Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
  • sclq logo
  1. Caselaw
  2. QIRC
  3. 2021
  4. Weerasekera v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) - [2021] QIRC 97

Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

Weerasekera v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works)[2021] QIRC 97

Weerasekera v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works)[2021] QIRC 97

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Weerasekera v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2021] QIRC 097

PARTIES: 

Weerasekera, Gamini Jayantha

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

PSA/2020/313

PROCEEDING:

Public Service Appeal – Appointment to position at higher classification

DELIVERED ON:

24 March 2021

MEMBER:

Industrial Commissioner Dwyer

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDER:

  1. The decision appealed against is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Public Service Appeal – application for permanent employment at higher classification – genuine operational requirements – adequacy of reasons

LEGISLATION:

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 27B

Directive 13/20 Appointing a public service employee to a higher classification level cls 4.2, 6.2, 7.1

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 562B, 562C

Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) ss 27, 149B, 149C

CASES:

Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10

Crofts v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2021] QIRC 083

Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018)

Holcombe v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2020] QIRC 195

Katae v State of Queensland & Anor [2018] QSC 225

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 232

Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2020] QIRC 203

Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252

Reasons for Decision

Background

  1. [1]
    Mr Gamini Jayantha (Jay) Weerasekera is substantively employed as a Consultant (AO5) within Queensland Shared Services ('QSS') Enabling Services, by the Department of Housing and Public Works ('the Department').
  2. [2]
    Since 24 September 2018, Mr Weerasekera had been acting as a Senior Consultant (AO6) within QSS. At the time of his request to be appointed to the position, the higher duties engagement was due to expire on 31 December 2020.
  1. [3]
    On 29 September 2020, Mr Weerasekera wrote to the Department requesting that he be permanently appointed to the higher classification Senior Consultant AO6 position within QSS in accordance with the amendments to the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) ('the PS Act'). At the time of his request, Mr Weerasekera had been acting at the higher classification for just over two years.
  1. [4]
    On 1 October 2020, Mr Weerasekera received an email from the Department advising that his request will be considered in accordance with s 149C of the PS Act and that the HR team will make further contact in due course.
  1. [5]
    On 27 October 2020, Mr Weerasekera received correspondence from Ms Kelly Carlon, Acting Principle Human Resources Consultant of the Department. The correspondence advised Mr Weerasekera that a review of his employment status had been conducted in accordance with the requirements of Directive 13/20 Appointing a public service employee to a higher classification level ('the Directive').
  1. [6]
    The correspondence from Ms Carlon advised Mr Weerasekera that he was not eligible for appointment, as the AO6 role was substantively owned by another employee who was expected to return to the position on 1 January 2021 ('the decision'). The decision noted that he could request another review on 24 September 2021 if his engagement in the position continued, or earlier if the position became a substantive vacancy.
  1. [7]
    The reasons for the decision were set out as follows:

 After considering your request to be permanently employed in the position of AO6, Senior Consultant within QSS Enabling Services, QSS and the circumstances of your temporary placement in that role, the Deputy Director-General, has determined that your engagement is to continue according to the terms of your existing temporary placement. The reasons for the Deputy Director-General's decision are:

  • The purpose of your temporary placement in the position of AO6, Senior Consultant, within QSS Enabling Services, QSS, is to backfill a substantive employee while the substantive employee is relieving in an alternate position.
  • On the return of the substantive employee on 1 January 2021, there will no longer be a continuing need for you to be engaged in the position of AO6, Senior Consultant within QSS Enabling Services, QSS.
  1. [8]
    Mr Weerasekera filed an Appeal Notice on 13 November 2020. In his appeal, he contended that:
  • He is appealing the decision of the Deputy Director-General to refuse to appoint him to the higher classification level pursuant to the PS Act;
  • By reference to s 149C(4A) of the PS Act, the Department erred in their decision by not giving due consideration to the genuine operational requirements of the Department;
  • It is not a requirement of the PS Act or the Directive that the role must be substantively vacant to enable conversion to occur. It is only a consideration of clause 4.2 of the Directive that the role is not substantively vacant, or a backfilling arrangement exists. He contends that this consideration is not a threshold question or blanket reason to decline an appointment. It is one consideration among many when assessing the 'genuine operational requirements of the department';[1]
  • The Department has failed to give due consideration to its genuine operational requirements and provide an explanation of that consideration in the decision as required by clause 7.1 of the Directive;
  • There are no issues as to merit in his request to be appointed to the higher classification level;[2] and
  • He seeks that the decision be set aside and substituted with the decision that his employment status "be converted to permanent in a role similar to the role I have been performing" with the Department".[3]

