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Kevesther Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2024] QIRC 195

Kevesther Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2024] QIRC 195

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Kevesther Pty Ltd v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 195

PARTIES:

Kevesther Pty Ltd

(Appellant)

v

Workers’ Compensation Regulator

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

WC/2023/141

PROCEEDING:

Application in existing proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

8 August 2024

MEMBER:

Gazenbeek IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDERS:

  1. That, pursuant to r 41 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld), the Appellant is to file an Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions with the Industrial Registry that is compliant with the requirements of the Commission and that, at minimum, contains the following amendments to the Statement of Facts and Contentions filed on 15 February 2024:
    1. the Appellant is to amend paragraphs [1]-[2] to include specific reference to the material facts upon which the Appellant relies; and
    2. the Appellant is to remove paragraphs [3]-[9].
  2. That the Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions is to be filed by the Appellant with the Industrial Registry within 28 days from the release of this Decision. 

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – APPEAL – WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION – where the worker has an accepted entitlement to compensation for a psychological and/or psychiatric injury – where an employer appellant appeals against a decision of the Regulator – where the worker is not a party to the substantive appeal – where the Appellant has filed a Statement of Facts and Contentions advancing a case based on errors in the Regulator’s decision at first instance – where the Respondent seeks a direction that the Appellant provide a compliant Statement of Facts and Contentions – consideration of the nature of a workers’ compensation appeal to the Commission – distinction between appeal stricto sensu and a hearing de novo – consideration of the issue in the substantive appeal and the onus of proof – consideration of the purpose of a Statement of Facts and Contentions – consideration of the Commission’s requirements as to the form and content of a Statement of Facts and Contentions – where case advanced by Appellant is irrelevant to a hearing de novo – consideration of requirement to be clear and concise – where Statement of Facts and Contentions does not alert the Commission or the Respondent to the Appellant’s case – Appellant’s Statement of Facts and Contentions deficient – Appellant ordered to file an Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions

LEGISLATION AND INSTRUMENTS:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 451, 989

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ss 11, 32, 548, 549, 550, 552-554, 556, 558

Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) rr 41, 45

CASES:

Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40

Anglo Coal (Capcoal Management) Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator & Etherington [2017] QIRC 103

Canton v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 145

Carlton v Blackwood [2017] ICQ 001

CFMEU v Blackwood and Vaccaneo [2015] QIRC 050

Charters Towers Regional Council v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 027

Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 031

Council of the City of Gold Coast v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 164

Davis v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 116

Deshong v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 205

Gillan v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 315

Hardy v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 027

Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84

Kim v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2019] ICQ 014

Lockyer Valley Regional Council v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 085

Mackay Regional Council v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 001

Northern Iron and Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood [2016] QIRC 041

Patlaw Securities Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 063

Reid v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2016] QIRC 047

Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) v Adams [2015] ICQ 001

Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) v Mahaffey [2016] ICQ 010

Simonsen v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 060

State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 053

State of Queensland (Office of the Queensland Parliamentary Counsel) v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 068

State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Q-COMP and Coyne (2003) 172 QGIG 1447

State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) v Workers' Compensation Regulator & Anor [2021] QIRC 366

Stratco v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) and Tory [2015] QIRC 022

Trimble v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) and State of Queensland (for Queensland Audit Office) [2014] QIRC 172

Walsh v Law Society (NSW) (1991) 198 CLR 84

Workers’ Compensation Regulator v Carr [2023] ICQ 001

Yarrabee Coal Company Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 156

Yousif v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 004

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    This interlocutory matter relates to an appeal to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (‘the Commission’), filed by Kevesther Pty Ltd on 10 October 2023, pursuant to ss 548(1) and 549 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (‘the WCR Act’). Kevesther Pty Ltd appeals against the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Regulator dated 12 September 2023 to accept an application for compensation of Ms Aniek Aardoom (‘the worker’) for a work-related psychological injury.
  2. [2]
    An initial Directions Order was issued by the Industrial Registry on 11 October 2023,[1] directing (amongst other things) that both Kevesther Pty Ltd (‘the Appellant’)[2] and the Workers’ Compensation Regulator (‘the Respondent’) file a Statement of Facts and Contentions (‘SOFC’) with the Registry by 19 December 2023 and 23 January 2024, respectively.[3]
  3. [3]
    Three further Directions Orders were issued by the Registry between October 2023 and January 2024,[4] in response to requests from the Appellant (with the consent of the Respondent) to be granted extensions of time to file their SOFC.[5]
  4. [4]
    The last directions issued by the Registry, Directions Order [4] of 30 January 2024, directed that the Appellant file a SOFC by 15 February 2024, and the Respondent by 21 March 2024. As in all prior directions, it required Statements of Facts and Contentions that detailed "clearly and concisely the key facts upon which [they rely] and the contentions that [they believe] should be drawn from those facts”.[6]
  5. [5]
    On 15 February 2024, the Appellant filed with the Registry, and served on the Respondent, a five-and-a-half page SOFC.
  6. [6]
    On 21 March 2024, the Registry received correspondence from the Respondent advising the following:[7] 

On 13 March 2024, the respondent wrote to the appellant and advised that it considers the appellant’s Statement does not comply with the Commission’s Directions Order [4] (attached) because its Statement does not clearly and concisely [sic] the key facts upon which the appellant relies and the contentions that the appellant believes should be drawn from those facts. The respondent invited the appellant to provide an Amended Statement (by way of application of leave from the Commission which we would not oppose) and raised that it would be unable to file and serve its own Statement until it was provided with the appellant’s compliant Statement. The respondent has not received any response to this correspondence.

  1. [7]
    The Respondent further advised that they were unable to comply with the requirement that they file and serve their own SOFC in accordance with Directions Order [4], and requested that the matter be listed for mention before a Member of the Commission.[8]
  2. [8]
    This matter was accordingly allocated to me for consideration. I issued directions on 26 March 2024 for all outstanding directions to be vacated,[9] and listed the matter for mention on 22 April 2024. 
  3. [9]
    At this mention, Counsel for the Appellant, Mr Anthony Morris KC, and for the Respondent, Mr Peter O'Neill, both made detailed submissions in relation to the adequacy of the Appellant’s SOFC. Ultimately, the Respondent reiterated their position that the Appellant's SOFC is noncompliant with the directions and the requirements of the Commission. The Respondent accordingly requested that the Commission make a decision on the papers in relation to this interlocutory matter, seeking an "order pursuant to rule 41 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) that the [Appellant] be directed to file and serve an Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions."[10]
  4. [10]
    The Appellant in reply confirmed they welcomed this course of action, with the view that it "would be useful for the Regulator, in particular, to have a clear guidance on [this] subject".[11]
  5. [11]
    I issued directions on 22 April 2024 for the filing of written submissions by both parties on the issue of whether the Appellant’s "Statement of Facts and Contentions (filed on 15 February 2024) is compliant with the requirements of the Commission”.[12] This is the present issue for my determination.

Approach to this decision

  1. [12]
    Despite the Appellant's submission that the only question before the Commission in this interlocutory matter "is whether the [SOFC] as filed by the Appellant is compliant with the Directions",[13] I do not consider such a limited focus to be appropriate, or even possible to maintain.
  2. [13]
    For one, I directed that the parties file submissions on whether the Appellant's SOFC was compliant with the Commission's requirements, not just the Industrial Registry's directions. That the Commission's requirements are broader than what is explicitly outlined in the directions (which are brief in nature) is apparent even from the parties' written submissions, which are more wide-ranging than simply offering an analysis on the wording of the directions issued.
  3. [14]
    Additionally, I have unfortunately found that the Appellant’s submissions often rest upon an incorrect understanding of the nature of a workers' compensation appeal to the Commission. If a SOFC is prepared on the basis of a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the substantive appeal, I would reasonably expect that SOFC to be non-compliant with the Commission’s requirements in some way, regardless of how clear and concise it may first appear to be. It has therefore been necessary to clarify several matters arising from the submissions before me, in order to ultimately determine whether the Appellant's SOFC is compliant with the Commission's requirements. These include:
  1. What is the nature of a workers’ compensation appeal at the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission?
  2. What is the issue to be decided in a workers’ compensation appeal, and which party bears the onus of proof?
  3. What is the purpose of a Statement of Facts and Contentions?
  4. What are the Commission’s requirements as to the form and content of a Statement of Facts and Contentions?
  1. [15]
    I have not endeavoured to provide an exhaustive summary of the written and verbal submissions of the parties. Having carefully considered all of the material before me, I have instead referred to the key positions of both parties throughout my consideration below.
  2. [16]
    Pursuant to s 451(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), no hearing was conducted in this interlocutory matter, and it has been decided on the papers.

What is the nature of a workers’ compensation appeal at the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission?

