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  4. Philp v State of Queensland (Department of Education) - [2023] QIRC 219

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Philp v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[2023] QIRC 219

Philp v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[2023] QIRC 219

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Philp v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 219

PARTIES:

Philp, Darren

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Department of Education)

(Respondent)

CASE NO.:

PSA/2023/43

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against a decision to suspend without remuneration

DELIVERED ON:

28 July 2023

MEMBER:

McLennan IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDERS:

That pursuant to s 562C(1)(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld):

  1. The appeal is allowed.
  1. The decision of 28 February 2023 is set aside and another decision is substituted.
  1. The Appellant is returned to suspension on normal remuneration, effective from 28 February 2023.
  1. The Respondent is to reimburse the Appellant for the normal remuneration he has been deprived of from 28 February 2023.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SERVICE – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – PUBLIC SERVICE APPEAL – Appellant employed as a teacher – Appellant charged with offences under the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) – Appellant suspended without remuneration pursuant to s 137(4) of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) – whether decision to extend suspension without remuneration was fair and reasonable – decision to extend suspension without remuneration was not fair and reasonable – appeal is allowed

LEGISLATION & OTHER

INSTRUMENTS:

Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld)

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 451, s 562C

Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 365, s 369, s 370, s 371, s 382

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld), s 91, s 101, s 131, s 289

Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 25, s 137, s 187, s 190, s 194

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) s 121, s 191

Directive 16/20 Suspension, cl 5, cl 6

CASES:

Ainsworth and Anor v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564

Baskin v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 349

BR v State of Queensland (No. 2) [2022] QIRC 154

Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 018

Darling Downs Hospital and Health Service v The Regulator (under the Work Health and Safety Act) [2022] QIRC 456

ENCO PRECAST PTY LTD v Construction Forestry, Mining and Energy Union & Ors [2020] QIRC 188

George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104

Growthbuilt Pty Ltd v SafeWork NSW [2018] NSWIRComm 1002

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475

Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (No. 2) [2019] QIRC 133

Russell v Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 All ER 109

Streat v Bauer; Streat v Blanco (unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Smart J, Nos 13686, 13687 of 1996, 16 March 1998)

Thomson v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 402

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    Mr Darren Philp (the Appellant) is permanently employed by the Department of Education, State of Queensland (the Respondent) as a Senior Teacher at Pimpama State Primary College.[1]
  1. [2]
    The Respondent received a complaint against the Appellant, alleging inappropriate conduct towards a student.[2]
  1. [3]
    In correspondence dated 11 February 2021, the Appellant was advised of the decision to suspend him from duties with remuneration:

… for a period of up to six months.  The duration of your suspensions may be reviewed as new information becomes available, the discipline process progresses or circumstances changed, and you be advised at the relevant time of any change.[3]

  1. [4]
    On 11 August 2021, the Appellant was notified of the decision to continue his suspension with remuneration.[4]
  1. [5]
    On 4 August 2022, the Appellant was notified of the decision to continue his suspension with remuneration "… for a period of six months until 15 February 2023."[5]
  1. [6]
    On 23 January 2023, the police formally charged the Appellant with one count of indecent treatment of a child under 16, child under 12 years lineal descendent / guardian carer with impairment of the mind, pursuant to ss 210(1)(a), 210(3), 210(4) and 210(4A) of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) (the Charge).[6]  The Respondent was also notified.[7]
  1. [7]
    On 24 January 2023, the Queensland College of Teachers (QCT) suspended the Appellant's teacher registration.[8]
  1. [8]
    On 25 January 2023, the QCT filed a referral in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) to continue the suspension of the Appellant's teacher registration.  (QCAT had not made a decision to continue the suspension of registration, as at 20 March 2023).[9]
  1. [9]
    On 30 January 2023, QSuper sought employment information from the Respondent in order to process the Appellant's income protection claim.  QSuper sought clarification as to the date the paid leave was due to cease.[10] 
  1. [10]
    On 3 February 2023, the Respondent completed the QSuper form and identified "15 February 2023" to be the date that the Appellant's remuneration would cease.[11]
  1. [11]
    In correspondence dated 3 February 2023 (but received on 6 February 2023) the Appellant was asked to show cause as to why he should not be suspended from duty without remuneration.[12]
  1. [12]
    On 13 February 2023, the Appellant provided a response to the proposed suspension without remuneration.
  1. [13]
    In correspondence dated 28 February 2023 the Respondent determined that the Appellant would be suspended without remuneration from 28 February 2023 until 3 August 2023 (the Decision).[13]
  1. [14]
    On 20 March 2023, the Appellant filed an Appeal Notice in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission against the Decision.

Appeal principles

  1. [15]
    The question to be determined is whether the Decision appealed against was fair and reasonable.
  1. [16]
    The appeal is not conducted by way of re-hearing, but rather involves a review of the decision arrived at and the associated decision-making process.
  1. [17]
    Findings made by the Respondent, which are reasonably open to it, should not be disturbed on appeal.  Even so, in reviewing the decision appealed against, the Commission may allow other evidence to be taken into account.

Relevant Legislation, Directive and Information Guides

  1. [18]
    This Decision is informed by the parties' submissions, the relevant legislation, the Public Service Commission's Directive 16/20 Suspension (Suspension Directive)[14] and the Public Service Commission's information guides Manage Employee Suspensions and Employee Suspension that applied at the relevant time.
  1. [19]
    Whilst these materials have been considered, different weight has been attributed to my consideration of each. 
  1. [20]
    On 1 March 2023, the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) (PS Act) came into effect. Section 289 of the PS Act repealed the former Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) which was in effect at the time of the Decision.  The parties agree that at the time the Decision was made, the decision maker was required to have regard to the relevant provisions of the (repealed) Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) and (superseded) Suspension Directive.
  1. [21]
    On 20 March 2023, the Appellant filed this appeal under ch 3 pt 10 of the new PS Act. Therefore, this appeal must be heard and decided under the PS Act.
  1. [22]
    Legislation prescribes the mandatory provisions that are essential to apply, as contained in the PS Act and Suspension Directive for the purposes of this Decision.
  1. [23]
    Section 131 of the PS Act[15] provides for decisions against which appeals may be made and relevantly provides as follows:
  1. 131
    Decisions against which appeals may be made
  1. (1)
    An appeal may be made against the following decisions—

…

  1. (f)
    a suspension without pay decision;

…

  1. [24]
    Section 101 of the PS Act[16] provides for the suspension of a public service employee as follows (emphasis added):
  1. 101
    Suspension
  1. (1)
    A public sector employee's chief executive may, by notice, suspend the employee from duty if the chief executive reasonably believes—
  1. (a)
    the employee is liable to discipline under a disciplinary law; or
  1. (b)
    the proper and efficient management of the entity might be prejudiced if the employee is not suspended.
  1. (2)
    The notice must state—
  1. (a)
    when the suspension starts and ends; and
  1. (b)
    whether the employee is entitled to remuneration for the period of the suspension; and
  1. (c)
    the effect that alternative employment may, under subsection (5), have on any entitlement to remuneration for the period of the suspension.
  1. (3)
    However, before suspending the employee, the chief executive must consider all reasonable alternatives available to the employee.

Examples of reasonable alternatives which may be available to the employee—

  • alternative duties
  • a change in the location where the employee performs duties
  • another alternative working arrangement
  1. (4)
    The employee is entitled to normal remuneration for the period of the suspension, unless—
  1. (a)
    the employee is suspended under subsection (1)(a); and
  1. (b)
    the employee's chief executive considers it is not appropriate for the employee to be entitled to normal remuneration for the period of the suspension, having regard to the nature of the discipline to which the chief executive believes the employee is liable.

…

  1. (9)
    In suspending a public sector employee under this section, the chief executive must comply with the directive made under section 102.
  1. [25]
    Section 91 of the PS Act[17] sets out the grounds for discipline and disciplinary action generally as follows:
  1. 91
    Grounds for discipline
  1. (1)
    A public service employee's chief executive may discipline the employee if the chief executive is reasonably satisfied the employee has—
  1. (a)
    engaged in repeated unsatisfactory performance or serious under performance of the employee’s duties, including, for example, by performing duties carelessly, incompetently or inefficiently; or
  1. (b)
    been guilty of misconduct; or
  1. (c)
    been absent from duty without approved leave and without reasonable excuse; or
  1. (d)
    contravened, without reasonable excuse, a direction given to the employee as a public sector employee by a responsible person; or
  1. (e)
    used, without reasonable excuse, a substance to an extent that has adversely affected the competent performance of the employee’s duties; or
  1. (f)
    contravened, without reasonable excuse, a requirement of the chief executive under section 71 in relation to the employee’s employment or secondment by, in response to the requirement—
  1. (i)
    failing to disclose a serious disciplinary action; or
  1. (ii)
    giving false or misleading information; or
  1. (g)
    contravened, without reasonable excuse, a provision of—
  1. (i)
    this Act, other than section 39 or 40; or
  1. (ii)
    another Act that applies to the employee in relation to the employee’s employment; or

…

  1. [26]
    The Suspension Directive commenced operation on 25 September 2020, and amongst other things, describes the circumstances in which a chief executive may decide a public service employee is not entitled to normal remuneration during a period of suspension.
  1. [27]
    Clause 5 of the Suspension Directive provides for suspension of a person from duty in the following terms (emphasis added):
  1. 5
    Suspension considerations
  1. 5.1
    Suspension
  1. (a)
    Section 137 of the PS Act provides that the chief executive of a department may, by notice, suspend a person from duty if the chief executive reasonably believes:
  1. (i)
    For a public service officer- the proper and efficient management of the department might be prejudiced if the officer is not suspended
  1. (ii)
    for a public service employee - the employee is liable to discipline under a disciplinary law.
  1. (b)
    Section 137(2) provides that suspension notice must state:
  1. (i)
    when the suspension starts and ends
  1. (ii)
    whether the person is entitled to remuneration for the period of the suspension; and
  1. (iii)
    the effect that alternative employment may, under subsection 137(5) have on any entitlement to remuneration.

