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  4. McIlroy-Ranga v Torres Strait Island Regional Council (No. 2) - [2023] QIRC 33

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McIlroy-Ranga v Torres Strait Island Regional Council (No. 2)[2023] QIRC 33

McIlroy-Ranga v Torres Strait Island Regional Council (No. 2)[2023] QIRC 33

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

McIlroy-Ranga v Torres Strait Island Regional Council (No. 2) [2023] QIRC 033

PARTIES: 

McIlroy-Ranga, Luke Ashley

(Applicant)

v

Torres Strait Island Regional Council

(Respondent)

CASE NO.:

B/2022/64

PROCEEDING:

Recovery of unpaid wages

DELIVERED ON:

7 February 2023

MEMBER:

Power IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDER:

  1. That the Applicant be paid annual leave and annual leave loading accrued up to the date of termination.
  1. Failing agreement on the amount, to be the subject of a further application to the Commission.
  1. Liberty to apply.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION – interpretation of s 38(4) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) – consideration of the meaning of the term worked under s 38(4) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld)

LEGISLATION:

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 87

Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) s 71

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 31, 32, 38 and 339

CASES:

Community and Public Sector Union, NSW Branch v Northcott Supported Living Ltd [2021] FCA 8

Flight Attendants Association of Australia – International Division v Virgin Australia t/as Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd [2018] FWC 3017

Mcllroy- Ranga v Torres Straity Island Regional Council [2022] QIRC 448

New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council v Minister Administering the Crown Land Act (2016) 260 CLR 232

Rankin v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 048

Schipp & Anor v The Star Entertainment Qld Limited [2019] ICQ 009

Schipp v The Star Entertainment Pty Ltd [2019] QIRC 49

Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Jetstar Services Pty Ltd [2017] FWC 2535

United Voice v Wilsons Security [2015] FWC 2507

Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde [2002] FCA 250

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    Mr Luke Ashley McIlroy-Ranga ('the Applicant') filed an application in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission ('the Commission'), seeking payment of annual leave entitlements ('the Application').
  1. [2]
    The Applicant was employed with the Torres Strait Island Regional Council ('the Respondent') from 12 November 2018 until 13 May 2022 when he was terminated from his employment.
  1. [3]
    The Applicant claims that the Respondent had: 
  1. (a)
    removed the Applicant's accrued annual leave from the termination advice; and
  1. (b)
    did not pay the accrued annual leave, despite advising the Applicant that he would be paid his statutory entitlements as outlined in his termination letter.

Legislative framework

  1. [4]
    Section 31 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') provides for an entitlement to annual leave:

31 Entitlement

  1. (1)
    For each completed year of employment with an employer, an employee is entitled to—
  1. (a)
    if the employee is not a shift worker—at least 4 weeks annual leave; or
  1. (b)
    if the employee is a shift worker—at least 5 weeks annual leave.

…

  1. [5]
    Section 32 of the IR Act provides for working out a completed year of employment under s 31:

32 Working out completed year of employment

  1. (1)
    This section applies for working out a completed year of employment for section 31.
  1. (2)
    The following periods when an employee is absent without pay are not to be taken into account—
  1. (a)
    a period of more than 3 months when an employee is absent with the employer’s approval;
  1. (b)
    a period when an employee is absent without the employer’s approval, unless the employee is absent for not more than 3 months because of illness or injury that is certified by a doctor.
  1. [6]
    Section 38 of the IR Act provides for payment of annual leave on termination of an employee's employment:

38 Payment for annual leave on termination of employment

  1. (1)
    This section applies if an employee’s employment is terminated by the employee or employer.
  1. (2)
    If the employee has not taken all the annual leave the employee is entitled to, the employee is presumed to have taken the leave from the day the termination takes effect (the termination day).
  1. (3)
    The employer must pay the employee for the annual leave not taken, including—
  1. (a)
    any public holiday during the period the employee is presumed to have taken the leave; and
  1. (b)
    any annual leave loading the employee is entitled to under section 36.
  1. (4)
    If the employee has worked part of a year, the employer must pay the employee the proportionate annual leave for the part of the year the employee worked, including any annual leave loading the employee is entitled to under section 36.
  1. (5)
    The employer must pay the employee at least the ordinary rate being paid to the employee immediately before the termination day, unless an applicable industrial instrument states otherwise.

