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Vanzwan v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service)[2021] QIRC 438

Vanzwan v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service)[2021] QIRC 438

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Vanzwan v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 438

PARTIES:

Vanzwan, Lee

(Applicant)

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

D/2021/146

PROCEEDING:

Notice of industrial dispute

DELIVERED ON:

23 December 2021

HEARING DATE:

16 December 2021

MEMBER:

O'Connor VP

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

ORDERS:

  1. 1.The Commission does not have the jurisdiction to hear and determine the question submitted for arbitration.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES – JURISDICTION – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – where dispute notification – where Commissioner of Police issued direction on 7 September 2021 mandating all police officers and other staff, unless exempted, must receive the COVID-19 vaccine including a first dose by 4 October 2021 under Direction 12 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) – where Applicant did not receive first dose – where Applicant filed an application for exemption which was not granted – where Applicant suspended and asked to show cause why she should not be suspended without pay – where Applicant required to respond to show cause by 6 November 2021 – where Applicant provided a medical certificate on 5 November 2021 advising she was unfit for work until 5 February 2022 – where Applicant applied for an extension of time to respond to show cause until after 5 February 2022 – where Respondent refused to grant an extension – where conciliation unsuccessful – where Applicant sought arbitration – whether Commission has jurisdiction to review a decision made by the Commissioner of Police under Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) – whether the decision to suspend under 6.1 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) is a reviewable decision under s 9.3(1)(c) of the Act

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld)  s 262

Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld)

CASES:

Brassel-Dellow & Ors v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 356

Deidre Marie Gomm v Department of Corrective Services (2004) 176 QGIG 319

Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment (2006) 225 CLR 130

Swanson v Monash Health [2018] FCCA 538

The Queensland Public Sector Union of Employees v Queensland Corrective Services (2006) 183 QGIG 964

APPEARANCES:

Mr J. McDonald, Sibley Lawyers for the Applicant.

Mr G. Patterson, Queensland Police Service for the Respondent.

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    This decision relates to the threshold issue raised by the Respondent that the application properly characterised is an application to review the decision to suspend the Applicant and the Commission does not have jurisdiction to determine matters pertaining to discipline that may be reviewed under Part 9 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) ('the PSA Act').

Background

  1. [2]
    Senior Constable Vanzwan (the Applicant) is a police officer with the State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (the Respondent) and subject to Direction  No. 12 ('the Direction') issued by the Commissioner of Police on 7 September 2021.  The effect of the Direction is that the Applicant was required to receive a first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 4 October 2021.  The Applicant did not receive such a first dose.
  1. [3]
    The Applicant is an employee of the Respondent and is appointed in accordance with the PSA Act as a police officer currently at the rank of Senior Constable.
  1. [4]
    In accordance with s 5.15 of the PSA Act, the Applicant is an employee of the Crown and is within the application of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act').
  1. [5]
    On 7 September 2021 the Respondent issued a Direction to all employees directing them to be vaccinated with one of the three approved vaccines currently in use in Australia against the COVID-19 virus.  The Direction required that unless an exemption is granted, all police officers and staff members of the Respondent must receive at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 4 October 2021 and receive a second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 24 January 2022.
  1. [6]
    Paragraphs eight and nine of the Direction provided for a police officer of the Respondent to apply for an exemption on three principal grounds:
  1. a.
    due to a medical contraindication;
  2. b.
    due to a genuine religious objection; or
  3. c.
    due to other exceptional circumstances.
  1. [7]
    Paragraph 10 of the Direction provided that a police officer who applies for an exemption must provide any supporting evidence requested.
  1. [8]
    On 30 September 2021 the Applicant filed an application for exemption from receiving the vaccine in accordance with the Direction. The application for exemption was assessed and not supported by the delegate.
  1. [9]
    The Applicant was directed not to attend the workplace on 5 October 2021 and remained on pay.
  1. [10]
    On 7 October 2021 the Applicant provided the Respondent with a medical certificate dated 7 October 2021 indicating she is, 'unable to attend her occupation' from 7 October 2021 to 6 November 2021.
  1. [11]
    On 8 October 2021 the Respondent issued the Applicant with a Suspension Notice with remuneration which also included a Show Cause Notice for suspension without salary ('the Suspension Notice') in accordance with s 6.1 of the PSA Act.  The Suspension Notice provided seven days for the Applicant to show cause why such suspension should not be without remuneration in accordance with s 6.3 of the PSA Act.
  1. [12]
    By notice received on 26 October 2021 the Applicant was suspended with pay and was also asked to show cause why she should not be suspended without pay (the Show Cause Notice).  The Applicant applied for an extension of time to respond to the Show Cause Notice until after 5 February 2022.  The Respondent refused to grant her an extension.
  1. [13]
    On 5 November 2021 the Applicant provided the Respondent with a further medical certificate stating that the Applicant has anxiety and depression and is unfit for duty from 5 November 2021 until 5 February 2022.