Suspension notices must state an end date or express the period of the suspension in terms of a specified number of weeks or months. It is not sufficient to state that suspension will end by reference to events, such as 'until this disciplinary process is finalised', or to state that the suspension will continue until 'otherwise determined'.

  1. (c)
    Section 137(8) provides that the chief executive may cancel a suspension at any time.
  1. 5.2
    Obligation to consider all reasonable alternatives
  1. (a)
    Section 137(3) of the PS Act provides that a chief executive must consider all reasonable alternatives before suspending an employee.
  2. (b)
    The alternative duties do not have to form part of an established role and can be outside the employee's usual place of work.
  3. (c)
    Employers are required to document and provide to the employee what duties or other options had been identified and considered, including any reason why the employee could not undertake those alternative options. This could include:
  1. (i)
    temporary transfer to alternative duties (either in the employee's workplace or at another workplace)
  1. (ii)
    directing the employee to work under close supervision or with another employee
  1. (iii)
    asking the employee if they wish to access accrued recreation and/or long service leave (access to accrued leave is at the discretion of the employee).
  1. [28]
    Clause 6 of the Suspension Directive provides for suspension of an employee from duty without remuneration in the following terms (emphasis added):
  1. 6.
    Suspension without remuneration
  1. 6.1
    Section 137(4) of the PS Act provides that the chief executive may decide that normal remuneration is not appropriate during a period of suspension where the employee is a public service employee liable to discipline.
  1. 6.2
    A decision that normal remuneration is not appropriate during the suspension will usually occur after a period of suspension with remuneration but may be made from the start of the suspension.
  1. 6.3
    In deciding that normal remuneration is not appropriate, the factors the chief executive is to consider include:
  1. (a)
    the nature of the discipline matter
  2. (b)
    any factors not within the control of the agency that are preventing the timely conclusion of the discipline process
  3. (c)
    the public interest of the employee remaining on suspension with remuneration.
  1. 6.4
    A decision to suspend an employee without remuneration is subject to the principles of natural justice. Natural justice is the right to be given a fair hearing and the opportunity to present one's case, the right to have a decision made by an unbiased or disinterested decision maker and the right to have that decision based on logically probative evidence. As part of the suspension process:
  1. (a)
    The employee must be given the opportunity to respond to the proposed suspension without remuneration prior to the decision being made by the delegate. This can occur through a 'show cause' process at the time of notification of the initial suspension on normal remuneration, or at any subsequent stage during the suspension.
  2. (b)
    The employee is to be provided with written notice, including the particulars required by section 137 of the PS Act, and reasons for the decision that suspension is without normal remuneration.
  3. (c)
    The chief executive must provide the employee with a minimum of 7 days from the date of receipt of a show cause notice to consider and respond to the notice, having regard to the volume of material and complexity of the matter. The chief executive may grant, and must consider any request for, an extension of time to respond to a show cause notice if there are reasonable grounds for extension.
  4. (d)
    If the employee does not respond to a show cause notice or does not respond within the nominated timeframe in clause 6.4(b) and has not been granted an extension of time to respond, the chief executive may make a decision on grounds based on the information available to them.

…

  1. [29]
    The advice contained within the Public Service Commission's information guides Manage Employee Suspensions and Employee Suspensions is not mandatory.  However, the guides were a published Queensland Government resource on the particular topic at the relevant point in time.  So with that caveat, I have also considered those resources with respect to this Decision.

Submissions

  1. [30]
    In accordance with the Directions Order issued on 24 March 2023, the parties filed written submissions.
  1. [31]
    Pursuant to s 451(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (IR Act), no hearing was conducted in deciding this appeal.  The matter was decided on the papers.
  1. [32]
    I have carefully considered all submissions and attached documents but have determined not to approach the writing of this Decision by summarising the entirety of those documents.  My focus is on determining whether the Decision appealed against is fair and reasonable so I will instead refer only to the parties' key positions in my consideration of this appeal. 

Summary of the Appellant's position

  1. [33]
    In correspondence dated 13 February 2023, the Appellant argued that the Respondent ought not impose the Decision because of the following factors:[18]
  • Pre-determination bias, with respect to the completion of the QSuper form;
  • The charge and first mention in the Magistrates Court is not "new information";
  • Procedural fairness;
  • Need to consider reasonable alternative work arrangements;
  • Neither the Department nor the Appellant have control over the time it may take for the criminal or regulatory proceedings to be resolved;
  • Not in the public interest;
  • Model litigant obligations;
  • No prima facie case against the Appellant;
  • Legal presumption of innocence;
  • Human Rights;
  • No decision has yet made by QCAT to continue the suspension of the Appellant's teacher registration;
  • Resultant financial hardship;
  • Appellant remains ready to participate in the Department's disciplinary process.
  1. [34]
    The Appellant submitted that the Respondent's Decision was unfair and unreasonable because:[19]
  1. (a)
    the Department as a model litigant must act in accordance with the Act and the Directive;
  1. (b)
    the mere preferring of the Charge (no prima facie case) and my initial suspension of teacher registration proves nothing.  Consequently, this does not prevent him from performing alternate duties;
  1. (c)
    where the Department is privy to new information it is proper that it be put to me before suspending me without remuneration.  It is unfair where the Department fails to do so where the consequential course is to suspend me without pay unreasonable and manifestly unfair;
  1. (d)
    further, the assertion that the allegation is now subject to a formal charge to be a 'material change' in circumstances does not amount to new information;
  1. (e)
    fairness and reasonability dictate that greater weight should be placed on the 'financial impact' of any decision to suspend me without remuneration;[20] and
  1. (f)
    the Department's requirement to manage public resources efficiently may in fact inspire deeper exploration of alternative duties or meaningful work that I may be employed to undertake, to yield some return on the wages paid.[21]

Summary of the Respondent's position

  1. [35]
    In correspondence dated 3 February 2023, the Respondent stated:[22]

While no determination has been made regarding the veracity of the alleged conduct the subject of the criminal charge against you, I am considering whether it is appropriate for you to be suspended from duty without remuneration (pay), taking into consideration:

  1. the nature and the seriousness of the matter you have been charged with;
  1. the ongoing court proceedings against you, which will delay the department's investigation process and any possible disciplinary process in relation to this matter;
  1. the suspension of your teacher registration by the QCT;
  1. the department's obligation to ensure the effective, efficient, economical and appropriate use of public resources, including the effect upon departmental finances while continuing your suspension with remuneration;
  1. the perception of the public regarding:
  1. your ongoing remuneration during the period of your suspension in the above circumstances; and
  1. the nature and seriousness of the offence that is the subject of the court proceedings against you.
  1. [36]
    The Respondent submitted that its Suspension Without Remuneration Decision was fair and reasonable, on the following grounds:[23]
  1. Criminal charges
  1. Suspension of teacher registration
  1. Nature of the disciplinary matter
  1. Factors preventing the timely conclusion of the discipline process as there is no end in sight for the resolution of the criminal matter
  1. Public interest noting the passage of time that has lapsed since the Appellant was suspended with remuneration from 11 February 2021.

Consideration

  1. [37]
    In this appeal, I must determine whether the decision to suspend the Appellant from duty without remuneration was fair and reasonable.

When can the Respondent take a decision to suspend an employee?

  1. [38]
    The PS Act states[24] (emphasis added):
  1. 101
    Suspension
  1. (1)
    A public sector employee's chief executive may, by notice, suspend the employee from duty if the chief executive reasonably believes—
  1. (a)
    the employee is liable to discipline under a disciplinary law; or

…

  1. [39]
    The allegation made against the Appellant is very serious;[25] although the Respondent has (appropriately) not yet initiated any disciplinary process at this time. 
  1. [40]
    Whether or not the allegation is serious is not in dispute.  Rather, the parties diverge on the question of whether or not the Appellant will continue to be paid for that period (either by retaining the original terms of the 'suspension with pay' - or through revisiting the requirement to explore any alternative duties that may be undertaken by him to achieve this outcome).
  1. [41]
    That turns on the further consideration of 'reasonable belief', explained at paragraphs [103]-[123] of this Decision.

