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  4. Sheppard v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) - [2021] QIRC 87

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Sheppard v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women)[2021] QIRC 87

Sheppard v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women)[2021] QIRC 87

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Sheppard v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2021] QIRC 087

PARTIES:

Sheppard, Janine

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

PSA/2020/322

PROCEEDING:

Public Service Appeal – Appointment to position at higher classification

DELIVERED ON:

19 March 2021

MEMBER:

Industrial Commissioner Dwyer

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDER:

  1. The decision appealed against is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Public Service Appeal – application for permanent employment at higher classification – genuine operational requirements – adequacy of reasons

LEGISLATION:

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) 27B

Directive 13/20 Appointing a public service employee to a higher classification level cls 4.2, 6.2, 7.1

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 562B, 562C

Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) ss 148(2), 149C

CASES:

Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10

Crofts v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2021] QIRC 083

Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018)

Holcombe v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2020] QIRC 195

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 232

Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2020] QIRC 203

Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252

Reasons for Decision

Background

  1. [1]
    Ms Janine Sheppard is substantively employed as an Administrative Officer (AO2) at Mount Gravatt Child Safety Service Centre ('Mount Gravatt CSSC'), by the Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women ('the Department').
  1. [2]
    Since 29 June 2017, Ms Sheppard has been acting as a part-time AO3 Administration Officer at Mount Gravatt CSSC one day per fortnight. Since 9 January 2020, she has also been acting as a part-time AO3 Administration Officer within the Collaborative Family Decision Making Team ('CFDMT') four days per fortnight.
  1. [3]
    On 1 October 2020, Ms Sheppard wrote to the Department requesting that she be permanently appointed to the higher classification level AO3 Administration Officer position at Mount Gravatt CSSC in accordance with s 149C of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) ('the PS Act'). She notes in her email that she has demonstrated the skills, knowledge and abilities required to undertake the role.
  1. [4]
    On 27 October 2020, Ms Sheppard received correspondence from Ms Leanne Black, Regional Director (Moreton Region) of the Department. The correspondence advised Ms Sheppard that a review of her employment status had been conducted in accordance with the requirements of Directive 13/20 Appointing a public service employee to a higher classification level ('the Directive') and the PS Act.
  1. [5]
    The correspondence from Ms Black advised Ms Sheppard that she was not eligible for appointment, as both AO3 roles were substantively owned by other staff ('the decision'). The decision noted that she could request another review in one year from the date of the decision.
  1. [6]
    The reasons for the decision were set out as follows:

I refer to your request to be appointed to a higher classification level under Directive 13/20 and have conducted a review of your request and have determined that I am unable to grant your request at this time.

…

The Administration Officer positions at Mt Gravatt Child Safety Service Centre and Collaborative Family Decision Making Team are substantively owned by other staff members and as such this makes you not eligible to be appointed to these roles.

Considerations when making the decision

I have considered the requirements of the Appointing a Public Service Employee to a Higher Classification Level Directive 13/20, the Public Service Act 2008 and your employment history.

  1. [7]
    Ms Sheppard filed an Appeal Notice on 18 November 2020. In her appeal, she contended that:
  • There were no issues regarding the merit of her request;
  • She is appealing the decision pursuant to s 149C of the PS Act as she had been working in the AO3 position at Mount Gravatt CSSC for a continuous period of more than two years;
  • With reference to s 149C(4A) of the PS Act, the Department erred in their decision by not giving due consideration to the genuine operational requirements of the Department;
  • One substantive position holder has been absent from the role for three years and the other has been absent for 10 months;
  • It is not a requirement of the PS Act or the Directive that the roles must be substantively vacant to enable conversion to occur. It is only a consideration of clause 4.2 of the Directive that the role is not substantively vacant, or a backfilling arrangement exists. She contends that this consideration is not a threshold question or blanket reason to decline an appointment. It is one consideration among many when assessing the 'genuine operational requirements of the department';[1]
  • The Department failed to give due consideration to the genuine operational requirements and provide an explanation for that consideration as required by clause 7.1 of the Directive; and
  • She seeks that the decision be set aside and substituted with the decision that her employment status is converted to permanent at an AO3 classification level.

What decisions can the Industrial Commissioner make?

