an inspector to weigh the seriousness of the risk observed, against the delay and effort required to make further investigative enquiries. Often this will occur in circumstances where the urgency to manage the perceived risk,  as a matter of practicality, will take precedence over conducting of exhaustive enquiries. 
  1. [63]
    INs are tools for the short-term management and elimination of risk. They can be withdrawn or appealed where e.g. evidence subsequently becomes available or is later presented that negates the preliminary conclusions of an inspector. INs are not a final determination of the existence of a contravention of the WHS Act and as such, the evidence required to issue them ought not to be of the same standard necessary to secure a conviction in a prosecution for contravention.[45]
  1. [64]
    In this matter it is uncontroversial that the work area being inspected by Inspector Elder was, at the time of his inspection, not supplied by any back up lighting system. There is some suggestion in the evidence that a system that included back up lighting was in the process of being installed at the time of inspection. Even if there was evidence that that task was completed e.g. 24 hours later, and there was subsequently a fully functioning back up light system operating at the site, that would in no way undermine the reasonable belief of the inspector as to the state of lighting at the time of his inspection. The installation that may have ultimately been completed was, in all practical terms, a mere rectification of the contravention identified by Inspector Elder. The fact remains that for the entirety of the period of the inspection, there were no functioning back up lights.
  1. [65]
    Further, the absence of a lux meter or the use of unverified ones is equally irrelevant. The apprehension of risk of injury or death was founded on the observations of the inspector.[46] It is submitted by Watpac that the Inspectors perceptions of the danger were insufficient to give rise to reasonable belief of contravention. I reject this. It does not take any imagination at all to appreciate how such an apprehension of risk might reasonably arise when one considers the setting i.e. a construction site, inside a stadium, with little to no access to natural light. Further, if there were any doubt as to the validity of Inspector Elder's observations, the photographs tendered as evidence[47] adequately depict the lighting deficit giving rise to Inspector Elder's concerns. It is also of note that Watpac did not present evidence from any other person present at the inspection to refute the perceptions of poor lighting held by Inspector Elder.
  1. [66]
    The prevailing circumstances when Inspector Elder formed his belief leading to issuing the IN were that:
  • The area was not well supplied by natural light;
  • There was no operational backup lighting capable of illuminating the work area in the event of a failure of the primary power supply; and
  • The work area was plunged into darkness when the primary power supply was shut off.
  1. [67]
    Having considered his evidence it is apparent that Inspector Elder's observations alone were the greater part of the basis for his conclusions leading to issuing the IN. I accept entirely that Inspector Elder's views were formed reasonably in the circumstances he described. The risk he identified was very real and was even more apparent to him when the lights were turned out.
  1. [68]
    Further, given the strict provisions of the Act prohibiting the delegation of duties, it was entirely understandable that Inspector Elder took no interest in the terms of the contract as between Watpac and KLN. It follows that his failure to undertake this exercise in no way undermined the reasonableness of the belief he held as to Watpac’s breach of s 40(d).
  1. [69]
    In all of those circumstances, I consider that Inspector Elder held a reasonable belief of contravention sufficient to warrant issuing the IN.           

WHS/2019/101

  1. [70]
    This application for review pertains to the IN numbered I1020943. The IN provides by way of particulars that Inspector Finn reasonably believes that Watpac was contravening sections 20(2) and 33 of the Act and section 315(a) of the Regs.
  1. [71]
    In written submissions filed 14 July 2020, Watpac primarily contends that it did not contravene ss 20(2) and 33 of the Act and 315(a) of the Regs, and consequently Inspector Finn could not have held a reasonable belief of contravention.
  1. [72]
    Watpac contends more particularly in its Application for Review, that:
  1. The Inspector did not hold a reasonable belief of a contravention against Watpac;
  1. The Inspector did not make reasonable inquiries prior to issuing the IN;
  1. The IN inadequately particularises the alleged contravention;
  1. The Inspector took no account of the role of an expert subcontractor engaged by Watpac;
  1. The IN misconceives the elements of s 315(a) of the Act; and
  1. The IN is void for ambiguity and or duplicity.

