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O'Neill v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service)[2022] QIRC 308

O'Neill v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service)[2022] QIRC 308

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

O'Neill v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) [2022] QIRC 308

PARTIES:

O'Neill, Daniel

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service)

(Respondent)

CASE NO.:

PSA/2022/416

PROCEEDING:

Public Service Appeal – Fair Treatment Decision

DELIVERED ON:

9 August 2022

MEMBER:

Power IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDER:

Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SERVICE – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – Public Service Appeal – appellant sought an exemption to COVID-19 vaccination requirements of the QAS Human Resources Policy – Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Requirements – exemption was refused – decision to deny exemption fair and reasonable

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), ss 562B and 562C

Public Service Act 2008 (Qld), s 194

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld), s 48

CASES:

Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 183 CLR 245

Brasell-Dellow & Ors v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service) & Ors [2021] QIRC 356

Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No. 2) [2022] QIRC 016

Gilmour v Waddell & Ors [2019] QSC 170

Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018)

Grundkvist v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 135

Higgins v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 030

Slykerman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 039

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    Mr Daniel O'Neill ('the Appellant') is employed by the State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) ('QAS'; 'the Respondent') as a Clinical Support Officer ('CSO'), Clinical Education Unit in the Central Queensland Region.
  1. [2]
    On 13 September 2021, the QAS Human Resource Procedure – COVID-19 Vaccine Requirements ('the Procedure') was published, with the effective date on 12 October 2021. The Procedure requires all existing and prospective employees who fall within a 'high risk group'[1] to receive the first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 30 September 2021 and a second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 31 October 2021. The Procedure provides that vaccination requirements detailed within the Procedure are a mandatory condition of employment.
  1. [3]
    The Procedure provides that an exemption application will be considered where the employee has a recognised medical contraindication, the employee has a genuinely held religious belief and/or where another exceptional circumstance exists.[2]
  1. [4]
    On 30 September 2021, the Appellant submitted an 'Employee COVID-19 vaccine exemption application form' (the 'exemption application'), seeking for an exemption from obtaining any COVID-19 vaccination based on 'other exceptional circumstances' in accordance with the Procedure. In support of the exemption application, the Appellant provided letters from Kennedy Spanner Lawyers dated 27 and 29 September 2021, outlining concerns regarding, inter alia, the lack of appropriate consultation, lack of risk assessments, lack of proper consideration of alternative measures, notice period for implementation of the Procedure and the impact on human rights.
  1. [5]
    On 31 January 2022, the Procedure was replaced by the QAS Human Resources Policy – Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Requirements ('the Policy'), which required that all existing employees must have received the first and second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 27 February 2022. The Policy outlines that the mandatory requirement to be vaccinated against COVID-19 applies to all existing and prospective employees who work in the following cohorts within QAS:
  1. (a)
    all QAS employees working in or providing services to residential aged care facilities and residential aged care within a multipurpose health service;
  1. (b)
    all QAS employees who are employed to work in a hospital or other healthcare setting where clinical care or support is provided; and
  1. (c)
    all other QAS employees who are employed in roles that require attendance at a hospital or other facility where clinical care or support is provided.
  1. [6]
    The Policy provides for the same basis as the Procedure upon which an exemption to the vaccination requirements could be considered.
  1. [7]
    On 1 February 2022, the Respondent informed the Appellant of the Policy which replaced the Procedure. As the exemption application had yet to be decided, the Appellant was provided with the following options:

Option 1

You may advise, within 7 days from the date of this letter, that you intend to receive the first and second dose of a COVID-19 vaccination by 27 February 2022 and seek to withdraw your application for an exemption to the COVID-19 vaccination requirements

Option 2

You may advise, within 7 days from the date of this letter, that your existing application for an exemption to the COVID-19 vaccination requirements contained under the former QAS HR Procedure remains relevant and you wish for that to be considered under the provisions of the new QAS HR Policy, with no amendments

Option 3

You may advise, within 7 days from the date of this letter, that your existing application for an exemption to the COVID-19 vaccination requirements contained under the former QAS HR Procedure remains relevant and you wish for that to be considered under the provisions of the new QAS HR Policy with any updated or additional information to be submitted and included in your response.