What decisions can the Industrial Commissioner make?

  1. [9]
    In deciding this appeal, s 562C(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') provides that the Commission may:
  1. (a)
    confirm the decision appealed against; or
  1. (b)
    set the decision aside and return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions permitted; or
  1. (c)
    set the decision aside and substitute another decision or return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate.

Nature of appeal

  1. [10]
    Under Chapter 11 of the IR Act, the role of the Commission is to review the decision appealed against.[4] The IR Act does not define the term 'review'. The term 'review' will take its meaning from the context in which it appears.[5]
  2. [11]
    An appeal under Chapter 11, of the IR Act is not a rehearing of the matter,[6] but rather, it is a review of the decision and the decision-making process.[7] The purpose of such an appeal is to have the Commission decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable.[8]
  1. [12]
    The issue for my determination in the matter before me is whether the decision to refuse to permanently appoint Mr Weerasekera to the higher position was fair and reasonable.[9]
  1. [13]
    For the reasons set out below I have determined that the decision was fair and reasonable.

Relevant sections of the PS Act and Directive

  1. [14]
    The relevant provisions of the PS Act and the Directive for consideration in this appeal are set out below.
  1. [15]
    Section 149C of the PS Act relevantly provides:

149C Appointing public service employee acting in position at higher classification level

  1. (1)
    This section applies in relation to a public service employee if the employee –
  1. (a)
    is seconded to, under section 120(1)(a), or is acting at, a higher classification level in the department in which the employee holds an appointment or is employed; and
  1. (b)
    has been seconded to or acting at the higher classification level for a continuous period of at least 1 year; and
  1. (c)
    is eligible for appointment to the position at the higher classification level having regard to the merit principle.

…

  1. (3)
    The employee may ask the department's chief executive to appoint the employee to the position at the higher classification level as a general employee on tenure or a public service officer, after –
  1. (a)
    the end of 1 year of being seconded to or acting at the higher classification level; and
  1. (b)
    each 1-year period after the end of the period mentioned in paragraph (a).
  1. (4)
    The department’s chief executive must decide the request within the required period.
  1. (4A)
    In making the decision, the department’s chief executive must have regard to –
  1. (a)
    the genuine operational requirements of the department; and
  1. (b)
    the reasons for each decision previously made, or taken to have been made, under this section in relation to the person during the person’s continuous period of employment at the higher classification level.
  1. (5)
    If the department’s chief executive decides to refuse the request, the chief executive must give the employee a notice stating –
  1. (a)
    reasons for the decision; and
  1. (b)
    the total continuous period for which the person has been acting at the higher classification level in the department; and
  1. (c)
    how many times the person’s engagement at the higher classification level has been extended; and
  1. (d)
    each decision previously made, or taken to have been made, under this section in relation to the person during the person’s continuous period of employment at the higher classification level.
  1. (6)
    If the department’s chief executive does not make the decision within the required period, the chief executive is taken to have refused the request.

…

  1. (8)
    In this section –

continuous period, in relation to an employee acting at a higher classification level, has the meaning given for the employee under a directive made under subsection (7).

required period, for making a decision under subsection (4), means-

  1. (a)
    the period stated in an industrial instrument within which the decision must be made; or
  1. (b)
    if paragraph (a) does not apply – 28 days after the request is made.

