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Glen v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service)[2023] QIRC 358

Glen v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service)[2023] QIRC 358

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Glen v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) [2023] QIRC 358

PARTIES: 

Glen, Daniels Charles

(Applicant)

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service)

(Respondent)

CASE NO.:

TD/2022/199

PROCEEDING:

Interlocutory application

DELIVERED ON:

14 December 2023

MEMBER:

Hartigan DP

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDER:

Application TD/2022/199 is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT – applicant employed by Queensland Ambulance Service – where the Applicant failed to comply with the QAS HR Policy vaccination requirements – where applicant did not comply with the vaccination requirements – where respondent filed an interlocutory application seeking an order that the proceedings be dismissed – whether discretion to dismiss the proceedings is enlivened – proceedings dismissed

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 317, s 320 and s 541

Industrial Relations (Tribunals ) Rules 2011 r 45

CASES:

Brasell-Dellow v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)  [2021] QIRC 356

Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18

Colwell v Wellways Australia [2002] FWC 1086

Fawcett v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) No 2 [2022] QIRC 314

Harris v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 342

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Mocnik & Others v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 058

Paul Scott v State of Queensland & Ors [2019] QIRC 115

State of Queensland v Lockhart [2014] ICQ 008

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    The State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) ('the QAS'), the Respondent in this proceeding, has filed an application seeking an order that the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to:
  1. (a)
    section 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act') on the basis that further proceedings by the Commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest; or
  1. (b)
    rule 45(3) of the Industrial Relations Tribunal Rules 2011 ('the Tribunal Rules') on the basis that the Applicant has failed to comply with directions issued by the Commission.
  1. [2]
    Mr Glen is the applicant in the proceedings and applies for reinstatement following the termination of his employment from his position as an Advanced Care Paramedic with the QAS. Mr Glen contends that the dismissal was harsh, unjust and unreasonable.
  1. [3]
    Mr Glen's employment was terminated on the basis that he failed to comply with a direction of a reasonable person including by not providing his line manager or uploading into the designated system evidence of vaccination confirming that he has received the prescribed number of doses of a COVID-19 vaccine.
  1. [4]
    Mr Glen opposes the application to dismiss the proceedings and submits that his matter should proceed to a hearing.

Relevant legislation

  1. [5]
    The application for reinstatement is filed pursuant to s 317 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act') which appears in Division 2, Part 2 of Chapter 8, 'Unfair dismissals'.  Section 316, which is within Division 2, provides that a dismissal is unfair if it is harsh, unjust and unreasonable.
  1. [6]
    The matters the Commission must consider when deciding whether a dismissal is unfair are set out in s 320 of the IR Act as follows:
  1. 320
    Matters to be considered in deciding an application
  1. In deciding whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the commission must consider -
  1. (a)
    whether the employee was notified of the reason for dismissal; and
  1. (b)
    whether the dismissal related to -
  1. (i)
    the operational requirements of the employer's undertaking, establishment or service; or
  1. (ii)
    the employee's conduct, capacity or performance; and
  1. (c)
    if the dismissal relates to the employee's conduct, capacity or performance -
  1. (i)
    whether the employee had been warned about the conduct, capacity or performance; or
  1. (ii)
    whether the employee was given an opportunity to respond to the claim about the conduct, capacity or performance; and
  1. (d)
    any other matters the commission considers relevant.
  1. …
  1. [7]
    The application to dismiss is brought pursuant to s 541 of the IR Act, or in the alternative, pursuant to r 45 of the Tribunal Rules. Section 541 of the IR Act relevantly provides:
  1. 541
    Decisions generally
  1. The court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following -
  1. …
  1. (b)
    dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers -
  1. (i)
    the cause is trivial; or
  1. (ii)
    further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest;
  1. …
  1. [8]
    With respect to the exercise of the discretion to dismiss proceedings pursuant to s 541 of the IR Act, the Commission must act with due circumspection and by undertaking a proper consideration of relevant material. In Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)[1], Martin J, in considering the application of s 541 of the IR Act, stated:[2]
  1. [27]
    Insofar as it may confine the exercise of discretion under s 541, the purpose of the Act is stated as follows:
  1. “3 Main purpose of Act
  1. The main purpose of this Act is to provide for a framework for cooperative industrial relations that—
  1. (a)
    is fair and balanced; and
  1. (b)
    supports the delivery of high quality services, economic prosperity and social justice for Queenslanders.”
  1. [28]
    The process for consideration of an application under s 541 does not require that the respondent’s case be taken at its highest. The cognate provisions in federal legislation9 were frequently considered by Full Benches of the federal tribunal, the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia. The accepted approach was that the applicant bore the onus of making the claim for relief. But the ascertainment in any particular case of where the public interest lay often depended on a balancing of interests, including competing public interests, and was very much a question of fact and degree.
  1. [29]
    As the power given to the Commission by s 541 can prevent a party from pursuing relief otherwise available under the IR Act it is one which is to be exercised with due circumspection on a proper consideration of relevant materials. 11 A “proper consideration” cannot be made where the case for the respondent is simply taken at its highest. While the onus remains on an applicant, the requirement to consider the “public interest” cannot be satisfied if an artificial inflation of the respondent’s case is applied. Indeed, to take a respondent’s case at its highest would almost always result in the dismissal of an application under this section. On an application of this type, a respondent is not relieved of any requirement to advance a case.
  1. [30]
    In considering the public interest, regard must be had to the legislative basis of the principal relief sought and the evidence before the Commission. The history of the anti-bullying provisions under the Act does not provide further guidance as to their object, save that the inspiration for the Queensland anti-bullying scheme was its federal counterpart.12 The intention behind the cognate provisions under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) was to provide workers with “a quick way to stop bullying so they do not suffer further harm or injury.”