Facts

  1. [73]
    The relevant facts giving rise to the issue of this IN are not contentious. On 12 June 2019, Inspector Finn visited the site to conduct inspections pursuant to his powers under the Act. He was accompanied at the relevant time by Mr Hullick, an employee of Watpac.
  1. [74]
    During the course of the inspection, Inspector Finn had cause to visit an area of the site described in the IN as 'Northwest end of the western grandstand'.
  1. [75]
    During the course of construction, this area is used for cutting masonry blocks with a 'drop saw'. Water is used for cooling purposes when the drop saw is being operated to cut the masonry blocks. Employees from Yellow Block Road ('YBR') were contracted to perform the masonry cutting, however none of them were present at the time of the inspection.
  1. [76]
    Relevantly, the ground in the area below the drop saw slopes downwards slightly towards the road.[48]
  1. [77]
    During the inspection, Inspector Finn took photographs of the area in question.[49] A photograph tendered during the hearing of this matter demonstrated that there was water both pooled under the drop saw and which was flowing away from under the area where the drop saw was being operated. There were also materials and debris from cut masonry blocks present on the ground in the area of the drop saw.[50]
  1. [78]
    Inspector Finn indicated in his evidence that he specifically went to this area to investigate an allegation of a build-up of waste from activities associated with the cutting of masonry blocks.
  1. [79]
    During the course of the inspection, Inspector Finn identified that the risks associated with the disposal of the wastewater and product from the activity had not been managed so far as reasonably practicable.