Submissions of the parties

  1. [7]
    The Applicant refers to the annual leave provisions of the Torres Strait Island Regional Council Certified Agreement 2021 ('the Agreement') and s 339 of the IR Act regarding the keeping of a time and wages record.
  1. [8]
    The Applicant states that the Respondent has removed the accrued annual leave record from the termination advice. The payment advice dated 6 May 2022 shows an accrued annual leave of 198.58 hours, however, the termination advice dated 20 May 2022 shows a zero balance in accrued annual leave.
  1. [9]
    The Respondent submits that the entitlement to annual leave under the Agreement refers to 'year of service' whereas s 31 of the IR Act refers to 'year of employment' and submits that, at the time of termination, the Applicant had not completed a further year of employment or service.
  1. [10]
    The Respondent contends that the Applicant's entitlement to payment of annual leave upon termination is governed by s 38 of the IR Act, submitting that the Applicant performed no work from the date of his anniversary of employment on 12 November 2021 to the date of termination and so has no proportionate entitlement upon termination pursuant to s 38(4) of the IR Act. The Respondent submits that the term 'worked' does not apply to any period of time when an employee is on leave or absent from duty.[1]

Further submissions of the parties

  1. [11]
    Following the dismissal of an application for the matter to be referred to a full bench,[2] parties sought and were granted an opportunity to provide further submissions with respect to the Application. Both parties subsequently filed further submissions with respect to the operation of s 38 of the IR Act. Those submissions are summarised below.

Further submissions of the Applicant

  1. [12]
    The Applicant notes the difference in language used in the current IR Act and the equivalent provisions in the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) ('the 1999 IR Act'). The 1999 IR Act refers to circumstances where an employee 'has been employed' for any period of less than a year whilst the IR Act refers to circumstances where an employee 'has worked' for part of a year. The Applicant submits that there is no reference or reason for the changed wording in the Explanatory Memorandum for the IR Act.
  1. [13]
    The Applicant disagrees with the Respondent's view that the replacement of the word 'employed' with the word 'worked' has the effect of completely altering access to payment of proportionate leave entitlements. The Applicant submits, in summary, that:
  1. (a)
    the IR Act is a beneficial legislation and if there is an ambiguity in relation to recognition of service for a part of the year worked, the provisions should be construed in a manner favourable to the employee who is to receive the benefit;
  1. (b)
    interpreting the impact of beneficial provisions is subject to the constraints imposed by the actual language used and what might be fairly open on a proper construction of the terms;
  1. (c)
    the recognition of annual leave accrual during a period in which the employee is directed to remain away from the workplace while 'on normal pay' does not extend the meaning of the relevant provisions; and
  1. (d)
    the word 'worked' is not defined under the IR Act and can therefore be attributed with its usual meanings. The Macquarie Dictionary defines 'worked' to mean 'to be employed' and there is no reason why this meaning should be overlooked or ignored.
  1. [14]
    The Applicant submits that the observations made by Merrell DP in Schipp & Anor v The Star Entertainment Qld Limited ('Schipp')[3] regarding the approach to statutory interpretation are apposite. The Applicant further submits, in summary, that:
  1. (a)
    the statutory purpose of s 38(4) of the IR Act is to ensure that employees receive the benefit of a pro rata accrual of annual leave when their employment is terminated for any reason and have not completed a full year of employment, subject to the exceptions under s 32 of the IR Act.
  1. (b)
    there have been no changes made when the provision is compared with the antecedent provisions under the 1999 IR Act;
  1. (c)
    where the intention of the legislation is that the employee is required to perform work extends to override the accrual of annual leave while an employee is on annual leave and personal leave, as argued by the Respondent, such an intention would be outlined in the legislation; and
  1. (d)
    the clearest of language and legislative intent would be necessary to sustain such an outcome and neither the language nor the intent is evident.

