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  4. Hoffman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2) - [2024] QIRC 186

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Hoffman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2)[2024] QIRC 186

Hoffman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2)[2024] QIRC 186

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Hoffman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2) [2024] QIRC 186

PARTIES:

Hoffman, Noel Ivan

(Applicant)

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Health)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

TD/2022/88

PROCEEDING:

Application for reinstatement

Interlocutory application to dismiss

DELIVERED ON:

30 July 2024

MEMBERS:

Hartigan DP

HEARD AT:

On the papers.

ORDERS:

  1. The application for reinstatement in proceedings TD/2022/88 is dismissed pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld); and
  1. The Respondent is to file an application for costs, if any, within 14 days of the date of this order.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – DISMISSALS – APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT – applicant was employed by Queensland Health – applicant's employment was terminated on the basis that they failed to comply with a workplace directive – where respondent filed an application in existing proceedings for matter to be dismissed – whether further proceedings necessary or desirable in the public interest – where application for reinstatement is dismissed pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld).

LEGISLATION:

Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 (Qld) ss 51A, 51E, 66

Health Employment Directive 12/21 Employee COVID-19 vaccination requirements

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 317, 320, 541, 545

Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) r 45

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 187

CASES:

Bax v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 304

Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18

Donnelly v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 149

Hoffman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 270

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Junulewicz v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 026

Mackenzie v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 121

Mocnik v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 058

Paul Scott v State of Queensland & Ors [2019] QIRC 115

Queensland v Lockhart [2014] ICQ 006

Slykerman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 39

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    The Applicant, Mr Noel Ivan Hoffman, was employed by the State of Queensland (Queensland Health) from 15 June 1992 to 3 March 2022.
  1. [2]
    At the time of his dismissal, Mr Hoffman was employed as an Operational Services Officer and Wardsperson at Warwick Hospital within the Darling Downs Hospital and Health Service.
  1. [3]
    On 21 March 2022, the Applicant filed an application seeking, inter alia, reinstatement to his former position.
  1. [4]
    The Applicant sought a stay of the proceedings which was granted by the Commission.[1] Following the expiration of the stay, the Respondent filed an interlocutory application, seeking that the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to section 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act') on the basis that further proceedings by the Commission are not necessary, or desirable in the public interest.
  1. [5]
    The Respondent also sought an order pursuant to s 545(2)(a)(ii) of the IR Act that the Applicant pay the Respondent's costs of the application from 22 November 2023.[2]
  1. [6]
    The Applicant was directed to file written submissions and affidavit material in reply, however, the Applicant failed to comply with this direction.
  1. [7]
    The Industrial Registry wrote to the parties and noted that the Applicant had not filed any written submissions or affidavit material in accordance with the direction. The parties were notified that the Commission would proceed to consider the application to dismiss the proceedings in the absence of these documents.

Relevant legislation

  1. [8]
    The application for reinstatement is filed pursuant to s 317 of the IR Act which appears in Division 2, Part 2 of Chapter 8, 'Unfair dismissals'.  Section 316, which is within Division 2, provides that a dismissal is unfair if it is harsh, unjust and unreasonable.
  1. [9]
    The matters the Commission must consider when deciding whether a dismissal is unfair are set out in s 320 of the IR Act as follows:

320 Matters to be considered in deciding an application

In deciding whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the commission must consider -

  1. whether the employee was notified of the reason for dismissal; and
  1. whether the dismissal related to -
  1. the operational requirements of the employer's undertaking, establishment or service; or
  1. the employee's conduct, capacity or performance; and
  1. if the dismissal relates to the employee's conduct, capacity or performance -
  1. whether the employee had been warned about the conduct, capacity or performance; or
  1. whether the employee was given an opportunity to respond to the claim about the conduct, capacity or performance; and
  1. any other matters the commission considers relevant.
  1. [10]
    The application to dismiss is brought pursuant to s 541 of the IR Act. Section 541 of the IR Act relevantly provides:

541  Decisions generally

The court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following -

…

  1. dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers -
  1. the cause is trivial; or
  1. further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest;

