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  4. Khalilidehkordi v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service - [2022] QIRC 387

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Khalilidehkordi v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service[2022] QIRC 387

Khalilidehkordi v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service[2022] QIRC 387

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Khalilidehkordi v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service & Ors [2022] QIRC 387

PARTIES:

Khalilidehkordi, Elham

(Applicant)

v

Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service

(First Respondent)

&

Dr Kee Meng Tan

(Second Respondent)

&

The Royal Australian College of Physicians ACN 000 039 047

(Third Respondent)

CASE NO:

GP/2021/25

PROCEEDING:

Application in existing proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

11 October 2022

HEARING DATE:

10 June 2022

MEMBER:

Industrial Commissioner Dwyer

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

ORDER:

  1. The Application filed on 18 March 2022 to dismiss proceedings is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS – QUEENSLAND – GENERAL PROTECTIONS – Application in a proceeding – Application by third respondent to dismiss various causes of action pleaded in statement of facts and contentions – whether causes of action should be dismissed pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) – consideration of 'desirable in the public interest' – whether pleadings are vexatious or without reasonable cause or fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action – application dismissed

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 3, 282, 284, 285, 295, 291, 541, 571

CASES:

Burton v The Shire of Bairnsdale (1908) "The Argus" Law Reports, Vol. XIV, 529

Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18

State of Queensland v Lockhart [2014] ICQ 6

GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin [2010] FWAFB 5343

O'Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210

Re Queensland Electricity Commission & Ors; ex parte Electrical Trades Union of Australia (1987) 72 ALR 1

Re MEAA; ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 112 ALR 193

Fair Work Ombudsman v Devine Marine Group Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1365

Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661; 59 ALJR 776; 61 ALR 307; [1985] HCA 65

CFMEU v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 50

Fair Work Ombudsman v Blue Impression Pty Ltd (2017) 269 IR 92; [2017] FCCA 810

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500; 290 ALR 647; [2012] HCA 32

Hennessy v gold Coast Hospital and Health Service [2020] QIRC 081

Byrne v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 013

The Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers Australia, Queensland Branch, Union of Employees v Brisbane City Council [2022] QIRC 005

Myers v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2021] QIRC 108

Tapfield v Ipswich City Council [2021] QIRC 069

Orchid Avenue Realty Pty Ltd v Percival [2003] QIC 160

APPEARANCES:

Mr D Pratt of Franklin Athanasellis Cullen Lawyers for the Applicant

Ms S Marsh of MinterEllison for the First Respondent and Second Respondent

Ms S Moody instructed by Ms A Hill of Corrs Chambers Westgarth for the Third Respondent

Reasons for Decision

         Background

  1. [1]
    On 1 October 2021, Dr Elham Khalilidehkordi filed a Form 2 Application seeking the Commission to deal with a general protections dispute in matter number GP/2021/25 ('the General Protections proceedings') under the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act').
  1. [2]
    The Respondents to that General Protections proceedings are:
  •     the Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service ('the first respondent);
  •     Dr Kee Meng Tan ('the second respondent'); and
  •     The Royal Australian College of Physicians ('the third respondent').
  1. [3]
    At the relevant time Dr Khalilidehkordi was employed as a 'Medical Officer – Advanced Trainee' at Gold Coast University Hospital, a facility operated by the First Respondent. Dr Khalilidehkordi was undergoing specialist training approved by the Third Respondent from 4 February 2019 towards qualifying for registration as a physician. Dr Khalilidehkordi's training was under the supervision of inter alia the second respondent. The second respondent was at all relevant times employed by the first respondent. 
  1. [4]
    In the General Protections Dispute, Dr Khalilidehkordi seeks an order in respect of adverse action in contravention of section 285 of the IR Act on the basis that she made complaints or inquiries in relation to her employment and started a process under an industrial instrument.[1]

The allegations of adverse action

  1. [5]
    Dr Khalilidehkordi's statement of facts and contentions, filed on 14 January 2022, set out the following factual matters:
  • The training period in which Dr Khalilidehkordi was employed by the respondent was from 4 February 2019 to 2 February 2020;
  • On 15 July 2019, following approximately four months of training, the second respondent and a Dr Sabet completed a satisfactory supervisor's report for Dr Khalilidehkordi ('the July assessment');
  • On 3 October 2019, Dr Khalilidehkordi was informed by the second respondent that if she did not improve, she was not going to successfully complete her training year;
  • On 25 October 2019, the Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation of Queensland ('the union') sent a letter to the first respondents senior director of human resources (Mr Brown) regarding the second respondent's conduct towards Dr Khalilidehkordi ('the union complaint');
  • At 8.23am on 28 October 2019, Mr Brown then forwarded the union complaint to the second respondent;
  • Over the course of the following nine hours after he was notified of the union complaint, the second respondent:
  • sent emails to nine consultant neurologists who had been working with Dr Khalilidehkordi to request they provide feedback on Dr Khalilidehkordi ('the consultants email');
  • sent a text to Professor Vucic of the third respondent;
  • sent an email to Professor Vucic about Dr Khalilidehkordi ('the Vucic email');
  • sent an email to the third respondent revoking the July Assessment ('the revocation email').
  • On 1 November 2019 the second respondent sent an email to the third respondent which stated Dr Khalilidehkordi was in 'full denial' ('the denial email');
  • On 12 November 2019, the Union lodged a dispute with this Commission;
  • In late January 2020, the second respondent and Dr Sabet jointly published a supervisor's report for Dr Khalilidehkordi which downgraded her scores to 'fails' for the training year ('the failure notification'); and
  • On 21 April 2020, Professor Vucic, the Chair of the third respondent's Advanced Training Committee in Neurology wrote to Dr Khalilidehkordi to advise that the third respondent would not certify Dr Khalilidehkordi's Advanced Neurology Traineeship for the period 4 February 2019 to 2 February 2020 ('the non-certification decision').