  1. [17]
    In correspondence to the Respondent of 21 March 2024 (as annexed to the Respondent's written submissions of 7 May 2024), the Appellant’s representative argued that there was:[14]
  1. … a tension (to put it mildly) between statutory references to an "appeal”, and the fact that appellate proceedings take the form of a rehearing de novo…if the appellate tribunal is to set aside a decision made by the first instance decision-maker, it surely has jurisdiction to consider the correctness of that decision.
  1. … If you are correct that the appellate tribunal "does not revisit the decision below or review the correctness of that decision”, it may well be otiose and futile to "specify…grounds of the appeal” which identify specific errors (either of fact or of law) committed by the first instance decision-maker. But our client can hardly be blamed for following the internally contradictory procedures applying in respect of such an "appeal”.
  1. [18]
    It was further argued in this correspondence that “whilst it may be intellectually gratifying to see how the Commission resolves the inconsistencies between the legislative provisions under which it operates and its internal practices and procedures, we do not conceive this to be a necessary exegesis on the present occasion.”[15]
  2. [19]
    At the mention of 22 April 2024, Mr Morris KC, for the Appellant, similarly submitted the following:[16]

Needless to say, we are conscious that the hearing on appeal is, in effect, a rehearing de novo, but despite that, the rules of this tribunal require us to provide grounds of appeal and we’ve done that, and the grounds of appeal naturally include the grounds on which we say the initial decision-maker got it wrong. Secondly, the fact is that this tribunal’s jurisdiction, under section 558(1)(c) of the Act, empowers this tribunal, as an appeal body, to set aside the decision made by the initial decision-maker … [and we are] at a loss to understand why it is said to be irrelevant that the initial decision-maker got it wrong if one is focussing on the question [of] whether a decision has to be set aside.

  1. [20]
    This 'tension' perceived by the Appellant between the statutory references to an appeal in the WCR Act, and the resulting appeal to the Commission being in the form of a hearing de novo, is no tension at all. The relevant legislative provisions indeed provide the starting point in determining the nature of the hearing in relation to an appeal. As relevantly noted by McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ in Walsh v Law Society (NSW):[17]

[50] An appeal is a creation of statute. There are various forms of appeal. Accordingly, it is always important, where a process called "appeal” is invoked, to identify the character of the appeal and the duties and powers of the court or tribunal conducting it.

(emphasis added)

  1. [21]
    The relevant legislative provisions in relation to appeals to the Commission against a decision of the Regulator, are found in Chapter 13, Part 3, Division 1 of the WCR Act. These provisions set out matters such as who may appeal,[18] what decisions may be appealed against,[19] the procedure for appeal,[20] and how parties are to receive notice of a time and place for hearing.[21] The Act also notes that:
  • certain parts of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) and the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) ('IRTR') apply to an appeal under this division, with necessary changes;[22]
  • each party must give each other party involved any relevant document that the party wants to adduce as evidence at the hearing;[23] and
  • the Commission can order a claimant or worker to submit to a personal examination by one or more specified registered persons (therefore allowing for additional medical evidence to be produced on the appeal).[24]
  1. [22]
    Having first noted that appeals of this kind have traditionally been treated as a hearing de novo,[25] Martin J observed in Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) that "some indication of the duties and powers of the Commission can be drawn" from the WCR Act and its references to other statutes and rules of court.[26] In particular, His Honour noted that:[27]

The blanket application of the IRTR means that the Commission can make directions orders about the filing and service of material to be relied on, notices to admit facts or documents, and that evidence be given by affidavit. Those rules, together with the other legislative instruments which apply to this type of appeal, lead to the conclusion that the appeal is to be conducted as a hearing de novo rather than an appeal by way of rehearing.

(emphasis added)

  1. [23]
    Dawson J relevantly provides the following explanation of how a hearing de novo is distinct from other forms of appeal in Harris v Caladine:[28]

An order made by a Registrar is reviewable by way of a hearing de novo. That means that the court reviewing the order begins afresh and exercises for itself any discretion exercised below by the Registrar. The parties commence the application again, subject to any restrictions in the rules upon the calling of evidence or provisions relating to the use before the court of evidence called before the Registrar. A hearing de novo involves the exercise of the original jurisdiction and ‘the informant or complainant starts again and has to make out his case and call his witnesses’: Builders Licensing Board v. Sperway Constructions (Syd.) Pty. Ltd.; see also Reg. v. Pilgrim; Campbell, ‘Judicial Review and Appeals as Alternative Remedies’, Monash University Law Review.

A hearing de novo may be contrasted with an appeal stricto sensu and an appeal by way of rehearing. In an appeal stricto sensu the question is whether, upon the material before the tribunal below, the conclusion which was reached was correct. An appeal by way of rehearing involves the rehearing of the matter as at the date of the appeal, but upon the evidence called before the tribunal below, subject to a power to receive further evidence. On an appeal by way of rehearing the rights of the parties must be determined by reference to the circumstances, including the law, as they exist at the time of the rehearing. But an appeal by way of rehearing does not call for a fresh hearing as does a hearing de novo; the appeal court does not hear the witnesses again. See Builders Licensing Board v. Sperway Constructions (Syd.) Pty. Ltd.; Quilter v. Mapleson; and Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co. Pty. Ltd. and Meakes v. Dignan.

(citations omitted, emphasis added)

  1. [24]
    Despite purporting to accept that an appeal against a decision of the Regulator is by way of a hearing de novo,[29] the Appellant's submissions do not suggest this has been accepted in practice. For example, in correspondence to the Respondent, the Appellant’s representatives assume that "the entire file of the first instance decision-maker would have been made available" to the Commission.[30]  However, it is clear that in a hearing de novo, the Commission "considers the evidence and submissions provided to it by the parties, rather than reviewing the material before the Regulator".[31] Given the Appellant is the party with carriage of this matter, it is regardless unclear to me how the Commission would have acquired this file without the Appellant's knowledge or involvement, or why the Commission would be inclined to do so.
  2. [25]
    More specifically, the written submissions prepared by Mr Morris KC provides the following summary of the Appellant's case:[32]
  1. as matters of fact:
  1. that the Worker was afflicted by multiple stressors that did not arise in the workplace ("the non-work stressors”);
  2. that the non-work stressors were before the decision-maker at first instance; and
  3. that the medical practitioner did not consider or offer any opinion regarding the impact of the non-work stressors; and
  1. as matters of contention, that the decision-maker at first instance:
  1. treated the medical opinion as conclusive;
  2. did so despite the medical practitioner’s failure to consider the non-work stressors; and
  3. thereby fell into a series of appellable errors.

(emphasis added)

  1. [26]
    Mr Morris KC also submitted at the mention on 22 April 2024, that: [33]

MR MORRIS: …the issue on this appeal is whether there is an evidentiary basis for the findings that were made at first instance that the injury arose out of the worker's employment, and that there was no contribution or causation from alternative stressors. Those are the findings made and that will be the issue which is alive on the hearing of the appeal.

  1. [27]
    I agree with the Respondent’s submission that the Appellant's repeated "concentration on the alleged errors of the review officer in making the decision" now appealed against, as evidenced above, is simply misguided.[34] As an appeal against a decision of the Regulator is by way of a hearing de novo, such an appeal is not a review of the reasons for decision of the Regulator and is not concerned with matters such as the “evidentiary basis of the findings that were made at first instance”. The Regulator’s decision is essentially relegated to one "of historical significance only."[35] I would add for completeness that what WorkCover Queensland did or did not do, or their reasons for originally rejecting the worker’s claim, are likewise irrelevant.[36]
  2. [28]
    It does not follow, however, that the Appellant specifying the grounds of their appeal with reference to perceived errors in the Regulator’s decision is an "otiose and futile" exercise indicative of "internally contradictory procedures".[37] It is trite to point out that the Commission’s jurisdiction is only attracted by the filing of such an appeal against the Regulator’s decision; without the Appellant’s efforts in identifying such errors and filing a notice of appeal accordingly, no proceedings before the Commission could exist.[38] Mr O'Neill usefully noted this at the mention on 22 April 2024:[39]

MR O'NEILL: The fact of there being a review decision…is sufficient to give rise to the right to appeal, [but] once that right to appeal is lodged, this is a fresh hearing, so the appellant is the one bringing the appeal. The appellant should set out, in detail in its statement of facts and contentions, what is the case that it intends to mount on this appeal. The respondent then is placed in the position that it can appropriately respond to that case that has been set out. It almost seems to be, in my learned friend’s argument, some allegation or suggestion of there being a reversal of the onus of proof here, that…in fact, the respondent has [an] obligation to prove a case or set out what caused an injury. That’s not the case at all, Commissioner. We respond to the appellant’s case.