…

  1. [11]
    With respect to the exercise of the discretion to dismiss proceedings pursuant to s 541 of the IR Act, the Commission must act with due circumspection and by undertaking a proper consideration of relevant material. In Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)[3], Martin J, in considering the application of s 541 of the IR Act, stated:[4]
  1. [27]
    Insofar as it may confine the exercise of discretion under s 541, the purpose of the Act is stated as follows:

“3 Main purpose of Act

The main purpose of this Act is to provide for a framework for cooperative industrial relations that—

  1. is fair and balanced; and
  2. supports the delivery of high quality services, economic prosperity and social justice for Queenslanders.”
  1. [28]
    The process for consideration of an application under s 541 does not require that the respondent’s case be taken at its highest. The cognate provisions in federal legislation9 were frequently considered by Full Benches of the federal tribunal, the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia. The accepted approach was that the applicant bore the onus of making the claim for relief. But the ascertainment in any particular case of where the public interest lay often depended on a balancing of interests, including competing public interests, and was very much a question of fact and degree.
  1. [29]
    As the power given to the Commission by s 541 can prevent a party from pursuing relief otherwise available under the IR Act it is one which is to be exercised with due circumspection on a proper consideration of relevant materials.11 A “proper consideration” cannot be made where the case for the respondent is simply taken at its highest. While the onus remains on an applicant, the requirement to consider the “public interest” cannot be satisfied if an artificial inflation of the respondent’s case is applied. Indeed, to take a respondent’s case at its highest would almost always result in the dismissal of an application under this section. On an application of this type, a respondent is not relieved of any requirement to advance a case.
  1. [30]
    In considering the public interest, regard must be had to the legislative basis of the principal relief sought and the evidence before the Commission. The history of the anti-bullying provisions under the Act does not provide further guidance as to their object, save that the inspiration for the Queensland anti-bullying scheme was its federal counterpart.12 The intention behind the cognate provisions under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) was to provide workers with “a quick way to stop bullying so they do not suffer further harm or injury.”

(citations omitted).

…

  1. [12]
    Section 51A of the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 (Qld) ('the HHB Act') provides for the issuing of health employment directives and is set out in the following terms:

51A Health employment directives

  1. The chief executive may issue health employment directives about the conditions of employment for health service employees.
  2. Without limiting subsection (1), a health employment directive may be about the following –
    1. remuneration for health executives and senior health service employees;
    2. the classification levels at which health executives and senior health service employees are to be employed;
    3. the terms of contracts for health executives and senior health service employees;
    4. the professional development and training of health service employees in accordance with the conditions of their employment.
  3. A health employment directive may apply to any or all of the following -
    1. the department, a Service or all Services;
    2. health service employees, or a stated type of health service employee.
  1. [13]
    Section 51E(1) of the HHB Act provides that, inter alia, a health employment directive that applies to an employee of the department is binding on the employee and the department.
  1. [14]
    Section 66(1) of the HHB Act sets out that the conditions of employment for a health service employee as follows:

66 Conditions of employment

  1. The conditions of employment for a health service employee, other than for a health executive or a senior health service employee, are governed by -
    1. this Act; and
    2. the Industrial Relations Act 2016; and
    3. the applied Public Service law; and
    4. an industrial instrument that applies to the employee; and
    5. health employment directives; and
    6. if the employee is appointed on a contract for a fixed term - the employee's contract.
  1. [15]
    In State of Queensland v Lockhart[5] the Industrial Court considered the meaning of "public interest" in the context of the exercise of the discretion under s 331 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) (repealed).[6] The Industrial Court relevantly held:[7]
  1. [21]
    In O'Sullivan v Farrer Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ considered the expression "in the public interest". Their Honours wrote:

"Indeed, the expression, 'in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only 'in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable … given reasons to be [pronounced] definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view."

  1. [22]
    In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin, the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia in considering what constitutes "the public interest" wrote:

"Appeals have lain on the ground that it is in the public interest that leave should be granted in the predecessors to the Act for decades. It has not been considered useful or appropriate to define the concept in other than the most general terms and we do not intend to do so. The expression ‘in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only by the objects of the legislation in question.