Closing submissions of Watpac

  1. [80]
    In its closing submissions filed 14 July 2020, Watpac argues that the IN I1020943 should be set aside and cancelled because it did not contravene ss 20(2) and 33 of the Act or s 315(a) of the Regs.
  1. [81]
    Mr O'Rourke, construction site manager of the Western stand at the site, appeared as a witness for Watpac. In its submissions, Watpac highlighted the following evidence given by Mr O'Rourke at the hearing:
  • Watpac did not have any direct employees engaged in construction work on the project.[51] Yellow Block Road ('YBR') was engaged by Watpac to "carry out the brick and block work",[52] as set out in the Major Works Subcontract Agreement ('the Contract'), defined as 'Masonry Work';[53]
  • Clauses of the Contract required YBR to manage rubbish and waste arising from that activity ensuring the health and safety of workers at the site.[54] It also required YBR to comply with the Project's environmental management plan,[55] and Watpac Project Safety Management Plan.[56]
  • YBR was required to clean up using the many bins provided by Watpac on the site,[57] as stipulated in clause 19 of the Contract;[58]
  • Mr O'Rourke highlighted the minutes of the Site Coordination Meeting held on 5 June 2019, in which it was discussed that it is the responsibility of all trades to clean their work area at the end of each day, otherwise cleaners would be engaged by Watpac;[59] and
  • A Water Truck had been recently deployed to distribute water on an access road close to the work area shortly before pictures of the area were taken by Inspector Finn.[60] The respondents had the opportunity to seek for the timelapse photos of the site to be disclosed but chose not to.
  1. [82]
    Mr Jones, Project Safety Coordinator for Watpac at the site, also appeared as a witness for Watpac. In its submissions, Watpac noted that the involvement of Mr Jones was not relevant for determining if Inspector Finn formed a reasonable belief of a contravention, and that there were minimal discussions in the close out meeting with Inspector Finn.[61]
  1. [83]
    Watpac highlighted the evidence given by Mr Hullick in its submissions. In summary, it submits that:
  • Subcontractors were required to have qualified HSRS to attend the Project WHS Committee Meeting;
  • He was involved in reviewing the Project Safety Management Plan which was distributed to all contractors on site, including YBR;[62]
  • A Weekly Site Safety Walk was undertaken weekly with representatives of subcontractors, including YBR;[63]
  • Although Inspector Finn requested YBR's Safe Work Method Statements, he did not request a copy of the Contract between YBR and Watpac or ask questions about how Watpac enforced the Project Safety Management Plan for subcontractors;[64]
  • No YBR workers were present when Inspector Finn inspected the area, and he could not recall if the hose was running;[65]
  • It was YBR's responsibility to rectify that area of the job site;[66] and
  • The Respondent's submissions that YBR's masonry was not held in high regard should be rejected as there were no questions put to any of Watpac's witnesses that it did not rely on YBR as an expert contractor.[67]
  1. [84]
    In Watpac's submissions, it highlighted the following evidence given by Inspector Finn at the hearing:
  • That there was no close out meeting after the inspection, but he spoke to Mr Jones as he was leaving the site;[68]
  • There were no YBR workers in the area at the time of the inspection,[69] and he did not recall asking Mr Hullick who performed the work in the area inspected,[70] or for the Contract between YBR and Watpac;[71]
  • He did not ask Mr Hullick how Watpac enforced the Project Safety Management Plan with subcontractors;[72]
  • The IN was issued based on his observations of waste and water caused by the saws used in the area and there was no system in place to collect that waste or water;[73]
  • He did not ask Mr Hullick about YBR's involvement in safety committees;[74] and
  • He did not talk to Mr Hullick about what the risks were or discuss Watpac's obligations under part 3.1 of the Regs.[75]
  1. [85]
    Watpac again submits that the principles set out by Chief Commissioner Kite in Growthbuilt adopted in Razorback Glass are appropriate to determine whether or not Inspector Finn held a 'reasonable belief' that Watpac was contravening s 20(2) and 33 of the Act and s 513(a) of the Regs.
  1. [86]
    Watpac submits that it was entitled to rely on the engagement of YBR as an expert contractor under the conditions of the Contract which required YBR to carry out masonry cutting and manage waste in a manner that ensured the health and safety of the workers at the site.[76]
  1. [87]
    There was no evidence that there were specific concerns raised regarding YBR's masonry work.
  1. [88]
    Upon vising the site, Inspector Finn made no enquiries about YBR's obligations, Watpac's health and safety obligations or the systems which Watpac implemented on the project for storage, movement and disposal of waste materials.
  1. [89]
    Inspector Finn's failure to make any of the enquiries, instead relying on his observations, meant that he could not have formed an objective reasonable belief regarding Watpac's failure to comply with its duties outlined in paragraph 61 above.
  1. [90]
    Inspector Finn failed to test any of the assumptions he made regarding the source of the water or its alleged contamination and failed to articulate what risks he believed existed beyond his experience leading him to subjectively believe that there was a risk. As per the principles set out in Razorback Glass and Growthbuilt, Inspector Finn had an obligation to make reasonable enquiries to form a reasonable belief.[77]
  1. [91]
    Watpac submits that the IN has inadequate particularisation of the alleged contravention,[78] and also what Watpac was required to do to address the alleged breach. It submits that direction to a section of the Regs does not provide practical direction of how to comply with the notice.
  1. [92]
    The conclusions reached by Inspector Finn were not based on any objective criteria.[79]

Closing submissions of the Regulator

  1. [93]
    In its closing submissions filed 28 July 2020, the Regulator argues that the Respondent made a forensic decision not to seek certain materials to be disclosed prior to the hearing. Regarding the circumstances surrounding disclosure of the time-lapse photos of the site, complete disclosure was not made as the obligation is on the applicant to disclose relevant documents, further the pictures were only disclosed three business days prior to the hearing.
  1. [94]
    Nothing in Watpac's conduct pre-hearing indicated that it was going to infer that the water truck could have contributed to the wastewater observed by the Inspector. Therefore, it is not accurate for Watpac to submit that the Respondent did not avail itself of the opportunity to seek disclosure.
  1. [95]
    Regarding Watpac's reliance on YBR, there was no requirement for Inspector Finn to conduct a full investigation, per Razorback Glass he demonstrated his years of experience and working knowledge of the site and Watpac's retention of subcontractors such as YBR.[80]
  1. [96]
    There is no direct evidence from the water truck operator, and it is pure speculation that any of the activities undertaken by the water truck had specific impacts on the area considered by Inspector Finn. Further, there is no evidence that Watpac sought to modify the water truck operation.