Can the Respondent change the terms of the suspension from 'with pay' to 'without pay'?

  1. [42]
    The Respondent's initial determination to apply a 'suspension with pay' to the Appellant does not mean it cannot make a different decision at some later time. 
  1. [43]
    Clause 6.2 of the Suspension Directive provided that "A decision that normal remuneration is not appropriate during the suspension will usually occur after a period of suspension with remuneration but may be made from the start of the suspension."  To be clear, it need not always be the case that a period of 'suspension without pay' must follow.
  1. [44]
    Section 101(4) of the PS Act[26] provides that (emphasis added):
  1. (4)
    The employee is entitled to normal remuneration for the period of the suspension, unless—
  1. (a)
    the employee is suspended under subsection (1)(a); and
  1. (b)
    the employee's chief executive considers it is not appropriate for the employee to be entitled to normal remuneration for the period of the suspension, having regard to the nature of the discipline to which the chief executive believes the employee is liable.

…

  1. [45]
    The point to draw from the above legislative provision is that while the default position is taken to be 'suspension with pay', it is nonetheless open to the chief executive to decide otherwise, if satisfied of the relevant criteria.  Notably, the guidance at that time was that "should only be used in limited circumstances".[27]
  1. [46]
    The correspondence dated 28 February 2023, communicating the Respondent's decision to now suspend the Appellant without pay, somewhat overstated the authority by omitting the qualifier of "having regard to …"[28]in my view:

As a preliminary matter, I note the prima facie entitlement of an employee to normal remuneration during a period of suspension is expressly subject to the Chief Executive (or their delegate) deciding otherwise (see section 137(4) of the PS Act) …[29]

  1. [47]
    While it is certainly open to the Respondent to make a different decision about the terms of the Appellant's suspension from duty, that is not an unfettered power.  Such decision must be fair and reasonable.  It should only be exercised in limited circumstances - and in a way consistent with the mandatory requirements (that is, considerations of the relevant factors, reasonable alternatives and natural justice).  My consideration of these conditions are explained below.

What must the Respondent do before suspending an employee without pay?

  1. [48]
    Any decision to suspend the Appellant without pay must comply with the legislative provisions, as contained in the PS Act and the Suspension Directive. 
  1. [49]
    The Suspension Directive provided that (emphasis added):
  1. 5
    Suspension considerations
  1. 5.1
    Suspension
  1. (a)
    Section 137 of the PS Act provides that the chief executive of a department may, by notice, suspend a person from duty if the chief executive reasonably believes:
  1. (i)
    For a public service officer- the proper and efficient management of the department might be prejudiced if the officer is not suspended
  1. (ii)
    for a public service employee - the employee is liable to discipline under a disciplinary law.
  1. (b)
    Section 137(2) provides that suspension notice must state:
  1. (i)
    when the suspension starts and ends
  1. (ii)
    whether the person is entitled to remuneration for the period of the suspension; and
  1. (iii)
    the effect that alternative employment may, under subsection 137(5) have on any entitlement to remuneration.

Suspension notices must state an end date or express the period of the suspension in terms of a specified number of weeks or months. It is not sufficient to state that suspension will end by reference to events, such as 'until this disciplinary process is finalised', or to state that the suspension will continue until 'otherwise determined'.

  1. (c)
    Section 137(8) provides that the chief executive may cancel a suspension at any time.
  1. 5.2
    Obligation to consider all reasonable alternatives
  1. (a)
    Section 137(3) of the PS Act provides that a chief executive must consider all reasonable alternatives before suspending an employee.
  2. (b)
    The alternative duties do not have to form part of an established role and can be outside the employee's usual place of work.
  3. (c)
    Employers are required to document and provide to the employee what duties or other options had been identified and considered, including any reason why the employee could not undertake those alternative options. This could include:
  1. (i)
    temporary transfer to alternative duties (either in the employee's workplace or at another workplace)
  1. (ii)
    directing the employee to work under close supervision or with another employee
  1. (iii)
    asking the employee if they wish to access accrued recreation and/or long service leave (access to accrued leave is at the discretion of the employee).
  1. 6.
    Suspension without remuneration

…

  1. 6.3
    In deciding that normal remuneration is not appropriate, the factors the chief executive is to consider include:
  1. (a)
    the nature of the discipline matter
  2. (b)
    any factors not within the control of the agency that are preventing the timely conclusion of the discipline process
  3. (c)
    the public interest of the employee remaining on suspension with remuneration.
  1. 6.4
    A decision to suspend an employee without remuneration is subject to the principles of natural justice. Natural justice is the right to be given a fair hearing and the opportunity to present one's case, the right to have a decision made by an unbiased or disinterested decision maker and the right to have that decision based on logically probative evidence. As part of the suspension process:
  1. (a)
    The employee must be given the opportunity to respond to the proposed suspension without remuneration prior to the decision being made by the delegate. This can occur through a 'show cause' process at the time of notification of the initial suspension on normal remuneration, or at any subsequent stage during the suspension.
  2. (b)
    The employee is to be provided with written notice, including the particulars required by section 137 of the PS Act, and reasons for the decision that suspension is without normal remuneration.
  3. (c)
    The chief executive must provide the employee with a minimum of 7 days from the date of receipt of a show cause notice to consider and respond to the notice, having regard to the volume of material and complexity of the matter. The chief executive may grant, and must consider any request for, an extension of time to respond to a show cause notice if there are reasonable grounds for extension.
  4. (d)
    If the employee does not respond to a show cause notice or does not respond within the nominated timeframe in clause 6.4(b) and has not been granted an extension of time to respond, the chief executive may make a decision on grounds based on the information available to them.

…

  1. [50]
    Ahead of deciding to suspend the Appellant without pay, the Respondent must have proper regard to:
  • Natural justice principles;
  • The suspension notice;
  • Reasonable alternatives;
  • Any arguments raised by the Appellant; and
  • Relevant factors, including:[30]
  1. (a)
    the nature of the discipline matter
  2. (b)
    any factors not within the control of the agency that are preventing the timely conclusion of the discipline process
  3. (c)
    the public interest of the employee remaining on suspension with remuneration.
  • 'Reasonable belief'
  1. [51]
    My consideration of the Respondent's discharge of these requirements follows.

Did the Respondent afford the Appellant 'natural justice', before making the decision to suspend him without pay?

  1. [52]
    Natural justice, or procedural fairness, is a term which has been the subject of expansive jurisprudence.  A summary of some of the relevant principles follows:
  • Natural justice is a flexible concept; it does not impose any specific rules per se, but rather encapsulates a range of principles.[31]
  • It requires the adoption of fair procedures which are appropriate and adapted to all the circumstances of the case.[32]
  • Foundationally, it requires that a person should have a reasonable opportunity to make their case.[33]
  • Natural justice is not a one-sided consideration.[34]
  • The matter of whether natural justice has been afforded in any given process should be considered holistically, rather than unduly narrowly focussing on one step or stage.[35]  
  1. [53]
    The relevance to this matter is not whether the rules of procedural fairness or natural justice apply.  They quite plainly do.[36]  It is part of any consideration of whether a decision was fair and reasonable.  The foundational problem here is determining what natural justice requires in this circumstance, and then whether it was afforded.  That involves a holistic view of the matter, rather than an artificially narrow consideration of any one particular step in the process utilised by the Respondent.
  1. [54]
    In addition to the 'natural justice' commentary above, the Suspension Directive stated that (emphasis added):
  1. 6.
    Suspension without remuneration

…

  1. 6.4
    A decision to suspend an employee without remuneration is subject to the principles of natural justice. Natural justice is the right to be given a fair hearing and the opportunity to present one's case, the right to have a decision made by an unbiased or disinterested decision maker and the right to have that decision based on logically probative evidence. As part of the suspension process:
  1. (a)
    The employee must be given the opportunity to respond to the proposed suspension without remuneration prior to the decision being made by the delegate. This can occur through a 'show cause' process at the time of notification of the initial suspension on normal remuneration, or at any subsequent stage during the suspension.
  2. (b)
    The employee is to be provided with written notice, including the particulars required by section 137 of the PS Act, and reasons for the decision that suspension is without normal remuneration.
  3. (c)
    The chief executive must provide the employee with a minimum of 7 days from the date of receipt of a show cause notice to consider and respond to the notice, having regard to the volume of material and complexity of the matter. The chief executive may grant, and must consider any request for, an extension of time to respond to a show cause notice if there are reasonable grounds for extension.
  4. (d)
    If the employee does not respond to a show cause notice or does not respond within the nominated timeframe in clause 6.4(b) and has not been granted an extension of time to respond, the chief executive may make a decision on grounds based on the information available to them.

