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CITE

Unreported Judgment

State of Queensland (Office of the Governor) v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2024] QIRC 205Dwyer IC
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State of Queensland (Office of the Governor) v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2024] QIRC 205

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	State of Queensland (Office of the Governor) v Workers’ Compensation Regulator & Anor [2024] QIRC 205
PARTIES:	State of Queensland (Office of the Governor) (Appellant) v Workers’ Compensation Regulator (First Respondent) & Giles, Angela (Second Respondent)
CASE NO:	WC/2023/105
PROCEEDING:	Application in existing proceedings
DELIVERED ON:	22 August 2024
MEMBER:	Dwyer IC
HEARD AT:	On the papers
ORDER:	Ms Giles’ application in existing proceedings is dismissed
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – LEGAL REPRESENTATION AT APPEAL OR CONFERENCE – consideration under section 552B of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) – where Appellant previously granted leave to be legally represented in proceeding – where Second Respondent objects to the Appellant being legally represented months after the fact – where the Commission’s discretion to uphold grant for legal representation is unconfined – circumstances of the case contemplated nevertheless – complexity, fairness and efficiency of proceedings – grant of leave for legal representation upheld – application in existing proceedings dismissed
LEGISLATION:	Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 530, s 530A Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 549, s 552B
CASES:	Gambaro v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 005 Mario v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 406 Peck v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 189 R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507 Turay v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2023] ICQ 13 Wanninayake v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines) [2014] QIRC 79

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

[1]
The State of Queensland (Office of the Governor) (‘the Appellant’) filed a Notice of Appeal on 27 July 2023 challenging the review decision of the Workers’ Compensation Regulator (‘the Regulator’) to accept Ms Angela Giles’ application for workers’ compensation for a psychological injury she sustained in the course of her employment. The matter has been allocated to me for the purposes of case management.

[2]
On 29 August 2023, an order was made granting leave for the Appellant to be legally represented in the proceeding. Relevantly, at that time the Regulator had (or was expected to have) legal representation.

[3]
On 9 February 2024, Ms Giles emailed the Registry to advise that the Regulator had informed her that they would no longer be defending their decision. In that same email Ms Giles expressed her intention to join the appeal as a party. A mention of the matter was held on 28 February 2024 at which the Regulator confirmed their position i.e., that they no longer intended to actively defend the appeal. At the same mention, Ms Giles came on to the record in the proceedings as is her right pursuant to section 549(3)(a) of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (‘WCR Act’).

[4]
On 1 May 2024, Ms Giles emailed the Registry with an extensive list of questions about how to conduct proceedings. The assistance being sought was in the form of advice. I have previously had occasion to caution Ms Giles that it is not the role of the Registry or the Commission to provide her with advice on procedural matters relevant to the conduct of proceedings.

[5]
Nevertheless, in the expectation of achieving optimum efficiency of the proceedings, I listed the matter for mention on 16 May 2024. At that mention, in the presence of the Regulator and their counsel, I gave Ms Giles detailed responses to her questions.

[6]
It was at this mention that Ms Giles first raised an objection to the Appellant being legally represented. I directed Ms Giles to make a formal application in existing proceedings if she wished to pursue that course.

[7]
It should be noted here that it is a rare occurrence for leave to be legally represented to be withdrawn. However, in circumstances where Ms Giles was now a party to the proceedings, and where the Regulator was no longer taking an active role, fairness to Ms Giles dictates that the question of legal representation be revisited.

[8]
Ms Giles filed her application objecting to the Appellant being legally represented on 3 June 2024. The application seeks an order that the Appellant be denied leave to be legally represented. An obvious difficulty arises in that leave has already been granted.

[9]
It is plain that the intention of Ms Giles is to have the Commission consider the question of legal representation afresh given the changes with respect to the roles of the parties to the proceedings. In those circumstances, noting the opposition to representation articulated by Ms Giles, I propose to approach the application as a fresh consideration of the Appellant’s request for leave to be represented.

[10]
Ms Giles’ application advances section 530 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (‘IR Act’) as being the determinative provision for the granting of leave to be legally represented. Conversely, the Appellant contends that section 552B of the WCR Act is the proper provision.