The Application

  1. [6]
    On 18 March 2022, the third respondent in the substantive matter filed an Application in existing proceedings ('the Application'), claiming that it is not necessary or desirable in the public interest for the cause against the third respondent to be heard.
  1. [7]
    Alternatively, the third respondent seeks:
  1. AN ORDER that, in Dr Khalilidehkordi's Amended Application filed on 18 November 2021, the following paragraphs be struck out as vexatious or without reasonable cause or as failing disclose a reasonable cause of action:
  1. (a)
    paragraph 9.1;
  1. (b)
    paragraph 9.2; and
  1. (c)
    paragraphs 10.1(c), (e), (g) (as against the Third Respondent) and (h) (as against the Third Respondent); and
  1. AN ORDER THAT, in Dr Khalilidehkordi's Statement of Facts and Contentions filed on 14 January 2022, the following paragraphs be struck out as vexatious or without reasonable cause or as failing disclose a reasonable cause of action;
  1. (a)
    paragraph 28;
  1. (b)
    in paragraph 29, the words “and the Non-Certification Decision to the extent it was caused by the Second Respondent's actions”;
  1. (c)
    in paragraph 31, the words “and the Non-Certification Decision to the extent it was caused by the Second Respondent's actions”;
  1. (d)
    in paragraph 33, the words “and the Non-Certification Decision to the extent it was caused by the Second Respondent's actions”;
  1. (e)
    paragraph 36;
  1. (f)
    in paragraph 37(a), the words “and thereby participated intentionally in causing the Non-Certification Decision to be made”;
  1. (g)
    in paragraph 37(b), the words “and thereby causing the Non-Certification Decision to be made”;
  1. (h)
    paragraph 38; and
  1. (i)
    paragraph 39.[2]
  1. [8]
    On 24 March 2022, the third respondent filed an affidavit of Sarah Miller, made in support of the Application.

Statutory framework 

Adverse action

  1. [9]
    Section 285 of the IR Act provides:
  1. (1)
    A person must not take adverse action against another person—
  1. (a)
    because the other person—
  1. (i)
    has a workplace right; or
  2. (ii)
    has, or has not, exercised a workplace right; or
  3. (iii)
    proposes to or proposes not to, or has at any time proposed to or proposed not to, exercise a workplace right; or
  1. (b)
    to prevent the exercise of a workplace right by the other person.

Note—

This subsection is a civil penalty provision.

  1. (2)
    A person must not take adverse action against another person (the second person) because a third person has exercised, or proposes to or has at any time proposed to exercise, a workplace right for the second person's benefit or for the benefit of a class of persons to which the second person belongs.

Note—

This subsection is a civil penalty provision.

  1. [10]
    Section 282(1) provides the meaning of adverse action to include action 'taken by an employer' against an employee if the employer:
  1. (a)
    dismisses the employee; or
  1. (b)
    injures the employee in his or her employment; or
  1. (c)
    alters the position of the employee to the employee's prejudice; or
  1. (d)
    discriminates between the employee and other employees of the employer.
  1. [11]
    Section 571 of the IR Act deals with accessorial liability for adverse action and provides:

571  Contraventions of civil penalty provision

  1. (1)
    A contravention of a civil penalty provision is not an offence.
  1. (2)
    A person involved in a contravention of a civil penalty provision is taken to have contravened the provision.
  1. (3)
    For this section, a person is involved in a contravention of a civil penalty provision only if the person—
  1. (a)
    has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention; or
  1. (b)
    has induced the contravention, whether by threats, promises or otherwise; or
  1. (c)
    has been in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or party to the contravention; or
  1. (d)
    has conspired with others to effect the contravention.

The Application

  1. [12]
    Section 541 of the IR Act provides as follows:

The court or Commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following—

  1. (a)
    make a decision it considers just, and include provision for preventing or settling the industrial dispute or dealing with the industrial matter to which the cause relates, without being restricted to any specific relief claimed by the parties to the cause;
  1. (b)
    dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or Commission considers—
  1. (i)
    the cause is trivial; or
  1. (ii)
     further proceedings by the court or Commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest;
  1. (c)
    order a party to the cause to pay another party the expenses, including witness expenses, it considers appropriate.
  1. [13]
    It is not submitted by the third respondent that the claim by Dr Khalilidehkordi is trivial. It would appear the third respondent relies on s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act.
  1. [14]
    Section 541 of the IR Act (previously s 331 of the 1999 IR Act) was considered by the Industrial Court of Queensland in Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General).[3]
  1. [15]
    In that decision, a number of authorities which considered the notion of the 'public interest' were considered:

[24]  Consideration given to s 331 in earlier decisions can inform the resolution of this ground of appeal. In State of Queensland v Lockhart,[4] Deputy President O'Connor summarised the meaning of “public interest” in relation to the exercise of discretion under s 331 in the following terms:

"[21] In O'Sullivan v Farrer, Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ considered the expression 'in the public interest'. Their Honours wrote:

'Indeed, the expression, 'in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only 'in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable … given reasons to be [pronounced] definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view.'

[22] In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin, the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia in considering what constitutes 'the public interest' wrote:

'Appeals have lain on the ground that it is in the public interest that leave should be granted in the predecessors to the Act for decades. It has not been considered useful or appropriate to define the concept in other than the most general terms and we do not intend to do so. The expression 'in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only by the objects of the legislation in question.

Although the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issues of importance and general Application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive, or that the legal principles applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar matters, it seems to us that none of those elements is present in this case.'

  1. [16]
    His Honour also considered the circumstances in which the exercise of the discretion under s 541 of the IR Act would be exercised: [5] 

[28]  The process for consideration of an Application under s 541 does not require that the respondent's case be taken at its highest. The cognate provisions in federal legislation were frequently considered by Full Benches of the federal tribunal, the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia. The accepted approach was that the applicant bore the onus of making the claim for relief. But the ascertainment in any particular case of where the public interest lay often depended on a balancing of interests, including competing public interests, and was very much a question of fact and degree.[6]

[29] As the power given to the Commission by s 541 can prevent a party from pursuing relief otherwise available under the IR Act it is one which is to be exercised with due circumspection on a proper consideration of relevant materials.[7] A “proper consideration” cannot be made where the case for the respondent is simply taken at its highest. While the onus remains on an applicant, the requirement to consider the “public interest” cannot be satisfied if an artificial inflation of the respondent's case is applied. Indeed, to take a respondent's case at its highest would almost always result in the dismissal of an Application under this section. On an Application of this type, a respondent is not relieved of any requirement to advance a case.

[30] In considering the public interest, regard must be had to the legislative basis of the principal relief sought and the evidence before the Commission.

(Emphasis added)

Submissions

  1. [17]
    On 29 April 2022, a Directions Order was issued inviting written submissions. On 10 June 2022 the parties were heard orally on the Application.