…

  1. [55]
    Although published the day after the Respondent's decision to suspend the Appellant without pay,[37] the below explanation of the two key elements of such procedural fairness was to be included in the Public Sector Commission's Periodic Review Guide: Discipline and suspension periodic reviews, effective 1 March 2023:

Procedural fairness is a right recognised and defined by law that involves two key elements:

  1. the fair hearing rule - a person must be given sufficient information to know the case against them and be given the opportunity to respond
  2. the rule against bias - a person is entitled to a decision that is made by a disinterested and unbiased decision maker.

Fair hearing rule

The fair hearing rule is the principle that a decision maker must afford a person whose interests will be adversely affected by a decision the opportunity to present their case. This rule requires that a decision maker listen to and consider a person's point of view on anything that may adversely affect them.

In a practical sense, this involves ensuring a person is provided with adequate notice and information relating to the case against them, given the opportunity to comment and the decision maker considering the information provided by the person in response.

Allegations arising from a discipline process must be sufficiently clear and specific to allow the employee the opportunity to fairly respond. This rule also requires that the employee be given the opportunity to rebut or comment on any new material adverse to their case, including information gathered by a decision maker. If a decision maker has become aware of any new evidence at any stage of a decision-making process, this information must be disclosed, and a response sought unless it was disregarded because it was not credible or relevant.

Rule against bias

The rule against bias requires that decisions are made by an impartial decision maker without an interest in the matter who is free from actual or apparent bias. This requires the reviewer to go beyond looking for actual bias. It also requires a reviewer to consider whether there is anything about a decision maker or their conduct that may give rise to the perception that a decision has been made based on the self-interest of the decision maker.

Risks to actual or perceptions of bias that should be considered during the review include whether:

  • a decision maker has a close personal or professional relationship with any party involved in a matter. Mere knowledge of a person or a previous working relationship may not ordinarily give rise to an actual or perceived bias, however decisions where there is a clear animosity or favouring of a particular version or party may, where there is no justifiable reason for this
  • there is any predetermination of an outcome
  • the decision maker would benefit from a particular outcome being achieved
  • whether the decision maker was involved in the events under review.
  1. [56]
    With those principles and definitions in mind, I have carefully reviewed the application of natural justice in the Appellant's case. 

Pre-determination

  1. [57]
    Clause 6.4(a) of the Suspension Directive provides that "The employee must be given the opportunity to respond to the proposed suspension without remuneration prior to the decision being made by the delegate."[38]  However, the Appellant raised the issue of 'pre-determination bias' because the QSuper form completed on 3 February 2023 stated that the period of suspension with pay would cease on 15 February 2023 (the end date of the current period of suspension with remuneration).  In doing so, the Appellant asserted that the decision to suspend him without pay was made before he was provided with correspondence from the Respondent on 6 February 2023 asking him to show cause as to why the terms of his suspension should not be changed. The Appellant argued that the decision was made before he had the required opportunity to respond to that suspension without pay proposal - and to have that response considered. 
  1. [58]
    At the core of his contention is that the date of the Respondent's show cause letter was also 3 February 2023 but that it was not received until 6 February 2023 - and no explanation has been forthcoming from the Respondent for the cause of that delay in providing him that letter.[39] 
  1. [59]
    I have noted that there was no such delay in the provision of the 28 February 2023 correspondence, in which the Respondent denied the outcome had already been determined and stated that "The QSuper form was completed prior to my decision to extend your suspension and to ask you to show cause on proposed suspension without remuneration.  I confirm that no decision to suspend you without remuneration was made without first providing you with the opportunity to respond and considering your Response."[40]  There is no dispute between the parties that the QSuper form was completed before the show cause letter was provided to the Appellant.  That is not the tension here, but rather whether or not the decision was made before the Appellant was alerted to any imminent consideration by the Respondent of changing the terms of his suspension. 
  1. [60]
    The 3 February 2023 date of both the completion of the QSuper form and the show cause correspondence is a strong coincidence.  However, the Respondent submitted that "The local HR Officer completed the form on 3 February 2023 and identified 15 February 2023 as the date the paid leave was due to cease … The local HR Officer who operates independent from the Integrity and Employee Relations Unit, simply referenced the date in the decision makers correspondence.  The Respondent asserts this was the only pragmatic date to be referenced based on the information available to the departmental officer at that time."[41] 
  1. [61]
    I have reviewed that correspondence dated 4 August 2022, to which the Respondent's submissions refer.  That letter does not say that the 15 February 2023 is the date the paid leave was due to cease.  The words are instead "For these reasons, I have determined that in the circumstances your suspension from duty, with normal remuneration, will continue under section 137(1)(b) of the Act for the reasons set out in the previous letter under the hand of Ms Gillies-Day, and will continue for a period of six months until 15 February 2023."[42]  In light of the fact that the Appellant's suspension from duty with pay had been extended several times already by 4 August 2022 - a duration of about 18 months at that point - it could not, nor should not, have been assumed by anyone that the period of suspension with pay would actually cease at the next foreshadowed date of 15 February 2023.
  1. [62]
    I note that the last two of the Respondent's previous correspondence to the Appellant, dated 4 August 2022[43]and 11 August 2021,[44] were issued in the context of (emphasis added) "As the conclusion of the nominated period of your suspension is approaching" (or "has arrived"), "I am required to consider whether it is appropriate for your suspension to continue."  Those letters continued on to advise the Appellant that "I have formed the view that there are no suitable alternative arrangements at another location …", with respect to the mandatory consideration of whether there are any reasonable alternatives ahead of taking a subsequent decision to suspend.  The letters concluded with the reminder that (emphasis added) "…the duration of your suspension may be reviewed as new information becomes available or circumstances change, and you will be advised at the relevant time of any change."  Nowhere does the previous correspondence indicate to the Appellant (or the HR Officer charged with completion of the QSuper form) that the status of his suspension 'with pay' was also up for reconsideration at the next foreshadowed date - only whether it is appropriate to continue the suspension, whether there are any reasonable alternatives, and the matter of the duration.
  1. [63]
    Despite the Appellant's clear expression of concern about this matter as early as the correspondence dated 13 February 2023, the Respondent provided no explanation as to the delay of its show cause correspondence in either its decision letter of 28 February 2023 or its submissions in this appeal.  In circumstances where that letter was sent to the Appellant by email, the delay remains both curious and unexplained.  At that juncture,[45] the Respondent was on notice that:

It appears the Department has made a decision to cease out client's remuneration as at 15 February 2023, communicated that decision to QSuper, in circumstances where our client had not been given notice of the intention to cease his remuneration and no opportunity to respond.

As such, in the event the Department ceases our client's remuneration, the Department will have breached its obligation to provide natural justice to our client and breached section 137(9) of the Public Service Act 2008.[46]

  1. [64]
    While the Appellant did receive the show cause correspondence from the Respondent on 6 February 2023, and was provided with an opportunity to respond, clause 6.4(a) of the Suspension Directive required that "The employee must be given the opportunity to respond to the proposed suspension without remuneration prior to the decision being made."
  1. [65]
    For the reasons above, I find it more likely than not that did not occur here.  As this is a mandatory requirement, the appeal must succeed.

New information

  1. [66]
    The fair hearing rule provides that "the employee be given the opportunity to rebut or comment on any new material adverse to their case, including information gathered by a decision maker." 
  1. [67]
    The Appellant objected to the lack of specificity of "new information", claimed by the Respondent. 
  1. [68]
    The Respondent issued correspondence to the Appellant dated 3 February 2023 (and received on 6 February 2023) inviting him to show cause as to why he should not be suspended without pay.  In doing so, the Respondent advised that:[47]
  • it has been advised of "new information" regarding the Appellant's court matter;
  • it has become aware of the charge and the next listing before the Magistrates court on 14 February 2023; and
  • it has determined to continue the Appellant's suspension for a period of six months from the date of the letter, or until his court matters are finalised, whichever is sooner.
  1. [69]
    In correspondence to the Respondent dated 13 February 2023, it was asserted on behalf of the Appellant that "Police have not yet prepared their brief of evidence.  The Charge has not been committed to the Court. Consequently, there is no more than a mere allegation and no prima facie case against our client."
  1. [70]
    However, in its 28 February 2023 correspondence, the Respondent explained its position as:

… I consider a matter progressing from a police investigation to a formal charge triggering the suspension of your teacher registration to be a material change of circumstances deserving consideration.  Accordingly, I am satisfied that circumstances have sufficiently changed warranting your suspension without remuneration.