[11]
Consequently, the questions for my determination are:

Which provision governs the grant of leave to be legally represented in a workers’ compensation appeal; and

Having regard to that provision, whether the Appellant’s leave to be legally represented in the proceeding should be withdrawn.

The WCR Act

[12]
Section 552B of the WCR Act provides for legal representation in the following terms:

552B
Legal representation at appeal or conference

A party may be represented by a lawyer at a conference called under section 552A or at the hearing of an appeal, but only with–

(a)
The agreement of the parties; or

(b)
The appeal body’s leave.

(Emphasis added)

The IR Act

[13]
Section 530 of the IR Act furnishes:

530
Legal representation

(1A)
This section applies in relation to proceedings other than a proceeding for a public service appeal.

(1)
A party to proceedings, or person ordered or permitted to appear or to be represented in the proceedings, may be represented by a lawyer only if—

(a)
for proceedings in the court—

(i)
all parties consent; or

(ii)
the court gives leave; or

(iii)
the proceedings are for the prosecution of an offence; or

(b)
for proceedings before the full bench—the full bench gives leave; or

(c)
for proceedings before the commission, other than the full bench, under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991—the commission gives leave; or

(d)
for proceedings before the commission, other than the full bench, relating to an industrial matter involving allegations of sexual harassment or sex or gender-based harassment—the commission gives leave; or

(e)
for other proceedings before the commission, other than the full bench—

(i)
all parties consent; or

(ii)
for a proceeding relating to a matter under a relevant provision—the commission gives leave; or

(f)
for proceedings before an Industrial Magistrates Court—

(i)
all parties consent; or

(ii)
both of the following apply—

(A)
the proceedings relate to a matter that could have been brought before a court of competent jurisdiction other than an Industrial Magistrates Court: and

(B)
an Industrial Magistrates Court gives leave; or

(iii)
the proceedings are for the prosecution of an offence; or

(g)
for proceedings before the registrar, including interlocutory proceedings—

(i)
all parties consent; or

(ii)
the registrar gives leave; or

(h)
for proceedings before a conciliator—the conciliator gives leave.

(2)
However, the person or party must not be represented by a lawyer—

(a)
if the if the party is a negotiating party to arbitration proceedings before the commission under chapter 4, part 3, division 2; or

(b)
in proceedings before the commission under section 403 or 475; or

(3)
Despite subsection (1), a party or person may be represented by a lawyer in making a written submission to the commission in relation to—

(a)
the making or variation of a modern award under chapter 3; and

(b)
the making of a general ruling about the Queensland minimum wage under section 458

(4)
An industrial tribunal may give leave under subsection (1) only if—

(a)
it would enable the proceedings to be dealt with more efficiently, having regard to the complexity of the matter; or

(b)
it would be unfair not to allow the party or person to be represented because the party or person is unable to represent the party’s or person’s interests in the proceedings; or

(c)
it would be unfair not to allow the party or person to be represented having regard to fairness between the party or person, and other parties or persons in the proceedings.

Examples of when it may be unfair not to allow a party or person to be represented by a lawyer—

•
a party is a small business and has no specialist human resources staff, while the other party is represented by an officer or employee of an industrial organisation or another person with experience in industrial relations advocacy

•
a person is from a non-English speaking background or has difficulty reading or writing

(5)
For this section, a party or person is taken not to be represented by a lawyer fi the lawyer is—

(a)
an employee or officer of the party or person; or

(b)
an employee or officer of an entity representing the party or person, if the entity is—

(i)
an organisation; or

(ii)
a State peak council; or

(iii)
another entity that only has members who are employers.

(6)
In proceedings before the Industrial Magistrates Court for the prosecution of an offence under subsection(1)(f), the person represented can not be awarded costs of the representation.