Further submissions of the Respondent

  1. [15]
    The Respondent submits no ambiguity or any other basis as to why resort should be had to extrinsic material to interpret the provisions of s 38 of the IR Act has been identified by the Applicant.
  1. [16]
    The Respondent outlines the principles to statutory interpretation and submits that:
  1. (a)
    it is permissible to compare the text of s 38 to s 31 of the IR Act;
  1. (b)
    had Parliament intended that payment for annual leave upon termination of employment was to be calculated in the same manner as s 31, it would have outlined as such in the legislation. If that was the Parliament's intention, s 38 would have been drafted to use the same word 'employed' instead of 'worked';
  1. (c)
    the words 'worked' or 'work' are words which have been regularly interpreted by the Courts and Tribunals and are words that are not ambiguous, uncertain or capable of more than one meaning;[4]
  1. (d)
    the approach of the Commission is to interpret the actual text of s 38 and not remake it to achieve a result that might be considered fair or desirable according to some standard of fairness or proper employment practice;
  1. (e)
    even if legislation is beneficial overall, not all sections of the legislation are to be read beneficially and no statute pursues its objects at all costs and some sections may be intended to limit access to a benefit;[5]
  1. (f)
    it is generally a mistake in the task of interpretation by posing the type of construction to be afforded; and
  1. (g)
    previous cases have interpreted the meaning of the word 'work' as requiring active duty or the actual physical performance of work. In the cases where an employee has been on leave or otherwise off duty, the consistent findings have been that the employee is not 'at work'.[6]
  1. [17]
    The Respondent submits, with respect to the Applicant's submissions, that:
  1. (a)
    the Applicant has selectively quoted from the Macquarie Dictionary and has ignored the other references which define 'work' as meaning an 'exertion directed to produce or accomplish something; labour; toil'; 'that on which exertion or labour is expended; something to be made or done; a task or undertaking'; 'Productive or operative activity …';
  1. (b)
    the Applicant's reliance on Schipp is misplaced as it concerned the interpretation of a different part of the IR Act relating to long service leave. In any event, the relevant provisions were subject to statements made by the Minister for Industrial Relations in the second reading speech. There are no statements made by the Minister in respect of the operation of s 38, as the Applicant has correctly identified; and
  1. (c)
    the Applicant's position creates an absurd result and is illogical. When the proper context of annual leave entitlement in the IR Act is properly understood the Respondent's interpretation is logical and rational.
  1. [18]
    The Respondent outlines that s 32 of the IR Act provides that an employee does not accrue an entitlement throughout the year, rather, it only confers an accrual of annual leave upon the completion of a year of employment.
  1. [19]
    The Respondent submits that, in the absence of s 38 of the IR Act, an employee would have no entitlement to any paid annual leave if they left employment prior to completion of twelve months and further that:

Section 38 cures the potential unfairness of the operation of Section 32 by allowing a pro rata calculation and payout of annual leave if the employee leaves before the completion of a full year of service. However, the benefit of pro rata annual leave payout has been made conditional upon the employee actually working for this pro rata period. This is a compromise position where an employee receives a benefit notwithstanding the fact that they have not completed a full year service but the beneficial entitlement is conditional upon the employee actually performing work during the pro rata period. Otherwise, an employee must remain employed for a completed year before becoming entitled to any accrual of annual leave at all.

  1. [20]
    The Respondent submits that s 38 of the IR Act can be distinguished from s 87(2) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) which expressly provides for a progressive accrual of annual leave throughout the year.

Consideration

  1. [21]
    The Applicant’s affidavit[7] stated that after a period of personal leave he emailed his workplace, specifically Megan Barrett (Interim Executive Director, Corporate Services) and David Baldwin (Acting Chief Executive Officer) requesting to return to the workplace on 21 January 2022.
  1. [22]
    On 18 January 2022, the Respondent advised that the Applicant was not required to return to active duty until further notice and that he would remain on normal pay for this period. During this time, the Applicant continued to receive fortnightly remuneration as per usual, and was emailed payment advices showing annual leave accruing at the usual rate.
  1. [23]
    The payment advice dated 6 May 2022 indicates that the Applicant had accrued 198.58 hours of annual leave.
  1. [24]
    On 13 May 2022, the Respondent advised that the Applicant's employment was terminated with immediate effect and that four weeks' notice in lieu would be paid along with any statutory entitlements. The subsequent termination advice included payment for four weeks' notice in lieu, however did not include payment for accrued annual leave, listing all the annual leave balance as 0.00 hours. 
  1. [25]
    Section 339 of the IR Act provides that an employer must keep time and wages records. This section states: 

339  Time and wages record – industrial instrument employees

  1. (1)
    An employer must keep a time and wages record that contains the following particulars for each industrial instrument employee –

…

( c)  for each pay period –

  1. (i)
    The employee’s designation; and
  1. (ii)
    The name of the industrial instrument or permit under which the   employee is working; and
  1. (iii)
    The number of hours worked by the employee during each day and week, the times at which the employee started and stopped work, and details of work breaks including meal breaks; and
  1. (iv)
    If the industrial instrument or permit provides for –
  1. (A)
    a weekly, daily or hourly wage rate – details of the wage rate for each week, day, or hour at which the employee is paid; or
  1. (B)
    piecework rates – details of the piecework performed and the rate at which payment is made to the employee; and
  1. (v)
    The gross and net wages paid to the employee; and
  1. (vi)
    Details of any deductions made from the wages; and
  1. (vii)
    Contributions made by the employer to a superannuation fund;

…

Maximum penalty – 40 penalty units.