  1. [8]
    In deciding this appeal, s 562C(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') provides that the Commission may:
  1. (a)
    confirm the decision appealed against; or
  1. (b)
    set the decision aside and return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions permitted; or
  1. (c)
    set the decision aside and substitute another decision or return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate.

Nature of appeal

  1. [9]
    Under Chapter 11 of the IR Act, the role of the Commission is to review the decision appealed against.[2] The IR Act does not define the term 'review'. The term 'review' will take its meaning from the context in which it appears.[3]
  1. [10]
    An appeal under Chapter 11, of the IR Act is not a rehearing of the matter,[4] but rather, it is a review of the decision and the decision-making process.[5] The purpose of such an appeal is to have the Commission decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable.[6]
  1. [11]
    The issue for my determination in the matter before me is whether the decision to refuse to permanently appoint Ms Sheppard to the higher position was fair and reasonable.[7]
  1. [12]
    For the reasons set out below I have determined that the decision was fair and reasonable.

Relevant sections of the PS Act and Directive

  1. [13]
    The relevant provisions of the PS Act and the Directive for consideration in this appeal are set out below.
  1. [14]
    Section 149C of the PS Act relevantly provides:

149C Appointing public service employee acting in position at higher classification level

  1. (1)
    This section applies in relation to a public service employee if the employee –
  1. (a)
    is seconded to, under section 120(1)(a), or is acting at, a higher classification level in the department in which the employee holds an appointment or is employed; and
  1. (b)
    has been seconded to or acting at the higher classification level for a continuous period of at least 1 year; and
  1. (c)
    is eligible for appointment to the position at the higher classification level having regard to the merit principle.

…

  1. (3)
    The employee may ask the department's chief executive to appoint the employee to the position at the higher classification level as a general employee on tenure or a public service officer, after –
  1. (a)
    the end of 1 year of being seconded to or acting at the higher classification level; and
  1. (b)
    each 1-year period after the end of the period mentioned in paragraph (a).
  1. (4)
    The department’s chief executive must decide the request within the required period.

(4A)  In making the decision, the department’s chief executive must have regard to –

  1. (a)
    the genuine operational requirements of the department; and
  1. (b)
    the reasons for each decision previously made, or taken to have been made, under this section in relation to the person during the person’s continuous period of employment at the higher classification level.
  1. (5)
    If the department’s chief executive decides to refuse the request, the chief executive must give the employee a notice stating –
  1. (a)
    reasons for the decision; and
  1. (b)
    the total continuous period for which the person has been acting at the higher classification level in the department; and
  1. (c)
    how many times the person’s engagement at the higher classification level has been extended; and
  1. (d)
    each decision previously made, or taken to have been made, under this section in relation to the person during the person’s continuous period of employment at the higher classification level.
  1. (6)
    If the department’s chief executive does not make the decision within the required period, the chief executive is taken to have refused the request.

…

  1. (8)
    In this section –

continuous period, in relation to an employee acting at a higher classification level, has the meaning given for the employee under a directive made under subsection (7).

required period, for making a decision under subsection (4), means-

  1. (a)
    the period stated in an industrial instrument within which the decision must be made; or
  1. (b)
    if paragraph (a) does not apply – 28 days after the request is made.
  1. [15]
    Clause 4 of the Directive provides as follows:

4. Principles

4.1  An employee seconded to or assuming the duties and responsibilities of a higher classification level in the agency in which the employee is substantively employed can be appointed to the position at the higher classification level as a general employee on tenure or a public service officer following a written request to the chief executive.

4.2  Secondment to or assuming the duties and responsibilities of a higher classification level should only be used when permanent appointment to the role is not viable or appropriate. Circumstances that would support the temporary engagement of an employee at a higher classification level include:

…

  1. when an existing employee is absent to perform another role within their agency, or is on secondment, and the agency does not use permanent relief pools for those types of roles

…

  1. [16]
    Clause 6 of the Directive provides as follows:

6. Decision making

6.1  When deciding whether to permanently appoint the employee to the higher classification level as a general employee on tenure or a public service officer, the chief executive may consider whether the employee has any performance concerns that have been put to the employee and documented and remain unresolved, that would mean that the employee is no longer eligible for appointment to the position at the higher classification level having regard to the merit principle.