Submissions of the Third Respondent

  1. [18]
    The Application is accompanied by submissions of the third respondent however, the third respondent's submissions of 6 May 2022 are stated to wholly replace the submissions attached to the Application.[8]
  1. [19]
    By way of background, the third respondent outlines its function as inter alia, providing accredited specialist training (including in specialities such as neurology) to trainee doctors who have completed their medical degree, and who wish to specialise as physicians.[9]
  1. [20]
    Advanced training is the final step in a training program to become a physician and fellow of the third respondent. The Gold Coast University Hospital (operated by the first respondent) is an accredited training site for advanced training in neurology. The Australian and New Zealand Association of Neurologists undertakes the site accreditation for core neurology positions. The Advanced Training Committee ('the committee') of the third respondent ratifies site accreditation decisions.[10]
  1. [21]
    The third respondent submits that outside of having minimum standards of required conduct for accreditation and approval of the appointment of supervisors, they do not direct the conduct of accredited training settings. The third respondent was not, at any time, Dr Khalilidehkordi's employer.[11]
  1. [22]
    The Committee within the third respondent is responsible for overseeing advanced training in neurology. Inter alia, the Committee monitors, assesses and confirms training requirements for trainees.
  1. [23]
    The third respondent submits that on 19 March 2020, the Committee held a meeting in which it was determined that Dr Khalilidehkordi's training for the period of 4 February 2019 to 3 February 2020 would not be certified.[12] The decision makers who made the non-certification decision were volunteers, not employees of the third respondent.
  1. [24]
    On 21 April 2021, the chair of the Committee (Professor Vucic) advised Dr Khalilidehkordi that the third respondent would not certify her Advanced Neurology Traineeship for the period 4 February 2019 to 2 February 2020.
  1. [25]
    The third respondent takes issue with Dr Khalilidehkordi's assertion that they are accessorily liable for adverse action for its non-certification decision. In simple terms, the third respondent submits they cannot be liable for adverse action under the IR Act because the third respondent is not an employer to whom the IR Act applies.
  1. [26]
    The third respondent further submits that the claim for accessorial liability is only in relation to the alleged breaches in relation to the non-certification decision, and not in relation to other alleged breaches such as the revocation email and failure notification.
  1. [27]
    The third respondent submits Dr Khalilidehkordi's pleading that the non-certification decision was adverse action taken by the first respondent must fail because the non-certification decision is not, and cannot constitute adverse action by the first respondent because:
  • Dr Khalilidehkordi was not employed by the first respondent at the time the non-certification decision was made or communicated to her by the committee of the third respondent;[13]
  • The non-certification decision was made by the third respondent, not the first respondent;
  • Even if the non-certification decision was the inevitable effect of the first respondents' actions (through the second respondent) in relation to the emails and failure notification, that does not make it an action taken by the first respondent against Dr Khalilidehkordi; and
  • Where the relevant adverse action is alleged to be a decision, on an ordinary natural meaning consideration of s282(1), the decision will only be action taken by the employer if the employer made the decision, to which the third respondent submits they did not.
  1. [28]
    The third respondent subsequently contends Dr Khalilidehkordi's claim that the first respondent has breached s 285(1), 295 and 291(b) of the IR Act must fail, and further that the claim that the third respondent is accessorily liable under s 571 of the IR Act also must fail.
  1. [29]
    The third respondent provides in further submissions that even if Dr Khalilidehkordi established primary liability against the first and second respondents, the claim against the third respondents should be dismissed because it is poorly pleaded. Specifically, it is submitted that Dr Khalilidehkordi did not particularise which limb of s 571(3) of the IR Act she relies on.

Submissions of Dr Khalilidehkordi

  1. [30]
    Dr Khalilidehkordi filed submissions in response on 13 May 2022. The submissions address the third respondent's Application and the discretionary power within s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act.
  1. [31]
    Dr Khalilidehkordi submits the relevant test for my consideration is whether the continuation of the proceedings would be against the public interest, which is a question of fact and degree.
  1. [32]
    Dr Khalilidehkordi raises the primary purpose of the IR Act, being to provide for a framework for cooperative industrial relations that is fair and balanced.[14]
  1. [33]
    Dr Khalilidehkordi submits she has the prima facie right to have her matter heard and determined. For the Commission to displace this right it must be satisfied that the continuation of the proceeding would not be in the public interest. The onus rests with the third respondent to establish this point, which they attempt to do so by arguing that certain facts (which are contested) lead to a conclusion that it asks the Commission to draw without having heard and determined those facts.
  1. [34]
    Dr Khalilidehkordi submits that hearing and determining the case against the third respondent is consistent with the purposes of the IR Act. Further, Dr Khalilidehkordi notes that the third respondent's arguments in relation to the submission of their 'involvement' is in issue before the Commission. The inquiry of the 'involvement' includes resolving the fact in issue as to whether the third respondent was wilfully blind to the overt references to Dr Khalilidehkordi's exercise of her workplace rights in the documents presented to it by the second respondent, and which subsequently compelled the non-certification decision. Dr Khalilidehkordi submits a hearing is required to reach such a conclusion if one is open on the evidence.
  1. [35]
    Dr Khalilidehkordi also notes there are significant factual disputes which need to be determined including for example, whether the non-certification decision was the 'inevitable effect' of the first and second respondents alleged adverse action, and what knowledge of workplace rights being exercised by Dr Khalilidehkordi was held at relevant times by agents of the third respondent who made (or contributed to making) the non-certification decision.
  1. [36]
    Dr Khalilidehkordi further contends that the third respondent's submissions that an employment relationship is required for a party to adversely act against an applicant in such proceedings is incorrect in law. Dr Khalilidehkordi concludes her submissions in contending that there is a case to be answered by the third respondent, and the Application to dismiss should be dismissed.

Submissions of the First and Second Respondents

  1. [37]
    On 13 May 2022, the solicitor for the first and second respondents advised they would not file any submissions in relation to the Application.