(7)
In this section—

Industrial tribunal means the Court of Appeal, court, full bench, commission or Industrial Magistrates Court.

proceedings—

(a)
means proceedings under this Act or another Act being conducted by the court, the commission, an Industrial Magistrates Court or the registrar; and

(b)
includes conciliation being conducted under part 3, division 4 or part 5, division 5A by a conciliator.

relevant provision, for a proceeding before the commission other than the full bench, means—

(a)
chapter 8; or

(b)
section 471; or

(Emphasis added)

Submissions

[14]
The Commission issued directions on 4 June 2024 for the Parties to file written submissions with respect to Ms Giles’ application. Given the Regulator is no longer actively involved, it does not oppose the Appellant being legally represented and did not file any material in response to Ms Giles’ application. The application has been dealt with on the papers.

The Appellant’s submissions

[15]
By way of summary, the Appellant relevantly submits that:

Section 530 of the IR Act does not apply in circumstances where section 552B of the WCR Act provides for legal representation in workers’ compensation appeals to the Commission.

The approach to legal representation expounded in the decision of Peck v Workers’ Compensation Regulator (‘Peck’)^[1] should be followed.

If the approach espoused in Peck is not preferred, then in the alternative, consideration of the factors outlined in section 530(4) of IR Act still justify the Appellant being legally represented.

The appeal involves complex questions of fact and law. To appropriately address such issues in the appeal, the Commission will be required to investigate and assess complex factual and medical evidence. To do so efficiently, the Commission will be assisted by skilful examination and cross-examination of the parties’ witnesses by a legal representative.

Upholding the grant of leave for the Appellant to be legally represented will reduce the duration and cost of the proceedings.

The Appellant does not have the industrial or advocacy experience to adequately represent itself in the proceedings. On that basis, it would be unfair to require officers employed with the Appellant to navigate proceedings without legal representation.

The Appellant does not oppose Ms Giles being legally represented in the proceedings. In any event, Ms Giles continuing to remain unrepresented does not create unfairness between the parties because the Appellant is bound by the Model Litigant Principles. Citing Neate IC:^[2]

The fact that one party, either by choice or circumstances, is not represented by a lawyer is no reason to deny the other party or parties of legal representation, particularly in significant and potentially complex cases. That point is strengthened when, as in this case, the respondent party is meant to act as a model litigant in accordance with the Model Litigant Principles.

(Emphasis added by Appellant)

Ms Giles’ submissions

[16]
In her submissions, Ms Giles acknowledges that section 552B of the WCR Act provides for legal representation, however, she purports that it does not do so arbitrarily. Rather, where agreement of the parties does not arise, legal representation can only be affirmed with the Commission’s leave. If leave of the Commission is required, the WCR Act does not specifically limit the matters to which the Commission may have regard.

[17]
It is submitted that the Commission is at liberty to determine what factors are relevant, and it is fair and reasonable to revert to section 530 of the IR Act as the determinative provision. Ms Giles argues that this approach, consistent with the view of Hartigan IC (as Her Honour then was) in Mario v Workers' Compensation Regulator (‘Mario’),^[3] should be adopted.

[18]
Having regard to the criteria in section 530(4) of the IR Act, Ms Giles contends the Appellant’s leave to be legally represented in the proceeding should be repudiated because:

The question of whether she suffered a personal injury is not complex. The Appellant is not calling any expert witnesses to oppose her diagnosis of Burn-out provided by a medical expert, and there is no evidence to contradict that she suffered a personal injury.

The question of whether her personal injury arose out of, or in the course of, her employment is not complex because the diagnosis of Burn-out is categorised as resulting from chronic workplace stress that has not been successfully managed.

The question of whether her personal injury arose out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way is not complex.

The Appellant’s contention that being legally represented will reduce the costs of the proceedings is irrelevant.

The Appellant is more than capable of representing itself because it employs highly educated staff who are familiar with the appeal. The fact that the Appellant’s staff have no legal training is irrelevant.

The Appellant being legally represented causes an unfair and unlevel playing field between the parties.

[19]
Ms Giles references multiple Fair Work Commission (‘FWC’) decisions in support of her assertions.^[4] As an aside, it is prudent to note that decisions of the FWC are (at best) persuasive to the extent that certain factual considerations might align. They arise in a discrete statutory context and are not binding on any determination I make under the jurisdiction of this Commission.