  1. [8]
    By letter dated 17 February 2022, Mr Ray Clarke, Executive Director, Workforce, advised the Appellant that his exemption application had been refused. The Appellant was informed that the exemption application was considered under the provisions of the Policy based on the information that was available as no response was received regarding which option the Appellant wished to undertake. The Appellant was directed to comply with the Policy to receive the first dose and provide confirmation of compliance within seven days from receipt of the letter.
  1. [9]
    On 2 March 2022, the Appellant requested an internal review of the decision to refuse the Appellant's exemption application.
  1. [10]
    On 17 March 2022, Acting Assistant Commissioner Tony Armstrong, Strategic Operations confirmed the decision to refuse the Appellant's exemption application.
  1. [11]
    On 6 April 2022, Supportah Australia Pty Limited trading as Industrial Advocacy Claims, on behalf of the Appellant, filed an appeal notice, appealing against the decision of A/AC Armstrong dated 17 March 2022, pursuant to s 194(1)(eb) of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld).

Appeal principles

  1. [12]
    The appeal must be decided by reviewing the decision appealed against.[3] Because the word 'review' has no settled meaning, it must take its meaning from the context in which it appears.[4] An appeal under ch 11 pt 6 div 4 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') is not by way of rehearing,[5] but involves a review of the decision arrived at and the decision making process associated therewith.
  1. [13]
    The stated purpose of such an appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable.[6] The issue for determination is whether the decision of A/AC Armstrong dated 17 March 2022 to confirm the decision to refuse the Appellant's exemption application was fair and reasonable. Findings which are reasonably open to the decision maker are not expected to be disturbed on appeal.

What decisions can the Industrial Commissioner make?

  1. [14]
    In deciding this appeal, s 562C of the IR Act provides that the Industrial Commissioner may:
  1. (a)
    confirm the decision appealed against; or
  1. (b)
    set the decision aside and substitute another decision; or
  1. (c)
    set the decision aside and return the issue to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate.

Grounds of Appeal

  1. [15]
    As best as I can understand it, the Appellant is seeking for an external review pursuant to cl 9.3(a) of the Individual employee grievances Directive 11/20 contending, broadly, that:
  1. (a)
    the decision was unlawful as the Appellant sought to be consulted with pursuant to the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) ('WHS Act') and was not;
  1. (b)
    as a result of the Appellant not being heard as part of the decision making process, the Respondent has not 'discharged' the Individual employee grievances Directive 11/20;
  1. (c)
    the decision makers involved were unknown people in the review committee who may have had a conflict of interest; and
  1. (d)
    the obligation to follow the principles of natural justice was not fulfilled.

Submissions

  1. [16]
    A Directions Order was issued calling for submissions from both parties following receipt of the appeal notice. The submissions are summarised below.

Appellant's submissions

  1. [17]
    The Appellant subsequently appointed QNurses First Inc. as agent for the matter who filed submissions on behalf of the Appellant.
  1. [18]
    The Appellant submits that the Policy breached the Appellant's contract of employment. The Appellant highlights that he has at least one employment contract which limits the type of immunisation and does not include COVID-19 vaccines. Further, the Policy is inconsistent with general contractual principles to the extent that the Policy unilaterally amends the Appellant's employment contract.
  1. [19]
    The Appellant submits that neither the chief executive or delegate has made a valid determination of the exemption application as contemplated in the Policy and that both the initial decision and the internal review decision to confirm the refusal of the exemption application was ultra vires.
  1. [20]
    The Appellant submits that the implementation of the direction to be vaccinated and subsequent handling of the exemption process were conducted contrary to workplace health and safety legislation, submitting the following:
  1. 4.1Not established whether any employee can ever be compelled to take medical treatment in the course of employment.
  1. 4.2Whether risk assessment ought to have been conducted? This would have taken into account the specific circumstances of each employee.
  1. 4.3The effect on the Human Rights of the affected staff are overlooked: no detailed reasons given as to how the requirement to adhere to the Directive does not offend any Human Rights enjoyed by the Appellant, either as established by Statute or at Common Law.
  1. 4.4It would presently appear that QAS would not assume liability for any adverse reactions from the employees forcibly taking the vaccine, sidestepping s 46 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003.
  1. 4.5QAS HR Procedure: that the policy has regard to the nature of the work undertaken by QAS staff, therefore to a stricter standard, but does not absolve duties either at Common Law or pursuant to Statute.
  1. 4.6Noting s 284 of the IR Act establishes workplace rights to include other industrial law. The Appellant was merely exercising industrial rights afforded to them under s 46 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) ('WHS Act'), and asking that the duties owed to them by the employer per s 20 of the WHS Act were abided by.
  1. 4.7The purpose of the exemption request under special circumstances was to wait until the entitlements and obligations afforded under the WHS Act were fulfilled.
  1. 4.8At the time of the exemption being refused and to date, the Respondent employer has not fulfilled these obligations by consulting with the appellant, nor exploring risk assessment avenues specific to their role or business area.
  1. [21]
    The Appellant made further submissions relating to a disciplinary process which does not appear to relate to the decision to confirm the refusal of the Appellant's exemption application.

