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Queensland Police Union of Employees v HSFirst Inc. (No. 2)[2023] QIRC 284

Queensland Police Union of Employees v HSFirst Inc. (No. 2)[2023] QIRC 284

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Queensland Police Union of Employees v HSFirst Inc. (No. 2) [2023] QIRC 284

PARTIES:

Queensland Police Union of Employees

(Applicant)

v

HSFirst Inc. trading as Sworn Officers' Association of Australia (SOPAA)

(First Respondent)

and

HSFirst Inc. trading as Sworn Officers' Association of Queensland (SOPAQ)

(Second Respondent)

CASE NO.:

B/2022/49

PROCEEDING:

Applications for various orders

DELIVERED ON:

3 October 2023

HEARING DATE:

9 June 2023

MEMBERS:

Merrell DP

Pidgeon IC

Power IC

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

ORDERS:

The orders contained in paragraph [122] of these reasons for decision.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATIONS – Applicant is an organisation registered under the Industrial Relations Act 2016 with the right to represent the industrial interests of certain employees in the Queensland Police Service –  Respondent is an incorporated association which trades under various business names – Applicant applied for declaratory relief, final injunctive relief and other orders including that the Respondent does not have the right to represent employees who are eligible for membership of the Applicant –  whether declarations as sought by the Applicant may and should be made where the Respondent consents to the declarations sought – whether a representation order and an ancillary order as sought by the Applicant should be made where the Respondent consents to the orders sought – whether the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission has power to grant an injunction, pursuant to s 473(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, to restrain the  Respondent as sought by the Applicant  – no power of the Commission, pursuant to s 473(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, to grant an injunction against the Respondent – whether a costs order should be made in favour of the Applicant against the Respondent pursuant to s 545(2)(a)(i) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – Respondent's response to the Applicant's application is not one that can be described as being vexatious or made without reasonable cause – no costs order made in favour of the Applicant against the Respondent.

STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT INTERPRETATION – construction of s 473(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – principles of construction of statutes – power of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission to grant an injunction within the meaning of s 473(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – whether use of the word 'may' in s 473(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 does not limit the identity of the persons to whom an injunction may apply – no power of the Commission, pursuant to s 473(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, to grant an injunction against the Respondent having regard to the construction of s 473(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016.

LEGISLATION AND OTHER

INSTRUMENTS:

Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s 14A

Brisbane City Council Determination 2023, cl 16, cl 28 and sch 5

Fair Work Act 2009, s 12 and s 570

Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 7, s 8, s 9, s 12, s 13, s 152, s 153, s 164, s 165, s 166, s 167, s 261, s 262 s 265, s 278, s 295, s 348, s 349, s 350, s 389, s 463,  s 473, s 474, s 479, s 481, s 482, s 483, s 527, s 529, s 545, s 596, s 602, s 978, s 979, s 1100, sch 1 and sch 5

Industrial Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2022, s 33, s 34 s 35, s 48, s 52A, s 65 and sch 1

Public Health Act 1902-1952 (NSW), s 66

Queensland Police Service Certified Agreement 2022, cl 27, 64 and 88

Queensland Police Service Employees Award – State 2016, cl 7, cl 11 and cl 22

Workers' Compensation Act 1916-1978, s 4

CASES:

Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2) [2022] ICQ 019

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v iSelect Limited [2020] FCA 1523

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 56; (2012) 201 FCR 378

Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 278

Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [1999] HCA 9; (1999) 198 CLR 334

Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503

Foris GFS Australia Pty Ltd v Manivel [2022] VSC 482; (2022) 67 VR 561

Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd [1972] HCA 61; (1972) 127 CLR 421

Gilbert v Metro North Health and Hospital Service and Ors (No 2) [2023] ICQ 20

Kelsey v Logan City Council and Ors [2021] ICQ 11

Messenger v Commonwealth of Australia (Represented by the Department of Finance) (No 2) [2023] FCA 20

Northern Territory v Collins [2008] HCA 49; (2008) 235 CLR 619

Pirmax Pty Ltd v Kingspan Insulation Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 1340

Project Blue Sky Inc. v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355

Queensland Police Union of Employees v HSFirst Inc. [2023] QIRC 030

R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 269 CLR 507

R v The Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland; ex parte Heffernan [1979] Qd. R 563

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362

Ward v Williams [1955] HCA 4; (1955) 92 CLR 496

APPEARANCES:

Mr P. McCafferty KC and Mr. H Clift of Counsel instructed by Hall Payne Lawyers for the Applicant.

Mr M. Williams of Counsel instructed by Saines Legal for the Respondent.

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    The background to this matter is set out in our decision in Queensland Police Union of Employees v HSFirst Inc. ('HSFirst Inc. No. 1').[1] These reasons assume familiarity with paragraphs [1]-[3] of that decision.
  1. [2]
    Unless otherwise stated, in these reasons, we will use the defined terms as used in HSFirst Inc. No. 1.
  1. [3]
    The four issues for our determination are:
  • whether, pursuant to s 463(1) of the IR Act, we should make the declarations  sought by the QPUE ('the declaratory relief sought');
  • whether, pursuant to s 479(c) of the IR Act, we should make the representation order sought by the QPUE and whether, pursuant to s 483(1)(c) of the IR Act, we should make the related ancillary order sought by the QPUE ('the representation orders sought');
  • whether, pursuant to s 473(1) of the IR Act, we should grant the injunctions sought by the QPUE ('the injunctive relief sought'); and
  • whether, pursuant to s 545(2)(a)(i) of the IR Act, we can and should make a costs order in favour of the QPUE.
  1. [4]
    For the reasons that follow, we will:
  • pursuant to s 463(1) of the IR Act, make declarations of the kind sought by the QPUE;
  • pursuant to s 479(c) of the IR Act, make the representation order sought by the QPUE and, pursuant to s 483(1)(c) of the IR Act, make the related ancillary order sought by the QPUE;
  • dismiss the QPUE's application for the injunctive relief sought; and
  • make no order as to costs.

Events following the decision in HSFirst Inc. No. 1

  1. [5]
    In our decision in HSFirst Inc. No. 1, HSFirst was ordered to file and serve a further response to the QPUE's Statement of Facts and Contentions and the QPUE was ordered to file a reply to HSFirst's further response.[2]
  1. [6]
    On 21 February 2023, HSFirst filed a further response. No reply was filed by the QPUE.
  1. [7]
    On 13 March 2023, the QPUE made an application that amended an earlier application it had made[3] for HSFirst to give disclosure of certain documents. On 14 March 2023, directions were made for the determination of that amended application for disclosure, to be heard on 9 June 2023.
  1. [8]
    However, on 28 April 2023, HSFirst filed a Second Amended Response to the QPUE's Statement of Facts and Contentions ('HSFirst's Second Amended Response'). By its second amended response, HS First:
  • did not oppose the grant of the relief sought by the QPUE in paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of the schedule to its substantive application filed on 17 June 2022 ('the QPUE's substantive application'), namely:
  1. –
    pursuant to s 473 of the IR Act, a declaration that HSFirst '… in respect of either business name, or at all' is not an employee organisation or an industrial association for the purposes of the IR Act, or a trade union;
  2. –
    pursuant to s 479(c) of the IR Act, an order that HSFirst does not have the right to represent employees who are eligible for membership of the QPUE; and
  3. –
    pursuant to s 483(1)(c) of the IR Act, an ancillary order prohibiting HSFirst from holding out membership on the basis of it being able to provide representation in stated industrial matters, being industrial matters  as defined in s 9 of the IR Act and sch 1 to the IR Act;[4]
  • resisted the making of injunctions as sought in paragraphs 2 and 3 of schedule 1 to the QPUE's substantive application, namely, pursuant to s 473 of the IR Act, injunctions to restrain HSFirst, and its officers, employees, servants and/or agents, '… in respect of either business name, or at all', from holding itself out:
  1. –
    as an employee organisation or an industrial association for the purposes of the IR Act, or a trade union; and
  2. –
    as an alternative union to the QPUE in respect of its eligibility.[5]
  1. [9]
    HSFirst contended that the Commission has no power to grant the injunctive relief sought by the QPUE because it is not an 'organisation' within the meaning of the IR Act.[6]
  1. [10]
    As a consequence of HSFirst's Second Amended Response, there was agreement between the parties that the amended disclosure application by the QPUE did not need to be determined, and that the hearing scheduled for 9 June 2023 would be used to determine the QPUE's substantive application.
  1. [11]
    A further issue for determination is whether we would order that HSFirst pays the QPUE's costs of the proceeding as sought by the QPUE.