…

  1. [16]
    Clause 6 of the Directive provides as follows:

6. Decision making

6.1  When deciding whether to permanently appoint the employee to the higher classification level as a general employee on tenure or a public service officer, the chief executive may consider whether the employee has any performance concerns that have been put to the employee and documented and remain unresolved, that would mean that the employee is no longer eligible for appointment to the position at the higher classification level having regard to the merit principle.

6.2  In accordance with section 149C(4A) of the PS Act, when deciding the request, the chief executive must have regard to:

  1. (a)
    the genuine operational requirements of the department, and
  1. (b)
    the reasons for each decision previously made, or deemed to have been made, under section 149C of the PS Act in relation to the employee during their continuous period of employment at the higher classification level.
  1. [17]
    Clause 7 of the Directive provides as follows:

7. Statement of reasons

7.1  A chief executive who decides to refuse a request made under clause 5 is required to provide a written notice that meets the requirements of section 149C(5) of the PS Act (Appendix A). The notice provided to the employee must, in accordance with section 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954:

  1. (a)
    set out the findings on material questions of fact, and
  1. (b)
    refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.

7.2  A written notice is not required to be prepared 'after the fact' to support a deemed decision made under clause 6.3.

Submissions of the parties

  1. [18]
    The parties filed written submissions in accordance with a Directions Order dated 13 November 2020. The parties' submissions primarily concern the genuine operational requirements of the Department and reasons for the decision.

Submissions of Mr Weerasekera

  1. [19]
    Mr Weerasekera contends, for reasons set out in his submissions dated 20 November 2020, that he should be appointed to the AO6 position. In summary, he submits that:
  • There is no dispute as to the merits of his application for conversion;
  • The Department erred in making their decision as they have only considered that the purpose of Mr Weerasekera's placement was to backfill the substantive employee. The Department did not have regard to the mandatory considerations in s 149C(4A)(a) of the PS Act and the term 'genuine operational requirements' must be given its ordinary meaning, accordingly, the decision was unfair and unreasonable;[10]
  • Citing Katae v State of Queensland & Anor ('Katae'),[11] conversion should not be denied solely on the basis that the role was created for a specific purpose, another circumstance outside clause 4.2 of the Directive exists or that there was not a substantive permanent vacancy;
  • The principles in clause 4.2 of the Directive are a non-exhaustive list and may be considerations which inform the assessment of genuine operational requirements of the Department,[12] but are not threshold questions or blanket reasons to deny appointment;
  • The Department did not have regard to the full extent of its genuine operational requirements which should have been taken into account;
  • The decision is unfair and unreasonable as Department has not provided the material findings of fact and the evidence relied upon to make the decision as required by the Directive,[13] and s 27B of the Acts Interpretations Act 1954 (Qld) ('AIA'); and
  • Noting his work history, knowledge and value, Mr Weerasekera contends that if he was appointed to the position it would support the operational requirements of the Department by ensuring the prompt and efficient functioning of QSS.

Submissions of the Department

  1. [20]
    The Department contends, for reasons set out in their submissions dated 26 November 2020, that genuine operational requirements preclude Mr Weerasekera's permanent appointment at the higher level. In summary, it submits that:
  • Citing clauses 4.2 and 6.2 of the Directive and s 149C(4A) of the PS Act, the purpose of Mr Weerasekera's temporary placement is to backfill the substantive employee who is relieving in an alternate position;
  • Once the substantive returns to their position, there would no longer be a continuing need for Mr Weerasekera to be in the position and the Department does not have a genuine operational need to permanently employee two full-time employees in the same AO6 position, as this is not appropriate or viable;
  • The decision was fair and reasonable as, per clause 4.2 of the Directive, it is appropriate to temporarily engage Mr Weerasekera in the circumstances as his skills are only temporarily required prior to the permanent employee returning to their substantive position; and
  • As required by the Directive and s 27B of the AIA, the Department provided the material findings of fact and evidence relied upon to come to the decision, and the requirements in s 149C(5)(a)-(c) of the PS Act were contained in the written notice provided to Mr Weerasekera on 27 October 2020. The Department notes the requirement in 149C(5)(d) did not apply as no previous or deemed decisions had been made in relation to Mr Weerasekera.