  1. [71]
    The Appellant submitted that was unfair and unreasonable because:[48]

where the Department is privy to new information it is proper that it be put to me before suspending me without remuneration.  It is unfair where the Department fails to do so where the consequential course is to suspend me without pay unreasonable and manifestly unfair;

further, the assertion that the allegation is now subject to a formal charge to be a 'material change' in circumstances does not amount to new information

  1. [72]
    While I agree with the Appellant that the Respondent was not then in possession of "new information", it remained the case however that he was nonetheless "given sufficient information to know the case against them and be given the opportunity to respond."
  1. [73]
    It was clear from the Respondent's 3 February 2023 correspondence that the events causative of the determination to revisit the terms of the Appellant's suspension were: the charge; the court listing; and the suspension of his teacher registration.  The Appellant comprehensively responded to those matters in the 13 February 2023 correspondence. 
  1. [74]
    I further note that the Respondent's correspondence to the Appellant had consistently included the caution that "… the duration of your suspension may be reviewed as new information becomes available, the discipline process progresses or circumstances changed, and you be advised at the relevant time of any change."  Even if the information held by the Respondent was not "new", it is nonetheless "circumstances changed".  In light of that, it was not remarkable that the Respondent reconsidered the matter at that time.
  1. [75]
    While I am satisfied that the Appellant had enough information before him to respond to those matters; I have found at [65] above that the decision was already made by that time on the balance of probabilities.
  1. [76]
    Clause 6.4(c) of the Suspension Directive stated that the employee must be provided with a minimum of 7 days to consider and respond to the notice.  I note that the minimum 7 day period was provided.
  1. [77]
    Section 137(2) of the PS Act and clause 5.1(b) of the Suspension Directive prescribed what is necessary to include within the suspension notice.  The correspondence dated 28 February 2023 stated that:
  1. (a)
    The period of suspension without pay is from 28 February 2023 until 3 August 2023.[49]
  1. (b)
    The terms of the suspension from duty has been changed from 'with pay' to 'without pay' for this period.

I find that the mandatory requirements for the suspension notice are met.

Did the Respondent consider all the relevant factors?

  1. [78]
    Clause 6 of the Suspension Directive provides that (emphasis added):
  1. 6.
    Suspension without remuneration

…

  1. 6.3
    In deciding that normal remuneration is not appropriate, the factors the chief executive is to consider include:
  1. (d)
    the nature of the discipline matter
  2. (e)
    any factors not within the control of the agency that are preventing the timely conclusion of the discipline process
  3. (f)
    the public interest of the employee remaining on suspension with remuneration.

The nature of the discipline matter

  1. [79]
    It is not disputed that the nature of the charge against the Appellant is very serious.

Factors outside the Respondent's control preventing timely conclusion of the discipline process

  1. [80]
    I agree that the criminal proceedings are unknown and outside the control of both the Appellant and Respondent. 
  1. [81]
    Appropriately, the Respondent's discipline process is paused until resolution of criminal proceedings. 
  2. [82]
    It follows that there are factors outside the Respondent's control preventing timely conclusion of the discipline process.

Public interest

  1. [83]
    It is uncontroversial that "Suspension is an administrative action, taken for administrative necessity.  It is not disciplinary action and is not to be used as a form of punishment."[50]
  1. [84]
    I appreciate that the Respondent had noted its obligations to 'manage public resources efficiently'.  That is true.  However it also holds an obligation to 'treated employees fairly and reasonably'.  The first obligation is not elevated over the second.
  1. [85]
    Balancing both obligations requires the proper assessment of maximising return on the investment in managing that risk and / or how ought that cost be mitigated?  As I found in Thomson v State of Queensland (Department of Education) ('Thomson'):[51]

the Department's requirement to manage public resources effectively may in fact inspire a deeper exploration of alternative duties or meaningful work that the Appellant may be deployed to undertake, to yield some return on the wages paid to him in the coming period.[52]

  1. [86]
    I would encourage continued review of whether or what 'reasonable alternatives' may be yet identified for project work the Appellant could independently perform in a 'work from home' arrangement.  Teachers and school staff have now had experience of working from home in periods of necessity, given the widespread, necessary and fast transition to such arrangements resultant from the global health pandemic of COVID. 
  1. [87]
    It would certainly be possible for meaningful project work to be allocated for the Appellant to perform independently, in such work from home arrangement, to mitigate the cost to the community of managing the risk of his (as yet untested) charge.
  1. [88]
    With respect to the Respondent's consideration of "the perception of the public regarding: your ongoing remuneration during the period of your suspension in the above circumstances …"[53], the Appellant has been suspended with pay for a lengthy period, without the identification and allocation of any suitable alternative duties.  The Appellant is presumed innocent - but the risk must be managed while the criminal and regulatory proceedings run its course.  In the meantime, some return on remuneration by the performance of meaningful work commensurate with the Appellant's experience and qualification, would mitigate the cost to the community of the Appellant's presumption of innocence in my view.

Did the Respondent consider all reasonable alternatives?

  1. [89]
    That is perhaps a useful segue to the consideration of any 'reasonable alternatives'.
  1. [90]
    Firstly, the Respondent's submissions dispute 'when' its mandatory consideration of such 'reasonable alternatives' must occur.  Whilst the various correspondence to the Appellant throughout the periods of suspension to date includes reference to such considerations, by the time of filing the Respondent's submissions it appears to argue that is only required before the initial decision to first suspend the Appellant 'with pay' was taken.  In taking that position, the Respondent relies on BR v State of Queensland (No. 2) ('BR').[54] I have considered that case; however instead refer to Deputy President Merrell's more recent decision in Baskin v State of Queensland (Department of Education) ('Baskin').[55]  In that case, the Department did consider reasonable alternatives before deciding to continue Mr Baskin's suspension without pay.  As is the Appellant here, Mr Baskin too was already suspended without pay at that point. 
  1. [91]
    By its repeated correspondence to the Appellant in this present matter (and in Baskin[56] and elsewhere), the Respondent has accepted by its words and conduct that there is a requirement for it to give careful consideration of 'reasonable alternatives' before taking both the initial suspension decision and any subsequent decisions to extend the period of suspension or change its terms (to 'suspension without pay' for example). 
  1. [92]
    The Respondent has not contested that requirement until its written submissions filed in this appeal.
  1. [93]
    Having found then that the consideration of "all reasonable alternatives, including alternative duties, a temporary transfer or another alternative working arrangement, that are available to the person" is a requirement that must be undertaken before a decision is taken to suspend an employee (either initially or subsequently, should the period be extended or the terms either proposed to be or in fact changed), clause 5.2 of the Suspension Directive prescribes the Respondent's obligation as (emphasis added):
  1. 5
    Suspension considerations

…

  1. 5.2
    Obligation to consider all reasonable alternatives
  1. (a)
    Section 137(3) of the PS Act provides that a chief executive must consider all reasonable alternatives before suspending an employee.
  1. (b)
    The alternative duties do not have to form part of an established role and can be outside the employee's usual place of work.
  1. (c)
    Employers are required to document and provide to the employee what duties or other options had been identified and considered, including any reason why the employee could not undertake those alternative options. This could include:
  1. (i)
    temporary transfer to alternative duties (either in the employee's workplace or at another workplace)
  1. (ii)
    directing the employee to work under close supervision or with another employee
  1. (iii)
    asking the employee if they wish to access accrued recreation and/or long service leave (access to accrued leave is at the discretion of the employee).
  1. [94]
    In the Respondent's correspondence dated 3 February 2023, in which the Appellant was invited to show cause as to why the terms of suspension should not be changed to 'without pay', the above requirement was discharged as follows:

Section 137(3) of the PS Act requires that before suspending an employee from duty, consideration must be given to all reasonable alternatives, including alternative duties, a temporary transfer or another alternative working arrangement available for you to perform.  Given that your teacher registration has been suspended, you cannot continue in a teacher role, or any school-based employment as you are not authorised to work in 'regulated employment' under the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000.  The South East Region has been consulted in considering alternative arrangements in accordance with section 137 of the PS Act and clause 5.2 of the Public Service Commission's Suspension Directive (16/20).  Based on these discussions, I have determined that there are no suitable alternative duties available at this time.[57]

  1. [95]
    The above extract demonstrates the Respondent's identification of the mandatory considerations, though provides scant information as to precisely "…what duties or other options had been identified and considered, including any reason why the employee could not undertake those alternative options …"[58] 
  1. [96]
    However, it is acknowledged that particular requirement is only enlivened "before suspending the person".[59]So it was only in the Respondent's correspondence dated 28 February 2023, where the Appellant was advised he would now be 'suspended without pay', that further detail was provided that discharged the obligation under clause 5.2(c)(iii):

In the event that you wish to apply to access your paid leave entitlements while you are suspended without remuneration, you can do so by submitting an application for leave to your regional contact… If your leave is approved, you will be paid your entitlements for the approved leave period, where you would have otherwise not been paid as a result of your suspension.  At the conclusion of your approved leave period, or if you deplete your leave entitlements balance, you will be returned to suspension without remuneration should the criminal or civil proceedings still be on foot.[60]

  1. [97]
    The Respondent also addressed other 'reasonable alternatives' considered, and the reasons for rejection,[61]noting that the Appellant is limited "to working in a non-teaching role and non-school based role only", as his teacher registration is currently suspended.  Noting the requirement is confined to "all reasonable alternatives", the Respondent had "considered potential duties in a non-teaching role, such as administrative or project work either at the Regional Office or working remotely" but concluded the Appellant could not undertake any such duties given "the serious nature of the criminal charge", "public perception and inherent risk."
  1. [98]
    I find that the Respondent did comply with its obligations to identify, consider and explain why any such possible alternative duties would be rejected, ahead of suspending the Appellant without pay.  That is required under the PS Act and Suspension Directive.
  1. [99]
    However, it remains open to the Respondent to continue to revise whether any reasonable alternatives may be found to mitigate this cost.