The dispute

  1. [14]
    A dispute notification was filed in the Commission on 10 November 2021 and was the subject of conciliation before Merrell DP on 15 November 2021.  As the matter was unable to be resolved the Applicant's representative requested on 16 November 2021 that the matter proceed to arbitration.
  1. [15]
    The Applicant contends the refusal by the Respondent to grant her an extension of time to respond to the Show Cause Notice is in contravention of clause 8 of the Queensland Police Service Certified Agreement 2019 (which deals with equity considerations) and clause 76 of that agreement (which deals with work, health and safety) as well as general entitlements to sick leave which are afforded under the certified agreement and the Police Service Employees Award - State 2016.
  1. [16]
    At a mention held on 24 November 2021 the parties agreed to provide a question to be dealt with by arbitration.  The Respondent raised the issue of jurisdiction and sought that the matter be dealt with before the substantive matter. The Respondent gave an undertaking not to take any further action and agreed that the status quo would remain in relation to the Show Cause until the question is determined.
  1. [17]
    On 3 December 2021 the parties submitted the following agreed question for arbitration:

Did the State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) act lawfully or reasonably, and in accordance with the provisions of the Queensland Police Service Certified Agreement 2019 ('EB'), by refusing to allow the Applicant a further period of time to comply with a direction to respond to a show cause notice regarding suspension without pay, in circumstances where the Applicant had provided a medical certificate certifying that she was suffering from a medical condition?