Reply submissions of the Third Respondent

  1. [38]
    On 27 May 2022, the third respondent filed their submissions in reply.
  1. [39]
    The third respondent's submissions re-state an outline of the Commission's discretionary powers under s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act.
  1. [40]
    In relation to prejudice which may be suffered by both parties, the respondent submits the prejudice to Dr Khalilidehkordi (being unable to obtain the remedy she seeks) may be outweighed against other factors, such as Dr Khalilidehkordi having been given opportunities to plead her case, or where the remedy sought is not available. The competing prejudice faced by the third respondent if the matter proceeded to trial is also relevant, such as where the substantial merits of the case are limited in circumstances where the remedy sought is unavailable.
  1. [41]
    The third respondent's submissions outline cases in which the Commission has made order under s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act.[15] The third respondent contends that this is an appropriate case for dismissal of Dr Khalilidehkordi's cause against the third respondent, because it cannot succeed on the law.
  1. [42]
    The third respondent submits that Dr Khalilidehkordi failed to address in her submissions the third respondent's principal contention that her statement of facts and contentions does not articulate a cause of action known to law against the third respondent. It is thus the third respondent's submission that it is not fair or in the public interest for the Commission to hear and determine any part of the proceeding against the third respondent in the circumstances where that part of the proceeding has no reasonable prospect of success and where Dr Khalilidehkordi has failed to advance any argument as to why she could succeed on the law.
  1. [43]
    The third respondent contends if the matter goes to hearing, they will be prejudiced by being required to incur time and monetary costs of a proceeding which they submit, is 'on its face hopeless'.[16]
  1. [44]
    In reply to Dr Khalilidehkordi's submission in relation to the notion of 'involvement' and novel issues, the third respondent submits that there are no contested issues of fact, only irrelevant allegations of fact made by Dr Khalilidehkordi which ought to be struck out, and a substantive cause which on any view of the facts cannot succeed.
  1. [45]
    The third respondent submits they cannot be involved in the alleged impugned conduct by virtue of a decision, i.e., the non-certification decision made four months after the impugned conduct was taken. The third respondent also contends they are not alleged to be accessorily liable for any of the first respondent's alleged breaches of the IR Act in relation to those matters.
  1. [46]
    The third respondent notes the statement of facts and contentions pleads that the non-certification decision was made by the first respondent and the third respondent. The third respondent submits Dr Khalilidehkordi has advanced no evidence of any kind that the non-certification decision was made by the first respondent. The third respondent notes the affidavit of Sarah Jade Millar deposes that the third respondent made the non-certification decision.
  1. [47]
    The third respondent submits that Dr Khalilidehkordi's claims of accessorial liability are based on the incorrect assertion that the first respondent made the non-certification decision and should therefore be struck out. The third respondent further submits a trial with witnesses will no better equip the Commission to resolve this issue.

