Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
  • sclq logo
  1. Caselaw
  2. QIRC
  3. 2022
  4. Wilson v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) - [2022] QIRC 497

Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

Wilson v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)[2022] QIRC 497

Wilson v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)[2022] QIRC 497

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Wilson v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 497

PARTIES: 

Wilson, Sara Elizabeth

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

(Respondent)

CASE NO.:

PSA/2022/997

PROCEEDING:

Application to stay decision appealed against

DELIVERED ON:

22 November 2022

MEMBER:

Merrell DP

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

ORDER:

The Appellant's application to stay the decision appealed against is dismissed.

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 562A and s 566

Public Service Act 2008, s 174 and s 175

CASES:

Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 380

Dean-Braieoux v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 209

APPEARANCES:

The Appellant by telephone.

Mr G. Carthew of the State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) for the Respondent.

Reasons for Decision (ex tempore)

Introduction

  1. [1]
    Ms Sara Elizabeth Wilson is employed by the State of Queensland as a Client Service Officer at Policelink, which is part of the Queensland Police Service ('the Service').
  1. [2]
    On 16 February 2022, Ms Wilson was required, pursuant to s 175 of the Public Service Act 2008 ('the PS Act'), to be examined by a doctor at 9.00 am on 31 March 2022 ('the February medical examination decision').
  1. [3]
    On 11 March 2022, Ms Wilson, pursuant to ch 7, pt 1 of the PS Act, appealed against the February medical examination decision. By a decision dated 19 August 2022, Industrial Commissioner Dwyer, pursuant to s 562A(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act'), declined to hear Ms Wilson’s appeal against the February medical examination decision ('the Commission's decision').
  1. [4]
    By application to appeal to the Industrial Court of Queensland filed on 9 September 2022, Ms Wilson appealed against the Commission’s decision. By Directions Order dated 26 September 2022, sitting as the Industrial Court of Queensland, I made orders for the hearing and determination of Ms Wilson’s appeal against the Commission’s decision which was to be heard before me on 12 December 2022.
  1. [5]
    By email dated 4 October 2022 to the Industrial Registry, Ms Wilson, for a range of reasons, requested that her appeal be placed into abeyance. By email sent on 6 October 2022 to the Industrial Registry, the Service indicated that it did not oppose Ms Wilson’s appeal being placed into abeyance. By Further Directions Order dated 10 October 2022, I vacated the earlier directions orders I made sitting as the Industrial Court of Queensland and further ordered that Ms Wilson was to notify the Industrial Registry and the Service when she was ready to proceed with her appeal against the Commission’s decision.
  1. [6]
    On 17 November 2022, Ms Wilson, as was her right, made an application to the Industrial Court of Queensland to stay '… the decision handed down on 19/08/2022 by Industrial Commissioner Dwyer for the QIRC to direct my employer, Queensland Police Service, to stop the IME process' ('Ms Wilson's stay application').
  1. [7]
    Earlier today, sitting as the Industrial Court of Queensland and in the absence of any objection from the Service, I adjourned Ms Wilson’s stay application upon her request. During the proceeding before the Industrial Court of Queensland earlier today, I was informed by Ms Wilson that she had today filed a public service appeal to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission against what she described as another medical examination decision that she asserts is a different decision to the one dealt with by Industrial Commissioner Dwyer in August 2022.
  1. [8]
    That further medical examination decision directed Ms Wilson, pursuant to s 175 of the PS Act, to attend a medical examination. That medical examination has been set down for tomorrow, being 23 November 2022. The appeal filed today by Ms Wilson in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission against that further medical examination decision has been given matter number PSA/2022/997. That medical examination decision was conveyed by letter from Assistant Commissioner Ben Marcus dated 29 August 2022. Ms Wilson says that she received that written decision by letter from Assistant Commissioner Marcus on 9 September 2022.
  1. [9]
    Ms Wilson also indicated, when I was sitting as the Industrial Court of Queensland earlier today, that it was her intention to seek a stay of Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision, but she had not been given the opportunity to make such an application because her appeal had not been filed at that stage. By consent, I adjourned the Court and reconvened sitting as the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission to give consideration to the matters concerning Ms Wilson’s public service appeal that she filed today, being the appeal against the decision of Assistant Commissioner Marcus in his letter dated 29 August 2022, which has been given number PSA/2022/997.
  1. [10]
    Despite an objection from Mr Carthew, who appears for the State of Queensland through the Service in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission matter, given the urgency of the situation, I indicated that I would hear from the parties about the oral application that was made by Ms Wilson to stay Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision dated 29 August 2022, that Ms Wilson attend a medical examination tomorrow, being 23 November 2022. The reason that I made that decision in the face of the objection of Mr Carthew was because of the urgency of the situation, namely, that the direction from Assistant Commissioner Marcus was that Ms Wilson attend the medical examination tomorrow, and because it is common ground that there may be consequences for Ms Wilson if she did not attend that medical examination. In my view, there were urgent circumstances that necessitated a hearing and determination of Ms Wilson’s application for a stay today.
  1. [11]
    Ms Wilson submitted that Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision should be stayed because:
  1. (a)
    she is under stress from, amongst other things, seeking meetings with the Service about the independent medical examination process and her return to work;