Respondent's submissions

  1. [22]
    The Respondent submits that the decision to confirm the refusal of the Appellant's exemption application was fair and reasonable. The Respondent submits, in summary, that:
  1. (a)
    the Appellant's role requires close contact with in-field officers while delivering and supervising coaching activities and also be present to provide health care;
  1. (b)
    A/AC Armstrong carefully considered the Appellant's submissions and weighed it against the objects and requirements of the Policy;
  1. (c)
    exemption applications are considered on an individual basis, weighed against the Respondent's health and safety obligations and are only approved in exceptional circumstances having regard to the public health risk posed by COVID-19;
  1. (d)
    the Appellant did not demonstrate any exceptional or extenuating circumstances relating to him as an individual that justified the granting of an exemption. The correspondence from Kennedy Spanner Lawyers raising concerns surrounding the vaccine and the vaccination requirements did not identify any extenuating circumstances relating to the Appellant as an individual;
  1. (e)
    A/AC Armstrong determined there was no other less restrictive means, other than vaccination, which would sufficiently ensure the safety of the Appellant, other staff, patients and the public;
  1. (f)
    the Appellant did not provide any evidence of a medical condition which meant he was unable to be safely administered the current vaccines and it is clear from the material that the Appellant is hesitant about receiving a COVID-19 vaccine which is not an exceptional circumstance;
  1. (g)
    the Appellant has provided no evidence that a real or perceived conflict of interest existed and A/AC Armstrong came to his decision to confirm the refusal independently;
  1. (h)
    the Appellant has not been deprived of consent with respect to receiving a COVID-19 vaccine and remains free to not receive a COVID-19 vaccine; and
  1. (i)
    the Appellant's human rights were considered and A/AC Armstrong determined that any limitation to the Appellant's human rights was justified by the need to ensure the readiness of the health system in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic and to protect the lives of employees, patients and the community.
  1. [23]
    The Respondent submits that the Policy is based on the Chief Health Officer's ('CHO') directions regarding workers in healthcare settings and hospital entries. The Respondent submits that, as the CHO is the more senior medical officer in Queensland, the Policy is both lawful and reasonable.
  1. [24]
    With respect to the Appellant's contention that the Respondent failed to undertake consultation or a risk assessment, the Respondent submits the following:

… QAS employees have access to information in respect to safety and efficacy of vaccination. QAS is part of the Department of Health. The Department complied with its obligations under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 to consult with employees and with registered unions representing employees in relation to the introduction of the vaccine mandate. The consultation included dedicated meetings with registered unions representing employees employed within the Department. The Work Health and Safety Act 2011 imposes a duty to consult so far as is reasonably practicable. What is reasonably practicable will depend on the individual circumstances, including the number of the workforce. Registered unions may negotiate with employers, not only on behalf of their members, but also on behalf of workers who are eligible for membership. Where registered unions agree with vaccine mandate 'consultation reached the level where the directive was not a matter of contention'.[7]

Further, there is no lawful basis upon which Mr O'Neil (sic) can request access to a risk assessment undertaken by QAS in relation to vaccines, and proof he is a heightened risk of transmission. The COVID-19 vaccinations have been approved by the Therapeutic Goods Administration and the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation. The TGA's approval of relevant vaccines is a matter of public record and is evidence of their safety and efficacy. QAS was not required to provide Mr O'Neil (sic) with assurances concerning the safety or efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccines, and was not required to do its own risk assessment of the vaccines.