6.2  In accordance with section 149C(4A) of the PS Act, when deciding the request, the chief executive must have regard to:

  1. (a)
    the genuine operational requirements of the department, and
  1. (b)
    the reasons for each decision previously made, or deemed to have been made, under section 149C of the PS Act in relation to the employee during their continuous period of employment at the higher classification level.

6.3  In accordance with section 149C(6) of the PS Act, if the chief executive does not make the decision within 28 days, the chief executive is taken to have decided that the person's engagement in the agency is to continue according to the terms of the existing secondment or higher duties arrangement.

6.4  Each agency must, upon request, give the Commission Chief Executive a report about the number of known deemed decisions occurring by operation of section 149C(6) of the PS Act.

  1. [17]
    Clause 7 of the Directive provides as follows:

7. Statement of reasons

7.1  A chief executive who decides to refuse a request made under clause 5 is required to provide a written notice that meets the requirements of section 149C(5) of the PS Act (Appendix A). The notice provided to the employee must, in accordance with section 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954:

  1. (a)
    set out the findings on material questions of fact, and
  1. (b)
    refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.

7.2  A written notice is not required to be prepared 'after the fact' to support a deemed decision made under clause 6.3.

Submissions of the parties

  1. [18]
    The parties filed written submissions in accordance with a Directions Order dated 18 November 2020. The parties' submissions are largely directed at the genuine operational requirements of the Department and reasons for the decision.

Submissions of Ms Sheppard

  1. [19]
    Ms Sheppard contends, for reasons set out in her submissions dated 25 November 2020, that she should be appointed an AO3 position. In summary she submits that:
  • There is no dispute as to the merits of her application for conversion;
  • The Department erred in making their decision as they have applied irrelevant criteria – that the role must be substantively vacant for Ms Sheppard to be eligible for appointment – and did not have regard to the mandatory considerations in s 149C(4A) of the PS Act. She contends this makes the decision unfair and unreasonable;[8]
  • There is no requirement in the PS Act or Directive that the positions must be substantively vacant, and the Department have misapplied the law which only provides for a consideration of the 'genuine operational requirements';[9]
  • If substantive vacancy was intended to be an eligibility or threshold requirement, it would have been stated in the same way as the threshold requirements for conversion in the PS Act.[10] The factors in clause 4.2 of the Directive are merely considerations, not mandatory criteria which a decision maker must have regard to;
  • The Department has not provided the material findings of fact and the evidence relied upon as required by the Directive,[11] and s 27B of the Acts Interpretations Act 1954 (Qld) ('AIA'); and
  • If she was appointed to the position at Mount Gravatt CSSC, this would support the operational requirements of the Department by ensuring prompt, efficient and effective delivery of services at the centre as she has developed the skills and knowledge required to add value to the role.

Submissions of the Department

  1. [20]
    The Department contends, for reasons set out in their submissions dated 25 November 2020, that their genuine operational requirements preclude Ms Sheppard's permanent appointment at the higher level. In summary it submits that:
  • At the time of her request, Ms Sheppard was performing higher duties in two different roles with the Department, both part-time;
  • The position at Mount Gravatt CSSC is substantively held by another employee. Ms Sheppard shares this position with the employee on a job-share basis;
  • Between 29 June 2017 and 28 September 2020, Ms Sheppard worked in the position at varying capacities per fortnight (full time employee 0.2, 0.4, 0.5 – 0.8).[12] From 12 October 2020 to 21 December 2020 the substantive employee had a nine day per fortnight part-time arrangement and Ms Sheppard was undertaking duties in the remaining one day per fortnight;
  • The Department only offered Ms Sheppard days in this position when they were left vacant by the substantive. Due to the gradual increase in days worked by the substantive, it was expected that they would resume their duties on a full-time basis on 21 December 2020;
  • Once the substantive resumed on a full-time basis, there would no longer be a continuing need for Ms Sheppard to be in the position. The Department does not have a genuine operational need to permanently appoint two employees in the same AO3 role;
  • Similarly, the AO3 position with the CFDMT is also on a job-share basis, which is substantively held by another employee expected to return to the position full-time on 1 January 2021. In any event, Ms Sheppard has not been in the role for longer than one year so is ineligible for appointment to that position; and
  • The Department considered the circumstances where temporary employment is and is not appropriate.[13] The Department also considered its genuine operational requirements with respect to clause 6.2 of the Directive, s 149C(4A) of the PS Act, the Department's Appointment to a higher classification level policy and DCSYW Workforce Guidelines – Managing the financial impacts of COVID-19. It concluded that both positions have substantive employees who are entitled to increase their work hours and have done so. In accordance with the guideline, the delegate has no authority to increase the workload in the positions above the full-time allocation and convert Ms Sheppard to either of the roles.