Consideration

  1. [97]
    As I have already held above, the standard of reasonable belief for the issuing of an IN does not require the standard for proof for a contravention of the WHS Act.[81] Further, the duties held by Watpac cannot be delegated to subcontractors by mere operation of a Contract (or at all).[82] The fact that subcontractors might have also held responsibility, both contractually and under the WHS Act, does not preclude Watpac from also having a duty.[83]
  1. [98]
    The submissions about the inspectors' reasonable belief are misconceived. The photos tendered in evidence of the scene observed by Inspector Finn[84] are more than capable of permitting an objective lay observer (let alone an inspector) that the area surrounding the saw was waterlogged and cluttered with masonry and other debris. For the purposes of an IN, no further investigation or enquiry was required. The risk to safety was obvious and the photographs speak for themselves. The site required immediate remediation.
  1. [99]
    Having regard to the evidence of Inspector Finn, the images of the scene confronting him during the inspection, and the fact that Watpac did not challenge the accuracy of those images, there was more than sufficient evidence on a plain examination of the scene for the Inspector to form a reasonable belief of contravention in my view.
  1. [100]
    Further, a reasonably minded recipient of such a notice, having been familiar with the scene confronting the inspector or having seen those photographs, would not have required any further particularisation of the IN. Having regard to the photographs, it is beyond obvious that the site immediately under and around the drop saw required attention. 
  1. [101]
    The theory advanced by Watpac that the water pooling under and around the drop saw might have been sourced from a water truck that looped the road surrounding the site was entirely unsupported by evidence. Had Watpac wished to seriously advance such a theory it would presumably have lead evidence as to the activities of the water truck and more importantly, observations of those who worked in its vicinity who might have observed e.g. water flow from the truck etc. No such evidence was called.
  1. [102]
    Moreover, Watpac's theory is unsupported by the laws of physics given there was evidence that the terrain under the drop saw sloped downwards and away from the saw, towards the road.[85] The downward gradient of the ground below the drop saw is equally obvious in the photographs, making the theory that the water ran uphill from the water truck more than a small challenge to the long accepted scientific principles developed by Sir Isaac Newton.
  1. [103]
    In all of the circumstances, I consider that the IN was validly issued.

Orders

  1. [104]
    I make the following Order:

The applications are dismissed.

Footnotes

[1] WHS/2019/100 and WHS/2019/101.

[2] Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) s 229D(2).

[3] [2018] QIRC 061.

[4] [2020] QIRC 188.

[5] Ibid [98]-[103].

[6] [2019] QIRC 133.

[7] [2018] NSWIRComm 1002 [94]-[96].

[8] (1990) 170 CLR 104.

[9] Ibid [105]-[108].

[10] Inspector Elder misdescribed the provision as 40(D) in the IN.

[11] T2-30, LL30-40; T2-31, LL25-45.

[12] T1-10, LL19-21.

[13] T1-10, LL24-26.

[14] T1-51, LL44-46; T1-77, LL10-14; T1-58, LL49-43.

[15] T1-88, LL37-44; T1-89, L 10.

[16] T1-88, LL12-20; T1-95, LL25-28.

[17] T1-89, LL45-47; T1-93, LL10-11; T1-94, L41.

[18] T2-33, LL1, 45-46; T2-34 LL1-2.

[19] T2-60, LL20-37; T2-66, LL1, 28-30; T2-60, LL 20-37.

[20] T2-72, LL1-28.

[21] Exhibit 17; T2-72, LL20-24.

[22] T2-72, LL1-28; T2-66, L31.

[23] T2-78, LL23-25.

[24] T2-78, LL37-38.

[25] T2-89, L31.

[26] Ibid at [50], [55]-[60], [95]-[96]

[27] [2018] NSWIRComm 1074, [20]-[23].

[28] Growthbuilt [56].

[29] Exhibit 3, clause 41.2(1)(iii), page 46.

[30] Exhibit 5, page 37 10.6.2; Exhibit 14.