Consideration

Which Act applies?

[20]
With respect to the question of whether the representation provisions of the WCR Act or the IR Act apply, I note the reasoning of Deputy President Merrell in Peck where he relevantly observed:

[10]
However, my preliminary view is that s 530 of the IR Act does not apply to appeals to the Commission made pursuant to ch 3, pt 3, div 1 of the Act.

[11]
Generally speaking, in respect of the construction of overlapping statutes, the operation of the statutes remains a matter to be gleaned by reference to the legislative intention which is to be extracted from all available indications.

(Emphasis added and citations omitted)

[21]
Deputy President Merrell did not definitively determine whether section 552B of the WCR Act prevailed over section 530 of the IR Act, but expressed a view for various reasons that it did. I agree with his conclusion and I would further observe that to whatever extent there is inconsistency between section 530 of the IR Act and section 552B of the WCR Act, the WCR Act prevails to the extent of any inconsistency between the two.^[5]

[22]
The language of s 552B of the WCR Act has a plain and clear meaning. It contemplates legal representation in workers’ compensation appeals, either by consent or with leave of the appeal body i.e., the Commission. The basis for granting that leave is unconfined.

[23]
The proceedings in this matter are brought under the WCR Act and relate to the question of whether Ms Giles has sustained an injury for the purposes of s 32 of the WCR Act. Chapter 13 of the WCR Act (within which s 552B is contained) prescribes various matters relevant to the conduct of appeals before the Commission.

[24]
There could be little clearer (albeit implied) intention that the legislature intended s 552B of the WCR Act to be the prevailing provision addressing the question of legal representation in appeals.^[6]

[25]
By contrast, s 530(1) of the IR Act presents an array of regulation and restriction for legal representation that is uniquely different depending on the type of proceedings and the forum in which they are being conducted. When one works through the list set out in s 530(1) of the IR Act, the only provision capable of applying to proceedings in the form of a workers’ compensation appeal made pursuant to Chapter 13 of the WCR is s 530(1)(e).

[26]
The only relevant provision for legal representation in that sub-section is where all parties consent. Section 530(1)(e)(i) of the IR Act is silent on whether leave can be granted in the absence of consent. The fact that s 530(1)(e)(i) of the IR Act is silent on the question of granting leave for representation in the absence of consent does not give rise to a conclusion that leave may not be granted, but it plainly places s 530 of the IR Act into conflict with s 552B of the WCR Act. It is here where the prevailing effect of s 552B of the WCR Act operates to resolve the inconsistency.

[27]
In all of the circumstances, I consider that s 552B of the WCR is the prevailing provision to be applied to the discretion to grant or refuse the right to legal representation in a workers’ compensation appeal.

[28]
For completeness, to the extent there is precedent for the Commission having applied s 530 of the IR Act to determine a question of legal representation in an appeal pursuant to the WCR Act, the basis for that decision is not wrong.^[7] The duplication of the discretion created by the overlapping statutory provisions in no way diminishes the powers of the Commission to make an order under either provision.

[29]
The absence of an express power to grant leave in the absence of consent in s 530(1)(e)(i) of the IR Act is not synonymous with a prohibition on granting leave. Moreover, the absence of an express power is not inconsistent with a construction of the section that implies the power.

[30]
In a recent observation on statutory construction the High Court discerned:^[8]

The method to be applied in construing a statute to ascertain the intended meaning of the words used is well settled. It commences with a consideration of the words of the provision itself, but it does not end there. A literal approach to construction, which requires the courts to obey the ordinary meaning or usage of the words of a provision, even if the result is improbable, has long been eschewed by this Court. It is now accepted that even words having an apparently clear ordinary or grammatical meaning may be ascribed a different legal meaning after the process of construction is complete. This is because consideration of the context for the provision may point to factors that tend against the ordinary usage of the words of the provision.