Reply submissions of Ms Sheppard

  1. [21]
    Ms Sheppard contends, for reasons set out in her reply submissions dated 9 December 2020, that she should be appointed to an AO3 position. The submissions are largely equivalent to her submissions dated 25 November 2020. In summary they restate that:
  • The Department misapplied the law by considering that a substantive occupant in the position prevents Ms Sheppard's appointment to the position under s 149C of the PS Act;
  • The decision did not have regard to the mandatory criteria in s 149C(4A) of the PS Act; and
  • The Department failed to provide adequate reasons for the decision as required by s 27B of the AIA and s 149C5(b)-(c) of the PS Act.
  1. [22]
    Ms Sheppard's submissions also contend that:
  • The reasons in the Department's submissions dated 25 November 2020 cannot retrospectively meet the requirement that the decision maker provided adequate reasons for the decision; and
  • The facts of the case and the decision by Deputy President Merrell in Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women),[14] (‘Morison’) supports her contention that the reasons for the decision were inadequate.

Consideration

The decision of Holcombe

  1. [23]
    The submissions of the parties in this matter were filed at around the time of the release of the decision by Commissioner McLennan in the matter of Holcombe v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works)[15] (‘Holcombe’) and, unsurprisingly, neither party has made reference to it in their submissions.
  1. [24]
    In Holcombe the Commission found that:

The PS Act, at s 149C(1)(c), provides that s 149 applies to a public service employee if they are eligible for appointment to the position. Further, s 149C(3) provides that the employee may ask to be appointed to the position at the higher classification level. The power afforded to the department to permanently appoint Mrs Holcombe is confined to the position into which she has been seconded at the time of the review. That can be contrasted with the entitlement to request a review, which merely requires that, amongst other things, a person be engaged in a higher classification level for a period. The term ‘the position’ is inherently more specific than ‘higher classification level’; many positions could be described as being of a higher classification level.

In that way, it can be said that an employee may be entitled to a review after engaging in a number of positions, but the review must be conducted against a precise position.

…

The PS Act at s 149C, in concert with the Directive, creates a framework where if a person has been acting at a higher classification for a particular period, they may be permanently appointed to the position they occupy. There is no contemplation in those materials that the meaning of the position would be so broad as to encapsulate any position with the same title and classification anywhere in the workplace, or the city, or indeed the State.

By way of contrast, a broader ambit of the type proposed by Mrs Holcombe is expressly imparted in other conversion reviews which immediately precede s 149C. In conducting a temporary employment review under ss 149A and 149B, the department’s chief executive may convert an employee to permanency if there is a continuing need for someone to be employed in the person’s role, or a role that is substantially the same. Following the review, the department chief executive may “offer to convert the person’s employment basis to employment as a general employee on tenure or a public service officer”. Therefore, the review is conducted against not only the present role, but a role which is substantially the same, and any appointment is not inherently tied to a particular position identified by a number.

The language of s 149C is narrower: the employee may ask the department’s chief executive to appoint the employee to the position at the higher classification level as a general employee on tenure or a public service officer. That does not empower the department chief executive to review the employee against positions which are substantially the same or appoint them to another comparable position. The power is expressly confined to the position occupied by the employee at that time.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [25]
    The conclusions reached in Holcombe, with which I agree, create a number of barriers for Ms Sheppard. Ms Sheppard was acting in two positions at the AO3 level at the time she made her request for appointment at the higher classification. Neither position has been specifically nominated as ‘the position’ to which she was seeking appointment.[16]
  1. [26]
    Without a specific designation of a position for appointment, the only outcome being sought by Ms Sheppard that can be implied from her material is that she be appointed permanently, as an AO3, but without any specific position or designation. Such an outcome is beyond the powers granted to the chief executive by s 149C of the PS Act.
  1. [27]
    The unavoidable conclusion, given the construction of s 149C arising from Holcombe, is that Ms Sheppard’s application was doomed to fail at the outset through lack of specificity. However, this barrier to Ms Sheppard’s application for appointment at the higher classification was not cited by the Department in their decision. In those circumstances, while the broader merits of the appeal are relevant to my discretion under s 562C(1) of the IR Act, I do not propose to rely on my conclusions in this regard with respect to my consideration of whether the decision was fair and reasonable.
  1. [28]
    To be clear, had the Department relied on Holcombe in refusing Ms Sheppard’s request I would have had no difficulty in accepting such a decision was fair and reasonable. However, as those principles did not feature in the decision, they fall outside of my consideration of the fairness (or otherwise) of the decision. I only intend to consider the likely effect of Holcombe on Ms Sheppard’s circumstances when considering the most appropriate disposal of the matter.

