KB v State of Queensland (Department of Education)
[2024] QIRC 143
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- Unreported Judgment
- KB v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[2024] QIRC 143
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KB v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[2024] QIRC 143
KB v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[2024] QIRC 143
QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
CITATION: | KB v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 143 |
PARTIES: | KB (Appellant) v State of Queensland (Department of Education) (Respondent) |
CASE NO: | PSA/2023/219 |
PROCEEDING: | Public Sector Appeal – Appeal against a transfer decision |
DELIVERED ON: | 6 June 2024 |
MEMBER: | Dwyer IC |
HEARD AT: | On the papers |
ORDER: | The Orders contained in paragraph [59] of these Reasons for Decision |
CATCHWORDS: | PUBLIC SECTOR – CLASSIFICATION, PROMOTION OR TRANSFER – appeal against a transfer decision – decision to transfer appellant to another school – required transfer – request to stay at base school – where history of domestic and family violence – where suppression of appellant’s name necessary – consideration of ‘reasonable’ travel time – whether decision fair and reasonable – decision appealed against is set aside |
LEGISLATION AND INSTRUMENTS: | Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 451, s 562B, s 562C Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld), s 131, s 161, s 162 Industrial Relations Tribunal Rules 2011 (Qld) r 97 Guideline for the assessment of compassionate circumstances Teacher Transfer Guidelines |
CASES: | Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10 Gilmour v Waddell & Ors [2019] QSC 170 Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018) ST v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 004 |
Reasons for Decision
Suppression of appellant’s name
- [1]The appellant in these proceedings and her children have been the victims of domestic violence. There is a history of Domestic Violence Orders (‘DVOs’) and breaches of the DVOs. The details of these matters are discussed more fully later in these reasons.
- [2]Neither party to this appeal has requested suppression orders or an order to seal the file. In my view, the uncontested history of domestic and family violence is such that both orders are appropriate in the interest of the appellant’s privacy and safety.[1]
- [3]The appellant will be identified in these reasons as ‘KB’. Other possible identifying factors such as place of employment etc will also be subject to some degree of de-identification in these reasons.
Background
- [4]KB is employed by the Department of Education ('the Department') as a teacher at a school in the South East Region (‘the current school’). She has worked there since July 2016.
- [5]On 8 September 2023, KB was notified by the Department that she was to be transferred to another school within the region (‘the transfer school’), effective 18 January 2024.
- [6]On 22 September 2023, KB applied for an internal review of the decision to transfer her from the current school to the transfer school, requesting that the transfer be set aside.
- [7]By way of correspondence dated 25 October 2023, Mr Chris Hodgson, Director, HR Business Partnering, South East Region, advised KB that her internal review appeal had been dismissed and confirmed that she was to be transferred to the transfer school (‘the decision’). In that same correspondence, he advised KB that her transfer had been deferred to 2025 having regard to the circumstances she reported in her internal appeal. Confirmation of the transfer, although deferred, is the decision which is the subject of this appeal.
Grounds of appeal
- [8]In her Appeal Notice, KB contended that the decision be overturned on compassionate grounds, citing:
- She is the sole parent of two children. She does not have access to family support or assistance to aide in caring for her children.
- The internal review panel overlooked serious concerns of potential exposure to danger to her children from their estranged father who is a habitual alcohol and drug user. She submits her employer owes a duty of care to her children when a forced transfer would leave them unattended.
- A letter from her General Practitioner adequately demonstrates the significant level of emotional turmoil her family has experienced, and that further stress caused by a forced transfer may exacerbate her mental health condition.
- The internal review panel failed to consider her daughter’s psychological condition and resumption of specialist treatment. KB acknowledges that she did not provide evidence of this to the internal review panel.
- The commute to the transfer school is unviable because the route incorporates the Pacific Motorway which is in constant ‘chaos’, and subject to high congestion and frequent delays. She contends this will result in a commute greater than 50 minutes, which is inconsistent with the Teacher Transfer Guidelines. Further, KB also submits that the extra distance travelled will burden her with increased expense which her current financial situation cannot accommodate.
- Her children have strong community and sporting ties. As a sole parent, she needs to be available to courier her children to and from these events, and a transfer to the transfer school will preclude her from doing this. The treating psychologists for her children have advised KB that her children’s continued involvement in these sporting endeavours are imperative for their psychological, physical and social wellbeing.