Consideration of the context for the provision is undertaken at the first stage of the process of construction. Context is to be understood in its widest sense. It includes surrounding statutory provisions, what may be drawn from other aspects of the statute and the statute as a whole. It extends to the mischief which it may be seen that the statute is intended to remedy. "Mischief" is an old expression. It may be understood to refer to a state of affairs which to date the law has not addressed. It is in that sense a defect in the law which is now sought to be remedied. The mischief may point most clearly to what it is that the statute seeks to achieve.

(Emphasis added)

[31]
There are very few circumstances where the IR Act excludes legal representation, and where it does, it does so expressly.^[9] The relevant context in the surrounding provisions of s 530(1)(e)(i) of the IR Act plainly contemplates legal representation either by consent or by grant of leave. Had the legislature intended to deprive the Commission of the discretion to grant leave pursuant to s 530(1)(e) of the IR Act it would have been a simple matter to state that expressly.

[32]
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the utilisation of the prevailing provision at s 552B of the WCR removes any doubt as to the Commission’s power to exercise a discretion to grant leave for a party to be legally represented.

[33]
It only remains to be observed that the duplication of the discretion regarding representation created by the coexistence of s 530 of the IR Act and s 552B of the WCR Act is not optimum, but remedying the problem is a matter for the legislature.

Should legal representation be allowed?

[34]
The discretion conferred by s 552B of the WCR Act is unconfined. In Peck, Deputy President Merrell addressed the manner in which such a discretion ought to be exercised:^[10]

The Commission, in respect of Mr Peck's appeal, meets the description of 'appeal body' referred to in s 552B(b) of the Act. There are no circumstances prescribed in s 552B of the Act which must exist in order for the Commission to exercise discretion to grant leave for a party to an appeal under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the Act to be represented by a lawyer. While the discretion is unconfined, clearly, it must be exercised judicially, that is to say, not arbitrarily or capriciously.

Because the discretion is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute, some implied limitation on the factors to which the Commission may legitimately have regard. If there is nothing in the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute that suggests some implied limitation on the matters to which the decision maker may legitimately have regard, it is largely for the decision maker, in light of the matters placed before it by the parties, to determine which matters are relevant and the comparative importance to be afforded to those matters.

(Emphasis added)

[35]
The grounds relied on by Ms Giles to support her objection to legal representation largely comprises, inter alia, a series of contentions that the matter is not complex or alternatively, that legal representation creates unfairness. These contentions largely reflect the considerations for the exercise of the direction set out in s 530(4)(a) and (c) of the IR Act.

[36]
While I do not consider that s 530(4) of the IR Act has any direct influence on my discretion, I do consider that matters of complexity and fairness are, more generally, relevant. In those circumstances it warrants noting that, to the extent I am wrong in my earlier conclusion about s 552B of the WCR Act prevailing, my consideration of complexity and fairness more generally overcomes the effect of any such error.

[37]
Ms Giles states that questions about her personal injury, its relationship to her employment and reasonable management action are not complex. With due respect to Ms Giles, the stark naivety of this submission reveals a critical lack of understanding as to the nature of the proceedings.

[38]
Appeals of this nature are conducted by way of hearing de novo. It is for the Appellant to prove that Ms Giles’ claim is not one for acceptance. Unless conceded, every applicable element of s 32 of the WCR Act must be established in evidence that is presented afresh.

[39]
To suggest that the elements of ‘arising out of or in the course of employment’, ‘significant contributing factor’ or ‘reasonable management action’ are not complex matters misunderstands the complexity of the task involved in establishing these elements through witness testimony and documentary evidence.

[40]
Additionally, the task of properly preparing submissions addressing that evidence and the relevant law is equally complex and requires no small degree of skill. Further, claims for (or against) psychological injuries are, by nature, invariably more complex.

[41]
I am entirely unable to accept Ms Giles’ submissions that any aspect of this appeal is not complex.