(citations omitted).

…

  1. [9]
    In State of Queensland v Lockhart[3] the Industrial Court considered the meaning of "public interest" in the context of the exercise of the discretion under s 331 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (repealed).[4] The Industrial Court relevantly held:[5]
  1. [21]
    In O'Sullivan v Farrer Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ considered the expression "in the public interest". Their Honours wrote:

"Indeed, the expression, 'in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only 'in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable … given reasons to be [pronounced] definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view."

  1. [22]
    In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin, the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia in considering what constitutes "the public interest" wrote:

"Appeals have lain on the ground that it is in the public interest that leave should be granted in the predecessors to the Act for decades. It has not been considered useful or appropriate to define the concept in other than the most general terms and we do not intend to do so. The expression ‘in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only by the objects of the legislation in question.

Although the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issues of importance and general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive, or that the legal principles applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar matters, it seems to us that none of those elements is present in this case."

(citations omitted).

…

  1. [10]
    Relevantly, the purpose of the Tribunal Rules is to provide for the just and expeditious disposition of the business of, relevantly, the Commission at a minimum of expense.[6]
  1. [11]
    Rule 45 of the Tribunal Rules will apply in circumstances where an Applicant has received a notice of a directions order made by the Commission and has failed to comply with them. One of the consequences of failing to comply with a directions order is that the Commission may dismiss the proceeding. Rule 45 is set out in the following terms:
  1. 45
    Failure to attend or to comply with directions order
  1. (1)
    This rule applies if—
  1. (a)
    a party to a proceeding receives notice of a directions order made by the court, commission or registrar stating a time, date and place for a hearing or conference for the proceeding; and
  1. (b)
    the party fails to attend the hearing or conference.
  1. (2)
    This rule also applies if—
  1. (a)
    a party to a proceeding receives notice of a directions order made by the court, commission or registrar; and
  1. (b)
    the party fails to comply with the order.
  1. (3)
    The court, commission or registrar may—
  1. (a)
    dismiss the proceeding; or
  1. (b)
    make a further directions order; or
  1. (c)
    make another order dealing with the proceeding that the court, commission or registrar considers appropriate, including, for example, a final order; or
  1. (d)
    make orders under paragraphs (b) and (c).
  1. [12]
    In Paul Scott v State of Queensland & Ors,[7] Vice President O'Connor stated in respect of r 45 of the Tribunal Rules:
  1. [8]
    In Quaedvlieg and Ors v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd his Honour President Hall, in dealing with an application to strike out for want of prosecution, cited with approval the reasoning of Thomas JA in Quinlan v Rothwell & Anor as follows:

There is now a consciousness of the need for some level of efficiency in the use of the courts as a public resource. That, of course, must not displace the need for reasonable access to the courts and the provision of justice according to law in each matter, but it highlights the fact that the former laissez faire attitude by courts towards the leisurely conduct of actions at the will of the parties has ended. At the same time the rules of court are not an end in themselves. They do not exist for the discipline of practitioners or clients, or for the protection of courts from inefficient litigants, but rather as a means of ensuring that issues will be defined in an orderly way and that parties have the opportunity of full preparation of their case before the trial commences. The rules also afford defendants the means of bringing to an end actions in which the other party will not abide by the rules.