- She appreciates that the transfer has been deferred until 2025, however, KB submits that neither her family nor financial circumstances will change such to make the transfer viable by that time.
Appeal principles
- [9]
- [10]
- [11]The issue for determination in this appeal is whether the decision of Mr Hodgson dated 25 October 2023 was fair and reasonable. Findings made by the Department, which are reasonably open on the relevant material or evidence, should not be disturbed on appeal.
What decisions can the Commission make?
- [12]In deciding this appeal, s 562C of the IR Act provides that the Commission may:
- Confirm the decision appealed against; or
- Set the decision aside and substitute another decision; or
- Set the decision aside and return the issue to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate.
Relevant legislation and guidelines
- [13]Section 131 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) (‘PS Act’) sets out decisions against which appeals may be made, as follows:
131 Decisions against which appeals may be made
- An appeal may be made against the following decisions—
- a conversion decision;
- a directive decision;
- a disciplinary decision;
- a fair treatment decision;
- a promotion decision;
- a suspension without pay decision;
- a transfer decision;
- a work performance direction decision;
- a decision about anything else against which another Act allows a person to appeal.
- However, if an appeal may be made under this section against a decision, other than under subsection (1)(d), the appeal cannot be made under subsection (1)(d).
- This section is subject to section 132.
(Emphasis added)
- [14]Sections 161 and 162 of the PS Act deal with the transfer of a public sector employee. Those sections provide:
161 Chief executive’s power to transfer or redeploy
- The chief executive of a public service entity (the first entity) may—
- transfer or redeploy a public service officer of the first entity within the first entity; or
- with the approval of the chief executive of another entity, transfer or redeploy a public service officer of the other entity to the first entity.
- However, a redeployment may be made only with the public service officer’s consent.
- A transfer or redeployment of a public service officer under this section—
- may involve a change in the location where the officer performs duties; and
- if the officer is employed on contract—has effect despite anything in the contract.
162 Consequence if public service officer refuses transfer
- If a public service officer is transferred under section 161, the transfer has effect unless the officer establishes reasonable grounds for refusing the transfer to the satisfaction of the officer’s chief executive.
- If the public service officer refuses the transfer after failing to establish reasonable grounds for the refusal to the chief executive’s satisfaction, the chief executive may terminate the officer’s employment by signed notice given to the officer.
- If the public service officer establishes reasonable grounds to the chief executive’s satisfaction—
(a) the transfer is cancelled; and
(b) the refusal must not be used to prejudice the officer’s prospects for future promotion or advancement.
(Emphasis added)
- [15]The Department also relies on the Teacher Transfer Guidelines which relevantly provide:
Purpose
The teacher transfer guidelines are to assist teachers, principals and regional HR teams in relation to the department’s teacher transfer system and process.
…
Required transfer
…To meet workforce planning needs of schools throughout the state or specific operational needs, the department may also require teacher’s to transfer…
…
Teachers are expected to comply with a departmentally required transfer unless they can establish that reasonable grounds exist for the transfer not to occur.
Reasonable travel time
A transfer placement to a designated base location of up to 50 minutes driving time from a teachers place of residence is considered reasonable. Time is calculated according to the nearest trafficable route, but should consider factors such as road and traffic conditions. Electronic trip planners such as www.googlemaps.com.au or www.mydrive.tomtom.com may be used as a guide to determine approximate driving time.
(Emphasis added)
- [16]Additionally, the Department has had regard to the Guideline for the assessment of compassionate circumstances which is a guideline to assist eligible staff to apply for assessment of compassionate circumstances, and to support their managers in making decisions. The guideline includes consideration of both medical and domestic and family violence (‘DFV’) circumstances. Relevantly, the guideline excludes consideration of:
Distance of travel to and from current school/location (with the exception of travel times for teachers that exceed reasonable travel time stipulated in Teacher Transfer Guidelines).
Submissions
- [17]On 16 November 2023, the Commission issued a Directions Order calling for written submissions from the Parties following receipt of KB’s Appeal Notice. The matter has been dealt with on the papers.[7]
KB’s Submissions
- [18]KB’s submissions, filed 5 December 2023, are summarised as follows:
- The internal review panel did not give sufficient weight to the ‘Personal Pressing Circumstances’ that she contends preclude her from transferring from her current location.