Did the Respondent consider financial hardship?

  1. [100]
    The Respondent's determination that the Appellant be suspended without pay would result in significant financial hardship for he and his family.  That has been acknowledged by the Respondent in the following terms:

I acknowledge your submission regarding the significant financial hardship my decision will have on you and your family.  I have carefully considered the financial impact my decision may have; however, this is not the only factor which I must take into consideration in deciding whether to suspend you without remuneration.  While I accept that there is a financial impact on every employee who is suspended without remuneration, I note that you have the option to apply to access your leave entitlements and/or seek employment outside the department during your suspension period …

  1. [101]
    However, in weighing this point in my overall consideration of whether or not the Respondent's decision was fair and reasonable, it is also significant that the duration of suspension from duty with remuneration has been over two years now (since 11 February 2021) and the Respondent has appropriately alerted the Appellant that he may draw on his accrued leave entitlements and/or seek employment outside the department. 
  1. [102]
    Those measures may mitigate the harsh financial impact on the Appellant and his family in the short term - though also would in effect shift the cost of managing the risk to the department resultant from the (as yet untested) charge to the Appellant.  My view as to the extent to which this can be considered 'fair and reasonable' has already been addressed above, with regard to the 'Public Interest'.

Reasonable belief

  1. [103]
    The PS Act provides that a public sector employee may be suspended from duty if the chief executive 'reasonably believes' the employee is liable to discipline under a disciplinary law.[62]
  1. [104]
    The term 'reasonably believes' is not defined in the PS Act.  Nor is the term defined in the WHS Act, where it also appears.
  1. [105]
    In the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) (WHS Act), reference is made to the 'reasonable belief' being held by an 'inspector'[63] or 'WHS entry permit holder'[64] for example - rather than the 'chief executive', as is the case in the PS Act.
  1. [106]
    However, the legislation is clear as to 'who' must hold such 'reasonable belief'.  In s 191 of the WHS Act, it is the 'inspector' who must have the 'reasonable belief' – that duty cannot be outsourced to a 'WHS entry permit holder'.  In the PS Act, it is the 'chief executive' who must have the 'reasonable belief'.  The chief executive cannot adopt as their own the 'reasonable belief' of an external party, such as a 'police officer'. 
  1. [107]
    In order to suspend a public sector employee from duty, the chief executive must have the required 'reasonable belief' - not a police officer.
  1. [108]
    But even if the chief executive was permitted to adopt the 'reasonable belief' of an external party, the approach would remain fundamentally flawed because the tests are different.  The test for a police officer to charge someone is less than the 'reasonable belief' that the chief executive must hold in order to suspend them. 
  1. [109]
    Police officers usually charge people with criminal offences by either: arrest; complaint and summons; or notice to appear.  Pursuant to the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), each of those methods only require a police officer to "reasonably suspect"[65] a person has committed an offence. 
  1. [110]
    'Reasonably suspect' is lower threshold than 'reasonable belief' - that difference is significant here.
  1. [111]
    Smart AJ explained that difference as "A reasonable suspicion involves less than a reasonable belief but more than a possibility".[66] 
  1. [112]
    Chief Commissioner Kite described the requirement for 'reasonable belief' to be "A reasonable and balanced approach does not allow an inspector to make assumptions and act on them without, at least, attempting to test, in a timely and practical manner, the validity of those assumptions."[67]  The Chief Commissioner elaborated that "… The Inspector was not required to satisfy himself to the level of proof of a breach of the Act … An inspector is however required to balance the objective information available to him, and is obliged to make reasonable inquiries … The Inspector is not bound by the responses but must take them into account in forming his view …"[68]  With respect to the allegation made against the Appellant in this matter, that has not occurred.
  1. [113]
    In BR v State of Queensland (No. 2) ('BR'),[69] Industrial Commissioner Hartigan (as she then was) set out the requirements of 'reasonable belief' as: "That provision does not require any positive finding that circumstances exist that assume disciplinary action will be taken. The facts referred to by the decision maker that informed the reasonable belief that the Appellant is liable to discipline under a disciplinary law include the criminal offences with which the Appellant has been charged and the Appellant's responses provided during the course of the show cause process."[70]  In BR,[71] the Respondent submitted that the words 'liable to discipline' should be read to mean 'subject to the probability of discipline'.[72] 
  1. [114]
    While a police officer may 'reasonably suspect' a person has committed an offence and charge them, that is a lower bar than what is required in order for a chief executive to have a 'reasonable belief' - something more is required for that standard to be met.  The Appellant is entitled to the presumption of innocence.  That presumption is extinguished at the point where either a 'guilty' verdict is determined by the court - or in the event that the Appellant pleads 'guilty' to the charge.  Neither of those conditions have yet occurred in this case.
  1. [115]
    I have been referred to his Honour Justice Daubney's comments on 4 August 2017, in the Supreme Court of Queensland, concerning a judicial review application for teacher 'AB'[73] following the Department's decision to cease his remuneration.  It was submitted that:

After expressing incredulity that the Department should seek to suspend the teacher's remuneration, Daubney J stated:

  1. "I just find it extraordinary – if that hasn't become obvious by now – that it's considered appropriate, simply to brush the presumption of innocence to one side, on the altar – and sacrifice it on the altar of public perception …"[74]
  1. [116]
    I agree that his Honour's observations are most apposite here. 
  1. [117]
    The principles expressed in AB v The State of Queensland[75] are unaffected by the recent amendments[76] to the PS Act and the new Suspension Directive.
  1. [118]
    The extent of what is currently known in this matter (subject of the present appeal) is that an allegation had been made against the Appellant - and now that a police officer 'reasonably suspects' an offence has been committed.  If a 'reasonable suspicion' (required to charge a person) is "more than a possibility" but "less than a reasonable belief", it does not follow that another can 'reasonably believe' that person to be "subject to the probability of discipline" (required to suspend a person in the first place). 
  1. [119]
    In Darling Downs Hospital and Health Service v The Regulator (under the Work Health and Safety Act),[77] Industrial Commissioner Dwyer observed the jurisprudence on the term 'reasonable belief' to be well settled.  He stated that:
  1. [15]
    … In Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (No. 2), Vice President O'Connor held:

Reasonable belief is not defined in the WHS Act. In George v Rocket & Anor the High Court had to consider what "reasonable grounds" meant in the context of whether or not a Magistrate had reasonable grounds to issue a search warrant. In a unanimous judgment, the Court (Mason CJ., Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) said:

The objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something need to point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to say that the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists: the assent of belief is given on more slender evidence than proof. Belief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [16]
    In Growthbuilt Pty Ltd v SafeWork NSW, Chief Commissioner Kite held:

I have referred, in these reasons, to additional inquiries the Inspector may have undertaken. I do not intend by those comments to suggest that the Inspector was required to conduct a full investigation. That would be contrary to the authorities such as George v Rockett, Halley v Kershaw and Essential Energy. The Inspector was not required to satisfy himself to the level of proof of a breach of the Act. Prohibition Notices are intended to prevent potential breaches so that is beyond what is required of him.

An inspector is however required to balance the objective information available to him, and is obliged to make reasonable inquiries. If he had attempted to make contact with the engineer and not been able to speak with him, for example, that would provide a different factual matrix than making no attempt to clarify any concerns about an expert engineer's opinion that contradicted his view. A similar point may be made about failing to raise with Mr Radopolous the allegation made by Ace or why the excavator was still in the excavation. The Inspector is not bound by the responses but must take them into account in forming his view.

A reasonable and balanced approach does not allow an inspector to make assumptions and act on them without, at least, attempting to test, in a timely and practical manner, the validity of those assumptions.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [17]
    In ENCO PRECAST PTY LTD v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union & Ors ('ENCO'), Commissioner Hartigan, also referring to George v Rockett, held:

In George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 112, the High Court considered the term "reasonable grounds" for a state of mind including suspicion, as follows:

When a statute prescribes that there must be "reasonable grounds" for a state of mind – including suspicion and belief - it requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person.