  1. [29]
    Section 558(1) of the WCR Act stipulates that the Commission has the following powers in deciding an appeal of this kind:
  1. confirm the decision;
  2. vary the decision:
  3. set aside the decision and substitute another decision; or
  4. set aside the decision and return the matter to the respondent with the directions the appeal body considers appropriate.
  1. [30]
    The Appellant referred to these powers when arguing that a Commission able to "set aside a decision made by the first instance decision-maker…surely has jurisdiction to consider the correctness of that decision."[40] This assumption fails to appreciate the distinction between a hearing de novo, and other forms of appeal. As noted by Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayden JJ in Allesch v Maunz:[41]

the critical difference between an appeal by way of rehearing and a hearing de novo is that, in the former case, the powers of the appellate court are exercisable only where the appellant can demonstrate that, having regard to all the evidence now before the appellate court, the order that is the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error, whereas, in the latter case, those powers may be exercised regardless of error. 

(emphasis added)

  1. [31]
    The relevance of the decision of the Regulator in a hearing de novo is, most simply, that it serves as the status quo.[42] The nature of that decision determines the parties to the appeal.[43] However, the reasoning, determinations, or evidence contained in the Regulator's decision are of no relevance to the scope of the appeal to the Commission.[44] The irrelevance of such matters is consistent with the nature of an appeal to the Commission pursuant to s 558 of the WCR Act, in that it is a hearing de novo. The success of an appeal against a decision of the Regulator is not dependent on the finding of error in that decision.[45]

What is the issue to be decided in the substantive appeal, and which party bears the onus of proof?

  1. [32]
    It is, and rightly so, uncontested between the parties that the Appellant bears the onus of proof in the substantive appeal.[46] However, the parties’ submissions demonstrate disagreement as to what the Appellant must actually prove to discharge this onus. It appears that this disagreement arises out of a failure of the Appellant to appreciate the distinction between an appeal against a decision of the Regulator filed by a worker, and an appeal filed by an employer.
  2. [33]
    A decision of the Regulator can be appealed against by either an aggrieved claimant, worker, or employer.[47] However, the status quo that, for example, an employer appellant would be aggrieved by and seek to disrupt, is distinct from the status quo that a worker appellant would themselves wish to disrupt. It follows that what an Appellant bears the onus of proving in appeals to the Commission of this kind, is dependent on the nature of the decision they are aggrieved by, and the status quo that decision sets.
  3. [34]
    This was articulated clearly by Industrial Commissioner Fisher in State of Queensland (Office of the Queensland Parliamentary Counsel) v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) (‘Queensland Parliamentary Counsel’):[48]
  1. [17]
    In its Notice of Appeal, the Appellant put in issue the decision made by the Regulator on injury and management action. An appellant, being either a worker or an employer, is required to satisfy the Commission that the decision of the Regulator was wrongly made. The matters to be established differ as between a worker appellant and an employer appellant. An employer appellant is required to establish that the decision was wrongly made by showing that any one of the elements of [s 32] is not satisfied or, alternatively, by satisfying s 32(5) of the Act i.e., that reasonable management action was taken in a reasonable way. In contrast, a worker appellant bears the onus of establishing all of the elements of [s 32] of the Act. A worker appellant is also required to negative any issue raised under s 32(5) of the Act raised by their own evidence, evidence led by the Regulator or called by an employer that has been granted leave to appear and be heard in the proceedings.

(emphasis added)

  1. [35]
    Further, Vice President O'Connor found the following in Charters Towers Regional Council v Workers' Compensation Regulator (in respect to an industrial deafness claim):[49]
  1. [61]
    For the purposes of the present appeal, it is not for the respondent to prove that Mr Smith’s industrial deadness arose out of, or in the course of his employment with the appellant. The appellant claimed no medical evidence to establish that Mr Smith’s industrial deafness did not arise out of, or in the course of his employment with the appellant.
  2. [62]
    Mr Smith has an accepted entitlement to compensation for industrial deafness in accordance with s 125 of the Act. I accept the submission of the respondent that it is incumbent on the appellant to disprove that fact. It has not done so. 
  1. [36]
    Referring to His Honour’s decision, Mr O'Neill submitted on behalf of the Respondent that:[50]
  1. In accordance with his Honour’s decision in the Charters Tower’s [sic] case, Ms Aardoom has an accepted entitlement to compensation for a work-related psychiatric injury, the onus is on the [substantive] Appellant to prove that Ms Aardoom has not sustained an ‘injury’ in accordance with s 32 of the Act.

(emphasis added)

  1. [37]
    I agree with Mr O'Neill’s submissions in this regard. The decision of the Respondent confirmed that Ms Aardoom has an accepted entitlement for compensation in accordance with section 32 of the WCR Act. By appealing against the Regulator's decision, the Appellant seeks to disturb this present entitlement. In Queensland Parliamentary Counsel, Industrial Commissioner Fisher also relevantly observed that:[51]
  1. [33]
    In Coyne, Hall P decided that in an employer appeal, a worker had the benefit of the decision below, even though in Queensland that decision is an administrative one where there is no requirement to observe the rules of evidence or to hear from anyone other than the person seeking the review. Despite recognizing the fundamental differences between an administrative decision and one made by a tribunal, the President nonetheless considered that a worker who had been successful in the administrative proceedings was entitled to the benefit of that decision until that decision was disturbed on appeal. Further, the worker was not required to go to proof at trial.

(emphasis added)

  1. [38]
    It has been reiterated by the Commission on numerous occasions that, where an employer is the appellant, and the relevant decision of the Regulator is a decision to accept a worker’s claim for compensation, the employer bears the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the claim was not one for acceptance.[52] As put by Industrial Commissioner Black in Stratco v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator), in which an employer appellant similarly appeals a decision of the Regulator to accept a worker’s application for compensation regarding a psychological/psychiatric injury:[53]

The appeal to the Commission is by way of a hearing de novo. To succeed with its appeal, the appellant must establish on the balance of probabilities that [the worker] did not sustain a psychological injury, or if a psychological injury was sustained that it did not arise out of or in the course of employment, if the employment was a significant contributing factor to the injury. Failing this, the appellant needs to establish that the injury sustained by [the worker] should be excluded from section 32(1) of the Act by virtue of section 32(5) of the Act.

  1. [39]
    This was similarly addressed by Industrial Commissioner Neate in CFMEU v Blackwood and Vaccaneo, who observed that:[54]

… it is clear than in cases such as the present case, where the employer is the appellant and the decision appealed against is a decision to accept the claim for compensation, the employer bears the onus of proving on the balance of probabilities that the claim is not one for acceptance. In some cases it would fall to the employer appellant to prove that:

  1. the person claiming compensation was not a "worker" within the meaning of the Act at the relevant time; or
  2. the person claiming compensation did not sustain an "injury" within the meaning of the act [sic] at the relevant time; or
  3. if they did sustain an injury, the injury either did not arise out of or in the course of the person's employment or the injury was one to which employment was not a significant contributing factor.
  1. [40]
    In contrast, Mr Morris KC submitted the following on the issue of onus (as extracted):[55]
  1. The Appellant’s case is limited to the question of causation…

…

the non-work stressors

  1. The Regulator’s Submissions appear to suggest – implicitly, if not explicitly – that, by the SFC, the Appellant should (in effect) "nail its colours to the mast” as to which of the non-work stressors, or what combination of them, caused the Worker’s injury. The simple answer is that the Appellant does not choose to advance any specific contention regarding the relative causal contributions made by different non-work stressors; nor is any such contention capable of being drawn from "the facts”.
  1. The critical issue here is one of onus. The Appellant’s case is that:
  1. by excluding consideration of the non-work stressors, the decision-maker at first instance failed – contrary to the requirements of Section 32 – to make a sustainable finding that "employment [was] a significant contributing factor to the injury”; and
  2. absent further evidence from or on behalf of the Worker, the Commission likewise cannot properly be satisfied that "employment [was] a significant contributing factor to the injury”.
  1. Of course, on the hearing of this appeal:
  1. the Appellant bears the onus of proof;
  2. the Commission is engaged in a "rehearing de novo”; and
  3. the Commission may receive further evidence which was not before the decision-maker at first instance.
  1. It does not follow – as the Regulator seems to suppose – that the Appellant bears the onus of proving that a particular non-work stressor, or a particular combination of non-work stressors, caused the Worker’s injury. The issue remains, simply, whether "employment [was] a significant contributing factor to the injury”. The non-work stressors are (and continue to be) relevant on the basis that the required factual conclusion – a conclusion that "employment [was] a significant contributing factor to the injury” – cannot be reached without addressing the non-work stressors.
  1. Ultimately, the Appellant will discharge the onus which it bears if, on the whole of the evidence (including any further evidence received on the hearing of the appeal), the Commission cannot be satisfied that "employment [was] a significant contributing factor to the injury”. If the evidence is evenly balanced on that issue, then – since the Appellant bears the onus of proof – the appeal will fail. But if the preponderance of evidence excludes a positive finding that "employment [was] a significant contributing factor to the injury”, the appeal must succeed.