…

  1. [26]
    ‘Wages’ are defined at sch 5 of the IR Act as follows:

wages means -

  1. (a)
    an amount payable to an employee for –
  1. (i)
    work performed, or to be performed, by the employee; or
  1. (ii)
    a public holiday; or
  1. (iii)
    leave the employee is entitled to; or
  1. (iv)
    termination of employment; or
  1. (b)
    a salary; or
  1. (c)
    an amount payable from wages for the employee, with the employee’s written consent.
  1. [27]
    The Respondent was required to retain accurate time and wages records in accordance with s 339 of the IR Act. The payment advice provided to the Applicant on 6 May 2022 recorded accrued annual leave of 198.58 hours. The Respondent has removed the accrued annual leave amount from the termination advice. This action would suggest that the time and wages record for the Applicant was either not recorded accurately as required under s 339, or the record was accurate and the annual leave entitlement is payable in accordance with s 38 of the Act.
  1. [28]
    The Applicant’s employment conditions are contained in the Agreement. The annual leave entitlement is outlined in clause 6.1.1 of the Agreement which states:
  1. 6.1.1
    Employees will be entitled to six (6) weeks Annual Leave per year of service comprising:
  1. a)
    four (4) weeks of Annual Leave prescribed by the Queensland Employment   Standards (QES); and
  1. b)
    an additional two (2) weeks leave in recognition of the remote location of the service area, various cultural events that occur during the year and in lieu of payment of specific Allowances under the Award as specified in clause 6.1.5 of this Agreement.
  1. [29]
    Clause 6.1.2 of the Agreement provides for leave loading, stating:

All Annual Leave shall attract leave loading, except in the circumstances provided for in clause 6.1.4 where such entitled is ‘cashed out’.

  1. [30]
    Clause 6.1.6.3 states:

If the employment of any employee is terminated at the expiration of a full year of employment, Council shall be deemed to have given the annual leave to the employee from the date of the termination at the expiration of a full year of employment, Council shall be deemed to have given the annual leave to the employee from the date of the termination of the employment and shall forthwith pay to the employee in addition to all other amounts due for five (5) or six (6) weeks as the case may be and also ordinary pay for any public holiday occurring during such period of five (5) or six (6) weeks.

  1. [31]
    Section 31 of the IR Act provides that an employee is entitled to at least four weeks of annual leave for each 'completed year of employment'. Clause 6.1.1 of the Agreement provides for annual leave to be provided 'per year of service'.
  1. [32]
    It is agreed between the parties that, at the anniversary of the Applicant's employment on 12 November 2021, he had an annual leave accrual of 275.33 hours.
  1. [33]
    It is not in dispute that the Applicant did not perform work duties for the Respondent from the date of his anniversary of his employment on 12 November 2021 to the date of his termination on 13 May 2022. Throughout this period the Applicant was on various forms of leave and in correspondence dated 18 January 2022 the Respondent directed the Applicant not to attend the workplace pending the Applicant’s attendance at an independent medical examination.
  1. [34]
    At the date upon which the Applicant's employment was terminated, he had not completed a further year of employment or service. The entitlement to payment of annual leave upon termination is governed solely by s 38 of the IR Act as the Agreement does not refer to payment of annual leave on termination of employment prior to a full year of employment.
  1. [35]
    The Respondent submits that there is a distinction made in the IR Act between s 31, which provides entitlement to the period of annual leave for completing a year of employment, and s 38 which provides that where employment ceases after a part of the year the entitlement extends only to the proportion of annual leave accrued for a period they engaged in work.
  1. [36]
    The Respondent submits that as the Applicant performed no work from his anniversary date on 12 November 2021 until the termination of his employment, he has no proportionate entitlement upon termination pursuant to s 38(4). The Applicant’s case is that proportionate entitlement was payable upon termination for the period he was employed between 12 November 2021 and the date of termination.
  1. [37]
    To determine if the Applicant has an entitlement to payment of proportionate annual leave between 12 November 2021 and his date of termination, it is necessary to consider the operation of s 38(4) of the IR Act. Section 38(4) provides that an employee is entitled to the payment of proportionate annual leave if the employee has worked part of a year, including any annual leave loading the employee is entitled to under s 36.
  1. [38]
    The objective of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislative purpose as expressed in the text of the statutory provisions. In confirming that the context of the provision must always be considered in the process of statutory construction, Merrell DP referred to the following in Schipp[8]:
  1. [12]
    In the matter of Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority it was stated:
  1. …the duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have. Ordinarily, that meaning (the legal meaning) will correspond with the grammatical meaning of the provision. But not always. The context of the words, the consequences of a literal or grammatical construction, the purpose of the statute or the canons of construction may require the words of a legislative provision to be read in a way that does not correspond with the literal or grammatical meaning.
  1. [13]
    Further in Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos[2], Dixon CJ stated:
  1. …context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed.
  1. [39]
    Section 14B(1)(a) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) provides that extrinsic material can be used in assisting interpretation if the provision is ambiguous or obscure. Whilst the term 'worked' is not obscure, it is arguably ambiguous in this context given the number of possible meanings.
  1. [40]
    The term 'worked' is not defined in the IR Act. The Macquarie Concise dictionary 7th edition 2017 defines 'work' in 76 different ways, including the following:
  1. 1.
    exertion directed to produce or accomplish something’ labour; toil.
  1. 2.
    that on which exertion or labour is expended; something to be made or done; as task or undertaking.
  1. 3.
    productive or operative activity