Consideration

  1. [48]
    The Application by the third respondent can be divided into three parts. There is firstly the Application for the Commission to exercise its discretion pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act.
  1. [49]
    In the alternative (secondly), the third respondent seeks an order striking out portions of Schedule 1 to Dr Khalilidehkordi's (Amended) General Application (‘the Amended Application’) filed 18 November 2021 and further (thirdly) portions of her Statement of Facts and Contentions ('SOFC’) filed14 January 2022.
  1. [50]
    Each of the second and third parts have their basis on an assertion that the identified pleadings are 'vexatious' or 'without reasonable cause' or 'failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action'.
  1. Section 541 - Dismiss or refrain from dealing in the public interest.
  1. [51]
    Each of the parties appear ad idem that the discretion granted to the Commission by s 541 of the IR Act must be approached with caution and with a careful and proper consideration of relevant materials. In my view, the dismissal of an entire cause of action at an interlocutory stage must be reserved for only the most compelling circumstances. 
  1. [52]
    It is fair to observe that the Amended Application of Dr Khalilidehkordi is a complex document dealing with a multitude of facts and legal propositions, against multiple parties. While one can readily appreciate why such complexity might be necessary in the circumstances of this matter, it is inevitable that the greater complexity of pleadings in a matter will enhance the risk that the key elements of the pleaded case could be difficult to identify when shrouded in extensive detail.
  1. [53]
    Added to the challenges of interpreting these complex pleadings in this matter is the further dimension of the somewhat unique nature of General Protections proceedings which, due to the reversal of the onus of proof, almost always require an applicant to plead a circumstantial case. Almost without exception, where a General Protections Application requires the evidence of a decision maker to explain the basis of their decision and deny any proscribed motive, the merits of an applicant's case cannot be reliably evaluated until that evidence is presented and tested under cross examination.
  2. [54]
    Notwithstanding these general observations, I do not consider that the case pleaded against each of the respondents by Dr Khalilidehkordi suffers from any obscurity.  While the thread that intertwines the case against each respondent in this matter can be difficult to follow in the pleadings at times, it is not lost to the objective eye.
  1. [55]
    The very simple explanation of the case against the third respondent is that the second respondent set out to take certain action against Dr Khalilidehkordi after she exercised her workplace rights. The second respondent sought to inter alia 'injure' Dr Khalilidehkordi in her employment by extinguishing the progress she had made in that year towards her specialist qualifications.[17]
  1. [56]
    To do this, the second respondent had to (firstly) amend a previous passing assessment of Dr Khalilidehkordi's performance during training, which he did. But because of the unique relationship of the third respondent to this employment relationship, the simple amendment of the passing assessment by the second respondent was not enough to give effect to his (alleged) proscribed intent.
  1. [57]
    In order to inflict the 'injury' (allegedly) intended, the second respondent required the involvement of the third respondent. Only the third respondent could formally extinguish the recognition or benefit of the training undertaken during the relevant period of employment with the first respondent.
  1. [58]
    It is here that the 'inevitable effect' pleading of Dr Khalilidehkordi is critical in her case against the first and second respondent.[18] It is also here that the extent of the third respondent's knowledge of the proscribed motives of the second respondent will be of critical importance to the case against it.
  1. [59]
    The third respondent complains ad nauseum that the case against it relies on a ‘circular argument’ and that it is alleged to be accessorily liable for its own decision. This submission subtly mischaracterises the case made against it by Dr Khalilidehkordi.
  1. [60]
    The non-certification decision is pleaded as adverse action taken by the first respondent but entirely in the vicarious sense i.e., via the second respondent.[19] Importantly, it is not the decision itself for which the third respondent is being called to account.
  1. [61]
    Careful regard to clause 9.1 of the Amended Application reveals quite plainly that it the issuing of the decision by the third respondent that draws them into the proceedings. More particularly, it is the issuing of the decision in response to (or because of) the actions of the second respondent, and with the requisite knowledge to cover the elements of accessorial liability.
  1. [62]
    The third respondent is not accused of taking adverse action but rather, facilitating the second (and first) respondents' adverse action. 
  1. [63]
    This is the case that is clear (and has always been clear) to the Commission on the pleadings. Moreover, this description of the case against the third respondent has been recited to them at hearing without overt protest[20], but regrettably this did not alleviate the third respondent’s mischaracterisation of the case against it which is an entirely unilateral error on its part. But the broader case theory of Dr Khalilidehkordi appears universally to be understood.
  1. [64]
    In those circumstances I do not accept the third respondent’s complaint about the alleged ‘circular argument’. But it does not end there. The third respondent also argues that the case against it is fundamentally flawed on technical grounds.
  1. [65]
    The case against the third respondent is entirely one of accessorial liability. In the circumstances of this particular matter the success of any defence by any respondent will rely heavily on their evidence. In those circumstances, the third respondent’s pre-emptive strike against the claim is a bold move indeed when one considers that critical portions of Dr Khalilidehkordi's case against the third respondent rely on determination of factual matters not yet before the Commission.
  1. [66]
    The key elements of accessorial liability are well established[21]. To be accessorily liable a person must:
  1. Have knowledge of the essential facts constituting the contravention;
  1. Be knowingly concerned in the contravention;
  1. Be an intentional participant based on actual not constructive knowledge of the essential facts constituting the contravention (including constructive knowledge where there is 'wilful blindness');
  1. Need not know that the matters in question constitute a contravention.
  1. [67]
    In those circumstances where the case against the third respondents is permitted to proceed, it is all but certain that evidence will be required from Professor Vucic about his dealings with the second respondent at the critical time and his knowledge of all the key elements of the alleged adverse action.[22]
  1. [68]
    Professor Vucic's state of knowledge will be determinative of the question of accessorial liability of the third respondent. No reliable or accurate submission can be made about the evidence of Professor Vucic by any party at this point and as such, it strikes me as extremely premature to contemplate dismissing the case against the third respondent.
  1. [69]
    If one briefly speculates that, in giving his evidence, Professor Vucic discloses discussions with the second respondent that support a finding that he was fully aware[23] of the essential facts constituting the contravention and that he agreed to facilitate the non-Certification, the merits of Dr Khalilidehkordi's case against all respondents are immediately obvious.
  1. [70]
    While the above hypothetical evidentiary scenario may not unfold at hearing, the point of considering it is to demonstrate how significant the evidence of key decision makers are to the evaluation of the merit of Dr Khalilidehkordi's claims.
  1. [71]
    Further, the technical arguments made by the third respondent about construction of the IR Act are somewhat mischievous in the absence of the evidence of key witnesses. The exploitation of that evidentiary void by the third respondent ought not to be a vehicle to for the denial of Dr Khalilidehkordi's fundamental right to have her case heard.
  1. [72]
    In respect of those technical arguments made by the third respondent, their submissions rely in one instance on a construction of s 282 of the IR Act and a particular characterisation of the meaning of the terms adverse action 'taken by an employer'. The construction contended by the third respondent is quite forcefully posited in its submissions but is not supported by any reference to precedent or other tool of statutory interpretation.[24]
  1. [73]
    It would seem to me that the meaning of those terms and their Application to the unique facts of Dr Khalilidehkordi's claim is not a matter that has previously been the subject of judicial consideration.
  1. [74]
    As noted above, it is alleged that that the second respondent retracted a previously issued satisfactory assessment of Dr Khalilidehkordi's work that she performed during her training in the first quarter of the relevant year. It is said by Dr Khalilidehkordi that in doing this, the issuing of the 'non-certification' decision by the third respondent constitutes adverse action (by the first respondent) because it was 'the inevitable effect' of the retraction of the satisfactory assessment.
  1. [75]
    If one puts to one side the case pleaded against the third respondent, the case against the first and second respondents is plain enough. The actions of the second respondent, as objective facts, are largely incapable of dispute given that they are mostly corroborated with contemporaneous records. However, there are gaps.
  1. [76]
    Portions of the second respondent's communications with the third respondent may yet be placed before the Commission e.g., telephone or other personal conversations, and there will inevitably need to be evidence from the second respondent as to why he took the actions that he did if the first and second respondents are to discharge their onus.[25] 
  1. [77]
    To the extent that the non-certification decision of the third respondent is alleged to be an 'inevitable effect' of the retraction of Dr Khalilidehkordi's satisfactory assessment, this too will require evidence of the second respondent or a concession. It will also require evidence of the third respondent as to how it might typically or usually react to notification of a candidate demonstrating sub-optimum skills.
  1. [78]
    In the absence of such evidence or concession from the first and second respondents, one can readily see the opportunity for an argument that the non-certification decision might not amount to 'action taken by the employer'. But it must be remembered that the factual findings as to the state of the mind of the first and second respondent about 'the inevitable effect' of the non-certification decision will not start and end with denials by the second respondent. Dr Khalilidehkordi will have an opportunity to cross examine the second respondent.
  1. [79]
    It is only after the evidence of the second respondent in the proceedings has been concluded that a member hearing the matter can form a view as to what the second respondent intended or expected to be the inevitable effect of his actions. It will ultimately be a matter for the Commission to determine what the state of mind of the second respondent was, having regard in particular to the plausibility (or otherwise) of any denials. 
  1. [80]
    While I am in no position to finally determine the issue, I can appreciate the merit of an argument that the language 'action taken by an employer' as it appears in s 282 of the IR Act could extend to action taken by a third party. Where such action was prompted, requested, or incited by an employer or person who, acting for proscribed reasons, was able to readily predict the reactions or response of the third party, and who knew that the third party's reaction would cause 'injury' to a targeted employee, I can readily see how the term 'action taken by an employer' might incorporate the actions of a third party.
  1. [81]
    Importantly, there is nothing about s 282 of the IR Act and there is no authority that I have been taken to that would lead me to consider that s 282 ought to be read as narrowly as the third respondent contends.
  1. [82]
    In their reply submissions, the third respondent relies on Orchid Avenue Realty Pty Ltd v Percival[26] to support the submission that 'where a question of construction is capable of finally resolving the matter, that exercise of construction should be undertaken notwithstanding that extensive argument may be necessary to demonstrate that the case of the applicant is so clearly untenable that it cannot succeed'.[27] This proposition, (with which I agree) plainly urges against dismissing the proceedings against the third respondent in my view.
  1. [83]
    The difficulty for the third respondent is that an argument about the construction of s 282 in these circumstances is very much limited in the abstract. In order to achieve the 'extensive argument' foreshadowed in Orchid Avenue Realty, the Commission would be very much aided by the factual scenario to which the section is said to apply (or not apply as the case may be). Conversely, the Commission would be at a disadvantage without it.
  1. [84]
    The success (or not) of the case against the third respondent in these proceedings turns on a number of factors, not least of which will be the evidence of the second respondent and more significantly, the evidence Professor Vucic. The merits are not fully apparent at this stage of the proceedings, but the argument advanced by Dr Khalilidehkordi is by no means unmeritorious.        
  1. [85]
    The proceedings against the third respondent are undeniably novel, but the novelty is not a feature of any misconceived construction of language in the statute or an attempt to unrealistically extend the boundaries of that language by Dr Khalilidehkordi. Rather, the novelty in Dr Khalilidehkordi's claim is a feature of the uniquely symbiotic relationship between each of the respondents and the dependent role that each of them has on the other to determine matters of critical importance to Dr Khalilidehkordi's employment.
  1. [86]
    In that context it is unsurprising that, quite apart from significant factual content not yet before the Commission, there are likely to be genuine disputes about untested boundaries of applicable statutes or authorities. In my view the public interest is best served by those disputes being fully ventilated before the Commission in the full factual context of this matter.
  1. [87]
    Accordingly, I decline the third respondent's Application to dismiss the proceedings against it pursuant to s 541 of the IR Act. 
  1. The pleadings – Amended Application
  1. [88]
    The second portion of the Application alternatively seeks the exercise of the Commission's discretion to strike out portions of Dr Khalilidehkordi's pleadings contained in her Amended Application. The third respondent asserts that the identified offending portions of the Amended Application are either 'vexatious', 'without reasonable cause', or 'fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action'.
  1. [89]
    The third respondent does not identify any statutory or other source from where it draws these terms. The third respondent does not make any submissions about how the identified portions of the Amended Application are said to be vexatious and nor can I clearly appreciate that the third respondent submits the identified pleadings are 'without reasonable cause'. The only basis cited that appears to be dealt with in the submissions is that the pleadings do not disclose a reasonable cause of action. 
  1. [90]
    This part of the Application to strike out the portions of Dr Khalilidehkordi's pleadings does not press for the proceedings against the third respondent to be entirely extinguished but rather, seeks an order requiring Dr Khalilidehkordi to re-plead or amend her material as the case may be.[28]
  1. [91]
    The third respondent's submissions in respect of the Amended Application address the case pleaded against it at paragraphs 9.1, 9.2 and 10.1(c), (e), (g) and (h). Those pleadings relevantly provide:

9 Third Respondent’s Involvement

9.1  The Third Respondent, via Prof Vucic, issued the Non-Certification Decision, which was conduct that was taken:

  1. (a)
    intentionally
  1. (b)
    because of the advice to and encouragement of the First (via the Second) Respondent in the form of the Vucic Email, the Revocation Email, the Denial Email and the Failure Notification; and
  1. (c)
    knowing at the relevant time that a substantial reason for the Vucic Email, the Revocation Email, the Denial Email and the Failure Notification that advice and encouragement was the Applicant's exercise of the Complaint Right, the Dispute Procedure Right, the Industrial Activity Right and the Trade Union Activity Right.

9.2  Accordingly, the Third Respondent was 'involved in; the Non Certification Decision Contravention (within the meaning of the term 'involved in' as it used in section 571 of the Act) the First (via the Second) Respondent's contravention – namely, causing the Non-Certification Decision to be made – because:

  1. (a)
    The Third Respondent knew at relevant times that the reasons for the First (via the Second) Respondent causing it to issue the Non-Certification Decision substantially included the Applicant's exercising of:
  1. (i)
    The Complaint Right;
  2. (ii)
    The Dispute Procedure Right;
  3. (iii)
    The Industrial Activity Right
  4. (iv)
    The Trade Union Activity Right;
  5. (v)
    Proposing to further exercise those Rights; and
  1. (b)
    The Third Respondent, with that knowledge, issued the Non-Certification Decision and thereby:
  1. (i)
    Was knowingly concerned in the First (via the Second) Respondent's contravention; and
  2. (ii)
    Took active steps that aided the First (via the Second) Respondent in causing the issuing of the Non-Certification Decision.

10.1  The Applicant seeks the following relief:

…

  1. (c)
    A declaration that the Third Respondent was involved in the First Respondent's causing the Non-Certification Decision to be made, which constituted a contraventions by the First Respondent of sections 285, 291 and 295.

…

  1. (e)
    Injunctive orders pursuant to section 473 of the Act compelling the Third Respondent to formally recognise the Applicant's supervised training from 4 February 2019 to 2 February 2020 as having been successfully completed;

… 

  1. (g)
    An order that the First, Second and Third Respondent each separately pay a civil penalty to the Applicant in respect of any contraventions of the Act that the Commission finds the First, Second and Third Respondents engaged in, or were involved in, which is to be paid within 21 days of such order issuing;

