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  4. Callen v Queensland Ambulance Service - [2022] QIRC 319

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Callen v Queensland Ambulance Service[2022] QIRC 319

Callen v Queensland Ambulance Service[2022] QIRC 319

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Callen v Queensland Ambulance Service [2022] QIRC 319

PARTIES: 

Barry, Callen

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

PSA/2022/206

PROCEEDING:

Public Service Appeal – appeal against a discplinary decision

DELIVERED ON:

15 August 2022

MEMBER:

Hartigan IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDER:

  1. Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) the decision appealed against is confirmed.
  1. Pursuant to s 566(1)(b) of the Industrial Relations act 2016 (Qld), the stay of the decision issued on 8 February 2022 is revoked.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SERVICE APPEAL – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – public service appeal – where appellant seeks review of the disciplinary decision pursuant to s 194(1)(b)(i) of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) – where appellant submits that finding decision is unfair and unreasonable – where disciplinary finding decision fair and reasonable – where disciplinary finding decision confirmed – stay of decision revoked

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), ss 562B and 562C

Public Service Act 2008 (Qld), ss 194

Ambulance Service Act 1991 (Qld), ss 18A and 18B

CASES:

Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245

Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018)

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    Mr Barry Callen is employed by the Queensland Ambulance Service ('the QAS') as a Critical Care Paramedic (CCP) at the North Lakes Ambulance Station on a permanent basis.
  1. [2]
    Mr Callen's employment with the QAS is regulated by the provisions of the Ambulance Service Act 1991 (Qld) ('Ambulance Service Act').[1]
  1. [3]
    Mr Callen seeks to appeal a discplinary finding decision of the QAS.
  1. [4]
    On 14 January 2022, following a show cause process, a disciplinary finding decision was made which substantiated the following three allegations:

Allegation One

That on multiple occasions between 30 November 2018 and 30 June 2020, you inappropriately logged on to the QAS iROAM system when you were not on duty.

Allegation Two

That on multiple occasions between 30 November 2018 and 30 June 2020, you inappropriately accessed an Incident Details Report when you were not on duty.

Allegation Three

You inappropriately provided [an] Officer access to your QAS username and password for her use.

(collectively, 'the allegations').

  1. [5]
    No decision has yet been made with respect to the imposition of the proposed discplinary action.
  1. [6]
    By appeal notice filed in the Industrial Registry on 4 February 2022, Mr Callen appealed against the discplinary finding decision of 14 January 2022, which determined to substantiate the allegations, pursuant to s 194(1)(b)(i) of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) ('the PS Act').
  1. [7]
    On 8 February 2022, this Commission ordered that the decision subject of this appeal be stayed until further determination of the appeal or further order of the Commission pursuant to s 566(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act').
  1. [8]
    Sections 562B(2) and (3) of the IR Act, which commenced operation on 14 September 2020, replicates the now repealed ss 201(1) and (2) of the PS Act..[2]  Section 562B(3) of the IR Act provides that the purpose of an appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair or reasonable. Accordingly, the issue for my determination in this appeal is whether the decision is fair and reasonable.
  1. [9]
    I must decide the appeal by reviewing the decision appealed against.  The word 'review' has no settled meaning and, accordingly, it must take its meaning from the context in which it appears.[3] An appeal under Ch. 7, Pt. 1 of the PS Act is not a re-hearing but, rather, involves a review of the decision arrived at and the decision-making process associated with it.[4]
  1. [10]
    For the reasons contained herein, I have found that the decision was fair and reasonable.

Relevant background and decision

  1. [11]
    On 29 June 2021, the QAS asked Mr Callen to show cause in relation to allegations concerning Mr Callen's alleged inappropriate use of the QAS's iROAM system during the period of 30 November 2018 and 30 June 2020 and inappropriately providing Officer X,[5] with whom Mr Callen worked, his QAS username and password.
  1. [12]
    Sometime prior to October 2020, the QAS referred the allegations to the Department of Health, Ethical Standards Unit ('ESU') for assessment. The ESU returned the assessment to the QAS and advised it 'suspected corrupt conduct'. The ESU also recommended that the matter be referred to the Queensland Police Service for their consideration on an account of the private patient information contained within the QAS iROAM system.
  1. [13]
    On 9 October 2020, Mr Callen was suspended form duty in relation to the allegations the subject of this appeal.
  1. [14]
    On 19 October 2020, the Queensland Police Service interviewed Mr Callen in relation to the allegations.[6]
  1. [15]
    By letter dated 29 June 2021, the QAS asked Mr Callen to show cause in relation to the allegations.
  1. [16]
    On 12 July 2021, Mr Callen's then legal representative provided a response to the show cause notice. The QAS sought further information to verify the responses that had been provided.
  1. [17]
    On 13 October 2021, the QAS provided the further information and provided Mr Callen with an opportunity to respond. 
  1. [18]
    On 3 November 2021, Mr Callen's then legal representative provided a response to the further information provided by the QAS.
  1. [19]
    On 14 January 2022, the decision maker issued Mr Callen the discplinary finding decision, which determined to substantiate the allegations against Mr Callen.
  1. [20]
    In Mr Callen's response dated 12 July 2021, Mr Callen's legal representatives set out a table[7] which provided an overview of the dates and time that Mr Callen's username and password was used to access the QAS's iROAM system. When making its factual findings in relation to Allegation One and Two, the decision maker outlined the relevant dates from Table 1.1 and the corresponding details as follows:

30 November 2018

  • You worked a sick relief shift of 0700 — 1715 hours at North Lakes Pod:
  • you had signed your drug kit back in at 1700 hours; and
  • your username and password were used to
  • log into iROAM at 1932 hours.
  • access IDR for incident 10816564 at 1932 hours; and
  • access IDR for incident 10816535 at 1933 hours

23 December 2018

  • You worked a 1900 — 0700 hours rostered shift on 22 December 2018 at North Lakes Pod;
  • you signed your drug kit over to Officer Cowen at 0700 hours on 23 December 2018;
  • your username and password were used to:
  • log into iROAM at 0750 hours on 23 December 2018;
  • Access IDR for incident 10900055 at 0751.55 hours;
  • Access IDR for incident 10900037 at 0752.21 hours;
  • Access IDR for incident 10900014 at 0752.39 hours; and
  • Access IDR for incident 10899979 at 0753.06 hours.
  • You worked a 1900 — 0700 hours rostered shift on 23 December 2018 at North Lakes pod;
  • you logged onto CAD at 1850 hours on 23 December 2018;
  • you signed your drug kit out at 1900 hours on 23 December 2018; and
  • your username and password were used to:
  • log into iROAM at 1817 hours on 23 December 2018;
  • access IDR for incident 10901600 at 1818.16 hours; and
  • access IDR for incident 10901514 at 1818.48 hours.