  1. (b)
    she wishes to obtain more legal advice about why Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision is flawed or invalid;
  1. (c)
    the injury management officers of the Service did not try hard enough to put medical information before Assistant Commissioner Marcus that may have persuaded him not to make his decision dated 29 August 2022 to direct that she attend an independent medical examination tomorrow;
  1. (d)
    her internal appeal rights about Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision have been withdrawn from her;
  1. (e)
    the decision of Assistant Commissioner Marcus did not explain or give adequate reasons why she was directed to attend the medical examination tomorrow, in that she submitted that she had obtained legal advice that the reasons given for that direction by Assistant Commissioner Marcus were ambiguous;
  1. (f)
    again, she had legal advice specifying that there was not one decision that she attend an independent medical examination, but in fact there were two decisions, and that Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision was a separate decision against which she could appeal; and
  1. (g)
    she indicated that there was a lack of transparency on behalf of the Service in that she was being prevented from putting information before the Service that would allow her to return to work on a graduated return to work basis.
  1. [12]
    Mr Carthew submitted that:
  1. (a)
    Ms Wilson’s appeal flows on from Industrial Commissioner Dwyer’s decision in PSA/2022/732, which was a decision in which, as I indicated earlier, Industrial Commissioner Dwyer dismissed an earlier appeal by Ms Wilson against the February examination decision;
  1. (b)
    in that decision, Industrial Commissioner Dwyer exercised discretion, pursuant to s 562A(3) of the IR Act, to decline to hear Ms Wilson’s appeal against the February medical examination decision;
  1. (c)
    the facts and matters that concern Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision dated 29 August 2022 rely on the same facts as concerned in the decision that was the subject of Ms Wilson’s appeal that was heard and decided by Industrial Commissioner Dwyer in August of 2022;
  1. (d)
    the reason for the medical examination direction given by Assistant Commissioner Marcus, pursuant to s 175 of the PS Act, was to assist the Service to manage Ms Wilson if she does return to the workplace; and
  1. (e)
    all the relevant elements of s 174 of the PS Act have been met, such that the direction that Ms Wilson attend an independent medical examination has been validly made, in that the issues are her absence from work and the reasonable suspicion formed by Assistant Commissioner Marcus, and indeed, the reasonable suspicion formed by the earlier decision maker in the February medical examination decision, that Ms Wilson’s absence was due to a mental illness or disability.
  1. [13]
    In submissions in reply, Ms Wilson referred to some more recent medical evidence from her general practitioner in a report dated October this year that indicated she could return to work, and she also referred to a number of questions that, in general, could be asked of the doctor conducting the medical examination of her, although the questions she read out were not questions directed to the doctor to whom she has been referred for examination tomorrow.
  1. [14]
    Section 566(1) of the IR Act is headed 'Stay of decision appealed against'. Subsection 1 provides:
  1. (1)
    On an appeal, the industrial tribunal may order that the decision being appealed be wholly or partly stayed pending-
  1. (a)
    the determination of the appeal; or
  1. (b)
    a further order of the industrial tribunal.
  1. [15]
    In the decision of Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service),[1] a decision delivered on 9 November 2021, I set out the relevant principles to be observed by the Commission in granting the relevant principles that may be observed by the Commission in granting a stay of a decision appealed against. Relevantly, I stated:
  1. [32]
    Section 566(1) of the IR Act confers an unfettered discretion on the Commission to grant a stay of a decision being appealed.
  1. [33]
    The parties agree on the relevant principles that apply, in determining whether or not to exercise discretion, to grant a stay. They are:
  • the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate a proper basis for a stay that will be fair to all parties;
  • the mere filing of an appeal will not, of itself, provide a reason or demonstrate an appropriate case, nor will it discharge the onus which the applicant bears;
  • the tribunal has a discretion whether or not to grant a stay and, if so, as to the terms that would be fair;
  • in the exercise of its discretion, the tribunal will weigh considerations such as the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties before it;
  • where there is a risk that the appeal will prove abortive if the applicant succeeds and a stay is not granted, tribunals will normally exercise their discretion in favour of granting a stay;
  • where it is apparent that unless a stay is granted, an appeal will be rendered nugatory, this will be a substantial factor in favour of the grant of a stay; and
  • although tribunals approaching applications for stay will not generally speculate about the applicant’s prospects of success, given that argument concerning the substance of the appeal is typically and necessarily attenuated, this does not prevent them from considering the specific terms of the stay that will be appropriate fairly to adjust the interests of the parties, from making some preliminary assessment about whether the applicant has an arguable case.
  1. [34]
    The prospects of success will obviously tend to favour the refusal of a stay if the prospects of the appeal can be seen to be very poor.
  1. [35]
    In general, the balance of convenience involves a consideration of whether the inconvenience of injury in which the applicant would be likely to suffer if a stay is refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the respondent will suffer if a stay was granted.
  1. [36]
    The above-mentioned principles have been applied by the Industrial Court of Queensland and by the Commission in respect of applications for stays of decisions, pending appeals or reviews of the decisions, in other analogous statutory contexts.[2]
  1. [16]
    Chapter 5, pt 7 of the PS Act is headed 'Mental or physical incapacity'. Section 174 has the subheading 'Application of pt 7' and it provides:

This part applies to a public service employee if-

  1. (a)
    the employee is absent from duty or the employee’s chief executive is reasonably satisfied the employee is not performing his or her duties satisfactorily; and
  2. (b)
    the chief executive reasonably suspects that the employee’s absence or unsatisfactory performance is caused by mental or physical illness or disability.
  1. [17]
    Section 175 is headed 'Chief executive may require medical examination' and that section provides:

The chief executive may-

  1. (a)
    appoint a doctor to examine the employee and give the chief executive a written report on the examination; and
  2. (b)
    require the employee to submit to the medical examination.
  1. [18]
    In a decision entitled Dean-Braieoux v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)[3] ('Dean-Braieoux'), a decision I delivered on 11 June 2021, I set out what is meant by the phrase 'reasonably suspects' in s 174(b) of the PS Act, namely:
  1. [34]
    The phrase 'reasonably suspects', in a different statutory context, was considered by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Goldie v Commonwealth of Australia ('Goldie'). In Goldie, the Full Court considered the meaning of s 189(1) of the Migration Act 1958 which provided:

If an officer knows or reasonably suspects that a person in the migration zone is an unlawful non-citizen, the officer must detain the person.

  1. [35]
    As to the meaning of “reasonably suspects”, Gray and Lee JJ stated:
  • the phrase means the detention referred to must be justifiable upon objective examination of relevant material;
  • the context of the phrase suggests that something substantially less than certainty is required;
  • reasonable suspicion, therefore, lies somewhere on a spectrum between certainty and irrationality;
  • the need to ensure that arrest is not arbitrary suggests that the requirement for a reasonable suspicion should be placed on that spectrum not too close to irrationality;
  • what is reasonable in a particular case depends upon the circumstances of that case;
  • all of the circumstances must be considered; and
  • the scheme contemplated under the Migration Act 1958 was indefinite detention pending removal or deportation under administrative fiat and those provisions confirm that the appropriate construction of s 189(1) is that an officer, in forming a reasonable suspicion, is obliged to make due inquiry to obtain material likely to be relevant to the formation of that suspicion.
  1. [36]
    Stone J stated:
  • the word, 'reasonable' expresses an indeterminate standard;
  • in deciding if an officer’s suspicion is reasonable, all relevant doubts and circumstances, including contradictory or insufficient evidence, should be taken into account; and
  • the reasonableness of a suspicion must be assessed in the light of the information that an officer has at the relevant time.
  1. [37]
    In Ruddock v Taylor ('Ruddock'), the High Court also considered the meaning of s 189(1) of the Migration Act 1958. The plurality held that what constitutes reasonable grounds for suspecting a person to be an unlawful non-citizen must be judged against what was known or reasonably capable of being known at the relevant time.
  1. [38]
    In my view, similar considerations to these are a sound guide to the formation of a reasonable suspicion by a chief executive as contemplated by s 174(b) of the PS Act. This is because s 189(1) of the Migration Act 1958, and the combined effect of s 174 and s 175 of the PS Act, require that a reasonable suspicion should be formed before action is directly taken against an individual.
  1. [39]
    Therefore, having regard to the observations of Gray and Lee JJ, and Stone J in Goldie, and to the plurality in Ruddock:
  • for the suspicion of a chief executive (or his or her delegate) that a public service employee’s absence is caused by mental or physical illness or disability to be reasonable, it must be justifiable upon objective examination of relevant material;