…

  1. (h)
    An order that the First, Second and Third Respondents jointly pay compensation to the Applicant as follows (which is to be paid within 21 days of such order issuing):
  1. (i)
    $1,173 for costs of engaging in the Third Respondent's review process;
  2. (ii)
    $7,022 for costs of engaging in the Third Respondent's appeal process:
  3. (iii)
    $60,000 as general damages for stress and humiliation; and
  4. (iv)
    $3,646 for fees paid for one years' worth of training at the Third Respondent; and
  5. (v)
    $265,241.39 being the difference between the Applicant's present income ($134,963.40) and the income the Applicant would receive when she attained the role of a Specialist ($400,204.79). 
  1. [92]
    There is little to no reference in the third respondent's submissions as to the precise aspects of the pleadings that are said to be 'vexatious, without reasonable cause, or failing to disclose a reasonable course of action'. In the circumstances, I intend to have objective regard to the challenged pleadings to ascertain whether they adequately articulate an identifiable claim against the third respondent.
  1. [93]
    Paragraph 9.1 appears under the heading 'Third Respondent's Involvement'. The use of the term 'involvement' is clearly deliberate. It is expressly stated in paragraph 9.2 to be a reference to s 571 of the IR Act in my view. It is folly to break paragraph 9 into its parts as a means of demonstrating alleged flaws. The entirety of paragraph 9 is intended to plead the cause of action of accessorial liability against the third respondent and while its separate parts each serve a function, it must be read as a whole to glean its true meaning.
  1. [94]
    Paragraph 9.1 broadly seeks to identify the material facts that Dr Khalilidehkordi alleges, and which she says attract accessorial liability i.e., that the third respondent issued the non-certification decision intentionally and (importantly) did so knowing that the actions taken by the second respondent that prompted that decision were substantially motivated by inter alia an exercise by Dr Khalilidehkordi of her workplace rights.
  1. [95]
    In my view, paragraph 9.1 competently pleads the bare elements of the alleged accessorial liability. Language and style can always be enhanced or improved, but whatever the language might be said to be lacking stylistically in this case, the pleadings still make plain the case against the third respondent.
  1. [96]
    Paragraph 9.1(b) is worthy of some comment. On the face of it, it appears to be a pleading of the type necessary to plead against e.g., an employer or person who is alleged to have taken adverse action, because it appears to plead the basis for the action taken by Professor Vucic with the use of the phrase 'because of'. Clearly Professor Vucic and the third respondent are not employers and nor is it alleged that they took adverse action for the purposes of these proceedings rather, it is alleged by these pleadings that they were 'involved in' adverse action within the terms of s 571 of the Act.
  1. [97]
    In those circumstances I do not accept the criticism by the third respondent of the pleading at 9.1(b). While I accept the pleading has typical characteristics of a pleading against an employer in adverse action proceedings, in the unique circumstances of this case it plainly has another purpose.
  1. [98]
    It is not pleaded that Professor Vucic acted 'because of' e.g., the exercise of a workplace right. It is pleaded by Dr Khalilidehkordi that Professor Vucic's decision was an inevitable consequence of the actions of the second respondent. To plead that Professor Vucic took the action he did because of the actions of the second respondent is simply another way of pleading that proposition. Indeed, it pleads the other end of that critical transaction i.e., the second respondent took certain actions knowing the third respondent would inevitably respond in a particular way, and the third respondent responded in a particular way because of the actions of the second respondent.  
  1. [99]
    The third respondent also contends that paragraph 9 fails to identify which parts of s 571 of the IR Act are relied on. There is no doubt that paragraph 9.2 makes clear the reliance on s 571 of the IR Act broadly. While paragraph 9.2 does not expressly identify any specific portion of s 571 of the IR Act, the language it contains makes sufficiently plain what case is pleaded.
  1. [100]
    Paragraph 9.2(a) pleads that the third respondent had the requisite knowledge of the matters substantially motivating the second respondent. Then, having pleaded that knowledge, paragraph 9.2(b)(i) expressly pleads that the third respondent was 'knowingly concerned' in the contravention. The term 'knowingly concerned' is clearly a reference to the language of s 571(3)(c).
  1. [101]
    Further, paragraph 9.2(b)(ii) expressly alleges that the third respondent “aided” the first respondent (via the second respondent) in issuing the non-certification decision. This can only be a reference to s 571(3)(a). 
  1. [102]
    I am sceptical that the third respondent was genuinely unable to reach this conclusion. While a party is not required to make assumptions as to the legislative provisions relied on by a party in their pleadings, the words used by Dr Khalilidehkordi are plainly a reference to those portions of s 571 using the same language.
  1. [103]
    In the circumstances I am satisfied that the pleadings set out in paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 are neither vexatious, without reasonable cause or fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action. On the contrary, I find those pleadings be competent and plainly capable of understanding.
  1. [104]
    In respect of the third respondent's complaint about clause 10.1(c), (e), (g) and (h) there is little to nothing contained in the written submissions to address this. There was nothing said about this in oral submissions.
  1. [105]
    In the circumstances where clause 10.1 deals with the relief sought by Dr Khalilidehkordi and, where all such relief sought in the pleadings is within the power of the Commission to grant if she is successful in her claim, I am unable to appreciate how the pleading can be subject to challenge. Naturally, if the third respondent had succeeded in its other arguments with respect to the pleadings (or the claim generally) an inevitable consequence would be to denude those portions of clause 10.1 of the Amended Application dealing with the third respondent.
  1. [106]
    But in circumstances where the third respondent has failed to achieve a favourable exercise of my discretion with respect to s 541, or in respect of its complaints about clause 9, clause 10.1 remains entirely viable in these proceedings.
  1. The pleadings - SOFC
  1. [107]
    The third respondent also seeks to strike out various contentions contained in Dr Khalilidehkordi's SOFC. Again, the third respondent relies on a contention that the allegedly offending pleadings are vexatious, without reasonable cause, or fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action. Again, the third respondent fails to identify whether these grounds are founded in statute or otherwise. Again, it is not clearly appreciable from the submissions which of the grounds is said to apply to these pleadings. 
  1. [108]
    Adopting a similar approach to the third respondent's Application with respect to clause 10.1 of the Amended Application, I conclude that in respect of this aspect of their Application, the third respondent needed to first succeed in its arguments about the claim generally pursuant to its Application in regard to s 541, or in its arguments about the pleadings found at clauses 9.1 and 9.2 (or both).
  1. [109]
    In those circumstances, I am not prepared to grant the Application insofar as it relates to the nominated passages of the SOFC from (variously) clause 28 to clause 39. 