  1. [9]
    Whilst Quinlan v Rothwell & Anor related to the application of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 in respect of application to dismiss for want of prosecution, in my respectful view, the reasoning of Thomas JA has equal application to the current proceedings.
  1. [10]
    In Lenijamar Pty Ltd and Ors v AGC (Advances) Ltd, Wilcox and Gummow JJ in dealing with a similar provision under the Federal Court Rules stated that the discretion conferred by the rule was:

unconfined, except for the condition of noncompliance with a direction ... [b]ut two situations are obvious candidates for the exercise of the power." The first were "cases in which the history of non-compliance by an applicant is such as to indicate an inability or unwillingness to co-operate with the Court and the other party or parties in having the matter ready for trial within an acceptable period". The second were cases "whatever the applicant's state of mind or resources - in which the non-compliance is continuing and occasioning unnecessary delay, expense or other prejudice to the respondent.

  1. [11]
    Their Honours went on to observe:

Even though the most recent non-compliance may be minor, the cumulative effect of an applicant's defaults may be such as to satisfy the judge that the applicant is either subjectively unwilling to co-operate, or for some reason, is unable to do so. Such a conclusion would not readily be reached; but where it was, fairness to the respondent would normally require the summary dismissal of the proceeding.

  1. [13]
    The discretion conferred under r 45 of the Tribunal Rules is to be exercised judicially.[8]

Relevant background

Disciplinary processes

  1. [14]
    On 13 September 2021, the QAS issued the Code of Practice and the QAS Human Resource Procedure – COVID-19 Vaccination Requirements ('the QAS HR Procedure'), which required all existing and prospective QAS employees who fall within certain high- risk groups to be vaccinated against COVID-19, unless the employee has a valid exemption. Relevantly, Mr Glen's employment as an Advanced Care Paramedic falls within a high-risk group of QAS employees that was required to be vaccinated against COVID-19.
  1. [15]
    The QAS HR Procedure provides that existing employees who fall within the high-risk groups must have received the first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 30 September 2021 and a second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 31 October 2021, unless the employee has a valid exemption.
  1. [16]
    On 31 October 2021, Mr Glen applied for an exemption to the mandatory vaccine requirements, on the basis of "other exceptional circumstances". Mr Glen attached a letter in support of the application. This letter detailed concerns he held regarding the risks of COVID- 19 vaccinations generally and expressed Mr Glen's reluctance to receive a second dose of a COVID- 19 vaccine until the vaccine has "passed the true clinical trial period".
  1. [17]
    On 31 January 2022, the QAS HR Procedure was replaced by the QAS HR Policy - Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Requirements ('the QAS HR Policy').
  1. [18]
    After the implementation of the QAS HR Policy, on 1 February 2022, the QAS wrote to Mr Glen asking him to advise whether:
  1. he intended to receive the first and second dose of a COVID-19 vaccination by 27 February 2022 and withdraw his application for an exemption; or
  2. he wished to have his existing exemption application considered under the new provisions of the QAS HR Policy and, if so, whether Mr Glen wanted to provide any further submissions or material to support his application.
  1. [19]
    Mr Glen did not respond to this correspondence and his application was considered on the materials previously provided.
  1. [20]
    By letter dated 18 February 2022, the QAS advised Mr Glen that it had determined to refuse Mr Glen's exemption application.
  1. [21]
    Mr Glen was directed to comply with the QAS HR Policy and receive a second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine within seven days of receipt of the decision. Mr Glen did not seek an internal review of the decision.
  1. [22]
    By email correspondence dated 25 February 2022, Mr Glen provided a medical certificate and advised the QAS of the following:

Thank you for your correspondence regarding my application for exemption from further COVID-19 vaccinations. While I don't agree with many of your assertions and I won't be able to voluntarily comply at this time, I have further information that is relevant to the stated lawful direction. I was unfortunate enough to acquire COVID-19 in January of this year and have therefore been given a temporary medical exemption from receiving COVID-19 vaccinations. I have attached the relevant medical certificate for your perusal. In accordance with this, I wouldn't be able to comply with your limited options until 8/05/2022.