1 January 2019

  • You worked a 1900 — 0700 hours rostered shift on 1 January 2019 at North Lakes Pod;
  • you logged onto CAD at 1849 hours on 1 January 2019;
  • [An] Officer signed their drug kit over to you at 1900 hours on 1 January 2019; and
  • your username and password were used to:
  • log into iROAM at 1836 hours on 1 January 2019;
  • access IDR for incident 10931916 at 1836.24 hours; and
  • access IDR for incident 10931881 at 1836.57 hours.

15 February 2019

  • You were on a Rostered Day Off on 15 February 2019; and
  • your username and password were used to log into iROAM at 1446, 2010 and 2019 hours on 15 February 2019.

13 March 2019

  • You worked a 1900 — 0700 hours rostered shift on 12 March 2019 at North Lakes Pod;
  • you signed your drug kit over to [an] Officer at 0700 hours on 13 March 2019; and
  • your username and password were used to:
  • log into iROAM at 0706 and 0933 hours on 13 March 2019.
  • access IDR for incident 11190434 at 0934.16 hours;
  • access IDR for incident 11190424 at 0936.01 hours; and
  • access IDR for incident 11190616 at 1007.02 hours.

31 March 2019

  • You worked a 1900 — 0700 hours sick relief shift on 31 March 2019 at North Lakes Pod;
  • you logged onto CAD at 1852 hours on 31 March 2019;
  • [An] Officer signed their drug kit over to you at 1900 hours on 31 March 2019;
  • your username and password were used to:
  • log into iROAM at 1619 and 1718 hours on 31 March 2019;
  • access IDR for incident 11260769 at 1619.55 hours;
  • access IDR for incident 11260125 at 1630.55 hours; and
  • access for IDR for incident 11260955 at 1718.15 hours

14 April 2019

  • You worked a 0700-1900 hours rostered shift at North Lakes Pod:
  • [An] Officer signed as receiving your drug kit at 1900 hours; and
  • your username and password were used to:
  • log into iROAM at 2137 hours; and
  • access IDR for incident 11312826 at 2138.13 hours

15 April 2019

  • You worked a 1900-0700 hours rostered shift at North Lakes Pod;
  • you logged onto CAD at 1840 hours;
  • [An Officer signed their drug kit over to you at 1900 hours: and
  • your username and password were used to:
  • log into iROAM at 1622 hours; and
  • access IDR for incident 11315605 at 1623.13 hours

14 May 2019

  • You worked a 1900 — 0700 hours sick relief shift at North Lakes Pod;
  • you logged onto CAD at 1826 hours;
  • you signed your drug kit out at 1900 hours; and
  • your username and password were used to:
  • log into iROAM at 1612 and 1635 hours;
  • access IDR for incident 11429503 at 1635.44 hours;
  • access IDR for incident 11429551 at 1639.09 hours; and
  • access IDR for incident 11429433 at 1638.14 hours

30 June 2020

  • You worked a 0700— 1900 rostered shift at North Lakes Pod;
  • you logged onto CAD at 0638 hours;
  • you signed your drug kit out at 0700 hours: and
  • your username and password were used to;
  • log into iROAM at 0629 hours; and
  • access IDR for incident 12985570 at 0630.16 hours.
  1. [21]
    With respect to allegation one, the decision maker considered the dates and the times indicating that Mr Callen logged onto iROAM, as set out at paragraph 20 above and determined as follows:

On all of these occasions you were not logged into CAD and, except 15 February 2019. they were either before or after a shift you did perform, However, if you do not have your drug kit, are not logged into CAD and do not have all of your equipment checks done, then I do not consider you were operational at the time. Therefore, any log on events which occurred when you were not operational, are not considered to be iROAM accesses for work purposes.

…

However, the following dates on which your username and password were used to log in to iROAM, were "denied' by the Officer; therefore, as it is your iROAM account, I consider that you are responsible for these log-on events when you were not on shift

  • 25 December 2018 at 1601 hours
  • 15 February 2019 at 2010 and 2019 hours
  • 16 February 2019 at 0305 hours
  • 7 March 2019 at 1828 and 1956 hours
  • 13 March 2019 at 1521 hours
  • 22 March 2019 at 1534 hours
  • 25 March 2019 at 1944 hours
  • 11 April 2019 at 2231 hours
  • 9 June 2019 at 2035 hours
  • 11 June 2019 at 0021 and 0352 hours
  • 19 June 2019 at 2008 hours
  • 21 September 2019 at 1852 hours
  • 5 November 2019 at 1853 hours
  • 11 January 2020 at 0519 hours
  • 20 January 2020 at 0136 and 0143 hours.

As these log-on times occurred when you were not on shift and operationally ready for duty. I cannot find any justifiable excuse for you to be logging in to ROAM.

The iROAM login screen has a warning that includes the user acknowledges and agrees to

comply with the terms and conditions of use. These are included in the QAS ICT Acceptable Use Policy (the ICT Policy) which provides that OAS ICT systems must be used only for official QAS business purposes. At clause 5.1, the ICT Policy also specifies that users are to protect their user id and passwords at all times and log out of systems when not in use.

Clause 7.2 of the ICT Policy further outlines that misuse includes accesses to QAS information where there is no genuine business need as well as revealing account passwords to others or allow use of their accounts by others.

  1. [22]
    In relation to allegation two, the decision maker considered the relevant dates and the times indicating Mr Callen accessed the IDR for incidents, as set out at paragraph 20 above and determined as follows:

On all of these occasions you were not logged into CAD and, except 15 February 2019, they were either before or after a shift you did perform. However, if you do not have your drug kit, are not logged into CAD and do not have all of your equipment checks done. then I do not consider you were operational at the time Therefore, any IDR accesses which occurred when you were not operational. are not considered to be iROAM accesses for work purposes.

