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  4. Baigorri v Workers' Compensation Regulator - [2023] QIRC 190

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Baigorri v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2023] QIRC 190

Baigorri v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2023] QIRC 190

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Baigorri v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2023] QIRC 190

PARTIES:

Baigorri, Horacio Augusto

(Appellant)

v

Workers' Compensation Regulator

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

WC/2021/204

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against decision of Workers' Compensation Regulator

DELIVERED ON:

22 June 2023

HEARING DATES:

8 February 2023

MEMBER:

Merrell DP

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

ORDERS:

The orders contained in paragraph [124] of these reasons.

CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS' COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION – PERSONS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION – WHO IS A WORKER OR EMPLOYEE – Appellant reopened  application for workers’ compensation for a back and shoulder injury due to items falling on him – application for workers’ compensation rejected by WorkCover Queensland on the basis that the Appellant was not a ‘worker’ within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 – Appellant sought review of the WorkCover Queensland decision by the Respondent – Respondent confirmed the WorkCover Queensland decision – appeal by Appellant against review decision of the Respondent – whether Appellant deemed to be a worker within the meaning of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 – whether Appellant was a 'contractor' prior to making an independent courier contract with              Allied Express Transport Pty Ltd – whether Appellant was performing work not incident to a business regularly carried on by him at the date of injury – Appellant not a worker within the meaning of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the        Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 – Respondent's review decision confirmed – parties to be heard as to costs

STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES – construction of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 – history of provision – whether individual has to be a contractor prior to making a contract with someone else for the performance of work – meaning of the phrase '… incident to a trade or business regularly carried on by the contractor' – whether provision is applicable to a circumstance where a person, who is not a contractor, subsequently enters into a continuing contract for services with a principal as part of the commencement of a business as a courier driver

LEGISLATION:

Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic), s 8

Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s 14A

Carriers and Inn-Keepers Act 1928 (Vic), s 14

Industrial Relations (Transparency and Accountability of Industrial Organisations) and Other Acts Amendment Act 2013, pt 4, s 71

Taxation Administration Act 1953, sch 1, pt 2-5

The Workers' Compensation Acts Amendment Act of 1918, s 2

Workers' Compensation Act 1916-1988, s 3

Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (NSW), s 6

Workers' Compensation Act 1928-1946 (Vic), s 3

Workers' Compensation Act 1990, s 1.3, s 2.1, s 2.2 and s 8

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 4, s 5, s 11, s 558, 588 and sch 2

WorkCover Queensland Act 1996, s 12, s 534, sch 2 and sch 3

Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1988 (NSW), sch 1, cl 2

CASES:

Cam v Cousins Interstate Transport Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 1288

Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503

Higgins v Jackson [1976] HCA 37; (1976) 135 CLR 174

Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills [1949] HCA 49; (1949) 79 CLR 389

Kovacic v Henley Arch Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 56; (2009) 22 VR 21

L&B Linings Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales [2011] NSWSC 474

Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 9; (2005) 222 CLR 194

Northern Territory v Collins [2008] HCA 49; (2008) 235 CLR 619

On Call Interpreters and Translators Agency Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 3) [2011] FCA 366; (2011) 214 FCR 82

Project Blue Sky Inc. v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355

R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 269 CLR 507

Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister for Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497

Smith v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 003

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362

Toowoomba Demolition and Earthmoving Pty Ltd ATF Castle Family Trust v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2020] QIRC 030

Turner v Stewardson [1962] NSWR 137

Wesfarmers Federation Insurance Ltd v Stephen Wells trading as Wells Plumbing [2008] NSWCA 186

Zuijs v Wirth Brothers Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 73; (1955) 93 CLR 561

TEXT CITED:

Dennis Peace and Robert Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (Lexis Nexis, 9th ed, 2019)

APPEARANCES:

Mr M. Hovarth of Counsel instructed by Ms M. Lo of AMK Lawyers for the Appellant.

Mr P. O'Neill of Counsel directly instructed by Ms C. Shedden of the Respondent.

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    Allied Express Transport Pty Ltd (‘Allied’) operates a courier transport business. Mr Horacio Augusto Baigorri performed work for Allied as a courier driver from 2014. Mr Baigorri performed that work pursuant to a written contract between him and Allied (‘the contract’).
  1. [2]
    On 9 February 2021, while at Allied’s warehouse located at Rocklea, and when sorting through stacked items to locate items he needed to deliver, certain items fell on Mr Baigorri and he injured his lower back and left shoulder.
  1. [3]
    Mr Baigorri lodged an application for workers' compensation with WorkCover Queensland for that injury. Mr Baigorri subsequently withdrew his application on the basis he was not a ‘worker’ within the meaning of s 11 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (‘the Act’).
  1. [4]
    Mr Baigorri’s solicitors subsequently requested a reopening of his application. By decision dated 4 June 2021, WorkCover rejected Mr Baigorri’s application on the basis that he was not a ‘worker’ within the meaning of the Act. Mr Baigorri sought a review of WorkCover’s decision with the Workers' Compensation Regulator. By review decision dated 23 November 2021, the Regulator confirmed the decision of WorkCover ('the review decision').
  1. [5]
    Mr Baigorri appeals against the review decision to this Commission.
  1. [6]
    Mr Baigorri gave evidence on his own behalf.
  1. [7]
    The Regulator called evidence from Mr Troy Finch who, in late 2020 and early 2021, was Allied's National Manager for Driver Recruitment and Sales and who, in January and February 2021 in the course of performing the duties of that position, regularly attended Allied's Rocklea warehouse.[1]
  1. [8]
    The issue for my determination is whether Mr Baigorri, at the date he was injured, met the description of a person who is a worker, for the purposes of the Act, as contained in sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act.
  1. [9]
    The determination of the above issue requires:
  • the construction of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act; and
  • the consideration of whether Mr Baigorri met the description of a worker contained in sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act.
  1. [10]
    For the reasons that follow, Mr Baigorri was not a worker within the meaning of    sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act.

The relevant provisions of the Act

  1. [11]
    Section 11(2) of the Act provides that sch 2 of the Act sets out who is a worker in particular circumstances. Schedule 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act sets out particular circumstances where a contractor will be a worker for the purposes of the Act. That section provides:
  1. A contractor, other than a contractor mentioned in part 2, section 4[2] of this schedule, is a worker if–
  1. (a)
    the contractor makes a contract with someone else for the performance of work that is not incident to a trade or business regularly carried on by the contractor, individually or by way of a partnership; and
  1. (b)
     the contractor–
  1. (i)
     does not sublet the contract; or
  1. (ii)
     does not employ a worker; or
  1. (iii)
     if the contractor employs a worker, performs part of the work personally.

The parties' contentions

  1. [12]
    Mr Baigorri contends that he was a ‘worker’ within the meaning of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act because:
  • at the time he made the contract with Allied, and at the date of his injury:
  1. –he was a contractor;
  1. –he made a contract with Allied for the performance of work;
  1. –he did not have a trade or business as a courier; and
  1. –he did not have a trade or business as a courier he was carrying on regularly;
  • accordingly, the contract (with Allied) was not incident to his trade or business because he did not have a trade or business as a courier at any time and he was not regularly conducting either a trade or business as a courier at any time; and
  • his injury occurred while carrying out a task – sorting through stacks of parcels –  being a task that was not incidental to:
  1. –the contracted work;
  1. –any trade or business he was operating or operating regularly; and
  1. –the business of being a courier.[3]
  1. [13]
    The Regulator contends that:
  • at the time Mr Baigorri entered into the contract with Allied in December 2014, he was not a contractor, the consequence of which is that sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act does not apply to him;[4] or, in the alternative
  • at the date of his injury, the work performed by Mr Baigorri for Allied was an incident to a trade or business that was regularly carried out by him, the consequence of which is that sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act did not apply to him.[5]

The construction of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act

  1. [14]
    Neither party has been able to refer to a decision of the Commission or of the Industrial Court of Queensland where the construction of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act has been fully argued and a considered decision made.[6]
  1. [15]
    Counsel for Mr Baigorri and for the Regulator made detailed written and oral submissions about the construction of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act.