Jurisdictional Argument

  1. [18]
    The Full Bench of the Commission considered in Brasell-Dellow & Ors v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service) & Ors,[1] the lawfulness of a direction by the Police Commissioner that staff of the Queensland Police Service be vaccinated with one of three approved COVID-19 vaccines in use in Australia. The Full Bench concluded that:
  1. [79]By force of the PSA Act, any person, upon employment in the QPS becomes subject to any directions of the Commissioner made under s 4.9.
  2. [80]Section 4.8(1) casts upon the Commissioner a responsibility for the operation of the QPS.  The Commissioner occupies the top position in the chain of command.  To enable her to fulfil those responsibilities, she is vested with general powers by s 4.8(3).  Those powers are to do 'all lawful acts and things' to achieve a particular aim, namely the discharge of the 'prescribed responsibility', which is the responsibility cast upon the Commissioner by s 4.8(1).  
  3. [81]Section 4.9 confers specific power upon the Commissioner, namely the power to give directions.  Again, that power, namely to give directions, is for the purpose of 'discharging the prescribed responsibility'.
  4. [82]The limitations upon the Commissioner’s powers are contained with ss 4.8(3) and 4.8(4), namely:
  1. 1.any act, including any direction, must be lawful;
  2. 2.any act, including any direction, must comply with:
  1. (a)
    'all relevant industrial instruments'.  The term 'industrial instruments' is defined as it is defined in the IR Act and includes an award or certified agreement;
  2. (b)
    any determination and rules made by an 'industrial authority'.  An 'industrial authority' means the Commission and the Queensland Industrial Court;
  3. (c)
    legislation and other laws binding on members of the QPS;
  4. (d)
    ministerial directions;
  5. (e)
    the PSA Act.
  1. [83]Within those restrictions, the Commissioner’s directions are clearly binding upon employees of the QPS.  That is what s 4.9(3) expressly provides.  Part 7 of the PSA Act concerns disciplinary action.  Section 7.4 prescribes the grounds of disciplinary action.  It provides, relevantly:
  1. “7.4.Grounds for disciplinary action
  1. (1)The subject officer may be disciplined under this part if the subject officer has—
  1. (a)
    committed misconduct; or
  2. (b)
    been convicted—
  1. (i)
    in Queensland of an indictable offence; or
  2. (ii)
    outside Queensland of an offence that, if it were committed in Queensland, would be an indictable offence; or
  1. (c)
    performed the subject officer’s duties carelessly, incompetently or inefficiently; or
  2. (d)
    been absent from duty without approved leave and without reasonable excuse; or
  3. (e)
    contravened, without reasonable excuse—
  1. (i)
    a provision of this Act or the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000; or
  2. (ii)
    a code of conduct that applies to the subject officer; or
  3. (iii)
    a direction given to the subject officer by the commissioner under this Act or by a senior officer with authority to give the direction. …' (emphasis added)
  1. [84]Therefore, on a proper construction of the PSA Act as a whole, and taken in the context of the QPS being maintained as a disciplined force:
  1. 1.within the restrictions that have been explained, the Commissioner may give a lawful direction to employees;
  2. 2.the direction is given by the Commissioner in her capacity as the effective employer of the employees;
  3. 3.unless there is 'reasonable excuse' not to comply, the employee must comply.
  1. [19]
    It is not in dispute between the parties that the Direction issued by the Respondent was a lawful Direction. Nor does the Applicant seek to disturb the Respondent's decision to suspend her.
  1. [20]
    The Respondent contends the Commission does not have jurisdiction to determine this matter which, properly characterised, is a review of the decision to suspend the Applicant. This is a decision which may be reviewed under Part 9 of the PSA Act.
  1. [21]
    Part 9, Review of decisions under the PSA Act, s 9.1A, 'Relationship with Industrial Relations Act 1999' provides:

9.1A Relationship with Industrial Relations Act 1999

The Industrial Court and the Industrial Relations Commission do not have jurisdiction in relation to a matter that has been, is being, or may be reviewed under this part even though it may be, or be about, or arise out of, an industrial matter within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 1999.

  1. [22]
    The Respondent submits that the application is an abuse of process as it is effectively a challenge of the decision to suspend the Applicant which is intrinsically linked with the discipline process.
  1. [23]
    The Applicant was cognisant of the Direction issued on 7 September 2021 by the Respondent for mandatory vaccination by 4 October 2021 and that if the Applicant failed to abide by that Direction then processes would occur to suspend the Applicant with remuneration in the first instance followed by potential suspension without remuneration.
  2. [24]
    The Respondent submits that the decision to suspend under s 6.1 of the PSA Act is a reviewable decision under s 9.3(1)(c) of the PSA Act.  Section 6.1 provides as follows:
  1. 6.1Power to stand down and suspend
  1. (1)
    If -
  1. (a)
    it appears to the commissioner, on reasonable grounds that -
  1. (i)
    an officer is liable to be dealt with for corrupt conduct; or
  2. (ii)
    an officer is liable to disciplinary action under part 7; or
  3. (iii)
    the efficient and proper discharge of the prescribed responsibility might be prejudiced, if the officer’s employment is continued; or
  1. (b)
    an officer is charged with an indictable offence; or
  2. (c)
    an officer is unfit for reasons of health to such an extent that the officer should not be subject to the duties of a constable;

the commissioner may -

  1. (d)
    stand down the officer from duty as an officer and direct the person stood down to perform such duties as the commissioner thinks fit; or
  2. (e)
    suspend the officer from duty.
  1. (2)
    The commissioner may at any time revoke a standing down or suspension imposed under subsection (1).
 