…

  1. 6.
    employment; a job, especially that by which one earns a living.

…

  1. 18.
    to be employed, as for one’s livelihood.

…

  1. [41]
    Applying the above definitions to the phrase 'worked part of a year' can result in an interpretation that a person must have physically laboured for part of a year or that a person simply be employed in the job for part of a year. As submitted by the way of example by the Applicant, a person saying they worked for Coles would be taken to mean that the person is employed by Coles.
  1. [42]
    The language used in the equivalent s 71EH(4) of the 1999 IR Act prior to its repeal refer to circumstances where an employee 'has been employed' for a period of less than a year. There is no reference to the changed wording from 'has been employed' to 'worked' in the Explanatory Memorandum for the IR Act. If the legislative intention was to replace the phrase 'has been employed' in the 1999 IR Act for the word 'worked' in the current IR Act in order to change the access to proportionate leave entitlements, it would be expected that such a change would be referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum. The change from 'employed' to 'worked' is not referred to nor is any reason provided for the change in the Explanatory Memorandum. This indicates that the legislature’s adoption of the term 'worked' was not intended to give rise to a significant change in the entitlements to proportionate leave entitlements.
  1. [43]
    That statutory purpose of s 38(4) is to provide employees with the benefit of a proportionate accrual of annual leave when their employment is terminated prior to completion of a full year of employment. The recognition of annual leave accrual during a period in which the employee was not in the workplace due to leave arrangements whilst continuing to be employed on normal pay is consistent with this purpose.
  1. [44]
    The Respondent submits that the term 'worked' does not apply to any period of time when an employee is on leave or absent from duty, citing Transport Workers Union of Australia v Jetstar Services Pty Ltd ('Jetstar') [9]. In Jetstar the Fair Work Commission was required to consider the term as contained in a clause within an enterprise agreement in relation to penalty rates. In Community and Public Sector Union, NSW Branch v Northcott Supported Living Ltd,[10] Katzmann J held in relation to a transfer of work under the Fair Work Act[11] that a narrow approach of the meaning of 'work' is not called for, stating:

“Work” in the context of s 311 refers to the nature or character of the employment, rather than the particular duties the employee was undertaking or will or may be called upon to undertake. It is abundantly clear from the Explanatory Memorandum that that was the legislative intention. This interpretation serves the legislative purpose. As a matter of principle, focusing on the substance of the work, rather than the particular duties that may or may not be required or performed at any particular time, would not unduly interfere with the interests of employers in running their enterprises efficiently.[12]