…

However, the following dates on which your username and password were used to access IDRs in iROAM, were "denied" by the Officer; therefore, as it is your iROAM account, i consider that you are responsible for these IDR accesses when you were not on shift:

  • 25 December 2018
  • access IDR for incident 10907305 at 1602.09 hours
  • access IDR for incident 10907297 at 160225 hours
  • 15 February 2019
  • access IDR for incident 1094923 at 2010.53 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11094924 at 2020.50 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11094923 at 2021.00 hours
  • 16 February 2019
  • access IDR for incident 11095825 at 0303.53 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11095825 at 0308.01 hours
  • 7 March 2019
  • access 'DR for incident 11169344 at 1958.26 hours
  • access IDR for incident 1 1169360 at 2004.17 hours
  • 22 March 2019
  • o access IDR for incident 11227381 at 1521.50 hours
  • o access IDR for incident 11227291 at 1535.16 hours
  • 25 March 2019
  • access IDR for incident 11238828 at 1821.40 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11238880 at 182252 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11239042 at 1833.40 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11239141 at 1914.07 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11239170 at 1915.11 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11238599 at 1946.34 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11239276 at 1951.48 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11239596 at 2218.33 hours
  • 26 March 2019
  • access IDR for incident 11239929 at 0013.52 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11240032 at 0140.30 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11240005 at 0141.51 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11239949 at 0142.33 hours
  • access DR for incident 11240032 at 0151.55 hours
  • 11 April 2019
  • access 'DR for incident 11303011 at 2232.30 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11303097 at 2233.39 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11302989 at 2233.55 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11303118 at 2234_22 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11303097 at 2235.23 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11303092 at 2235.34 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11303079 at 224B.12 hours
  • 13 April 2019
  • access IDR for incident 11309679 at 1948.43 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11309636 at 1949.04 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11309556 at 1949.29 hours
  • 18 April 2019
  • access IDR for incident 11334931 at 1615.54 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11340758 at 1616.24 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11340758 at 1616.57 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11340765 at 1617.51 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11340758 at 1617.54 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11340758 at 1627.10 hours
  • 19 April 2019
  • access IDR for incident 11344569 at 2035.14 hours
  • 21 April 2019
  • access IDR for incident 11350555 at 2216.24 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11350534 at 2218.08 hours
  • 30 April 2019
  • o access IDR for incident 11377922 at 0041.26 hours
  • 16 May 2019
  • access IDR for incident 11437364 at 1851.05 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11437863 at 2232.22 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11437860 at 223225 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11437854 at 2232, 53 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11437602 at 2233.29 hours
  • 9 June 2019
  • access IDR for incident 11525774 at 2036.04 hours
  • 11 June 2019
  • access IDR for incident 11530740 at 0022.11 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11530765 at 0030.09 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11530770 at 0030.38 hours
  • access 'DR for incident 11530780 at 0039.24 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11530777 at 0039.27 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11530814 at 0149.24 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11530966 at 035306 hours
  • access IDR for incident 11530933 at 0354.12 hours
  • 19 June 2019
  • access IDR for incident 11565350 at 2009.09 hours
  • 21 September 2019
  • access IDR for incident 11935391 at 1852.48 hours
  • 11 January 2020
  • access IDR for incident 12365934 at 0519.39 hours
  • 20 January 2020
  • o access IDR for incident 12398218 at 0137.11 hours
  • 27 January 2020
  • access IDR for incident 12429964 at 2123.53 hours

As these IDR accesses occurred when you were not on shift and operationally ready for duty, I cannot find any justifiable excuse for you to be using iROAM to access IDRs.

The iROAM login screen has a warning that includes the user acknowledges and agrees to comply with the term and conditions of use. These are included in the QAS ICT Acceptable Use Policy 9 (the ECT Policy) which provides that QAS ICT systems must be used only for official QAS business purposes. At clause 5.1, the ICT Policy also specifies that users are to protect their user id and passwords at all times and log out of systems when not in use.

Clause 7.2 of the ICT Policy further outlines that misuse includes accesses to QAS information where there is no genuine business need as well as revealing account passwords to others or allow use of their accounts by others.

  1. [23]
    In relation to allegation three, the decision maker made the following factual findings:

In your response you advise "you were spending a significant amount of time with the Officer both in your personal time and working overtime shifts. You recall that the Officer would on occasions forget her own username and password and on occasions used your access to complete the eARF.

The sharing of your password started in the context of the Officer being a casual and not having her own iPAD so she would use yours during your shifts together. She also had other personal passwords of yours and that your passwords did include a nickname you had for the Officer.

You say you gave the Officer your QAS login details for the purpose of accessing your roster so that you could coordinate the time when you were both off work together or to potentially work overtime shifts together. However, in the Officer's response, her evidence is that you gave her your username and password to iROAM and provided her with each new password when she requested it.

In your response, you have said that you were not aware that the Officer was using your QAS username and password to access iROAM when she was not working with you and you did not give her permission or encouragement to do so. I note your comment that you thought that the Officer was checking your roster which is why you had no issue with providing her with your password.

Ultimately, you admit to Allegation Three but confirm that you had no knowledge that the Officer was using your login details to access iROAM unless you were working together. You take responsibility for your conduct in relation to this allegation and are sincerely apologetic for your actions.

In your QPS interview, you advised that it is the same password for each application on your iPad. Therefore. regardless of the purpose for which you gave the Officer your password, you knew that she had access to all applications within your iPad, including iROAM. As it is your iROAM account. I consider that you are responsible for all accesses made by that account that have otherwise not been admitted to by the Officer or those of which she is uncertain, The QAS ICT Acceptable Use Policy (the ICT Policy) at clause 5.1, specifies that users are to protect their user id and passwords at all times.

Clause 7.2 of the ICT Policy further outlines that misuse includes revealing their account password to others or allow use of their account by others.