The New South Wales Industrial Commission in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (New South Wales Branch) v Acciona Infrastructure Australia Pty Ltd & Anor ("Acciona") when considering a similar provision of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW), had regard to the following authorities:

  1. 65.
    In R v Rondo, an authority relied upon by both parties, the Court of Criminal Appeal considered the term "reasonably suspects" in the context of section 357E of the Crimes Act 1990 which was, at the time of those proceedings, in the following terms:

357E A member of the police force may stop, search and detain:

  1. (a)
    any person whom he or she reasonably suspects of having or conveying any thing stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained or any thing used or intended to be used in the commission of an indictable offence; or
  1. (b)
    any vehicle in which he or she reasonably suspects there is any thing stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained or any thing used or intended to be used in the commission of an indictable offence.
  1. 66.
    After considering the authorities cited in Streat v Bauer; Streat v Blanco (unreported, Supreme court, NSW, Smart J, Nos 13686, 13687 of 1996, 16 March 1998) Smart AJ stated as follows at:
  1. 53
    These propositions emerge:
  1. (a)
    A reasonable suspicion involves less than a reasonable belief but more than a possibility. There must be something which would create more than a possibility. There must be something which would create in the mind of a reasonable person an apprehension of fear of one of the state of affairs covered by s. 357E. A reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to consider or look into the possibility of its existence.
  1. (b)
    Reasonable suspicion is not arbitrary. Some factual basis for the suspicion must be show. A suspicion may be based on hearsay material or materials which may be inadmissible in evidence. The materials must have some probative value.
  1. (c)
    What is important is the information in the mind of the police officer stopping the person or the vehicle or making the arrest at the time he did so. Having ascertained that information the question is whether that information afforded reasonable grounds for the suspicion which the police officer formed. In answering that question regard must be had to the source of the information and its content, seen in the light of the whole of the surrounding circumstances.

After considering these authorities, the New South Wales Industrial Commission concluded that:

  1. 67.
    In the present matter, the question to be answered was whether or not there was some factual basis, some material or materials with probative value, which would create in the mind of a reasonable person a suspicion that Pacifico had contravened, or was contravening, s 19 of the WHS Act by failing to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the psychological health of workers engaged on the Site.

I propose to adopt a similar approach in this matter. I will consider whether or not there was some factual basis or material/s with probative value which would create, in the mind of a reasonable person, a suspicion that Enco had contravened, or was contravening, s 19 of the WHS Act.

(Emphasis added)[78]

  1. [120]
    In Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service),[79] Deputy President Merrell considered the concept of 'reasonable belief' as:
  1. [28]
    When a statute prescribes that there must be reasonable grounds for a state of mind, including suspicion or belief, it require the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person.[80]
  1. [121]
    It is clear that whilst a suspicion is more than a 'possibility', it is less than a 'probability'. 
  1. [122]
    The PS Act provides that natural justice is not required if the person is entitled to normal remuneration during the suspension.[81]  For the reasons above, I do not accept that the chief executive can be satisfied at this time, to the required standard, that the Appellant will probably be subject to discipline - when he is yet been heard on the substantive allegation by either the Respondent or the court. 
  1. [123]
    In all the circumstances, I find the 'fair and reasonable' approach is to continue the suspension with pay.

Was the Respondent's decision fair and reasonable?

  1. [124]
    In deciding this question, I have first considered the mandatory requirements of the PS Act.
  1. [125]
    The Respondent's submission and correspondence filed reveals the extent of its consideration of the various factors set out in the PS Act and Suspension Directive.
  1. [126]
    However my determination of what is 'fair and reasonable' has departed from the Respondents, with respect to the relative weight that reason and fairness dictate should be attributed to the various factors considered. 
  1. [127]
    Ultimately, I have found that the Respondent's decision to suspend the Appellant without pay was not fair and reasonable.  In arriving at this conclusion, the factors below are relevant.
  1. [128]
    The very serious nature of the (as yet untested) allegation against the Appellant is acknowledged.  Although no internal process has been initiated as yet, the Queensland Police Service (QPS) has charged the Appellant and an external process is underway.
  1. [129]
    However, the 'reasonable suspicion' of the police officer is not the same as the required 'reasonable belief' of the chief executive. 'Reasonable belief' is a higher bar than 'reasonable suspicion' and cannot be outsourced by the chief executive to the QPS.
  1. [130]
    On the balance of probabilities, I have found that the Appellant was not afforded the proper 'opportunity to be heard' ahead of the decision to suspend him without pay.  In doing so, I consider that the mandatory requirement for procedural 'natural justice' has not been adequately discharged - and so the appeal must succeed.
  1. [131]
    While I have found that the Respondent did adequately meet the mandatory requirement to consider all alternative duties that may be available for the employee to perform, I would urge it to continue to periodically review whether there is any such meaningful work available for the Appellant to perform independently from home, that may utilise his considerable experience, skill and qualifications.  Such encouragement would extend to the Respondent's active consultation with the Appellant and his representative. 
  1. [132]
    I agree though that the Appellant cannot work with students or in school settings whilst the allegation against him remains unresolved.  That is clear.
  1. [133]
    The Appellant has submitted that the financial impact of the decision to suspend him without pay would have dire consequences on he and his family.  Although the Appellant is permitted to apply to access any leave accruals and / or seek alternate employment with an entity other than the Queensland Government,[82] I do not consider this an adequate mitigation of the financial impact of 'suspension without pay'.
  1. [134]
    The Respondent has submitted that while this 'financial impact' factor was considered, it is not the only factor which it must take into consideration.  While that is of course true, it is nonetheless another point of difference between the Respondent's rationale of what is 'fair and reasonable' and my own. 
  1. [135]
    Fairness and reasonability dictate that, in this instance, greater weight should be placed on the 'financial impact' of any decision to suspend the Appellant without pay.  In his current circumstances, the likelihood of securing any alternative, private sector employment holds significant challenge. 
  1. [136]
    My judgement of what is 'fair and reasonable' in this case is also informed by the fact that the allegation against the Appellant has not yet been tested.  Whilst the QPS have laid charges, all that is required for that to occur is that the police officer "reasonably suspects" a person has committed an offence. As Smart AJ observed "A reasonable suspicion involves less than a reasonable belief but more than a possibility."[83]  Further, no internal investigation has commenced. 
  1. [137]
    Fundamentally, I am disturbed by the prospect that the Appellant's capacity to provide for his family would be so significantly impacted, in the absence of having any (external or internal) opportunity to be heard on the allegation to date. 
  1. [138]
    It is apparent to me that - regardless of the fact that 'suspension without pay' is characterised as an 'administration action' - the end result is that the Appellant would be lurched into dire straits financially and denied the income he relies on to support his family for an undefined period. 
  1. [139]
    However the 'suspension without pay' may be intended, it is a relevant consideration to what is a 'fair and reasonable' outcome that the Appellant has not yet been heard on the allegation.
  1. [140]
    I also note that the Respondent has in this case determined to suspend the Appellant without pay proximate to the events of the charge, the listing and the suspension of his teacher registration.  That is less favourable treatment than extended to either Mr Thomson or Mr Baskin, in two of the cases referred to earlier in this decision.  For example, in Thomson,[84] the Appellant was suspended without pay almost 7 months after being charged and having his Blue Card suspended.  (In that earlier case, Mr Thomson was found 'not guilty' by a jury two months later).  In Deputy President Merrell's recent decision in Baskin,[85] it was shown that the Appellant in that case was suspended without pay almost a year after being charged and having his teacher registration suspended.  The timing of the Respondent's decisions to 'suspend without remuneration' in those two recent examples are more favourable than that extended to the Appellant here.
  1. [141]
    The Respondent stated that their internal investigation had not yet commenced.  Further, that this cannot progress until the matter of the charge is resolved.  Those are presented as reasons 'why' the Department's internal process cannot be concluded in a timely way due to the existence of external factors beyond their control.
  1. [142]
    Other than the submission that the time taken to conclude any such processes would be lengthy, no estimation or projection of any timeframe for the conclusion of these were submitted by the parties.  It may indeed be lengthy.  It may not be.  On the material before me, I do not know.  In the time that has now elapsed since the show cause correspondence dated 3 February 2023, the charge has been listed in the Magistrates Court.[86]  I have no visibility over the outcome of that, if there was any.  In light of that, it is uncertain as to whether or not the processes can be concluded in a timely way. 
  1. [143]
    For these reasons, I do not share the Respondent's weighing of the significance of this factor in their decision to suspend the Appellant without pay.
  1. [144]
    The Respondent submitted that they have an obligation to manage public resources, according to the terms mandated in the PS Act.  This is certainly the case.
  1. [145]
    The Respondent's consideration is drawn from the PS Act 'management principles' provision below, which states (emphasis added):
  1. 25
    The management and employment principles
  1. (1)
    Public service management is to be directed towards—
  1. (a)
    providing responsive, effective and efficient services to the community and the Government; and
  2. (b)
    maintaining impartiality and integrity in informing, advising and assisting the Government; and
  3. (c)
    promoting collaboration between Government and non-government sectors in providing services to the community; and
  4. (d)
    continuously improving public service administration, performance management and service delivery; and
  5. (e)
    managing public resources efficiently, responsibly and in a fully accountable way; and
  6. (f)
    promoting the Government as an employer of choice; and
  7. (g)
    promoting equality of employment opportunity.
  1. [146]
    As I have earlier observed, the Respondent's requirement to manage public resources efficiently may in fact inspire deeper exploration of alternative duties or meaningful work the Appellant may undertake, to yield some return on the wages paid to him in this uncertain period.
  1. [147]
    Equally as important, though, are the following provisions addressing the 'employment principles' contained in the PS Act.[87]  These state that (emphasis added):
  1. (2)
    Public service employment is to be directed towards promoting—
  1. (a)
    best practice human resource management; and
  2. (b)
    equitable and flexible working environments in which all public service employees are—
  1. (i)
    treated fairly and reasonably; and
  2. (ii)
    remunerated at rates appropriate to their responsibilities; and
  1. (c)
    a diverse and highly skilled workforce drawing from Government and non-government sectors.
  1. [148]
    The obligation on the Respondent under this provision is not a one-sided consideration. For this reason, I do not share the Respondent's weighing of the significance of this factor in its decision to suspend the Appellant without pay.
  1. [149]
    The Respondent stated that it also considered "the perception of the public" if the Appellant continued to be paid while the matter remained unresolved.
  1. [150]
    In a scenario where the Appellant was already found to have engaged in the conduct that is subject of the allegation, this factor would demand heightened significance. However, that is not what has happened here.
  1. [151]
    People are presumed innocent until the required standard of proof has been discharged to determine otherwise. The proceedings may yet exonerate the Appellant. We do not know.
  1. [152]
    For these reasons, the Respondent's decision to suspend the Appellant without pay was not fair and reasonable.