(emphasis added)

  1. [41]
    I do not find that these submissions have demonstrated a proper understanding of the requirements of the substantive appeal. The Appellant's ‘questions of causation’ as to how the Regulator reached their decision, and their belief that the Regulator failed to make a sustainable finding that the worker's employment was a significant contributing factor to their injury, are, again, entirely irrelevant in a hearing de novo.
  2. [42]
    Furthermore, requiring the Respondent (or the worker, who is not a party to the substantive appeal) to produce further medical evidence to address the Appellant's concerns about issues of causation – as the Appellant appears to expect[56] – would have the perverse effect of essentially reversing the onus of proof. This was foreseen by President Hall in State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Q-COMP and Coyne (‘Coyne’), who observed that it:[57]

…would be a very unusual appeal indeed if, by filing a notice of appeal, the appellant might impose upon the [Respondent] … the carriage of the case in which it bore the onus of justifying the decision appealed against.

  1. [43]
    As submitted by the Respondent, if the Appellant "alleges that there is some non-work-related cause or causes that have given rise to the claimant's psychological injury, the [Appellant] has the obligation to provide medical evidence to positively establish that case."[58] I agree with this submission, in that the Appellant cannot discharge its onus in an appeal by hearing de novo, by merely levelling criticism at the decision of the Regulator, or otherwise anticipating that the Regulator will be unable to produce further medical evidence to support its own decision. The substantive appeal is not an opportunity for the Appellant to demand that the Respondent justify their decision to accept the worker’s application for compensation.
  2. [44]
    As a hearing de novo involves the exercise of the original jurisdiction, the Appellant is required to start again and make out their case anew.[59] The ‘issue’ is the same as it was in the first instance, namely whether the worker sustained an injury within the meaning of section 32 of the WCR Act. By appealing against the decision to accept the worker’s claim, the onus is on the Appellant in the substantive appeal to positively establish that the worker's claim was not one for acceptance as the worker did not sustain an injury within the meaning of the Act.[60]
  3. [45]
    For completeness, section 32 of the Act relevantly provides:[61]

32 Meaning of injury

  1. An injury is personal injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if –
  1. for an injury other than a psychiatric or psychological disorder – the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury; or
  2. for a psychiatric or psychological disorder – the employment is the major significant contributing factor to the injury.

…

  1. Despite subsections (1) and (3), injury does not include a psychiatric or psychological disorder arising out of, or in the course of, any of the following circumstances –
  1. reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with the worker's employment;
  2. the worker's expectation or perception of reasonable management action being taken against the worker;
  3. action by the Regulator or an insurer in connection with the worker's application for compensation.

Examples of actions that may be reasonable management actions taken in a reasonable way–

  • action taken to transfer, demote, discipline, redeploy, retrench or dismiss the worker.
  • a decision not to aware or provide promotion, reclassification or transfer of, or leave of absence or benefit in connection with, the worker's employment.
  1. [46]
    The onus therefore rests with the Appellant to demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, either that:
  • the worker was not a worker within the meaning of s 11 of the WCR Act; or
  • the worker did not sustain a personal injury in the nature of a psychological injury; or
  • the worker’s personal injury did not arise out of, or in the course of, her employment; or
  • the worker’s employment was not a significant contributing factor to her personal injury; or
  • the worker’s injury did arise out of management action taken in a reasonable way by the Appellant in connection with her employment, excluding her injury from an entitlement to compensation pursuant to s 32(5) of the WCR Act. 

What is the purpose of a Statement of Facts and Contentions?

  1. [47]
    In their submissions on behalf of the Respondent, Mr O'Neill cited the decision of Workers’ Compensation Regulator v Adams, in which Martin J, President held that:[62]
  1. [17]
    The case which was mounted by Ms Adams before the Commission was one which was based on the stressors set out in the Statement of Stressors. The Regulator was entitled to engage in the proceeding on the basis that they were the matters which constituted the entirety of the claim made by Ms Adams.
  1. [48]
    Mr O'Neill also cited His Honour’s decision in Carlton v Blackwood, in which it is observed that:[63]
  1. [10]
    It is a requirement of all appeals to the Commission under the Act for the appellant to provide, among other things, a Statement of Stressors.
  2. [11]
    It has been emphasised, time and time again, that one of the purposes of the Statement of Stressors (or a Statement of Events) is to confine the issues to be considered.

…

  1. [14]
    The parties to an appeal before the Commission, and the Commission itself, must not allow an appeal under the Act to become a vehicle for the resolution of a list of grievances which are not relevant to the event or events which are said to have given rise to the compensable injury.

…

  1. [18]
    …An appellant’s case has to be known before the hearing starts. The Commission cannot allow a case to “evolve” and place the respondent in the position of having to contend with the shifting sands of an undefined argument. If an appellant wishes to advance a different case, then that should be done by seeking an amendment to the Statement of Stressors or the document identifying the facts and contentions. The Commission can then decide whether or not to allow such an amendment.
  1. [49]
    However, in his submissions on behalf of the Appellant, Mr Morris KC contended that the above authorities “relied upon [by the Respondent] are not applicable to the question currently before the Commission, because those authorities deal with a ‘Statement of Stressors’ or ‘Statement of Events’.”[64] He continues to submit that:[65]

As outlined in Yousif v Workers’ Compensation Regulator, it is no longer the Commission’s practice to require a Statement of Stressors, but rather a [SOFC]. This:

  1. is a different requirement altogether; and
  1. in [sic] regulated by the limits contained in the Directions.
  1. [50]
    For completeness, in Yousif v Workers’ Compensation Regulator (‘Yousif’), Martin J, President observed the following:[66]
  1. [11]
    In appeals brought to the Commission under the Act, it was once the standard practice for a direction to be given requiring the appellant to file and serve a Statement of Stressors. It is now the common practice for a direction to be given requiring the parties to file and serve Statements of Facts and Contentions. The legislative power to make such a direction is found in s 451(2)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act). More detailed provisions are contained in r 41 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011. Rule 45 also provides that, among other things, the Commission may dismiss a proceeding if there is a failure to comply with a direction.
  1. [51]
    With respect to the Appellant, I do not believe that the distinction between a Statement of Stressors (‘SOS’) and a SOFC is so pronounced that the authorities cited by the Respondent are rendered irrelevant to my present consideration. Across several decisions, Martin J, President provided guidance regarding the utility of SOS being filed by an appellant in a workers’ compensation appeal, including that:
  • the process of filing a SOS is used to identify those events or matters which an appellant, seeking to demonstrate a compensable psychological or psychiatric injury, says caused that injury;[67]
  • the provision of a SOS alerts the respondent to the case advanced by the appellant;[68]
  • the SOS filed by the appellant confines the issues which must be considered on the appeal;[69]
  • the SOS cannot serve as a platform for the appellant to outline a list of grievances that are irrelevant to the injury;[70]
  • the SOS sets the boundaries of the appeal, which the Commission cannot go beyond when deciding the appeal/making findings.[71]
  1. [52]
    More recent decisions of the Industrial Court of Queensland illustrate that directing the parties to file SOFCs serves a similar purpose. Martin J, President noted the following in Yousif :[72]
  1. [13]
    A Statement of Facts and Contentions is not attended with the same level of formality as pleadings in the traditional sense are. The Commission is relieved, by s 531 of the IR Act, of many of the strict rules which apply in the civil courts. But, the Commission is still in charge of its own procedure and may, consistently with the provisions of s 531, require parties to provide an outline of their respective cases. This is particularly important in appeals under the Act where the nature of injuries, their cause, and the times at which they were suffered are essential to the resolution of an appeal. It follows, then, that the Commission is entitled to rely on the Statement as a complete statement of a party’s case and, if an admission is made, to rely on that admission.

…

  1. [15]
    It is consistent with the requirements of s 531 for a party in an appeal under the Act to set out its case by way of a Statement of Facts and Contentions. It alerts the other party to the case it will have to deal with and it identifies the issues which exist which, in turn, allow for a confinement of the matters in dispute. An appeal under the Act is not the time for a broad ranging inquiry into an unlimited number of complaints or grievances. The time and resources of the Commission are constrained and it is necessary for those constraints to be acknowledged in this way. Subject always to the Commission’s power to allow appropriate amendments (so that s 531 may be observed) a party will be bound by its Statement of Facts and Contentions and may not lead evidence which is not relevant to the identified issues.

(emphasis added)

  1. [53]
    Additionally, as observed by Deputy President Merrell in Workers’ Compensation Regulator v Carr:[73]
  1. [47]
    In a court governed by them, pleadings are not only directed to the other party, they have another important audience, namely, the court. As such, they must be drawn so as to allow the tribunal of fact to know what the case is about, and to know, before the trial starts, the real issues that remain in dispute and that must be resolved. The statements of facts and contentions ordered by the Commission to be filed and served have a similar function, although they are not subject to the detailed rules contained in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999.