The declaratory relief sought

  1. [12]
    By paragraphs 15C(a) and (b) of HSFirst's second amended response, it:
  • agrees that the Commission's jurisdiction to make a declaration under s 463 of the Act is enlivened; and
  • consents to the Commission making a declaration of the kind sought by the QPUE in schedule 1, paragraph 1 of its substantive application.
  1. [13]
    QPUE submitted that while declarations are not just for the asking, because the purpose of a declaration is to quell controversies, declarations may be made on an agreed factual situation.[7]
  1. [14]
    In support of that submission, the QPUE referred[8] to Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd ('Bass'),[9] where the majority[10] stated:
  1. 45
    The purpose of a judicial determination has been described in varying ways. But central to those descriptions is the notion that such a determination includes a conclusive or final decision based on a concrete and established or agreed situation which aims to quell a controversy. In R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd, Kitto J said:

"[J]udicial power involves, as a general rule, a decision settling for the future, as between defined persons or classes of persons, a question as to the existence of a right or obligation, so that an exercise of the power creates a new charter by reference to which that question is in future to be decided as between those persons or classes of persons ... [T]he process to be followed must generally be an inquiry concerning the law as it is and the facts as they are, followed by an application of the law as determined to the facts as determined; and the end to be reached must be an act which ... entitles and obliges the persons between whom it intervenes, to observance of the rights and obligations that the application of law to facts has shown to exist."

  1. [15]
    We are of the view that the position of HSFirst in relation to the declaratory relief sought goes further than an '… agreed situation' in the sense referred to above in the passage from Bass.  This is because HSFirst actually consents to the making of the declarations sought by the QPUE.
  1. [16]
    In general terms, it has been held that a party seeking a declaration should secure a contradictor.[11] However, the requirement of a contradictor may be met where there is a party who has a genuine interest in opposing the declaratory relief sought, whether or not that party chooses to oppose the granting of that relief.[12]
  1. [17]
    The purpose of s 463 of the IR Act is to make a declaration to resolve genuine controversies about industrial matters.[13] The matter between the parties meets that description because the QPUE contends that:
  • HSFirst is not a body registered or recognised under the IR Act, is not a trade union or is not an alternative to the QPUE;[14] and
  • it is an organisation, within the meaning of the Act, which can enrol police officers into its membership.[15]
  1. [18]
    HSFirst initially resisted the QPUE's substantive application for declaratory relief, but now consents to the making of the declarations sought. There was a controversy between the two parties. Despite that HSFirst now consents to the declaratory relief sought, it is still a contradictor. Thus, the fact that it now does not oppose the declaratory relief being sought is not, on its own, a reason the relief sought should not be granted.
  1. [19]
    There are five other matters for our consideration.
  1. [20]
    First, the facts referred to in the QPUE's Statement of Facts and Contentions[16] and the admissions made in HSFirst's Second Amended Response[17] provide a sufficient factual foundation for the making of the declarations sought.[18]
  1. [21]
    Secondly, in Pirmax Pty Ltd v Kingspan Insulation Pty Ltd ('Pirmax'),[19] Snaden J stated of the power of the Federal Court of Australia to grant binding declarations:
  1. 386
    The court’s power to grant binding declarations of right is found in s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).  As with the court’s power to grant injunctive relief, the discretion there conferred is very wide.  It should “…be exercised ‘sparingly,’ with ‘great care and jealousy,’ with ‘extreme caution,’ [and] with ‘the utmost caution’” and, at all events, with “…a proper sense of responsibility and a full realisation that judicial pronouncements ought not to be issued unless there are circumstances that call for their making”:  Ibeneweka v Egbuna [1964] 1 WLR 219, 224-225 (Viscount Radcliffe, Guest and Upjohn LLJ); Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 (“Ainsworth”), 596 (Brennan J).
  2. 387
    Declaratory relief will rarely, if ever, be appropriate unless it can be said that there is some utility to be realised by granting it:  Ainsworth, 582 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 591, 613 [52] (Gaudron J); Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Ltd v Ancient Order of Foresters in Victoria Friendly Society Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 99, [3] (Allsop CJ, Middleton and Davies JJ).
  1. [22]
    On 3 November 2022, pt 2, div 2 of the Industrial Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2022 commenced operation. That division amended s 529 of the Act which deals with representation in proceedings under the IR Act or another Act before the Industrial Court of Queensland, the Commission, an Industrial Magistrates Court or the Industrial Registrar.[20] As a consequence of that amendment, s 529 of the IR Act now provides:
  1. 529
    Representation of parties generally
  1. A party to proceedings, or a person ordered or permitted to appear or to be represented in the proceedings, may be represented in the proceedings by–
  1. a lawyer, only in accordance with section 530; or
  1. an employee or officer of an organisation appointed in writing as the agent of the party or person; or
  1. if the party or person is an organisation–an employee, officer or member of the organisation; or
  1. if the party or person is an employer–an employee or officer of the employer; or
  1. another person appointed in writing as the agent of the party or person, only with the leave of the industrial tribunal conducting the proceedings.
  1. However, a party or person may not be represented under subsection (1)(e) by a person who–
  1. directly or indirectly demands or receives a fee for representing the party or person; or
  1. is an employee or officer of, or acting for, an entity (other than an organisation) that purports to represent the industrial interests of employees or employers.
  1. The industrial tribunal may give leave under subsection (1)(e) only if–
  1. giving leave would enable the proceedings to be dealt with more efficiently, having regard to the complexity of the matter; or
  1. it would be unfair not to allow the party or person to be represented because the party or person is unable to represent itself, himself or herself; or
  1. it would be unfair not to allow the party or person to be represented having regard to fairness between the party or person, and other parties or persons in the  proceedings.
  1. In this section–

industrial tribunal means the Court of Appeal, court, full bench or commission or an Industrial Magistrates Court.

proceedings–

  1. means proceedings under this Act or another Act being conducted by the court, the commission, an Industrial Magistrates Court or the registrar; and
  1. includes conciliation being conducted under part 3, division 4 or part 5, division 5A by a conciliator.
  1. [23]
    Assuming, without deciding, that HSFirst would be an entity of the kind described in                s 529(2) of the IR Act, its employees or officers would now not be able to represent a party to proceedings or a person ordered or permitted to appear or to be represented in proceedings.
  1. [24]
    Despite this, we are of the view that there is utility in granting  declaratory relief of the kind sought by the QPUE. This is because the declaratory relief sought by the QPUE goes beyond the matter of representation in proceedings before an industrial tribunal.
  1. [25]
    The declaratory relief sought goes to the controversy about the correct description of HSFirst and, therefore, its role in a regulated system of industrial relations which is based upon, in part, the registration of organisations of employers and employees which expressly recognises their role as participants in that system. Such recognition includes, by way of two examples:
  • registered organisations being able to start proceedings in the Industrial Court or in the Commission;[21]and
  • the officers or employees of registered employee organisations having the right to enter relevant workplaces to inspect time and wages records of employees.[22]
  1. [26]
    Thirdly, we have given consideration as to whether, as a matter of discretion, the declaratory relief sought should be granted if we did decide to make the representation orders sought.
  1. [27]
    In Pirmax,[23] Snaden J also relevantly stated in respect of the need for utility in the granting of declaratory relief:
  1. 388
    Such utility might be said to be lacking in circumstances where other relief is granted in respect of the conduct that is sought to be made the subject of a declaration:  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Francis (2004) 142 FCR 1, 33 [98] (Gray J); Grant v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 1374, [45] (Collier J).
  1. [28]
    In this regard, we are of the view the declaratory relief sought should be granted.
  1. [29]
    Again, the nature of the effect of the declaratory relief sought is different to that of the representation order sought.  In respect of the former, the declarations sought resolve the controversy by declaring that HSFirst is not an employee organisation or industrial association within the meaning of the IR Act, or a trade union. The latter specifically goes to a determination by us, upon our consideration of the matters referred to in s 481 and s 482 of the IR Act, as to whether HSFirst does not have the right to represent a particular group of employees (predominately, Queensland police officers) who are eligible for membership of the QPUE.
  1. [30]
    Fourthly, we initially had some reservation about declaring that HSFirst was not '… a trade union.' The term 'trade union' only appears in s 295(1) of the IR Act which provides that an employer must not take adverse action against a  person who is an employee or prospective employee because of the person's '… trade union activity.'
  1. [31]
    However, the facts admitted by HSFirst[24] include that:
  • since the time of incorporation, the objects of HSFirst included that to '… secure satisfactory remuneration and working conditions' for its members;[25]
  • on 27 October 2021, the constitution of HSFirst was amended to describe it as being '… a not for profit professional body representing the interests of Police Officers in Australia';[26] and
  • HSFirst holds itself out as belonging to the '… Red Union Group' and the 'Red Union Support Hub'.[27]
  1. [32]
    We are of the view that, in ordinary Australian parlance, a 'trade union' means a group of employees who have formed a collective for the predominate purpose of improving their wages or salaries and their conditions of employment.[28] These purposes are clearly part of the objects of HSFirst when it comes to its members who are police officers.
  1. [33]
    Further, HSFirst's association with the 'Red Union Group' clearly identifies it as, at least,  a union. For these reasons, it is likely that an employee in the Queensland Police Service, who is eligible for membership of HSFirst, may well consider that HSFirst is a trade union as we have described, despite the fact that HSFirst is not an organisation for the purposes of the system of industrial relations established under the IR Act.
  1. [34]
    As a consequence, we will make a declaration that HSFirst is not a trade union.
  1. [35]
    Fifthly, HSFirst contended that there was no utility in making the declaration that it is not an 'industrial association' for the purposes of the IR Act, because that term has been removed as a defined term in the IR Act and no longer appears in the IR Act in any relevant context to the present matter.[29]
  1. [36]
    It is true that from 3 November 2022, the definition of 'industrial association' for the purposes of ch 8, pt 1 of the IR Act, was removed.[30] That phrase does not now appear in the IR Act in any relevant context.[31]
  1. [37]
    For these reasons, there is no utility in making a declaration that HSFirst is not an industrial association for the purposes of the IR Act.
  1. [38]
    We will make the declarations sought by the QPUE other than in respect of declaring that HSFirst, by either of its business names, is not an industrial association.