Mr Baigorri's submissions

  1. [16]
    Mr Baigorri submitted:
  • schedule 2 of the Act brings some people within the definition of 'worker' and excludes others;[7] and
  • the elements of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act are:
  1. –there has to be a contract;
  1. –a trade or business;
  1. –trade or business regularly carried out;
  1. –the work, under the contract, was not incident to that regularly carried out in the trade or business;
  1. –the work was not sublet; and
  1. –if sublet, the work was at least, in part, done by the contractor.[8]
  1. [17]
    Mr Baigorri also made submissions about these elements by reference to the decided cases on the equivalent provisions in legislation in Victoria, namely, s 3(6) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1928-1946 (Vic) and s 8(1) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic).
  1. [18]
    Mr Baigorri referred to Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills ('Humberstone')[9] which concerned s 3(6) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1928-1946 (Vic)                   ('the 1946 Victorian Act'). That section provided:
  1. (6)
     Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any law where any person (in this sub-section referred to as 'the principal') in the course of and for the purposes of his trade or business enters into a contract with any other person (in this sub-section referred to as 'the contractor')–
  1. (a)
     under or by which the contractor agrees to perform any work not being work incidental to a trade or business regularly carried on by the contractor in his own name or under a firm or business name; and
  1. (b)
    in the performance of which the contractor does not either sublet the contract or employ workers or although employing workers actually performs some part of the work himself–

then for the purposes of this Act the contractor shall be deemed to be working under a contract of service with an employer and the principal shall be deemed to be that employer.[10]

  1. [19]
    That case concerned an appeal to the High Court from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria that the claimant's late husband was not a 'worker' within the meaning of s 3(6) of the 1946 Victorian Act.
  1. [20]
    The facts were that the deceased was licensed under s 14 of the                            Carriers and Inn‑Keepers Act 1928 (Vic) to carry on a business as a carrier, he owned a two ton truck which bore the inscription of his name, address, and that he was a licensed carrier. While initially he carried goods for anyone who hired him, for           twenty-five years his work had been substantially confined to carrying logs, timber and boxes for Northern Timber Mills and he no longer held himself out as a carrier ready and willing to lift goods for others. The deceased attended the premises of Northern Timber Mills each working day other than Saturday and he delivered whatever load he was requested to take, was paid a rate calculated on the weight of the load and the distance travelled, the amount owed was calculated weekly by Northern Timber Mills and the deceased bore the cost of petrol.[11]
  1. [21]
    Relevantly, in respect of the application of s 3(6) of the 1946 Victorian Act, Latham CJ held that the provision did not apply to the deceased because for s 3(6) of that Act to apply, '… the work agreed to be done should be work which is outside any trade or business regularly carried on by the person described as a contractor.' His Honour held that the '… carrying work' the deceased did for Northern Timber Mills '… was not outside the trade or business which he carried on with his registered truck - it was the business itself. He was in the same position as the plumber … who carries on a trade or business on his own account' and agrees to do plumbing work.[12]
  1. [22]
    Justice Dixon held that at the time of the accident, the deceased was not conducting an independent trade or business and was not holding himself out as ready to carry goods for anyone but Northern Timber Mills, and that the relation between the deceased and Northern Timber Mills was a continuing contract which contained an implied term that either party could terminate the contract on reasonable notice.[13] His Honour then held that the contract between the parties was not caught by the provision because it was entered into before its commencement.[14]
  1. [23]
    Mr Baigorri also referred to Kovacic v Henley Arch Pty Ltd[15] ('Kovacic') which concerned s 8 of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) ('1985 Victorian Act').  Mr Kovacic injured his lower back while working for the respondent on about 25 November 2003.[16] At that time, s 8 of the 1985 Victorian Act provided:

Contractors

  1. (1)
     Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other law, where any person (in this section referred to as "the principal") in the course of and for the purposes of a trade or business carried on by the person enters into a contract with any natural person or natural persons (in this section referred to as "the contractor")–
  1. (a)
     under or by which the contractor agrees to perform any work not being work incidental to a trade or business regularly carried on by the contractor in the name of the contractor or under a firm or business name; and
  1. (b)
     in the performance of which the contractor does not either sublet the contract or employ workers or although employing workers actually performs some part of the work personally–

then for the purposes of this Act the contractor shall be deemed to be working under a contract of service with an employer and the principal shall be deemed to be that employer and the amount payable by the principal to the contractor in respect of the performance of work under the first-mentioned contract shall be deemed to be remuneration and shall be deemed to include any payment that would be a superannuation benefit if made in relation to a person in the capacity of an employee.[17]

  1. [24]
    On appeal to the Victorian Court of Appeal, one of the issues was whether Mr Kovacic was a 'worker' within the meaning of s 8 of the 1985 Victorian Act. Justice of Appeal Ashley (with whom Warren CJ[18] and Buchanan JA[19] agreed) found that Mr Kovacic regularly carried on a trade as a bricklaying contractor and had entered into a contract for services with the respondent.[20] It was then found that it was clear that Mr Kovacic's bricklaying contracts were not confined to the respondent after July 2002, albeit that Mr Kovacic and members of his team worked largely on the respondent's projects, and when work from the respondent was not available, other work was taken on.[21]
  1. [25]
    Relevantly, it was held that Mr Kovacic was a worker within the meaning of s 8 of the 1985 Victorian Act because when he suffered the injury, he was assisting to lift a large steel lintel (a beam that spans openings such as doors and windows) which was held not to be incidental to Mr Kovacic's trade as a bricklayer.[22]
  1. [26]
    Another case referred to by Mr Baigorri was Cam v Cousins Interstate Transport Pty Ltd ('Cam').[23] That case concerned s 6 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (NSW) which, at s 6(3A), provided:

Where a contract to perform any work exceeding five pounds in value (not being work incidental to a trade or business regularly carried on by the contractor in his own name, or under a business or firm name) is made with the contractor, who neither sub-lets the contract nor employs workers, the contractor shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a worker employed by the person who made such contract with the contractor.[24]

  1. [27]
    The facts were that on 6 March 1962, the applicant was driving a large truck, owned by him and registered in his name, from Melbourne to Sydney, carrying 13 tons of steel for the appellant company. The truck ran off the road at Yass and the applicant was injured.[25]
  1. [28]
    It was held that the applicant came within s 6(3A) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (NSW) because it was open, on the evidence before the primary judge, to conclude that by the date of the accident, the applicant had given up carrying on a business or trade regularly in his own name and was working exclusively for the appellant.[26]
  1. [29]
    In his written submissions, Mr Baigorri submitted:
  • the starting point is a contract by a contractor;[27]
  • if the section applies, the person is deemed to be a worker for a snapshot in time;[28] and
  • that deemed result requires a special relationship where there is either:
  1. –no trade or business; or
  1. –work outside those.[29]
  1. [30]
    By reference to s 8 of the 1985 Victorian Act and the decision about that section in Kovacic, Mr Baigorri also submitted:
  • the principal must carry on a trade or business, and the pertinent contract must be entered into in the course of and for the purposes of that trade or business;
  • the relevant contract must be a contract for services;
  • the relevant contract must be the one being performed at the time of the injury, rather than on any subsisting contract;
  • the contract may be in writing or informal and may be a continuing contract or a series of contracts;
  • the section deems a contractor to be a worker and the principal to be the employer in certain situations;
  • a contractor will not be deemed a worker if injured performing work for a principal in the course of or incidental to the contractor's regular trade;
  • however, if the contract is not incidental to a trade regularly carried on, the contractor is deemed to be working under a contract of services at that time;
  • if the other elements are satisfied, the protection afforded by the section is not denied only because the contractor is a partnership or others are employed, as long as the contractor performs some of the work; and
  • whether at the time of contracting the contractor regularly carried on a trade, the following propositions from the authorities apply:
  1. –where there is a special relationship between principal and contractor (in the two situations described by Dixon J in Humberstone), the contractor will not be regularly carrying on a trade or business;
  1. –the section will still provide protection if the contractor has one customer and there is no holding out to undertake the trade generally;
  1. –a contractor is not excluded from protection under the section by retaining the right to hold himself or herself out as willing to contract with others while only working for a single principal; and
  1. –there is no separate element of holding out to the public as having a business.[30]
  1. [31]
    By way of conclusion, Mr Baigorri submitted:
  • the typical style of contract covered by the provision is for a single piece of work and it is unusual for it to cover a continuing contract and, relevantly to the present case, a carrier contract is a continuing one compared to a contract that is made each day or for each delivery;[31]
  • the relevant time to consider the contract is at the date of injury;[32]
  • there needs to be a determination of whether there is a business[33] and the various factors are:
  1. – taking risks to earn a profit;
  1. –engaging customers;
  1. –employing people;
  1. –creating goodwill;
  1. –promoting the business to the public;
  1. –having and using tangible assets;
  1. –using systems typical for that style of business;
  1. –providing services indicative of a profession or a trade; and
  1. –meeting regulatory obligations;[34] and
  • having a single customer in a business suggests:
  1. – no trade or business;[35]
  1. – the trade or business is not regular;[36] or
  1. –that the contract work is not incidental to any regularly run business;[37] and
  • in respect of whether the work done was incidental to the regularly run trade or business, there are three things to ascertain:
  1. –what was the contracted work? and
  1. – what was the task (carried out at the time of the injury)? and
  1. – how did the task relate to the contracted work and the business?[38]
  1. [32]
    In oral submissions, Mr Baigorri further submitted:
  • in respect of assessing whether a contractor has made a contract for the purposes of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act, the time of the assessment is at the time of the injury;[39]
  • there is no precondition that there has to be two contracts and the important contract is the second contract (namely, the contract for the performance of work contemplated in sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act);[40] and
  • sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act is designed for a single piece of contract work and not a continuing contract (as was the case between him and Allied).[41]
  1. [33]
    It was also submitted that it was tempting to think that the word '… incident' in       sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act may be a typographical error because the word '… incidental' is used in comparable legislation in other States.[42]