Relevant legislation

  1. [24]
    Section 194 of the PS Act identifies the decisions against which appeals may be made relevantly as follows:

194  Decisions against which appeals may be made

  1. (1)
    An appeal may be made against the following decisions—

…

  1. (b)
    a decision under a disciplinary law to discipline—
  1. (i)
    a person (other than by termination of employment), including the action taken in disciplining the person; or

…

  1. [25]
    Section 18A of the Ambulance Service Act provides for the grounds for discipline as follows:

18A  Grounds for discipline

  1. (1)
    The chief executive may discipline a service officer if the chief executive is reasonably satisfied the officer has—
  1. (a)
    performed the officer’s duties carelessly, incompetently or inefficiently; or
  2. (b)
    been guilty misconduct; or
  3. (c)
    been absent from duty without approved leave and without reasonable excuse; or
  4. (d)
    contravened, without reasonable excuse, a direction given to the officer as a service officer by a responsible person; or
  5. (e)
    used, without reasonable excuse, a substance to an extent that has adversely affected the competent performance of the officer’s duties; or
  6. (f)
    contravened, without reasonable excuse, a requirement of the chief executive under section 13A(1) in relation to the officer’s appointment by, in response to the requirement—
  1. (i)
    failing to disclose a serious disciplinary action; or
  2. (ii)
    giving false or misleading information; or
  1. (g)
    contravened, without reasonable excuse, a provision of this Act or an obligation imposed on the person under—
  1. (i)
    a code of practice; or
  2. (ii)
    a code of conduct—
  1. (A)
    approved under the Public Sector Ethics Act 1994; or
  2. (B)
    prescribed under a directive of the commission chief executive under the Public Service Act 2008; or
  1. (iii)
    an industrial instrument.
  1. (2)
    A disciplinary ground arises when the act or omission constituting the ground is done or made.
  2. (3)
    Also, the chief executive may—
  1. (a)
    discipline a service officer under subdivision 2 if a ground mentioned in subsection (1) exists; or
  2. (b)
    discipline a former service officer under subdivision 3 or 4 on the same grounds mentioned in subsection (1).
  1. (4)
    If the chief executive is contemplating taking disciplinary action against a service officer in relation to performance or conduct that the chief executive considers may have been influenced by the officer’s health, or on the ground of absence from duty, the chief executive may—
  1. (a)
    appoint a medical practitioner to examine the officer and to give the chief executive a written report about the officer’s mental or physical condition, or both; and
  2. (b)
    direct the officer to submit to the medical examination.
  1. (5)
    In this section—

Misconduct means —

  1. (a)
    inappropriate or improper conduct in an official capacity; or
  2. (b)
    inappropriate or improper conduct in a private capacity that reflects seriously and adversely on the ambulance service.

Example of misconduct —

victimising another service officer in the course of the other officer’s employment in the ambulance service

responsible person, for a direction, means a person with authority to give the direction, whether the authority derives from this Act or otherwise.

  1. [26]
    Section 18B of the Ambulance Service Act provides for the disciplinary action that may be taken against a service officer generally as follows:

18B Disciplinary Action that may be taken against a service officer generally

  1. (1)
    In disciplining a service officer, the chief executive may take the action, or order the action be taken, (disciplinary action) that the chief executive considers reasonable in the circumstances.

Examples of disciplinary action—

  • termination of employment
  • reduction of classification level and a consequential change of duties
  • transfer or redeployment to other ambulance service employment
  • forfeiture or deferment of a remuneration increment or increase
  • reduction of remuneration level
  • imposition of a monetary penalty
  • if a penalty is imposed, a direction that the amount of the penalty be deducted from the officer’s periodic remuneration payments
  • a reprimand
  1. (2)
    If the disciplinary action is taken following an agreement under section 18F(1) between the previous chief executive and the employing chief executive mentioned in the section, the chief executives must agree on the disciplinary action.
  2. (3)
    A monetary penalty can not be more than the total of 2 of the officer’s periodic remuneration payments.
  3. (4)
    Also, an amount directed to be deducted from any particular periodic remuneration payment of the officer—
  1. (a)
    must not be more than half of the amount payable to or for the officer in relation to the payment; and
  2. (b)
    must not reduce the amount of salary payable to the officer in relation to the period to less than—
  1. (i)
    if the officer has a dependant—the guaranteed minimum wage for each week of the period; or
  2. (ii)
    otherwise—two-thirds of the guaranteed minimum wage for each week of the period.
  1. (5)
    An order under subsection (1) is binding on anyone affected by it.

Note —

See the following provisions in relation to appeals against a decision of the chief executive to take disciplinary action against a person—

  1. (a)
    the Public Service Act 2008, sections 23 and 194;
  2. (b)
    the Public Service Regulation 2008, sections 5 and 7 and schedule 1, item 4.
  1. [27]
    The Queensland Ambulance Service Discipline Human Resource Policy ('the QAS Discipline Policy') came into effect on 25 January 2018 and outlines the discplinary provisions applicable to employees of the QAS.
  1. [28]
    Clause 3.1 of the QAS Discipline Policy provides for the grounds for discipline as relevantly follows:

…

3.1.2. Employees engaged under the authority of the Ambulance Service Act 1991, may be subject to discplinary and penalties in accordance with the applicable provisions of that Act.

3.1.3.  Decisions to implement discplinary penalty must be decided on the balance of probabilities.

  1. [29]
    Clause 3.2 of the QAS Discipline Policy sets out the principles of discipline and relevantly provides as follows:

3.2.1. All discplinary action (including post separation discipline) must be:

  1. (a)
    in accordance with the appropriate legislation and standards;
  2. (b)
    supported by objective evidence which has taken all of the relevant matters into account;
  3. (c)
    in accordance with the principles of natural justice; and
  4. (d)
    provided to the employee in writing.

Grounds of appeal

  1. [30]
    Mr Callen's written submissions sets out the ground of appeal as they relate to the allegations and can be relevantly summarised as follows:

In relation to allegation one and two:

  • the decision maker ignores the evidence of the Assistant Commissioner which supports the evidence of the Appellant ('Appeal Ground One');
  • the decision maker refers to three arbitrary criteria in relation to establishing whether the Appellant was 'operational' to determine whether the Appellant has engaged in the conduct as alleged ('Appeal Ground Two');
  • the decision maker ignores 'work practices' to find the Appellant has engaged in the conduct ('Appeal Ground Three');
  • the decision maker refers to policies that do not exist ('Appeal Ground Four');
  • the conduct that is the subject of the discplinary findings has been admitted by the Appellant's colleague ('Appeal Ground Five');
  • the evidence is insufficient to meet the standard of proof ('Appeal Ground Six'); and
  • the decision maker has considered irrelevant factors ('Appeal Ground Seven').