Conclusion

  1. [153]
    In summary, the Respondent's decision to change the terms of the Appellant's suspension was somewhat hasty and premature.
  1. [154]
    Should the external proceeding progress, the likely timeframes inherent in resolving the allegation may be clearer at that time. This may enable a more measured assessment of what is 'fair and reasonable' at some later juncture.
  1. [155]
    If it happens that the charge is not proceeded with, all that remains is for the Respondent to conduct its own internal processes, over which it does have control.
  1. [156]
    In light of all the circumstances, I have found that the Appellant's suspension without pay was not fair and reasonable. That does not disturb the original decision to suspend the Appellant, only that such suspension is to continue on normal remuneration.
  1. [157]
    I order accordingly.

Orders:

That pursuant to s 562C(1)(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld):

  1. 1.
    The appeal is allowed.
  1. 2.
    The decision of 28 February 2023 is set aside and another decision is substituted.
  1. 3.
    The Appellant is returned to suspension on normal remuneration, effective from 28 February 2023.
  1. 4.
    The Respondent is to reimburse the Appellant for the normal remuneration he has been deprived of from 28 February 2023.

Footnotes

[1]Respondent's submissions filed 31 March 2023, 1 [5].

[2]Ibid [6].

[3]Respondent's submissions filed 31 March 2023, Attachment 2, 1-2.

[4]Ibid, Attachment 3, 2.

[5]Ibid, Attachment 4, 2.

[6]Appeal Notice filed 20 March 2023, Attachment 2, 1 [3].

[7]Respondent's submissions filed 31 March 2023, 2 [11].

[8]Ibid, Attachment 5.

[9]Appeal Notice filed 20 March 2023, Attachment 2, 1 [5].

[10]Respondent's submissions filed 31 March 2023, 2 [13].

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid [15].

[13]Ibid, 3 [17].

[14]This directive has since been superseded by Directive 06/23 Suspension.

[15]Equivalent provision in the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) was s 194.

[16]Equivalent provision in the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) was s 137.

[17]Equivalent provision in the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) was s 187.

[18]Respondent's submissions filed 31 March 2023, Attachment 6, 2.

[19]Appeal Notice filed 20 March 2023, Attachment 2, 5 [36].

[20]Thomson v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 402, [63].

[21]Ibid.

[22]Respondent's submissions filed 31 March 2023, Attachment 7.

[23]Ibid 4 [23].

[24]Equivalent provision in the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) was s 137.

[25]Respondent's submissions filed 31 March 2023, [6].

[26]Equivalent provision in the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) was s 137(4).

[27]Public Service Commission's Guide, Manage Employee Suspensions cl 3 ‘Suspension without pay'.

[28]Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 137(4); Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 101(4).

[29]Appeal Notice filed 20 March 2023, Attachment 1, 1.

[30]Though not "limited to".

[31]Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, [11], [15], [33].

[32]Ibid [33].

[33]Russell v Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 All ER 109, 118.

[34]Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475, 504.

[35]Ainsworth and Anor v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564, [29].

[36]Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 190.

[37]28 February 2023.

[38]Directive 16/20 Suspension cl 6.4.

[39]Appeal Notice filed 20 March 2023, Attachment 2, 2 [13].

[40]Ibid, Attachment 1, 2 [3].

[41]Respondent's submissions filed 31 March 2023, 2 [13]-[14].

[42]Ibid, Attachment 4.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid, Attachment 3.

[45]13 February 2023.

[46]Respondent's Submissions filed 31 March 2023, Attachment 7.

[47]Appeal Notice filed 20 March 2023, Attachment 2, 1 [6].

[48]Appeal Notice filed 20 March 2023, Attachment 2, 5 [36].

[49]Appeal Notice filed 20 March 2023, Attachment 1, 6.

[50]Public Service Commission Information Guide: Employee Suspensions 29 April 2020.

[51][2022] QIRC 402.

[52]Thomson v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 402, [63].

[53]Respondent's submissions filed 31 March 2023, Attachment 6.

[54][2022] QIRC 154.

[55][2022] QIRC 349.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Respondent's submissions filed 31 March 2023, Attachment 6, 1.

[58]Directive 16/20 Suspension cl 5.2.

[59]Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 137(3).

[60]Appeal Notice filed 20 March 2023, Attachment 1, 3.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 101; equivalent provision in the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) was s 137.

[63]Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) s 191.

[64]Ibid s 121.

[65]Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), ss 365, 369, 370, 371, 382.

[66]Streat v Bauer; Streat v Blanco (unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Smart J, Nos 13686, 13687 of 1996, 16 March 1998) [53].

[67]Growthbuilt Pty Ltd v SafeWork NSW [2018] NSWIRComm 1002 [96].

[68]Ibid [94]-[95].

[69][2022] QIRC 154.

[70]Ibid [39].

[71]Ibid.

[72]Ibid [38].

[73]'AB’ had been charged with sexual offences against a minor.

[74]AB v The State of Queensland, Supreme Court, Brisbane, 11:23 am, Friday 4 August 2017 (No 3805 of 2017) Daubney J [25]; Appeal Notice filed 20 March 2023, Attachment B, 4 [25]-[27].

[75]Supreme Court, Brisbane, 11:23 am, Friday 4 August 2017 (No 3805 of 2017) Daubney J.

[76]Effective 1 March 2023.

[77][2022] QIRC 456.

[78]Darling Downs Hospital and Health Service v The Regulator (under the Work Health and Safety Act) [2022] QIRC 456, citing Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (No. 2) [2019] QIRC 133; Growthbuilt Pty Ltd v WorkSafe NSW [2018] NSWIRComm 1002; ENCO PRECAST PTY LTD v Construction Forestry, Mining and Energy Union & Ors [2020] QIRC 188.

[79][2022] QIRC 018.

[80]Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 018, citing George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104, 112 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).

[81]Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 137(10); Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 101(10).

[82]Subject to conditions.

[83]Streat v Bauer; Streat v Blanco (unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Smart J, Nos 13686, 13687 of 1996, 16 March 1998) [53].

[84][2022] QIRC 402.

[85][2022] QIRC 349.

[86]14 February 2023.

[87]Public Sector Act 2008 (Qld) s 25(2).

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Philp v State of Queensland (Department of Education)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Philp v State of Queensland (Department of Education)

  • MNC:

    [2023] QIRC 219

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    McLennan IC

  • Date:

    28 Jul 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992) 175 CLR 564
Baskin v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 349
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 349
BR v State of Queensland (No. 2) [2022] QIRC 154
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 154
Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 18
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 18
Darling Downs Hospital and Health Service v The Regulator (under the Work Health and Safety Act) [2022] QIRC 456
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 456
Enco Precast Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union [2020] QIRC 188
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 188
George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) 170 CLR 104
Cite 2 - (1990) 170 CLR 104
George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1990] HCA 26
Cite 2 - [1990] HCA 26
Growthbuilt Pty Ltd v Safe Work NSW [2018] NSWIRComm 1002
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] NSWIRComm 1002
Kioa v West (1985) 159 C.L.R 550
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1985) 159 C.L.R 550
Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1963) 113 CLR 475
Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v The Regulator under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (No 2) [2019] QIRC 133
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 133
Russell v Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 All ER 109
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1949) 1 All ER 109
Thomson v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 402
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 402

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Bah v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2025] QIRC 963 citations
Colebrook v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2025] QIRC 532 citations
Philp v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2025] QIRC 557 citations
Wearne v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2025] QIRC 872 citations
1

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