The Regulator's submissions

  1. [34]
    By way of overview, the Regulator submitted that:
  • it has always been the intent or policy decision of the Legislature that contractors were not to be covered under workers' compensation legislation and the manifestation of that legislative intention has been various iterations of the test contained in workers' compensation legislation over time to distinguish between contractors and employees;
  • schedule 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act provides a very limited exception to that intention and in very narrow circumstances; and
  • for the deeming provision in sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act to apply, at the time of entry into the contract, the person must be a contractor who is conducting a trade or business; and the contract is for the provision of work distinct from the trade or business that the contractor usually conducts.[43]
  1. [35]
    After referring to the principles of statutory construction, including by referring to s 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954,[44] the Regulator submitted that:
  • the wording of the provision makes it clear that for a contractor to satisfy the requirements of that section they must, at the time of the entry into the contract, be a contractor who has regularly carried on a trade or business whether individually or by way of partnership;[45]
  • sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act will only apply in the limited circumstances where a contractor, who meets the description referred to immediately above, enters into a contract for the performance of work which is separate and distinct from their usual trade or business;[46]
  • the contextual meaning of the word 'incident' in sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act means '… something that occurs casually in connection with something else' or '… something appertaining or attaching to something else';[47]
  • the noun 'contractor' is defined in sch 6 to the Act to mean ' … a person who has contracted with someone else for the performance of work or provision of the service';[48] and
  • the purpose of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act is to deem an individual, providing work or services under a contract for services, to be a worker when:
  1. –he or she makes a contract was someone else for the performance of work or provision of a service that is not casually connected with or is not appertaining or attached to the trade or business regularly carried out by the person as an individual; and
  1. – an individual contractor meets one of the descriptions in sch 2, pt 1, s 3(b) of the Act.[49]
  1. [36]
    In oral submissions, the Regulator further submitted:
  • it is a pre-condition for the operation of the provision that the person, when they make the contract for the performance of the work, must in fact be a contractor;[50]
  • sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act is a very narrow exception to the policy objective of the Act, namely that employees, not contractors, are covered by the Act;[51] and
  • sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act applies to the highly limited circumstances where there is a contractor, that is conducting a trade or business that is regularly carried on, who then enters into a contract with someone else for the performance of another type of work which is not part of their trade or business; for example, if Mr Baigorri was conducting a business as a courier and he then made a contract to provide his labour to paint a house, and the owner of the house provided the necessary paint and materials, then, in that case, Mr Baigorri would be deemed to be a worker.[52]

The relevant principles of construction

  1. [37]
    In SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[53] Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ summarised the modern approach to statutory construction:

14 The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.[54]

  1. [38]
    Consideration of the context includes the statute's surrounding provisions, what may be drawn from other aspects of the statute, the statute as a whole and it extends to the mischief which it may be seen that the statute is intended to remedy.[55] In that regard:

“Mischief” is an old expression. It may be understood to refer to a state of affairs which to date the law has not addressed. It is in that sense a defect in the law which is now sought to be remedied. The mischief may point most clearly to what it is that the statute seeks to achieve.[56]

  1. [39]
    The meaning of a provision in a statute must be determined by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole[57] and the legislative instrument must be construed on the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals.[58] The purpose of legislation must be derived from what the legislation says, and not from any assumption about the desired or desirable reach or operation of the relevant provisions.[59]
  1. [40]
    A consideration of the context of statutory text includes the legislative history and extrinsic materials, and understanding context has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text; but legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of the statutory text, nor is their examination an end in itself.[60] It is still the fundamental duty of a court to give meaning to the legislative command according to the terms in which it is been expressed and legislative history and references to pre‑existing law should not deflect from the duty of a court of resolving an issue of statutory construction which ultimately is always a text-based activity.[61]
  1. [41]
    Pursuant to s 14A(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954, in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act (which includes its policy objective) is to be preferred to any other interpretation.

The legislative history of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act

  1. [42]
    The Act that provided for the workers' compensation scheme in Queensland between 1916 and 1990 was the Workers' Compensation Act 1916-1988 ('the 1916 Act').
  1. [43]
    Section 3 of the 1916 Act defined who was a 'worker' for the purposes of that Act and primarily provided, but not exclusively, that persons who worked under a contract of service were workers. In 1918,[62] that definition of 'worker' was amended by the introduction of sub-section (2.), namely:

(2.)  Where a contract to perform any work exceeding five pounds in value (not being work incidental to a trade or business regularly carried on by the contractor in his own name or under a firm name) is made with a contractor who–

  1. (a)
     Neither sublets the contract nor employs wages-men; or
  1. (b)
     Though employing wages-men, actually performs any part of the work himself,

such contractor and also such wages-men so employed shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be workers employed by the person who made such contract with such contractor:

Provided that such contractor and wages-men shall be deemed to be covered by the subsisting policy held by the person who made such contract:

Provided further that this subsection shall not apply to salesmen, canvassers, collectors, or any person in receipt of commission.

  1. [44]
    The primary definition of a worker in s 3, and the extension of the definition of worker referred to in s 3(2.) of the 1916 Act (apart from a change to the monetary amount and the removal of the two provisos) remained in the 1916 Act until it was repealed by s 1.3 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1990.
  1. [45]
    Section 2.1 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1990 maintained the same primary definition of a worker as contained in the 1916 Act, namely, that a worker was a person who works under a contract of service. Section 2.2 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1990 then relevantly provided:

2.2 Persons declared to be employers or workers.

  1. (1)
     For the purposes of this Act, a person declared by a provision of this section to be an employer or a worker is an employer or, as the case may be, a worker in the circumstances prescribed by the provision.

…

  1. (9)
     If a contract is made with a contractor (other than a person declared by section 2.3 not to be a worker) for the performance of work that is not incident to a trade or business regularly carried on by the contractor, individually or by means of a partnership, and the contractor–
  1. (a)
     neither sublets the contract nor employs a wages-worker; or
  1. (b)
     although employing a wages-worker, performs part of the work personally;

the contractor, and any wages-worker employed by the contractor in performance of the work, is a worker employed by the person who makes the contract with the contractor.

  1. [46]
    Section 2.2 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1990 remained in that Act (although later renumbered as s 8) until that Act was repealed by s 534 of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996.
  1. [47]
    Section 12(1) of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 defined who was a 'worker' for the purposes of that Act, namely, an individual who worked under a contract of service and who was a PAYE taxpayer in relation to the remuneration or other benefit received for the performance of work under the contract of service. The definition did not include a provision the same or similar to s 3(2) of the 1916 Act or s 8 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1990.[63] Schedule 3 of the WorkCover Act 1996 defined 'contractor' to mean ' …. a person who has contracted with someone else for the performance of work or provision of a service.'
  1. [48]
    However, s 5 of the WorkCover Queensland Amendment Act 1999 omitted s 12 of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 and inserted a new s 12 and sch 2.
  1. [49]
    Section 12 then provided:

Who is a “worker”

12. (1)  A “worker” is an individual who works under a contract of service.

(2)  Also, a person mentioned in schedule 2, part 1 is a “worker”.

(3)  However, a person mentioned in schedule 2, part 2 is not a “worker”.

  1. [50]
    Schedule 2, pt 1 of the WorkCover Act 1996 then relevantly provided:

4.  A contractor, other than a contractor mentioned in part 2, section 4[64] of this schedule, if–

  1. (a)
     the contractor makes a contract with some one else for the performance of work that is not incident to a trade or business regularly carried on by the contractor, individually or by way of a partnership; and
  1. (b)
     the contractor–
  1. (i)
     does not sublet the contract; or
  1. (ii)
     does not employ a worker; or
  1. (iii)
     if the contractor employs a worker, performs part of the work personally.
  1. [51]
    When the WorkCover Act 1996 was repealed by s 588 of the Act, the extended definition of 'worker', as contained in sch 2, pt 1 of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996, was maintained by sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act. The Act also maintained the definition of contractor as contained in sch 3 of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996. Section 11(1) of the Act defines a worker as a person who works under a contract and who, in relation to the work, is an employee for the purpose of assessment for PAYG withholding under sch 1, pt 2-5 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953.
  1. [52]
    This history discloses that the persons primarily covered by workers' compensation legislation in Queensland have been employees. However, the Legislature has extended the benefit of the various Acts to certain persons who are not employees. Relevantly, this was done by deeming contractors, or persons who were not employees, to be workers when they entered into contracts to perform work which was not connected with a trade or business regularly carried on by them and where they performed part of the work personally.
  1. [53]
    Put shortly, for most of the time since 1918, the Legislature has decided to treat a contractor as a worker, for the purposes of workers' compensation legislation, when the contractor was injured in the course of performing work that they contracted with someone else to perform, being work they did not do in their regularly carried on trade or business.