Please feel free to contact me or my lawyer if any further information should be required.

  1. [23]
    By correspondence dated 4 March 2022, the QAS advised Mr Glen that previous SARS- CoV-2 infection is not a contraindication to vaccination. The QAS also provided Mr Glen with an extension to 9 March 2022 to receive a second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine in order to comply with the direction.
  1. [24]
    Mr Glen did not adduce any evidence that he had complied with the direction.
  1. [25]
    By correspondence dated 18 March 2022, the QAS invited Mr Glen to show cause in relation to the allegation that he failed to comply with the requirements of the QAS HR Policy to receive the prescribed doses of a COVID-19 vaccine.
  1. [26]
    During the show cause process, the QAS suspended Mr Glen from duty on normal remuneration. The QAS also advised Mr Glen that it was considering suspending him without pay and provided Mr Glen with seven days to respond as to why he should not be suspended without pay.
  1. [27]
    By correspondence dated 24 March 2022 and 25 March 2022, Mr Glen's legal representative raised concerns, inter alia, about the appeal period for an internal review of Mr Glen's exemption application as well as the show cause process overall.
  1. [28]
    By correspondence dated 9 April 2022, the QAS advised Mr Glen that it rescinded its letter of 18 March 2022 and provided Mr Glen with a further 14 days to seek an internal review of the decision.
  1. [29]
    On 6 May 2022, the QAS advised Mr Glen that it had confirmed the decision dated 18 February 2022 and that his application for exemption from compliance with the QAS HR Policy had been denied. The QAS directed Mr Glen to receive the required doses of a COVID-19 vaccine within seven days of receipt of the decision ('the direction').
  1. [30]
    By letter dated 8 June 2022, the QAS invited Mr Glen to show cause in relation to the allegation that he failed to follow the QAS HR Policy which required employees to receive at least two doses of a COVID-19 vaccine ('the allegation').
  1. [31]
    On 29 June 2022, Mr Glen's legal representative provided a response on his behalf as to why a disciplinary finding should not be made against him.
  1. [32]
    By letter dated 11 July 2022, the QAS advised Mr Glen that the allegation was substantiated, that the QAS was proposing disciplinary action and provided Mr Glen with seven days to show cause why disciplinary action of termination of employment should not be taken.
  1. [33]
    Mr Glen did not provide a response to the show cause notice.
  1. [34]
    On 4 August 2022, the QAS determined to terminate Mr Glen's employment.

Allegations of non-compliance with directions

  1. [35]
    On 24 May 2023, the Commission issued directions with respect to the filing of material to progress the matter to hearing.
  1. [36]
    Mr Glen did not comply with Orders (11) and (12) of the directions issued on 24 May 2023 which required Mr Glen to file a list of witnesses that he proposes to call at the hearing and an outline of evidence for each of the witnesses by 6 September 2023.
  1. [37]
    On 26 September 2023, Mr Glen filed an application seeking that the directions issued on 24 May 2023 be vacated and that new directions be issued for the filing of the following by the parties:
  1. a list of witnesses;
  2. an outline of evidence for each witness; and
  3. an outline of argument and argument in reply.
  1. [38]
    In support of his application, Mr Glen filed an affidavit affirmed on 26 September 2023 which outlined his reasons for not complying with the current directions as follows:

…

  1. On or about 24 May 2023 I received the Directions. However, I was facing exceptional circumstances that impeded my ability to comply with the order.
  2. Firstly, I had a prior commitment to attend my wedding on 26 August 2023. This commitment had been arranged long before the Directions were issued, and I had no control over the scheduling of the event.
  3. Secondly, due to the aforementioned wedding and other prior commitments, I found myself severely short on time to adequately address the requirements of the Directions.
  4. Furthermore, during this period, my grandfather-in-law fell seriously ill and was hospitalised in Brisbane. His condition was critical, and I had to provide support and assistance to my family during this difficult time.
  5. In the midst of these events, I also had to relocate from Brisbane to Townsville due to personal reasons. This move added further complexity to my situation and made it challenging to meet the commission's requirements.
  6. My non-compliance with the directions order was not deliberate but rather a result of these unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances.