Reply submissions of Mr Weerasekera

  1. [21]
    In correspondence received on 4 December 2020, Mr Weerasekera chose not to provide reply submissions.

Consideration

The decision of Holcombe

  1. [22]
    The submissions of the parties in this matter were filed at around the time of the release of the decision by Commissioner McLennan in the matter of Holcombe v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) (‘Holcombe’).[14] Neither party has made reference to Holcombe in their submissions.
  1. [23]
    In Holcombe the Commission found that:[15]

The PS Act, at s 149C(1)(c), provides that s 149 applies to a public service employee if they are eligible for appointment to the position. Further, s 149C(3) provides that the employee may ask to be appointed to the position at the higher classification level. The power afforded to the department to permanently appoint Mrs Holcombe is confined to the position into which he has been seconded at the time of the review. That can be contrasted with the entitlement to request a review, which merely requires that, amongst other things, a person be engaged in a higher classification level for a period. The term ‘the position’ is inherently more specific than ‘higher classification level’; many positions could be described as being of a higher classification level.

In that way, it can be said that an employee may be entitled to a review after engaging in a number of positions, but the review must be conducted against a precise position.

…

The PS Act at s 149C, in concert with the Directive, creates a framework where if a person has been acting at a higher classification for a particular period, they may be permanently appointed to the position they occupy. There is no contemplation in those materials that the meaning of the position would be so broad as to encapsulate any position with the same title and classification anywhere in the workplace, or the city, or indeed the State.

By way of contrast, a broader ambit of the type proposed by Mrs Holcombe is expressly imparted in other conversion reviews which immediately precede s 149C. In conducting a temporary employment review under ss 149A and 149B, the department’s chief executive may convert an employee to permanency if there is a continuing need for someone to be employed in the person’s role, or a role that is substantially the same. Following the review, the department chief executive may “offer to convert the person’s employment basis to employment as a general employee on tenure or a public service officer”. Therefore, the review is conducted against not only the present role, but a role which is substantially the same, and any appointment is not inherently tied to a particular position identified by a number.

The language of s 149C is narrower: the employee may ask the department’s chief executive to appoint the employee to the position at the higher classification level as a general employee on tenure or a public service officer. That does not empower the department chief executive to review the employee against positions which are substantially the same or appoint them to another comparable position. The power is expressly confined to the position occupied by the employee at that time.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [24]
    The material provided by the parties does not make clear whether Mr Weerasekera has been acting in the same position since 2018. The decision makes reference to Mr Weerasekera ‘performing the duties of AO6, Senior Consultant’ but then twice refers to Mr Weerasekera having been engaged in ‘the position’ and a reference to that engagement being extended 13 times.
  2. [25]
    None of the submissions filed by either party makes reference to any history of filling multiple positions at the AO6 level with the title ‘Senior Consultant’. In the circumstances it is not open for me to make assumptions on this important factual issue.
  1. [26]
    On the material before me, the only conclusion open to me is that the position that Mr  Weerasekera was in at the time he made his application for permanent appointment is a position that is substantively held by another employee. It is this position against which his application must be considered.
  1. [27]
    The presence of an incumbent employee gives rise to some difficulties for Mr Weerasekera.