[31] T1-93, LL10-15; T1-94, L35-40.

[32] T1-58, LL49-43.

[33] T1-77, LL10-14.

[34] Tobiassen v Reilly (2009) 178 IR 213, [65].

[35] Re: National Retail Association Limited, Union of Employers [2018] QIRC 118, [30]-[31].

[36] Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658; Lindores Construction Logistics Pty Ltd v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 [2018] QIRC 61 [20].

[37] King Gee Clothing Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 184; Timber World Pty Ltd v Meander Valley Council [2020] TASSC 27, 197.

[38] T1-86, L15 - T1-87, L25.

[39] [2018] QIRC 118, [27]-[34].

[40] Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) s 15.

[41] Ibid s 14.

[42] Ibid s 3(1)(a).

[43] See for example Growthbuilt [95].

[44] Ibid [95]-[96].

[45] Ibid [94].

[46] T2-60, LL25-40.

[47] Exhibit 17.

[48] T2-15, LL1 & 25.

[49] Exhibits 7 to 10.

[50] See Exhibits 7 & 8.

[51] T1-10, LL19-21.

[52] T1-30, LL48-49.

[53] Exhibit 4, schedule 20, cl 1.

[54] Exhibit 2, cl 17-20.

[55] T1-32, LL6-17.

[56] T1-32, LL43-44; Exhibit 5.

[57] T1-32, LL25-26.

[58] T1-32, LL22-23.

[59] T1-39, LL1-4; Exhibit 6

[60] Exhibit 8, 9, 10 & 11.

[61] T1-84, LL15-45.

[62] T2-9, LL5-14.

[63] Exhibit 16.

[64] T2-14, LL20-25, 27-28, 30-31.

[65] T2-15, LL10-14.

[66] T2-17, LL 26-29.

[67] T2-26, LL25 – T2-27, LL15

[68] T2-86, L6.

[69] T2-87, L25.

[70] T2-94, L15.

[71] T2-95, LL15-20.

[72] T2-94, LL9-13.

[73] T2-83, LL28-30; T2-90, LL30-34; T2-83, LL23-24; T2-94, LL1-5.

[74] T2-95, LL5-37.

[75] T2-96, LL41-46; T2-89, LL9-26.

[76] Exhibit 4, cl 17-19 & sch 6, 23.

[77] Growthbuilt [95]-[96], [98]-[96];

[78] Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658; Lindores Construction Logistics Pty Ltd v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 [2018] QIRC 61 [20].

[79] King Gee Clothing Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 184, 179.

[80] Razorback Glass [27].

[81] Growthbuilt [94].

[82] Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) s 14.

[83] Ibid s 16.

[84] See Exhibits 7 & 8 in particular.

[85] T2-15, LL1 & 25.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Watpac Construction Pty Ltd v The Regulator (under the Work Health and Safety Act)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Watpac Construction Pty Ltd v The Regulator (under the Work Health and Safety Act)

  • MNC:

    [2021] QIRC 375

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Dwyer IC

  • Date:

    04 Nov 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658
3 citations
Enco Precast Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union [2020] QIRC 188
3 citations
George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104
4 citations
George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26
1 citation
Growthbuilt Pty Ltd v Safe Work NSW [2018] NSWIRComm 1002
8 citations
King Gee Clothing Co Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R 184
3 citations
Lindores Construction Logistics Pty Ltd v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 [2018] QIRC 61
4 citations
Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (No 2) [2019] QIRC 133
2 citations
Re: National Retail Association Limited, Union of Employers [2018] QIRC 118
3 citations
Simon Anthony Green Wilkeen Pty Ltd T/as Razorback Glass v SafeWork NSW [2018] NSWIRComm 1074
3 citations
Timber World Pty Ltd v Meander Valley Council [2020] TASSC 27
2 citations
Tobiassen v Reilly (2009) 178 IR 213
2 citations

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Darling Downs Hospital and Health Service v The Regulator (under the Work Health and Safety Act) [2022] QIRC 4562 citations
University of the Sunshine Coast v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 [2022] QIRC 2982 citations
1

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.