The context of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act

  1. [54]
    Chapter 1, pt 2, ss 4-6 of the Act, states the main objects of the Act. Relevantly, s 4(2) of the Act provides that the objects are an aid to the interpretation of the Act.
  1. [55]
    Section 5 of the Act relevantly provides:

5 Workers’ compensation scheme

  1. (1)
     This Act establishes a workers’ compensation scheme for Queensland–
  1. (a)
     providing benefits for workers who sustain injury in their employment, for dependants if a worker’s injury results in the worker’s death, for persons other than workers, and for other benefits; and
  1. (b)
     encouraging improved health and safety performance by employers.

…

  1. (3)
     There is some scope for the application of this Act to injuries sustained by persons other than workers, for example–
  1. (a)
     under arrangements for specified benefits for specified persons or treatment of specified persons in some respects as workers; and
  1. (b)
    under procedures for assessment of injuries under other Acts by medical assessment tribunals established under this Act.[65]
  1. [56]
    Section 11 of the Act provides:

11  Who is a worker

  1. (1)
     A worker is a person who–
  1. (a)
     works under a contract; and
  1. (b)
     in relation to the work, is an employee for the purpose of assessment for PAYG withholding under the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cwlth), schedule 1, part 2-5.
  1. (2)
     Also, schedule 2, part 1 sets out who is a worker in particular circumstances.
  1. (3)
     However, schedule 2, part 2 sets out who is not a worker in particular circumstances.
  1. (4)
     Only an individual can be a worker for this Act.
  1. [57]
    The present definition of 'worker' in s 11(1) was introduced into the Act in 2013.[66] The Explanatory Notes to the Bill introducing that definition relevantly provided:

Definition of ‘worker’ in the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003

Finally, the current definition of ‘worker’ in the WCR Act is considered to be unworkable; it creates uncertainty and adds to the regulatory burden on employers who have to interpret the definition i.e. who is a worker and who is a contractor. The Bill amends the definition of worker by aligning it with the tests used by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) to determine whether a person is a worker for workers’ compensation purposes.[67]

…

Clause 71 amends section 11(1) to provide that a worker is a person who works under a contract and in relation to the work, is an employee for the purpose of assessment for PAYG withholding under the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), schedule 1, part 2-5. This applies to a contract regardless of whether it is a contract of service or another kind of contract for example, a contract for piecework. This applies to a person for whom PAYG tax instalments are required to be withheld, or for whom they would be withheld if the withholding is not exempted, for example by tax free income thresholds.[68]

  1. [58]
    By virtue of s 5 of the Act and the present definition of 'worker', it seems clear that the Act primarily covers workers who are employees, for whom PAYG tax instalments are required to be withheld, and that some other persons will be taken to be workers if they meet one of the descriptions in sch 2, pt 1 to the Act.
  1. [59]
    The clear intention of the Legislature is to extend the protection of the Act to a contractor who meets the description in sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act.
  1. [60]
    In its written submissions, the Regulator submitted that it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to so broaden the operation of the Act by the inclusion of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 to '… drag in individuals like the Appellant in the present scenario' in that if Mr Baigorri was deemed to be a 'worker' by sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act, given the factual circumstances of the case, '… it would effectively nullify the operation of           s 11 of the Act' which could not have been the legislative intention.[69]
  1. [61]
    The purpose or policy objective of provisions in other States, equivalent to                 sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act, have been identified in the cases that considered those provisions.
  1. [62]
    In Humberstone, Latham CJ stated that the idea of s 3(6) of the 1946 Victorian Act was to extend the benefits of that Act to persons who agree to do work which is not work belonging to a trade or business carried on by them even though they may regularly carry on a trade or business. [70] In the same case, Dixon J stated that the provision was to apply to persons who work for the principal, but have no independent business or trade, and to persons, who though carrying on an independent trade or business, undertake a contract outside the scope or course of that trade or business. [71]
  1. [63]
    In Turner v Stewardson,[72] Evatt CJ and Herron and Collins JJ stated of s 6(3A) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1958 (NSW):

Looked at broadly, the Legislature meant to provide that persons who are in business for themselves, and who systematically and regularly accept work to be done under contract, and who hold themselves out as open to be employed under contract, are expected to undertake the risk of injury and not to rely for compensation upon the principal whose contract work they are performing at the moment of injury. The original notion that a contractor is deprived of the benefits of the Act because he is not a worker has disappeared, and today many small contractors who undertake contract work, not as a regular or systematic practice, are covered by the Act. This is in keeping with modern practice as to payment for labour at piece work or contract rates.[73]

  1. [64]
    In Cam,[74]Herron CJ stated of s 6(3A) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (NSW):

It only remains, I think, to adopt with respect the interpretation of an identical subsection of the Victorian Act laid down by Dixon, J., as he then was, in Humberstone v. Northern Timber Mills (1949), 79 C.L.R. 389, at p. 402. His Honour said: "These [the words of this subsection] all indicate a business or trade conceived as independently existing or exercised by a person holding himself out to the public under a name or style. No doubt the policy is a matter of inference but it seems reasonable to suppose that is [sic] was considered proper that a person conducting a business in the course of which he contracted to perform work should himself carry the risk of personal injury as one of the hazards of his business, while the man who worked under contract but only for the employer without any general trade or business Baigorri v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2023] QIRC 190or outside his trade or business should, like an ordinary employee, be insured by the Act against the risk of injury in his work."[75]

  1. [65]
    In L&B Linings Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales ('L&B Linings')[76] Rothman J, in respect of sch 1, cl 2 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1988 (NSW),[77] held that the mischief to which that provision was directed '… was plain and is of longstanding' and was aimed at the provision of workers' compensation benefits to persons who do not work under contracts that fit the traditional definitions of contracts of service.[78]
  1. [66]
    I generally accept the submissions of Mr O'Neill, who appeared for the Regulator, which are referred to in paragraph [60] of these reasons.
  2. [67]
    The purpose or policy objective of the combined effect of s 11(2) and sch 2, pt 1 of the Act is primarily to provide the protection of the Act to individuals who are employees for the purposes of PAYG taxation and that, in limited circumstances, that protection is extended to certain individuals who meet one of the descriptions set out in sch 2, pt 1 of the Act, including individuals who meet the description contained in sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act.
  1. [68]
    This view is consistent with the history of the provision in Queensland and how the purpose of the cognate provisions in other States has been described.

The elements of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act

  1. [69]
    The text of s 5, s 11 and sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act is set out earlier in these reasons.
  1. [70]
    In my view, having regard to the text of s 5, s 11 and sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act, and to the context of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act, for an individual to be deemed a worker within the meaning of  sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act, the following elements must be met.

Schedule 2, pt 1, s 3(a)

A contractor, other than a contractor mentioned in part 2, section 4 of this schedule

  1. [71]
    First, the individual must be a contractor. The deliberate use of the phrase 'A contractor' means the person is not a worker within the meaning of s 11(1) of the Act. Clearly this is the case because the exception in sch 2, pt 1, s 3, namely, '… other than a contractor mentioned in part 2, section 4' of sch 2 of the Act is a reference to a person who, in performing work under a contract other than a contract of service, supplies or uses a motor vehicle for driving tuition.

The contractor makes a contract with someone else for the performance of work

  1. [72]
    Secondly, the contractor must subsequently make a contract for the performance of work which is a contract for services. This has to be the case because if it were not, the person would be an employee. Such a construction accords with how the comparable provision in  s 8(1) of the 1985 Victorian Act has been construed.[79]
  1. [73]
    Mr Baigorri submitted that the typical style of contract covered by the section is for a single piece of work and it was unusual for the provision to cover a continuing contract.[80]
  1. [74]
    In Humberstone, Dixon J held that on the facts of that case, namely a continuing contract of indefinite duration which bound the parties '… although no doubt within the words of the sub-section is not the typical case for which it provides. The typical case provided for is an express contract for the carrying out of a definite piece of work involving not a continuing relation or a succession of services but the producing of a given result once for all.' [81] In Zuijs v Wirth Brothers Pty Ltd ('Zuijs')[82] it was held that a contract for an indefinite duration for repeated performances of an act on a trapeze was not one that fell within the words: 'Where a contract to perform any work exceeding five pounds in value' which were located in the opening words of s 6(3A) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1948 (NSW).[83]  Schedule 2, pt 1, s 3(a) of the Act uses different words to the opening words of s 6(3A) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1948 (NSW) that were material in Zuijs.
  1. [75]
    The plain words of sch 2, pt 1, s 3(a) of the Act refer to the contractor making '… a contract with someone else for the performance of work.'
  1. [76]
    Given the facts of the present case that I deal with below, it is not necessary for me to express a concluded view on this issue.