In relation to allegation three:

  • the evidence does not support the commentary surrounding the situation ('Appeal Ground Eight')

Whether the decision was fair and reasonable

  1. [31]
    The relevant principles in determining whether a decision is 'unreasonable' was outlined by Ryan J in Gilmour v Waddell & Ors[8] as follows:

The focus of a review of the reasonableness, or unreasonableness, of a decision is on whether the decision is so unreasonable that it lacks intelligent justification in all of the relevant circumstances.

The legal standard of unreasonableness is to be considered by reference to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute conferring the power.

A court considering an argument that a decision is unreasonable is not undertaking a merits review. If a decision may be reasonably justified, then it is not an unreasonable decision, even if a reviewing court might disagree with it.

Appeal ground one - the decision maker ignores the evidence of the Assistant Commissioner which supports the evidence of the Appellant

  1. [32]
    In relation to allegation one, Mr Callen submits that he admitted to accessing iROAM on one occasion when he was not rostered to work, namely the access dated 19 June 2019 at 8.09pm.
  1. [33]
    Mr Callen submits that for the remainder of the 59 occasions in which his log on details were used to access iROAM, his roster demonstrates that he was working a shift and the iROAM/IDR access is when he was about to start work or, he was working past his rostered shift time, which was the usual working pattern at that time. Mr Callen submits that the relevant dates when he was rostered to work were 30 November 2018, 23 December 2018, 1 January 2019, 13 March 2019 and 30 June 2020.
  1. [34]
    The Appellant contends that the decision maker has ignored the evidence of Assistant Commissioner Chris Broomfield, which supports the evidence of the Appellant that the start and finish times that are shown on the rosters 'are not necessarily indicative down to minutes and seconds of when the Appellant was working' and that 'paramedics undertaking an incoming shift may, depending on operational need, arrive early and overlap with paramedics finishing up on the outgoing shift'. In this regard, Mr Callen relies on email correspondence between the QAS and Assistant Commissioner Broomfield. The email from the QAS to Assistant Commissioner Broomfield dated 21 July 2021 is as follows:[9]

Hi Chris

As you may be aware, Craig is delegate for a matter involving Barry Callen and his alleged use of iROAM when not on shift.

As part of Officer Callen's response to Craig, he provided the following information:

Officer Callen's instructions are that there was in informal arrangement at North Lakes station (which he believes to have been approved by the Assistant Commissioner at the time) where CCP'S could take over from other CCP's regarding the previous shift and although that process did not generate overtime, it was beneficial for the officers to finish earlier while the appropriate CCP coverage was maintained. Officer Callen believes that the terminology of the informal arrangement was '1 for 1'. For example, if it was a short period of time prior to the commencement of Officer Callen's shift, and he was there early, instead of the on duty CCP being dispatched on a job that would result in overtime for them to complete the job after the end of their shift, Officer Callen would start early and logon to respond to the job. QAS should be able to locate evidence to support this position by reviewing the MDT log on times. Officer Callen did not claim overtime for an early start to his shift and it may therefore not appear on his timesheet.

Could you please advise whether you were aware of and/or approved any such arrangement?

The reply email from Assistant Commissioner Broomfield dated 29 July 2021 is as follows:[10]

Hi Kathryn

I was aware of, and agree that officers who arrived to commence their shifts early could in fact take over from the completing shift to allow staff to finish on time. This process could only occur when both shifts of officers were present at the station to enable the changeover.

In regards to the use of IROAM, there was never any additional authorisation to use this technology to enable the handover to occur as this would be a breach of policy in the utilisation of IROAM.

  1. [35]
    The QAS, in their written submissions[11] deny the Appellant's contention that the decision maker ignored the evidence. The QAS submit that on a 'fair reading' of the email correspondence as set out above, Assistant Commissioner Broomfield does not support the Appellant's contentions and that in fact, Assistant Commissioner Broomfield states that there was never an authorisation to use to the technology in the manner in which the Appellant submits.
  1. [36]
    In the Appellant's reply submissions,[12] the Appellant states that Assistant Commissioner Broomfield's reply email dated 29 July 20221 'unequivocally' supports his contention that paramedics on an incoming shift may arrive early and overlap with paramedics finishing a shift which may result in the Appellant's start and finish times not being exactly in accordance with the Appellant's rostered start and finish times. The Appellant relies on the following extract of the email in this regard:

I was aware of, and agree that officers who arrived to commence their shifts early could in fact take over from the completing shift to allow staff to finish on time. This process could only occur when both shifts of officers were present at the station to enable the changeover.

  1. [37]
    A review of the reasons for the decision with respect to allegations one and two does not identify any reference to the evidence contained in the email of Assistant Commissioner Broomfield, dated 29 July 2021 (the '29 July email').
  1. [38]
    The Appellant contends that it was not fair or reasonable that the decision maker did not have regard to the 29 July email as it supported his position that he worked times that were not reflected in his timesheet. Whilst the 29 July email does accept, that in certain circumstances,[13] officers started working prior to the shift, that concession in and of itself, does not necessarily assist the Appellant.
  1. [39]
    Relevantly, Assistant Commissioner Broomfield directly states in the 29 July email that the QAS never authorised the use of iROAM to enable the handover to occur, as such an authorisation would be a breach of policy with respect to the utilisation of iROAM.
  1. [40]
    Further, there is no evidence that both shift officers were present on the dates nominated by Mr Callen.
  1. [41]
    Whilst it is accepted that the decision maker did not refer to the 29 July email, that failure did not render the decision as not fair and reasonable. The reason for this, is that, when read as a whole, the 29 July email does not support the Appellant's contention that the iROAM use may have occurred due to the early commencement of the shift, as the policy did not authorize the use of iROAM in such circumstances.