Genuine operational requirements

  1. [29]
    The grounds relied on to refuse Ms Sheppard’s request are quite narrow, namely, the presence of incumbent employees in the positions currently occupied (part-time) by Ms Sheppard are a barrier to her appointment. Ms Sheppard proposes a unique interpretation of the term 'genuine operational requirements'. Ms Sheppard’s submission is not dissimilar to the appellant’s submissions in Morison. With respect, Ms Sheppard misunderstands the terminology.
  1. [30]
    In Morison the Deputy President observed:[17]

Ms Morison submits that neither the PS Act or Directive include a role being substantively vacant as a prerequisite for appointment to the higher classification level. However, s 149C(4A)(a) of the PS Act and cl 6.2(a) of the Directive provide that the department's chief executive, in making a decision about a relevant request for an employee to be appointed to the position at the higher classification level, must have regard to the 'genuine operational requirements of the department'.

The phrase 'genuine operational requirements of the department' is not defined in the PS Act or in the Directive. As a consequence, that phrase must take its meaning from the words used in it and the context in which it appears in the PS Act; and consideration of the context includes surrounding provisions, what may be drawn from other aspects of the instrument, the instrument as a whole and it extends to what the instrument seeks to remedy. The same considerations apply to the construction of the same phrase in cl 6.2(a) of the Directive.

The adjective 'genuine' relevantly means '... being truly such; real; authentic.' The phrase 'operational requirements of the department' is obviously a broad term that permits a consideration of many matters depending upon the particular circumstances of the department at a particular time. In considering the context of s 149C(4A)(a) of the PS Act, the chief executive of a department, under the PS Act, is responsible for, amongst other things:

  • managing the department in a way that promotes the effective, efficient and appropriate management of public resources; and
  • planning human resources, including ensuring the employment in the department of persons on a fixed term temporary or casual basis occurs only if there is a reason for the basis of employment under the PS Act.

In respect of the Directive, cl 4.2 provides that secondment to or assuming the duties and responsibilities of a higher classification level should only be used when permanent appointment to the role is not viable or appropriate. That clause goes on to provide that circumstances that would support the temporary engagement of an employee at a higher classification level include:

  • when an existing employee takes a period of leave such as parental, long service, recreation or long-term sick leave and needs to be replaced until the date of their expected return; or
  • when an existing employee is absent to perform another role within their agency, or is on secondment, and the agency does not use permanent relief pools for those types of roles.

The phrase '... genuine operational requirements of the department' in s 149C(4A)(a) and in cl 6.2(a) of the Directive, construed in context, would at least include whether or not there was an authentic need, having regard to the effective, efficient and appropriate management of the public resources of the department, to appoint an employee, who has been assuming the duties and responsibilities of a higher classification level in the department for the requisite period of time, to '...the position at the higher classification level.'

There can be no dispute that the reason Ms Morison is presently acting in the higher classification level in position number 7021866 is that the incumbent of that position is on special leave. However, the incumbent may return from such leave. That was a relevant matter for Ms Matebau to have considered in deciding the request made by Ms Morison. Put another way, in having regard to genuine operational requirements of the Department, it was relevant for Ms Matebau to consider whether, in terms of managing the Department in a way that promoted the effective, efficient and appropriate management of public resources, Ms  Morison  should be appointed to position number 7021866 when it was possible the incumbent was likely to return to that position.

Ms Morison does contend that requirement was not genuine.