- In reaching the decision, the internal review panel erroneously dismissed the events associated with Domestic Violence Orders as ‘factors not relevant in consideration of the required transfer’. These events provide context for KB’s need to remain in close proximity to her place of residence and the school her children attend. KB further contends that her personal circumstances, as relates to those events, prevent her assisting the Department to deliver the best possible outcomes for schools as stated in the Teacher Transfer Guidelines.
- The decision did not give sufficient weight to the medical opinion of KB’s General Practitioner, which provided that KB has undergone “significant emotional turmoil” and that “it is simply not feasible for (KB) to facilitate this particular transfer location”.
- The decision contains identical rationale as was considered by this Commission in ST v State of Queensland (Department of Education) (‘ST’),[8] that teachers may be required to “transfer to meet the workforce planning needs of schools throughout the state or specific operational needs including to support school renewal, continuous improvement and innovation and generate vacancies for teachers seeking to transfer following rural and remote service”.
- That the circumstances of the present appeal are analogous to those in ST, where McLennan IC found that:[9]
In my view, the Decision reasons summarised in [26] and [27] above do not reasonably explain why the Department is not satisfied with the Appellant's reasons for refusal. The Appellant was not specifically advised in the Decision why the transfer was occurring – rather the Department generally outlined reasons for why transfers occur. Merely stating that the Appellant's personal circumstances are "not sufficient" when balancing those specific circumstances against broad objectives is not fair or reasonable.
- The internal review panel was not fair and reasonable when balancing the performance of parental duties, the significant distress to KB’s mental health, and the welfare of her children, against broad objectives set by policy guidelines. It is therefore submitted that the test of reasonableness as expounded in Gilmour v Waddell & Ors,[10] is satisfied in that the rationale provided in the decision lacks intelligent justification.
The Department’s Submissions
- [19]The Department filed submissions on 11 January 2024, contending that the decision was fair and reasonable because:
- The Commission must have regard to the Teacher Transfer Guidelines and Compassionate Circumstances Guidelines in assessing whether KB has reasonable grounds to refuse the transfer.
- KB has not established a reasonable ground for refusing the transfer. Based on the documentation she provided when requesting a review of the transfer, KB did not establish exceptional and compelling circumstances as to why she should not be transferred to the transfer school.
- The Department acknowledged the personal circumstances of KB and deferred of the transfer until 2025. This allows KB adequate time to make arrangements for the transport and care of her children, as well as a further 12 months for her daughter to attend counselling.
- The letter dated 12 September 2023 from Dr Lowe did not provide a medical reason as to why KB could not transfer to the transfer school.
- Additional documentation accompanied KB’s Appeal Notice that was not available to the decision maker at the time the decision was made. Further, that documentation is dated 6 November 2023, nearly two months after KB was notified of the transfer on 8 September 2023. The Department contends that the role of the Commission is to assess the information that was before the decision maker when the decision was made, and in any event, the new documentation does not make the decision to transfer KB to the transfer school unfair or unreasonable.
- KB’s history of domestic and family violence was considered by the internal review panel. However, she does not have a current Domestic Violence Order in place.
- She is not the only parent with sole responsibility for her children working for the Department. This alone is not a compelling or exceptional circumstance, and there are Departmental mechanisms in effect which provide guidance and support to employees who are attempting to balance challenging personal circumstances with full time employment.
- The Teacher Transfer Guidelines recognise that travel up to 50 minutes from a teacher’s home is reasonable. The travel time from KB’s residence to the transfer school is 40 minutes, so it is not unreasonable. Further, the Compassionate Circumstances Guidelines expressly state that distance of travel to and from current school or location is not an exceptional or compelling circumstance.
Consideration
- [20]In my view, there are two clear errors in the reasoning of the Department that have rendered the decision unfair and unreasonable. The Department has failed to give proper consideration to the question of reasonable travel time, and they have failed to give proper weight to the domestic violence issues.
Travel time
- [21]The distance between the current school and the transfer school, considered in the abstract, is not a significant distance. According to the trip planner available at ‘racq.com.au’, it is a distance of 37kms with an estimated travel time of 31 minutes. Relevantly, the journey includes significant amounts of travel on the Pacific Motorway (‘the M1’).