Appeal ground two - the decision maker refers to three arbitrary criteria in relation to establishing whether the Appellant was 'operational' to determine whether the Appellant has engaged in the conduct as alleged

  1. [42]
    In the decision, the decision maker determined that in circumstances where the Appellant did not have his drug kit, was not logged into the CAD and did not have his equipment checks completed, the decision maker did not consider the Appellant 'operational' and therefore any access to iROAM in circumstances where the Appellant was not 'operational' is not considered iROAM access for work purposes.
  1. [43]
    The Appellant submits that the there is no QAS policy that refers to a test of being 'operational' and further submits that the test of being 'operational' 'appears to be an arbitrary yardstick applied to some, not all, of the Appellant's evidence' and contends that the decision maker has not provided a basis for the 'test itself' or the manner in which the 'test' has been applied to the Appellant's evidence. 
  1. [44]
    The QAS submits that the decision maker's definition of being 'operational' was not an 'arbitrary yardstick' and submits that it would be counterintuitive to suggest the Appellant was operational in circumstances where his allocated drug kit was not signed out or in his possession, and where the Appellant had not logged into the CAD (computer aided dispatch) system, or that he had not completed his equipment checks.
  1. [45]
    The decision sets out a number of instances where the Appellant's username and password were logged onto the iROAM system or accessed an IDR prior to, or after, the Appellant signing in, or out, a drug kit. The decision maker acknowledged the Appellant's submissions that when he accessed the iROAM system early or late at work, that he believed he was at work, was helping and was trying to be part of the team, but ultimately found that in circumstances where the Appellant was not on shift and was not operationally ready for duty, there was no justifiable excuse as to why the Appellant would be logging into the iROAM system or accessing an IDR.
  1. [46]
    In the decision, the decision maker refers to the QAS ICT Acceptable Use Policy ('ICT Policy') and notes that cls 3 and 4 of the ICT Policy state that QAS ICT systems must only be used for official QAS business purposes and cl 5.1 specifies that users are to protect their usernames and passwords at all times. The decision maker also refers to the iROAM log in screen and notes that the screen displays a warning that the user acknowledges and agrees to comply with the terms and conditions of use.
  1. [47]
    The Appellant submits that the decision maker has created the test of being operational after the fact and that it is not contained in any QAS Policy. The Appellant further submits that the ICT Policy's primary purpose is to assist QAS staff in carrying out their duties. The Appellant submits that there is no reference in the ICT Policy to using iROAM for work purposes or that the use of iROAM will only be considered for 'official QAS business purposes' when the criteria for being 'operationally ready' has been met.
  1. [48]
    The allegations made are that the Appellant logged onto the QAS iROAM System and accessed IDRs whilst he was not on duty. The decision maker has had regard to the submissions made on behalf of the Appellant that he was present at the station before and after his shift when he logged on or accessed the reports.
  1. [49]
    Clause 4 of the ICT Policy relevantly states that: 

"[U]nless otherwise authorised in this policy or by the Commissioner QAS, QAS ICT facilities, systems, solutions and devices must be used only for official QAS business purposes and professional research and development."

  1. [50]
    Clause 5 of the ICT Policy provides that the primary purpose for which QAS provides staff access to equipment including computers, mobile devices, email, internet, and other technology is to assist them in carrying out their duties with the agency.
  1. [51]
    The decision maker clearly had regard to the submissions made by the Appellant that asserted that he was on duty at the time of the use, as he was at the station performing work. It was open to the decision maker to have regard to all material facts with respect to whether the Appellant had started his shift early or worked later. Those facts included when the log on and/or access occurred, the time of the Appellant's shift that day (if at all) and whether there is any other evidence to support the Appellant's contention that he was working.
  1. [52]
    The evidence in this matter included whether and/or when the Appellant had signed out or signed into his possession his allocated drug kit, whether and/or when the Appellant had logged into the CAD System, and whether and/or when he had conducted his equipment checks. It was open on the evidence for the decision maker to consider this evidence and whether it corroborated the Appellant's submissions that he was on duty and/or working at the relevant times.
  1. [53]
    I do not consider that a reference to whether or not the Appellant was 'operational' was an arbitrary yardstick. The Appellant's mere presence (on some of the occasions relied on) at the workplace is not, in and of itself, enough to establish that the logins were for official QAS business and consequently accorded with the ICT Policy. Further, it is noted that beyond the Appellant's assertion, there is limited evidence to conclude that the Appellant was present at the station.
  1. [54]
    Further, as noted above, clause 5 of the ICT Policy provides that the primary purpose for the provision of equipment to staff is to assist them in carrying out their duties. I consider it was open on the material before the decision maker to consider evidence that went beyond the Appellant's assertion that he was on duty because he contends that he was present (at least on some of the occasions) at the workplace. This includes considering whether he had taken other steps ordinarily taken at the commencement of duty (or to become operational), including considering whether he had signed in or out of his possession his allocated drug kit, whether he had logged onto the CAD system and whether he had conducted his equipment checks. 
  1. [55]
    Accordingly, I do not consider that appeal ground two establishes that the decision was not fair and reasonable.

Appeal ground three - the decision maker ignores 'work practices' to find the Appellant has engaged in the conduct

  1. [56]
    The Appellant submits that the decision maker is aware that accessing iROAM prior to logging on to CAD is undertaken to judge the operational needs of the business and rather than accepting that the Appellant was working, the decision maker determined that the Appellant's iROAM access prior to his rostered shift start time was inappropriate because the Appellant had not logged on to CAD or signed out the drug kit and was not considered operational.
  1. [57]
    The QAS submits that at the Northlakes site (where the Appellant is stationed), critical care paramedics share drug kits and therefore 'irrespective of whether there was an operational need to log onto the CAD system, the oncoming critical care paramedic could not be dispatched without retrieving the drug kit from the previous crew.'
  1. [58]
    The Appellant's submission with respect to 'work practices' must be considered in the context of the particulars of the allegations.
  1. [59]
    For instance, on 12 March 2019 the Appellant was rostered to work a 1900 to 0700 hours shift. The Appellant signed the drug kit over to another officer at 0700 hours on 13 March 2019. Following this the Appellant logged into iROAM at 0706 and 0933 hours on 13 March 2019 and accessed IDRs variously at 0934.16, 0936.01 and 1007.02 hours. There are similar examples to this provided in the particulars for other allegations.
  1. [60]
    As can be seen from the example provided above, the Appellant logged into iROAM and accessed the IDR after the completion of his rostered shift, after he had signed his drug kit over and, in some instances, several hours after he had completed his rostered shift and signed the drug kit over. This conduct does not accord with the Appellant's submissions with respect to 'work practices'.
  1. [61]
    For these reasons, I do not consider that the decision maker ignored 'work practices' to find that the Appellant engaged in the conduct. Further, I do not consider that appeal ground three established that the decision was not fair and reasonable.