That is not incident to a trade or business regularly carried on by the contractor, individually or by way of a partnership

  1. [77]
    Thirdly, the work performed pursuant to the contract is not incident to a trade or business regularly carried on by the contractor as an individual or by way of a partnership.
  1. [78]
    Having regard to the text and context of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act, the trade or business  the subject of this part of the provision concerns a trade or business regularly carried on by the contractor, individually or by way of a partnership, before or at the time the contractor makes a contract with someone else for the performance of work.

Business

  1. [79]
    A set out earlier, Mr Baigorri, by reference to Humberstone, submitted that if an individual only had one customer, they could not be carrying on a business.[84] The Regulator submitted that the notion of what is a 'business' has moved on from the time  Humberstone was decided.[85]
  1. [80]
    The word ‘business’ is notorious for taking its colour and its content from its surroundings and its meaning depends upon its context.[86]
  1. [81]
    In my view, the contextual meaning of the word '… business' in sch 2, pt 1, s 3(a) of the Act, fundamentally concerns the conduct of a commercial enterprise in the nature of a going concern.[87] This is because, principally, the Act covers individuals who work under a contract and, in relation to the work, are employees for whom PAYG tax instalments are required to be withheld and does not cover individuals who contract with someone else for the performance of work, or for the provision of a service, through the operation, as individuals or by way of a partnership, of their own commercial enterprise.
  1. [82]
    Depending on the circumstances, there may be other indicia that confirm that a contractor is carrying on a business. No exhaustive list can be compiled.[88] However, the indicia may include ownership of tangible assets and the chance of making a profit and the risk of loss in the business that is carried on,[89] the meeting of regulatory requirements concerning, for example, GST[90] and the nature of transactional systems used.[91] The concept of a person holding themselves out as carrying on a business is not an element of the provision.[92]
  1. [83]
    In my opinion, an individual may, depending on all the circumstances, be carrying on a business even if they have only one customer. Those circumstances may include, as submitted by the Regulator,[93] the presence of a detailed written contract between the individual and the person for whom they are working.

Incident to

  1. [84]
    The work performed by the contractor by the contract made with someone else for the performance of work must not be incident to, that is not naturally related or connected with,[94] a trade or business regularly carried on by the contractor as an individual or by way of a partnership.
  1. [85]
    Since the Workers' Compensation Act 1990, the Legislature has used the phrase '… incident to' for the purposes of describing the relevant work performed by the individual so as to bring them within the scope of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act and within the equivalent provisions in the earlier Acts. Before that, the Legislature used the phrase '… incidental to'.
  1. [86]
    Given that the Legislature has consistently used the phrase '… incident to' in the Workers' Compensation Act 1990, the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 and now in the Act, it is difficult to conclude this is a drafting error. It is not immediately apparent it is an error.[95] In any event, the construction of the provision is not in doubt when regard is had to the relevant dictionary definitions of the phrases '… incident to' and '… incidental to'.[96]
  1. [87]
    The relevant time to consider the contract for the performance of work is at the date of injury.[97]

Schedule 2, pt 1, s 3(b)

  1. [88]
    Finally, the contractor must meet one of the descriptions in sch 2, pt 1, s 3(b) of the Act.

Did Mr Baigorri meet the description of a worker contained in sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act?

Mr Baigorri's submissions

  1. [89]
    In written and oral submissions, Mr Baigorri submitted that he fell within                   sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act because:
  • he was a contractor because he owned, operated and maintained a series of vehicles,[98] he was not a PAYG employee and was a subcontractor for Australian Tax Office ('ATO') purposes;[99]
  • the relevant time to consider the contract is at the date of injury and, at the date of his injury on 9 February 2021, he was not running a regular business because he only had one customer (Allied);[100]
  • while by cl 3.6 of the contract with Allied, it was part of his contact to load and unload parcels:

[T]he actual task on the day was beyond loading or unloading his parcels. It involved sorting and redistributing stock, both his and other people's. That came about because the loading system could not cope and there were parcels throughout the warehouse. Sorting parcels and moving parcels not belonging to him out of his bay was not just sorting, that is a warehouse role. It cannot be said to be incidental to a courier's business and the contracted work.; [101]

  • he did not sublet the work he performed for Allied;[102] and
  • if the work was sublet, the work was at least in part done by him.[103]
  1. [90]
    By way of summary, Mr Baigorri, submitted:

66.  In conclusion, applying the principles above, there are several layers of reasons why the appellant is a deemed worker. The layers are:

  1. (a)
     because, at all times, he had only one customer:
  1. (i)
     the appellant did not have a business at the start;
  1. (ii)
     he did not have a business at the time of injury;
  1. (iii)
     he did not have a regular business at the start;
  1. (iv)
     he did not have a regular business at injury;
  1. (b)
    even assuming a regular business, the fact of having only one customer meant that the contracted work was not incidental to it;
  2. (c)
    again, assuming a regular business, the task performed at the time of injury was not incidental to either any courier business or the contracted work.
  1. [91]
    In oral submissions, Mr Baigorri further submitted:
  • if he was running a business, he was not running it regularly in that he did not use his vehicle on weekends to do courier work for persons other than Allied;[104] and
  • on the day of his injury, he was faced with a situation where because the bay where the parcels were placed for him to deliver was overrun, his sorting and moving of other parcels, to get to the parcels he had to deliver, was not incidental to his contract to deliver goods.[105]

The Regulator's submissions

  1. [92]
    In written submissions, the Regulator submitted:
  • at the time of his entry into the contract with Allied, Mr Baigorri was an unemployed worker who was not conducting any form of trade or business, and therefore it is difficult to see how he could even maintain that he was a '… contractor';[106]
  • Mr Baigorri had already decided he was going to operate a courier business and had taken steps towards this by purchasing the Mercedes Vito van and commencing repairs on it, all of which occurred prior to him speaking with Allied and is consistent with him having the intention of running his own business;[107]
  • Mr Baigorri set out with the intention of commencing his own courier business;[108]
  • by the time Mr Baigorri sustained his injury on 9 February 2021, he had been conducting his own business, without raising any question or issue with Allied about not being a contractor, for over six years;[109]
  • Mr Baigorri's operation had every indicium of being his own business in that he was fully equipped with all the tools and equipment required to undertake his role as a courier, including that he determined when he would work and he claimed all available business income and expenses including depreciation on his vehicles and equipment;[110]
  • from Mr Baigorri's tax return for the 2020-2021 year, after his injury, he earned income from renting out his truck, which is entirely consistent with him operating his own business;[111]
  • Mr Baigorri clearly had the opportunity of taking on additional work on the weekends, in that there was nothing in his contract with Allied that prevented him from doing so and he made a business decision he would not pursue that opportunity to earn additional income, which is entirely consistent with him conducting his own business;[112]
  • Mr Baigorri made business decisions overtime about changing the vehicle he was using or purchasing additional vehicles to undertake his business, and that he did so without input from Allied express,[113] and further, he could decide to make alterations to his vehicle or equipment without having to consult Allied;[114]
  • Mr Baigorri employed someone to perform work for a number of weeks in March and April 2020, during a time when he was not personally performing work, which is consistent with him conducting his own business;[115] and
  • it was clear that the courier work Mr Baigorri contracted to perform under the contract (with Allied) was attached to or pertaining to a business regularly carried out by him, which means that he could not fall within sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act.[116]
  1. [93]
    In oral submissions, the Regulator further submitted that:
  • on the evidence given by Mr Baigorri in the course of cross examination, it was clear he was undertaking a systematic activity as a courier driver in that he was undertaking a systematic activity looking for reward with a view to gain and grow his business and, as he was busy, there was a prospect of him being able to become busier and grow the business, such that he purchased the second truck to enable that to occur;[117]
  • apart from the confidential information and restraint clause in the contract,[118] there was no provision in the contract preventing Mr Baigorri from seeking outside clientele away from Allied;[119]
  • clause 3.6 of the contract obligated Mr Baigorri to be responsible for the safe loading and unloading of the vehicle, and that he had to be present to assist in the loading and unloading of the vehicle;[120]
  • the oral evidence of Mr Baigorri and Mr Finch was that each day a courier driver was expected to:
  1. –attend the Rocklea warehouse in the morning where they would have a particular bay assigned to them commensurate with the geographic area in which they were to deliver parcels;
  1. –go into the bay, identify the parcels that had to be delivered that day, take those parcels and load the vehicle in a safe manner; and
  1. –undertake the delivery;[121] and
  • on the evidence before the Commission, it was not an unusual event that:
  1. –there may be other parcels within Mr Baigorri's bay that belonged to another area; and
  1. –there may be some requirement for him to shift those in order to identify parcels he had to deliver,

which was clearly incidental to the duties imposed by cl 3.6 of the contract.[122]

Mr Baigorri was not a worker within the meaning of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act

  1. [94]
    The Regulator submitted that in the absence of Mr Baigorri operating a trade or business that was separate and distinct from the work he contracted to perform for  Allied, he did not fall within the class of contractors identified in sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act and cannot be deemed to be a 'worker'.[123]
  1. [95]
    I accept this submission. There are two reasons for this.