  • the reasonable suspicion should be placed on a spectrum, the spectrum being between certainty and irrationality and not too close to irrationality;
  • what is reasonable depends on all the circumstances of the case and all the circumstances must be considered;
  • all relevant doubts and circumstances, including contradictory or insufficient evidence, should be taken into account; and
  • the reasonableness of any suspicion formed by the decision maker must be justifiable in light of the facts available to him or her at a particular time or what was reasonably capable of being known at that time.
  1. [40]
    These considerations are not to supplant the statutory test in s 174(b) of the PS Act, but, as I have referred to above, my opinion is that they provide a sound guide to a person required to make a decision under s 174(b).[4]
  1. [19]
    Putting Ms Wilson’s case for a stay at its highest - that is leaving aside the fact that her appeal has been filed out of time, and clearly it has been filed out of time because, in her appeal filed today, Ms Wilson applied for an extension of time to lodge her appeal; and also leaving aside Mr Carthew’s submissions that Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision is, in fact, the same decision as was dealt with by Industrial Commissioner Dwyer in his decision in August 2022 - this is not a case where justice dictates that I should exercise discretion to stay Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision.
  1. [20]
    Having regard to Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision, on page 2 of that decision, he states as follows:

I am aware of the following:

  • You commenced sick leave from 4 July 2021, then provided medical clearance to return to full duties from 19 August 2021.
  • You performed three shifts from 28 August 2021 until 30 August 2021 and have since been continuously absent from the workplace since 31 August 2021.
  • You have provided consecutive medical certificates issued by General Practitioner Dr Rob Ruberry and Dr Pav Chopra.
  • In [sic] letter dated 6 April 2022, Dr Chopra indicated your current diagnosis is stress.
  1. [21]
    Assistant Commissioner Marcus then stated:

As such, pursuant to s. 174 of the Public Service Act 2008 (PS Act), I am reasonably satisfied your absence since 31 August 2021 is caused by mental or physical illness or disability.

  1. [22]
    Annexed to that letter were extracts from a number of medical certificates and medical reports that have been received by the Service, mainly from Dr Chopra, but also from a Dr Rick Allen. Without referring to all of the extracts from the medical reports, the letter states as follows:
  • Medical letter received by Dr Chopra dated 6 April 2022 indicating -

"…symptoms consistent with stress. The symptoms have been exacerbated recently by a combination of workplace and domestic stresses, and she was directly affected by the Brisbane floods with the loss of some possessions."

"…she has ongoing industrial disputes which are in progress. I feel it is unlikely for her return to her 'substantial role' within 3 months, but she should be able to resume alternative duties by the end of this month…unknown at this stage whether she would be return [sic] to her previous role, this will be reviewed frequently and periodically."

"…current diagnosis is of stress with no objective anxiety or depression, She is currently unfit to handle documents of violent, criminal or graphic nature due to her condition as these are likely to worsen her symptoms."

"She is currently unfit to deal with members of the public who are suffering from altered mental states, abusive or aggressive individuals, or handle emergency calls for the same reason."

  1. [23]
    Two pages over, there is an extract from a medical letter received from Dr Chopra, dated 4 August 2022, where the following quotes are included in the decision from Assistant Commissioner Marcus:

"…attended here again today with ongoing symptoms from her previously diagnosed condition (stress)."