Although the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issues of importance and general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive, or that the legal principles applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar matters, it seems to us that none of those elements is present in this case."

(citations omitted).

…

  1. [16]
    Relevantly, the purpose of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) ('Tribunal Rules') is to provide for the just and expeditious disposition of the business of, relevantly, the Commission at a minimum of expense.[8]
  1. [17]
    Rule 45 of the Tribunal Rules will apply in circumstances where an Applicant has received a notice of a directions order made by the Commission and has failed to comply with them. One of the consequences of failing to comply with a directions order is that the Commission may dismiss the proceeding. Rule 45 is set out in the following terms:

45 Failure to attend or to comply with directions order

  1. This rule applies if—
  1. a party to a proceeding receives notice of a directions order made by the court, commission or registrar stating a time, date and place for a hearing or conference for the proceeding; and
  2. the party fails to attend the hearing or conference.
  1. This rule also applies if—
  1. a party to a proceeding receives notice of a directions order made by the court, commission or registrar; and
  2. the party fails to comply with the order.
  1. The court, commission or registrar may—
  1. dismiss the proceeding; or
  2. make a further directions order; or
  3. make another order dealing with the proceeding that the court, commission or registrar considers appropriate, including, for example, a final order; or
  4. make orders under paragraphs (b) and (c).
  1. [18]
    In Paul Scott v State of Queensland & Ors,[9] Vice President O'Connor stated in respect of r 45 of the Tribunal Rules:
  1. [8]
    In Quaedvlieg and Ors v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd his Honour President Hall, in dealing with an application to strike out for want of prosecution, cited with approval the reasoning of Thomas JA in Quinlan v Rothwell & Anor as follows:

There is now a consciousness of the need for some level of efficiency in the use of the courts as a public resource. That, of course, must not displace the need for reasonable access to the courts and the provision of justice according to law in each matter, but it highlights the fact that the former laissez faire attitude by courts towards the leisurely conduct of actions at the will of the parties has ended. At the same time the rules of court are not an end in themselves. They do not exist for the discipline of practitioners or clients, or for the protection of courts from inefficient litigants, but rather as a means of ensuring that issues will be defined in an orderly way and that parties have the opportunity of full preparation of their case before the trial commences. The rules also afford defendants the means of bringing to an end actions in which the other party will not abide by the rules.

  1. [9]
    Whilst Quinlan v Rothwell & Anor related to the application of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 in respect of application to dismiss for want of prosecution, in my respectful view, the reasoning of Thomas JA has equal application to the current proceedings.
  1. [10]
    In Lenijamar Pty Ltd and Ors v AGC (Advances) Ltd, Wilcox and Gummow JJ in dealing with a similar provision under the Federal Court Rules stated that the discretion conferred by the rule was:

unconfined, except for the condition of noncompliance with a direction ... [b]ut two situations are obvious candidates for the exercise of the power." The first were "cases in which the history of non-compliance by an applicant is such as to indicate an inability or unwillingness to co‑operate with the Court and the other party or parties in having the matter ready for trial within an acceptable period". The second were cases "whatever the applicant's state of mind or resources - in which the non-compliance is continuing and occasioning unnecessary delay, expense or other prejudice to the respondent.

  1. [11]
    Their Honours went on to observe:

Even though the most recent non-compliance may be minor, the cumulative effect of an applicant's defaults may be such as to satisfy the judge that the applicant is either subjectively unwilling to co-operate, or for some reason, is unable to do so. Such a conclusion would not readily be reached; but where it was, fairness to the respondent would normally require the summary dismissal of the proceeding.