(emphasis added)

  1. [54]
    I am somewhat sympathetic to the Appellant’s concerns about the authorities relied on by the Respondent, which all involve a worker appellant appealing against a decision to reject their application for compensation in relation to a psychiatric or psychological injury. The differences in form and content between a SOS and a SOFC are less pronounced in appeals of this nature, where the onus is on the worker appellant to prove that they have suffered an injury within the meaning of the WCR Act. That can be difficult for a worker appellant to establish, as psychological or psychiatric injuries can occur “over a lengthy period of time and may involve many different factors”.[74] It is therefore still standard practice for such appellants to be directed to include a list of work-related stressors (essentially a Statement of Stressors) within their SOFC.[75] However, I do not find this distinction to be particularly relevant to the present matter; directing a worker appellant to provide a list of stressors is simply an effective way of ensuring that an appellant files a SOFC that advances as clear a case as possible.
  2. [55]
    The authorities relied upon by the Respondent continue to provide useful general guidance to parties directed to file a SOFC, as doing so serves a similar purpose to what once was achieved through the filing of a SOS. While the present Appellant was not directed to provide a list of stressors, they are still required to file a SOFC that is a comprehensive and complete statement of their case, that alerts both the Respondent and the Commission to the case it is advancing, and that confines the issues to be considered on appeal. In summary, the filing of SOFCs by each party must have the effect of:
  • alerting the other party to the case it will have to deal with;
  • identifying the issues which exist between the parties;
  • confining the issues to be considered on appeal by the Commission; and
  • alerting the Commission to the cases advanced by the parties prior to the hearing.

What are the Commission’s requirements as to the form and content of a Statement of Facts and Contentions?

Relevant form

  1. [56]
    As a preliminary matter, Mr Morris KC submitted that "there is no required form or other rule, whether legislative or regulatory, with which the Appellant was required to comply” in preparing their SOFC.[76]
  2. [57]
    I acknowledge that there is no mandatory form that the Appellant was required to use when filing a SOFC. However, a number of forms have been approved for use by or within the Commission,[77] which relevantly includes ‘Form 9A – Appellant's statement of facts and contentions psychiatric and/or psychological injuries’. This form provides examples of what the contentions in a matter may be, including:[78]
  • whether the appellant was a worker within the meaning of section 11 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003;
  • whether the appellant sustained an injury within the meaning of section 32 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003;
  • whether employment was a significant contributing factor to the psychiatric injury;
  • whether the psychiatric injury is excluded because it arose out of or in the course of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way; and
  • whether the psychiatric injury is excluded because of the perception of the worker's expectation or perception of reasonable management action being taken against the worker.
  1. [58]
    It is evident from the Appellant’s SOFC that its authors, who elected not to use the Form 9A, may well have benefitted from the clarity it could have provided them had they done so. 

Contents

  1. [59]
    In their submissions, Mr Morris KC took issue with the drafting of the directions in relation to the outlining of contentions in a SOFC. I do not find that these digressive submissions warrant further consideration, but note that Mr Morris KC eventually correctly concluded that the directions require the Appellant to outline “the contentions advanced by the Appellant which the Appellant believes are supported by [the outlined] facts”.[79]
  2. [60]
    The Appellant’s SOFC should contain a statement of the material facts, i.e., those relied upon to establish the Appellant’s case. The SOFC should then proceed to list the Appellant’s contentions, setting out the case advanced on appeal to the Commission. Simply, a SOFC is an outline of a party’s case.[80] As put by Deputy President Bloomfield in Davis v Workers’ Compensation Regulator, a SOFC “simply records what a party proposes to establish by way of fact – through evidence it will lead and through the cross-examination of the other party’s witnesses – as well as the contentions, in a legal sense, it will then advance in reliance upon those facts.”[81] 

Directions Order

  1. [61]
    By virtue of the Industrial Registry’s directions, it is also required that the Appellant files a SOFC that “clearly and concisely” details the key facts relied upon by the Appellant, and the contentions they believe should be drawn from those facts.[82] In my view, this direction is consistent with the purposes of a SOFC; for example, a meandering or ambiguous SOFC would likely not appropriately alert the other party or the Commission to the case being advanced.

Consideration of the Appellant’s Statement of Facts and Contentions

  1. [62]
    I will now proceed to consider the contents of the Appellant’s SOFC, with reference to the purposes of a SOFC as discussed above, the requirements of the Commission as to a SOFC’s form and content, and the Registry’s directions.
  2. [63]
    In his written submissions on behalf of the Appellant, Mr Morris KC submitted that:[83]
  1. The Appellant’s case is limited to the question of causation. That position is made clear by the Appellant’s [SOFC], as briefly summarised above.
  1. It cannot be the case that the Appellant’s [SOFC] is required either:
  1. to narrate a chronology of the matters under consideration; or
  1. to outline or address the evidence which the Appellant intends to call in support of its position.

Any such requirement would directly contradict the express obligation to be “concise”.

  1. [64]
    While I appreciate Mr Morris KC’s emphasis on the importance of complying with a direction of the Commission (like one to be clear and concise),[84] I do not accept his apparent understanding of what being clear and/or concise in this context entails.
  2. [65]
    To be concise is to be “marked by brevity of expression or statement” and “free from all elaboration and superfluous detail”.[85] In other words, the author of a concise SOFC has successfully discerned what is relevant to the appeal, and what only serves as a distraction.
  3. [66]
    As the case advanced by the Appellant purports to be limited to a ‘question of causation’, its SOFC is almost entirely focused on the Regulator’s decision. As exhaustively explored above, advancing such a case is entirely misconceived, so any mention of the reasoning, determinations, findings, or evidence contained in the Regulator’s decision within the SOFC, is entirely irrelevant. It is unfortunate, then, that the Appellant dedicated five pages of their five-and-a-half page SOFC to the following paragraphs:[86]

Facts

…

  1. In providing the work capacity certificate dated 15 December 2022 (herein called “the purported medical opinion”), Dr Ong-Garza:
  1. was not aware of any of the alternative stressors;
  2. did not record any of the alternative stressors;
  3. did not consider or take into account any of the alternative stressors;
  4. on the issue whether the worker’s employment was a significant contributing factor to the alleged condition:
  1. was unable to offer any opinion;
  2. did not offer any opinion;
  3. did not purport to offer any opinion;
  1. on the issue whether the alternative stressors were a significant contributing factor to the alleged condition:
  1. was unable to offer any opinion;
  2. did not offer any opinion;
  3. did not purport to offer any opinion.
  1. By the decision under appeal, the decision-maker:
  1. found that the purported medical opinion provided “support” to the contention that the worker’s employment was a significant contributing factor to the alleged condition;
  2. treated the purported medical opinion as being:
  1. relevant to that issue;
  2. conclusive of that issue;
  1. found that the purported medical opinion did not support the Appellant’s contentions that:
  1. the worker was afflicted by the alternative stressors;
  2. the alternative stressors were a significant contributing factor to the alleged condition;
  1. treated the purported medical opinion as being relevant to the issues whether:
  1. the worker was afflicted by the alternative stressors;
  2. the alternative stressors were a significant contributing factor to the alleged condition;
  1. treated the purported medical opinion as being conclusive of the issues whether:
  1. the worker was afflicted by the alternative stressors;
  2. the alternative stressors were a significant contributing factor to the alleged condition;
  1. found that:
  1. “the medical evidence indicates the injury arose out of [the worker’s] employment”;
  2. there was no “competing cause…to the contrary”;
  1. identified three categories of alleged “bullying and harassment in the workplace” as causative of the worker’s alleged “emotional stress”, namely:
  1. alleged “interactions” between the worker and the Appellant’s director, Jeanette Mary Jones;
  2. alleged “underpayment [of] overtime”;
  3. the allegation that “single accommodation was booked at the request of Ms Jones”;
  1. accepted that:
  1. the second category comprised “reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way”, as the worker had “not provided sufficient evidence to indicate the overtime was excessive or above and beyond what is reasonably required”;
  2. the third category comprised “reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way”, as “this was said to have been done for budgetary reasons and [the worker has] not provided evidence to indicate [that she was] uncomfortable with this arrangement at the time”;
  1. concluded, in respect of the alleged condition, that “from a global perspective”, the decision-maker was “not satisfied that [the worker’s] injury can be said to have arisen out of management action taken in a reasonable way”;
  1. in respect of that conclusion, provided:
  1. no reasons;
  2. no rational, cogent, intelligible or satisfactory reasons;
  1. used the word “substantiated” to characterise assertions of fact made by the worker which were:
  1. untested;
  2. fiercely disputed;
  3. contradicted by other witnesses;
  4. highly subjective;
  1. otherwise;
  1. provided no or no intelligible process of analytical ratiocination supporting any of the decision-maker’s findings of fact;
  2. identified no rational basis for accepting evidence provided by and on behalf of the worker in preference to evidence supplied by the Appellant;
  3. referred generally to what the (unspecified) “witness evidence indicates” as conclusive of specific areas of factual dispute;
  4. purported, without detailing any reasons or explanation, to rely on “the evidence in its entirety” to support a conclusion that “the weight of the evidence substantiates” the worker’s factual assertions;
  1. failed to have any or sufficient regard to the compelling contemporaneous documentary evidence contradicting the worker’s claims;
  1. failed to take or take sufficiently into account the powerful indicia that the worker’s account of evidence was fabricated, by the worker and the worker’s supporting witnesses, for reasons of self-interest;
  1. made findings of serious misconduct against:
  1. the Appellant;
  2. the Appellant’s director, Jeanette Mary Jones;
  1. in making those findings of serious misconduct, did not apply the principles expressed by the High Court of Australia in Briginshaw v Briginshaw, [1938] HCA 34; 60 CLR 336;
  1. expressed an admonishment that the Appellant’s director, Jeanette Mary Jones, “is supposed to set an example for other staff and set the standards for the culture within a company”…;
  1. expressed the admonishment despite its being entirely irrelevant.
  1. The decision-maker’s decision gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias:
  1. for the reasons set out in:
  1. Ground 1 of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal;
  2. Ground 2 of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal;
  3. Ground 3 of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal;
  4. Ground 4 of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal;
  5. Ground 5 of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal;
  1. because the decision-maker expressed the admonishment despite its being entirely irrelevant.