Appeal ground four - the decision maker refers to policies that do not exist

  1. [62]
    The Appellant does not provide any particulars with respect to when the QAS has allegedly referred to an 'iROAM Policy'. Upon a review of the material filed in this matter, it appears the Appellant's legal representatives raised a concern in relation to the ICT Policy in their response to the second show cause notice. This concern was in relation to the application of the ICT Policy and specifically whether it provides for a prohibition of QAS staff from accessing iROAM prior to commencing a shift.
  1. [63]
    The decision maker refers to cl 7 of the ICT Policy which provides, inter alia, that '[e]mployees must not misuse the QAS ICT services, systems, equipment and other information for illegally obscene or other inappropriate activities, or in support of such activities.' The decision maker also refers to cl 7.2 of the ICT Policy which provides an unexhaustive list of examples of 'misuse' and relevantly includes, accesses to QAS information when there is no genuine business need and revealing account passwords to other or allow use of their accounts by others.
  1. [64]
    The QAS submits that in no correspondence provided to the Appellant has there been reference to an 'iROAM Policy' or that an 'iROAM Policy' has been relied upon in determining the matter and contends that the only policy that has been referred to is the ICT Policy.
  1. [65]
    A review of the decision reveals that the decision maker had regard to the ICT Policy. There is no suggestion by the Appellant that it was those references to the ICT Policy in the reasons that he complains about. The ICT Policy clearly exists and was the correct policy for the QAS to refer to as it, in part, regulates the use of electronic devices by QAS staff.
  1. [66]
    The Appellant has failed to particularise where the 'iROAM Policy' is referred to in the decision or why such a reference (if indeed such a reference was made) has rendered the decision as not fair and reasonable. On this basis, appeal ground four fails.

Appeal ground five - the conduct that is the subject of the discplinary findings has been admitted by the Appellant's colleague

  1. [67]
    The Appellant contends that the misconduct, which is the subject of this discplinary matter, has been admitted to by Officer X in her record of interview with the Queensland Police Service on 20 October 2020, during their criminal investigation. The Appellant submits that Officer X admitted to 106 out of 276 alleged occasions of inappropriate access to iROAM or IDR and described the remainder of the alleged accesses as 'uncertain' or 'denied'.
  1. [68]
    The Appellant refers to the first show cause notice dated 29 June 2021 and submits that the delegate does not provide a basis for accepting Officer X's assertions, only that Officer X was open and honest in her dealings with the Queensland Police Service.
  1. [69]
    The QAS submits that the purpose of Officer X's interview with the Queensland Police Service was to ascertain her liability to the potential criminal charges, not in relation to specific iROAM/IDR accesses. The QAS submits that Officer X provided the QAS a comprehensive response which detailed instances where she admitted to and denied accessing iROAM/IDR and instances where she could not recall the accesses.[14] This response was provided to the Appellant as an attachment to the first show cause notice dated 29 June 2021.
  1. [70]
    In the show cause notice dated 29 June 2021, the delegate advised the Appellant that it had accepted Officer X's evidence on the basis that Officer X admitted to inappropriate accesses and did not plainly deny accesses that she could not recall. The delegate advised the Appellant that he considered Officer X was open and honest in her dealings with QPS and in her responses (to QAS).
  1. [71]
    The Appellant, in his written submissions, provides an overview of the decision makers' findings which he deems as a 'seemingly ad-hoc approach to accepting or rejecting the evidence of the Appellant's colleague'.[15] The Appellant contends that the findings of the decision maker, in relation to allegation one and two, do not take into account the relevance of Officer X's admissions to the accesses.
  1. [72]
    The QAS contend that the decision maker did have regard to all circumstances of the accesses including Officer X's admissions, that at relevant times and dates the Appellant was not operational, that the Appellant admitted to providing Officer X with his username and password and that Officer X was accessing iROAM, and that Officer X was open and honest in her responses to the Queensland Police Service and to the delegate in relation to the inappropriate accesses.
  1. [73]
    In the decision, the decision maker clearly identifies the dates on which Officer X has admitted to and/or cannot recall using the Appellant's username and password to log onto iROAM and IDR and determined that those accesses would not be attributed to the Appellant.
  1. [74]
    Further, the decision maker sets out the dates on which the Appellant's username and password were used to log onto iROAM and IDR which Officer X had denied and determined that these accesses were attributable to the Appellant.
  1. [75]
    I consider the decision maker had appropriate regard to the admissions made by Officer X and placed appropriate weight on those admissions. I further consider that it was open to conclude, on the evidence before the decision maker, that the accesses which were not made by Officer X were attributable to the Appellant. This is particularly the case, in circumstances where the Appellant has surmised that he may have made the access either before or after his rostered shift whilst still at the station.
  1. [76]
    For these reasons, I consider that appeal ground five has failed to establish that the decision was not fair and reasonable. 

Appeal ground six - the evidence is insufficient to meet the standard of proof

  1. [77]
    The decision provides that the QAS is considering termination of employment as a disciplinary penalty. The Appellant submits that, the standard of proof required to substantiate an allegation which may result in the termination of employment, is higher than if a lesser disciplinary penalty was being considered. The Appellant submits that the decision maker has insufficient evidence to meet the high standard of proof to substantiate the allegations.
  1. [78]
    In an appeal of this nature, the civil standard of proof, being on the balance of probabilities, applies to the determination to be made. It is inferred that the Appellant's submissions contend that the principles enunciated in Briginshaw v Briginshaw[16] ("Briginshaw") apply to the relevant standards of proof. Whilst not altering the civil standard of proof, the principles in Briginshaw, identify that the nature and gravity of the subject matter may be considered when determining if the standard of proof has been met.[17]
  1. [79]
    This ground of appeal is reliant upon other grounds of appeal being accepted, insofar as the Appellant submits "[B]y ignoring evidence and work practices, referring to non-existent policies and applying arbitrary criteria, the decision maker has insufficient evidence to meet the high standard of proof required to substantiate the allegations."
  1. [80]
    For the reasons contained herein, I have not found that the decision maker ignored work practices, referred to non-existent policies and applied arbitrary criteria. Whilst it is accepted that the decision maker failed to have regard to the 29 July email, for the reasons already stated, I do not consider that such a failure rendered the decision as not fair and reasonable.
  1. [81]
    The Appellant has failed to establish that the evidence is insufficient to meet the standard of proof and therefore, appeal ground six must fail.