  1. [19]
    The discretion conferred under r 45 is to be exercised judicially.[10]

Relevant Background

  1. [20]
    The Applicant's employment was terminated on the basis that he failed to comply with a directive of his employer, being the Health Employment Directive 12/21 Employee COVID-19 vaccination requirements ('the directive').
  1. [21]
    The directive was issued by Queensland Health on 11 September 2021. Clause 1 provides that compliance with the directive is mandatory.
  1. [22]
    Relevantly, clause 8.1 of the directive requires existing employees in the categories set out in clause 7.1 to:
  1. have received at least the first does of a COVID-19 vaccine by 30 September 2021;
  2. have received the second does of a COVID-19 vaccine by 31 October 2021; and
  3. provide to their line manager or upload into the designated system, within seven days after receiving the vaccine, evidence of vaccination.
  1. [23]
    In his role as an Operational Services Officer and Wardsperson, the Applicant was categorised as an employee falling within Group 2 under section 7.1 of the directive. Group 2 covers employees employed to work in a hospital or other facility where clinical care or support is required. The Applicant worked at the Warwick Hospital and, on the basis that this location was a hospital, the Applicant was subject to the mandatory vaccination requirements under clause 8.1 of the directive.
  1. [24]
    In accordance with the directive, in the absence of an exemption, the Applicant was required to have received at least the first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 30 September 2021, and to have provided evidence of vaccination to his line manager by uploading the evidence onto the designated system by 18 October 2021.
  1. [25]
    The Applicant did not provide evidence confirming that he had received a dose of a COVID-19 vaccine, nor did he apply for an exemption from the directive or otherwise provide any evidence to support or communicate a request to be exempt from the directive. This is not disputed by the Applicant.
  1. [26]
    The Respondent commenced a show cause process and in response, the Applicant informed his employer that he was intending to have some health issues addressed before he retired, so he could use his sick leave or alternatively, his recreation and long service leave until his leave entitlements were depleted.
  1. [27]
    The Applicant's employment was terminated on 3 March 2022 and the Applicant filed an application for reinstatement on 21 March 2022.
  1. [28]
    Due to the Applicant's request and the subsequent grant of a stay, the proceedings have not progressed in written form, beyond the filing of the application for reinstatement and the Employer's response.
  1. [29]
    Consequently, no further documentation including a Statement of Facts and Contentions have been filed by either of the parties.

Consideration

Application for reinstatement

  1. [30]
    The Applicant seeks reinstatement on the basis that his dismissal was unfair because he "could have performed a role within Qld Health that didn't involve patient contact".[11]
  1. [31]
    In response, the Respondent submits that the Applicant contravened, without reasonable excuse, a lawful and reasonable workplace direction given to him as a health service employee by a responsible person.[12] 
  1. [32]
    The Respondent denies that the termination of the Applicant's employment was unfair on the basis that it was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable as:[13]
  1. there was a valid reason for the Applicant's dismissal being that the Applicant failed to comply with a lawful and reasonable directive without reasonable excuse; 
  2. the Applicant was afforded procedural fairness through a show cause process; and
  3. dismissal was a proportionate measure given the "significant and unacceptable risk" to the health of workers and patients presented by unvaccinated workers in a health care setting.