Appellant's submissions in reply

  1. [25]
    In reply to the Respondent's submissions, the Appellant submits, in summary, that:
  1. (a)
    the consultation process at QAS had not reached the point of non-contention and it was 'likely more arduous for the employer to have commenced exemption review and disciplinary processes than it would have to simply consult with the workforce, or at the very least those who had raised concerns'. Accordingly, the Respondent did not do all that was reasonably practicable to consult with the workforce;
  1. (b)
    negotiations between the Respondent and registered unions, without the opportunity for reply from a significant portion of the workforce who are not members of registered unions, amounts to a 'rubber-stamping' process from the Respondent;
  1. (c)
    having an individual bargaining agent is an 'equally uncontroversial view' in the modern industrial relations system where employers are required to allow employees the opportunity to use a private bargaining agent;
  1. (d)
    simply providing information is not satisfactory consultation, noting that s 48(1) of the WHS Act requires employers to express their views and contribute to the decision making process;
  1. (e)
    the Appellant did not seek a risk assessment solely on the vaccines, rather, sought for an assessment to be undertaken for their work environment in determining whether alternatives existed that would allow employees to continue to work;
  1. (f)
    clause 24 of the Workers in a healthcare setting (COVID-19 Vaccination Requirements) Direction (No. 4) allows for routine testing instead of vaccination where there is a critical workforce shortage;
  1. (g)
    the Appellant was never engaged in good faith discussions regarding his options. Where the Respondent fulfilled their obligations regarding consultation under the WHS Act and industrial instruments, the decision to confirm the refusal of the Appellant's exemption application would likely not have been seen as unfair and unreasonable; and
  1. (h)
    the Respondent's engagement in this process with the Appellant has been 'one-sided'. As demonstrate by the protracted timeline of this dispute, there was ample time for the Appellant's concerns to be heard and for alternative options to be discussed, even if the options were non-existent.

Consideration

  1. [26]
    Consideration of an appeal of this kind requires a review of the decision by A/AC Armstrong to determine if the refusal of the Appellant's exemption application was fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
  1. [27]
    The only power the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission ('the Commission') has in this appeal is to make an order pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) or (c) of the IR Act, which is to confirm the decision appealed against, or to set aside the decision appealed against and substitute another decision or return the matter to the decision maker. The other issues raised by the Appellant are beyond the scope of this appeal.[8]
  1. [28]
    The employee COVID-19 vaccine exemption application provides that employees may seek an exemption to the vaccination requirements set out in the Policy in circumstances where the employee has a recognised medical contraindication to the COVID-19 vaccine, where the employee has refused the COVID-19 vaccine on grounds of a genuinely held religious belief or other exceptional circumstances which preclude them from meeting the COVID-19 vaccination requirements.
  1. [29]
    The Appellant applied for an exemption from compliance with the Policy requirement to receive a COVID-19 vaccination on the basis of 'other exceptional circumstances'. The correspondence provided in support of his application outlined concerns regard the risks and safety of the vaccine, concerns regarding a lack of risk assessment and the impact on human rights.
  1. [30]
    The Appellant's exemption application was referred to an independent panel in the Department of Health who provided a recommendation to Mr Clarke that his application be refused. A/AC Armstrong then conducted an internal review of this decision upon the request of the Appellant and made the following determination:

Having reviewed the material and explanation provided to you, I am satisfied that Mr Clarke adequately considered and addressed the matters raised by you in determining your request for an exemption and that your concerns do not constitute 'another exceptional circumstance'.

In conducting a review of the decision by Mr Clarke, I am required to have regard to the information presented before me. I reaffirm it is the position of the QAS that there are no less restrictive means other than vaccination (including in conjunction with other control measures) which are open to the organisation to keep you, your colleagues, and persons accessing healthcare safe.

In the broader context of your role and taking into account the ongoing risks associated with the operating environment of the QAS impacted by COVID-19, I do not consider that the grounds contained in your exemption application constitute sufficient rationale to justify an exemption from the requirement for vaccination when having regard for the exemption framework provided or the obligations of the QAS as an employer under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011.

...

  1. [31]
    The Appellant submits that his human rights have been overlooked, however I am satisfied that the decision demonstrated appropriate consideration of human rights. I note the decision states the following:

The QAS HR Policy makes vaccination compulsory for certain workers and others in specific circumstances to protect the community during the pandemic. I acknowledge that my decision may engage a number of your human rights, including your right to recognition and equality before the law, and your right to take part in public life (through employment in the public service). I am satisfied that any limits on human rights engaged are justified by the need to ensure the readiness of the health system in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, to protect the lives of employees, patients and the community they serve and to discharge the QAS's legal obligations, including under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011. I do not consider there is any less restrictive means, other than vaccination, which would sufficiently ensure your safety and the safety of other staff and patients.