The representation order sought

  1. [39]
    By paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Schedule to its substantive application, the QPUE seeks:
  1. 4.
    Pursuant to s 479(c) of the Act, an order that the respondent does not have the right to represent employees who are eligible for membership of the applicant.
  2. 5.
    Pursuant to s 483(1)(c) of the Act, an ancillary order prohibiting the respondent from holding out membership on the basis of being able to provide representation in stated industrial matters, being Industrial Matters as defined in s 9 and schedule 1 to the Act.
  1. [40]
    At the time the QPUE's substantive application was made, s 479 of the IR Act provided:
  1. 479
    Power of full bench to make orders about rights of associations or employee organisations to represent

On application by an entity under section 480, the full bench may make the following orders about a demarcation dispute-

  1. an order that an employee organisation has the right, to the exclusion of an association or another organisation, to represent a particular group of employees who are eligible for membership of the organisation;
  1. an order that an employee organisation that does not have the right to represent a particular group of employees has the right;
  1. an order that an association or employee organisation does not have the right to represent a particular group of employees who are eligible for membership of the organisation.
  1. [41]
    Section 483 of the IR Act relevantly provided:
  1. 483
    Orders and ancillary orders
  1. If the full bench makes an order under this subdivision, it may also make an ancillary order it considers necessary to support the order, including an order prohibiting–
  1. an officer or employee of an association or organisation from representing a person in a matter before the court, the commission, the full bench or the registrar; and
  1. an association or organisation from arranging for an agent to represent a person in relation to making an agreement under chapter 6; and
  1. an association or organisation from holding out membership on the basis of being able to provide representation in stated industrial matters.
  1. An order under this subdivision, and an ancillary order, may–
  1. be subject to conditions; and
  1. apply to an individual, an association or an organisation.
  1. The full bench may, on application by the Minister or a person or organisation affected by an order, make the further order it considers appropriate to ensure the order, an ancillary order and this Act are complied with.
  1. An individual, association or organisation to which an order mentioned in subsection (2) or (3) applies must comply with the order.

Maximum penalty—100 penalty units.[32]

  1. [42]
    HSFirst accepts that the QPUE is an organisation within the meaning of the Act and is eligible to apply for an order under s 479 of the IR Act.[33] Further, HSFirst admits the existence of a demarcation dispute between it and the QPUE.[34] By paragraph 34B of HSFirst's Second Amended Response, it consents to the grant of relief sought in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the schedule to the QPUE's substantive application.
  1. [43]
    Given the stage to which the proceedings have advanced and HSFirst's admission of a demarcation dispute, we:
  • consider conciliation proceedings would not help the settlement of the dispute;[35] and
  • are satisfied that HSFirst has made representations directed at employees, about it having rights, functions or powers in relation to employees under the IR Act, that it does not have.[36]
  1. [44]
    Further, s 482 of the IR Act provided:
  1. 482
    Matters the full bench must consider in making order

In considering whether to make an order, the full bench must consider–

  1. the wishes of employees who would be affected by the order; and
  1. the effect of an order on the operations (including operating costs, work practices, efficiency and productivity) of the employees’ employer; and
  1. whether it should consult with appropriate State peak councils or organisations; and
  1. the ability of the organisation to adequately represent the employees’ interests; and
  1. an agreement or understanding that deals with an employee organisation’s right to represent a particular group of employees; and
  1. the consequences of not making an order for the employees, employer or organisation; and
  1. another order made by the commission that it considers relevant.
  1. [45]
    Of the considerations contained in s 482 of the IR Act, given the facts of the present case, we think the only relevant matters are those contained in s 482(a), (d) and (f).
  1. [46]
    As to s 482(a) of the IR Act, by HSFirst's consent to the representation order sought by the QPUE, we infer that a larger number of relevant employees, eligible to join either the QPUE or HSFirst, are members of the QPUE. From that, we infer the wishes of the employees are in favour of the representation order being made in favour of the QPUE.
  1. [47]
    As to s 482(d) of the IR Act, the evidence is that the QPUE has been a registered organisation, for the purposes of Queensland industrial law, since 1917.[37] We take notice that the QPUE is an organisation that has the ability to adequately represent the interests of the employees affected by the order.
  1. [48]
    As to s 482(f) of the IR Act, the consequence for the QPUE of not making the order is that it would diminish its role as a registered organisation in the system of industrial relations established under the IR Act. 
  1. [49]
    For the reasons we have given in paragraphs [40]-[48], we will grant the relief sought by the QPUE.
  1. [50]
    Further, given the consent of HSFirst, we can see no reason why we would refrain from granting the ancillary order sought by the QPUE pursuant to s 483(1)(c) of the IR Act. In our view, such an order naturally supports our principal order that HS First does not have the right to represent employees who are eligible for membership of the QPUE.

The injunctive relief sought

  1. [51]
    Section 473 of the IR Act relevantly provides:
  1. 473
    Power to grant injunctions
  1. On application by a person under section 474, the commission may grant an injunction–
  1. to compel compliance with an industrial instrument, a permit or this Act; or
  1. to restrain or prevent a contravention, or continuance of a contravention, of an industrial instrument, a permit or this Act; or

…

  1. The injunction may apply to–
  1. the officers or members of an organisation generally; or
  1. particular officers or members of an organisation; or
  1. a particular employer; or
  2. a particular employee.
  1. [52]
    It is an issue between the parties as to whether the Commission has the power to grant the injunctive relief sought. This is because HSFirst is not an organisation within the meaning of the IR Act and, therefore, no injunction may apply to the officers or members of HSFirst generally, or to particular officers or members of HSFirst, as provided for in               s 473(2)(a) and (b) of the IR Act.
  1. [53]
    In its written submissions, the QPUE contended:
  • s 473(2) of the IR Act is expressed in permissive, non-exhaustive, language in that it provides that the injunction 'may' apply to certain legal persons, which is a strong textual indication that the Parliament did not intend the provision to be an exhaustive list of subjects;
  • the subject-matter an injunction is intended to address is broad in that s 473(1) of the IR Act empowers the Commission to grant an injunction to compel compliance with, among other things, the IR Act or to restrain or prevent a contravention of the IR Act, and because HSFirst admits those circumstances exist:
  1. –
    it would be a strange result, and inconsistent with the purpose of the IR Act, if an injunction could not be granted because HSFirst is not an organisation within the meaning of the IR Act; and
  2. –
    HSFirst should not be able to escape being compelled to comply with the IR Act simply because it is not registered ('the QPUE's non-registration submission');
  • having regard to the language of the other provision of that subdivision, s 473(2) of the IR Act should not be construed to be exhaustive, in that s 474(a) permits, for example, an application for an injunction to be made by a party to an industrial dispute;
  • on the construction for which HSFirst contends, the power to grant an injunction is limited '… to a smaller universe of subjects than those who have standing to seek an injunction' which is '… not a desirable construction';
  • the provision is, in truth, a remedial provision in that it grants power to the Commission to grant an injunction to compel compliance with the IR Act or to restrain a contravention of it and:
  1. –
    it should be construed to provide a complete remedy; and
  2. –
    a construction of s 473(2) of the IR Act which yields the most complete remedy is that it is not exhaustive; and
  • it follows that s 473(2) of the IR Act does not set out an exhaustive list of the subjects to which the Commission's injunction power applies.[38]
  1. [54]
    In oral submissions, the Union contended that:
  • it would be a curious feature, bearing in mind the remedial nature of an injunction, if a person could simply avoid the operation of the injunction provision of the IR Act, and avoid an order compelling it to comply with the IR Act, simply because it was not registered; and
  • such would be an absurd outcome which does not best achieve the purpose of the IR Act particularly where sections 448 and 450 of the IR Act confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Commission over matters arising out of an industrial matter and industrial disputes.[39]
  1. [55]
    HSFirst referred[40] to the Explanatory Notes to the Industrial Relations Bill 2016 which relevantly provided:

Subdivision 8 Injunctions

Clause 473 preserves section 277 of the IR Act and provides that the commission may issue an injunction, who may apply, who can be bound and that a person must comply with an injunction of the commission where they have received notice of it. The onus of proof for the defence to an allegation of contravention of an injunction by a registered organisation is reversed. The matters to be proved by the organisation would all be within the knowledge of the organisation. The clause provides a definition of organisation for use in this section that includes a branch of the organisation.[41]

  1. [56]
    In relation to the Explanatory Notes, HSFirst submitted:
  • the inclusion of:
  1. –
    the words '… who can be bound' in reference to an injunction granted pursuant to cl 473 in the Explanatory Notes makes it abundantly clear that the Parliament intended that s 473 of the IR Act exhaustively prescribe the persons who can be bound by an injunction;
  2. –
    a '… definition of organisation for use in this section that includes a branch of the organisation' would be superfluous if the Parliament did not intend          s 473 to prescribe the persons who can be bound by such an injunction and, the whole of s 473(2) would be superfluous if s 473(1) conferred upon the Commission jurisdiction to grant an injunction against any person;
  • it could not sensibly be contended that s 474 of the IR Act does not exhaustively prescribe the persons with standing to apply for an injunction when that section uses the same language, namely, '… may', as does s 473;
  • it would be inconsistent to conclude that s 474 exhaustively prescribes the persons with standing to apply for an injunction, but that s 473 –  which appears in the same subdivision of the IR Act, makes express reference to s 474 and uses the same language – does not exhaustively prescribe the persons against whom such an injunction may be made;
  • if the Parliament had intended s 473(2) of the IR Act to have the effect contended for by the QPUE, it would have been a simple matter for it to draft the section in such a way that it had that effect; and
  • the ordinary meaning of s 473(2) is the preferable one in that:
  1. –
    s 473(2) prescribes the persons the '… injunction may apply to';
  2. –
    no ambiguity arises; and
  3. –
    the ordinary meaning is supported, unambiguously, by the Explanatory Note.[42]

The relevant principles of statutory construction

  1. [57]
    In SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[43] Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ summarised the modern approach to statutory construction:
  1. 14
    The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.[44]
  1. [58]
    Consideration of the context includes the statute's surrounding provisions, what may be drawn from other aspects of the statute, and the statute as a whole; and it extends to the mischief which it may be seen that the statute is intended to remedy.[45]
  1. [59]
    The meaning of a provision in a statute must be determined by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole[46] and the legislative instrument must be construed on the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals.[47] The purpose of legislation must be derived from what the legislation says, and not from any assumption about the desired or desirable reach or operation of the relevant provisions.[48]
  1. [60]
    A consideration of the context of statutory text includes the legislative history and extrinsic materials, and understanding context has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text; but legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of the statutory text, nor is their examination an end in itself.[49] It is still the fundamental duty of a court to give meaning to the legislative command according to the terms in which it has been expressed and legislative history and references to pre-existing law should not deflect from the duty of a court of resolving an issue of statutory construction which ultimately is always a text-based activity.[50]
  1. [61]
    Pursuant to s 14A(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954, in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act (which includes its policy objective) is to be preferred to any other interpretation.

The text and context of s 473(2) of the IR Act

  1. [62]
    We cannot accept the QPUE's submissions. There are four reasons for this.
  1. [63]
    First, the QPUE submitted that s 473(2) is expressed in permissive, non-exhaustive language and that because of the use of the word 'may', the starting point in its construction is that the provision is, prima facie, permissive. In support of this submission, the QPUE referred to Ward v Williams ('Ward')[51] and to R v The Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland; ex parte Heffernan ('Heffernan').[52] However, the material provisions in those two cases are not of the same nature as s 473(2) of the IR Act.
  1. [64]
    Ward concerned s 66(2) of the Public Health Act 1902-1952 (NSW) which provided that a magistrate may make certain orders, including an order abating a nuisance, if the magistrate was satisfied '… the nuisance exists.'[53] Heffernan concerned s 4(2) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1916-1978 which provided that the requirement – that an application for workers' compensation, to be valid and enforceable, must be filed within six months of the injury – may be waived by the insurer if the insurer was satisfied the failure to file in that time was due to mistake, absence from Queensland or other reasonable cause.[54]
  1. [65]
    Section 473(2) of the IR Act does not confer a power on the Commission to do something if it is satisfied a certain state of affairs exists. Section 473(2) of the IR Act is narrower in scope. On the text used in s 473(2) of the IR Act, that provision exhaustively identifies the persons to whom an injunction can apply, in the exercise of the Commission's discretion conferred by s 473(1), to grant an injunction to compel compliance with, or to restrain a contravention of, one of the instruments referred to in s 473(1).
  1. [66]
    On the plain words used in s 473(2), the discretion contained in that provision is a limited one dependent upon the exercise of the substantive discretion contained in s 473(1) of the IR Act. That is, where one of the circumstances referred to in s 473(1)(a) or (b) arises, and the Commission exercises discretion to grant an injunction, the exercise of the Commission's discretion as to whom such an injunction applies is limited to the persons identified in the four categories contained in s 473(2)(a) to (d). 
  1. [67]
    Secondly, the context and purpose of s 473(2) of the IR Act is against the interpretation pressed by the QPUE.
  1. [68]
    The scope of the injunctions that can be granted under s 473(1) is limited to injunctions to compel compliance with an industrial instrument, a permit or the IR Act, or to restrain or prevent a contravention, or continuance of a contravention, of an industrial instrument, a permit or the IR Act.
  1. [69]
    That an injunction can only apply to the officers or members of an organisation generally, to particular officers or members of an organisation, to a particular employer or to a particular employee, is unremarkable when that limited scope is considered.

Industrial Instruments

  1. [70]
    An 'industrial instrument' is defined in sch 5 to the IR Act to mean:
  1. an award; or
  1. a certified agreement; or
  1. an arbitration determination; or
  1. a code of practice under section 389; or
  1. an order under chapter 2, part 5 or 6.
  1. [71]
    An award generally means a modern award, a bargaining award or an award continued in force under the IR Act.[55]
  1. [72]
    Under ch 3, pt 3 of the IR Act, organisations, within the meaning of the IR Act, may apply to make, vary or revoke a modern award. A modern award applies to an employee, an employer or an organisation if the award states that it so applies[56] or by virtue of a provision of the IR Act or an order of the Commission or of the Industrial Court of Queensland.[57]
  1. [73]
    A modern award does not impose obligations or confer entitlements on a person unless the award applies to the person.[58] Where a modern award applies to an employer, employees and employee organisations, it may impose relevant obligations on them.[59]
  1. [74]
    A bargaining award is an award made under ch 4, pt 5 that covers the following persons stated in the bargaining award:
  • an employer;
  • a group of employees of the employer, whether all employees or a category of employees; and
  • an employee organisation, that represents or is entitled to represent any employees:
  1. –
    who are, or are entitled to be, members of the organisation; and
  2. –
    who are covered by the bargaining award.[60]
  1. [75]
    A bargaining award may be made only with the consent of all parties who will be covered by it.[61] In our view, a bargaining award may impose particular obligations on the relevant employer, employees and employee organisations.
  1. [76]
    Certified agreements are written agreements (that have been certified under ch 4, pt 5 of the IR Act) about industrial matters relating to employers, a group of employees of the employer and employee organisations.[62]  Certified agreements may be made between an employer and the employees of the employer at the time the agreement is made, or between an employer and one or more employee organisations that represent or are entitled to represent any employees of the employer who are, or who are eligible to be, members of the organisation.[63] Certified agreements may impose particular obligations on the relevant employer, employees and employee organisations.[64]
  1. [77]
    An arbitration determination is one made by the Commission under ch 4, pt 3 of the IR Act when the negotiating parties for a certified agreement (an employer and a group of employees or an employer and one or more employee organisations) cannot reach agreement on industrial matters that are at issue between them.[65] An arbitration determination may impose particular obligations on the relevant employer, employees and employee organisations.[66]
  1. [78]
    A Code of Practice made under s 389 of the IR Act is directed to employers in the clothing industry[67] and to their employees who are outworkers.[68]
  1. [79]
    An order under ch 2, pt 5 of the IR Act primarily concerns an order for wages and employment conditions for apprentices and trainees who are employees within the meaning of the IR Act.[69]  An order under ch 2, pt 6 of the IR Act concerns an order for wages and employment conditions for employees who participate in labour market programs.