Application to dismiss

  1. [33]
    Due to the Applicant's failure to comply with directions, the Commission does not have any submissions from the Applicant regarding the Respondent's application to dismiss the proceeding.
  1. [34]
    The Respondent submits that the Commission should exercise its discretion to dismiss the matter on the basis that "further proceedings are not necessary or would not be in the public interest because the Applicant's application is misconceived or lacking in substance" and "matters with analogous circumstances have previously been heard and determined by the Commission."
  2. [35]
    The Respondent contends that the Applicant has no reasonable prospects of success as:
  1. the directive was lawful and reasonable;
  2. the Applicant did not have a reasonable excuse for his failure to comply with the lawful direction as he did not provide any evidence that he was unable to receive the available COVID-19 vaccines, nor did he apply for an exemption from the directive; and
  3. they were not obliged to provide the Applicant with alternative duties to accommodate his failure to comply with the directive.
  1. [36]
    The Respondent relies on the following decisions of the Commission which have found the directive to be lawful and reasonable:
  1. Mackenzie v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 121;
  2. Slykerman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 39;
  3. Bax v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 304; and
  4. Donnelly v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 149.
  1. [37]
    As noted above, the Applicant has not provided any submissions objecting to the application to dismiss.
  1. [38]
    In Mackenzie v State of Queensland (Queensland Health),[14] the Full Bench of the Commission held that:
  1. it is well accepted that the directive is a lawful direction;[15]
  2. the directive is objectively reasonable, and it was necessary, having regard to the identified risks, coupled with the workplace health and safety obligations incumbent upon the Department and employees, that the Department required employees in high-risk groups to be vaccinated against COVID-19;[16] and
  3. 'vaccination hesitancy' does not constitute a reasonable excuse to not comply with the directive.
  1. [39]
    In making the finding that the directive is reasonable, the Full Bench made the following observations:
  1. [54]
    In our view, HED 12/21 is objectively reasonable. As is evident from cl 6 of the Directive, the COVID-19 virus has been shown to disproportionately affect health care workers and health support staff and pose a significant risk to Queensland Health patients and the broader community. In such circumstances, it is entirely reasonable, and necessary, that having regard to the identified risks, coupled with the workplace health and safety obligations incumbent upon the Department and employees, that the Department required employees in high-risk groups to be vaccinated against COVID-19.
  1. [55]
    Nothing raised by the Applicant in her submissions displaces the widely accepted view, and a view accepted by this Commission in a myriad of cases that vaccination is a reasonably practicable control measure to manage risks arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 places a person at a high risk of developing serious illness which may lead to death; all the available COVID-19 vaccines are effective at preventing symptomatic infection and reducing the risk of serious illness or death; and any adverse effects are usually mild with a low probability of developing serious complications.
  1. [56]
    The underlying rationale for the Directive is that the relevant Departmental staff must be vaccinated against COVID-19 in order to minimise the effects of the virus on the relevant employees and to ensure that the Department can maintain the required number of health service employees to deliver public health services in Queensland.
  1. [57]
    Under the HHB Act, a 'health service' is defined as a 'service for maintaining, improving, restoring, or managing people's health and wellbeing'. Section 19(1) of HHB Act provides that 'A Service's main function is to deliver the hospital services, other health services, teaching, research and other services stated in the service agreement for the Service'. It was incumbent on Dr Wakefield to take all reasonable steps to ensure the maintenance and continuation of a health service during the pandemic.
  1. [58]
    It was contended by the Applicant that HED 12/21 was inconsistent with both the Anti‑Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) ('the AD Act'); and/or the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) ('the HR Act') within the meaning of s 51B of the HHB Act. However, in Mocnik the Commission determined that no inconsistency arose. We follow Mocnik.
  1. [59]
    Whilst it was not agitated before the Full Bench during the hearing, it was contended that the Health Department did not conduct appropriate consultations with employees and their representatives prior to implementing HED 12/21 in contravention of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011.
  1. [60]
    That issue has been previously dealt with by the Commission in Brasell-Dellow & Ors v State of Queensland, (Queensland Police Service) & Ors where the Commission found:

[128] When considering in any particular case what consultation is "reasonably practicable", regard must be had not only to the particular circumstances, but also to the legislative intention behind ss 47 and 48. The point of s 47 is to enable workers who may be affected by workplace, health and safety issues to have input into the management of those issues before an employer imposes conditions upon them. Obviously, the desirable outcome is agreement between the employer and employees as to the work, health and safety measures.

[129] Here, the unions agreed with the directive. In other words, the consultation reached the level where the directive was not a matter of contention. The unions, with total coverage over the workforce, agreed with it.

  1. [61]
    A similar view was taken in Mocnik, where the Commission found:

[88] The evidence is that the Respondent consulted with the unions with total coverage over the workforce and agreed with it. It is well-established that trade unions may negotiate with employers, not only on behalf of their members, but also on behalf of workers who are eligible for membership.

  1. [40]
    In determining whether a dismissal was unfair,[17] the onus rests on the Applicant to establish that the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.
  1. [41]
    When determining an application, the Commission must have regard to the matters referred to in s 320 of the IR Act.
  1. [42]
    The Applicant's application for reinstatement states in brief terms:

I was dismissed for not getting the COVID-19 vaccine. It is unfair because I could have performed a role with Qld Health that didn’t involve patient contact.