  1. [32]
    It remains a matter for the Appellant to determine if he obtains a COVID-19 vaccination, however there may be consequences for his employment if he chooses not to do so.
  1. [33]
    The Policy is based on the CHO's direction regarding workers in healthcare setting and has been determined to be lawful and reasonable in a number of similar matters.[9] Since 10 November 2021, a worker in healthcare must not enter, work in, or provide services in a 'healthcare setting' unless the worker in healthcare complies with the COVID-19 vaccination requirements. It was reasonable for the QAS to implement the Policy to ensure it complied with the CHO Direction. The Appellant is employed as a CSO which is considered to fall within a high-risk group and consequently, is a person to whom the Procedure, and the subsequent Policy applies.
  1. [34]
    The Appellant submits that the QAS failed to undertake adequate consultation. A similar consultation process in another Queensland public service agency has been considered and determined by the Full Bench of the Commission to be reasonable in the circumstances.[10] The Respondent complied with its obligations to consult with employees and with the registered unions representing employees in relation to the vaccine mandate. The decision maker was not compelled to accept the Appellant's submissions that further consultation was required.
  1. [35]
    The Appellant's submissions relating to his request for a risk assessment was also addressed reasonably by the decision maker. As has been noted in many other similar matters, there is no lawful basis upon which the Appellant can request access to a risk assessment.[11]
  1. [36]
    The Appellant submits that the Policy 'unilaterally amends the Appellant's employment contract'. This submission is not accepted on the basis that the requirement to obtain a COVID-19 vaccination is a lawful and reasonable direction by the employer and is not an amendment to an employment contract.
  1. [37]
    Deputy President Merrell determined in Grundkvist v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[12] that the basis of an exemption application on 'exceptional circumstances' must concern circumstances that affect or concern the appellant as an individual employee as opposed to circumstances which concern all or a large group of employees. When considering a similar exemption regime in the Queensland Police Service in Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No. 2),[13] Deputy President Merrell stated:

It seems to me that construed in context, for an exemption of the kind referred to in paragraphs 8 or 9 of Direction No. 12 to be granted, the grounds for the exemption must relate to the employee as an individual. This can be seen in respect of the exemptions that may be granted on medical or religious grounds. Similarly, in my view, the '... other exceptional circumstances' basis for an exemption concern circumstances that affect or concern the individual employee as opposed to general circumstances which may concern all or a large group of the members of the Service.[14]

  1. [38]
    The Appellant's submissions can be characterised generally as objecting to the Policy on the basis that the Appellant does not accept that the Policy is reasonable or lawful. These submissions do not support the premise that there are exceptional circumstances affecting the Appellant that should have reasonably formed the basis for an exemption. In the absence of extenuating circumstances relating to the Appellant as an individual, it was open to the decision maker to confirm the decision to deny the exemption application.
  1. [39]
    The relevant principles in considering whether a decision is 'unreasonable' were outlined by Ryan J in Gilmour v Waddell & Ors:[15] 

The focus of a review of the reasonableness, or unreasonableness, of a decision is on whether the decision is so unreasonable that it lacks intelligent justification in all of the relevant circumstances.

The legal standard of unreasonableness is to be considered by reference to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute conferring the power.

A court considering an argument that a decision is unreasonable is not undertaking a merits review. If a decision may be reasonably justified, then it is not an unreasonable decision, even if a reviewing court might disagree with it.[16]

  1. [40]
    Applying the principles outlined above, I do not consider that the decision lacks justification in the circumstances. Based on the information before me, I am satisfied that the internal review decision confirming the decision not to grant the Appellant an exemption under the Policy was fair and reasonable.
  1. [41]
    I order accordingly.

Order

Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against is confirmed.

Footnotes

[1] 'High risk group' is identified under cl 3.3.2 of the Procedure.

[2] The Procedure, cl 3.6.2.

[3] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(2) ('IR Act').

[4] Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 183 CLR 245, 261.

[5] Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5 as to the former, equivalent provisions in s 201 of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld).

[6] IR Act s 562B(3).

[7] citing Brasell-Dellow & Ors v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service) & Ors [2021] QIRC 356 ('Brasell-Dellow').

[8] Grundkvist v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 135.

[9] Slykerman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 039; Higgins v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 030.

[10] Brasell-Dellow (n 7).

[11] Ibid.

[12] [2022] QIRC 135.

[13] [2022] QIRC 016.

[14] Ibid [54].

[15] [2019] QSC 170.

[16] Ibid [207]-[209].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    O'Neill v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    O'Neill v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service)

  • MNC:

    [2022] QIRC 308

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Power IC

  • Date:

    09 Aug 2022

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Brandy v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245
2 citations
Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10
2 citations
Brasell-Dellow v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 356
2 citations
Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No. 2) [2022] QIRC 16
3 citations
Gilmour v Waddell [2019] QSC 170
3 citations
Goodall v State of Queensland [2018] QSC 319
2 citations
Grundkvist v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 135
3 citations
Higgins v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 30
2 citations
Slykerman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 39
2 citations

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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