Permits

  1. [80]
    A 'permit'[70] under the IR Act refers to students' work permits[71] or aged or infirm persons permits.[72] The former permits a student to work, as an employee, in a calling for a particular period. The latter permits an aged or infirm person, as an employee, to work in a calling for less than the minimum wage as defined.

The IR Act

  1. [81]
    Generally speaking, the IR Act applies to employers and employees to the extent the Fair Work Act 2009 does not apply.[73] Without dealing with every circumstance where other persons are taken to be employers or employees for the purposes of the IR Act:
  • the IR Act generally applies to other employers, and their employees, if the employers are declared by Queensland law not to be national system employers for the Fair Work Act 2009 and the declaration is endorsed by the Minister under the Fair Work Act 2009;[74] and
  • some entitlements in the Queensland Employment Standards contained in ch 2, pt 3 of the IR Act –  which confer entitlements and impose obligations about certain conditions of employment on State system employers and employees – apply to some national system employers and employees[75] who are, in respect of those matters, defined to be employers[76] and employees[77] within the meaning of the IR Act.
  1. [82]
    Employers, employees and employee organisations have particular rights and obligations, pursuant to ch 4, pt 8 of the IR Act, in relation to taking protected industrial action in supporting or advancing claims for a proposed bargaining instrument, or in responding to such claims.
  1. [83]
    Pursuant to ch 6 of the IR Act, the Commission has power to make orders, including granting an interim injunction under s 473 of the IR Act,[78] in relation to unresolved industrial disputes between an employer organisation or employer, and an employee organisation or employee.[79] By s 265(1) of the IR Act, the Commission may direct an order about a dispute to an organisation, a person in a capacity as an officer or agent of an organisation or to any other person. Under ch 6, pt 4 of the IR Act, employers, employees and employee organisations have certain rights and obligations in relation to the payment to employees for strikes.[80]
  1. [84]
    Chapter 12 of the IR Act provides for the registration and regulation of organisations and deals with matters concerning their officers and members.
  1. [85]
    Until the Industrial Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2022, the IR Act did not expressly deal with incorporated associations of the nature of HSFirst.[81]  True it is that, prior to the operation of the Industrial Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2022, HSFirst could be the subject of a declaration under s 463 of the IR Act. However, that is because of the combined effect of the meaning of 'industrial matter' in sch 1, item 23 to the IR Act, and the non-exhaustive definition of 'demarcation dispute' in sch 5 to the IR Act.[82] HSFirst could also be the subject of an order by the Commission under s 479 of the IR Act because of the broad definition of 'association' that was given in s 478 of the IR Act.[83]
  1. [86]
    With the operation of the Industrial Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2022, the IR Act was amended to comprehensively deal with incorporated associations in so far as they purported to represent employees under the IR Act. Relevantly, that purpose was expressed the following way in the Explanatory Notes to the Industrial Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2022:

The Bill amends the terminology used in the IR Act to provide clarity about the rights and responsibilities of employee and employer organisations registered under the IR Act to represent employees and employers. The Bill confirms that the rights and protections conferred upon these entities by the IR Act are limited to employee and employer organisations which are registered, or otherwise eligible for and seeking registration, under the IR Act. Under the IR Act registered organisations are subject to a range of accountability and transparency obligations including reporting to ensure they operate with rigour and integrity. The provisions clarify that an incorporated unregistered industrial association does not have the right to represent its members under the IR Act, and that the term “association” does not mean an entity with some distinct corporate personality from that of its individual members. The Bill clarifies the distinction between registered and unregistered bodies and the corresponding rights and obligations of such bodies and introduces penalties for the misrepresentation of an organisation’s registration status under the IR Act.

…

Amendments relating to incorporated associations

To achieve the objective of addressing the risk of employers and employees being confused about the ability of entities to represent industrial interests where the entity is not a registered employee or employer organisation under the IR Act, but is incorporated under the AI Act, the Bill amends the IR Act and AI Act.

The Bill provides that, if an association incorporated under the AI Act is subject to certain adverse orders or industrial penalties under the IR Act, then the chief executive under the AI Act must cancel the association’s incorporation. This will ensure there are significant consequences for incorporated associations under the AI Act that, among other things, falsely present themselves as having a right to represent the industrial interests of employees or employers under the IR Act.

The Bill provides a mechanism to review applications for incorporation by associations and applications to register amendment of rules of an incorporated association, that have a purpose of furthering, or protecting, or representing the industrial interests of members or other persons. The purpose of the review mechanism is to ensure that the application cannot be approved if there is an objection ground – that is, if the application were to be granted, it would be reasonable for the incorporated association to be mistaken for an organisation under the IR Act; or an entity that has functions that are the same or comparable to an organisation under the IR Act; or an entity that is lawfully able to further, protect or represent the industrial interests of its members or other persons under the IR Act. The review mechanism will provide that all registered employee and employer organisations and State Peak Councils under the IR Act are made aware of the application, provide opportunity for an objection to be made in relation to the application, and provide for access to review rights under the IR Act.[84]

  1. [87]
    The purpose of traversing these provisions of the IR Act is to identify that, in our view,  the only persons who may relevantly be compelled or restrained, in relation to an industrial instrument, a permit or the IR Act, are:
  • the officers or members of an organisation generally; or
  • particular officers or members of an organisation; or
  • a particular employer; or
  • a particular employee.
  1. [88]
    This is because, by virtue of the IR Act, it is only the above mentioned persons, who have or may have, obligations, positive or negative, under an industrial instrument, a permit or the IR Act, that may be amenable to compliance or restraint by an injunction. HSFirst does not relevantly meet the description of an employer or an employee. HSFirst's officers and members do not meet the description of officers or members of an organisation.
  1. [89]
    This is a strong contextual pointer against the QPUE's construction.
  1. [90]
    Further, as referred to in paragraph [53] of these reasons, as part of the QPUE's non-registration submission, it submitted that HSFirst had admitted the circumstances existed where by it (HSFirst) was in contravention of the IR Act such that it should be restrained by an injunction. The QPUE did not particularise the provision of the IR Act that HSFirst admitted it had contravened. We cannot discern such an admission from HSFirst's Second Amended Response. At most, at paragraph 29G of its Second Amended Response, HSFirst responded that other than its contention about the construction of s 473(2) of the IR Act, it did not resist the injunctive relief sought by the QPUE.  However, we have not been taken to a particular provision of the IR Act, that HSFirst is said to have admitted it has contravened, which may be amenable to restraint by an injunction.
  1. [91]
    Thirdly, the construction of s 473(2) of the IR Act, pressed by HSFirst, is not inconsistent with the exhaustive identification of persons, who may apply for an injunction, contained in s 474 of the Act.
  1. [92]
    Section 474 provides:
  1. 474
    Who may apply for an injunction

An application for an injunction under section 473 may be made by–

  1. a party to industrial action or an industrial dispute; or
  1. an applicant for an industrial matter other than a party mentioned in paragraph (a); or
  1. an applicant for an order in relation to a contravention, or alleged contravention, of a civil penalty provision; or
  1. a person who is, or is likely to be, directly affected by industrial action or an industrial dispute; or
  1. the registrar; or
  1. the chief inspector; or
  1. an inspector.
  1. [93]
    Again, under s 473(1) of the IR Act, an injunction may only be granted:
  • to compel compliance with an industrial instrument, a permit or the IR Act; or
  • to restrain or prevent a contravention, or continuance of a contravention, of an industrial instrument, a permit or the IR Act.
  1. [94]
    In oral submissions, the QPUE contended that:
  • when the IR Act is looked at in the context of the standing to bring an application for an injunction, being s 474, it applies to a party to an industrial action or industrial dispute, which includes it (the QPUE); and
  • taken to its logical conclusion, it would mean that if the QPUE is in a situation where it is a party to an industrial dispute against an entity that is not registered, it could never obtain an injunction against such an entity, which could not be the intention of the Legislature and would amount to a situation which would not give effect to the purpose of the IR Act.[85]
  1. [95]
    We cannot accept this submission.
  1. [96]
    Schedule 5 to the IR Act defines an 'industrial dispute' as:

industrial dispute means–

  1. a dispute, including a threatened or probable dispute, about an industrial matter; or
  1. a situation that is likely to give rise to a dispute about an industrial matter.
  1. [97]
    Section 9 of the IR Act defines the phrase 'industrial matter' and provides:

What is an industrial matter

  1. An industrial matter is a matter that affects or relates to-
  1. work done or to be done; or
  1. the privileges, rights or functions of-
  1. employers or employees; or
  1. persons who have been, or propose to be, or who may become, employers or employees; or
  1. a matter the court or commission considers has been, is, or may be a cause or contributory cause of an industrial action or industrial dispute.
  1. However, a matter is not an industrial matter if it is the subject of a proceeding for-
  1. an indictable offence; or
  1. a public service appeal.
  1. Without limiting subsection (1) or affecting subsection (2), a matter is an industrial matter if it relates to a matter mentioned in schedule 1.[86]
  1. [98]
    Schedule 1 to the IR Act sets out 31 separate matters which, on the text used to describe them and in the context of the definition of 'industrial matter' in s 9 of the IR Act, are primarily matters about the relationship between State system employers and employees.[87] Schedule 1 to the IR Act, at item 31, refers to '… matters relating to the relationship between employers and organisations.' Section 261(2) of the IR Act requires the parties to an unresolved industrial dispute to immediately give written notice of the dispute to the Industrial Registrar. By s 261(1)(a) of the IR Act, s 261(2) applies if an unresolved industrial dispute exists between an employer organisation or employer, and an employee organisation or employee.
  1. [99]
    As a consequence, what may constitute an industrial matter and an industrial dispute is very wide.
  1. [100]
    Given the definition of industrial matter though, it is clear that an industrial dispute is fundamentally concerned with a dispute about an industrial matter between a State system employer and its employees.  Further, given sch 1, item 31 of the IR Act and s 261(1)(a) of the IR Act, an industrial dispute can exist between a State system employer and an organisation. Given the broad number of circumstances where there may be a person who wants to compel compliance with, or restrain a contravention of, an industrial instrument, a permit or the IR Act, it is unremarkable that the Legislature, in part, described such an applicant by using the broad description of  '… a party to … an industrial dispute.' This may include an organisation such as the QPUE.
  1. [101]
    However, for the reasons given earlier having regard to the text and context of s 473(1) and (2) of the IR Act, it is equally clear that the intention of the Legislature, in respect of prescribing who may be so compelled or restrained by an injunction, is limited to those persons who, by virtue of the system of industrial relations established by the IR Act, have obligations, positive or negative, under an industrial instrument, a permit or the IR Act. As the participants in the system of industrial relations under the IR Act, who have such obligations under an industrial instrument, a permit or the IR Act, have not included incorporated associations of the nature of HSFirst, the interpretation that best achieves the purpose of s 473(2) of the IR Act is the one pressed by HSFirst.
  1. [102]
    For these same reasons, our view is that by the QPUE's non-registration submission, it is attempting to give s 473(2) of the IR Act a construction by making assumptions about its desired or desirable reach, rather than by construing the provision by having regard to its text and context.
  1. [103]
    Fourthly, as submitted by HSFirst, the  Explanatory Notes to the Industrial Relations Bill 2016, that dealt with cl 473 of that Bill, referred to in paragraph [55] of these reasons, is consistent with the conclusion that s 473(2) of the IR Act exhaustively prescribes the persons to whom an injunction may apply.
  1. [104]
    For all the reasons given above, because HSFirst is not a person referred to in s 473(2) of the IR Act, we have no discretion to exercise under s 473(1) of the IR Act.
  1. [105]
    The QPUE's application for an injunction must be dismissed.

The QPUE's application for costs

  1. [106]
    The QPUE, in its written submissions, stated:

Costs

  1. 15.
    The respondent's conduct in this proceeding falls within the conduct described by s 545(2)(a) of the Act. The respondent vigorously defended the matter and only recently, in the face of an application for discovery, surrendered almost entirely to the relief sought by the union. In those circumstances, the union seeks an order that the respondent pay the costs it has incurred in the proceeding.
  1. [107]
    In oral submissions, the QPUE submitted that HSFirst's complete capitulation on the factual matters was conduct that was '… either vexatious or has been done without reasonable cause' and by the latter, it meant the change of HSFirst in its position.[88] The QPUE did not press its application for costs by relying on s 545(2)(a)(ii) of the IR Act.[89]
  1. [108]
    HSFirst submitted that the QPUE should not have its costs because:
  • the vast bulk of its costs must pertain to the preparation of its application and the extensive affidavit material filed with it which would have been incurred:
  1. –
    regardless of any conduct by it (HSFirst); and
  2. –
    given the nature of the discretionary relief sought;
  • the QPUE's application for summary judgment, which was wholly unsuccessful, would have been partially unsuccessful even without the HSFirst's opposition given the Commission's reservations about its power to grant the injunctive relief sought by the QPUE; and
  • the final hearing was needed in any event, despite HSFirst's resistance to the injunctive relief sought, given the discretion by the Commission to grant the declaratory relief sought.[90]
  1. [109]
    HSFirst further submitted that there is no prospect the QPUE can establish that HSFirst's opposition to the injunctive relief sought by the QPUE was without reasonable cause or that it would have been reasonably apparent to HSFirst that it had no reasonable prospects of success.[91]
  1. [110]
    Section 545 of the Act relevantly provides:
  1. 545
    General power to award costs
  1. A person must bear the person’s own costs in relation to a proceeding before the court or commission.
  1. However, the court or commission may, on application by a party to the proceeding, order –
  1. a party to the proceeding to pay costs incurred by another party if the court or commission is satisfied –
  1. the party made the application or responded to the application vexatiously or without reasonable cause; or
  1. it would have been reasonably apparent to the party that the application or response to the application had no reasonable prospect of success;
  1. [111]
    As to the consideration of whether, relevantly to the present circumstances, HSFirst responded to the QPUE's substantive application vexatiously, Snaden J in Messenger v Commonwealth of Australia (Represented by the Department of Finance) (No 2)[92] stated of s 570(2)(a) of the Fair Work Act 2009,[93] which is in similar terms to s 545(2)(a)(i) of the IR Act:
  1. 13
    The policy underpinning s 570 of the FW Act recognises that an applicant might fairly (and without costs consequences) prosecute “…a weak case as long as it is not utterly hopeless”:  Nilsen v Loyal Orange Trust (1997) 76 IR 180, 181 (“Nilsen”; North J).
  1. 14
    A respondent who submits that a proceeding arising under the FW Act was brought vexatiously must demonstrate that the applicant’s predominant purpose in instituting it was to harass or embarrass, or to gain a collateral advantage unrelated to the vindication of the rights, privileges or immunities in respect of which it was instituted:  Nilsen, 181 (North J).  The onus is “a heavy one”:  Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 478, 498 (Scarman  LJ).  If a proceeding is instituted by an applicant who does not intend to prosecute it to conclusion; but instead seeks to use it as a means of obtaining some advantage for which it was not designed or some collateral advantage that is beyond what the law offers, then it might be said to have been instituted vexatiously:  Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509, 526-527 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ).
  1. [112]
    In Kelsey v Logan City Council and Ors,[94] Davis J, President relevantly stated:
  1. [25]
    Section 545 and provisions like it have been the subject of analysis in various decisions. The following principles can be identified:
  1. The starting point is that each party bears their own costs.
  2. A discretion to depart from that point only arises, relevantly here, if one of the jurisdictional facts identified in s 545(2)(a)(i) or s 545(2)(a)(ii) are established.
  3. The assessment of “reasonable cause” in s 545(2)(a)(i) is:
  1. an objective assessment; and
  1. made considering the facts existing as at the time of the institution of the proceedings, here the appeal.
  1. Section 545(2)(a)(ii) prescribes a separate and distinct jurisdictional fact giving rise to a discretion to award costs. In consideration of whether s 545(2)(a)(ii) is engaged, facts which arise after the commencement of the proceedings may be relevant.[95]
  1. [113]
    In Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2),[96] Davis, J, President further stated:
  1. [8]
    The term “without reasonable cause” was the subject of consideration in Kanan v Australian Postal and Telecommunications Union:

“It seems to me that one way of testing whether a proceeding is instituted without reasonable cause is to ask whether, upon the facts apparent to the applicant at the time of instituting the proceedings, there was no substantial prospect of success. If success depends upon the resolution in the applicant’s favour of one or more arguable points of law, it is inappropriate to stigmatise the proceeding as being ‘without reasonable cause’. But where, on the applicant’s own version of the facts, it is clear that the proceeding must fail, it may properly be said that the proceeding lacks reasonable cause.”[97]

  1. [114]
    In our view, the facts of the present case do not trigger our discretion to award costs in favour of the QPUE. There are two reasons for this.
  1. [115]
    First, HSFirst's ultimate response to the QPUE's substantive application could not be described as vexatious. Even accepting as accurate the QPUE's characterisation of HSFirst's more recent position in the litigation, namely, '… a complete capitulation on the factual matters',[98] such acceptance does not persuade us that HSFirst's predominant purpose in initially resisting but then, significantly conceding, the QPUE's substantive application was to harass or embarrass the QPUE, or to gain a collateral advantage unrelated to HSFirst's position in the litigation.
  1. [116]
    HSFirst raised a number of triable issues in its response to the QPUE's summary judgement application.  These issues included:
  • whether there was a demarcation dispute necessary to give rise to the discretion to grant the declaratory relief sought;[99]
  • whether the Commission had jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief because HSFirst was not an organisation within the meaning of the IR Act;[100] and
  • whether there was evidence which proved a relevant matter for the purposes of making the representation order, namely, the wishes of the employees who would be affected by the representation order.[101]
  1. [117]
    Indeed, the QPUE's application for summary judgement was dismissed by us for reasons that went to the specified triable issues, some of which were identified by HSFirst. 
  1. [118]
    The fact HSFirst resiled from most aspects of its initial resistance to the relief sought by the QPUE does not mean its position has been vexatious. Without more, there is nothing vexatious in a party to litigation initially defending its position and later resiling from part of its defence.
  1. [119]
    Secondly, it is not accurate to describe HSFirst's response[102] to the QPUE's substantive application as without reasonable cause. While HSFirst's response was technically deficient for the reasons we gave in HSFirst Inc. No. 1,[103] the success of the QPUE's substantive application depended upon arguable points of law as raised by HSFirst in that response, including whether there was a demarcation dispute necessary to give rise to the discretion to grant the declaratory relief[104] and the identity of the industrial instrument, permit or Act said to be contravened by it in respect of which the injunctive relief was sought.[105]
  1. [120]
    For these reasons, we are not persuaded that our discretion to award costs in favour of the QPUE is triggered.

Conclusion

  1. [121]
    For the reasons we have given, we make the orders set out below.

Orders

  1. [122]
    We make the following orders:
  1. Pursuant to s 463(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the Commission declares that HSFirst Inc. is not, in respect of the business names Sworn Officers' Professional Association of Australia or SOPAA, or at all, an employee organisation for the purposes of the Industrial Relations Act 2016.
  1. Pursuant to s 463(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the Commission declares that HSFirst Inc. is not, in respect of the business names Sworn Officers' Professional Association of Queensland or SOPAQ, or at all, an employee organisation for the purposes of the Industrial Relations Act 2016.
  1. Pursuant to s 463(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the Commission declares that HSFirst Inc. is not, in respect of the business names Sworn Officers' Professional Association of Australia or SOPAA, or at all, a trade union.
  1. Pursuant to s 463(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the Commission declares that HSFirst Inc. is not, in respect of the business names Sworn Officers' Professional Association of Queensland or SOPAQ, or at all, a trade union.
  1. The application by the Queensland Police Union of Employees for injunctive relief is dismissed.
  1. Pursuant to s 479(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, it is ordered that HSFirst Inc. does not have the right to represent employees who are eligible for membership of the Queensland Police Union of Employees.
  1. Pursuant to s 483(1)(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, it is ordered that HSFirst Inc. is prohibited from holding out membership on the basis of being able to provide representation in stated industrial matters, being industrial matters as defined in s 9 of the Industrial Relations  Act 2016 and in Schedule 1 to the Industrial Relations Act 2016.
  1. There be no order as to costs.

Footnotes

[1][2023] QIRC 030 ('HSFirst Inc. No.1').

[2]HSFirst Inc. No.1 (n 1), [135].

[3]Filed on 18 August 2022.

[4]The outline of submissions on HSFirst filed on 28 April 2023 ('HSFirst's submissions'), para. 2 (a).

[5]HSFirst's submissions, para. 2 (b).

[6]HSFirst's submissions, para. 2 (b).

[7]T 1-4, ll 29-32. Unless otherwise indicated, the transcript references are to the hearing that took place on 9 June 2023.

[8]T 1-4, ll 34-42.

[9][1999] HCA 9; (1999) 198 CLR 334. Citations omitted.

[10]Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ.

[11]Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd [1972] HCA 61; (1972) 127 CLR 421, 437–438 (Gibbs J).

[12]Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 56; (2012) 201 FCR 378, [16]-[17] and [30] (Greenwood, Logan and Yates JJ) and Foris GFS Australia Pty Ltd v Manivel [2022] VSC 482; (2022) 67 VR 561, [35] (Elliott J).

[13]Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 278, [26]-[27] (Deputy President Merrell).

[14]The QPUE's Statement of Facts and Contentions filed on 22 July 2022 ('the QPUE's contentions'), para. 38.

[15]The QPUE's contentions, paras. 3-5.

[16]The QPUE's contentions, paras. 1-3 and 7-31.

[17]HSFirst's Second Amended Response filed on 28 April 2023 ('HSFirst's Second Amended Response'), para. 3.

[18]Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v iSelect Limited [2020] FCA 1523, [18] (and the cases cited therein) (Moshinsky J).

[19][2022] FCA 1340 ('Pirmax').

[20]Industrial Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2022, s 52A.

[21]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 527(1)(a).

[22]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 348, s 349 and s 350.

[23]Pirmax (n 19).

[24]HSFirst's Second Amended Response, para. 3.

[25]The QPUE's contentions, para. 8.

[26]The QPUE's contentions, para. 9.

[27]The QPUE's contentions, para. 14.

[28]See Gilbert v Metro North Health and Hospital Service and Ors (No 2) [2023] ICQ 20, [144]-[146] (Deputy President Hartigan).

[29]HSFirst's Second Amended Response, para. 15C(c).

[30]Industrial Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2022, s 33, s 34 s 35, s 65 and items 17, 18, 21 and  23 of sch 1.

[31]Section 507J of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 uses the phrase 'industrial association' but by reference to the definition of that phrase in s 12 of the Fair Work Act 2009.

[32]Sections 479 and 483 of the IR Act were amended by s 48 and items 30-33 of sch 1 to the Industrial Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2022. However, in relation to the QPUE's substantive application, ch 11, pt 2, div 4, sub-div 10 of the IR Act continues to apply as if the Industrial Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2022 had not been enacted: s 1100(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016.

[33]HSFirst's Second Amended Response, para. 31A.

[34]HSFirst's Second Amended Response, para. 31B.

[35]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 481(1)(a).

[36]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 481(2)(c).

[37]The affidavit of Shane Allan Prior filed on 17 June 2022, para. 5.

[38]The QPUE's submissions filed on 26 May 2023 ('the QPUE's submissions'), paras. 8-14.

[39]T 1-8, ll 1-10.

[40]HSFirst's submissions in reply filed on 2 June 2023 ('HSFirst's submissions in reply'), para. 4.

[41]Explanatory Notes, Industrial Relations Bill 2016 (Qld), 80. Emphasis added.

[42]HSFirst's submissions in reply, paras. 5-6 and 8-10.

[43][2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362.

[44]Citations omitted.

[45]R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 269 CLR 507, [33] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J, with Nettle and Gordon JJ at [148] generally agreeing).

[46] Project Blue Sky Inc. v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 ('Project Blue Sky'), [69] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

[47]Ibid [70].

[48]Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378, [26] (French CJ and Hayne J).

[49]Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503, [39] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ).

[50]Northern Territory v Collins [2008] HCA 49; (2008) 235 CLR 619, [16] (Gummow A-CJ and Kirby J).

[51][1955] HCA 4; (1955) 92 CLR 496 ('Ward'), 505 (Dixon CJ, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ).