  1. [43]
    In making this argument it appears that the Applicant contends that his failure to comply with the directive should not have resulted in the termination of his employment but, rather, he could have been placed in a role with limited patient contact.
  1. [44]
    The Applicant does not attempt to grapple with relevant matters including the issuing of the directive and his subsequent failure to comply with the directive at the relevant time.
  1. [45]
    The Applicant's application for reinstatement does not address, in any meaningful way, the matters required to be considered pursuant to s 320 of the IR Act.
  1. [46]
    On the terms of the application for reinstatement, I am satisfied that the matters relied on by the Applicant are not novel or unique. They raise no reasonable excuse for his failure to comply with the directive and are not able to be distinguished from a line of judicial determination including, Mackenzie v State of Queensland (Queensland Health);[18] Junulewicz v State of Queensland (Queensland Health);[19] and Mocnik v State of Queensland (Queensland Health).[20]

Conclusion

  1. [47]
    For the above reasons, it is not necessary or desirable in the public interest for this matter to proceed in the Commission.
  1. [48]
    On the material before the Commission, there is insufficient prospects of success to justify the matter progressing to hearing. Accordingly, the proceedings will be dismissed in its entirety.
  1. [49]
    The Respondent's position with respect to costs is not immediately apparent. The terms of the application seek that costs be reserved whilst the supporting affidavit to the application identifies that the Respondent seeks its costs.
  1. [50]
    Due to the Applicant's failure to provide any written submissions, I have no information from Applicant before me which is relevant to a cost application. I consider, given the nature of this jurisdiction, that should the Respondent seeks its costs then the Applicant should be provided with an opportunity to make submissions regarding costs. Should the Respondent make an application for costs further directions will be issued by the Commission for the scheduling of submissions with respect to costs.

Order

  1. [51]
    The Commission orders:
  1. The application for reinstatement in proceedings TD/2022/88 is dismissed pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld); and
  1. The Respondent is to file an application for costs, if any, within 14 days of the date of this order.

Footnotes

[1] Hoffman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 270.

[2] Affidavit of Nicola Smith filed on 13 December 2023. However, the application sought that a decision on costs be reserved. 

[3] [2019] ICQ 18.

[4] [27] – [30].

[5] [2014] ICQ 006.

[6] Section 331 of the Industrial Relations Act 1991 (Qld) is in near identical terms to s 541 of the IR Act.

[7] [21]–[22].

[8] Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) r 6.

[9] [2019] QIRC 115 ('Paul Scott').

[10] Ibid [13] per O'Connor VP, citing House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ).

[11] Application for reinstatement filed by the Applicant on 21 March 2022.

[12] Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 187(1)(d).

[13] Employer response to application for reinstatement filed by the Respondent on 13 April 2022.

[14] [2023] QIRC 121.

[15] Ibid [43]; Mocnik v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 058, [17]-[23].

[16] Ibid [54]-[61].

[17] Within the meaning of s 31 of the IR Act.

[18] [2023] QIRC 121.

[19] [2023] QIRC 026.

[20] [2023] QIRC 058.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Hoffman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Hoffman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2)

  • MNC:

    [2024] QIRC 186

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Hartigan DP

  • Date:

    30 Jul 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Bax v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 304
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 304
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 304
Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] ICQ 18
Cite 2 - [2019] ICQ 18
Donnelly v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 149
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 149
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 149
Hoffman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 270
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 270
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 270
House v R (1936) HCA 40
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1936) HCA 40
Cite 2 - (1936) HCA 40
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Cite 2 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Janulewicz v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 26
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 26
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 26
Mackenzie v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 121
4 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 121
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 121
Cite 3 - [2023] QIRC 121
Cite 4 - [2023] QIRC 121
Mocnik v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 58
3 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 58
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 58
Cite 3 - [2023] QIRC 58
Paul Scott v State of Queensland [2019] QIRC 115
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 115
Cite 2 - [2019] QIRC 115
Slykerman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 39
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 39
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 39
State of Queensland v Lockhart [2014] ICQ 6
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2014] ICQ 6
Cite 2 - [2014] ICQ 6

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2025] QIRC 1231 citation
1

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