Contentions

  1. in the premises of the facts set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3, the decision under appeal was:
  1. illogical;
  1. irrational;
  1. misconceived.
  1. In the premises of the facts set forth in paragraph 4, the decision under appeal:
  1. was and is:
  1. demonstrably wrong;
  2. misconceived;
  3. logically untenable;
  4. bad in law;
  5. wrong in fact:
  6. bereft of any logical or rational foundation;
  1. is factually unsustainable;
  1. constitutes a miscarriage of justice;
  1. amounts to a denial of natural justice.
  1. In the premises of the facts set forth in subparagraphs 4(n) and (o), the decision-maker erred in law by failing to apply the principles expressed by the High Court of Australia in Briginshaw v Briginshaw, [1938] HCA 34; 60 CLR 336.
  1. The decision under appeal ought be set aside:
  1. for the reasons stated in paragraph 6;
  2. for the reasons stated in paragraph 7;
  3. for the reasons stated in paragraph 8;
  4. because the decision is infected by a reasonable apprehension of bias.
  1. [67]
    The matters raised in the above paragraphs are entirely irrelevant to a hearing de novo and should not be included in the Appellant’s SOFC.[87] I do not believe that concision can be achieved by filing a SOFC that substantially relates to matters of no relevance to the substantive appeal. As stated previously, the Appellant is required to establish that the Regulator’s decision was wrongly made, either by showing that one of the elements of s 32(1) is not satisfied, or by satisfying s 32(5) of the WCR Act. Nothing raised in the above paragraphs has any bearing on such matters, and they will not be considered further.
  2. [68]
    I disagree with Mr Morris KC’s submission that, on the basis of the Appellant’s SOFC, “the Regulator is entitled to assume that the Appellant does not challenge … [that] … the worker is a worker for the purposes of the Act…[and that] the worker has sustained a personal injury.”[88] A sufficient SOFC does not require its audience to assume what case is being advanced, it explicitly alerts them to it. The Regulator, and indeed the Commission, is entitled to receive a SOFC that does not ask them to ‘read between the lines’, to guess what is intended by the Appellant, or to “contend with the shifting sands of an undefined argument.”[89] I also take issue with the suggestion that these assumptions are reasonably open to the Respondent; for example, if the Appellant accepts that the worker sustained a personal injury, that is not clear from the references to the worker’s “alleged” condition and emotional stress.[90]
  3. [69]
    Further to the importance of omitting all superfluous information, a SOFC can only be reasonably described as concise if it includes all pertinent information. The overarching issue with the Appellant’s SOFC is that it rests upon a misconceived understanding of the nature of the substantive appeal. If the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction was limited to the consideration of questions of law, arguments relating to the decision at first instance would understandably be central to the Appellant’s case. However, the substantive appeal is by hearing de novo, and the success of the appeal depends on the Appellant’s ability to establish either that one of the elements of s 32(1) is not satisfied, or that s 32(5) is satisfied. Allowing the Respondent to simply assume the case advanced in relation to the elements of s 32(1), or to submit that s 32(5) “does not fall to be decided because the worker’s claim must fail on the issues of causation”, is imprudent.[91] The Appellant’s contentions as to s 32(1) and s 32(5) should have been explicitly outlined in their SOFC; in the SOFC filed, they are a peripheral concern at best.
  4. [70]
    Additionally, while Mr Morris KC essentially submitted that an attempt at concision and the provision of “a chronology of the matters under consideration” are mutually exclusive, the resulting absence of any material key facts has produced a SOFC so lacking in detail that it is difficult to ascertain the case being advanced. This is evident in the first two paragraphs of the Appellant’s SOFC:[92]
  1. Except as stated below, the Appellant adopts the facts set out in the decision under appeal.
  1. The worker:
  1. was afflicted by multiple stressors, as set out [sic] the Appellant’s solicitors [sic] letter of 10 January 2023 (herein called “the alternative stressors”);
  2. was not afflicted by any of the alternative stressors arising out of or in the course of her employment;
  3. to the extent that she suffered alleged “emotional stress” (herein called “the alleged condition”), suffered the alleged condition as a result of the alternative stressors.
  1. [71]
    Given that the Regulator’s decision is only of historical significance, and that the Appellant is required to make their case anew before the Commission, it is not sufficient, or appropriate, to simply refer back to the facts outlined in that decision. This approach regardless has puzzling results. I share the Respondent’s concerns in relation to the challenge of identifying which facts the Appellant purports to adopt by referring to the Regulator’s decision in their SOFC:[93]
  1. The review officer found there to be substantiated allegations that:
  • Ms Jones commented about the claimant’s body;
  • Ms Jones touched the claimant on her bottom;
  • Ms Jones called the claimant ‘bubby’, ‘bulldog’ and ‘sausage eater’;
  • Those comments included swearing and derogatory terms and comments about the claimant’s sexual activity with her partner;
  • Single accommodation was booked at the request of Ms Jones which meant that Ms Jones and the claimant slept in the same room.
  1. Are these facts adopted by the [Appellant] (as per paragraph 1 of the Appellant’s Statement of Facts and Contentions) because those facts are not specifically denied in the Statement of Facts and Contentions?

(emphasis added)

  1. [72]
    What is outlined in paragraphs 1-2 of the Appellant’s SOFC, lacks clarity; it is not “easily understood”, nor is it “free from obscurity or ambiguity”.[94] While the SOFC refers to ‘alternative stressors’, these alternative stressors are not listed or described in any further detail. A reference to a letter in which these alternative stressors are set out, is of no assistance if that letter is not before the Commission. Mr Morris KC’s submission that the letter that lists the alternative stressors “is available on the file, [and] certainly available to the respondent”, again appears to assume that the Commission has covertly acquired the file that was before the Regulator at the time of the decision appealed against. The Commission’s file, in any matter before it, consists of documents from the parties that have been accepted for filing in the Industrial Registry. As the Regulator’s file being reviewed by the Commission would be incompatible with a hearing de novo, neither party would have been permitted to file the material before the Regulator, had they attempted to do so. 
  2. [73]
    The Appellant’s submission that the Respondent’s complaint that “documents referred to in the [SOFC] are not before the Commission…is a distraction from the question which the Commission is currently required to determine”, is a failure to recognise the Commission as an important audience of its SOFC.[95] The Appellant’s SOFC should alert the Commission to the case being advanced; by not sparing a single word to define the ‘alternative stressors’ in the SOFC, the Commission is unable to ascertain what the Appellant’s case is even fundamentally about.
  3. [74]
    Again, the Appellant’s SOFC has suffered because of the misconceived case advanced within it. This Commission cannot consider an appeal that “is limited to the question of causation”.[96]  It is understandable that the Appellant, in advancing such a case anyway, would submit the following:[97] 
  1. It does not follow – as the Regulator seems to suppose – that the Appellant bears the onus of proving that a particular non-work stressor, or a particular combination of non-work stressors, caused the Worker’s injury … The non-work stressors are (and continue to be) relevant on the basis that the required factual conclusion – a conclusion that "employment [was] a significant contributing factor to the injury” – cannot be reached without addressing the non-work stressors.
  1. [75]
    The conclusion that the worker’s employment was a significant factor to their psychological/psychiatric injury has already been reached; the worker has an accepted entitlement to compensation. If the Appellant believes that the worker should not have an entitlement to compensation, it is “incumbent on the appellant to disprove that fact”. For example, if the Appellant believes that relevant non-work stressors to the worker’s injury were overlooked by the Regulator, the Appellant must establish on the balance of probabilities that the worker’s employment was not a significant factor to their injury, or that their injury did not arise out of or in the course of their employment.
  2. [76]
    Merely alluding to the existence of ‘alternative stressors’ that ought to have been considered by the Regulator, without identifying what those stressors are (or acknowledging the irrelevance of the Regulator’s decision), is plainly insufficient. As observed by Industrial Commissioner Neate in CFMEU v Blackwood and Vaccaneo:[98]

… the question of whether or not a worker has sustained an injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment and whether employment is a significant contributing factor to an injury, is a question of mixed law and fact to be determined by the court or Commission. In reaching that determination, ordinarily emphasis is placed on the opinions of medical practitioners.