…

  1. [39]
    On 27 September 2023, the QAS filed the interlocutory application to dismiss the proceedings.
  1. [40]
    On 10 October 2023, following a mention with respect to the two application that had been filed, the Commission issued directions for the parties to file submissions with respect to both applications. Those directions also provided that unless an application was made for an oral hearing on or before 12 noon on 23 November 2023, the applications would be dealt with on the papers. No application for an oral hearing was received by either party.

The proceedings

  1. [41]
    Mr Glen relies on the following grounds in support of his application for reinstatement:
  1. that Mr Glen's family has a "history of illness" that may be "exacerbated" if he were to receive the prescribed doses of a COVID-19 vaccine;
  2. that the dismissal was unfair because at all times Mr Glen had a "valid reason" for not receiving the prescribed doses of a COVID-19 vaccine;
  3. that at all times Mr Glen was willing to wear Personal Protective Equipment ('PPE') as well as undergo daily COVID-19 testing to mitigate the risks associated with contracting or transmitting COVID-19;
  4. that Mr Glen was advised by the QAS that he would be able to attend work so long as he wore PPE;
  5. that during the show cause process Mr Glen requested that the QAS consult with his medical practitioner to discuss his individual medical circumstances in assessing the necessity of requiring him to receive the prescribed doses of a COVID-19 vaccine;
  6. that the termination was unjust because Mr Glen is not "guilty of any misconduct" as the QAS drew unreasonable inferences from Mr Glen's response during the show cause process; and
  7. that the termination was harsh because the QAS did not have regard to Mr Glen's personal and economic situation and that the termination was "disproportionate to the gravity of the alleged conduct".

Commission's power to dismiss proceedings

  1. [42]
    The Commission is vested with a discretion under s 541 of the IR Act to dismiss a cause, or refrain from hearing or deciding a cause if the Commission considers that further proceedings by the Commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.
  1. [43]
    In exercising the discretion, the Commission is mindful that the power to dismiss or refrain from hearing a cause is to be employed with due circumspection on a proper consideration of relevant materials.[9]  The value judgment vested in s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act is a broad one.[10]
  1. [44]
    The QAS submits that the proceedings be dismissed on the basis that further proceedings would not be necessary or desirable in the public interest as the matters raised by Mr Glen in his application for reinstatement have been extensively considered and determined in numerous public service appeals and the collective reinstatement matter of Mocnik & Others v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[11].
  1. [45]
    Mr Glen provided the following brief submission in support of his position that the proceedings not be dismissed:
  1. 5.
    The applicant in his application of 26 August 2022 states that:
  1. a.
    His employment was terminated in circumstances where he was working throughout the pandemic. He did not receive a notice to vaccinate until the end of 2021. He continued working and was only given a copy of the new policy in February 2022. He was then terminated on 5 August 2022 (which is at the tail end of the pandemic where public interest in it and the risks associated with it seemed to be reduced due to widespread immunisation).
  1. b.
    He was willing to underdo [sic] daily COVID-19 testing and wear all necessary protective equipment to mitigate his risk of contracting COVID-19.
  1. c.
    The initial view of the respondent was that the applicant could continue to work while utilising protective equipment. This was somewhat arbitrarily changed later on.
  1. d.
    The applicant’s employment was terminated in circumstances where there were non-frontline duties available for him to complete.
  1. 6.
    Cases such as Mocnik & Others v State of Queensland [2023] QIRC 058 must be seen in their own light, and in reference to the arguments raised. That case in particular focused on anti-discrimination legislation and the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), as well as the requirement to consult under various other workplace legislation. This case did not engage with the argument raised in the current case, being that the applicant in his particular role was able to rely on personal protective equipment, and in fact had an indication initially from other more senior employees of the respondent that this would be suitable. It also naturally does not engage with the applicant’s personal circumstances in relation to the availability of an alternate non-frontline role for him. In the present case, the applicant is raising his own personal circumstances, and those ought to be considered.
  1. [46]
    In making these submissions, Mr Glen does no more than nominate alternative methods that he would have preferred to have adopted to avoid compliance with the direction. In doing so, Mr Glen seems to advance that because alternative methods (as nominated by him) were available, then his non-compliance with the direction issued by his employer was justified.
  1. [47]
    On the material, Mr Glen was reluctant to comply with the direction on the basis of his understanding of his and his family's medical history and "concerns" he held in relation to the COVID-19 vaccination. Mr Glen sought an exemption from the direction on this basis. After a review process, a decision confirming that Mr Glen had not been granted an exemption from complying with the direction was confirmed.
  1. [48]
    Mr Glen does not contend that the direction was not lawful or reasonable. Indeed, Mr Glen's Statement of Facts and Contentions[12] accept that the direction applied to him. There is no dispute that Mr Glen did not adduce evidence of being administered the two doses of the vaccination in accordance with the direction. That is the allegation that was put to Mr Glen in the show cause process and, once substantiated, formed the basis for his dismissal. In this context, the matters that Mr Glen raises in his submissions and in the Statement of Facts and Contentions about alternative methods he would have preferred to have been adopted are irrelevant.
  1. [49]
    Mr Glen was dismissed from his employment because he failed to comply with a lawful and reasonable direction, including a vaccination requirement which has been found in this and other jurisdictions to be a valid reason.[13] In Brasell-Dellow v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)[14] it was held that a "direction must be obeyed provided compliance does not involve illegality and the directive is reasonable".[15] Mr Glen raises no arguments that undermine these findings. Accordingly, in this regard, the public interest would not be served by further proceedings.
  1. [50]
    Further, Mr Glen's arguments are not novel or unique and have already been the subject of judicial determination.[16] The contentions relied on by Mr Glen raise no reasonable excuse for his failure to comply with the directive. It is not in the public interest to hear and determine these proceedings.
  1. [51]
    Having regard to the material before the Commission, it is determined that Mr Glen has limited prospects of success. Further, I am of the view that further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.
  1. [52]
    Given this finding, it is unnecessary to determine the application by the Respondent that the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to rule 45 of the Tribunal Rules because of Mr Glen's failure to comply with the Commission's directions and Mr Glen's application for fresh directions to be issued.
  1. [53]
    The Respondent has not applied for costs. Accordingly, I will make no order as to costs.