  1. [25]
    Section 9.3(1)(c) of the PSA Act provides:
  1. 9.3Application for review
  1. (1)
    A police officer who is aggrieved by a decision about -

…

  1. (c)
    suspension or standing down of the officer under section 6.1; or

…

  1. [26]
    Further, s 449 of the IR Act sets out the limitations on the Commission's jurisdiction and expressly states that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide a matter about which another Act excludes the Commission's jurisdiction about the matter.  Section 449 provides:

449 Limitations on jurisdiction

The commission does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide a matter about which another Act excludes -

  1. (a)
    the jurisdiction of the commission about the matter; or
  2. (b)
    the application of a decision under this Act about the matter.
  1. [27]
    The Respondent referred the Commission to the High Court decision of Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment ('Ferdinands').[2] That case concerned the intersection between the disciplinary provisions of the Police Act 1998 (SA) (‘the Police Act’) and the unfair dismissal provisions of the Industrial and Employees Relations Act 1994 (SA). The High Court applied the established principles of implied repeal to the intersection between the then Police Act 1998 (SA) and the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA) with a four to one majority accepting that the Police Act 1998 excluded the operation of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA). The key finding was that the Police Act was intended to be exhaustive on this subject matter.
  1. [28]
    Gleeson CJ was of the view that the provisions of the SA Police Act concerning the control and management of the police force are to be understood in a context which includes the history and character of the police force.[3] His Honour wrote:

There is an elaborate system of merits review of decisions relating to transfer, promotion, termination on certain grounds, and discipline. However, the Police Act reserves to the Commissioner the power to decide whether the appointment of a member of the police force should be terminated following a conviction. The evident reason for that reservation lies in the disciplined nature of the police force, the Commissioner's responsibilities of control and management, and the range of information and considerations that would need to be taken into account in deciding whether, in a particular case, retention of appointment is consistent with such a conviction. In particular, issues of morale and integrity, perhaps extending beyond the circumstances of the individual officer, are likely to arise. The arrangements for control and management of the police force, and for merits review of some kinds of decision by the Commissioner, and the absence of merits review of others, have the appearance of exhaustiveness.[4]

  1. [29]
    In Ferdinands, Callinan J accepted the Respondent's submission that the SA Police Act constituted a self-contained scheme for challenges to decisions of the Police Commissioner. His Honour concluded:

The respondent's submission substantially adopts the reasoning of the majority in the Full Court, that the Police Act constitutes a self-contained scheme for challenges to decisions of the Police Commissioner.  That submission should be accepted.  That it is correct follows from the detailed provision that the Police Act makes for all aspects of the engagement and disciplining of members of the force, and by reason of the nature of the duties and obligations of police officers to which Bleby J made reference, and which need no repetition. …[5]

  1. [30]
    The Respondent submits that the PSA Act provides for review rights for decisions about suspension to be made to the Commissioner for Police Service Reviews. 
  1. [31]
    It was contended that this application is analogous to the matter in The Queensland Public Sector Union of Employees AND Queensland Corrective Services.[6] That case concerned an urgent application to the Commission in relation to disciplinary action on a public servant who had been suspended under the PS Act. The Queensland Corrective Services argued that the matters were reserved to the Public Service Commissioner and the Commission lacks jurisdiction to deal with them. Blades C said:

It cannot be doubted that management has the right to discipline its workforce and with respect to the PSA, this right is encapsulated in the provisions of s. 87.  The guiding principle is that it is not the function of this Commission to interfere in the exercise of the right to discipline an employee or to attempt to delay it, unless something extraordinary or unfair is apparent.  An aggrieved public servant has certain appeal rights under the PSA or, if a dismissal does occur, a right to take unfair dismissal proceedings in the Commission is available under the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (the Act).  It is then that the employer's practices and procedures can be examined in minute detail. Common sense suggests that an employee could not avoid a 'show cause' process without good reason.[7]

  1. [32]
    The Respondent further relies on the decision of the Commission in Deidre Marie Gomm v Department of Corrective Services (No. B45 of 2004).[8] That case involved a challenge to the Commission's jurisdiction to hear an application for reinstatement under the IR Act consequent upon what was claimed to have been an unfair dismissal. Ms Gomm was a public servant who had been demoted as disciplinary action under the Public Service Act 1996. The central issue was whether the demotion for disciplinary reasons constituted dismissal. Bechley C wrote:

It would seem to me that it was Parliament's intention when making the Public Service Act 1996 that all matters of appeal on disciplinary action are to be dealt with by the Public Service Commissioner except in the case where the disciplinary action involves a termination of employment from the Public Service. In such a case the appeal lies to the Industrial Relations Commission. In other words it is the clear scheme of the Public Service Act 1996 that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Relations Commission with respect to appeals relating to termination of employment is limited to the action taken by the employing authority to terminate the employment of a person as an officer or employee of the public service. That legislation does not enable later changes in employment law with respect to dismissal to be taken as being incorporated within it.[9] (Underlining in original)

  1. [33]
    The Applicant contends that the Respondent has misconceived the basis of the application and the question for arbitration.  The Applicant argues that she does not seek to disturb the Respondent's decision to suspend her employment. Rather, her grievance centres on the failure of the Respondent to consider an extension of time in respect of a show cause process dealing with her suspension.
  1. [34]
    On the Applicant's argument, the dispute concerns the entitlements of a person who provides a medical certificate certifying their unfitness and the extent to which the Applicant can be given directions by the Commissioner.
  1. [35]
    The Applicant relies on the decision in Swanson v Monash Health.[10] I do not regard the case as being of great assistance in determining the issue currently before the Commission. Whilst it is correct that the Court considered a number of circumstances when determining whether a direction was reasonable,[11] the case involved allegations of adverse action.
  1. [36]
    In Swanson, the Applicant alleged that her employer, Monash Health, had taken adverse action in threatening to and ultimately summarily terminating her employment. The Applicant was on paid personal leave and had been absent from work for a lengthy period of time after she had made a complaint of bullying and harassment. The employer offered the Applicant two alternative positions and directed her to attend an Independent Medical Examination on three occasions. The Applicant rejected the offers of alternative employment and refused to attend the IMEs, arguing she was exercising a workplace right not to work which included a right to refuse directions made by her employer to attend an IME. The employer dismissed the Applicant and argued that the reason for the Applicant's termination was not her exercise of a workplace right to take personal leave, but her failure to comply with lawful and reasonable directions by the employer that she attend an IME.
  1. [37]
    Importantly, the Court rejected the Applicant's argument that an employee has a right not to work, or a right not to follow directions during personal leave, stating that the employment contract remains on foot during any period of leave and employers can give lawful and reasonable directions to employees during this time.[12] It concluded that the employer's actions in dismissing an employee who refused a direction to attend an IME during a period of paid personal leave did not amount to adverse action. The employer's direction was, in the Court's view, lawful and reasonable, and that the employee's refusal amounted to serious misconduct warranting summary dismissal.
  1. [38]
    In the Applicant's submission the question to be resolved by the Commission has significant consequences on the rights and obligations of the Respondent and its employees.
  1. [39]
    It is argued that it is entirely inappropriate for the Respondent to suggest that the Applicant is seeking to frustrate the disciplinary process by exercising her workplace right.  It overlooks the significant mental health toll that is placed on an employee during the disciplinary proceedings.
  1. [40]
    The Applicant submits that the request for the Applicant to show cause is not a matter than can be reviewed by the Review Commissioner pursuant to s 9.3 of the PSA Act.  The only ability for the Applicant to ensure her rights as an employee to personal leave are upheld are through the Commission.  It is for the Commission to determine whether the Respondent's direction to require the Applicant to respond to the show cause notice whilst on personal leave, are lawful and reasonable.
  1. [41]
    What is contended for by the Applicant is that the dispute by its very nature is an industrial matter within the meaning of s 9 of the IR Act as it relates to the privileges, rights and functions of employers and employees within the meaning of the section.  Therefore, the Commission has jurisdiction to hear the matter in accordance with s 448(1) of the IR Act and is not excluded by the PSA Act.
  1. [42]
    However, that submission ignores the import of s 9.1A of the PSA Act which provides that the Commission does not have the jurisdiction in relation to a matter '...even though it may be, or be about, or arise out of, an industrial matter within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 1999'.[13]
  1. [43]
    Even if a matter commenced as an industrial matter, the language of the PSA Act is such that if it relates in any way to a matter that is reviewable under the PSA Act, then the Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear or determine the matter.  The PSA Act is a legislative scheme relating to discipline, suspension, stand down and termination of appointment of police officers by the Police Commissioner in certain circumstances.
  1. [44]
    It is broadly asserted in the Notice of Industrial Dispute filed in the Industrial Registry on 10 November 2021 that there has been a breach '... of the Certified Agreement, namely clause 9 (sic) regarding discrimination (imposing a term the Applicant cannot comply with because of her impairment), clause 76 regarding Work Health and Safety, as well as the general entitlements to sick leave are afforded to the Applicant under the Agreement and Award.'
  1. [45]
    Of course, the issue of the Applicant's general entitlements to sick leave afforded to her under the Certified Agreement and Award is not the question before the Commission. What is before the Commission is a determination whether the Commission acted lawfully or reasonably, and in accordance with the provisions of the Queensland Police Service Certified Agreement 2019 (EB), by refusing to allow the Applicant a further period of time to comply with a direction to respond to a show cause notice regarding suspension without pay.
  1. [46]
    On the Respondent's submission, the decision to suspend under s 6.1 of the PSA Act is reviewable decision under s 9.3(1)(c) of the PSA Act which is reviewable to the Commissioner for Police Service Reviews.  I agree.
  1. [47]
    The matter the subject of the grievance goes, in my view, to the steps the Respondent has taken in the exercise of the power under s 6.1 of the PSA Act. It is a grievance concerning a decision about a suspension or standing down of an officer under section 6.1 of the PSA Act.
  1. [48]
    Moreover, it is clear by operation of s 9.1A of the PSA Act, that the Commission does not have jurisdiction in relation to a matter that has been, is being, or may be reviewed under part 9 even though it may be, or be about, or arise out of, an industrial matter.  In coming to that view, I consider that the PSA Act reveals a clear intention by Parliament to render decisions made by the Commissioner under s 6.1 of the PSA Act to suspend a police officer immune from review by the Commission, notwithstanding the conferral of jurisdiction on the Commission by the IR Act in broad and general terms to deal with an industrial matter.
  1. [49]
    In my opinion, Parliament has also manifested the clear intention that, within the statutory parameters as identified in Brasell-Dellow & Ors v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service) & Ors, the Commissioner has control over the police service. 
  1. [50]
    An aggrieved police officer has appeal rights under the PSA Act.
  1. [51]
    For the reasons advanced above, I am of the view that the Commission does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the question submitted for arbitration.