  1. [77]
    In its SOFC, the Appellant is not required to detail the evidence it will lead at a hearing. However, the Appellant is bound by its SOFC, and it cannot lead evidence which is not relevant to the issues identified in its SOFC at the hearing.[99] If the Appellant, in accordance with Industrial Commissioner Neate’s observations above, intends to lead evidence at a hearing in relation to specific non-work stressors, those stressors must be explicitly identified in the Appellant’s SOFC. I agree with the Respondent’s submission that:[100]
  1. …if the [Appellant] wishes to run a case that there were non-work-related stressors that were a, or the significant contributing factor to the claimant’s injury, it is necessary for the [Appellant] to specifically set out in the Statement of Facts and Contentions:
  1. -what the alleged stressor(s) is/are;
  2. -when the stressor(s) occurred;
  3. -how it is alleged that the stressor(s) contributed to the psychological injury.

…

  1. If the [Appellant] seeks to run a case that the claimant’s injury is not work-related, it bears the onus to call medical evidence to establish this and this case should be properly identified and set out in the [Appellant’s] Statement of Facts and Contentions.
  1. [78]
    I note the following submission of Mr Morris KC on this point:[101]
  1. The Regulator’s Submissions appear to suggest – implicitly, if not explicitly – that, by the [SOFC], the Appellant should (in effect) “nail its colours to the mast” as to which of the non-work stressors, or what combination of them, caused the Worker’s injury. The simple answer is that the Appellant does not choose to advance any specific contention regarding the relative causal contributions made by different non-work stressors; nor is any such contention capable of being drawn from “the facts”.
  1. [79]
    If the Respondent did indeed suggest that the Appellant should “nail its colours to the mast” as to which non-work stressor, or combination of non-work stressors, caused the worker’s injury, the Respondent was correct in doing so. Failing to outline any material facts, or advance any specific contentions, in relation to non-work stressors is not only non-compliant with the Commission’s requirements, but also ignorant of both the onus that the Appellant bears by appealing the Regulator’s decision, and the nature of their appeal to the Commission.

Conclusion

  1. [80]
    Despite Mr Morris KC’s submission that “the nature of the rehearing – and specifically the characterisation of the appeal as either stricto sensu or de novo – is irrelevant to the question presently before the Commission”,[102] the opposite is true. Advancing a case of any merit or relevance in an appeal stricto sensu, is far removed from what is required in a hearing de novo, which often bears more resemblance to an original hearing than it does other forms of appeal. The Appellant’s SOFC has suffered from a failure to appreciate that distinction, despite the high calibre of the legal professionals involved in its drafting. The result is a SOFC that, rather than clearly and concisely alerting its audience to the case the Appellant will advance (or at least, that the Appellant can advance), has succeeded only in alerting its audience of an entirely misconceived understanding of the nature of the substantive appeal.
  2. [81]
    As the entirety of the SOFC’s contents are either irrelevant to a hearing de novo, or too vague to be instructive, any attempt of the Appellant to adequately inform the Commission of the case it is to advance has failed. While maintaining clarity and concision in a SOFC is important, and is directed, this is relegated to a concern of secondary importance when the case being expressed in that SOFC is misconceived. The SOFC can offer no assistance in any later endeavour of the Commission to identify, let alone narrow down, the issues in dispute between the parties. It also offers no assistance to the Respondent, who has not been sufficiently alerted to the case it will be required to answer. I find that the Appellant’s SOFC is deficient for these reasons, and I order accordingly.

Orders

  1. [82]
    I make the following orders:
    1. That, pursuant to r 41 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld), the Appellant is to file an Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions with the Industrial Registry that is compliant with the requirements of the Commission and that, at minimum, contains the following amendments to the Statement of Facts and Contentions filed on 15 February 2024:
      1. the Appellant is to amend paragraphs [1]-[2] to include specific reference to the material facts upon which the Appellant relies; and
      2. the Appellant is to remove paragraphs [3]-[9].
    2. That the Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions is to be filed by the Appellant with the Industrial Registry within 28 days from the release of this Decision. 

Footnotes

[1]I note that it is the standard practice of the Industrial Registry to issue directions in workers’ compensation appeals, prior to allocating the matter to a Member of the Commission, when both parties are legally represented.

[2]While Kevesther Pty Ltd is the Appellant in the substantive matter, they are the Respondent in this interlocutory matter. Likewise, the substantive Respondent, the Regulator, is the present Applicant. However, to avoid confusion and maintain consistency between the parties’ submissions and this Decision, the parties will be referred to by their substantive roles for the purposes of this Decision.

[3]Directions Order, issued 11 October 2023, Orders 6-7.

[4]Directions Order [2], issued 21 December 2023; Directions Order [3], issued 18 January 2024; Directions Order [4], issued 30 January 2024.

[5]Email from Yusuf Furgan to Industrial Registry, 20 December 2023; Email from Yusuf Furgan to Industrial Registry, 17 January 2024; Email from Spencer Wright to Industrial Registry, 30 January 2024.

[6]Directions Order [4], issued 30 January 2024, Orders 2-3.

[7]Email from Michael Cutting, Senior Appeals Officer, Appeals Unit to Industrial Registry, 21 March 2024.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Directions Order [5], issued 26 March 2024, Order 1.

[10]Respondent's submissions, filed 7 May 2024, [1].

[11]T 1-9, l 36.

[12]Further Directions Order (No. 6), issued 22 April 2024, Orders 1-2.

[13]Appellant's submissions, filed 21 May 2024, [9].

[14]Letter of Gibbs Wright Litigation Lawyers to Mr M. Cutting, 21 March 2024, [12]-[13].

[15]Ibid, [16].

[16]T 1-6, l 42 – T 1-7, l 1.

[17](1999) 198 CLR 73, [50].

[18]Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 549.

[19]Ibid, s 548.

[20]Ibid, s 550.

[21]Ibid, s 552.

[22]Ibid, s 553.

[23]Ibid, s 554.

[24]Ibid, s 556.

[25]Citing State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Q-COMP and Coyne (2003) 172 QGIG 1447.

[26][2015] ICQ 031, [25].

[27]Ibid, [27].

[28](1991) 172 CLR 84.

[29]For example, T 1-6, l 42 – T 1-7, l 1.

[30]Letter of Gibbs Wright Litigation Lawyers to Mr M. Cutting, 21 March 2024, [6].

[31]CFMEU v Blackwood and Vaccaneo [2015] QIRC 050, [44].

[32]Appellant's submissions, filed 21 May 2024, [20].

[33]T 1-7, ll 31-35.

[34]Respondent's submissions, filed 7 May 2024, [21].

[35]Council of the City of Gold Coast v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 164, [5].

[36]Canton v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 145, [22].

[37]Letter of Gibbs Wright Litigation Lawyers to Mr M. Cutting, 21 March 2024, [6], [13].

[38]CFMEU v Blackwood and Vaccaneo [2015] QIRC 050, [45].

[39]T 1-9, ll 1-10.

[40]Letter of Gibbs Wright Litigation Lawyers to Mr M. Cutting, 21 March 2024, [6].

[41][2000] HCA 40, [27].

[42]CFMEU v Blackwood and Vaccaneo [2015] QIRC 050, [45].

[43]Ibid, [46].

[44]Canton v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 145; Trimble v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) and State of Queensland (for Queensland Audit Office) [2014] QIRC 172.

[45]Deshong v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 205, 4.

[46]Appellant’s submissions, filed 21 May 2024, [27]; Respondent's submissions, filed 7 May 2024, [44]-[48].

[47]Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 549(1).

[48][2014] QIRC 068, [17], [19].

[49][2019] QIRC 027, [61]-[62], as cited in the Respondent's submissions, filed 7 May 2024, [47]. 

[50]Respondent’s submissions, filed 7 May 2024, [48].

[51][2014] QIRC 068, [33], citing State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Q-COMP and Coyne (2003) 172 QGIG 1447, 1448.

[52]See, e.g., State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Q-COMP and Coyne (2003) 172 QGIG 1447, 1448; Mackay Regional Council v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 001, [114]; Lockyer Valley Regional Council v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 085, [2]; Northern Iron and Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood [2016] QIRC 041, [8]; Anglo Coal (Capcoal Management) Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator & Etherington [2017] QIRC 103, [114]; State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) v Workers' Compensation Regulator & Anor [2021] QIRC 366, [3]-[4]; and State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 053, [16].