- [22]KB’s submissions address the likely impact on her journey time if she is required to travel on the M1. KB alludes to chronic congestion caused by accidents and other factors. KB invites the Commission to take judicial notice of this and contends that, on her estimation, the journey is more likely to be in the order of 80 minutes.
- [23]The Department’s decision simply proclaims the distance between the two schools is ‘within 50 minutes’ and therefore within the Teacher Transfer Guidelines. It provides no basis for this assertion. The submissions filed on behalf of the Department on 11 January 2024 state that the relevant commute is ‘approximately 40 minutes’ and, again, provides no reasoning for this estimate.
- [24]The Teacher Transfer Guidelines relevantly state:
Time is calculated according to the nearest trafficable route, but should consider factors such as road and traffic conditions.
- [25]Firstly, there is no evidence that the Department considered road and traffic conditions. While the Teacher Transfer Guideline does not compel consideration of road and traffic conditions, it would be inherently unfair to base an estimate exclusively on an abstract estimated travel time that does not take into consideration the likely delays or impediments on the specific journey being considered.[11]
- [26]The absence of any reference in the decision to consideration of road and traffic conditions, even if it occurred, renders the decision unfair and unreasonable simply by virtue of the absence of such evidence and intelligible justification.[12]
- [27]Secondly, KB’s observations about the M1 are not fanciful. I am more than content to take judicial notice of the matter and accept KB’s concerns about the time required for the journey. No one familiar with the current operation of the M1 could disagree. The M1, between Brisbane and the southern State border, has long been notorious for delays. It is even more so in recent times. Journey’s that ought to take less than 60 minutes routinely take up to double that time. Additionally, there is no reliable time where a driver might expect to find no delays.
- [28]Between the interminable road widening projects, accidents, and outdated infrastructure that is incapable of coping with a rapidly increasing population, there is almost no journey on the M1 that will not be subject to delay. The estimate of the Department of a 40-minute journey, most of which is on the M1, is even more precarious having regard to these common experiences.
- [29]For completeness, it ought to be noted that any possible alternative route would involve traversing a series of winding roads through the corridor to the west of the M1. Some of those roads are well maintained, some remain unsealed, and some are poorly lit and subject to flooding during heavy rain periods. They are not a viable alternative route.
- [30]While KB might be fortunate on some days to complete one of her two daily journeys in under 50 minutes, in my view this outcome would very much be the exception. I wholly agree with the concerns expressed by KB regarding congestion and accidents on the M1. I would, however, disagree with her estimated journey time. Having regard to the most trafficable route, I would conservatively estimate she might expect a travel time closer to 60-70 minutes each way. Either way, the travel time is plainly unreasonable having regard to these well known facts.
Domestic violence
- [31]KB has particularised a lengthy history of interventions necessary to protect her and her children from domestic violence. Those interventions, in summary, are:
- The imposition of a DVO for 2 years (from 2015-2017);
- The further imposition of a ‘non-contact’ DVO due to breaches of the earlier order for 5 years (from 2017-2022);[13]
- An Order allowing for the change of the last names of her children in 2020;
- An Order from the Federal Circuit and Family Court in March 2023 granting Sole Parental Responsibility.
- [32]In addition to these relevant matters, KB also informed the Department that her former partner was the subject of a National Police alert in August 2020 arising from concerns about the safety of a child he was travelling with.
- [33]One of the submissions made by KB in respect of the history of domestic violence was that she needs to be available for drop off and pick up of her children from school. Relevantly, KB’s children were aged 13 and 11 at the time of her submissions. In her Appeal Notice KB emphasised the danger that her former partner presented in relation to her children, especially if they had to be left unattended for any period either before or after school.
- [34]In response to these concerns the Department (through a four person review panel comprised of Human Resource Consultants) noted the concerns but then concluded:
The Panel acknowledges the information provided with regards to (KB’s) personal circumstances – children’s safety. In considering this information it is noted that no current domestic violence matters are in place. While there have been ongoing actions associated with Domestic Violence Orders, namely a non-contact period of five years being put in place in July 2017; name change in 2020; national police incident 2020 and being awarded sole parental responsibility in 2023, they are not factors relevant in consideration of your required transfer for 2024.
(Emphasis added)
- [35]In their submission filed on 11 January 2024, the Department reiterated this view and said:
(KB’s) personal circumstances, namely the history of domestic and family violence, were acknowledged and considered by the Panel. However, (KB) does not have a current domestic violence order in place.