Orders:

  1. 1.The Commission does not have the jurisdiction to hear and determine the question submitted for arbitration.

Footnotes

[1] [2021] QIRC 356.

[2] (2006) 225 CLR 130.

[3] Ibid [5].

[4] Ibid [10].

[5] Ibid [148].

[6] The Queensland Public Sector Union of Employees v Queensland Corrective Services (2006) 183 QGIG 964.

[7] Ibid 964-8.

[8] 176 QGIG 319.

[9] Ibid 320.

[10] [2018] FCCA 538.

[11] Ibid, [54].

[12] Ibid [33].

[13] Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) pt 9 s 9.1A.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Vanzwan v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Vanzwan v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service)

  • MNC:

    [2021] QIRC 438

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    O'Connor VP

  • Date:

    23 Dec 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Brasell-Dellow v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 356
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 356
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 356
Deidre Marie Gomm v Department of Corrective Services (2004) 176 QGIG 319
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2004) 176 QGIG 319
Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment (2006) 225 CLR 130
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2006) 225 CLR 130
Cite 2 - (2006) 225 CLR 130
Swanson v Monash Health [2018] FCCA 538
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] FCCA 538
Cite 2 - [2018] FCCA 538
The Queensland Public Sector Union of Employees v Queensland Corrective Services (2006) 183 QGIG 964
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2006) 183 QGIG 964
Cite 2 - (2006) 183 QGIG 964

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Chase v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 1402 citations
1

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