Order

  1. [54]
    Accordingly, I make the following order:

Application TD/2022/199 is dismissed.

Footnotes

[1] [2019] ICQ 18.

[2] [27] – [30].

[3] [2014] ICQ 008.

[4] Section 331 of the Industrial Relations act 1991 is in near identical terms to s 541 of the IR Act.

[5] [21] – [22].

[6] Industrial Relation Tribunal Rules 2011 (Qld) r 6.

[7] [2019] QIRC 115.

[8] Paul Scott v State of Queensland & Ors  [2019] QIRC 115 [13] per O'Connor VP, citing House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ).

[9] Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18, [29].

[10] Ibid, [32].

[11] [2023] QIRC 058 ('Mocnik').

[12] Applicant's Statement of Facts and Contentions filed 15 June 2023 at [24].

[13] Fawcett v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) No 2 [2022] QIRC 314; Harris v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 342; Colwell v Wellways Australia [2002] FWC 1086.

[14] [2021] QIRC 356.

[15] Ibid at [65].

[16] Mocnik v State of Queensland [2023] QIRC 088; Brassell-Dellow v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 356; Mackenzie v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 121.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Glen v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Glen v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service)

  • MNC:

    [2023] QIRC 358

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Hartigan DP

  • Date:

    14 Dec 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Brasell-Dellow v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 356
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 356
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 356
Cite 3 - [2021] QIRC 356
Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] ICQ 18
Cite 2 - [2019] ICQ 18
Cite 3 - [2019] ICQ 18
Davidson v Blackwood [2014] ICQ 8
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] ICQ 8
Cite 2 - [2014] ICQ 8
Fawcett v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) No 2 [2022] QIRC 314
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 314
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 314
Harris v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 342
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 342
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 342
House v R (1936) HCA 40
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1936) HCA 40
Cite 2 - (1936) HCA 40
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Cite 2 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Mackenzie v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 121
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 121
Mocnik v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 58
3 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 58
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 58
Cite 3 - [2023] QIRC 58
Paul Scott v State of Queensland [2019] QIRC 115
3 citations
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Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 115
Cite 2 - [2019] QIRC 115
Cite 3 - [2019] QIRC 115
Sher v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 88
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 88

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

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