[42]
On the question of fairness, I do not consider that Ms Giles’ election to be unrepresented, whether it be voluntarily or due to impecuniosity, gives rise to any unfairness of the Appellant’s making. No doubt Ms Giles will not have the advantages that come with representation in legal proceedings. But, as Martin J held in Gambaro v Workers’ Compensation Regulator, a lack of legal representation is a misfortune, not a privilege.^[11]

[43]
Further, any perception of unfairness experienced by Ms Giles ought to be assuaged by the knowledge that the Appellant is bound by the Model Litigant Principles.^[12] Additionally, it is not the practice of the Commission to allow unrepresented parties to be treated unfairly.

[44]
It would be highly unjust to deprive the Appellant the opportunity to be legally represented simply because Ms Giles, their opponent in these adversarial proceedings, cannot (or will not) herself obtain representation.

[45]
Further, while Ms Giles might profess a sense of unfairness at conducting proceedings against a legally represented opponent, it is worth noting that she has (presumably) been solely responsible for filing this application in existing proceedings and preparing complex legal submissions in support of her application. If her apparent capabilities to represent herself were at all relevant, I would confidently conclude that whatever imbalance she might face, it will be well mitigated by the skill she has demonstrated in the conduct of this application.

[46]
Finally, I also consider that the continued legal representation of the Appellant will aid in the efficient conduct of the matter. It is invariably the case that where both parties are unrepresented, there will be a much greater degree of oversights and errors at all levels of the conduct of proceedings. These often require interventions by the Commission which inevitably lead to adjournments or other interruptions, which in turn extend hearing time.

[47]
The resources of the Commission are not so plentiful that it can afford to indulge the misconceived whims of unrepresented parties as they meander through proceedings. The presence of at least one legally represented party will, in all likelihood, assist all parties in maintaining a focus on only matters of relevance which will in turn, produce a greater efficiency to the conduct of the proceedings. This will be to the benefit of all involved.

Order

[48]
Accordingly, it is the order of the Commission that:

Ms Giles’ application in existing proceedings is dismissed.

Footnotes

[1] [2022] QIRC 189.

[2] Wanninayake v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines) [2014] QIRC 79, 7.

[3] [2021] QIRC 406.

[4] Second Respondent’s submission in reply filed 2 July 2024, [17], [20].

[5] Turay v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2023] ICQ 13, [75].

[6] Peck v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 189, [11].

[7] Mario v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 406.

[8] R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507, [32]-[33].

[9] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 530(2), 530A.

[10] Peck v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 189, [13]-[14].

[11] [2017] ICQ 005, [14].

[12] Wanninayake v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines) [2014] QIRC 079.

Editorial Notes

Published Case Name:
State of Queensland (Office of the Governor) v Workers' Compensation Regulator & Anor
Shortened Case Name:
State of Queensland (Office of the Governor) v Workers' Compensation Regulator
MNC:
[2024] QIRC 205
Court:
QIRC
Judge(s):
Dwyer IC
Date:
22 Aug 2024

Appeal Status

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Cases Cited List of Cases Cited by this judgment

Case Name	Full Citation	Frequency
Gambaro v Workers' Compensation Regulator	[2017] ICQ 5	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2017] ICQ 5 Cite 2 - [2017] ICQ 5
Mario v Workers' Compensation Regulator	[2021] QIRC 406	3 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 406 Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 406 Cite 3 - [2021] QIRC 406
Peck v Workers' Compensation Regulator	[2022] QIRC 189	4 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 189 Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 189 Cite 3 - [2022] QIRC 189 Cite 4 - [2022] QIRC 189
R v A2	View on:JADE(2019) 269 CLR 507	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2019) 269 CLR 507 Cite 2 - (2019) 269 CLR 507
Turay v Workers' Compensation Regulator	[2023] ICQ 13	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2023] ICQ 13 Cite 2 - [2023] ICQ 13
Wanninayake v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines)	[2014] QIRC 79	3 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2014] QIRC 79 Cite 2 - [2014] QIRC 79 Cite 3 - [2014] QIRC 79

Cases Citing List of cases on Queensland Judgments citing this Judgment

Case Name	Full Citation	Frequency
National College of Australia v Workers' Compensation Regulator	[2025] QIRC 95	2 citations

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State of Queensland (Office of the Governor) v Workers' Compensation Regulator[2024] QIRC 205