Appeal ground seven - decision maker has considered irrelevant factors

  1. [82]
    The Appellant submits that the decision maker has considered irrelevant factors in the disciplinary process. In this regard, the Appellant refers to an extract of a report titled 'Operation Impala' which was included as an attachment to the decision letter. The Appellant does not provide any further submissions with respect to how, if at all, the reference to the 'Operation Impala' report renders the decision as not fair and reasonable.
  1. [83]
    On a review of the decision, it is apparent that the decision maker does have regard to the 'Operation Impala' report in relation to allegations one and two, insofar as the decision maker refers to it in the context of placing the Appellant on notice as to why it is considered that the allegations raise serious concerns about the Appellant's behaviour, and the seriousness of the Appellant's alleged misconduct. The decision maker states that the recommendation of the 'Operation Impala' report is to, inter alia, make a new criminal offence for the misuse of confidential information by public officers.
  1. [84]
    The QAS submits that the reference to the 'Operation Impala' report was included in the decision under the heading 'Grounds for Discipline' and is relevant as the report demonstrates how serious the Appellant's alleged misconduct is considered in the context of the public service, and demonstrates why the QAS is considering imposing disciplinary action in response to the alleged misconduct.
  1. [85]
    The QAS further submits that the Appellant has been invited to respond to the decision maker's reasoning in respect of the proposed disciplinary action.
  1. [86]
    I do not consider the reference to the Operations Impala Report to be irrelevant as it has been included to explain the basis upon which, inter alia, the QAS views the impugned conduct as serious. The Appellant will be provided with an opportunity to respond to the reference to and reliance on the Operations Impala Report if the disciplinary process continues.
  1. [87]
    On this basis, I consider that the Appellant has failed to establish appeal ground seven.

Appeal ground eight - the evidence does not support the commentary surrounding the situation

  1. [88]
    The Appellant contends that the decision maker's 'commentary' around the allegation, specifically, 'regardless of the purpose for which you gave Officer X your password, you knew that she had access to all applications on your iPad, including iROAM,' is not 'correct' as at the time the Appellant gave Officer X his username and password, the Appellant did not have access to iROAM.
  1. [89]
    In the Appellant's written submissions, the Appellant admits to allegation three which is in the following form:

Allegation Three

You inappropriately provided Officer X access to your QAS username and password for her use.

  1. [90]
    The Appellant submits that the 'commentary' implies knowledge and intent on the part of the Appellant which may affect the proportionality of the disciplinary penalty.
  1. [91]
    The QAS submits that even if the Appellant provided his password to Officer X before he had access to the iROAM system:
  1. (a)
    Officer X states that the Appellant gave her his username and password each time it changed;
  1. (b)
    the Appellant advised the QPS Officer X knew what his password configuration was and what he would change it to when it expired; and
  1. (c)
    the Appellant knew that Officer X was using his username and password for access to other QAS systems.
  1. [92]
    I consider that the 'commentary' (or conclusion) of the decision maker that the Appellant objects to was open to be made on the evidence before the decision maker.
  1. [93]
    The decision maker referred to the evidence contained in the Appellant's police interview wherein he stated that he had the same password for each application on his device. The evidence was also that the Appellant gave Officer X his username and password to iROAM and that he provided her with each new password when she requested it. The Appellant does not dispute that he provided Officer X with his updated passwords when they were requested.
  1. [94]
    Whilst the decision maker noted the Appellant's position that the purpose he provided Officer X with his password was for her to check his roster or to use iROAM when they were working together, it was further noted that the Appellant admitted the allegations.
  1. [95]
    I consider that, in providing Officer X with his username and password, the Appellant provided Officer X with access to all of the Appellant's applications, which ultimately included iROAM.
  1. [96]
    It follows, that I consider that appeal ground eight also fails.
  1. [97]
    It is noted that, appeal ground eight seems to be raised by the Appellant on the basis that the commentary (or conclusion) may affect the proportionality of the disciplinary decision.
  1. [98]
    If the disciplinary process proceeds further, the Appellant will no doubt be provided with a further opportunity to make submissions with respect to any proposed penalty, including the proportionality of such a penalty.

Conclusion

  1. [99]
    I have concluded that the Appellant has failed to establish that the decision was not fair and reasonable. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the decision that is the subject of this appeal is confirmed.

Order

  1. [100]
    Accordingly, I make the following order:
  1. Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) the decision appealed against is confirmed.
  1. Pursuant to s 566(1)(b) of the Industrial Relations act 2016 (Qld), the stay of the decision issued on 8 February 2022 is revoked.

Footnotes

[1] Ambulance Service Act 1991 (Qld), s 15.

[2] See the Public Service and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2020 (Qld).

[3] Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 183 CLR 245, 261 (Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ).

[4] Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018).

[5] I have determined not to refer to the Officer by name within this Reasons for Decision.

[6] Ultimately, the Queensland Police Service advised the QAS that they would not progress their investigation of the matter, see Appellant's submissions filed on 25 February 2022, Appendix Five, letter from QAS to Appellant dated 13 October 2021.

[7] Appellant's submissions filed on 25 February 2022, Appendix Four, letter from Devaney Law to QAS dated 12 July 2021, Table 1.1.

[8] [2019] QSC 170, [207] – [209].

[9] Appellant's submissions filed on 25 February 2022, Appendix 5.

[10] Appellant's submissions filed on 25 February 2022, Appendix 5.

[11] Filed on 4 March 2022.

[12] Filed on 11 March 2022.

[13] When both shift officers were present.

[14] Appellant's submissions filed on 25 February 2022, Appendix 8.

[15] Appellant's submissions filed on 25 February 2022, [19.1] – [19.7]

[16] Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 

[17] Ibid, 361-362 (Dixon J). 

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Callen v Queensland Ambulance Service

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Callen v Queensland Ambulance Service

  • MNC:

    [2022] QIRC 319

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Hartigan IC

  • Date:

    15 Aug 2022

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Brandy v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1995) 183 CLR 245
Cite 2 - (1995) 183 CLR 245
Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1995] HCA 10
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
Cite 2 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
Cite 3 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
Gilmour v Waddell [2019] QSC 170
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QSC 170
Goodall v State of Queensland [2018] QSC 319
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QSC 319
Cite 2 - [2018] QSC 319

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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