For the reasons given above, in my view, this aspect of Ms Matebau's decision was fair and reasonable.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [31]
    In Ms Sheppard’s case, the substantive employees in both AO3 positions were expected to return to full time duties in December 2020 and January 2021 respectively. Ms Sheppard does not contend otherwise.
  1. [32]
    Ms Sheppard contends that she does not dispute the roles are substantively owned and that this fact was a relevant consideration. Ms Sheppard then, in something of a contradiction, submits that the Department misapplied the law by considering that not acting against a substantively vacant role makes an employee ineligible for appointment.[18]
  1. [33]
    In the circumstances, while the PS Act or the Directive do not include an express reference to the impact of an incumbent employee on such an application, Morison makes clear that the impending return of an incumbent employee would be a relevant consideration for the purposes of considering genuine operational requirements.[19]
  1. [34]
    There are no unique or materially different facts in Ms Sheppard’s case that would invite consideration of another conclusion. The decision on this basis is therefore fair and reasonable.

Adequacy of reasons

  1. [35]
    Ms Sheppard further contends that the reasons contained in the decision are inadequate. Inadequate reasons could, in the right circumstances, render a decision unfair or unreasonable.
  1. [36]
    On the question of adequacy of reasons, I note the finding of the Deputy President in Morison where he said:

Although her reasons were very brief, read in context, Ms Matebau's decision, in the third paragraph, refers to that reason as being a genuine operational requirement of the Department not to permanently appoint Ms  Morison  to the position at the higher classification level.

  1. [37]
    The reasons provided in the decision in this instance simply refer to the positions being substantively owned by other staff members. Ideally some more detail might be provided in terms of any information relevant to when those staff members were returning. But it is clear that Ms Sheppard understood the reason. Moreover, there is little more that needs to be communicated other than that the positions were substantively held by other employees.
  1. [38]
    While the reasons might fairly be regarded as only barely informative, the lack of information does not give rise to any disadvantage to Ms Sheppard in my view. Even if it did, the only proper remedy for that would be to return the matter to the decision maker to issue the decision again. Given the very clear barriers to Ms Sheppard’s application for appointment to the higher classification that I have identified above, returning the matter would be an exercise in futility.
  1. [39]
    In all of these circumstances, I consider the decision to be fair and reasonable.

Order

  1. [40]
    In the circumstances I make the following order:
  1. The decision appealed against is confirmed.

Footnotes

[1]Directive 13/20: Appointing a public service employee to a higher classification level cl 6.2(a).

[2]Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B.

[3]Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10.

[4]Goodall v State of Queensland (unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(3).

[7]Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252, 60-61.

[8]Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, 39-40; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 232; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332.

[9]Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 149C(4A); Explanatory Memorandum, Public Service and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2020 (Qld) 3.

[10]Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) ss 149C(1)(a)-(c), 149C(2)(a)-(c).

[11]Directive 13/20 Appointing a public service employee to a higher classification level cl 7.1

[12]Submissions of the Respondent, page 2, paragraphs 10-14.

[13]Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 148(2); Directive 13/20 Appointing a public service employee to a higher classification level cl 4.2.

[14][2020] QIRC 203, [49]-[50].

[15][2020] QIRC 195.

[16]I note that the Department, at [6] of their submissions filed 25 November 2020, suggests the request and appeal relates to a single position. This conclusion is entirely inconsistent with the application email dated 1 October 2020 (in which Ms Sheppard asks for appointment to ‘an AO3 position’), and with all of the materials filed by Ms Sheppard subsequently.

[17]Ibid, [36]-[44].

[18]Reply submissions of the Appellant dated 9 December 2020, paragraphs 2-3.

[19]Crofts v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2021] QIRC 083, [48].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Sheppard v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Sheppard v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women)

  • MNC:

    [2021] QIRC 87

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Member Dwyer IC

  • Date:

    19 Mar 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Biddle v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs) [2021] QIRC 283
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 283
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 283
Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1995] HCA 10
Cite 2 - [1995] HCA 10
Crofts v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2021] QIRC 83
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 83
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 83
Holcombe v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2020] QIRC 195
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 195
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 195
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) 162 CLR 24
Cite 2 - (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2013) 249 CLR 332
Cite 2 - (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 232
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 206 CLR 232
Cite 2 - (2001) 206 CLR 232
Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2020] QIRC 203
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 203
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 203
Page v Thompson [2014] QSC 252
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QSC 252
Cite 2 - [2014] QSC 252

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Leatherbarrow v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 2612 citations
1

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