No evidence Mr Baigorri was a contractor prior to him contracting with Allied to perform courier work

  1. [96]
    First, there is no evidence that Mr Baigorri, before or at the time of him making the contract with Allied, was a contractor, namely, a person who was not a worker within the meaning of s 11(1) of the Act and who contracted with someone else for the performance of work or the provision of a service.
  1. [97]
    The evidence is that:
  • Mr Baigorri was employed, on a full-time basis, by a company called Technofibre for about six years prior to him, on 24 July 2014, sustaining an injury in the course of that employment; [124]
  • following that injury:
  1. –Mr Baigorri was off work for a period of time on workers' compensation benefits;[125] and
  1. –after that period of time, he returned to work with Technofibre for a couple of weeks[126] following which the business of Technofibre was sold and a decision was made to relocate that business to Western Australia, in respect of which Mr Baigorri declined an offer of a job in that business in Western Australia;[127]
  • Mr Baigorri then decided to '… do courier work or something similar'[128] because he wanted an easy job to handle, to be close to his family, to be able to transport his children to and from school and to be close to home;[129] and
  • in about late 2014 Mr Baigorri:
  1. –saw an advertisement for a courier company that was based near the Brisbane Airport and he '… met with someone from the company to talk to them about working as a courier';
  1. –saw an advertisement for a Mercedes Vito van, bought that van and repaired it, which cost him about $6000; and
  1. –ultimately, he '… did not work for that courier company.'[130]
  1. [98]
    Mr Baigorri's evidence then is:

Working for Allied Express

  1. In about late-2014, I saw an advertisement on the internet by Allied Express, which is a courier company. The advertisement said that they wanted drivers to make deliveries for the company. It said the driver needed either a one-tonne ute or a two-tonne truck. It also said that a uniform would be provided.
  1. I telephoned the company, and they told me to come in. I do not remember the exact date, but it was in December 2014. I went to their warehouse in Randolph Street in Rocklea and met with the fleet manager, Tim Rixon.
  1. First, Mr Rixon inspected the van. He said that it was a good van and would be fine to use.
  1. Then, we went back inside the office. Mr Rixon handed me some documents including a written contract. He did not give me time to read the documents. But he told me that one of them was a contract and he explained some of the terms to me. I cannot recall exactly what terms we discussed.
  1. [99]
    Mr Baigorri then stated that on the same day, after he watched an induction video and he briefly read some of the clauses in the contract, Mr Rixon said that Allied would '… engage me as a courier' and that he '… started working for Allied' a day or so later.[131] In cross-examination, Mr Baigorri stated that he actually commenced work for Allied in late December 2014.[132]
  1. [100]
    Having regard to the evidence referred to above, I accept the Regulator's submissions that at the time of his entry into the contract with Allied, Mr Baigorri was an unemployed worker and was not a contractor who was carrying on any form of trade or business.
  1. [101]
    There is no evidence that Mr Baigorri was performing any kind of work as a contractor in the six years to when he finished working for Technofibre sometime in 2014, and from that time to late December 2014 when he made the contract with Allied.
  1. [102]
    In oral submissions, Mr Hovarth, who appeared for Mr Baigorri, submitted:

Can we then get to the idea of, on the one hand, the submission that my client has a business at the start but is not a contractor, for example. Well, on that basis, someone can be ready to perform a business, buy all the tools, they’re ready to go, and somehow they’re - they’re running a business but they’re not a contractor because they haven’t incurred - sorry, they haven’t earned an income. And he still has to lodge BAS documents and so forth. He still has to deal with - there might be limits in terms of - if you don’t earn an income you might have leeway with the tax department, but you’re still running a business.[133]

  1. [103]
    While Mr Baigorri exhibited, to his affidavit, his 2015 Business Activity Statements ('BAS') for the April-June, July-September and October-December quarters[134] (after he started doing work for Allied), there is no evidence Mr Baigorri:
  • lodged any BAS with the ATO after he bought the Mercedes Vito van and before he started doing work for Allied in late December 2014; and
  • received any GST on sales or claimed any GST on purchases in respect of any work he performed after finishing his employment with Technofibre and before he started doing work for Allied in late December 2014.

Mr Baigorri was carrying on a business when performing work for Allied for which he accepted the risk of injury

  1. [104]
    Secondly, the evidence is that Mr Baigorri, during the operation of his contract with Allied, was carrying on a business, namely, as set out in his 2021 tax return, the business of 'Courier Pick-up and Delivery Services.'[135]
  1. [105]
    I accept the Regulator's submission that, after the end of his employment with Technofibre and before he first spoke to Mr Rixon of Allied, Mr Baigorri had decided he was going to operate a courier business because, by purchasing the Mercedes Vito van and repairing it, he took steps towards that goal.
  1. [106]
    Mr Baigorri's evidence also was that he purchased pallet jacks and a hand trolley '… probably in the same time' of him speaking to Allied so as '… to get ready for the work.'[136] Mr Baigorri agreed that the provision by him of such equipment was consistent with him running his own business.[137] That evidence is consistent with        Mr  Baigorri having the future intention of running his own business.
  1. [107]
    Mr Baigorri's evidence was that:
  • the Mercedes Vito van was his vehicle and it was being used in his business;[138]
  • he claimed, as a business expense on his tax returns, the cost of maintenance and repairs for the vehicle;[139]
  • he claimed depreciation on the vehicles he used over time;[140]
  • he received a fuel tax credit from the ATO because his vehicle was being used in his business;[141]
  • he had an accountant acting for the business who presented the paper work to the ATO;[142]
  • Allied gave him a tax invoice in respect of the work he performed;[143]
  • he claimed all relevant business expenses and depreciation;[144]
  • for the 2021 financial year:
  1. –in addition to ordinary business income, he declared fuel tax credits, the sale of a truck and the rent of a truck as business income;[145] and
  1. –he claimed business expenses, including, but not limited to motor vehicle expenses, advertising, insurance and mobile phone;[146]
  • he used an ABN in respect of the work he did pursuant to the contract with Allied, and, over the period of that work, he collected GST on sales and claimed GST credits on purchases;[147]
  • he bought a second truck '… to upgrade the business';[148] and
  • for a period of time in 2020, took out workers' compensation insurance under the Act because he was '… going to - to hire my friend and it didn't work out because he got a job.'[149]
  1. [108]
    This evidence persuades me that Mr Baigorri was carrying out a business when doing courier work for Allied in that he conducted the activity to make a profit in respect of which he owned tangible assets, met regulatory requirements and used business transactional systems. Mr Baigorri does not dispute that his contract with Allied was a contract for services.
  1. [109]
    The purpose or policy objective of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act is not to extend the protection of the Act to a contractor who starts and then conducts a business and, in doing so, bears the risk of lost income and medical expenses from personal injury arising out of or in the course of undertaking that business.
  1. [110]
    Mr Baigorri, by entering into the contract, expressly agreed that he personally accepted the risk of lost income and medical expenses from any injury he suffered in the course of performing the contract courier work for Allied. Clause 5.2 (b) of the contract provided that Mr Baigorri would, either by himself or where agreed in co-operation with Allied, obtain and maintain a '…Workers' Compensation Insurance Policy to cover the Contract Carrier, and any person who may from time to time be employed by the Contract Carrier.' [150] Mr Baigorri's evidence was that he took out insurance which covered public liability and injury or sickness, or as he put it: '… Income protection, basically'.[151]
  1. [111]
    Mr Baigorri stated that he understood he was running his own business.[152]
  1. [112]
    For all these reasons, my view is that Mr Baigorri, from the time he entered into the contract with Allied, was conducting a courier business and he accepted the risk of personal injury to himself in the course of conducting that business.
  1. [113]
    The work Mr Baigorri did for Allied was not outside the business which he carried on with his vehicle; it was the business itself. It is not the purpose of the Act that an individual, such as Mr Baigorri, as a contractor and in the circumstances established by the evidence, would be covered by the Act.
  1. [114]
    Because it was argued I will deal with one final matter. Mr Baigorri submitted that while, pursuant to cl 3.6 of the contract with Allied, it was part of his contract to load and unload parcels, because he had to sort and move other parcels he did not have to deliver - due to the particular circumstances at the Rocklea warehouse on the day he was injured - that specific task '… cannot be said to be incidental to a courier's business and the contracted work.'[153] The Regulator submitted that such a task was incidental to the business of a courier who worked for Allied.
  1. [115]
    If the business of a courier is to load parcels into a vehicle for delivery, then the sorting of parcels, at the point of collection, as a preliminary step to locating and loading parcels to be delivered into the vehicle, is incident to the business of a courier. The sorting of parcels at the point of collection so as to be able to load deliverable parcels is obviously naturally related to or connected with the business of a courier. To suggest that because a more involved sorting of parcels was required, so as to locate deliverable parcels, is not incident to courier work, strains the ordinary meaning of the phrase '… incident to' and is contrary to common sense.
  1. [116]
    It is not in the same degree of difference as was the case in Kovacic, namely, a person conducting a bricklaying business or trade who was injured when installing a steel lintel.