(Emphasis added)
- [36]In my view, the Department have grossly underestimated the significance of the (uncontested) history of domestic violence particularised by KB and further, have demonstrated a significant lack of understanding of the relevance of lapsed Domestic Violence Orders as an indicator of the future risk of violence.
- [37]There is something rather concerning about the perfunctory manner in which the Department describes KB’s lengthy history of Court ordered interventions as ‘ongoing actions associated with Domestic Violence’.
- [38]In the normal course of events, the necessity to obtain a DVO is an indicator that the applicant for such an order has an apprehension of violence sufficient to necessitate assistance from a Court. That alone is a significant step for any person to have to take for their personal protection. The fact that, after two years and at least one contravention, KB was granted a further (non-contact) DVO for a period five years is, objectively, an indication that the relevant Court was satisfied that there was an ongoing risk of violence that would potentially persist for that period.
- [39]It takes no imagination at all to appreciate that an individual against whom a Court has issued an order restraining him from contacting or approaching his former partner (and his children) for a total period of seven years is, in all likelihood, the type of individual who will continue to pose a risk of violence to those people, or others. The fact that this individual breached the first order and was then subject to a National Police alert during the term of the second order are clear indications that the lapsing of the second order in 2022 did not mean that the risk of violence has passed.
- [40]On the history provided, KB and her children have plainly been living with the threat of violence (since at least 2015) from a person who has demonstrated a propensity to breach orders and engage in further acts endangering the safety of other children. The fact that no further orders have been made does not mean that there is no risk.
- [41]Had the decision makers properly understood the other facts set out by KB, they may have appreciated this. In particular, the granting of a ‘Sole Parental Responsibility’ order by the Federal Circuit and Family Court is significant. In the context of disputes involving children in that Court, a Sole Parental Responsibility order is a significant departure from the usual approach that seeks to include both parents with a role in raising children.
- [42]While the precise details or basis of KB’s orders are unknown, she submits that it is an order with respect to all parental rights and duties, and it was granted ‘due to any danger the children may encounter from the respondent’. That submission is not inconsistent with the types of circumstances that will often warrant the making of a Sole Parental Responsibility order.
- [43]Further, when the age of KB’s children is taken into account, the risk is even more pronounced. At the age of 13 and 11 the children are still at a very vulnerable age. Their awareness and ability to anticipate and manager any risk posed by their estranged father is still very underdeveloped. While adult children are not immune from the risk of a violent family member, they are at least more mature, experienced, and generally better equipped to avoid it.
- [44]In my view, the extensive seven year history of domestic violence orders culminating in the granting of a Sole Parental Responsibility order are much more than mere antecedents or ‘ongoing actions associated with Domestic Violence’. They are indicators that this particular individual will likely continue to pose a risk to KB and her children indefinitely, regardless of whether he is the subject of a domestic violence order.
- [45]The history of DVOs and other matters provided by KB is highly relevant when considering the implications of the proposed transfer on her capacity to manage the risk posed to two young children. The need for KB to deposit and collect the children from their schools in these particular circumstances is readily apparent. Such a responsibility cannot be divested to a third party without diluting the protection afforded by KB performing the role. Extended wait times before or after school (or routinely unpredictable delays in collection from school) will equally exacerbate the risk.
- [46]In those circumstances I consider that the conclusions of the review panel to dismiss the history of domestic violence as irrelevant was unfair and unreasonable. Further, I consider that KB has established reasonable grounds within the meaning of s 162(3) of the PS Act to warrant cancelation of the transfer.
Other matters
- [47]For completeness, I note that the concerns about travel time and on-going risk of domestic violence were only two of a number of grounds relied on by KB in resisting her transfer.
- [48]Without descending into detail, I do not consider the evidence of the other matters raised by KB (relating to the medical well being of her children and sporting commitments) to have been sufficiently compelling matters to warrant setting the decision aside.
- [49]Further, to be clear, not every candidate for transfer with a history of DVO could expect to reasonably refuse a transfer. Each case will depend on its unique circumstances, and this decision ought not to be read as authority that more broadly prevents the Department from the important task of deploying teaching resources where they are needed.