[52][1979] Qd. R 563 ('Heffernan'), 567 (Kelly J, Stable SPJ and Dunn J at 570 agreeing).

[53]Ward (n 51), 503.

[54]Heffernan (n 52), 567.

[55]Industrial Relations Act 2016 sch 5, (definition of 'award').

[56]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 153(1)(a).

[57]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 153(1)(b).

[58]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 152.

[59]See, for example, the Queensland Police Service Employees Award – State 2016, at cl 11 ('Consultation – Introduction of changes – all employees') in relation to the employer, at cl 22 (c)(i), regarding notice to be given about parental leave, in relation to employees; and at cl 7.1(d), dispute resolution procedures about the interpretation or implementation of that Award, in relation to employee organisations, including the Queensland Police Union of Employees ('the QPUE').

[60]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 166.

[61]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 167.

[62]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 164.

[63]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 165.

[64]See, for example, the Queensland Police Service Certified Agreement 2022, at cl 27 ('Right to disconnect – Non-Commissioned Officers') in relation to the employer, at cl 64(3), regarding the production of medical certificates for sick leave, in relation to employees; and at cl 88(6)(a), dispute resolution procedures about flexible work arrangements for part-time officers, in relation to employee organisations, including the QPUE.

[65]Industrial Relations Act 2016, ch 4, pt 3.

[66]See for example the Brisbane City Council Determination 2023, at cl 28.1 ('Superannuation') in relation to the employer, sch 5, ('Personal Leave and rehabilitation procedures') at cl 4.2, in relation to employees; and cl 16. ('Achieving Zero Harm') in relation to employee organisations.

[67]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 7(2)(b).

[68]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 8(2)(e).

[69]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 8(2)(f) and s 8(2)(g).

[70]Industrial Relations Act 2016, sch 5 (definition of 'permit')

[71]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 978.

[72]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 979.

[73]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 12(1)(b).

[74]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 12(3).

[75]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 13.

[76]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 7(2)(a)

[77]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 8(2)(a).

[78]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 262(3) and (4).

[79]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 261(1).

[80]Certain conduct by employers, prospective employers and employees, and by 'industrial associations' as defined, is prohibited under ch 8 pt 1 of the IR Act, but the power to make orders about such conduct, including an order granting an injunction, is contained in ch 8, pt 1, div 8 of the IR Act.

[81]However, pursuant to s 602(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, a corporation which, by virtue of s 596(1)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, includes an incorporated association under the Associations  Incorporation  Act 1981, can only apply for registration as employer organisation.

[82]As conceded in HSFirst contentions, paras. 15A-15C.

[83]As conceded in HSFirst contentions, paras. 31A-32.

[84]Explanatory Notes, Industrial Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2022 (Qld), 2-3.

[85]T 1-22, ll 5-11.

[86]Emphasis added.

[87]The only exception may be 'a demarcation' dispute' as referred to in sch 1 to the IR Act at item 23, read with the non-exhaustive definition of 'demarcation dispute' contained in sch 5 to the IR Act.

[88]T 1-13, ll 33-35.

[89]T 1-14, ll 14-23.

[90]HSFirst' submissions in reply, para. 11.

[91]HSFirst' submissions in reply, para. 12.

[92][2023] FCA 20.

[93]Section 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009, relevantly provides:

570 Costs only if proceedings instituted vexatiously etc.

(1)A party to proceedings (including an appeal) in a court (including a court of a State or

Territory) in relation to a matter arising under this Act may be ordered by the court to pay

costs incurred by another party to the proceedings only in accordance with subsection (2)

or section 569 or 569A.

…

(2)The party may be ordered to pay the costs only if:

(a)the court is satisfied that the party instituted the proceedings vexatiously or without

reasonable cause; or

(b)the court is satisfied that the party’s unreasonable act or omission caused the other

party to incur the costs; or…

[94][2021] ICQ 11.

[95]Citations omitted.

[96][2022] ICQ 019.

[97]Citations omitted.

[98]T 1-13, ll 25-26.

[99]HSFirst Inc. No. 1 (n 1), [56].

[100]Ibid [58].

[101]Ibid [61].

[102]Filed on 12 August 2022 ('HSFirst's response').

[103]HSFirst Inc. No. 1 (n 1) [122]-[129].

[104]HSFirst's response, para. 44.

[105]HSFirst's response, para. 45.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Queensland Police Union of Employees v HSFirst Inc. (No. 2)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Queensland Police Union of Employees v HSFirst Inc. (No. 2)

  • MNC:

    [2023] QIRC 284

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Merrell DP, Pidgeon IC, Power IC

  • Date:

    03 Oct 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564
1 citation
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Cite 1 - (1992) 175 CLR 564
Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2) [2022] ICQ 19
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2022] ICQ 19
Cite 2 - [2022] ICQ 19
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Francis (2004) 142 FCR 1
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2004) 142 FCR 1
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v iSelect Limited [2020] FCA 1523
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] FCA 1523
Cite 2 - [2020] FCA 1523
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd (2012) 201 FCR 378
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2012) 201 FCR 378
Cite 2 - (2012) 201 FCR 378
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 56
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] FCAFC 56
Cite 2 - [2012] FCAFC 56
Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 278
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 278
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 278
Bass v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1999) 198 CLR 334
Cite 2 - (1999) 198 CLR 334
Bass v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd (1999) HCA 9
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1999) HCA 9
Cite 2 - (1999) HCA 9
Certain Lloyd's Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross [2012] HCA 56
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] HCA 56
Cite 2 - [2012] HCA 56
Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2012) 248 CLR 378
Cite 2 - (2012) 248 CLR 378
Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2012) 250 CLR 503
Cite 2 - (2012) 250 CLR 503
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] HCA 55
Cite 2 - [2012] HCA 55
Foris GFS Australia Pty Ltd v Manivel [2022] VSC 482
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] VSC 482
Cite 2 - [2022] VSC 482
Foris GFS Australia Pty Ltd v Manivel (2022) 67 VR 561
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2022) 67 VR 561
Cite 2 - (2022) 67 VR 561
Forster v Jododex Aust. Pty. Ltd [1972] HCA 61
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1972] HCA 61
Cite 2 - [1972] HCA 61
Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd & Anor (1972) 127 CLR 421
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1972) 127 CLR 421
Cite 2 - (1972) 127 CLR 421
Gilbert v Metro North Health and Hospital Service (No. 2) [2023] ICQ 20
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] ICQ 20
Cite 2 - [2023] ICQ 20
Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd (1977) 1 WLR 478
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1977) 1 WLR 478
Grant v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 1374
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] FCA 1374
Ibeneweka v Egbuna (1964) 1 WLR 219
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1964) 1 WLR 219
Kelsey v Logan City Council [2021] ICQ 11
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] ICQ 11
Cite 2 - [2021] ICQ 11
Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Ltd v Ancient Order of Foresters in Victoria Friendly Society Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 99
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] FCAFC 99
Messenger v Commonwealth of Australia (Represented by the Department of Finance) (No 2) [2023] FCA 20
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] FCA 20
Cite 2 - [2023] FCA 20
Nilsen v Loyal Orange Trust (1997) 76 IR 180
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1997) 76 IR 180
Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2008) 235 CLR 619
Cite 2 - (2008) 235 CLR 619
Northern Territory v Collins [2008] HCA 49
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] HCA 49
Cite 2 - [2008] HCA 49
Pirmax Pty Ltd v Kingspan Insulation Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 1340
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] FCA 1340
Cite 2 - [2022] FCA 1340
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1998] HCA 28
Cite 2 - [1998] HCA 28
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 C.L.R 355
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1998) 194 C.L.R 355
Cite 2 - (1998) 194 C.L.R 355
Queensland Police Union of Employees v HS First Inc. [2023] QIRC 30
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 30
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 30
R v A2 [2019] HCA 35
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] HCA 35
Cite 2 - [2019] HCA 35
R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2019) 269 CLR 507
Cite 2 - (2019) 269 CLR 507
R v Workers Compensation Board; ex parte Heffernan [1979] Qd R 563
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1979] Qd R 563
Cite 2 - [1979] Qd R 563
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2017) 262 CLR 362
Cite 2 - (2017) 262 CLR 362
Sztal v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) HCA 34
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2017) HCA 34
Cite 2 - (2017) HCA 34
Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd Limited v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 591
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 200 CLR 591
Ward v Williams (1955) 92 CLR 496
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1955) 92 CLR 496
Cite 2 - (1955) 92 CLR 496
Ward v Williams [1955] HCA 4
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1955] HCA 4
Cite 2 - [1955] HCA 4
Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992) 174 CLR 509

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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