Conclusion

  1. [117]
    In this appeal, the onus was on Mr Baigorri to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he was a worker within the meaning of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act.
  1. [118]
    In my view, there is no evidence Mr Baigorri was a contractor at the time he made the contract with Allied. Mr Baigorri was an unemployed employee who had purchased a van with a view to going into business for himself in the future.
  1. [119]
    The evidence is that when Mr Baigorri was performing work pursuant to the contract with Allied, he was carrying on a business, and the work Mr Baigorri did for Allied was not outside the business which he carried on with his vehicle; it was the business itself.
  1. [120]
    Put simply, Mr Baigorri's circumstances cannot be viewed, in any way, which would involve him meeting the description of a person identified in sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act.
  1. [121]
    For the reasons given above, Mr Baigorri was not a worker within the meaning of      sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act.
  1. [122]
    The review decision of the Regulator is confirmed.
  1. [123]
    I will hear the parties as to costs.

Orders

  1. [124]
    I make the following orders:
  1. Pursuant to s 558(1)(a) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, the review decision of the Respondent, dated 23 November 2021, is confirmed.
  1. Pursuant to r 41(1) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011:
  1. (a)
    the parties are to exchange and file written submissions on the costs of the hearing (of no more than two (2) pages, 12‑point font size, line and a‑half spacing with numbered paragraphs and pages) by 4.00 pm on 6 July 2023;
  1. (b)
    unless otherwise ordered, the decision on costs be determined on the papers.

I certify that the preceding [124] paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Decision of Deputy President Merrell

J.W. Merrell

Deputy President:     ………………………………

(Signature)

Dated: 22 June 2023

Footnotes

[1]T 1-54, l 39 to T 1-55, l 31.

[2]Schedule 2, pt 2, s 4 of the Act provides:

4A person who, in performing work under a contract, other than a contract of service,

supplies and uses a motor vehicle for driving tuition is not a worker.

[3]Mr Baigorri’s statement of facts and contentions filed on 10 May 2022 ('Mr Baigorri's contentions'), paras. 26‑30.

[4]The Regulator's statement of facts and contentions filed 27 June 2022 ('the Regulator's contentions'), attachment 'A', paras. 14-15.

[5]The Regulator's contentions, attachment 'A', paras. 16-17.

[6]There have been some reasonably recent decisions about sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act, namely Toowoomba Demolition and Earthmoving Pty Ltd ATF Castle Family Trust v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2020] QIRC 030 ('Toowoomba Demolition') (Deputy President Merrell) and Smith v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 003 (Industrial Commissioner Power), but these decisions did not require a detailed consideration of the construction of sch 2, pt 1, s 3 of the Act.

[7]The written submissions of Mr Baigorri filed on 8 February 2023 ('Mr Baigorri's submissions'), para. 33.

[8]Mr Baigorri's submissions, paras. 34 and 36.

[9][1949] HCA 49; (1949) 79 CLR 389 ('Humberstone').

[10]Humberstone (n 9) 397 (Latham CJ).

[11]Ibid 400-401(Dixon J).

[12]Ibid 398.

[13]Ibid 402-403.

[14]Ibid 404. At 399, Rich J held that s 3(6) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1928-1946 (Vic) did not have retrospective operation.

[15][2009] VSCA 56; (2009) 22 VR 21 ('Kovacic').

[16]Ibid [3] (Ashley JA).

[17]Version No. 121, Accident Compensation Act 1985, Act No. 10191/1985, Version incorporating amendments as at 16 June 2003.

[18]Kovacic (n 15) [1].

[19]Ibid [2].

[20]Ibid [30]-[31].

[21]Ibid [43].

[22]Ibid [47].

[23][1964] NSWR 1288 ('Cam').

[24]Ibid 1289.

[25]Ibid 1288-1289 (Herron CJ, Ferguson J at 1290 and Nagle J at 1291 agreeing).

[26]Ibid 1289-1290.

[27]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 48, citing Kovacic (n 15), [18](5) (Ashley JA (Warren CJ at [1] and Buchanan JA at [2] agreeing).

[28]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 48, citing Kovacic (n 15), [27].

[29]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 48, citing Humberstone (n 9), 400 (Dixon J).

[30]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 49, citing Kovacic (n 15), [18](1)-(9).

[31]Mr Baigorri's submissions, paras. 51 and 52, citing Humberstone (n 9), 403 (Dixon J).

[32]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 53, citing Humberstone (n 9), 402 (Dixon J), Kovacic (n 15), [18](3) and               Cam (n 23), 1290 (Herron CJ).

[33]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 55, citing Humberstone (n 9), 401-402 (Dixon J).

[34]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 57, citing On Call Interpreters and Translators Agency Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 3) [2011] FCA 366; (2011) 214 FCR 82 ('On Call'), [217]-[218] (Bromberg J).

[35]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 59, citing Humberstone (n 9), 402 (Dixon J) and Cam (n 23), 1290 (Herron CJ).

[36]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 59, citing Cam (n 23), 1290 (Ferguson J).

[37]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 59, citing Cam (n 23), 1291 (Nagle J).

[38]Mr Baigorri's submissions, paras. 62-63, citing Kovacic (n 15), [27] and [47].

[39]T 1-82, l 45 to T 1-83, l 7.

[40]T 1-100, l 28.

[41]T 1-99, l 1 to T 1-100, l 4 and T 1-101, ll 24-30.

[42]T 1-74, ll 5-9.

[43]The submissions of the Workers' Compensation Regulator filed on 8 February 2023 ('the Regulator's submissions'), paras. 9-12.

[44]The Regulator's submissions, paras. 39-43.

[45]The Regulator's submissions, para. 47.

[46]The Regulator's submissions, para. 48.

[47]The Regulator's submissions, para. 56,  citing Toowoomba Demolition (n 6), [233].

[48]The Regulator's submissions, para. 56,  citing Toowoomba Demolition (n 6), [233].

[49]The Regulator's submissions, para. 56,  citing Toowoomba Demolition (n 6), [234].

[50]T 1-86, l 47 to T 1-87, l 1.

[51]T 1-87, ll 9-10.

[52]T 1-87, ll 7-23.

[53][2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362.

[54]Citations omitted.

[55]R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 269 CLR 507, [33] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J, with Nettle and Gordon JJ at [148] generally agreeing).

[56]Ibid.

[57] Project Blue Sky Inc. v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355, [69] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

[58]Ibid [70].

[59]Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378, [26] (French CJ and Hayne J).

[60]Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503, [39] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ).

[61]Northern Territory v Collins [2008] HCA 49; (2008) 235 CLR 619, [16] (Gummow A-CJ and Kirby J).

[62]The Workers' Compensation Acts Amendment Act of 1918, s 2 (vi.).

[63]The Explanatory Notes to the WorkCover Queensland Bill 1996 (Qld) at 11 provided, in respect of the new definition of 'worker' in that Bill:

The new definition overcomes the need for sections 8 and 9 of the Workers’ Compensation Act 1990 which deemed certain persons to be, and not to be, workers and employers.

[64]This referred to a '…person who, in performing work under a contract, other than a contract of service, supplies and uses a motor vehicle for driving tuition.

[65]Emphasis added.

[66] Industrial Relations (Transparency and Accountability of Industrial Organisations) and Other Acts Amendment Act 2013, pt 4, s 71.

[67]Explanatory Notes, Industrial Relations (Transparency and Accountability of Industrial Organisations) and Other Acts Amendment Bill 2013 (Qld) 3.

[68]Ibid 16.

[69]The Regulator's submissions, paras. 73-74.

[70]Humberstone (n 9), 397.

[71]Ibid 401.

[72][1962] NSWR 137 ('Stewardson').

[73]Ibid 139. Emphasis added.

[74]Cam (n 23). Emphasis added.

[75]Ibid 1290.

[76][2011] NSWSC 474 ('L&B Linings').