Conclusion

  1. [110]
    The third respondent has failed to demonstrate that a hearing of the case against it is not necessary or desirable in the public interest. On the contrary, the case against the third respondent is novel and without precedent, and its determination by this Commission will especially add valuable texture to the language around inter alia s 282 of the IR Act and the already established principles.
  1. [111]
    Nothing about my conclusions ought to be construed as a complete rejection of the merits of the arguments that the third respondent has contend are available to them to challenge the claim against it. But the absence of e.g., authorities to support their narrow reading of s 282 of the IR Act or (more importantly) the absence of evidence from the second respondent and Professor Vucic are significant factors that lead me to conclude that Dr Khalilidehkordi ought to have the opportunity to argue her case.
  1. [112]
    Further, the criticisms of the pleadings in Dr Khalilidehkordi's Amended Application at clauses 9.1, 9.2 and 10.1 are not made out on an objective examination of those pleadings. Further again, as a consequence of these conclusions, the Application of the third respondent with respect to Dr Khalilidehkordi's Statement of Facts and Contentions (variously from paragraph 28 to 39) must also fail.
  1. [113]
    To whatever extent the third respondent is prejudiced by having to defend the actions of Professor Vucic in these proceedings they would likely be in a position to address this through an order for costs in the event that they ultimately prevail in their arguments.
  1. [114]
    Finally, to be clear, Dr Khalilidehkordi ought not to interpret this decision as an endorsement for her arguments against any of the respondents. Her path is by no means clear, and a hearing of this matter will involve considerable time and expense.                   While Dr Khalilidehkordi is entitled to have this matter heard in full, she ought to give careful consideration to the not insignificant exposure to a costs order she will incur if some or all of her arguments fail. 

Orders

  1. [115]
    In all of the circumstances, I make the following order:
  1. The Application filed on 18 March 2022 to dismiss proceedings is dismissed.

Footnotes

[1] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 284(1)(b), s284(1)(c)(ii).

[2] Annexure B to Application in Existing Proceedings filed on 18 March 2022.

[3] [2019] ICQ 18 (29 November 2019).

[4] [2014] ICQ 6.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Re Queensland Electricity Commission & Ors; ex parte Electrical Trades Union of Australia (1987) 72 ALR 1 at 5.

[7] Re MEAA; ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 112 ALR 193 at 194.

[8] Third Respondent's Amended Submissions dated 6 May 2022, paragraph 3.

[9] Affidavit of Sarah Jade Millar, filed 25 March 2022, paragraph 4.

[10] Ibid, paragraphs 5-7.

[11] Ibid paragraph 10.

[12] Ibid paragraph 16 & Exhibit SJM-2.

[13] By April 2020 Dr Khalilidehkordi was employed or about to be employed in the Sunshine Coast health district.

[14] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 3.

[15] Hennessy v gold Coast Hospital and Health Service [2020] QIRC 081; Byrne v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 013; The Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers Australia, Queensland Branch, Union of Employees v Brisbane City Council [2022] QIRC 005; Myers v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2021] QIRC 108; Tapfield v Ipswich City Council [2021] QIRC 069; Campbell v Stat of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney General) [2019] ICQ 18.

[16] Submissions in reply of the third respondent, paragraph 18.

[17] Whether the actions of the second respondent will meet the definition of adverse action contained at s 282 of the IR Act will no doubt be a matter for later argument.

[18] See clause 4.4(a) of the Amended Application.

[19] See paragraph 4.4 of the Amended Application.

[20] T 1-5 to T 1-8.

[21] Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661; 59 ALJR 776; 61 ALR 307; [1985] HCA 65 at 666-667; see also Fair Work Ombudsman v Devine Marine Group Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1365 at [176].

[22] Note – the reverse onus contained at s 306 of the IR Act would appear to only apply as against the person alleged to be taking the adverse action (see also CFMEU v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 50 at [59]). Notwithstanding this, a failure by the third respondent to lead evidence from Professor Vucic as to his state of knowledge in the circumstances of this case would risk an adverse inference being drawn.

[23] Or wilfully blind - see for example Fair Work Ombudsman v Blue Impression Pty Ltd (2017) 269 IR 92; [2017] FCCA 810.

[24] See paragraph 52 of the third respondent’s amended submissions filed 6 May 2022. 

[25] See s 306 of the IR Act. See also Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500; 290 ALR 647; [2012] HCA 32.

[26] [2003] QIC 160.

[27] See paragraph 4(g) of the third respondent’s submissions filed 27 May 2022.

[28] See paragraph 2 of the amended submissions of the third respondent filed 6 May 2022.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Khalilidehkordi v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service & Ors

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Khalilidehkordi v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service

  • MNC:

    [2022] QIRC 387

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Industrial Commissioner Dwyer

  • Date:

    11 Oct 2022

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Avenue Realty Pty Ltd v Percival [2003] QIC 160
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QIC 160
Cite 2 - [2003] QIC 160
Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2012) 248 CLR 500
Cite 2 - (2012) 248 CLR 500
Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 290 ALR 647
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2012) 290 ALR 647
Cite 2 - (2012) 290 ALR 647
Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) HCA 32
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2012) HCA 32
Cite 2 - (2012) HCA 32
Byrne v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 13
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 13
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 13
Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] ICQ 18
Cite 2 - [2019] ICQ 18
Cite 3 - [2019] ICQ 18
Fair Work Ombudsman v Blue Impression Pty Ltd (2017) 269 IR 92
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2017) 269 IR 92
Cite 2 - (2017) 269 IR 92
Fair Work Ombudsman v Blue Impression Pty Ltd [2017] FCCA 810
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] FCCA 810
Cite 2 - [2017] FCCA 810
Fair Work Ombudsman v Devine Marine Group Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1365
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] FCA 1365
Cite 2 - [2014] FCA 1365
GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin [2010] FWAFB 5343
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] FWAFB 5343
Gregory Hennessy v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service [2020] QIRC 81
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 81
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 81
Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 50
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] FCAFC 50
Cite 2 - [2017] FCAFC 50
Myers v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2021] QIRC 108
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 108
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 108
O'Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1989) 168 CLR 210
Re MEAA; ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 112 ALR 193
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1993) 112 ALR 193
Cite 2 - (1993) 112 ALR 193
Re Queensland Electricity Commission & Ors; ex parte Electrical Trades Union of Australia (1987) 72 ALR 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1987) 72 ALR 1
Cite 2 - (1987) 72 ALR 1
State of Queensland v Lockhart [2014] ICQ 6
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] ICQ 6
Cite 2 - [2014] ICQ 6
Tapfield v Ipswich City Council [2021] QIRC 69
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 69
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 69
The Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers, Australia, Queensland Branch, Union of Employees v Brisbane City Council [2022] QIRC 5
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 5
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 5
Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1985) 158 CLR 661
Cite 2 - (1985) 158 CLR 661
Yorke v Lucas [1985] HCA 65
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1985] HCA 65
Cite 2 - [1985] HCA 65
Yorke v Lucas (1985) 61 ALR 307
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1985) 61 ALR 307
Cite 2 - (1985) 61 ALR 307

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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