Genuine operational requirements

  1. [28]
    The grounds relied on to refuse Mr Weerasekera’s request are singular and clear. The Department contends that the position in which Mr Weerasekera was working at the time of his application is substantively owned by another employee and that Mr Weerasekera has been backfilling while that employee is relieving elsewhere.
  1. [29]
    Mr Weerasekera’s submissions contend that neither the PS Act nor the Directive expressly state that the presence of a substantive position holder precludes permanent appointment to the higher classification. The submission then, somewhat illogically, seeks to conclude that the absence of such an express reference somehow invalidates consideration of the presence of a substantive position holder. This submission is not dissimilar to the appellant’s submissions in Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women).[16]
  1. [30]
    With respect to Mr Weerasekera, the absence of an express reference to factual scenarios that preclude permanent appointment does not exclude those scenarios from being valid grounds to refuse a permanent appointment to the higher classification. 
  1. [31]
    In Morison the Deputy President observed:[17]

Ms Morison submits that neither the PS Act or Directive include a role being substantively vacant as a prerequisite for appointment to the higher classification level. However, s 149C(4A)(a) of the PS Act and cl 6.2(a) of the Directive provide that the department's chief executive, in making a decision about a relevant request for an employee to be appointed to the position at the higher classification level, must have regard to the 'genuine operational requirements of the department'.

The phrase 'genuine operational requirements of the department' is not defined in the PS Act or in the Directive. As a consequence, that phrase must take its meaning from the words used in it and the context in which it appears in the PS Act; and consideration of the context includes surrounding provisions, what may be drawn from other aspects of the instrument, the instrument as a whole and it extends to what the instrument seeks to remedy. The same considerations apply to the construction of the same phrase in cl 6.2(a) of the Directive.

The adjective 'genuine' relevantly means '... being truly such; real; authentic.' The phrase 'operational requirements of the department' is obviously a broad term that permits a consideration of many matters depending upon the particular circumstances of the department at a particular time. In considering the context of s 149C(4A)(a) of the PS Act, the chief executive of a department, under the PS Act, is responsible for, amongst other things:

  • managing the department in a way that promotes the effective, efficient and appropriate management of public resources; and
  • planning human resources, including ensuring the employment in the department of persons on a fixed term temporary or casual basis occurs only if there is a reason for the basis of employment under the PS Act.

In respect of the Directive, cl 4.2 provides that secondment to or assuming the duties and responsibilities of a higher classification level should only be used when permanent appointment to the role is not viable or appropriate. That clause goes on to provide that circumstances that would support the temporary engagement of an employee at a higher classification level include:

  • when an existing employee takes a period of leave such as parental, long service, recreation or long-term sick leave and needs to be replaced until the date of their expected return; or
  • when an existing employee is absent to perform another role within their agency, or is on secondment, and the agency does not use permanent relief pools for those types of roles.

The phrase '... genuine operational requirements of the department' in s 149C(4A)(a) and in cl 6.2(a) of the Directive, construed in context, would at least include whether or not there was an authentic need, having regard to the effective, efficient and appropriate management of the public resources of the department, to appoint an employee, who has been assuming the duties and responsibilities of a higher classification level in the department for the requisite period of time, to '...the position at the higher classification level.'

There can be no dispute that the reason Ms Morison is presently acting in the higher classification level in position number 7021866 is that the incumbent of that position is on special leave. However, the incumbent may return from such leave. That was a relevant matter for Ms Matebau to have considered in deciding the request made by Ms Morison. Put another way, in having regard to genuine operational requirements of the Department, it was relevant for Ms Matebau to consider whether, in terms of managing the Department in a way that promoted the effective, efficient and appropriate management of public resources, Ms  Morison  should be appointed to position number 7021866 when it was possible the incumbent was likely to return to that position.

Ms Morison does contend that requirement was not genuine.