[53][2015] QIRC 022, [8].

[54][2015] QIRC 050, [51].

[55]Appellant’s submissions, filed 21 May 2024, [6]-[29].

[56]Appellant's submissions, filed 21 May 2024, [26].

[57](2003) 172 QGIG 1447, 1448.

[58]Respondent's submissions, filed 7 May 2024, [45]-[46].

[59]Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84.

[60]See Mackay Regional Council v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 001 at [114]; and Yarrabee Coal Company Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 156 at [50]-[51]. I note that this characterisation of the onus of proof that an employer Appellant bears, has not been without some criticism. In Patlaw Securities Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 063 (‘Patlaw’) at [4], Deputy President Kaufmann noted that they had “grave reservations” about the law requiring that the Appellant “prove a negative” in persuading the Commission that “the injury did not occur”. However, Deputy President Kaufmann regardless adopted the approach of President Hall in Coyne, as the Commission has continued to do since Patlaw in workers’ compensation appeals involving an employer appellant.

[61]Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 32(1), (5).

[62][2015] ICQ 001, [17]; cited in Respondent’s submissions, filed 7 May 2024, [15].

[63][2017] ICQ 001, [10]-[18]; cited in Respondent’s submissions, filed 7 May 2024, [16].

[64]Appellant’s submissions, filed 21 May 2024, [36].

[65]Ibid.

[66][2017] ICQ 004, [11].

[67]Hardy v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 027, [7]; also see Reid v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2016] QIRC 047, [31].

[68]Hardy v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 027, [8].

[69]Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) v Mahaffey [2016] ICQ 010, [35].

[70]Hardy v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 027, [7].

[71]Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) v Adams [2015] ICQ 001, [19].

[72][2017] ICQ 004, [13]-[15].

[73][2023] ICQ 001, [47].

[74]Queensland Industrial Relations Commission’s Workers’ Compensation Appeal Guide, 22.

[75]Workers’ Compensation Regulator v Carr [2023] ICQ 001, [13]. See also Gillan v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 315, [16], where the appellant provided a list of 15 workplace stressors in her SOFC to assist in establishing that her psychological injury arose out of or in the course of her employment,. These stressors included incidents of her employer excluding her from workshops and programs, and denying her various requests that additional staff be hired to assist with an increased workload. This list of stressors is similar to the SOS in, for example, Simonsen v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 060, 4-5.

[76]Appellant’s submissions, filed 21 May 2024, [17].

[77]Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 989(1).

[78]Commission’s Form 9A – Appellant's statement of facts and contentions psychiatric and/or psychological injuries, 1.

[79]Appellant’s submissions, filed 21 May 2024, [16].

[80]Yousif v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 004, [13].

[81][2019] QIRC 116, [11].

[82]Directions Order [4], issued 30 January 2024, Order 2.

[83]Appellant’s submissions, filed 21 May 2024, [23]-[24].

[84]The Commission has a discretion to inter alia dismiss proceedings where a party failed to comply with a directions order, pursuant to r 45 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011.

[85]Merriam-Webster (online at 11 July 2024) ‘concise’.

[86]Appellant’s Statement of Facts and Contentions, filed 15 February 2024, 1-6.

[87]See Kim v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2019] ICQ 014, [31]-[32]; as submitted by the Respondent in their submissions, filed 7 May 2024, [22], [24].

[88]Appellant’s submissions, filed 21 May 2024, [40].

[89]Carlton v Blackwood [2017] ICQ 001, [18].

[90]Appellant’s Statement of Facts and Contentions, filed 15 February 2024, [2].

[91]Carlton v Blackwood [2017] ICQ 001, [43].

[92]Appellant’s Statement of Facts and Contentions, filed 15 February 2024, [1]-[2].

[93]Respondent’s submissions, filed 7 May 2024, [38]-[39].

[94]Merriam-Webster (online at 11 July 2024) ‘clear’ (def 3c).

[95]Appellant’s submissions, filed 21 May 2024, [30].

[96]Ibid, [23].

[97]Ibid, [28].

[98][2015] QIRC 050, [53]; as cited by Vice President O'Connor in Charters Towers Regional Council v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 027, [72]. I note that Vice President O'Connor agreed with this reasoning of Industrial Commissioner Neate at [73].

[99]Yousif v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 004, [15].

[100]Respondent’s submissions, filed 7 May 2024, [32], [49].

[101]Appellant’s submissions, filed 21 May 2024, [25].

[102]Ibid, [37].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Kevesther Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Kevesther Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator

  • MNC:

    [2024] QIRC 195

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Gazenbeek IC

  • Date:

    08 Aug 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] HCA 40
Cite 2 - [2000] HCA 40
Anglo Coal (Capcoal Management) Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 103
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] QIRC 103
Cite 2 - [2017] QIRC 103
Belal Yousif v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 4
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] ICQ 4
Cite 2 - [2017] ICQ 4
Cite 3 - [2017] ICQ 4
Cite 4 - [2017] ICQ 4
Cite 5 - [2017] ICQ 4
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) HCA 34
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1938) HCA 34
Cite 2 - (1938) HCA 34
Canton v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 145
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 145
Cite 2 - [2019] QIRC 145
Cite 3 - [2019] QIRC 145
Carlton v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 1
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] ICQ 1
Cite 2 - [2017] ICQ 1
Cite 3 - [2017] ICQ 1
Cite 4 - [2017] ICQ 1
CFMEU v Blackwood [2015] QIRC 50
6 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QIRC 50
Cite 2 - [2015] QIRC 50
Cite 3 - [2015] QIRC 50
Cite 4 - [2015] QIRC 50
Cite 5 - [2015] QIRC 50
Cite 6 - [2015] QIRC 50
Charters Towers Regional Council v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 27
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 27
Cite 2 - [2019] QIRC 27
Cite 3 - [2019] QIRC 27
Church v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2015] ICQ 31
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] ICQ 31
Cite 2 - [2015] ICQ 31
Council of the City of Gold Coast v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 164
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 164
Cite 2 - [2019] QIRC 164
Davis v the Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 116
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 116
Cite 2 - [2019] QIRC 116
Deshong v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 205
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 205
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 205
Gillan v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 315
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 315
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 315
Hardy v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2015] ICQ 27
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] ICQ 27
Cite 2 - [2015] ICQ 27
Cite 3 - [2015] ICQ 27
Cite 4 - [2015] ICQ 27
Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 C.L.R 84
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1991) 172 C.L.R 84
Cite 2 - (1991) 172 C.L.R 84
Cite 3 - (1991) 172 C.L.R 84
Kim v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] ICQ 14
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] ICQ 14
Cite 2 - [2019] ICQ 14
Lockyer Valley Regional Council v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 85
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QIRC 85
Cite 2 - [2015] QIRC 85
Mackay Regional Council v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 1
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QIRC 1
Cite 2 - [2014] QIRC 1
Cite 3 - [2014] QIRC 1
Northern Iron and Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood [2016] QIRC 41
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QIRC 41
Cite 2 - [2016] QIRC 41
Patlaw Securities Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 63
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QIRC 63
Cite 2 - [2015] QIRC 63
Reid v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2016] QIRC 47
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QIRC 47
Cite 2 - [2016] QIRC 47
Simonsen v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 60
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QIRC 60
Cite 2 - [2015] QIRC 60
State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 53
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 53
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 53
State of Queensland (Office of the Queensland Parliamentary Counsel) v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 68
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QIRC 68
Cite 2 - [2014] QIRC 68
Cite 3 - [2014] QIRC 68
State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 366
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 366
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 366
State of Queensland v Q-COMP and Beverley Coyne (2003) 172 QGIG 1447
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 172 QGIG 1447
Cite 2 - (2003) 172 QGIG 1447
Cite 3 - (2003) 172 QGIG 1447
Cite 4 - (2003) 172 QGIG 1447
Cite 5 - (2003) 172 QGIG 1447
Stratco Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2015] QIRC 22
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QIRC 22
Cite 2 - [2015] QIRC 22
Trimble v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) and State of Queensland (for Queensland Audit Office) [2014] QIRC 172
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QIRC 172
Cite 2 - [2014] QIRC 172
Walsh v Law Society of New South Wales (1999) 198 CLR 73
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1999) 198 CLR 73
Workers' Compensation Regulator v Adams [2015] ICQ 1
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] ICQ 1
Cite 2 - [2015] ICQ 1
Cite 3 - [2015] ICQ 1
Workers' Compensation Regulator v Carr [2023] ICQ 1
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] ICQ 1
Cite 2 - [2023] ICQ 1
Cite 3 - [2023] ICQ 1
Workers' Compensation Regulator v Mahaffey [2016] ICQ 10
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] ICQ 10
Cite 2 - [2016] ICQ 10
Yarrabee Coal Company Pty Ltd v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 156
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QIRC 156
Cite 2 - [2014] QIRC 156

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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