"…also seeking legal advice and will be fit to return [sic] part time work on 29/08/2022 with the restrictions previously provided to you in my previous letters (alternative placement/suitable duties)."

"She has commenced grief counselling through her church, and will attend every three weeks. She visits her priest monthly also. She also does regular meditation at home and has previously attended a meditation group. She still intends restarting yoga classes also."

"When she does return to work she should not be subjected to investigation processes for at least three months to allow her to re-integrate to her work environment without additional stressors."

  1. [24]
    The final extract is from a medical letter received from Dr Allen dated 24 August 2022, which states:

"I have recommended a month of leave to assist with her medical condition and strongly encourage a plan for three (3) months light/alternate duties (outside her substantive work area)following this period as outlined through workcover, prior to commencing full substandard duties. Tasks can include simple administrative tasks such as filing, data entry and those that do not involve high analytical requirement. She is not to be involved in investigative processes as was advised to her through additional management action in August 2021."

  1. [25]
    At the beginning of Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ letter, he sets out the duties associated with Ms Wilson’s position as a Client Service Officer, classification AO3, at Policelink, which include:
  • Provide prompt, consistent, and courteous client service via telephone, email and intranet, in line with Service and Policelink policies and standards.
  • Identify and manage client needs via effective questioning, negotiation, and conflict management.
  • Facilitate successful resolution of client contacts in accordance with relevant service benchmarks.
  • Enter and process data to a high standard of speed and accuracy with a minimum touch-typing speed of 40 - 45 words per minute and ninety-eight percent (98%) accuracy.
  • Adhere to information security procedures to safeguard the confidentiality and integrity of information.
  • Develop effective working relationships with Policelink staff and contribute to a positive workplace culture.
  • Apply problem solving and analytical skills to maintain and improve customer service standards and to contribute to Policelink business improvement and business goals.
  • Provide assistance to clients attempting to access on-line services.
  • Plan and prioritise workload in accordance with operational requirements and client demand.
  1. [26]
    As I have indicated earlier, there must be an objective assessment whether, in this case, the delegate of the Commissioner of Police - which is obviously Assistant Commissioner Marcus - reasonably suspected that Ms Wilson’s absence was caused by mental illness or disability. In my view, the decision given by Assistant Commissioner Marcus and the reasons given in his decision, objectively indicate that he made a considered, reasonable, and rational decision in forming the view that he reasonably suspected that Ms Wilson’s absence was caused by mental illness or disability.
  1. [27]
    There are a number of reasons for my view. In forming that view, I have had regard to the principles I referred to earlier in these reasons that came from the case of Dean-Braieoux.[5] In particular, there is no dispute, as is set out in Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision, that Ms Wilson has been absent from work since 31 August 2021. That is a period, as the Commission sits today, of over 12 months. I understand Ms Wilson's submissions that she has made attempts for a graduated return to work, however, the fact is that she has been absent from work for a period of over 12 months.
  1. [28]
    Furthermore, in his letter, Assistant Commissioner Marcus refers to the letter dated 6 April 2022 from Dr Chopra, which indicated that his diagnosis of Ms Wilson was that of stress and indeed, that is confirmed in the extract from the medical report from Dr Chopra dated 14 July 2022, which is also annexed to Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision. In addition, as I referred to earlier, there is a later medical report from Dr Chopra dated 4 August 2022 where Dr Chopra again indicated that, on that day, Ms Wilson attended upon him (Dr Chopra) with ongoing symptoms from her previously diagnosed condition of stress.
  1. [29]
    In all those circumstances, and not just having regard to the medical evidence that I have referred to in these reasons for decision, but also having regard to all the medical evidence annexed to Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision, it is my view that Assistant Commissioner Marcus has come to his decision on the basis of an objective examination of the relevant material. In my view, the reasonable suspicion that he has formed, for the reasons I have given, is on a spectrum between certainty and irrationality, and is not a decision that could be described as irrational, given the reasons in his decision.
  1. [30]
    Having regard to all of the circumstances of the case, including all the medical evidence that Assistant Commissioner Marcus refers to as annexed to his decision, then as at the date of his decision, it seems to me that the reasonable suspicion he formed was based upon objective material, namely:
  • the fact that Ms Wilson had been absent from work for over 12 months as at the time he made his decision, which was on 29 August 2022; and
  • the medical evidence that that absence was caused by Ms Wilson’s mental illness or disability, namely, stress.
  1. [31]
    In these circumstances, my view is that the reasonable suspicion formed by Assistant Commissioner Marcus was one that was fairly and objectively made.
  1. [32]
    On that basis, if ultimately it is determined that Ms Wilson has a competent appeal, in respect of the fact that she has filed her appeal out of time and in respect of the other issues Mr Carthew has raised, my view is that Ms Wilson’s prospects of success in her appeal would be very weak, given the objective basis upon which Assistant Commissioner Marcus came to his view about a reasonable suspicion that her absence is caused by mental illness or disability.
  1. [33]
    Whilst the considerations of the balance of convenience may be even, my view is that the fact that Ms Wilson’s case is weak persuades me that this is not a case where justice dictates that I should exercise my discretion and stay the decision against which Ms Wilson has purported to appeal, namely, the decision of Assistant Commissioner Marcus set out in his letter dated 29 August 2022.
  1. [34]
    I understand what Ms Wilson says about there being more recent medical evidence in October that she referred to in her submissions in reply; however, I have to make my decision on the basis of the material that was before Assistant Commissioner Marcus, and for the reasons I have given, that decision was one that was objectively rational and reasonable.
  1. [35]
    The one final thing I want to say is there is merit in Mr Carthew’s submissions about the purpose of a public service employee being directed to attend a medical examination pursuant to ch 5, pt 7 of the PS Act, that is, a direction to attend a medical examination pursuant to s 175 of the PS Act. In Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ letter, he states:

The purpose of the medical examination is to obtain independent medical examination regarding your physical illness/disability and the effect of your illness/disability has on you in performing the inherent requirements of your position and any reasonable adjustment that may be considered.

  1. [36]
    The clear purpose of ss 174 and 175, and indeed, the clear purpose of ch 5, pt 7 of the PS Act is that it is not to be used as a step to terminating a person’s employment. Its purpose is to arm a chief executive with medical information to be able to deal with an employee who is absent from work or who is performing unsatisfactorily due to a mental or physical illness or disability, and to take action, having regard to the medical evidence that is provided. To that extent, there is some force in the submissions made by Mr Carthew.
  1. [37]
    For all those reasons and as I have indicated, Ms Wilson, I have considered your case at its highest and I have considered that Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision is a fresh decision. I have discounted the submissions made by Mr Carthew that there was, in fact, one whole decision. I put your case at its highest. But for the reasons that I have given, I am not persuaded to issue a stay this afternoon against Assistant Commissioner Marcus’ decision. As a consequence, the direction that you attend the independent medical examination tomorrow at 11.00 am, by Dr Mary-Ellen O'Hare, stands.
  1. [38]
    Finally, as I understood Ms Wilson’s case, she filed her appeal today for the purposes of wanting to make an urgent application for a stay. I am grateful for the assistance given by Ms Wilson in appearing on an urgent basis. I am grateful for Mr Carthew’s consideration in being able to respond to the matters concerning Ms Wilson’s appeal this afternoon and her oral application for a stay.

Conclusion

  1. [39]
    The order that I make is that I will dismiss the oral application for a stay made by Ms Wilson against the decision of Assistant Commissioner Marcus, that Ms Wilson attend an independent medical examination with Consultant Psychiatrist Dr O'Hare on 23 November 2022, which, as I understand it, is now at 11.00 am.

Order

  1. [40]
    I make the following order:

The Appellant's application to stay the decision appealed against is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding [40] paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Decision of Deputy President Merrell.

J.W. Merrell, Deputy President: ………………………

(Signature)

Dated: 31 January 2023

Footnotes

[1] [2021] QIRC 380.

[2] Citations omitted.

[3] [2021] QIRC 209 ('Dean-Braieoux').

[4] Citations omitted.

[5] Dean-Braieoux (n 3).

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Wilson v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Wilson v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

  • MNC:

    [2022] QIRC 497

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Merrell DP

  • Date:

    22 Nov 2022

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 380
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 380
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 380
Dean-Braieoux v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 209
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 209
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 209

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.