[77]Which relevantly provided:

(i)Where a contract-

(a)to perform any work exceeding $10 in value (not being work incidental to a trade or

business regularly carried on by the contractor in the contractor’s own name, or under

a business or firm name), or

(b)(Repealed)

is made with the contractor, who neither sublets the contract nor employs any worker, the contractor is, for the purposes of this Act, taken to be a worker employed by the person who made the contract with the contractor. (See L&B Linings (n 76), [35]).

[78]L&B Linings (n 76), [36].

[79]Kovacic (n 15), [18](2).

[80]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 51.

[81]Humberstone (n 9) 403-404 (Dixon J).

[82][1955] HCA 73; (1955) 93 CLR 561.

[83]Ibid 574 (Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Taylor JJ).

[84]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 59 and T 1-76, ll 14-42.

[85]T 1-88, ll 32-37.

[86]Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 9; (2005) 222 CLR 194 ('Gribbles') [32] (Gleeson CJ, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).

[87]On Call (n 34), [210] (Bromberg J, citing Gribbles (n 86), [83] (Kirby J)).

[88]On Call (n 34), [211] (Bromberg J). As to a non-exhaustive list of indicia that may indicate if a business is being carried see L&B Linings (n 76), [60] (Rothman J) and see On Call (n 34), [217] (Bromberg J).

[89]L&B Linings (n 76), [60] (Rothman J) citing Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister for Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497, 526 (MacKenna J) and On Call (n 34), [217], ninth dot point (Bromberg J).

[90]Wesfarmers Federation Insurance Ltd v Stephen Wells trading as Wells Plumbing [2008] NSWCA 186, [39]‑[42] (Basten JA, Hodgson JA at [18] and Handley AJA at [121] agreeing).

[91]On Call (n 34), [217], seventh dot point (Bromberg J).

[92]Higgins v Jackson [1976] HCA 37; (1976) 135 CLR 174, 176 (Barwick CJ, Stephen and Mason JJ at 177 and Murphy J at 178 agreeing).

[93]T 1-88, ll 32-42.

[94]Macquarie Dictionary (7th ed 2017) 'incident' (def 8. incident to), namely, '… b. naturally related to or connected with.'

[95]See Dennis Peace and Robert Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (Lexis Nexis, 9th ed, 2019) 2.45.

[96]Macquarie Dictionary (7th ed 2017) 'incidental' (def 5, incidental to), namely, '… liable to happen in connection with; naturally appertaining to.'

[97]Humberstone (n 9), 402, Stewardson (n 72), 139 and Kovacic (n 15) [18](3).

[98]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 26.

[99]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 29 and T 1-79, ll 22-24.

[100]Mr Baigorri's submissions, paras. 53 and 59.

[101]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 65.

[102]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 36(e).

[103]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 36(f).

[104]T 1-80, ll 16-31.

[105]T 1-81, ll 4-12.

[106]The Regulator's submissions, para. 52.

[107]The Regulator's submissions, para. 53.

[108]The Regulator's submissions, para. 59.

[109]The Regulator's submissions, para. 60.

[110]The Regulator's submissions, paras. 61-63.

[111]The Regulator's submissions, para. 65.

[112]The Regulator's submissions, para. 69(a).

[113]The Regulator's submissions, para. 64.

[114]The Regulator's submissions, para. 66.

[115]The Regulator's submissions, para. 71.

[116]The Regulator's submissions, para. 68.

[117]T 1-91, ll 10-17.

[118]Exhibit 1, exhibit 'HAB-1', pages 16-17, cl 13.

[119]T 1-93, ll 6-35.

[120]T 1-94, ll 6-12.

[121]T 1-94, ll 14-22.

[122]T 1-94, ll 32-35.

[123]The Regulator's submissions, para. 54.

[124]T 1-17, ll 11-22.

[125]Exhibit 1, para. 6.

[126]T 1-18, l 13.

[127]Exhibit 1, para. 7.

[128]Exhibit 1, para. 8.

[129]T 1-18, ll 24-25.

[130]Exhibit 1, paras. 9-11.

[131]Exhibit 1, paras. 17-19.

[132]T 1-21, l 18.

[133]T 1-100, ll 4-11.

[134]Exhibit 1, exhibit 'HAB-3', pages 30-35.

[135]Exhibit 1, exhibit 'HAB-2', page 28.

[136]T 1-23, ll 27-32.

[137]T 1-23, ll 37-38.

[138]T 1-22, l 22.

[139]T 1-22, ll 24-26.

[140]T 1-22, ll 28-29.

[141]T 1-22, l 31 to T 1-23, l 15.

[142]T 1-37, ll 1-5.

[143]T 1-37, ll 31-32.

[144]T 1-37, ll 37-48.

[145]Exhibit 1, exhibit 'HAB-2', page 28.

[146]Exhibit 1, exhibit 'HAB-2', page 28.

[147]Exhibit 1, paras. 103-107 and exhibit 'HAB-3', page 33.

[148]T 1-47, l 15.

[149]Exhibit 1, exhibit 'HAB-8', page 46 and T 1-30, ll 35-36.

[150]Exhibit 1, exhibit 'HAB-1', page 13.

[151]T 1-35, l 15 to T 1-36, l 11.

[152]T 1-36, l 40.

[153]Mr Baigorri's submissions, para. 65.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Baigorri v Workers' Compensation Regulator

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Baigorri v Workers' Compensation Regulator

  • MNC:

    [2023] QIRC 190

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Merrell DP

  • Date:

    22 Jun 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Cam v Cousins Interstate Transport Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 1288
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1964] NSWR 1288
Cite 2 - [1964] NSWR 1288
Certain Lloyd's Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross [2012] HCA 56
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] HCA 56
Cite 2 - [2012] HCA 56
Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2012) 248 CLR 378
Cite 2 - (2012) 248 CLR 378
Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2012) 250 CLR 503
Cite 2 - (2012) 250 CLR 503
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] HCA 55
Cite 2 - [2012] HCA 55
Higgins v Jackson (1976) 135 CLR 174
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1976) 135 CLR 174
Cite 2 - (1976) 135 CLR 174
Higgins v Jackson [1976] HCA 37
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1976] HCA 37
Cite 2 - [1976] HCA 37
Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills (1949) 79 CLR 389
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1949) 79 CLR 389
Cite 2 - (1949) 79 CLR 389
Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills [1949] HCA 49
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1949] HCA 49
Cite 2 - [1949] HCA 49
Kovacic v Henley Arch Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 56
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] VSCA 56
Cite 2 - [2009] VSCA 56
Kovacic v Henley Arch Pty Ltd (2009) 22 VR 21
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2009) 22 VR 21
Cite 2 - (2009) 22 VR 21
L&B Linings Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales [2011] NSWSC 474
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] NSWSC 474
Cite 2 - [2011] NSWSC 474
Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 9
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] HCA 9
Cite 2 - [2005] HCA 9
Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 194
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) 222 CLR 194
Cite 2 - (2005) 222 CLR 194
Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2008) 235 CLR 619
Cite 2 - (2008) 235 CLR 619
Northern Territory v Collins [2008] HCA 49
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] HCA 49
Cite 2 - [2008] HCA 49
On Call Interpreters & Translators Agency Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 3) (2011) 214 FCR 82
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2011) 214 FCR 82
Cite 2 - (2011) 214 FCR 82
On Call Interpreters & Translators v Commissioner of Taxation (No. 3) [2011] FCA 366
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] FCA 366
Cite 2 - [2011] FCA 366
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1998] HCA 28
Cite 2 - [1998] HCA 28
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 C.L.R 355
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1998) 194 C.L.R 355
Cite 2 - (1998) 194 C.L.R 355
R v A2 [2019] HCA 35
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] HCA 35
Cite 2 - [2019] HCA 35
R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2019) 269 CLR 507
Cite 2 - (2019) 269 CLR 507
Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1968] 2 QB 497
Cite 2 - [1968] 2 QB 497
Smith v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 3
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 3
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 3
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2017) 262 CLR 362
Cite 2 - (2017) 262 CLR 362
Sztal v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) HCA 34
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2017) HCA 34
Cite 2 - (2017) HCA 34
Toowoomba Demolition and Earthmoving Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2020] QIRC 30
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 30
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 30
Turner v Stewardson [1962] NSWR 137
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1962] NSWR 137
Cite 2 - [1962] NSWR 137
Wesfarmers Federation Insurance Ltd v Stephen Wells trading as Wells Plumbing [2008] NSWCA 186
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] NSWCA 186
Cite 2 - [2008] NSWCA 186
Zuijs v Wirth Bros Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 561
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1955) 93 CLR 561
Cite 2 - (1955) 93 CLR 561
Zuijs v Wirth Brothers Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 73
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1955] HCA 73
Cite 2 - [1955] HCA 73

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Baigorri v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] ICQ 27 citations
Baigorri v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2) [2023] QIRC 2012 citations
1

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