For the reasons given above, in my view, this aspect of Ms Matebau's decision was fair and reasonable.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [32]
    In Mr Weerasekera’s case, while there is no submission as to the likely return of the employee who substantively holds the position, there is no dispute that the position is substantively owned and, at the time of the decision, Mr Weerasekera’s appointment had  a designated end date. There is no submission from Mr Weerasekera questioning these facts.  
  1. [33]
    While the PS Act or the Directive do not include an express reference to the impact of an incumbent employee on such an application, Morison makes clear that the impending return of an incumbent employee would be a relevant consideration for the purposes of considering genuine operational requirements.[18]
  1. [34]
    Further, in this instance there is no submission from the Department setting out a likely or impending return by the employee who substantively owns the position. In my view this does not invite a different conclusion to that reached in Morison. If there were evidence that the substantive owner had or was about to relinquish their ownership of the position, then that might bear some consideration. But that is not the case here.
  1. [35]
    In these circumstances, the decision to refuse to permanently appoint Mr Weerasekera on this basis is fair and reasonable.

Adequacy of reasons

  1. [36]
    Mr Weerasekera further contends that the reasons contained in the decision are inadequate. It is trite to observe that inadequate reasons will likely  produce a finding that a decision is unfair or unreasonable.
  1. [37]
    Deputy President Merrell address the question of adequacy of reasons in Morison where he said:

Although his reasons were very brief, read in context, Ms Matebau's decision, in the third paragraph, refers to that reason as being a genuine operational requirement of the Department not to permanently appoint Ms Morison to the position at the higher classification level.

  1. [38]
    The reason provided in the decision are simple and singular. Mr Weerasekera’s application was refused because the position for which he was applying was substantively held by another employee. While more could always be said, it does not follow that more elaborate reasons will remedy any unfairness. Conversely, concise reasons are not rendered unfair or unreasonable by their brevity alone. Having regard to his submissions, there is no question that Mr Weerasekera was fully informed of and understood the reasons for the decision.
  1. [39]
    In all of these circumstances, I consider the decision to be fair and reasonable.
  1. [40]
    For completeness I add that submissions by Mr Weerasekera seeking to invoke the reasoning in Katae are misconceived given the fundamental differences in the language contained in the (now defunct) directive that was the subject of Katae and the Directive.  

Order

  1. [41]
    In the circumstances I make the following order:
  1. The decision appealed against is confirmed.

Footnotes

[1] Directive 13/20: Appointing a public service employee to a higher classification level cl 6.2(a).

[2] Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) ss 27, 149B(5)(a).

[3] Appeal Notice filed 13 November 2020, page 6.

[4] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B.

[5] Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10.

[6] Goodall v State of Queensland (unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5.

[7] Ibid.

[8]  Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(3).

[9] Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252, 60-61.

[10] Explanatory Memorandum, Public Service and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2020 (Qld) 3; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, 39-40; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 232, 348; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, 350 [26].

[11] [2018] QSC 225.

[12] Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 149C(4A).

[13] Directive 13/20 Appointing a public service employee to a higher classification level cl 7.1

[14] [2020] QIRC 195.

[15] Ibid, 16 [48], 17 [54]-[56].

[16] [2020] QIRC 203.

[17] Ibid, [36]-[44].

[18] Crofts v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2021] QIRC 083, [48].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Weerasekera v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Weerasekera v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works)

  • MNC:

    [2021] QIRC 97

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Dwyer IC

  • Date:

    24 Mar 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1995] HCA 10
Cite 2 - [1995] HCA 10
Crofts v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2021] QIRC 83
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 83
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 83
Holcombe v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2020] QIRC 195
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 195
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 195
Cite 3 - [2020] QIRC 195
Katae v State of Queensland [2018] QSC 225
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QSC 225
Cite 2 - [2018] QSC 225
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) 162 CLR 24
Cite 2 - (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2013) 249 CLR 332
Cite 2 - (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 232
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 206 CLR 232
Cite 2 - (2001) 206 CLR 232
Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2020] QIRC 203
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 203
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 203
Cite 3 - [2020] QIRC 203
Page v Thompson [2014] QSC 252
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QSC 252
Cite 2 - [2014] QSC 252

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.