  1. [45]
    I hold a similar view that a narrow approach of the meaning 'worked' is not appropriate in this matter on the basis that the entitlement to annual leave accrues by virtue of being employed rather than the completion of work.
  1. [46]
    The Respondent also submits that the Independent Medical Report confirms that the Applicant was not in a position to medically perform his normal duties from January 2022 until the date of termination of his employment. This situation is not unlike that of employees who take periods of sick or personal leave and are unable to perform their normal duties yet continue to accrue annual leave.[13] I accept the Applicant’s submission that any legislative intent that annual leave not be accrued whilst on personal or annual leave would need to be outlined in the clearest of language. No such language indicating such an intent is evident in s 38 of the IR Act.
  1. [47]
    I note the parties' reference to the IR Act as beneficial legislation and the Applicant’s submission that where there is ambiguity in relation to statutory interpretation, provisions should be construed in a manner that is more favourable to the employee who is to benefit from the provision. I accept the Respondent’s submission that even if legislation is beneficial overall, not all sections of the legislation are to be read beneficially and some sections may be intended to omit access to a benefit. In this matter however, there is no evidence of an intention to deny access to the benefit of proportionate annual leave accrual where employment ceases within a year. If there was evidence of a legislative intention to limit access to the benefit conferred in s 38 through the amendment of the term 'employed' to 'worked', I would have no difficulty in interpreting s 38 accordingly. However, in the absence of such evidence, and after considering that the dictionary meaning of the term lends itself to both possible interpretations, I am of the view that the correct interpretation is that an employee is entitled to proportionate annual leave where employment ceased within a year in accordance with s 38(4).
  1. [48]
    On the basis that the Applicant worked for the Respondent between 12 November 2021 and 13 May 2021, the Applicant was entitled to accrue annual leave during this period and be paid the proportionate amount along with leave loading upon termination.

Order

  1. [49]
    I make the following orders:
  1. That the Applicant be paid annual leave and annual leave loading accrued up to the date of termination.
  1. Failing agreement on the amount, to be the subject of a further application to the Commission.
  1. Liberty to apply.

Footnotes

[1] The Respondent referenced Transport Workers' Union of Australia v Jetstar Services Pty Ltd [2017] FWC 2535.

[2] McIlroy-Ranga v Torres Strait Island Regional Council [2022] QIRC 448.

[3] [2019] ICQ 009.

[4] Transport Workers' Union of Australia v Jetstar Services Pty Ltd [2017] FWC 2535, [46].

[5] New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council v Minister Administering the Crown Land Act (2016) 260 CLR 232.

[6] See e.g., Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde [2002] FCA 250; United Voice v Wilsons Security [2015] FWC 2507, [63]-[67]; Flight Attendants Association of Australia – International Division v Virgin Australia t/as Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd [2018] FWC 3017.

[7] sworn on 14 September 2022.

[8] Schipp v The Star Entertainment Pty Ltd [2019] QIRC 49.

[9] Citing consideration of penalty rates in a certified agreement in Transport Workers Union of Australia v Jetstar Services Pty Ltd [2017] FWC 2535.

[10] [2021] FCA 8.

[11] 2009 (Cth).

[12] At [161]-[162].

[13] See Rankin v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 048.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    McIlroy-Ranga v Torres Strait Island Regional Council (No. 2)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    McIlroy-Ranga v Torres Strait Island Regional Council (No. 2)

  • MNC:

    [2023] QIRC 33

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Power IC

  • Date:

    07 Feb 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Community and Public Sector Union, NSW Branch v Northcott Supported Living Ltd [2021] FCA 8
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] FCA 8
Cite 2 - [2021] FCA 8
Flight Attendants Association of Australia - International Division v Virgin Australia t/as Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd [2018] FWC 3017
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] FWC 3017
Cite 2 - [2018] FWC 3017
McIlroy-Ranga v Torres Strait Island Regional Council [2022] QIRC 448
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 448
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 448
New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council v Minister Administering the Crown Land Act (2016) 260 CLR 232
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2016) 260 CLR 232
Cite 2 - (2016) 260 CLR 232
Rankin v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 48
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 48
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 48
Schipp v The Star Entertainment Qld Limited [2019] QIRC 49
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 49
Cite 2 - [2019] QIRC 49
Schipp v The Star Entertainment Qld Ltd; Minister for Education and Minister for Industrial Relations v The Star Entertainment Qld Ltd [2019] ICQ 9
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] ICQ 9
Cite 2 - [2019] ICQ 9
Transport Workers' Union of Australia v Jetstar Services Pty Ltd [2017] FWC 2535
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] FWC 2535
Cite 2 - [2017] FWC 2535
Cite 3 - [2017] FWC 2535
Cite 4 - [2017] FWC 2535
United Voice v Wilsons Security [2015] FWC 2507
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] FWC 2507
Cite 2 - [2015] FWC 2507
Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde [2002] FCA 250
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] FCA 250
Cite 2 - [2002] FCA 250

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Torres Strait Island Regional Council v McIlroy-Ranga (No 2) [2023] ICQ 292 citations
1

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