Conclusion
- [50]For clarity, it must be observed that the principles underpinning the Department’s powers to transfer teachers are prima facie both valid and necessary. For all of the reasons set out in the Department’s submissions and in the Teacher Transfer Guidelines, I accept that the Department must have capacity to transfer teachers to locations where inter alia they are needed. This will be against an employee’s wishes in some instances, but that must be accepted by every teacher who agrees to be employed by the Department. However, there will always be exceptions.
- [51]In my view, the circumstances of this matter are an exception. Consequently, I consider the decision in this matter is unfair and unreasonable, and I have reached that conclusion on two entirely independent grounds.
- [52]The failure to explain what consideration was given to traffic or road conditions, and the conclusion that the journey in question could be completed in under 50 minutes was, for reasons already stated, unfair and unreasonable. However, had that been the only ground for the appeal, I might have considered returning the matter to the decision maker for further consideration.
- [53]Additionally, KB’s concerns regarding the ongoing risk of domestic violence to her and her children should not have been dismissed as irrelevant simply because the last of the domestic violence orders expired in 2022. Again, for the reasons already stated, those concerns are genuine, reasonable, and sufficient to warrant cancelation of the transfer.
- [54]It would benefit the Department to reflect on this error. It is a regrettable feature of our society that we are increasingly compelled to be aware of the diverse and complex nature of domestic violence. Domestic violence can be easy to dismiss or diminish by those who are inexperienced in dealing with it, or who still do not appreciate what a pervasive and serious problem it is. But, with recent media and other awareness campaigns highlighting the tragic consequences of domestic and family violence that unfold every week in Australia, there is no longer an excuse for decision makers to make such errors.
- [55]In my view, to the extent it is not occurring already, the Department ought to ensure that its decision makers are properly trained and able to more competently evaluate the relevance of domestic violence concerns when they arise in transfer refusals. I hasten to reiterate that the mere existence of a history of domestic violence should not, of itself, lead to a conclusion that an individual should (or should not) be transferred. Each matter requires evaluation on its unique facts.
- [56]Finally, the effect of an order cancelling KB’s transfer does not prevent her from being considered for another transfer in the future. The Department remains at liberty to consider such a transfer. I do not have powers to restrain the Department from taking such steps, nor would I purport to be able to adequately predict what further circumstances might give rise to such a decision. Further, changes in the circumstances of KB may well give rise to a different attitude to a transfer.
- [57]To the extent I can meaningfully speculate about what may change, it is important to note that the age of KB’s children was an important factor in my conclusions in these reasons. Even if they are now 14 and 12, they remain affected by the vulnerability I identified above. But, for example, the reasonableness of KB’s refusal would arguably be diminished once the children had reached the age of 18. Further, a transfer to a school genuinely within reasonable travel time, such that there was no risk of the children being left unattended for any significant period, would also arguably remove the current barriers.
- [58]But subject to any significant change in her circumstances, these reasons ought to serve as a guide for the Department in terms of any future transfer contemplated for KB.
Order
- [59]The Commission makes the following orders:
- Pursuant to rule 97(3) of the Industrial Relations Tribunal Rules 2011 (Qld), the name of the appellant be supressed and only reasons for decision and orders excluding the appellant’s name be released by the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission;
- Pursuant to section 451(2)(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the contents of the file held in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission Registry for matter number PSA/2023/219 be withheld from release or search;
- The decision appealed against is set aside;
- The transfer is cancelled.
Footnotes
[1] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 451(2)(b).
[2] Ibid s 562B.
[3] Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10.
[4] Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(3).
[7] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 451(1).
[8] [2023] QIRC 004.
[9] Ibid [28].
[10] [2019] QSC 170, [207]-[210], citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, [63]-[76].
[11] As an aside, the Teacher Transfer Guidelines standard for ‘reasonable’ travel time is measured against ‘driving time’. While this term might capture something other than driving a private vehicle, it would seem that the guideline contains an inherent bias against individuals who, for whatever reason, choose other forms of transport for their commute. Public or alternative transport are increasingly utilised by employees to address e.g. cost of living pressures. They are also important choices to reduce traffic congestion. An employee in those circumstances may well be able to assert a decision is unfair by virtue of the inherent bias in the guideline.
[12] Gilmour v Waddell & Ors [2019] QSC 170, [207]–[210].
[13] The conditions of this order, reflecting the previous breaches, were that the former partner could not enter any dwelling or approach within 100m either KB or her children at their home, employment or school.